THE
vedAnta-sOtras
WITH THE COMMENTARY BY
sankaraa'Arya
TRANSLATED BY
GEORGE THIBAUT
PART I
#jTorti
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
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[ All rights reserved ]
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CONTENTS.
Introduction
PAGE
ix
VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY
BY SANKARAAlRYA.
Adhyaya I.
Pada I.
Pada II.
Pada III.
Pada IV.
AdhyIya II.
Pada I.
Pada II.
3
107
154
237
290
363
Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Trans¬
lations of the Sacred Books of the East . . . . 445
INTRODUCTION.
To the sacred literature of the Brahmans, in the strict
sense of the term, i. e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain
number of complementary works without whose assistance
the student is, according to Hindu notions, unable to do
more than commit the sacred texts to memory. In
the first place all Vedic texts must, in order to be under¬
stood, be read together with running commentaries such as
Saya;za 5 s commentaries on the Sa^hitas and Brahma^as,
and the Bhashyas ascribed to .Sankara on the chief Upani-
shads. But these commentaries do not by themselves
conduce to a full comprehension of the contents of the
sacred texts, since they confine themselves to explaining
the meaning of each detached passage without investigating
its relation to other passages, and the whole of which they
form part; considerations of the latter kind are at any rate
introduced occasionally only. The task of taking a com¬
prehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings as a
whole, of systematising what they present in an unsyste-
matical form, of showing the mutual co-ordination or sub¬
ordination of single passages and sections, and of reconciling
contradictions—which, according to the view of the orthodox
commentators, can be apparent only—is allotted to a sepa¬
rate jastra or body of doctrine which is termed Mima^sa,
i. e. the investigation or enquiry kclt iioxyv, viz. the enquiry
into the connected meaning of the sacred texts.
Of this Mima^sa two branches have to be distinguished,
the so-called earlier (purva) Mim 4 ^s 4 , and the later (uttara)
Mima^sa. The former undertakes to systematise the
karmakcb^a, i. e. that entire portion of the Veda which is
concerned with action, pre-eminently sacrificial action, and
which comprises the Sawhitas and the Brahma^as exclusive
of the Ara^yaka portions; the latter performs the same
X
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
service with regard to the so-called gn&nakanda., i. e. that
part of the Vedic writings which includes the Arazzyaka
portions of the Brahmazzas, and a number of detached
treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not action but
knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.
At what period these two ^astras first assumed a definite
form, we are unable to ascertain. Discussions of the nature
of those which constitute the subject-matter of the Purva
Mimazzzsa must have arisen at a very early period, and the
word Mimazzzsa itself together with its derivatives is
already employed in the Brahmazzas to denote the doubts
and discussions connected with certain contested points of
ritual. The want of a body of definite rules prescribing how
to act, i. e. how to perform the various sacrifices in full
accordance with the teaching of the Veda, was indeed an
urgent one, because it was an altogether practical want,
continually pressing itself on the adhvaryus engaged in
ritualistic duties. And the task of establishing such rules
was moreover a comparatively limited and feasible one; for
the members of a certain Vedic .rakha or school had to do
no more than to digest thoroughly their own brahmazza and
sazzzhita, without being under any obligation of reconciling
with the teaching of their own books the occasionally con¬
flicting rules implied in the texts of other Vakhas. It was
assumed that action, as being something which depends on
the will and choice of man, admits of alternatives, so that
a certain sacrifice may be performed in different ways by
members of different Vedic schools, or even by the followers
of one and the same sakhL
The Uttara Mimazzzsa-^astra may be supposed to have
originated considerably later than the Purva Mimazzzsa. In
the first place, the texts with which it is concerned doubtless
constitute the latest branch of Vedic literature. And in the
second place, the subject-matter of those texts did not call
for a systematical treatment with equal urgency, as it was
in no way connected with practice; the mental attitude of
the authors of the Upanishads, who in their lucubrations on
Brahman and the soul aim at nothing less than at definite¬
ness and coherence, may have perpetuated itself through
INTRODUCTION.
XI
many generations without any great inconvenience resulting
therefrom.
But in the long run two causes must have acted with
ever-increasing force, to give an impulse to the systematic
working up of the teaching of the Upanishads also. The
followers of the different Vedic Vakhas no doubt recog¬
nised already at an early period the truth that, while
conflicting statements regarding the details of a sacrifice
can be got over by the assumption of a vikalpa, i. e. an
optional proceeding, it is not so with regard to such
topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation to it of the
human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and the like.
Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, and
it therefore becomes absolutely incumbent on those, who
look on the whole body of the Upanishads as revealed
truth, to demonstrate that their teaching forms a con¬
sistent whole free from all contradictions. In addition
there supervened the external motive that, while the karma-
k&nda, of the Veda concerned only the higher castes of
brahmanically constituted society, on which it enjoins
certain sacrificial performances connected with certain re¬
wards, the ^Tzanaka/^a, as propounding a certain theory of
the world, towards which any reflecting person inside or
outside the pale of the orthodox community could not but
take up a definite position, must soon have become the
object of criticism on the part of those who held different
views on religious and philosophic things, and hence stood
in need of systematic defence.
At present there exists a vast literature connected with the
two branches of the Mima^sa. We have, on the one hand, all
those works which constitute the Purva Mima/^sa-.s*astra—or
as it is often, shortly but not accurately, termed, the Mima/^sa-
i-astra—and, on the other hand, all those works which are
commonly comprised under the name Vedanta-^astra. At
the head of this extensive literature there stand two collec¬
tions of Sutras (i. e. short aphorisms constituting in their
totality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject),
whose reputed authors are Uaimini and B&daraya^a. There
can, however, be no doubt that the composition of those two
Xll
VEDANTA-SfjTRAS.
collections of Sutras was preceded by a long series of pre¬
paratory literary efforts of which they merely represent the
highly condensed outcome. This is rendered probable by
the analogy of other .rastras, as well as by the exhaustive
thoroughness with which the Sutras perform their task of
systematising the teaching of the Veda, and is further
proved by the frequent references which the Sutras make to
the views of earlier teachers. If we consider merely the
preserved monuments of Indian literature, the Stitras (of the
two Mimosas as well as of other Astras) mark the begin¬
ning ; if we, however, take into account what once existed,
although it is at present irretrievably lost, we observe that
they occupy a strictly central position, summarising, on the
one hand, a series of early literary essays extending over
many generations, and forming, on the other hand, the head
spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as
well as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to
our days, and may yet have some future before itself.
The general scope of the two Mima^si-sutras and their
relation to the Veda have been indicated in what precedes.
A difference of some importance between the two has, how¬
ever, to be noted in this connexion. The systematisation of
the karmaka^a of the Veda led to the elaboration of two
classes of works, viz. the Kalpa-sutras on the one hand, and
the Purva Mim&^sa-sutras on the other hand. The former
give nothing but a description as concise as possible of the
sacrifices enjoined in the Brahma^as; while the latter
discuss and establish the general principles which the
author of a Kalpa-sfitra has to follow, if he wishes to render
his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of the Veda.
The ^anakd^a of the Veda, on the other hand, is system¬
atised in a single work, viz. the Uttara Mima^sa or Ved&nta-
sutras, which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the
teaching of the Veda, and of argumentatively establishing
the special interpretation of the Veda adopted in the S&tras.
This difference may be accounted for by two reasons. In
the first place, the contents of the karmaki^rfa, as being of
an entirely practical nature, called for summaries such as
the Kalpa-sutras, from which all burdensome discussions of
INTRODUCTION.
Xlll
method are excluded ; while there was no similar reason for
the separation of the two topics in the case of the purely
theoretical science of Brahman. And, in the second place,
the Vedanta-sutras throughout presuppose the Purva
Mima^sa-shtras, and may therefore dispense with the
discussion of general principles and methods already esta¬
blished in the latter.
The time at which the two Mima^sa-sutras were com¬
posed we are at present unable to fix with any certainty;
a few remarks on the subject will, however, be made later
on. Their outward form is that common to all the so-
called Sutras which aims at condensing a given body of
doctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, and
often even mere detached words in lieu of sentences.
Besides the Mima^sa-sutras this literary form is common
to the fundamental works on the other philosophic systems,
on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on sacred
law, on grammar, and on metres. The two Mtma^sa-
sfttras occupy, however, an altogether exceptional position
in point of style. All Sutras aim at conciseness; that is
clearly the reason to which this whole species of literary
composition owes its existence. This their aim they reach
by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be
spared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repeti¬
tions, and, as in the case of the grammatical Sutras, by the
employment of an arbitrarily coined terminology which
substitutes single syllables for entire words or combination
of words. At the same time the manifest intention of the
Sutra writers is to express themselves with as much clear¬
ness as the conciseness affected by them admits of. The
aphorisms are indeed often concise to excess, but not
otherwise intrinsically obscure, the manifest care of the
writers being to retain what is essential in a given phrase,
and to sacrifice only what can be supplied, although perhaps
not without difficulty, and an irksome strain of memory and
reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without
a commentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the
ordinary Sutras. Altogether different is the case of the
two Mima/^sa-sutras. There scarcely one single Sutra is
XIV
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
intelligible without a commentary. The most essential
words are habitually dispensed with ; nothing is, for instance,
more common than the simple omission of the subject or
predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sutra
occurs whose words construe without anything having to be
supplied, the phraseology is so eminently vague and obscure
that without the help derived from a commentary we should
be unable to make out to what subject the Sutra refers.
When undertaking to translate either of the Mima^sa-
sutras we therefore depend altogether on commentaries ;
and hence the question arises which of the numerous com¬
mentaries extant is to be accepted as a guide to their right
understanding.
The commentary here selected for translation, together
with Badaraya;za's Sutras 1 (to which we shall henceforth
confine our attention to the exclusion of Gaimini’s Purva
Mima;^sa-sfitras), is the one composed by the celebrated
theologian .Sankara or, as he is commonly called, Sankar&-
£arya. There are obvious reasons for this selection. In
the first place, the Sankara-bhashya represents the so-
called orthodox side of Brahmanical theology which strictly
upholds the Brahman or highest Self of the Upanishads as
something different from, and in fact immensely superior to,
the divine beings such as Vishnu or Siva, which, for many
centuries, have been the chief objects of popular worship in
India. In the second place, the doctrine advocated by
Sankara is, from a purely philosophical point of view and
apart from all theological considerations, the most im¬
portant and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil;
neither those forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the
view represented by Sankara nor any of the non-Vedantic
systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox
Vedanta in boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation.
In the third place, Sankara’s bhashya is, as far as we know,
the oldest of the extant commentaries, and relative antiquity
is at any rate one of the circumstances which have to be
1 The Sutras in which the gnknak&nda. of the Veda is systematised go by
various names, being called either Vedanta-sutras, or Uttara Mimawsa-sutras,
or Brahma-sutras, or .Sariraka Mimawsa-sutras.
INTRODUCTION.
XV
taken into account, although, it must be admitted, too much
weight may easily be attached to it. The Sankara-bhashya
further is the authority most generally deferred to in India
as to the right understanding of the Vedanta-sutras, and
ever since Sankara’s time the majority of the best thinkers
of India have been men belonging to his school. If in
addition to all this we take into consideration the intrinsic
merits of Sankara’s work which, as a piece of philo¬
sophical argumentation and theological apologetics, un¬
doubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given
to it will be easily understood.
But to the European—or, generally, modern—translator
of the Vedanta-sutras with Sankara’s commentary another
question will of course suggest itself at once, viz. whether
or not Sankaras explanations faithfully render the intended
meaning of the author of the Sutras. To the Indian PaWit
of Sankara’s school this question has become an indifferent
one, or, to state the case more accurately, he objects to
its being raised, as he looks on Sankara’s authority as
standing above doubt and dispute. When pressed to
make good his position he will, moreover, most probably
not enter into any detailed comparison of Sankara’s com¬
ments with the text of Badar^ya^a’s Sutras, but will rather
endeavour to show on speculative grounds that Sankara’s
philosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course
follows that it accurately represents the meaning of Bada-
raya/za, who himself must necessarily be assumed to have
taught the true doctrine. But on the modern investigator,
who neither can consider himself bound by the authority of
a name however great, nor is likely to look to any Indian
system of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative
wants, it is clearly incumbent not to acquiesce from the out¬
set in the interpretations given of the Vedanta-sutras—and
the Upanishads—by Sankara and his school, but to submit
them, as far as that can be done, to a critical investigation.
This is a task which would have to be undertaken even if
Sankara’s views as to the true meaning of the Sutras and
Upanishads had never been called into doubt on Indian
soil, although in that case it could perhaps hardly be entered
XVI
vedanta-s£jtras.
upon with much hope of success ; but it becomes much more
urgent, and at the same time more feasible, when we meet
in India itself with systems claiming to be Vedantic and
based on interpretations of the Sfitras and Upanishads
more or less differing from those of .Sankara. The claims
of those systems to be in the possession of the right under¬
standing of the fundamental authorities of the Vedanta
must at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be
compelled to reject them.
It appears that already at a very early period the
Vedanta-sutras had come to be looked upon as an authori¬
tative work, not to be neglected by any who wished to
affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present, at
any rate, there are very few Hindu sects not interested in
showing that their distinctive tenets are countenanced by
Badaraya^a’s teaching. Owing to this the commentaries
on the Sutras have in the course of time become very
numerous, and it is at present impossible to give a full and
accurate enumeration even of those actually existing, much
less of those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward
Hall, in his Bibliographical Index, mentions fourteen com¬
mentaries, copies of which had been inspected by himself.
Some among these (as, for instance, Ramanuja’s Vedanta-
sara, No. XXXV) are indeed not commentaries in the strict
sense of the word, but rather systematic expositions of the
doctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sutras; but, on
the other hand, there are in existence several true commen¬
taries which had not been accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall.
It would hardly be practical—and certainly not feasible in
this place—to submit all the existing bh­as to a critical
enquiry at once. All we can do here is to single out one or
a few of the more important ones, and to compare their
interpretations with those given by 5ankara, and with the
text of the Sutras themselves.
The bhashya, which in this connexion is the first to press
itself upon our attention, is the one composed by the famous
Vaish^ava theologian and philosopher Ramanuja, who is
supposed to have lived in the twelfth century. The Rama¬
nuja or, as it is often called, the .Sri-bh­a appears to be
INTRODUCTION.
XVII
the oldest commentary extant next to .Sankara’s. It is
further to be noted that the sect of the R&manuj*as occupies
a pre-eminent position among the Vaish^ava sects which
themselves, in their totality, may claim to be considered the
most important among all Hindu sects. The intrinsic value
of the Sri-bhashya moreover is — as every student ac¬
quainted with it will be ready to acknowledge—a very high
one; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance
due to a writer of extensive learning and great power of argu¬
mentation, and in its polemic parts, directed chiefly against
the school of .Sankara, it not unfrequently deserves to be
called brilliant even. And in addition to all this it shows
evident traces of being not the mere outcome of Ramanuja’s
individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty
tradition.
This latter point is clearly of the greatest importance.
If it could be demonstrated or even rendered probable only
that the oldest bhashya which we possess, i. e. the San-
kara-bhashya, represents an uninterrupted and uniform
tradition bridging over the interval between Badaraya^a,
the reputed author of the Sutras, and Sankara; and if, on
the other hand, it could be shown that the more modern
bhashyas are not supported by old tradition, but are
nothing more than bold attempts of clever sectarians to
force an old work of generally recognised authority into
the service of their individual tenets ; there would certainly
be no reason for us to raise the question whether the later
bhashyas can help us in making out the true meaning of
the Sutras. All we should have to do in that case would be
to accept Sankara's interpretations as they stand, or at the
utmost to attempt to make out, if at all possible, by a
careful comparison of Sankara’s bhashya with the text of
the Sutras, whether the former in all cases faithfully repre¬
sents the purport of the latter.
In the most recent book of note which at all enters into the
question as to how far we have to accept Sankara as a guide
to the right understanding of the Sutras (Mr. A. Gough’s
Philosophy of the Upanishads) the view is maintained (pp.
339 ff.) that Sankara is the generally recognised expositor
[34] b
XV111
VEDANTA-St)TRAS.
of true Vedanta doctrine, that that doctrine was handed
down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening between
him and the Sutrakara, and that there existed from the
beginning only one Vedctnta doctrine, agreeing in all essen¬
tial points with the doctrine known to us from .Sankara’s
writings. Mr. Gough undertakes to prove this view, firstly,
by a comparison of Sankara’s system with the teaching of
the Upanishads themselves; and, secondly, by a comparison
of the purport of the Sutras—as far as that can be made
out independently of the commentaries—with the interpre¬
tations given of them by .Sankara. To both these points
we shall revert later on. Meanwhile, I only wish to remark
concerning the former point that, even if we could show
with certainty that all the Upanishads propound one and
the same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of
our being confronted by a considerable number of essen¬
tially differing theories, all of which claim to be founded on
the Upanishads. And with regard to the latter point I
have to say for the present that, as long as we have
only .Sankara’s bh­a before us, we are naturally
inclined to find in the Sutras — which, taken by them¬
selves, are for the greater part unintelligible—the meaning
which .Sankara ascribes to them; while a reference to
other bhashyas may not impossibly change our views at
once.— Meanwhile, we will consider the question as to the
unbroken uniformity of Vedantic tradition from another
point of view, viz. by enquiring whether or not the
Sutras themselves, and the .Sankara-bhashya, furnish any
indications of there having existed already at an early time
essentially different Vedantic systems or lines of Vedantic
speculation.
Beginning with the Sutras, we find that they supply ample
evidence to the effect that already at a very early time,
viz. the period antecedent to the final composition of the
Vedanta-sutras in their present shape, there had arisen
among the chief doctors of the Vedanta differences of
opinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine,
but affecting the most essential parts of the system. In
addition to Badaraya/za himself, the reputed author of the
INTRODUCTION.
XIX
Sutras, the latter quote opinions ascribed to the following
teachers: Atreya, A^marathya, Aru/ulomi, Karsh/za^ini,
Karakrztsna, £aimini, B&dari. Among the passages where
diverging views of those teachers are recorded and con¬
trasted three are of particular importance. Firstly, a
passage in the fourth pada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 5-7),
where the opinions of various teachers concerning the
characteristics of the released soul are given, and where the
important discrepancy is noted that, according to Au^ulomi,
its only characteristic is thought (^aitanya), while £aimini
maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities, and
Bcidarciya/za declares himself in favour of a combination of
those two views.—The second passage occurs in the third
p&da of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 7 ” r 4 ^ where Gaimini
maintains that the soul of him who possesses the lower know¬
ledge of Brahman goes after death to the highest Brahman,
while Badari—whose opinion is endorsed by Sankara—
teaches that it repairs to the lower Brahman only.—Finally,
the third and most important passage is met with in the
fourth p&da of the first adhyaya (Sutras 20-22), where the
question is discussed why in a certain passage of the
Brfhadara^yaka Brahman is referred to in terms which are
strictly applicable to the individual soul only. In con¬
nexion therewith the Stitras quote the views of three ancient
teachers about the relation in which the individual soul
stands to Brahman. According to A^marathya (if we
accept the interpretation of his view given by Sankara and
Sankara’s commentators) the soul stands to Brahman in
the bhedabheda relation, i.e. it is neither absolutely different
nor absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire.
Au^ulomi, on the other hand, teaches that the soul is alto¬
gether different from Brahman up to the time when ob¬
taining final release it is merged in it; and Klrakrztsna
finally upholds the doctrine that the soul is absolutely non-
different from Brahman, which in some way or other
presents itself as the individual soul.
That the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose
speculations and discussions is embodied in the Vedanta-
sutras, disagreed among themselves on points of vital
b 2
XX
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
importance is sufficiently proved by the three passages
quoted. The one quoted last is specially significant as
showing that recognised authorities—deemed worthy of
being quoted in the Sutras—denied that doctrine on which
the whole system of .Sankara hinges, viz. the doctrine of
the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman.
Turning next to the Sankara-bh­a itself, we there
also meet with indications that the Ved&ntins were divided
among themselves on important points of dogma. These
indications are indeed not numerous : Sankara does not on
the whole impress one as an author particularly anxious to
strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a
peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies
have not failed to remark and criticise. But yet more than
once Sankara also refers to the opinion of £ another/viz.,
commentator of the Sutras, and in several places Sankara’s
commentators explain that the £ other ’ meant is the VWtti-
k&ra (about whom more will be said shortly). Those
references as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and
hence throw little or no light on important differences of
dogma; but there are two remarks of Sankara’s at any
rate which are of interest in this connexion. The one is
made with reference to Sfitras 7-14 of the third pada
of the fourth adhyaya ; £ some/ he says there, £ declare those
Sutras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhanta
view, to state merely the purvapaksha; ’ a difference of
opinion which, as we have seen above, affects the important
question as to the ultimate fate of those who have not
reached the knowledge of the highest Brahman.—And
under I, 3, 19 Sankara, after having explained at length
that the individual soul as such cannot claim any reality,
but is real only in so far as it is identical with Brahman,
adds the following words, £ apare tu vadina^ paramarthikam
eva gawam rupam iti manyante asmadiya^ ka ke£it/ i.e.
£ other theorisers again, and among them some of ours, are of
opinion that the individual soul as such is real.’ The term
£ ours/ here made use of, can denote only the Aupanishadas
or Vedantins, and it thus appears that Sankara himself
INTRODUCTION.
XXI
was willing to class under the same category himself and
philosophers who—as in later times the Ramanujas and
others—looked upon the individual soul as not due to the
fictitious limitations of M&y&, but as real in itself; whatever
may be the relation in which they considered it to stand
to the highest Self.
From what precedes it follows that the Vedantins of the
school to which Sankara himself belonged acknowledged
the existence of Vedantic teaching of a type essentially
different from their own. We must now proceed to enquire
whether the RcLmanug*a system, which likewise claims to be
Vedcinta, and to be founded on the Vedanta-sutras, has any
title to be considered an ancient system and the heir of a
respectable tradition.
It appears that R^manu^a claims—and by Hindu writers
is generally admitted—to follow in his bhashya the autho¬
rity of Bodhayana, who had composed a vrztti on the
Sutras. Thus we read in the beginning of the Sri-bhashya
(Pandit, New Series, VII, p. 163), ‘ Bhagavad-bodhayana-
kritam vistir/zam brahmasfitra-vrftti;^ purv&kavyaA samki-
kshipus tanmatanus&rezza sutrakshara/zi vyakhyasyante/
Whether the Bodhayana to whom that vritti is ascribed is to
be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sfitra, and other
works, cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient vritti
on the Sutras connected with BodMyana’s name actually
existed, there is not any reason to doubt. Short quotations
from it are met with in a few places of the Sri-bMshya, and,
as we have seen above, Sankara’s commentators state that
their author’s polemical remarks are directed against the
Vnttikara. In addition to Bodhayana, Ramanuja appeals to
quite a series of ancient teachers—purva^ 4 ry 4 s—who carried
on the true tradition as to the teaching of the Vedanta and
the meaning of the Sutras. In the Ved&rthasangraha
—a work composed by R 4 manu^*a himself—we meet in one
place with the enumeration of the following authorities:
Bodhayana, Tanka, DramLTa, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharu^i,
and quotations from the writings of some of these are not
unfrequent in the Vedarthasangraha, as well as the Sri-
xxii
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
bhcishya. The author most frequently quoted is Dramk/a 1 ,
who composed the Drami^/a-bhashya; he is sometimes
referred to as the bhashyakara. Another writer repeatedly
quoted as the vakyakara is, I am told 2 , to be identified with
the 7 anka mentioned above. I refrain from inserting in
this place the information concerning the relative age of
these writers which may be derived from the oral tradition
of the Ram^nu^a sect. From another source, however, we
receive an intimation that Dramk/aMrya or Dravk/aMrya
preceded Sankara in point of time. In his /ikd on San¬
kara’s bhashya to the iTMndogya Upanishad III, 10, 4,
Anandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to
reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the
teaching of Smrzti on the same point is a reproduction of
the analogous attempt made by the Dravi^aMrya.
It thus appears that that special interpretation of the
Vedclnta-stitras with which the Sri-bhashya makes us
acquainted is not due to innovating views on the part of
Rcimanu^a, but had authoritative representatives already
at a period anterior to that of Sankara. This latter point,
moreover, receives additional confirmation from the relation
in which the so-called Ramanuja sect stands to earlier
sects. What the exact position of Ramanuja was, and of
what nature were the reforms that rendered him so pro¬
minent as to give his name to a new sect, is not exactly
known at present; at the same time it is generally acknow¬
ledged that the Rimanu^as are closely connected with the
so-called Bhagavatas or Pa^aratras, who are known to
have existed already at a very early time. This latter point
is proved by evidence of various kinds; for our present purpose
it suffices to point to the fact that, according to the interpre¬
tation of the most authoritative commentators, the last
1 The name of this writer is sometimes given as Dramida, sometimes as
Dravi^/a. In the opinion of Vaudit Rama Mura Aastrin of the Benares
College—himself a Ramanuja and thoroughly conversant with the books and
traditions of his sect—the form ‘ Dramk/a ’ is the correct one.
2 Viz. by Pandit Rama Mura Gastrin. As the ~Pandit intends himself to
publish all the traditional information he possesses concerning the history of
the Bhagavatas and Ramanujas, I limit myself in the text to stating the most
relevant results of my study of the .Sri-bhashya and the Vedarthasangraha.
INTRODUCTION.
XXlll
Sutras of the second p&da of the second adhyaya (Ved&nta-
sutras) refer to a distinctive tenet of the Bhagavatas—which
tenet forms part of the Rdmanu^a system also—viz. that
the highest being manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyuha)
as Vasudeva, Sankarsha^a, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those
four forms being identical with the highest Self, the indi¬
vidual soul, the internal organ (manas), and the principle
of egoity (ahankara). Whether those Sutras embody an
approval of the tenet referred to, as Ramanuja maintains,
or are meant to impugn it, as Sankara thinks ; so much is
certain that in the opinion of the best commentators the
Bhagavatas, the direct forerunners of the Ramanujas, are
mentioned in the Sutras themselves, and hence must not
only have existed, but even reached a considerable degree
of importance at the time when the Sutras were composed.
And considering the general agreement of the systems of
the earlier Bhagavatas and the later Ramanujas, we have
a full right to suppose that the two sects were at one also
in their mode of interpreting the Vedanta-sutras.
The preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to
think, to show that it will by no means be wasted labour to
enquire how R&manu^a interprets the Sutras, and wherein
he differs from Sankara. This in fact seems clearly to be
the first step we have to take, if we wish to make an attempt
at least of advancing beyond the interpretations of scho¬
liasts to the meaning of the Sutras themselves. A full and
exhaustive comparison of the views of the two com¬
mentators would indeed far exceed the limits of the space
which can here be devoted to that task, and will, moreover,
be made with greater ease and advantage when the complete
Sanskrit text of the Srt-bhashya has been printed, and thus
made available for general reference. But meanwhile it is
possible, and—as said before—even urged upon a translator
of the Sfttras to compare the interpretations, given by the
two bhdshyakaras, of those Sutras, which, more than others,
touch on the essential points of the Vedanta system 1 . This
1 Owing to the importance of the 6ankara-bhashya as the fundamental work
of the most influential Hindu school of philosophy, the number of topics which
might be discussed in the introduction to its translation is considerable. But
XXIV
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
will best be done In connexion with a succinct but full
review of the topics discussed in the adhikara^as of the
Ved&nta-sutras, according to Sankara; a review which—
apart from the side-glances at Ramanuja’s comments—
will be useful as a guide through the Sutras and the
Sankara-bhashya. Before, however, entering on that
task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the
philosophical systems of Sankara as well as of Ramanuja,
which may be referred to when, later on, discrepancies
between the two commentators will be noted. In these
sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and
not enter into any details. Of Sankara’s system we possess
as it is more than one trustworthy exposition; it may
suffice to refer to Deussen’s System of the Ved&nta, in
which the details of the entire system, as far as they can be
learned from the Sfitra-bhashya, are represented fully and
faithfully, and to Gough’s Philosophy of the Upanishads
which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid
sketch of the Ankara Vedanta, founded on the Sutra-
bhashya, the Upanishad bMshyas, and some later writers
belonging to Sankara’s school. With regard to Ram&nuja’s
philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Ram&nuja
chapter in the Sarvadar^a^asa^graha ; the short sketch
about to be given is founded altogether on the Sri-
bhashya itself.
What in Sankara’s opinion the Upanishads teach, is
shortly as follows.—Whatever is, is in reality one; there
truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or
Paramatman, the highest Self. This being is of an abso¬
lutely homogeneous nature; it is pure ‘ Being,’ or, which
comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (^aitanya,
the limitation of the space at our disposal necessitates a selection, and it can
hardly be doubted that, among the possible tasks of a translator, that of
ascertaining how far the teaching of .Sankara agrees with that of Badaraya^a,
and, further, how far either of them represents the true doctrine of the
Upanishads, is the one first to be taken in hand.—Some other topics, such as a
detailed account of .Sankara’s teaching according to the bhashya, an enquiry as
to the books and authors quoted by .Sankara, &c., have, moreover, been treated
not long ago in a very thorough fashion by Dr. Deussen in his ‘ System des
Vedanta.’
INTRODUCTION.
XXV
guana). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of
Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes its substance ;
Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It
is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever qualities or
attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it.—But,
if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence
the appearance of the world by which we see ourselves
surrounded, and in which we ourselves exist as individual
beings ?—Brahman, the answer runs, is associated with a
certain power called Mayi or avidya to which the appearance
of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called
‘ being ’ (sat), for ‘ being * is only Brahman ; nor can it be
called ‘ non-being ’ (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate
produces the appearance of this world. It is in fact a prin¬
ciple of illusion ; the undefinable cause owing to which there
seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct
individual existences. Being associated with this principle
of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of
the world, in the same w T ay as a magician is enabled by his
incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory ap¬
pearances of animate and inanimate beings. May£ thus
constitutes the up^ddna, the material cause of the world; or
—if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that
M&yci belongs to Brahman as a ^akti—we may say that
the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it
is associated with Maya* In this latter quality Brahman is
more properly called tsvara, the Lord.
Maya, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by
a progressive evolution into all the individual existences
(bheda), distinguished by special names and forms, of
which the world consists ; from it there spring in due
succession the different material elements and the whole
bodily apparatus belonging to sentient beings. In all
those apparently individual forms of existence the one
indivisible Brahman is present, but, owing to the particular
adjuncts into which M&ya has specialised itself, it appears
to be broken up—it is broken up, as it were—into a multi¬
plicity of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called
^ivas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each
XXVI
vedAnta-s£>tras.
giva is only the universal Brahman itself; the whole
aggregate of individualising bodily organs and mental
functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and
distinguish one £iva from another, is the offspring of Maya
and as such unreal.
The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience
(vyavahara) thus consists of a number of individual souls
engaged in specific cognitions, volitions, and so on, and of
the external material objects with which those cognitions
and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific cognitions
nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word,
for both are altogether due to Maya. But at the same
time we have to reject the idealistic doctrine of certain
Bauddha schools according to which nothing whatever
truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or ideas
to which no external objects correspond; for external
things, although not real in the strict sense of the word,
enjoy at any rate as much reality as the specific cognitional
acts whose objects they are.
The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and
beyond Maya, which, like a veil, hides from it its true
nature. Instead of recognising itself to be Brahman, it
blindly identifies itself with its adjuncts (upadhi), the
fictitious offspring of Maya, and thus looks for its true
Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ
(manas), i. e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul,
which in reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite,
thus becomes limited in extent, as it were, limited in
knowledge and power, an agent and enjoyer. Through
its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit, the
consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of
future embodied existences, the Lord—as a retributor and
dispenser—allotting to each soul that form of embodiment
to which it is entitled by its previous actions. At the end
of each of the great world periods called kalpas the Lord
retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world is
dissolved and merged into non-distinct Maya, while the
individual souls, free for the time from actual connexion
with upadhis, lie in deep slumber as it were. But as the
INTRODUCTION.
XXV11
consequences of their former deeds are not yet exhausted,
they have again to enter on embodied existence as soon as
the Lord sends forth a new material world, and the old
round of birth, action, death begins anew to last to all
eternity as it has lasted from all eternity.
The means of escaping from this endless sa/^sara, the way
out of which can never be found by the non-enlightened
soul, are furnished by the Veda. The karmaka/^a indeed,
whose purport it is to enjoin certain actions, cannot lead
to final release; for even the most meritorious works
necessarily lead to new forms of embodied existence. And
in the gn^mkknddi of the Veda also two different parts
have to be distinguished, viz., firstly, those chapters and
passages which treat of Brahman in so far as related to the
world, and hence characterised by various attributes, i. e. of
l^vara or the lower Brahman; and, secondly, those texts
which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman tran¬
scending all qualities, and the fundamental identity of the
individual soul with that highest Brahman. Devout medi¬
tation on Brahman as suggested by passages of the former
kind does not directly lead to final emancipation; the
pious worshipper passes on his death into the world of
the lower Brahman only, where he continues to exist as
a distinct individual soul—although in the enjoyment of
great power and knowledge—until at last he reaches the
highest knowledge, and, through it, final release.—That
student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose soul has
been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher know¬
ledge of Brahman, whom passages such as the great saying,
‘ That art thou/ have taught that there is no difference
between his true Self and the highest Self, obtains at the
moment of death immediate final release, i.e. he withdraws
altogether from the influence of Mayd, and asserts himself
in his true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute
highest Brahman.
Thus Sankara.—According to Ramanuja, on the other
hand, the teaching of the Upanishads has to be summarised
as follows.—There exists only one all-embracing being called
Brahman or the highest Self or the Lord. This being is
XXV111
VEDANTA-S{jTRA$.
not destitute of attributes, but rather endowed with all
imaginable auspicious qualities. It is not 4 intelligence/—as
Sankara maintains,—but intelligence is its chief attribute.
The Lord is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-
merciful ; his nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil.
He contains within himself whatever exists. While, accord¬
ing to .Sankara, the only reality is to be found in the non¬
qualified homogeneous highest Brahman which can only be
defined as pure ‘Being’ or pure thought, all plurality being a
mere illusion; Brahman—according to Ramanuja’s view—*
comprises within itself distinct elements of plurality which
all of them lay claim to absolute reality of one and the same
kind. Whatever is presented to us by ordinary experience,
viz. matter in all its various modifications and the individual
souls of different classes and degrees, are essential real
constituents of Brahman’s nature. Matter and souls (a£it
and k\t) constitute, according to Rdmanqja’s terminology,
the body of the Lord; they stand to him in the same
relation of entire dependence and subserviency in which
the matter forming an animal or vegetable body stands to
its soul or animating principle. The Lord pervades and
rules all things which exist—material or immaterial—as
their antaryamin; the fundamental text for this special
Ramanuja tenet—which in the writings of the sect is
quoted again and again—is the so-called antaryamin brah-
ma«a (B rL Up. Ill, 7) which says, that within all elements,
all sense organs, and, lastly, within all individual souls,
there abides an inward ruler whose body those elements,
sense-organs, and individual souls constitute.—Matter and
souls as forming the body of the Lord are also called
modes of him (prakara). They are to be looked upon as his
effects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual exist¬
ence which is theirs from all eternity, and will never be
entirely resolved into Brahman. They, however, exist in
two different, periodically alternating, conditions. At some
times they exist in a subtle state in which they do not
possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily known,
and there is then no distinction of individual name and
form. Matter in that state is unevolved (avyakta); the
INTRODUCTION.
XXIX
individual souls are not joined to material bodies, and their
intelligence is in a state of contraction, non-manifestation
(sankoyfca). This is the pralaya state which recurs at the end
of each kalpa, and Brahman is then said to be in its causal
condition (karazzavastha). To that state all those scriptural
passages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as
being in the beginning one only, without a second. Brahman
then is indeed not absolutely one, for it contains within itself
matter and souls in a germinal condition; but as in that
condition they are so subtle as not to allow of individual
distinctions being made, they are not counted as something
second in addition to Brahman.—When the pralaya state
comes to an end, creation takes place owing to an act of
volition on the Lord’s part. Primary unevolved matter then
passes over into its other condition; it becomes gross and
thus acquires all those sensible attributes, visibility, tangi¬
bility, and so on, which are known from ordinary experience.
At the same time the souls enter into connexion with
material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or
demerit acquired by them in previous forms of existence;
their intelligence at the same time undergoes a certain
expansion (vika^a). The Lord, together with matter in its
gross state and the c expanded 5 souls, is Brahman in the
condition of an effect (karyavastha). Cause and effect are
thus at the bottom the same; for the effect is nothing but
the cause which has undergone a certain change (pari-
zzama). Hence the cause being known, the effect is known
likewise.
Owing to the effects of their former actions the indi¬
vidual souls are implicated in the sa/zzsara, the endless
cycle of birth, action, and death, final escape from which
is to be obtained only through the study of the gh ana-
kazzdfo of the Veda. Compliance with the injunctions of
the karmakazz^a does not lead outside the sazzzsara; but
he who, assisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes—and
meditates on—him in the way prescribed by the Upani-
shads reaches at his death final emancipation, i.e. he
passes through the different stages of the path of the
gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an
XXX
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
everlasting blissful existence from which there is no re¬
turn into the sphere of transmigration. The character¬
istics of the released soul are similar to those of Brahman;
it participates in all the latter’s glorious qualities and
powers, excepting only Brahman’s power to emit, rule, and
retract the entire world.
The chief points in which the two systems sketched
above agree on the one hand and diverge on the other
may be shortly stated as follows.—Both systems teach
advaita, i.e. non-duality or monism. There exist not
several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the pra-
krzti and the purushas of the Sankhyas, but there exists
only one all-embracing being. While, however, the advaita
taught by Sankara is a rigorous, absolute one, Ramanuja’s
doctrine has to be characterised as vLdsh/a advaita, i.e.
qualified non-duality, non-duality with a difference. Ac¬
cording to Sankara, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman
itself is absolutely homogeneous, so that all difference and
plurality must be illusory. According to Ramanuja also,
whatever is, is Brahman; but Brahman is not of a homo¬
geneous nature, but contains within itself elements of
plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a
diversified world. The world with its variety of material
forms of existence and individual souls is not unreal Maya,
but a real part of Brahman's nature, the body investing
the universal Self. The Brahman of .Sankara is in itself
impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless thought,
transcending all attributes; a personal God it becomes
only through its association with the unreal principle of
Maya, so that—strictly speaking—.Sankara’s personal God,
his t^vara, is himself something unreal. Ramanuja’s Brah¬
man, on the other hand, is essentially a personal God, the
all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a real world permeated
and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room for
the distinction between a param nirguzzam and an aparaz^
saguzzam brahma, between Brahman and Irvara.—.San¬
kara’s individual soul is Brahman in so far as limited by
the unreal upadhis due to Maya. The individual soul of
Ramanuja, on the other hand, is really individual; it has
INTRODUCTION.
XXXI
indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brah¬
man, but nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal exist¬
ence and will remain a personality for ever.—The release
from sawsara means, according to Sankara, the absolute
merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due to the dis¬
missal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct
from Brahman; according to R&manu^a it only means
the soul’s passing from the troubles of earthly life into
a kind of heaven or paradise where it will remain for ever
in undisturbed personal bliss.—As Ramanuja does not
distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction
of a higher and lower knowledge is likewise not valid for
him; the teaching of the Upanishads is not twofold but
essentially one, and leads the enlightened devotee to one
result only 1 .
I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents
of the Vedanta-sutras according to .Sankara in which at the
same time all the more important points concerning which
Ramanuja disagrees will be noted. We shall here have to
enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it
is only on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that
we can hope to establish any definite conclusions regarding
the comparative value of the different modes of interpreta¬
tion which have been applied to the Sutras. The line of
investigation is an entirely new one, and for the present
nothing can be taken for granted or known.—In stating the
different heads of discussion (the so-called adhikara/zas),
each of which comprises one or more Sutras, I shall follow
the subdivision into adhikara/zas adopted in the Vyasadhika-
ra/zamala, the text of which is printed in the second volume
of the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the Sutras.
1 The only •' sectarian ’ feature of the 6ri-bhashya is, that it identifies Brahman
with Vish#u or Narayarca ; but this in no way affects the interpretations put on
the Sfitras and Upanishads. Narayawa is in fact nothing but another name of
Brahman.
xxxu
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
FIRST ADHYAYA.
PAda I.
The first five adhikara/zas lay down the fundamental
positions with regard to Brahman. Adhik, I (i) 1 treats of
what the study of the Vedanta presupposes. Adhik. II
(2) defines Brahman as that whence the world originates,
and so on. Adhik. Ill (3) declares that Brahman is the
source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be
the uniform topic of all Vedanta-texts. Adhik. V (5-11)
is engaged in proving by various arguments that the Brah¬
man, which the Vedanta-texts represent as the cause of
the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be iden¬
tified with the non-intelligent pradMna from which the
world springs according to the Sankhyas.
With the next adhikara/za there begins a series of dis¬
cussions of essentially similar character, extending up to
the end of the first adhyaya. The question is throughout
whether certain terms met with in the Upanishads denote
Brahman or some other being, in most cases the ^iva, the
individual soul. ^Sankara remarks at the outset that, as the
preceding ten Sutras had settled the all-important point
that all the Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman, the question
now arises why the enquiry should be continued any fur¬
ther, and thereupon proceeds to explain that the acknow¬
ledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all
qualities and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities
necessitates an investigation whether certain Vedic texts
of prima facie doubtful import set forth the lower Brah¬
man as the object of devout meditation, or the higher
Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an
investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion
of the first adhyaya, appears neither from the wording of the
Sfttras nor even from 6arikara’s own treatment of the Vedic
1 The Roman numerals indicate the number of the adhikarawa ; the figures
in parentheses state the Sfitras comprised in each adhikara^a.
INTRODUCTION.
xxxiii
texts referred to in the Sfitras. In I, i, 20, for instance, the
question is raised whether the golden man within the sphere
of the sun, with golden hair and beard and lotus-coloured
eyes—of whom the ^Oandogya Upanishad speaks in I, 6, 6
—is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the
highest Lord. .Sankara’s answer is that the passage refers
to the Lord, who, for the gratification of his worshippers,
manifests himself in a bodily shape made of Maya. So that
according to Sankara himself the alternative lies between
the saguzza Brahman and some particular individual soul, not
between the saguzza Brahman and the nirguzza Brahman.
Adhik. VI (12-19) raises the question whether the ananda-
maya, mentioned in Taittirtya Upanishad II, 5, is merely
a transmigrating individual soul or the highest Self. San¬
kara begins by explaining the Sutras on the latter suppo¬
sition—and the text of the Sutras is certainly in favour of
that interpretation—gives, however, finally the preference to
a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to
which the Sutras teach that the anandamaya is not Brah¬
man, since the Upanishad expressly says that Brahman is
the tail or support of the anandamaya 1 .—Ramanuja’s in¬
terpretation of Adhikarazza VI, although not agreeing in
all particulars with the former explanation of Sankara, yet
is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the ananda¬
maya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while
Sankara looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of
interpretatory discussions, all of which treat the question
whether certain Vedic passages refer to Brahman or not,
Ramanuja separates the adhikarazza from the subsequent
part of the pada and connects it with what had preceded.
In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be
1 Deussen’s supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage conveying the second,
interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two objections. In the first place,
the passage is accepted and explained by all commentators ; in the second
place, Sankara in the passage immediately preceding Sutra 12 quotes the
adhikarawa ‘ &nandamayo x bhyasat ’ as giving rise to a discussion whether the
param or the aparam brahman is meant. Now this latter point is not touched
upon at all in that part of the bhashya which sets forth the former explanation,
but only in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and advocates the
latter interpretation.
[34] C
XXXIV
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
identified with the pradhana; Adhik. VI shows that it is
different from the individual soul, and the proof of the
fundamental position of the system is thereby completed h—
Adhik. VII (30, 21) demonstrates that the golden person
seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye,
mentioned in Kh . Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul
of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman.—Adhik. VIII
(22) teaches that by the ether from which, according to
Kh . Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not the elemental ether
has to be understood but the highest Brahman.—Adhik.
IX (23). The prazza also mentioned in Kh . Up. I, 11, 5
denotes the highest Brahman 1 2 .—Adhik. X (24-27) teaches
that the light spoken of in Kh. Up. Ill, 13, 7 is not the
ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman 3 .—Adhik.
XI (28-31) decides that the prazza mentioned in Kau. Up.
Ill; 2 is Brahman.
PAda II.
Adhik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of
mind, whose body is breath, &c., mentioned in Kh. Up.
Ill, 14, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. The
Sutras of this adhikarazza emphatically dwell on the dif¬
ference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence
^Sankara is obliged to add an explanation—in his comment
on Sutra 6—to the effect that that difference is to be under¬
stood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts
of the highest Self.—The comment of Ramanuja through¬
out closely follows the words of the Sutras ; on Sfitra 6
it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self
1 Eva m ^i^asitasya brahmanas ^etanabhogyabhuta^adarupasattvara^astamo-
mayapradhanad vyavrzttir ukta, idaniw karmavaxyat trign^atmakaprakrzti-
sawsarganimittananavidhanantadukhasagaranima < £§anena.mddha/£ ka pratya-
gatmano^nyan nikhilaheyapratyanikaw niratirayanandam brahmeti pratipa-
dyate, anandamayo * bhyasat.
2 There is no reason to consider the passage ‘ atra ke/£it’ in .Sankara’s
bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p. 30). It simply
contains a criticism passed by -Sankara on other commentators.
3 To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text, which Deussen
thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the remark made in the
preceding note.
INTRODUCTION.
XXXV
from the individual soul rests thereon that the former
as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works
in the same way as the soul is 1 .—Adhik. II (9, 10) decides
that he to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but
food (Ka/^a Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.—Adhik. Ill
(11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave (Ka/^a
Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul 2 .—Adhik.
IV (13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned
in Kh. Up. IV, 15, 1 is Brahman.—Adhik. V (18-20) shows
that the ruler within (antaryamin) described in Bri. Up. Ill,
7, 3 is Brahman. Sutra 20 clearly enounces the difference
of the individual soul and the Lord; hence Sankara is
obliged to remark that that difference is not real.—Adhik.
VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c.,
mentioned in Mu;/^/aka Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman.—Adhik.
VII (24-32) shows that the atman vaLsvanara of Kh . Up. V,
11, 6 is Brahman.
PAda III.
Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven,
the earth, &c. are woven (Wlund. Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman.—
Adhik. II (8, 9) shows that the bhuman referred to in Kh.
Up. VII, 23 is Brahman.—Adhik. Ill (10-12) teaches that
the Imperishable in which, according to Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 8,
the ether is woven is Brahman.—Adhik. IV (13) decides
that the highest person who is to be meditated upon with
the syllable Om, according to Pra^na Up. V, 5, is not the
1 £ivasya iva parasyapi brahmanah jurirantarvartitvam abhyupagata^ kei
tadvad eva jurirasambandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogapraptir iti ken na,
hetuvaijeshyat, na hi jurirantarvartitvam eva sukhadukhopabhogahetu^ api
tu pu^yapaparupakarmaparavajutvaw tak Hpahatapapmana^ paramatmano
na sambhavati.
2 The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 °f the Sanskrit text (beginning
with apara aha) Deussen considers to be an interpolation, caused by the
reference to the Paingi-upanishad in Sankara’s comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232).
But there is no reason whatever for such an assumption. The passage on
p. 232 shows that Sankara considered the explanation of the mantra given in
the Paingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only in case
of its having been quoted before by Sankara himself.—That the ‘ apara ’ quotes
the Brzhadara^yaka not according to the Ka^va text—to quote from which is
.Sankara's habit—but from the Madhyandina text, is due just to the circum¬
stance of his being an ‘ apara,’ i.e. not .Sankara.
XXXVI
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
lower but the higher Brahman.—According to Ramanuja
the two alternatives are Brahman and Brahma (^ivasa-
mashrirupo^^adhipatij ^aturmukha^).—Adhik. V and VI
(comprising, according to .Sankara, Sutras 14-21) 1 discuss
the question whether the small ether within the lotus of the
heart mentioned in Kh . Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether
or the individual soul or Brahman ; the last alternative
being finally adopted. In favour of the second alternative
the purvapakshin pleads the two passages Kh . Up. VIII,
3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about the serene being (samprasada) ;
for by the latter the individual soul only can be understood,
and in the chapter, of which the latter passage forms part,
there are ascribed to it the same qualities (viz. freeness
from sin, old age, death, &c.) that were predicated in VIII,
1, of the small ether within the heart.—But the reply to
this is, that the second passage refers not to the (ordinary)
individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true
nature has become manifest, i. e. in which it is Brahman ; so
that the subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called
individual soul but Brahman. And in the former of the
two passages the soul is mentioned not on its own account,
but merely for the purpose of intimating that the highest
Self is the cause through which the individual soul manifests
itself in its true nature.—What Ramanuja understands by
the avirbhava of the soul will appear from the remarks on
IV, 4.
The two next Sutras (22, 23) constitute, according to
^Sankara, a new adhikara^a (VII), proving that he ‘ after
whom everything shines, by whose light all this is lighted ’
(KaMa Up. II, 5,15) is not some material luminous body, but
Brahman itself.—According to R&manu£*a the two Sutras
do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further
arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the
preceding Sutras 2 .
1 Sutras 14-21 are divided into two adhikara;zas by the Adhikara/zaratnamala,
but really constitute a simple adhikara^a only.
2 Itaj ^aitad evam. Anukrztes tasya £a. Tasya daharakajasya parabrahma/zo
xnukarad ayam apahatapapmatvadigu^ako vimuktabandha^ pratyagatma na
daharakaja>fc tadanukaras tatsamya;;? tatha hi pratyagatmanoxpi vimuktasya
INTRODUCTION*
XXXVU
Adhik. VIII (24, 25) decides that the person of the size
of a thumb mentioned in Kaths. Up. II, 4, 12 is not the
individual soul but Brahman.
The two next adhikarazzas are of the nature of a digres¬
sion. The passage about the arigush/^amatra was explained
on the ground that the human heart is of the size of a
span ; the question may then be asked whether also such
individuals as belong to other classes than mankind, more
particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of
Brahman : a question finally answered in the affirmative.—
This discussion leads in its turn to several other digressions,
among which the most important one refers to the problem
in what relation the different species of beings stand to the
words denoting them (Sfitra 28). In connexion herewith
.Sankara treats of the nature of words (^abda), opposing the
opinion of the Mima^saka Upavarsha, according to whom
the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive
letters, to the view of the grammarians who teach that over
and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a super-
sensuous entity called £ spho/a,’ which is the direct cause of
the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX ; Sutras
26-33)-
Adhik. X (34-38) explains that Sudras are altogether
disqualified for Brahmavidya.
Sutra 39 constitutes, according to Sankara, a new adhi-
karazza (XI\ proving that the pra/za in which everything
trembles, according to Ka/^a Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman.—
According to Ramanuja the Sutra does not introduce a new
topic but merely furnishes an additional reason for the
parabrahmanukara^ miyate yada pa^ya^ pa^yate rukmavarzzazzz kartaram isa.m
purushazzz brahmayoni/zz tada vidvan puzzyapape vidhuya mxa.ngan&h paramazzz
samyam upaitity ato*nukarta pra^apativakyanirdish/a/^ anukaryazzz parazzz
brahma na daharaka^. Api ka. smaryate. Saz/zsarizzo * pi muktavasthayazzz
paramasamyapattilakshazza^ parabrahmanukara/fc smaryate ida zzz ^-zzanam
up&yritya, &c .—Kekid anukrztes tasya Hpi smaryate iti ka. shtradvayam adhi-
karazzantarazzz tarn eva bhantam anubhati sarvazzz tasya bhasa sarvam ida m
vibhatity asya/z jrute/z parabrahmaparatvanirzzayaya pravrzttazzz vadanti. Tat
tv adwyatvadiguzzako dharmokte^ dyubhvadyayatanazzz sva^abdad ity adhi-
karazzadvayena tasya prakarazzasya brahmavishayatvapratipadanat gyoWska.-
razzabhidh&nat ity adishu parasya brahmazzo bharupatvavagatej' ka. purvapaksha-
nutthanad ayuktazzz sutiaksharavairupya^ ka..
xxxviii vedanta-sOtras.
decision arrived at under Sutras 24, 25, viz. that the angush-
/^amatra is Brahman. On this supposition, Sutras 24-39 f° rm
one adhikarazza in which 26-38 constitute a mere digression
led up to by the mention made of the heart in 25.— The
angush/^amatra is referred to twice in the KaMa Upanishad,
once in the passage discussed (11,4, 12 )> and once in II, 6,17
(‘ the Person not larger than a thumb ’). To determine
what is meant by the angush/^amatra, Ramanuja says, we
are enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate
between the two passages concerning the angush/^amatra,
and which clearly refers to the highest Brahman, of which
alone everything can be said to stand in awe.
The next Sutra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of
opinion. According to Sankara it constitutes by itself a
new adhikarazza (XII), proving that the ‘ light ’ (^yotis)
mentioned in Kh . Up. VIII, 12, 3 is the highest Brahman.
—According to Ramanuja the Sutra continues the pre¬
ceding adhikarazza, and strengthens the conclusion arrived
at by a further argument, referring to KaMa Up. II, 5, 15
—a passage intermediate between the two passages about
the angush/^amatra—which speaks of a primary light that
cannot mean anything but Brahman. The Sutra has in
that case to be translated as follows : ‘ (The angush/^a-
matra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening be¬
tween the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can
be Brahman only).’
The three last Sutras of the pada are, according to
.Sankara,to be divided into two adhikarazzas (XIII and XIV),
Sutra 41 deciding that the ether which reveals names and
forms ( Kh . Up. VIII, 14) is not the elemental ether but
Brahman; and 42, 43 teaching that the vi^/?anamaya, ‘ he
who consists of knowledge/ of B ri. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the
individual soul but Brahman.—According to Ramanuja
the three Sutras make up one single adhikarazza discussing
whether the .Oandogya Upanishad passage about the
ether refers to Brahman or to the individual soul in the
state of release; the latter of these two alternatives being
suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the
subject of the passage immediately preceding (‘ Shaking off
INTRODUCTION.
XXXIX
all evil as a horse shakes off his hair, 5 &c.). Sfitra 41
decides that ‘ the ether (is Brahman) because the passage
designates the nature of something else/ &c. (i.e. of some¬
thing other than the individual soul; other because to the
soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed,
&c.)—But, an objection is raised, does not more than one
scriptural passage show that the released soul and Brahman
are identical, and is not therefore the ether which reveals
names and forms the soul as well as Brahman ?—(The two,
Sutra 43 replies, are different) ‘because in the states of
deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as
different ’ (from the soul)—which point is proved by the
same scriptural passages which .Sankara adduces;—and
‘ because such terms as Lord and the like ’ cannot be
applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is made to
IV, 4, 14, where all ^agadvyapara is said to belong to the
Lord only, not to the soul even when in the state of
release.
Pada IV.
The last pada of the first adhyaya is specially directed
against the S&nkhyas.
The first adhikara^a (1-7) discusses the passage Ka/^a
Up. I, 3, 10 ; 11, where mention is made of the Great and
the Undeveloped—both of them terms used with a special
technical sense in the Sankhya-^astra, avyakta being a
synonym for pradhana.—Sankara shows by an exhaustive
review of the topics of the Ka//za Upanishad that the term
avyakta has not the special meaning which the Sankhyas
attribute to it, but denotes the body, more strictly the
subtle body (sukshma jarira), but at the same time the
gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of the
subtle one.
Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to Sankara, that
the tricoloured a g& spoken of in Sve. Up. IV, 5 ls n °t the
pradhana of the Sankhyas, but either that power of the
Lord from which the world springs, or else the primary
causal matter first produced by that power.—What Rama-
xl
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
nu£*a in contradistinction from .Sankara understands by the
primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given
above of the two systems.
Adhik. Ill (11-13) shows that the pazz^a pa^&a^ana/z
mentioned in B ri. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five
principles of the Sctnkhyas.—Adhik. IV (14,15) proves that
Scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important
point of Brahman, i. e. a being whose essence is intelligence,
being the cause of the world.
Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to Sankara, meant to
prove that ‘ he who is the maker of those persons, of whom
this is the work,’ mentioned in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not
either the vital air or the individual soul, but Brahman.—
The subject of the adhikarazza is essentially the same in
R&m&nu^a's view ; greater stress is, however, laid on the
adhikarazza being polemical against the Sankhyas, who
wish to turn the passage into an argument for the pradh&na
doctrine.
The same partial difference of view is observable with
regard to the next adhikarazza (VI ; Sutras 19-22) which
decides that the ‘Self to be seen, to be heard, 5 &c. (Brz. Up.
II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not the individual soul. This
latter passage also is, according to Rctm&nu^a, made the
subject of discussion in order to rebut the S&nkhya who is
anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object
of knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sankhya
purusha.
Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only
the efficient or operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but
its material cause as well. The world springs from Brahman
by way of modification (parizz&ma ; Sutra 26).—Ramanuja
views this adhikarazza as specially directed against the
Se^vara-sankhyas who indeed admit the existence of a
highest Lord, but postulate in addition an independent
pradhana on which the Lord acts as an operative cause
merely.
Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the
Sankhya views is applicable to other theories also, such as
the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms.
INTRODUCTION.
xli
After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhy&ya
and the succinct indication of the most important points in
which the views of Sankara and Ramanuja diverge, we
turn to a short consideration of two questions which here
naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which is the prin¬
ciple on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sutras
have been selected and arranged ; and, secondly, if, where
Sankara and Rimanu^a disagree as to the subdivision of
the Sutras into Adhikara^as, and the determination of the
Vedic passages discussed in the Sutras, there are to be met
with any indications enabling us to determine which of the
two commentators is right. (The more general question as
to how far the Sutras favour either Sankara’s or Rama¬
nuja’s general views cannot be considered at present.)
The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to
point out the reason why the discussion of a certain Vedic
passage is immediately followed by the consideration of a
certain other one. Their explanations—which have occa¬
sionally been referred to in the notes to the translation—
rest on the assumption that the Sutrakara in arranging the
texts to be commented upon was guided by technicalities
of the Mima^sci-system, especially by a regard for the
various so-called means of proof which the Mima/^saka
employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning
and position of scriptural passages. But that this was the
guiding principle, is rendered altogether improbable by a
simple tabular statement of the Vedic passages referred to
in the first adhyaya, such as given by Deussen on page 130;
for from the latter it appears that the order in which the
Sutras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in
which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads,
and it would certainly be a most strange coincidence if that
order enabled us at the same time to exemplify the various
prama/zas of the Mima;/zsa in their due systematic suc¬
cession.
As Deussen’s statement shows, most of the passages dis¬
cussed are taken from the KMndogya Upanishad, so many
indeed that the whole first adhyaya may be said to consist
of a discussion of all those -Oandogya passages of which it
xlii
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman or
not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in
wherever an opportunity offers. Considering the prominent
position assigned to the Upanishad mentioned, I think it
likely that the Sutrakara meant to begin the series of
doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the
jOandogya, and that hence the sixth adhikarazza which
treats of the anandamaya mentioned in the Taittiriya
Upanishad has, in agreement with Ramanuja’s views, to be
separated from the subsequent adhikarazzas, and to be com¬
bined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down
the fundamental propositions regarding Brahman’s nature.
—The remaining adhikarazzas of the first pada follow the
order of passages in the ATMndogya Upanishad, and there¬
fore call for no remark ; with the exception of the last
adhikarazza, which refers to a Kaushitaki passage, for whose
being introduced in this place I am not able to account.—
The first adhikarazza of the second pada returns to the
ATMndogya Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage
in the Ka^a Upanishad where a being is referred to which
eats everything. The reason why that passage is introduced in
this place seems to be correctly assigned in the Sri-bhashya,
which remarks that, as in the preceding Sutra it had been
argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a doubt
arises whether by that being which eats everything the
highest Self can be meant K —The third adhikarazza again,
whose topic is the ‘two entered into the cave 5 (Ka^a Up.
I, 3, 1), appears, as Ramanuja remarks, to come in at this
place owing to the preceding adhikarazza; for if it could
not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a
doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the
‘ eater/ since the ‘two entered into the cave/ and the ‘eater’
stand under the same prakarazza, and must therefore be
held to refer to the same matter.—The fourth adhikarazza
is again occupied with a Khan dogya passage.—The fifth
adhikarazza, whose topic is the Ruler within (antaryamin),
manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Ramanuja also,
1 Yadi paramatma na bhokta eva m tarhi bhoktrztaya pratiyamano ^iva eva
syad ity asankyaha atta.
INTRODUCTION.
xliii
to the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed
in the preceding adhikarazza (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of
strengthening the argument 1 .—The sixth adhikarazza, again,
which discusses‘ that which is not seen’ (adre^ya; Mu nd. Up.
I, i, 6), is clearly introduced in this place because in the pre¬
ceding adhikarazza it had been said that adrzshz'a, &c. denote
the highest Self.—The reasons to which the last adhikarazza
of the second pada and the first and third adhikarazzas of the
third pada owe their places are not apparent (the second
adhikarazza of the third pada treats of a ATMndogya passage).
The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the
Prama Upanishad treating of the akshara Ozzzkara is clearly
due to the circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature,
had been discussed in the preceding adhikarazza.—The fifth
and sixth adhikarazzas investigate ATMndogya passages.—
The two next Sutras (22, 23) are, as remarked above, con¬
sidered by .Sankara to constitute a new adhikarazza treating
of the ‘ being after which everything shines ’(Mund. Up. II, 2,
10); while Ramanuja looks on them as continuing the sixth
adhikarazza. There is one circumstance which renders it at
any rate probable that Ramanuja, and not .Sankara, here
hits the intention of the author of the Sutras. The general
rule in the first three padas is that, wherever a new Vedic
passage is meant to be introduced, the subject of the dis¬
cussion, i. e. that being which in the end is declared to be
Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most
cases a nominative form 2 . From this rule there is in the
preceding part of the adhyaya only one real exception, viz.
in I, 2, 1, which possibly may be due to the fact that there
a new pada begins, and it therefore was considered super-
1 Sthanadivyapade^a^ ka ity atra ya h ^akshushi tish/^ann ity adina prati-
padyamana^z ^akshushi sthitiniyamanadikaw paramatmana eveti siddhaw
krztv& akshipurushasya paramatmatvaw sadhitam idani m tad eva samarthayate
antarya 0 .
2 Anandamaya/fc I, 1, 12 ; antah I, 1, 20 ; akasah I, 1, 22; prana^ I, 1, 23 ;
£7oti/£ I, 1, 24 ; prana^ I, 1, 28; atta I, 2, 9 ; guham pravishZau I, 2, 11;
antara I, 2, 13 ; antaryaml I, 2, 18 ; adrisyatvadigimaka/i I, 2, 21 ; vauvanara^
I, 2, 24; dyubhvadyayatanam I, 3, 1 ; bhuma I, 3, 8 ; aksharam I, 3, 10; sati
I, 3, 13; dahara^ I, 3, 14; pramita^ I, 3, 24; (^-yotlfc I, 3, 40;) aka^a^ I,
3 > 4 1 *
xliv
vedAnta-s^tras.
fluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a
special word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only
an apparent one ; for, as remarked above, Sfttra 19 does not
in reality begin a new adhikarazza. A few exceptions
occurring later on will be noticed in their places.—Now
neither Sfttra 22 nor Sutra 23 contains any word intimating
that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration,
and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with
Ramdnuja, as continuing the topic of the preceding adhika¬
razza.—This conclusion receives an additional confirmation
from the position of the next adhikarazza, which treats of
the being ‘ a span long 5 mentioned in Ka/^a Up. II, 4,12 ;
for the reason of this latter passage being considered here is
almost certainly the reference to the alpairuti in Sutra 21,
and, if so, the angush/Zzamatra properly constitutes the sub¬
ject of the adhikarazza immediately following on Adhik. V,
VI; which, in its turn, implies that Sutras 22, 23 do not form
an independent adhikarazza.—The two next adhikarazzas are
digressions, and do not refer to special Vedic passages.—
Sutra 39 forms a new adhikarazza, according to Sankara, but
not according to Ramanuja, whose opinion seems again to be
countenanced by the fact that the Sutra does not exhibit
any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference of
opinion prevails with regard to Sutra 40, and it appears from
the translation of the Sutra given above, according to
Ramanuja’s view, that ‘gyotiti need not be taken as a nomi¬
native.—The last two adhikarazzas finally refer, according to
R&m&nuja, to one Kh andogya passage only, and here also
we have to notice that Sutra 42 does not comprise any word
intimating that a new passage is about to be discussed.
From all this we seem entitled to draw the following
conclusions. The Vedic passages discussed in the three
first padas of the Vedanta-sutras comprise all the doubtful
—or at any rate all the more important doubtful—passages
from the KM ndogya Upanishad. These passages are
arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad
exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishads are dis¬
cussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special
reason why a certain ZTMndogya passage is followed by
INTRODUCTION.
xlv
a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those
reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a num¬
ber of cases although not in all, and from among those
passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily ac¬
counted for some are eliminated by our following the
subdivision of the Sutras into adhikara/zas adopted by
Ramanuja, a subdivision countenanced by the external
form of the Sutras.
The fourth pada of the first adhyaya has to be taken
by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against
Sankhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier
part which discusses isolated passages, but also—as is
brought out much more clearly in the SYt-bhashya than by
^Sankara—in its latter part which takes a general survey
of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the
material as well as the operative cause of the world.
Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the
Sutrakara of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of
Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one.
But this reproach rests on the assumption that the pas¬
sages referred to in the first adhyaya were chosen for the
purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this
assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedanta-sutras
as well as the Pftrva Mima/^sa-sutras are throughout Mi-
mams&, i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as
on a primd facie view admit of different interpretations
and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their mean¬
ing. Here and there we meet with Sutras which do not
directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular
Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some
important point. But those cases are rare, and it would
be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutras to
assume that a whole adhyaya should be devoted to the
task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is suf¬
ficiently determined in the first five (or six) adhikara^as;
but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once
confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning
which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not.
With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/zas of the
xlvi
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
first adhyaya are occupied. That the Vedanta-sutras
view it as a particularly important task to controvert the
doctrine of the Sankhyas is patent (and has also been fully
pointed out by Deussen, p. 33J. The fifth adhikara^a
already declares itself against the doctrine that the world
has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhana,
and the fourth pada of the first adhyaya returns to an
express polemic against Sankhya interpretations of cer¬
tain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying
too much if we maintain that the entire first adhydya is
due to the wish, on the part of the Sutrakara, to guard his
own doctrine against Sankhya attacks. Whatever the
attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be
towards the Veda, the Sankhya system is the only one
whose adherents were anxious—and actually attempted—
to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural pas¬
sages. The Sankhya tendency thus would be to show
that all those Vedic texts which the Vedantin claims as
teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole
cause of the world, refer either to the pradhana or some
product of the pradhana, or else to the purusha in the
Sankhya sense, i. e. the individual soul. It consequently
became the task of the Vedantin to guard the Upanishads
against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in
the first adhyaya of the Vedanta-sutras, selecting those
passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some
reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages
singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to
various interpretations; of others it is less apparent why
it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But
this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find
fault with the Sutrakara; for no modern scholar, either
European or Hindu, is—or can possibly be—sufficiently at
home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical
views which prevailed at the time when the Sutras may
have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the in¬
tricacies of the Mima/^sa, to judge with confidence which
Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not.
INTRODUCTION.
xlvii
SECOND ADHYAYA.
The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts
unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the
world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that
there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to
establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more especially
the Sankhya system. The task of the two first p&das of
the second adhyaya is to rebut any objections which may
be raised against the Vedanta doctrine on purely specula¬
tive grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show,
again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the sys¬
tems irreconcilable with the Veddnta can be satisfactorily
established.
Pada I.
Adhikara^a I refutes the Sankhya objection that the
acceptation of the Vedanta system involves the rejection
of the S&nkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part
of Smrzti, and as such has claims on consideration.—To
accept the Sdnkhya-smrzti, the Vedantin replies, would
compel us to reject other Smrztis, such as the Manu-smrzti,
which are opposed to the Sankhya doctrine. The con¬
flicting claims of Smrztis can be settled only on the ground
of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does
not confirm the Sankhya-smrzti, but rather those Smrztis
which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent
primary cause.
Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to
the Yoga-smrzti.
Adhik. Ill (4-11) shows that Brahman, although of the
nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non-
intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated
by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded
into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that
like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities
of effected things when the latter are refunded into their
causes—as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted
xlviii
VEDANTA-SU TR AS.
and thereby become simple gold again—do not continue to
exist in those causes.—Here also the argumentation is
specially directed against the Sankhyas, who, in order to
account for the materiality and the various imperfections
of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal sub¬
stance participating in the same characteristics.
Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning fol¬
lowed in the preceding adhikara^a is valid also against
other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.
The one Sutra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, accord¬
ing to Sankara, that although the enjoying souls as well as
the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman,
and on that account identical, yet the two sets may prac¬
tically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart,
and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves,
ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves,
ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither
more nor less than sea-water.—The Sri-bhashya gives a
totally different interpretation of the Sutra, according to
which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the
eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to
be enjoyed. Translated according to Ramanuja’s view,
the Sutra runs as follows : f If non-distinction (of the Lord
and the individual souls) is said to result from the circum¬
stance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul),
we refute this objection by instances from every-day ex¬
perience.’ That is to say: If it be maintained that from
our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this
world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it
follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essen¬
tially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as
they are; we reply that the Lord’s having a body does
not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than
in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied
being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain
which his servants have to undergo.—The construction
which Ramanuja puts on the Sutra is not repugnant either
to the words of the Sutra or to the context in which the
latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears
INTRODUCTION.
xlix
from a quotation made by Ramanuja from the Drami-
dabhashyakara \
Adhik. VI (14-30) treats of the non-difference of the
effect from the cause; a Vedanta doctrine which is de¬
fended by its adherents against the Vaueshikas according
to whom the effect is something different from the cause.
—The divergent views of 5 ankara and Ramanuja on this
important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the
general sketch of the two systems.
Adhik. VII (31-33) refutes the objection that, from the
Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and
the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like
the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the
entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being
the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sutra-
kclra remarks, the creative principle of the world is addi¬
tional to, i.e. other than, the individual soul, the difference
of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture.—The
way in which the three Sutras constituting this adhikara^a
are treated by Sankara on the one hand and Ramanuja on
the other is characteristic. Ramanuja throughout simply
follows the words of the Sutras, of which Sutra 21 formu¬
lates the objection based on such texts as £ Thou art
that/ while Sutra 33 replies that Brahman is different
from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scrip¬
ture. .Sankara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to
add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in
Sfitra 33, is not real, but due to the soul’s fictitious limiting
adjuncts.
Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although des¬
titute of material and instruments of action, may yet pro¬
duce the world, just as gods by their mere power create
1 Lokavat. Yatha loke ra^ajasananuvartinaw ka. ra^anugrahanigrahakrzta-
sukhadukhayoge 1 pi na saj-ariratvamatre^a J-asake ra^any api jasananuvrzttya-
tivr/ttinimittasukhadukhayor bhoktrz t vaprasanga^. Yathaha Drami^/abha-
shyakara^ yatha loke ra^a pra^uradanda^uke ghore*narthasawkafe *pi
prade^e vartamano * pi vya^anadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprzVyate abhipre-
ta ms ka. lokan paripipalayishati bhogawj ka. gandhadin avijva^anopabhogyan
dharayati tathasau loke^varo bhramatsvasamarthyaHmaro doshair na spmyate
rakshati ka. lokan brahmalokadiwj Hvirva^anopabhogyan dharayatiti.
[34] d
1
VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns
into curds.
Adhik. IX (2,6-2 9) explains that, according to the express
doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass
over into the world, and, although emitting the world from
itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, ac¬
cording to Sankara, because the world is unreal; according
to Ramanuja, because the creation is merely the visible and
tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brah¬
man in a subtle imperceptible condition.
Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although des¬
titute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the
world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.
Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or,
more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating
the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but
follows a mere sportive impulse.
Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges
of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against
it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various
animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world.
Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the
merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted
from all eternity.
Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation
by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman—omniscience
and so on—are such as to capacitate it for the creation of
the world.
Pada II.
The task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments
independent of Vedic passages, the more important philo¬
sophical theories concerning the origin of the world which
are opposed to the Vedanta view.—The first adhikarazza
(1-10) is directed against the Sankhyas, whose doctrine had
already been touched upon incidentally in several previous
places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause,
such as the pradhana of the Sankhyas, is unable to create
and dispose.—The second adhikarazza (11-17) refutes the
INTRODUCTION.
li
VaLeshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set
in motion by the adrzsh/a.—The third and fourth adhika-
razzas are directed against various schools of Bauddha phi¬
losophers. Adhik. Ill (18-27) impugns the view of the
so-called sarvastitvavddins, or bahy&rthavadins, who main¬
tain the reality of an external as well as an internal world ;
Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vi^anavadins,
according to whom ideas are the only reality.—The last
Sutra of this adhikarazza is treated by Ram 4 nu^*a as a
separate adhikarazza refuting the view of the Madhyamikas,
who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing what¬
ever is real.—Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doc¬
trine of the Gainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philo¬
sophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the
material but only the operative cause of the world.
The last adhikarazza of the pada (42-45) refers, according
to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the
doctrine of the Bhagavatas or Pazz^aratras. But Sankara
and Ramanuja totally disagree as to the drift of the
Sfttrakara's opinion regarding that system. According to
the former it is condemned like the systems previously
referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.—
S&tras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise
objections against the system; Sutra 42 being directed
against the doctrine that from the highest being, called
Vasudeva, there is originated Sankarshazza, i.e. the ^iva,
on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would
be contradicted which teach the soul’s eternity; and Sutra
43 impugning the doctrine that from Sankarshazza there
springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.—The Sutra on which
the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally trans¬
lated it runs, 4 Or, on account of there being’ (or, ‘their
being’) ‘knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction
of that.’—This means, according to Sankara, 4 Or, if in
consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on
the part of Sankarshazza, &c. they be taken not as soul,
mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.),
yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection
raised in Sutra 42 against the Bhagavata doctrine).’—
d 2
lii
vedAnta-s<jtras.
According to Raminu^a, on the other hand, the Sutra
has to be explained as follows: ‘ Or, rather there is non¬
contradiction of that (i. e. the Pa^aratra doctrine) on ac¬
count of their being knowledge and so on (i. e. on account
of their being Brahman)/ Which means: Since San-
karsha^a and so on are merely forms of manifestation
of Brahman, the Pa^aratra doctrine, according to which
they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.—The form
of the Sutra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the
two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears
to me that the explanations of the ‘vd’ and of the ‘tat/
implied in R&manu^a’s comment, are more natural than
those resulting from Sankara’s interpretation. Nor would
it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pada
with a defence of that doctrine which—in spite of objec¬
tions—has to be viewed as the true one.
Pada III.
The third pada discusses the question whether the dif¬
ferent forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute
the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co¬
eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded
into it at stated intervals.
The first seven adhikara^as treat of the five elementary
substances.—Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not
co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first
effect.—Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether;
Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 13) that fire springs from air,
water from tire, earth from water.—Adhik. Ill (9) explains
by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some
special entity, but quite generally 'that which is/ cannot
have originated from anything else.
Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one
element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to
Brahman acting in it.
Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the
elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of
their emission.
Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which
INTRODUCTION.
liii
the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary sub¬
stances take place is not interfered with by the creation
and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense
organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are
of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted to¬
gether with the elements of which they consist.
The remainder of the pdda is taken up by a discussion of
the nature of the individual soul, the £*iva.—Adhik. X (16)
teaches that expressions such as 4 Devadatta is born/ 4 De-
vadatta has died/ strictly apply to the body only, and are
transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with
a body.
Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, accord¬
ing to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like
the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman
at the time of creation.—This Sutra is of course com¬
mented on in a very different manner by .Sankara on the
one hand and Ramanuja on the other. According to the
former, the ^iva is in reality identical—and as such co¬
eternal — with Brahman ; what originates is merely the
soul’s connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that con¬
nexion is moreover illusory.—According to R&manu£*a, the
^-iva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in
Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as
a mode (prak&ra) of Brahman. So indeed have also the
material elements; yet there is an important distinction
owing to which the elements may be said to originate at
the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the
soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist
in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the
qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary
experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state
at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The
souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same
essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only,
whenever a new creation takes place, they associate
themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith
undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikaj-a),
contrasting w T ith the unevolved or contracted state (san-
liv
vedAnta-s^tras.
koka) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya.
But this change is not a change of essential nature (svaru-
p&nyathabhava), and hence we have to distinguish the souls
as permanent entities from the material elements which at
the time of each creation and reabsorption change their
essential characteristics.
Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul.
The Sutra declares that the soul is ‘ gna' This means,
according to .Sankara, that intelligence or knowledge does
not, as the Vai^eshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of
the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is
the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but
knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.—Ramanuja,
on the other hand, explains ‘ gna’ by ‘ gnatri’ i.e.knower,
knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not
only against the VaLreshikas, but also against those philo¬
sophers who—like the Sinkhyas and the Vedantins of
Sankara’s school—maintain that the soul is not a knowing
agent, but pure ^aitanya.—The wording of the Sutra cer¬
tainly seems to favour Ramanuja’s interpretation; we can
hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views
of .Sankara should, when propounding the important dogma
of the soul’s nature, use the term gna of which the most
obvious interpretation is gnatri, not gnanam.
Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the
individual soul is a/m, i. e. of very minute size, or omni¬
present, all-pervading (sarvagata, vy^pin). Here, again, we
meet with diametrically opposite views.— In .Sankara’s
opinion the Stitras 19-28 represent the purvapaksha view,
according to which the giva is a/m, while Sutra 29 formu¬
lates the siddhanta, viz. that the gtva, which in reality is
all-pervading, is spoken of as anu in some scriptural passages,
because the qualities of the internal organ—which itself is
anu —constitute the essence of the individual soul as long
as the latter is implicated in the samsara .—According to
Ramanuja, on the other hand, the first Sultra of the adhi-
karana gives utterance to the siddMnta view, according to
which the soul is of minute size; the Sutras 20-25 confirm
this view and refute objections raised against it; while the
INTRODUCTION.
lv
Sfitras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under
Sutra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent
(gnatri) stands to knowledge (gnana). —In order to decide
between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations
we must enter into some details.—.Sankara maintains that
Sfitras 19-28 state and enforce a ptirvapaksha view, which is
finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is
the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prima
facie view is carried ; in no other place the Sutras take so
much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be re¬
jected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly
feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with
the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned,
but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and
vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not
altogether impossible that the purvapaksha should here be
treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is
therefore whether we can, with Sankara, look upon Sutra 29
as embodying a refutation of the purvapaksha and thus im¬
plicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul
is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that
.Sankara’s interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced.
Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word
‘ pra^avat 5 ) the Sutra runs as follows : ‘ But on account of
that quality (or “those qualities; ” or else “ on account of the
quality—or qualities—of that ”) being the essence, (there is)
that designation (or “ the designation of that 55 ).’ This .San¬
kara maintains to mean, ‘ Because the qualities of the
buddhi are the essence of the soul in the samsaxa state,
therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/m.’
Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the
explanation of the first ‘ tat 5 by buddhi. And—which is
more important — in the second place, it is more than
doubtful whether on .Sankara’s own system the qualities
of the buddhi—such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,
&c.—can with any propriety be said to constitute the
essence of the soul even in the samsara state. The essence
of the soul in whatever state, according to Sankara’s sys¬
tem, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
lvi
association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more
strictly, unreal, false.
There are no similar difficulties in the way of R&manu^a’s
interpretation of the adhikara/za. He agrees with Sankara
in the explanation of Sfitras 19-25, with-this difference that
he views them as setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the
siddh&nta. Sfitras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not
very different from .Sankara’s, special stress being laid on
the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a
mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the sub¬
stratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise
to the question how it is that Scripture in some places
makes use of the term vi^Tzana when meaning the indi¬
vidual soul. The answer is given in Sutra 29, ‘ The soul is
designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its
essence,’ i. e. because knowledge is the essential character¬
istic quality of the soul, therefore the term ‘knowledge ’ is
employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This
latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It
closely follows the wording of the text and does not
necessitate any forced supplementation. The ‘tu’ of the
Sutra which, according to Sankara, is meant to discard
the purvapaksha, serves on R 4 manu^a’s view to set aside
a previously-raised objection; an altogether legitimate
assumption.
Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/za (30-32),
30 explains, according to Sankara, that the soul may be
called a/zu, since, as long as it exists in the sa//zsara con¬
dition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to
Ramanuja the Sutra teaches that the soul may be called
vigTZclna because the latter constitutes its essential quality as
long as it exists.—Sutra 31 intimates, according to Sankara,
that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is poten¬
tially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state
that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same
Sutra, according to Raminu^a, teaches that ^zzatrztva is
properly said to constitute the soul’s essential nature,
although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul
only.—In Stitra 32, finally, Sankara sees a statement of the
INTRODUCTION.
lvii
doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting
adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or perma¬
nently non-cognizing; while, according to Rctm&nu^a, the
Stitra means that the soul would either be permanently
cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure
knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being gn&tri and
a^u, as it is in reality).—The three Sutras can be made
to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be
noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul’s
connexion with the buddhi.
Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39 ; 40) refer to the kartntva of
the £*iva, i. e. the question whether the soul is an agent.
Sutras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according
to Sankara’s system, this cannot be the final view,—the soul
being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the
world of upadhis,—he looks upon the next following Sutra
(40) as constituting an adhikara^a by itself, and teaching
that the soul is an agent when connected with the instru¬
ments of action, buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when
dissociated from them, ‘just as the carpenter acts in both
ways,’ i. e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields
his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside.—
Ramcinqg'a, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sutra
40 from the preceding Stitras, but interprets it as follows :
Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but
therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually
active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the
requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as
he pleases.
Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity
is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its
former actions.
Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the indivi¬
dual soul to Brahman. Sutra 43 declares that the individual
soul is a part (a^a) of Brahman, and the following Sutras
show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman
is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls,
or that one soul has to participate in the experiences of
other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely
lviii
VEDANTA-S$ TR AS.
different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of
Brahman. According to Riminu^a the souls are in reality
parts of Brahman 1 ; according to Sankara the ‘ az/wa ’ of
the Sfttra must be understood to mean ‘ a^a iva,’ £ a part
as it were; 5 the one universal indivisible Brahman having
no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its
limiting adjuncts. — One Sutra (50) in this adhikara/za
calls for special notice. According to Sankara the words
‘dbhasa eva k a’ mean ‘(the soul is) a mere reflection/
which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the
so-called pratibimbavada ; i. e. the doctrine that the so-called
individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in
the buddhi; while Sutra 43 had propounded the so-called
ava££^edav&da, i. e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest
Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.—According to
R&manug'a the cLbMsa of the Sutra has to be taken in the
1 6ivasya kartritvam paramapurushayattam ity uktam. Idsaiim kim ayaw
givah parasmad atyantabhinna^ uta param eva brahma bhrantam uta brahmaivo-
padhyava^Minnam atha brahmamsa. iti sa.msa.yya.te mitivipratipatte^ samsayak.
Nanu tadananyam arambha^ajabdadibhya^ adhikaw tu bhedanirde^ad ity
atraivayam artho mxmtah. Satya m sa eva nanatvaikatvamitivipratipattya
* kshipya ga vasya brahmaw^atvopapadanena vlreshato nirmyate. Yavad dhi
^ivasya brahmawsatvaw na nimitam tava^* ^ivasya brahmano * nanyatvaw
brahma^as tasmad adhikatvaw ka na pratitishMati. Ki m tavat praptam.
Atyantaw bhinna iti. Kutah. Gnagnaa dvav ityadibhedanirde.rat. Gnagnayox
abhedajrutayas tv agnina sinked itivad viruddharthapratipadanad aupa^arikya^.
Brahmano * mso ^iva ity api na sadhiya^, ekavastvekade^ava^i hy amsasabdah,
giwasya brahmaikade^atve tadgata dosha brahmam bhaveyu^. Na ka brahma-
khaWo giva ity aw^atvopapatti^ kha^ananarhatvad brahma^a^ pragukta-
doshaprasanga^ ka, tasmad atyantabhinnasya tadamsatvam durupapadam.
Yadva bhrantaw brahmaiva ^iva^. Kutak. Tat tvam asi ayam atma brah-
metyadibrahmatmabhavopadejat, nanatmatvavadinyas tu pratyakshadisiddhar-
thanuvaditvad ananyathasiddhadvaitopade^aparabhi^ .rrutibhi/6 pratyakshadayaj
ka avidyantargata^ khyapyante.—Athava brahmaivanadyupadhyava/£Minnazrc
g\\ah. Kuta h. Tata eva brahmatmabhavopade^at. Na kayam. upadhir
bhrantiparikalpita ita vaktuw sakyam bandhamokshadivyavasthanupapatter.
Ity eva m prapte ^ bhidhiyate. Brahma^wa iti. Kuta^. Nanavyapade^ad
anyatha /^aikatvena vyapade^ad ubhayatha hi vyapade.ro drisyate. Nanavya-
pade^as tavat sra shtritYasrigyatva — niyantrztvaniyamyatva — sarva^atva-
gnatva —svadhinatvaparadhinatva— juddhatva^uddhatva — kalyawagu^akarat-
vaviparitatva—patitva^eshatvadibhir dmyate. Anyatha Hbhedena vyapa-
de.ro pi tat tvam asi ayam atma brahmetyadibhir drisyate. Api da^akita-
vaditvam apy adhiyate eke, brahma da.ra brahma da.ra brahmeme kitava ity
atharvamka brahmano dsurakitavaditvam apy adhiyate, tata s ka sarva^ivavya-
pitvena abhedo vyapadiryata ity artha^. Evam ubhayavyapade.ramukhyatva-
siddhaye ^ivo^-yaw brahmano * msa ity abhyupagantavya^.
INTRODUCTION.
lix
sense of hetv&bh&sa, a fallacious argument, and the Sfitra is
explained as being directed against the reasoning of those
Vedintins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far
as limited by non-real adjuncts \
Pada IV.
Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the prazzas (by
which generic name are denoted the buddhindriyas, karmen-
driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in
number ; and are of minute size (azzu).
Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the
mukhya prazza, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman;
that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from
the pr&zzas discussed above; and that it is minute (azzu).
Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the
prazzas are superintended and guided in their activity by
special divinities, and that they are independent principles,
not mere modifications of the mukhya prazza.
Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names
and forms (the namarupavyakarazza) is the work, not of the
individual soul, but of the Lord.
THIRD ADHYAYA.
PAda I.
Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of
the body at the time of death, remains invested with the
subtle material elements (bhutasukshma) which serve as an
abode to the prazzas attached to the soul.
Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who
had enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon
descend to the earth in order to undergo a new embodi¬
ment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anusaya) of their
1 Nanu bhrantabrahma^ivavade * py avidyakrztopadhibhedad bhogavya-
vasthadaya upapadyanta ata aha, abhasa eva ka. Akha^/aikarasapraklrama-
tratvarupasya svarupatirodhanapurvakopadhibhedopapadanahetur abhasa eva.
Prakajaikasvarupasya prakajatirodhanaw prakajanaja eveti prag evopapaditam.
Abhasi eveti va p&/^a-6, tatha sati hetava abhasa^.
lx
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
former deeds which determines the nature of the new
embodiment.
Adhik. Ill (12-2,1) discusses the fate after death of those
whom their good works do not entitle to pass up to the
moon.
Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle
bodies of the souls descending from the moon through the
ether, air, &c., do not become identical with ether, air, &c.,
but only like them ; that the entire descent occupies a short
time only; and that, when the souls finally enter into plants
and so on, they do not participate in the life of the latter,
but are merely in external contact with them.
Pada II.
Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state.
According to .Sankara the three first Sfitras discuss the
question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul
in some scriptural passages produces things as real as those
by which the waking soul is surrounded, or not; Sfitra 3
settles the point by declaring that the creations of the
dreaming soul are mere 4 Maya, 5 since they do not fully
manifest the character of real objects. Sutra 4 adds that
dreams, although mere Maya, yet have a prophetic quality.
Sutras 5 and 6 finally reply to the question why the soul,
which after all is a part of the Lord and as such parti¬
cipates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in
its dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul’s
knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with
the gross body.
The considerably diverging interpretation given of this
adhikara^a by Ramanuja has the advantage of more
closely connecting the Sutras with each other. According
to him the question is not whether the creations of a dream
are real or not, but whether they are the work of the indi¬
vidual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sutras
1 and 2 set forth the purvapaksha. The creations of dreams
(are the work of the individual soul); for thus Scripture
declares: ‘ And the followers of some ^akhas declare (the
INTRODUCTION.
lxi
soul to be) a creator/ &c. The third Sutra states the
siddhanta view: ‘But the creations of dreams are Maya,
i. e. are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be
effected by the individual soul), since (in this life) the nature
(of the soul) is not fully manifested/ Concerning the word
‘ maya,’ Ramanuja remarks, ‘ maycLabdo hy askaryavaM
janakajya kule j&ta devamayeva nirmita ityadishu tatha
dananat.’ The three remaining Sutras are exhibited in
the Sri-bhashya in a different order, the fourth Sutra,
according to Sankara, being the sixth according to Rama¬
nuja. Sutras 4 and 5 (according to Ramanuja’s numera¬
tion) are explained by Ramanuja very much in the same
way as by Sankara; but owing to the former’s statement
of the subject-matter of the whole adhikara^a they connect
themselves more intimately with the preceding Sutras than
is possible on Sankara’s interpretation. In Sutra 6 (siikakas
ka hi) Ramanuja sees a deduction from the siddhanta of
the adhikara^a, ‘Because the images of a dream are pro¬
duced by the highest Lord himself, therefore they have
prophetic significance.’
Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless
sleep the soul abides within Brahman in the heart.
Adhik. Ill (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to
assume that the soul awakening from sleep is the same
that went to sleep.—Adhik. IV (9) explains the nature of
a swoon.
Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to Sankara, taken up with
the question as to the nature of the highest Brahman in
which the individual soul is merged in the state of deep
sleep. Sfitra 11 declares that twofold characteristics (viz.
absence and presence of distinctive attributes, nirvLeshatva
and savLeshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman
even through its stations, i. e. its limiting adjuncts; since
all passages which aim at setting forth Brahman’s nature
declare it to be destitute of all distinctive attributes.—The
fact, Sutra 1 % continues, that in many passages Brahman
is spoken of as possessing distinctive attributes is of no
relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned limiting ad¬
juncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially stated
Ixii
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and—Sutra
13 adds—in some places the assumption of diversity is spe¬
cially objected to.—That Brahman is devoid of all form
(Sfitra 14), is the pre-eminent meaning of all Ved 4 nta-texts
setting forth Brahman’s nature.—That Brahman is repre¬
sented as having different forms, as it were, is due to its
connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the
light of the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were,
according to the nature of the things he illuminates (15).—
The BWhad&ra/zyaka expressly declares that Brahman is
one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the same is
taught in other scriptural passages and in Smnti (17).—At
the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self,
caused by the limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural
passages in which the Self is compared to the sun, which
remains one although his reflections on the surface of the
water are many (18),—Nor must the objection be raised
that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not
material like the sun, and there are no real upadhis separate
from it as the water is from the sun ; for the comparison
merely means to indicate that, as the reflected image of
the sun participates in the changes, increase, decrease, &c.,
which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains
unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the
attributes of the upadhis, while, in so far as it is limited by
the latter, it is affected by them as it were (19, 20).—That
the Self is within the upadhis, Scripture declares (21).
From the above explanation of this important adhikara^a
the one given in the Sn-bhashya differs totally. According
to Raminu^a the adhikara^a raises the question whether
the imperfections clinging to the individual soul (the dis¬
cussion of which has now come to an end) affect also the
highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within the
soul as antaryamin. ‘ Notwithstanding the abode (of the
highest Self within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul’s
imperfections) because everywhere (the highest Self is repre¬
sented) as having twofold characteristics (viz. being, on one
hand, free from all evil, apahatapapman, wig ara, vimrztyu,
&c., and, on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious
INTRODUCTION.
Ixiii
qualities, satyak&ma, satyasa/^kalpa, &c.) (n).—Should it
be objected that, just as the soul although essentially free
from evil—according to the Pra^cipativakya in the Kh an-
dogya—yet is liable to imperfections owing to its connexion
with a variety of bodies, so the antaryamin also is affected
by abiding within bodies; we deny this because in every
section of the chapter referring to the antaryamin (in the
IWhad&ra/zyaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the
ruler within; which shows him to be free from the short¬
comings of the ^iva (is).—Some, moreover, expressly assert
that, although the Lord and the soul are within one body,
the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord (dvfi supar/za sayu^a
sakhctyd) (13).—Should it be said that, according to the
.Oandogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into
the elements previously to the evolution of names and
forms, and hence participates in the latter, thus becoming
implicated in the sa;^sara; we reply that Brahman, although
connected with such and such forms, is in itself devoid of form,
since it is the principal element (agent; pradhana) in the
bringing about of names and forms (according to ‘ aka.ro ha
vai namarupayor nirvahita’) (14).—But does not the pas¬
sage ‘ satya m ^anam anantam brahma ’ teach that Brah¬
man is nothing but light (intelligence) without any difference,
and does not the passage ‘ neti neti' deny of it all qualities ?
—As in order, we reply, not to deprive passages as the one
quoted from the Taittiriya of their purport, we admit that
Brahman’s nature is light, so we must also admit that
Brahman is satyasa^kalpa, and so on ; for if not, the pas¬
sages in which those qualities are asserted would become
purportless (15).—Moreover the Taittiriya passage only
asserts so much, viz. the praka^arupata of Brahman, and
does not deny other qualities (16).—And the passage ‘neti
neti 5 will be discussed later on.—The ubhayalingatva of
Brahman in the sense assigned above is asserted in many
places of 5 ruti and Smrzti (17)-—Because Brahman although
abiding in many places is not touched by their imperfec¬
tions, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether limited
by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).—Should it be said
that the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the
IxiV VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
sun is apprehended in the water erroneously only while the
antarydmin really abides within all things, and therefore
must be viewed as sharing their defects (19); we reply that
what the simile means to negative is merely that Brahman
should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate in
the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this
view both similes are appropriate (20).—Analogous similes
we observe to be employed in ordinary life, as when we
compare a man to a lion (21).
Sutras 22-30 constitute, according to .Sankara, a new
adhikara^a (VI), whose object it is to show that the clause
f not so, not so'(neti neti; Brzhadar.) negatives, not Brah¬
man itself, but only the two forms of Brahman described in
the preceding part of the chapter. Sutras 23-26 further
dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive
attributes which are altogether due to the upadhis. The
last four Sfttras return to the question how, Brahman being
one only, the souls are in so many places spoken of as
different from it, and, two explanatory hypotheses having
been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all difference
is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.
According to Ramanuja, Sutras 22 ff. continue the dis¬
cussion started in Sutra 11. How, the question is asked, can
the ubhayalingatva of Brahman be maintained considering
that the ‘ not so, not so ’ of the Brzhadara^yaka denies of
Brahman all the previously mentioned modes (prakara), $0
that it can only be called that which is (sanmatra) ?—The
reply given in Sutra 22 is that ‘ not so, not so ’ does not
deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared
previously (for it would be senseless at first to teach them,
and finally to deny them again 1 ), but merely denies the
prakrztaitavattva, the previously stated limited nature of
Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses only the
previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that
subsequently to ‘ neti neti ’ Scripture itself enunciates
further qualifications of Brahman.—That Brahman as stated
1 All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from Scripture only, not
from ordinary experience. If the latter were the case, then, and then only,
Scripture might at first refer to them ‘ anuvadena,’ and finally negative them.
INTRODUCTION.
Ixv
above is not the object of any other means of proof but Scrip¬
ture is confirmed in Sutra 23, ‘ Scripture declares Brahman
to be the non-manifest/—And the intuition (sdkshatkara)
of Brahman ensues only upon its sa^radhana, i.e. upon its
being perfectly pleased by the worshipper’s devotion, as
Scripture and Smrz'ti declare (24).—That this interpretation
of ‘neti ’ is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in
the same way as prakai’a, luminousness, ^/zana, intelligence,
&c., so also the quality of being differentiated by the world
(prapa^avirish/ata) is intuited as non-different, i. e. as like¬
wise qualifying Brahman ; and that prakai’a, and so on,
characterise Brahman, is known through repeated practice
(on the part of rishis like Vamadeva) in the work of
sawridhana mentioned before (25).—For all these reasons
Brahman is connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite
number of auspicious qualities; for thus the twofold indica¬
tions (linga) met with in Scripture are fully justified (26 ).—
In what relation, then, does the a£id vastu, i.e. the non-
sentient matter, which, according to the Brzhadara/zyaka,
is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the latter?—Non-
sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as special
arrangements (sa/^sthanavLesha^) of Brahman, as the coils
are of the body of the snake ; for Brahman is designated
as both, i.e. sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is
all this, &c.), sometimes as different from it (Let me enter
into those elements, &c.) (27).—Or, in the second place,
the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous to
that of light and the luminous object which are two and
yet one, both being fire (38).—Or, in the third place, the
relation is like that stated before, i.e. the material world
is, like the individual souls (whose case was discussed in
II, 3, 43), a part— ainsz .—of Brahman (29, 30).
Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical
expressions, seemingly implying that there is something
different from Brahman, have to be truly understood.
Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is
not, as Gaimini opines, the independent result of the works
acting through the so-called apurva, but is allotted by the
Lord.
[34]
e
lxvi
VEDANTA-sflTRAS.
PADA III.
With the third pada of the second adhyaya a new
section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe
how the individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brah¬
man to obtain final release. The first point to be deter¬
mined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman,
and, more particularly, in what relation those parts of
the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin identical
or partly identical meditations. The reader of the Upa¬
nishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different
jakhas contain many chapters of similar, often nearly iden¬
tical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one
and the same ^akha exhibits the same matter in more
or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that
the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas
which were in circulation at the time of the composition of
the Upanishads found separate expression in the different
priestly communities ; hence the same speculations, legends,
&c. reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in
more or less differing dress. Originally, when we may
suppose the members of each Vedic school to have confined
themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact
that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar
contents would hardly appear to call for special note or
comment; not any more than the circumstance that the
sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some
particular jakha were found described with greater or
smaller modifications in the books of other ^akhas also.
But already at a very early period, at any rate long before
the composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present
form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the
truth that, in whatever regards sacrificial acts, one sakha, may
indeed safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts
of all other Vakhas ; that, however, all texts which aim at
throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation
to it of the human soul must somehow or other be com¬
bined into one consistent systematical whole equally valid
for the followers of all Vedic schools. For, as we have had
occasion to remark above, while acts may be performed
INTRODUCTION.
lxvii
by different individuals in different ways, cognition is de¬
fined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can
be one only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence
the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful
interpretation all contradictions met with in the sacred
text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections of
the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the
same matter, and therefore must be combined in one medi¬
tation. The latter is the special task of the present pada.
Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question
whether those vidyas, which are met with in identical or
similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be con¬
sidered as constituting several vidyas, or one vidya only.
Sankara remarks that the question affects only those vidyas
whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge
of the non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely
uniform nature, can of course be one only wherever it is
set forth. But things lie differently in those cases where
the object of knowledge is the saguzzam brahma or some
outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as
well as manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating
the subject of a later adhikarazza, we may take for an
example the so-called Sazzafilyavidya which is met with in
Kh . Up. Ill, 14, again—in an abridged form—in B ri. Up.
V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the *Satapatha-
brahmazza (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a medita¬
tion on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of
which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance,
manomayatva, bharupatva), while others are peculiar to
each separate passage (pra/za^ariratva and satyasa/zzkalpatva,
for instance, being mentioned in the AVzandogya Upanishad
and Satapatha-br&hmazza, but not in the BrzTiadarazzyaka
Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvavaritva, not
referred to in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room
for a doubt whether the three passages refer to one object
of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedantin the question
is not a purely theoretical one, but of immediate practical
interest. For if the three texts are to be held apart, there are
three different meditations to be gone through ; if, on the
e 2
lxviii
vedAnta-s6tras.
other hand, the vidya is one only, all the different qualities
of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be
combined into one meditation.—The decision is here, as in
all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative. A
careful examination of the three passages shows that the
object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation also
is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in
the three texts.
Adhik. Ill (6-8) discusses the case of vidyas being really
separate, although apparently identical. The examples
selected are the udgithavidyas of the .Oandogya Upanishad
(I, 1-3) and the Brzhadara/zyaka Upanishad (I, 3), which,
although showing certain similarities—such as bearing the
same name and the udgitha being in both identified with
prazza—yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the
Khk .ndogya vidya is not the whole udgitha but only the
sacred syllable Om, while the Brzhadarazzyaka Upanishad
represents the whole udgitha as the object of meditation.
Sfitra 9 constitutes in .Sankara’s view a new adhikarazza
(IV), proving that in the passage, ‘ Let a man meditate ’
( Kh . Up. I, 1, 1), the Oz^kara and the udgitha stand in the
relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being,
f Let a man meditate on that Ozzzkara which/ &c.—Ac¬
cording to Ramanuja’s interpretation, which seems to fall
in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the
Sutra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument
for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikarazza.—
Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called prazza-
vidy&s and the consequent comprehension of the different
qualities of the prazza, which are mentioned in the different
texts, within one meditation.
Adhik. VI comprises, according to .Sankara, the Sutras
11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the medi¬
tations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or
only those mentioned in the special vidya. The decision
is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman,
such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account
everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as,
for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, men-
INTRODUCTION.
lxix
tioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special medita¬
tions.—Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to .Sankara, aims at
proving that the object of Ka/^a Up. Ill, 10, 11 is one
only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than
everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidya only.
—Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to .Sankara,
that the Self spoken of in Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower
form of the Self (the so-called sutr^tman), but the highest
Self; the discussion of that point in this place being due to
the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest Self
have to be comprehended in the Aitareyaka meditation.
According to Rdmanu^ci the Sutras 11-17 constitute a
single adhikara/za whose subject is the same as that of
.Sankara’s sixth adhikara/za. Sfitras 11-13 are > on the
whole, explained as by .Sankara; Sutra 12, however, is
said to mean, ‘ Such attributes as having joy for its head,
&c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and
therefore not to be included in every meditation ; for if
they were admitted as qualities, difference would be intro¬
duced into Brahman’s nature, and that would involve a
more or less on Brahman’s part.’ Sfitras 14-17 continue
the discussion of the passage about the priya.nrastva.—If
priya^irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of
Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them ?—
‘ Because,’ Sutra 14 replies, ‘ there is no other purpose,
Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious medita¬
tion.’—But how is it known that the Self of delight is the
highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having
limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)—‘ Be¬
cause,’ Sutra 15 replies/ the term “ Self” (atma anandamaya)
is applied to it.’—But in the previous parts of the chapter
the term Self (in atm& pra/zamaya, &c.) is applied to non-
Selfs also; how then do you know that in atma dnanda-
maya it denotes the real Self?—‘The term Self,’ Sutra 16
replies, ‘ is employed here to denote the highest Self as in
many other passages (atmi va idam eka, &c.), as we con¬
clude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, May I
be many.’—But, an objection is raised, does not the con¬
text show that the term ‘ Self,’ which in all the preceding
lxx
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
clauses about the prazzamaya, &c. denoted something other
than the Self, does the same in anandamaya atman, and
is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent
passage?—To this question asked in the former half of 17
(anvayad iti kdt) the latter half replies, £ Still it denotes the
Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,’ i.e. the fact of the
highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage
also, viz. II, 1, £ From that Self sprang ether/
Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with
the prazzasaz/zvada.—The subject of Adhik. X (19) has
been indicated already above under Adhik. I.—Adhik. XI
(20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature; in Brz. Up.
V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of
the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we therefore,
in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two
separate vidyas.—Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case;
certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Razzaya-
niya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding
AVzandogya vidya, because the stated difference of Brah¬
man’s abode involves difference of vidya.—Adhik. XIII
(24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be
held apart.
Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras
and brahmazza passages met with in the beginning of some
Upanishads—as, for instance, a brahmazza about the maha-
vrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-arazzyaka
—do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect
them with the brahmavidya, not belong to the latter, since
they show unmistakable signs of being connected with
sacrificial acts.
Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the
man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off
all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement,
made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the
good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies
of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.
Sutras 27-30 constitute, according to /Sankara, two adhi-
karazzas of which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the
shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place—not, as
INTRODUCTION.
lxxl
the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman’s world—
but at the moment of the soul’s departure from the body;
the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken
literally.—The latter adhikarazza (XVII; 29, 30) treats of
the cognate question whether the soul that has freed itself
from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the gods
(as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that he
only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the saguzzam
brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who
knows the nirguzzam brahma becomes one with it without
moving to any other place.
The .Sri-bhashya treats the four Sutras as one adhikarazza
whose two first Sutras are explained as by .Sankara, while
Sutra 29 raises an objection to the conclusion arrived at,
‘ the going (of the soul on the path of the gods) has a sense
only if the soul’s freeing itself from its works takes place
in both ways, i. e. partly at the moment of death, partly on
the road to Brahman 5 for otherwise there would be a con¬
tradiction 5 (the contradiction being that, if the soul’s works
were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body
would likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodi¬
less soul would be unable to proceed on the path of the
gods).—To this Sutra 30 replies, ‘The complete shaking off
of the works at the moment of death is possible, since
matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,’ i. e. since
scriptural passages show that even he whose works are
entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his
true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body ; com¬
pare the passage, ‘para m ^yotir upasampadya svena rupe-
zzabhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti krn/an ramamana/^ sa
svar kd bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kama^aro bhavati.’
That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul’s
vidyamahatmya.—That the explanation of the .Sri-bhashya
agrees with the text as well as .Sankara’s, a comparison of
the two will show; especially forced is .Sankara’s explana¬
tion of ‘ arthavattvam ubhayatha,’ which is said to mean
that there is arthavattva in one case, and non-arthavattva
in the other case.
The next Sutra (31) constitutes an adhikarazza (XVIII)
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
lxxil
deciding that the road of the gods is followed not only by
those knowing the vidyas which specially mention the
going on that road, but by all who are acquainted with the
saguzza-vidyas of Brahman.—The explanation given in the
•Sri-bhashya (in which Stitras 31 and 33 have exchanged
places) is similar, with the difference however that all who
meditate on Brahman—without any reference to the dis¬
tinction of nirguzza and saguzza—proceed after death on the
road of the gods. (The 6ri-bhashya reads ‘sarveshdm,’
i. e. all worshippers, not ‘ sarvasam/ all saguzza-vidyas.)
Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect
of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet
even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may
retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices.
—In the Sri-bhashya, where the Sutra follows immediately
on Sfitra 30, the adhikarazza determines, in close connexion
with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule
divest themselves of the gross body—there remaining only
a subtle body which enables them to move—and no longer
experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although
having reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested
with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain
until they have fully performed certain duties.
Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of
Brahman mentioned in some vidyas—such as its being not
gross, not subtle, &c.—are to be included in all meditations
on Brahman.—Adhik. XXI (34) determines that Ka/fe Up.
Ill, 1, and Mu. Up. Ill, 1, constitute one vidya only, because
both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According
to Ramanuja the Sfitra contains a reply to an objection
raised against the conclusion arrived at in the preceding
Sutra.—Adhik. XXII (35, 36) maintains that the two
passages, Bri. Up. Ill, 4 and III, 5, constitute one vidya
only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman
viewed as the inner Self of all.—Adhik. XXIII (37) on the
contrary decides that the passage Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6 con¬
stitutes not one but two meditations.—Adhik. XXIV (38)
again determines that the vidyi of the True contained in
Bri. Up. V, 4, 5, is one only.—According to Rimanu^a,
INTRODUCTION/
Sfitras 35-38 constitute one adhikara^a only whose subject
is the same as that of XXII according to Sankara.
Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Kh . Up.
VIII, 1 and Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidya,
since the former refers to Brahman as possessing qualities,
while the latter is concerned with Brahman as destitute of
qualities.—Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats, according to .San¬
kara, of a minor question connected with Kh. Up. V, 11 ff.
—According to the .Srt-bhashya, Sutras 39-41 form one
adhikara^a whose first Sfitra reaches essentially the same
conclusion as .Sankara under 39. Sutras 40, 41 thereupon
discuss a general question concerning the meditations on
Brahman. The qualities, an opponent is supposed to re¬
mark, which in the two passages discussed are predicated of
Brahman—such as va^itva, satyakamatva, &c.—cannot be
considered real (paramarthika), since other passages (sa esha
neti neti, and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all
qualities. Hence those qualities cannot be admitted into
meditations whose purpose is final release.—To this objec¬
tion Stitra 40 replies, ‘(Those qualities) are not to be left out
(from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passages
under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated
with emphasis 1 /—But, another objection is raised, Scrip¬
ture says that he who meditates on Brahman as satyakama,
&c. obtains a mere perishable reward, viz. the world of the
fathers, and similar results specified in Kh . Up. VIII, 2;
hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not include
those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.—To this ob¬
jection Sutra 41 replies, ‘Because that (i.e. the free roaming
in all the worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as
proceeding therefrom (i. e. the approach to Brahman which
is final release) in the case of (the soul) which has approached
Brahman ;' (therefore a person desirous of release, may
include satyakamatva, &c. in his meditations.)
1 Ramanuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability of qualities
emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one passage, having to be set
aside in any meditation: ‘ Na £a matapitWsahasrebhyo s pi vatsalataraw
jastraw pratarakavad aparamarthikau nirasaniyau guwau pramawantaraprati-
pannau adarewopadlrya sawsara^akraparivartanena purvam eva bambhramya-
m&nan mumukshhn bhftyo * pi bhramayitum alam,’
Ixxiv
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which
are connected with certain matters forming constituent parts
of sacrificial actions, are not to be considered as perma¬
nently requisite parts of the latter.—Adhik. XXVIII (43)
teaches that, in a Bri. Up. passage and a similar Kh. Up.
passage, Vayu and Pr&;za are not to be identified, but to be
held apart.—Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the fire-
altars made of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agni-
rahasya, do not constitute parts of the sacrificial action
(so that the mental, &c. construction of the altar could
optionally be substituted for the actual one), but merely
subjects of meditations.
Adhik. XXX (53,54) treats, according to .Sankara, in the
way of digression, of the question whether to the Self an
existence independent of the body can be assigned, or not
(as the Materialists maintain).—According to the 5 ri-bh&-
shya the adhikara^a does not refer to this wide question,
but is concerned with a point more immediately connected
with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question as to
the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the
meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sutras
then have to be translated as follows: ‘ Some (maintain
that the soul of the devotee has, in meditations, to be
viewed as possessing those attributes only which belong to
it in its embodied state, such as gnatritva and the like),
because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.*
-—The next Sutra rejects this view, ‘ This is not so, but the
separatedness (i. e. the pure isolated state in which the Self
is at the time of final release when it is freed from all evil,
&c.) (is to be transferred to the meditating Self), because
that will be 1 the state (of the Self in the condition of final
release). 5
Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected
with constituent elements of the sacrifice, such as the
udgitha, are, in spite of difference of svara in the udgitha,
&c., valid, not only for that sakha. in which the medita¬
tion actually is met with, but for all Vakhas.—Adhik.
1 The *Sri-bhashya as well as several other commentaries reads tadbh&va*
bhavitvat for .Sankara’s tadbhavabhavitvat.
INTRODUCTION.
lxxV
XXXII (57) decides that the Vabvanara Agni of Kh. Up.
V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his
single parts.—Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those
meditations which refer to one subject, but as distinguished
by different qualities, have to be held apart as different
meditations. Thus the daharavidya, .Sa/zafilyavidya, &c>
remain separate.
Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on
Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit
are optional, there being no reason for their being cumu¬
lated.—Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those meditations,
on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be
cumulated or optionally employed according to choice.—
Adhik. XXXVI (61-66) extends this conclusion to the
meditations connected with constituent elements of action,
such as the udgitha.
Pada IV.
Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman
is not kratvartha, i. e. subordinate to action, but indepen¬
dent.—Adhik. II (18-20) confirms this conclusion by show¬
ing that the state of the pravra^ins is enjoined by the
sacred law, and that for them vidyd only is prescribed,
not action.—Adhik. Ill (21, 22) decides that certain clauses
forming part of vidyas are not mere stutis (arthavadas), but
themselves enjoin the meditation.—The legends recorded
in the Vedanta-texts are not to be used as subordinate
members of acts, but have the purpose of glorifying—as
arthavadas—the injunctions with which they are connected
(Adhik. IV, 23, 24).—For all these reasons the urdhvare-
tasa^ require no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V,
25).—Nevertheless the actions enjoined by Scripture, such
as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds, &c., are required as
conducive to the rise of vidya in the mind (Adhik. VI, 26,
27).—Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws
regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need
(Adhik. VII, 28-31).—The ajramakarmam are obligatory
on him also who does not strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII,
lxxvi
vedAnta-s^tras.
33-35).—Those also who, owing to poverty and so on, are
anlsrama have claims to vidyd (Adhik. IX, 36-39).—An
tirdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).—Ex¬
piation of the fall of an firdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).—
Exclusion of the fallen urdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik.
XII, 43).—Those meditations, which are connected with
subordinate members of the sacrifice, are the business of
the priest, not of the ya^*amana (Adhik. XIII, 44-46).—
B ri. Up. Ill, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to
balya and pa^ditya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).—By balya is to
be understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik.
XV, 50).
Sfitras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Rdmanu^a, the
question when the vidya, which is the result of the means
described in III, 4, arises. Sutra 51 treats of that vidyd
whose result is mere exaltation (abhyudaya), and states
that ‘it takes place in the present life, if there is not
present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmantara (in
which latter case the vidya arises later only), on account of
Scripture declaring this (in various passages).’—Sfitra 52,
‘Thus there is also absence of a definite rule as to (the
time of origination of) that knowledge whose fruit is release,
it being averred concerning that one also that it is in the
same condition (i. e. of sometimes having an obstacle, some¬
times not).—.Sankara, w r ho treats the two Sutras as two
adhikara^as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while,
putting a somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes
it out to mean that a more or less is possible only in the
case of the sagu^a-vidyds.
FOURTH ADHYAYA,
PAda I.
Adhikara^a I (1, 2 ).—The meditation on the Atman
enjoined by Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once
only, but is to be repeated again and again.
Adhik. II (3).—The devotee engaged in meditation on
Brahman is to view it as constituting his own Self.
INTRODUCTION.
lxxvii
Adhik. Ill (4).—To the rule laid down in the preceding
adhikara^a the so-called prattkopasanas, i. e. those medita¬
tions in which Brahman is viewed under a symbol or out¬
ward manifestation (as, for instance, mano brahmety upasita)
constitute an exception, i. e. the devotee is not to consider
the pratika as constituting his own Self.
Adhik. IV (5).—In the pratikopasanas the pratika is to
be meditatively viewed as being one with Brahman, not
Brahman as being one with the pratika.—Ramanuja takes
Sutra 5 as simply giving a reason for the decision arrived
at under Sutra 4, and therefore as not constituting a new
adhikara^a.
Adhik. V (6).—In meditations connected with constitu-
tives of sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evasau tapati
tarn udgitham upasita) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be
transferred to the sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the
example quoted, for instance, the udgitha is to be viewed as
Aditya, not Aditya as the udgitha.
Adhik. VI (7-10).—The devotee is to carry on his medi¬
tations in a sitting posture.—Sankara maintains that this
rule does not apply to those meditations whose result is
sa^yagdanrana; but the Sutra gives no hint to that effect.
Adhik.VII (11).—The meditations may be carried on at any
time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind.
Adhik. VIII (12).—The meditations are to be continued
until death.—Sankara again maintains that those medita¬
tions which lead to sa^yagdansana are excepted.
Adhik. IX (13).—When through those meditations the
knowledge of Brahman has been reached, the vidvan is no
longer affected by the consequences of either past or future
evil deeds.
Adhik. X (14).—Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.
—The literal translation of the Sutra is, ‘ There is likewise
non-attachment (to the vidvan) of the other (i.e. of the
deeds other than the evil ones, i.e. of good deeds), but on
the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes place)/ The
last words of the Sfitra, ‘ but on the fall,’ are separated by
Sankara from the preceding part of the Sutra and interpreted
to mean, ‘ when death takes place (there results mukti of
lxxviii
vedanta-s£jtras.
the vidvan, who through his knowledge has freed himself
from the bonds of works).’-—According to R 4 m 4 nu^*a the
whole Sutra simply means, ‘ There is likewise non-attach¬
ment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is
reached), but on the death of the vidvan V
Adhik. XI (15).—The non-operation of works stated in
the two preceding adhikara/zas holds good only in the case
of anclrabdhakcirya works, i. e. those works which have not
yet begun to produce their effects, while it does not extend
to the arabdhak^rya works on which the present existence of
the devotee depends.
Adhik. XII (16, 17).—From the rule enunciated in Adhik.
X are excepted such sacrificial performances as are enjoined
permanently (nitya): so, for instance, the agnihotra, for
they promote the origination of knowledge.
Adhik. XIII (18).—The origination of knowledge is
promoted also by such sacrificial works as are not accom¬
panied with the knowledge of the upasanas referring to the
different members of those works.
Adhik. XIV (19).—The arabdhakarya works have to be
worked out fully by the fruition of their effects ; whereupon
the vidvan becomes united with Brahman.—The £ bhoga ’
of the Sutra is, according to vSankara, restricted to the
present existence of the devotee, since the complete know¬
ledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which other¬
wise would lead to future embodiments. According to
Ramanuja a number of embodied existences may have to
be gone through before the effects of the ctrabdhakarya
works are exhausted.
Pada II.
This and the two remaining padas of the fourth adhyaya
describe the fate of the vidvan after death. According to
vSankara we have to distinguish the vidvan who possesses
the highest knowledge, viz. that he is one with the highest
1 Nanu vidushoxpi setikartavyatakopasananirvrzttaye vri’sh/yannadiphala-
nishZany eva katha m tesha m virodhad vinajra u^yate. Tatraha pate tv iti.
.Sarirapate tu tesha m vin&sa/i j-arirapatad urdhvaw tu vidyanuguwadmhZa-
phalani sukntani na-ryantity artha h.
INTRODUCTION.
lxxix
Brahman, and the vidvan who knows only the lower Brah¬
man, and have to refer certain Sutras to the former and
others to the latter. According to Rcimanu^a the vidvan
is one only.
Adhik. I, II, III (1-6).—On the death of the vidvan (i.e.
of him who possesses the lower knowledge, according to
.Sankara) his senses are merged in the manas, the manas in
the chief vital air (pr&^a), the vital air in the individual
soul (^*iva), the soul in the subtle elements.—According to
Rclm&nug'a the combination (sampatti) of the senses with
the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sa^yoga), not a
merging (laya).
Adhik. IV (7).—The vidvan (i.e. according to Sankara,
he who possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidv&n,
i.e. he who does not possess any knowledge of Brahman,
pass through the same stages (i.e. those described hitherto)
up to the entrance of the soul, together with the subtle
elements, and so on into the n&/is.—The vidv&n also
remains connected with the subtle elements because he has
not yet completely destroyed avidya, so that the immor¬
tality which Scripture ascribes to him (amr/tatva;^ hi vidvan
abhyajnute) is only a relative one.—Ramanuja quotes the
following text regarding the immortality of the vidvan :
c Yada sarve pramu^yante kima ye*sya hr/di sthita^
atha martyo * mrito bhavaty atra brahma samaj-nute/
and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to
the vidvan as soon as he abandons all desires can only
mean the destruction—mentioned in the preceding pada—
of all the effects of good and evil works, while the ‘ reaching
of Brahman ’ can only refer to the intuition of Brahman
vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.
Adhik. V (8-i 1) raises, according to Sankara, the ques¬
tion whether the subtle elements of which Scripture says
that they are combined with the highest deity (te^*a^
parasyaw devatay&m) are completely merged in the latter
or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the
elements takes place only when final emancipation is
reached; that, on the other hand, as long as the sa^sara
state lasts, the elements, although somehow combined with
lxxx
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able to form new
bodies for the soul.
According to RAmanu^a the Stitras 8-n do not con¬
stitute a new adhikara«a, but continue the discussion of
the point mooted in 7. The immortality there spoken of
does not imply the separation of the soul from the body,
‘ because Scripture declares sa#/sara, i. e. embodiedness up
to the reaching of Brahman ’ (tasya tdvad eva kiram yivan
na vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8).—That the soul after
having departed from the gross body is not disconnected
from the subtle elements, is also proved hereby, that the
subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from authority 1
(9).—Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural
passage quoted is not effected by means of the total
destruction of the body (10).
Adhik. VI (13-14) is of special importance.—According
to Sankara the Sfttras now turn from the discussion of the
departure of him who possesses the lower knowledge only to
the consideration of what becomes of him who has reached
the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught that in the
case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidyd)
the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on,
depart from the body of the dying devotee ; this implies at
the same time that they do not depart from the body of
the dying sage who knows himself to be one with Brahman.
-—Against this latter implied doctrine Sutra 12 is supposed
to formulate an objection. c If it be said that the departure
of the pranas from the body of the dying sage is denied
(viz. in B ri. Up. IV, 4, 5, na tasya pra^a utkramanti, of him
the pr&nas do not pass out); we reply that in that passage
the genitive “tasya” has the sense of the ablative “tasmat,”
so that the sense of the passage is, “from him, i.e. from the
<£*iva of the dying sage, the pranas do not depart, but
remain with it.” ’—This objection .Sankara supposes to be
disposed of in Sutra 13. ‘By some there is given a clear
denial of the departure of the pranas in the case of the
1 Upalabhyate hi devayanena pantha ga^Mato vidushas tam pratibruyat
satyam bruyad iti ^andramasa sawvadava^anena jarirasadbhava^, 2X2J1 sukshma-
jariram anuvartate.
INTRODUCTION.
Ixxxi
dying sage,’ viz. in the passage B ri. Up. Ill, 2, 11, where
Ya^avalkya instructs Artabhaga that, when this man dies,
the pranas do not depart from it (asmat; the context
showing that asmat means ‘ from it,’ viz. from the body,
and not ‘ from him/ viz. the £*iva).—The same view is,
moreover, confirmed by Smrzti passages.
According to Rcimanu£*a the three Sutras forming San¬
kara’s sixth adhikara^a do not constitute a new adhikara^a
at all, and, moreover, have to be combined into two Sutras.
The topic continuing to be discussed is the utkranti of the
vidvan. If, Sfttra 12 says, the utkranti of the pranas is not
admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to be
contained in Bn. Up. IV, 4, 5 \ the reply is that the sense
of the tasya there is ‘ jarirat 5 (so that the passage means,
‘ from him, i. e. the £*iva, the pranas do not depart ’); for
this is clearly shown by the reading of some, viz. the
Madhyandinas, who, in their text of the passage, do not
read ‘ tasya ’ but ‘ tasmat.’—With reference to the instruc¬
tion given by Ya^avalkya to Artabhaga, it is to be
remarked that nothing there shows the ‘ ayam purusha * to
be the sage who knows Brahman.—And, finally, there are
Smrzti passages declaring that the sage also when dying
departs from the body.
Adhik. VII and VIII (15,16) teach, according to Sankara,
that, on the death of him who possesses the higher know¬
ledge, his pranas, elements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so
as to be no longer distinct from it in any way.
According to Ramanuja the two Sutras continue the
teaching about the pranas, bhfttas, &c. of the vidvan in
general, and declare that they are finally merged in Brah¬
man, not merely in the way of conjunction (sawyoga), but
completely 1 .
Adhik. IX (17).—Sankara here returns to the owner of
the apara vidya, while Ramanuja continues the description
of the utkranti of his vidvan.—The £*iva of the dying man
1 When the ^iva has passed out of the body and ascends to the world of
Brahman, it remains enveloped by the subtle body until it reaches the river
Vi^ara. There it divests itself of the subtle body, and the latter is merged in
Brahman.
[34]
lxxxii
vedanta-s6tras.
passes into the heart, and thence departs out of the body by
means of the nadis ; the vidvan by means of the na d!i called
sushum^a, the avidvan by means of some other na d\.
Adhik. X (18, 19).—The departing soul passes up to the
sun by means of a ray of light which exists at night as well
as during day.
Adhik. XI (20, 21).—Also that vidvan who dies during
the dakshb/ayana reaches Brahman.
Pada III.
Adhik. I, II, III (1—3) reconcile the different accounts
given in the Upanishads as to the stations of the way which
leads the vidvan up to Brahman.
Adhik. IV (4-6).—By the ‘ stations’ we have, however, to
understand not only the subdivisions of the way but also
the divine beings which lead the soul on.
The remaining part of the pada is by Sankara divided
into two adhikara^as. Of these the former one (7—14)
teaches that the Brahman to which the departed soul is led
by the guardians of the path of the gods is not the highest
Brahman, but the effected (karya) or qualified (sagu^a)
Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sutras 7-11 by
Badari, and, finally, accepted by Sankara in his commentary
on Sutra 14. In Sutras 12-14 Caimini defends the opposite
view, according to which the soul of the vidvan goes to the
highest Brahman, not to the karyam brahma. But £ai-
mini’s view, although set forth in the latter part of the
adhikara^a, is, according to Sankara, a mere purvapaksha,
while Badari’s opinion represents the siddhanta. — The
latter of the two adhikara^as (VI of the whole pada; 15, 16)
records the opinion of Badaraya^a on a collateral question,
viz. whether, or not, all those who worship the effected Brah¬
man are led to it. The decision is that those only are
guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a
pratika form.
According to Ramanuja, Sfitras 7—16 form one adhikara^a
only, in which the views of Badari and of Gaimini represent
two purvapakshas, while Badaraya^a’s opinion is adopted
INTRODUCTION.
Ixxxiii
as the siddhanta. The question is whether the guardians
of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship the
effected Brahman, i. e. Hira?/yagarbha, or those who worship
the highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual
soul as free from Prakrzti, and having Brahman for its Self
(ye pratyagatmana/^ prakrztiviyukta;^ brahmatmakam upa-
sate).—The first view is maintained by Badari in Sutra 7,
4 The guardians lead to Brahman those who worship the
effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the
latter only;’ for no movement can take place towards the
highest and as such omnipresent Brahman.—The explana¬
tion of Sfttra 9 is similar to that of .Sankara; but more clearly
replies to the objection (that, if Hirazzyagarbha were meant
in the passage, 4 purusho*manava^ sa etan brahma gama-
yati,’ the text would read 4 sa etan brahmazzam gamayati ’)
that Hirazzyagarbha is called Brahman on account of his
nearness to Brahman, i.e.on account of his prathama^atva.—
The explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in .San¬
kara ; so also of 12-14.—The siddhanta view is established
in Shtra 13, 4 It is the opinion of B&darayazza that it, i. e. the
gazza of the guardians, leads to Brahman those who do not
take their stand on what is pratika, i. e. those who worship
the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the indi¬
vidual Self as dissociated from prakrzti, and having Brahman
for its Self, but not those who worship Brahman under
pratikas. For both views—that of Gaimini as well as that
of Badari—are faulty.’ The karya view contradicts such
passages as 4 asma^ ^arirat samutthaya paraz^ ^yotir upa-
sampadya,’ &c.; the para view, such passages as that in the
pazz^agni-vidya, which declares that ya itthazzz vi&uk, i. e.
those who know the pa^agni-vidya, are also led up to
Brahman.
Pada IV.
Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to Sankara, to the
owner of the para vidya, and teaches that, when on his
death his soul obtains final release, it does not acquire any
new characteristics, but merely manifests itself in its true
nature.—The explanation given by Ramanuja is essentially
f 2
lxxxlv
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
the same, but of course refers to that vidvan whose going to
Brahman had been described in the preceding pada.
Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the
released soul stands to Brahman is that of avibhaga, non¬
separation. This, on Sankara's view, means absolute non¬
separation, identity.—According to Ramanuja the question
to be considered is whether the released soul views itself as
separate (pmhagbhhta) from Brahman, or as non-separate
because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is
favoured by those 5 ruti and SnWti passages which speak
of the soul as being with, or equal to, Brahman ; the latter
by such passages as tat tvam asi and the like 1 .
Adhik, III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the re¬
leased soul (i.e. of the truly released soul, according to
vSankara). According to Gaimini the released soul, when
manifesting itself in its true nature, possesses all those quali¬
ties which i n Kk. Up. VIII, 7,1 and other places are ascribed
to Brahman, such as apahatapcipmatva, satyasawkalpatva,
&c., alsvarya.—According to Au^ulomi the only character¬
istic of the released soul is ^aitanya.—According to Badara-
yana the two views can be combined (Garikara remarking
that satyasa;/zkalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul
vyavaharapekshaya).
Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to .Sankara, to the
aparct vidya, and discusses the question whether the soul of
1 Kim aya m paraw f ^yotir upasampanna/fc sarvabandhavinirmukta^ pratya-
gatma svatmanaw paramatmana^ przthagbhutam anubhavati uta tatprakarataya
tadavibhaktam iti viraye so*mute sarvan kaman saha brahma^a vipa^ita
pajya^ pajyate rukmavamaw kartaram \sam purushaw brahmayoniw tada
vidvan purcyapape vidhilya mxafigaaah paramaw samyam upaiti ida m gnanam
upamtya mama sadharmyam agatah sarve * pi nopa^ayante pralayena vyathanti
^etyadijrutisnmtibhyo muktasya pare^a sahityasamyasadharmyavagamat
prAhagbhdtam anubhavatiti prapte u^yate. Avibhageneti. Parasmad brahma-
nah svatmanam avibhagenanubhavati mukta^. Kutak. DrzshAitvat. Far am
brahmopasampadya nivrzttavidyatirodhanasya yathatathyena svatmano drishfa-
tvat. Svatmana^ svarupaw hi tat tvam asy ayam atma brahma aitadatmyam
ida m sarva m sarvaw khalv ida m brahmetyadisamanadhikara^yanirdemi^ ya
atmani tishfkan atmano * ntaro yam atma na veda yasyatma sariram ya
atmanam antaro yamayati atmantaryamy amnta^ anta h pravishfe/z rnsta
^ananam ityadibhu ka paramatmatmakam ta^^arirataya tatprakarabhutam iti
pratipaditam avasthiter iti karakrztsnety atrato * vibhagenahaw brahmasmity
evanubhavati.
INTRODUCTION.
lxxxv
the pious effects its desires by its mere determination, or
uses some other means. The former alternative is ac¬
cepted.—According to Ramanuja the adhikarawa simply
continues the consideration of the state of the released,
begun in the preceding adhikarawa. Of the released soul it
is said in Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3 that after it has manifested
itself in its true nature it moves about playing and rejoicing
with women, carriages, and so on. The question then arises
whether it effects all this by its mere sawzkalpa (it having
been shown in the preceding adhikarawa that the released
soul is, like the Lord, satyasawkalpa), or not. The answer
is in favour of the former alternative, on account of the
explicit declaration made in Kh. Up.VIII, 2, ‘By his mere
will the fathers come to receive him.’
Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied
or disembodied according to their wish and will.
Adhik. VI (11,12) explains how the soul of the released
can animate several bodies at the same time.—Sutra 12 gives,
according to Sankara, the additional explanation that those
passages which declare the absence of all specific cognition
on the part of the released soul do not refer to the partly
released soul of the devotee, but either to the soul in the
state of deep sleep (svapyaya = sushupti), or to the fully
released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).—R&manu^a
explains that the passages speaking of absence of conscious¬
ness refer either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time
of dying (sampatti = marawam according to ‘ van manasi
sampadyate,’ &c.).
Adhik. VII (17-21).—The released ^ivas participate in all
the perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception
of the power of creating and sustaining the world. They
do not return to new forms of embodied existence.
After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted
with the contents of the Brahma-sutras according to the
views of .Sankara as well as Ramanuja, we have now
to consider the question which of the two modes of
interpretation represents—or at any rate more closely
approximates to—the true meaning of the Sutras. That
lxxxvl
vedanta-sOtras.
few of the Sutras are intelligible if taken by themselves, we
have already remarked above; but this does not exclude
the possibility of our deciding with a fair degree of cer¬
tainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees
better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.
We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very
numerous discrepancies,—of which only the more important
ones have been singled out in the conspectus of contents,—
the two commentators are at one as to the general drift of
the Sutras and the arrangement of topics. As a rule, the
adhikara/zas discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing
upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority
of cases the two commentators agree as to which are the
special texts referred to. And, moreover, in a very large
number of cases the agreement extends to the interpreta¬
tion to be put on those passages and on the Sutras. This
far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a
certain confidence as to the existence of an old tradition
concerning the meaning of the Sutras on which the bulk of
the interpretations of Sankara as well as of Ramanuja are
based.
But at the same time we have seen that, in a not incon¬
siderable number of cases, the interpretations of Sankara
and Ramanuja diverge more or less widely, and that
the Sutras affected thereby are, most of them, especially
important because bearing on fundamental points of the
Vedanta system. The question then remains which of the
two interpretations is entitled to preference.
Regarding a small number of Sutras I have already (in
the conspectus of contents) given it as my opinion that
Ramanuja’s explanation appears to be more worthy of
consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a number
of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the
literal meaning of a Sutra, but where Sankara sees him¬
self reduced to the necessity of supplementing his inter¬
pretation by certain additions and reservations of his own
for which the text gives no occasion, while Ramanuja is
able to take the Sutra as it stands. To exemplify this
remark, I again direct attention to all those Sutras which in
INTRODUCTION.
lxxxvii
clear terms represent the individual soul as something dif¬
ferent from the highest soul, and concerning which .Sankara
is each time obliged to have recourse to the plea of the
Sfttra referring, not to what is true in the strict sense of
the word, but only to what is conventionally looked upon as
true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that .San¬
kara’s interpretation should represent the real meaning of
the Sutras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms em¬
ployed by Dr. Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an
exoteric doctrine adapted to the common notions of man¬
kind, which, however, can be rightly understood by him
only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while
present. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point
which requires convincing proofs before it can be allowed.—
We have had, in the second place, to note a certain number
of adhikarazzas and Sutras concerning whose interpretation
.Sankara and Ramanuja disagree altogether; and we have
seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the
latter commentator appear to be preferable because falling
in more easily with the words of the text. The most
striking instance of this is afforded by the 13th adhikarazza
of II, 3, which treats of the size of the jiva, and where
Ramanuja’s explanation seems to be decidedly superior to
Sankaras, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole
adhikarazza and to the wording of the single Sutras. The
adhikarazza is, moreover, a specially important one, be¬
cause the nature of the view held as to the size of the indi¬
vidual soul goes far to settle the question what kind of
Vedanta is embodied in Badarayazza’s work.
But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpre¬
tations of a few detached Sutras, but to make the attempt
at least of forming some opinion as to the relation of the
Vedanta-sutras as a whole to the chief distinguishing
doctrines of Sankara as well as Ramanuja. Such an
attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results;
but in the present state of the enquiry even a merely
negative result, viz. the conclusion that the Sutras do not
teach particular doctrines found in them by certain com¬
mentators, will not be without its value.
lxxxviii
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
The first question we wish to consider in some detail is
whether the Sutras in any way favour .Sankara's doctrine
that we have to distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brah¬
man, a higher knowledge which leads to the immediate
absorption, on death, of the individual soul in Brahman,
and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an
exalted form of individual existence. The adhyaya first to
be considered in this connexion is the fourth one. According
to .Sankara the three latter padas of that adhyaya are
chiefly engaged in describing the fate of him who dies in
the possession of the lower knowledge, while two sections
(IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him
who, before his death, had risen to the knowledge of
the highest Brahman. According to Ramanuja, on the
other hand, the three padas, referring throughout to one
subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the succes¬
sive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord
through the Upanishads passes, at the time of death, out of
the gross body which it had tenanted, ascends to the world
of Brahman, and lives there for ever without returning into
the sa^s&ra.
On an a priori view of the matter it certainly appears
somewhat strange that the concluding section of the Sutras
should be almost entirely taken up with describing the fate
of him who has after all acquired an altogether inferior
knowledge only, and has remained shut out from the true
sanctuary ofVedantic knowledge, while the fate of the fully
initiated is disposed of in a few occasional Sutras. It is, I
think, not too much to say that no unbiassed student of
the Sutras would — before having allowed himself to be
influenced by Sankara's interpretations — imagine for a
moment that the solemn words, c From thence is no return,
from thence is no return,' with which the Sutras conclude,
are meant to describe, not the lasting condition of him who
has reached final release, the highest aim of man, but
merely a stage on the way of that soul which is engaged in
the slow progress of gradual release, a stage which is
indeed greatly superior to any earthly form of existence,
but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious sa^sara,
INTRODUCTION.
lxxxix
and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti.
And this a priori impression—which, although no doubt
significant, could hardly be appealed to as decisive—is
confirmed by a detailed consideration of the two sets of
Sutras which .Sankara connects with the knowledge of the
higher Brahman. How these Sutras are interpreted by
Sankara and Ramanuja has been stated above in the con¬
spectus of contents; the points which render the interpre¬
tation given by Ramanuja more probable are as follows.
With regard to IV, 2, 12-14, we have to note, in the first
place, the circumstance—relevant although not decisive in
itself—that Sutra 12 does not contain any indication of a
new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can
hardly be doubted that the text of Sutra 13, ‘ spashfo hy
ekesham/ is more appropriately understood, with Rama¬
nuja, as furnishing a reason for the opinion advanced in
the preceding Sfitra, than—with .Sankara—as embodying
the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case
we should expect not ‘ hi ’ but ‘ tu ’). And, in the third
place, the ‘eke/ i.e. ‘some/ referred to in Sutra 13 would,
on .Sankara’s interpretation, denote the very same persons
to whom the preceding Sutra had referred, viz. the
followers of the Ka^va-^akha (the two Vedic passages
referred to in 12 and 13 being B ri. Up. IV, 4, 5, and III, 2,
11, according to the Ka^va recension); while it is the
standing practice of the Sutras to introduce, by means of the
designation ‘eke,’ members of Vedic Vakhas, teachers, &c.
other than those alluded to in the preceding Sutras. With
this practice Ramanuja’s interpretation, on the other hand,
fully agrees; for, according to him, the ‘ eke 5 are the Ma-
dhyandinas, whose reading in B ri. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. ‘ tasmat,’
clearly indicates that the ‘ tasya 5 in the corresponding
passage of the Ka^vas denotes the j-arira, i.e. the j*iva.
I think it is not saying too much that .Sankaras explana¬
tion, according to which the 4 eke ’ would denote the very
same Ka^vas to whom the preceding Sutra had referred*—
so that the Ka^vas would be distinguished from themselves
as it were—is altogether impossible.
The result of this closer consideration of the first set of
xc
VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
Sutras, alleged by vSankara to concern the owner of the
higher knowledge of Brahman, entitles us to view with some
distrust vSankara’s assertion that another set also—IV, 4,
1-7—has to be detached from the general topic of the
fourth adhyaya, and to be understood as depicting the
condition of those who have obtained final absolute release.
And the Sutras themselves do not tend to weaken this
preliminary want of confidence. In the first place their
wording also gives no indication whatever of their having
to be separated from what precedes as well as what follows.
And, in the second place, the last Sutra of the set (7)
obliges vSankara to ascribe to his truly released souls
qualities which clearly cannot belong to them; so that
he finally is obliged to make the extraordinary state¬
ment that those qualities belong to them ‘ vyavaharape-
kshaya,’ while yet the purport of the whole adhikarazza is
said to be the description of the truly released soul for
which no vyavahara exists! Very truly vSankara’s com¬
mentator here remarks, ‘atra kekln muhyanti akhazz^a-
/Ifinmatra^zzanan muktasya^anabhavat kuta a^zzanika-
dharmayoga^,’ and the way in which thereupon he himself
attempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not
improve matters.
In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet
in the fourth adhyaya with another passage, which indeed
has no direct bearing on the distinction of apara and para
vidya, but may yet be shortly referred to in this place as
another and altogether undoubted instance of vSankara’s
interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the
Sutras. The Sutras 7-16 of the third pada state the
opinions of three different teachers on the question to which
Brahman the soul of the vidvan repairs on death, or—
according to Ramanuja—the worshippers of which Brah¬
man repair to (the highest) Brahman. Ramanuja treats
the views of Badari and (Saimini as two purvapakshas, and
the opinion of Badarayazza—which is stated last—as the
siddhanta. vSankara, on the other hand, detaching the Sutras
in which Badarayazza’s view is set forth from the preceding
part of the adhikarazza (a proceeding which, although not
INTRODUCTION.
XC1
plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether illegiti¬
mate), maintains that Badari’s view, which is expounded
first, represents the siddhanta, while Gaimini’s view, set
forth subsequently, is to be considered a mere purva-
paksha. This, of course, is altogether inadmissible, it
being the invariable practice of the Vedanta-sutras as
well as the Purva Mima;/zsa-sutras to conclude the dis¬
cussion of contested points with the statement of that view
which is to be accepted as the authoritative one. This is
so patent that Sankara feels himself called upon to defend
his deviation from the general rule (Commentary on IV, 4,
13), without, however, bringing forward any arguments but
such as are valid only if Sankara’s system itself is already
accepted.
The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to
think, no choice but to side with Ramanuja as to the
general subject-matter of the fourth adhyaya of the Sutras.
We need not accept him as our guide in all particular
interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that
the Sutras of the fourth adhyaya describe the ultimate fate
of one and the same vidvan, and do not afford any basis
for the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of
Brahman in Sankara’s sense.
If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a
higher knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the dis¬
tinction of a lower and a higher Brahman is likewise not
valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on the
negative evidence of the fourth adhyaya, but regarding
which the entire body of the Vedanta-sutras has to be
consulted. And intimately connected with this investiga¬
tion—in fact, one with it from a certain point of view—is
the question whether the Sutras afford any evidence of
their author having held the doctrine of Maya, the principle
of illusion, by the association with which the highest
Brahman, in itself transcending all qualities, appears as the
lower Brahman or li*vara. That Ramanuja denies the
distinction of the two Brahmans and the doctrine of Maya
we have seen above; we shall, however, in the subsequent
investigation, pay less attention to his views and inter-
XC11
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
pretations than to the indications furnished by the Sutras
themselves.
Placing myself at the point of view of a .Sankara, I am
startled at the outset by the second Sutra of the first
adhyaya, which undertakes to give a definition of Brahman.
‘Brahman is that whence the origination and so on (i. e. the
sustentation and reabsorption) of this world proceed.’ What,
we must ask, is this Sutra meant to define?—That Brah¬
man, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first
Sutra declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedanta ;
that Brahman whose cognition is the only road to final
release; that Brahman in fact which Sankara calls the
highest.—But, here we must object to ourselves, the highest
Brahman is not properly defined as that from which the
world originates. In later Vedantic writings, whose authors
were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher
absolute Brahman and the lower Brahman related to Ma yk
or the world, we meet with definitions of Brahman of an
altogether different type. I need only remind the reader
of the current definition of Brahman as sa£-£id-ananda, or,
to mention one individual instance, refer to the introductory
dokas of the Pa^ada^i dilating on the sa^vid svayam-
prabha, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all
time, past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes
(P. D. I, 7). ‘ That from which the world proceeds ’ can by
a Sankara be accepted only as a definition of l^vara, of
Brahman which by its association with Maya is enabled to
project the false appearance of this world, and it certainly
is as improbable that the Sfitras should open with a
definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition
there can accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a
remark made above, it is unlikely that they should con¬
clude with a description of the state of those who know
the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from
obtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we
discard the idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brah^
man as one only, as the all-enfolding being which some¬
times emits the world from its own substance and sometimes
again retracts it into itself, ever remaining one in all its
INTRODUCTION.
XC1U
various manifestations—a conception which need not by
any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the
Ramanujas—the definition of Brahman given in the second
Sutra becomes altogether unobjectionable.
We next enquire whether the impression left on the
mind by the manner in which Badaraya^a defines Brah¬
man, viz. that he does not distinguish between an absolute
Brahman and a Brahman associated with Maya, is con¬
firmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The
Sfitras being throughout far from direct in their enun¬
ciations, we shall have to look less to particular terms
and turns of expression than to general lines of reasoning.
What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being
taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed
by the Sfitrakara against the Sankhya doctrine, which
maintains that the world has originated, not from an
intelligent being, but from the non-intelligent pradhana.
The most important Sutras relative to this point are to be
met with in the first pada of the second adhyaya. Those
Sfitras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by them¬
selves, but the unanimity of the commentators as to their
meaning enables us to use them as steps in our investiga¬
tion. The sixth Sutra of the pada mentioned replies to the
Sankhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot
spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that ' it
is thus seen/ i.e. it is a matter of common observation that
non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed
with intelligence; hair and nails, for instance, springing from
animals, and certain insects from dung.—Now, an argu¬
mentation of this kind is altogether out of place from the
point of view of the true vSankara. According to the latter
the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in
so far as the latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is
associated with Maya. Maya is the upadana of the material
world, and Maya itself is of a non-intelligent nature, owing
to which it is by so many Vedantic writers identified with
the prakr/ti of the Sankhyas. Similarly the illustrative
instances, adduced under Sutra 9 for the purpose of showing
that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal sub-
XC1V
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
stances do not impart to the latter their own qualities, and
that hence the material world also, when being refunded
into Brahman, does not impart to it its own imperfections,
are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion with
the doctrine of Maya, according to which the material
world is no more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than
during the period of its subsistence. According to 5 ankara
the world is not merged in Brahman, but the special forms
into which the up 4 dana of the world, i.e. Maya, had
modified itself are merged in non-distinct Maya, whose
relation to Brahman is not changed thereby.—The illus¬
tration, again, given in Sutra 24 of the mode in which Brah¬
man, by means of its inherent power, transforms itself into
the world without employing any extraneous instruments
of action, ‘kshlravad dhi,’ ‘ as milk (of its own accord turns
into curds),’ would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to
bring nearer to our understanding the mode in which
Brahman projects the illusive appearance of the world ;
and also the analogous instance given in the Sutra next
following, ‘ as Gods and the like (create palaces, chariots,
&c. by the mere power of their will) ’—which refers to the
real creation of real things—would hardly be in its place if
meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be
the true character of the world. The mere cumulation of
the two essentially heterogeneous illustrative instances
(kshiravad dhi; dev&divat), moreover, seems to show that
the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite
theory as to the particular mode in which the world
springs from Brahman, but was merely concerned to render
plausible in some way or other that an intelligent being
can give rise to what is non-intelligent without having
recourse to any extraneous means 1 .
That the Maya doctrine was not present to the mind of
the Sutrakara, further appears from the latter part of the
fourth pada of the first adhyaya, where it is shown that
Brahman is not only the operative but also the material
cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been
1 .Sankara’s favourite illustrative instance of the magician producing illusive
sights is—significantly enough—not known to the Sutras.
INTRODUCTION.
XCV
the place to indicate, had such been the authors view, that
Brahman is the material cause of the world through Maya
only, and that the world is unreal; but the Sutras do not
contain a single word to that effect. Sutra 26, on the other
hand, exhibits the significant term ‘ parbzamatBrahman
produces the world by means of a modification of itself. It
is well known that later on, when the terminology of the
Vedanta became definitely settled, the term ‘pari/zamavada’
was used to denote that very theory to which the followers
of Sankara are most violently opposed, viz. the doctrine
according to which the world is not a mere vivarta, i.e. an
illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the effect of Brah¬
man undergoing a real change, may that change be con¬
ceived to take place in the way taught by Rimanu^a or in
some other manner.—With regard to the last-quoted Sutra,
as well as to those touched upon above, the commentators
indeed maintain that whatever terms and modes of ex¬
pression are apparently opposed to the vivartavada are
in reality reconcilable with it; to Sutra 26, for instance,
Govindananda remarks that the term ‘ parizzama * only
denotes an effect in general (karyamatra), without implying
that the effect is real. But in cases of this nature we are
fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we were not
compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators,
such as Rdmanu^-a, are satisfied to take ‘ parizzama ’ and
similar terms in their generally received sense.
A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is
met with in III, 2,11 ff. It is, according to Sankara’s view,
of special importance, as it is alleged to set forth that Brah¬
man is in itself destitute of all qualities, and is affected with
qualities only through its limiting adjuncts (upadhis), the
offspring of Maya. I have above (in the conspectus of
contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole
section as interpreted by Sankara on the one hand, and
Ramanuja on the other hand, from which it appears that
the latter’s opinion as to the purport of the group of Sutras
widely diverges from that of Sankara. The wording of
the Sutras is so eminently concise and vague that I find it
impossible to decide which of the two commentators—if
XCV1
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
indeed either—is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide ;
regarding the sense of some Sutras Sankara’s explanation
seems to deserve preference, in the case of others Rama¬
nuja seems to keep closer to the text. I decidedly
prefer, for instance, Ramanuja’s interpretation of Sutra 22,
as far as the sense of the entire Sutra is concerned, and
more especially with regard to the term 4 prakrztaitavat-
tvam,’ whose proper force is brought out by Ramanuja’s
explanation only. So much is certain that none of the
Sfttras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by
Sankara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly
miss coherence and strictness of reasoning, and it is
thus by no means improbable that the section is one of
those—perhaps not few in number—in which both inter¬
preters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and
to tradition than to their desire of forcing Badarayazza’s
Stitras to bear testimony to the truth of their own philo¬
sophic theories*
With special reference to the Maya doctrine one impor¬
tant Sutra has yet to be considered, the only one in which
the term ‘m&ya’ itself occurs, viz. Ill, 2, 3. According
to Sankara the Sutra signifies that the environments of
the dreaming soul are not real but mere Mayi, i. e. unsub¬
stantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the
character of real objects. Ramanuja (as we have seen in
the conspectus) gives a different explanation of the term
‘ maya,’ but in judging of Sankara’s views we may for the
time accept Sankara’s own interpretation. Now, from the
latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams
are to be called Maya, i.e. illusion, because not evincing
the characteristics of reality, the objective world surround¬
ing the waking soul must not be called Mayi. But that
the world perceived by waking men is Maya, even in a
higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming con¬
sciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the Sankara Vedanta ;
and the Sutra therefore proves either that Badaraya/za did
not hold the doctrine of the illusory character of the world,
or else that, if after all he did hold that doctrine, he used
the term ‘ maya ’ in a sense altogether different from that
INTRODUCTION.
XCV11
in which Sankara employs it.—If, on the other hand, we,
with Rdmanu^a, understand the word ‘ mayi 5 to denote
a wonderful thing, the Sfttra of course has no bearing what¬
ever on the doctrine of Mayd in its later technical sense.
We now turn to the question as to the relation of the
individual soul to Brahman. Do the Sfttras indicate any¬
where that their author held .Sankara’s doctrine, according
to which the ^iva is in reality identical with Brahman, and
separated from it, as it were, only by a false surmise due to
avidya, or do they rather favour the view that the souls,
although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute
elements of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual exist¬
ence apart from it ? This question is in fact only another
aspect of the Maya question, but yet requires a short
separate treatment.
In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the
Shtras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed
can hardly be understood in .Sankara’s sense, and rather
seem to favour the opinion, held among others by Rama¬
nuja, that the soul is of minute size. We have further seen
that Sfttra 18 of the third pada of the second adhyaya, which
describes the soul as ‘ gn^ is more appropriately under¬
stood in the sense assigned to it by Ramanuja; and, again,
that the Sfttras which treat of the soul being an agent, can
be reconciled with .Sankara’s views only if supplemented
in a way which their text does not appear to authorise.—
We next have the important Stitra II, 3, 43 in which the
soul is distinctly said to be a part (am) of Brahman, and
which, as we have already noticed, can be made to fall in
with .Sankaras views only if a^a is explained, altogether
arbitrarily, by ‘a^a iva,’ while Ramanuja is able to take the
Stitra as it stands.—We also have already referred to Stitra
5o, c abh&sa eva £a,’ which .Sankara interprets as setting forth
the so-called pratibimbavada according to which the indi¬
vidual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self. But
almost every Sutra—and Sutra 50 forms no exception—being
so obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of
various, often totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe
method is to keep in view, in the case of each ambiguous
[ 34 ] g
XCV111
vedanta-sOtras.
aphorism, the general drift and spirit of the whole work,
and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no means favour¬
able to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sutra 5 °?
if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sfltra
43, which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman ?
For that 43 contains, as Sankara and his commentators
aver, a statement of the ava^Medavdda, can itself be ac¬
cepted only if we interpret a^a by amsa iva, and to do so
there is really no valid reason whatever. I confess that
Ramanuja’s interpretation of the Sutra (which however is
accepted by several other commentators also) does not
appear to me particularly convincing; and the Sutras
unfortunately offer us no other passages on the ground of
which we might settle the meaning to be ascribed to the
term abhasa, which may mean ‘ reflection,’ but may mean
hetvabhasa, i. e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things
stand, this one Sfitra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to
as proving that the pratibimbav&da which, in its turn, pre¬
supposes the mayavada, is the teaching of the Sutras.
To the conclusion that the Siitrakara did not hold the
doctrine of the absolute identity of the highest and the
individual soul in the sense of Sankara, we are further led
by some other indications to be met with here and there
in the Sutras. In the conspectus of contents we have had
occasion to direct attention to the important Sutra II, 1,23,
which distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i. e.
additional to, or different from, the individual soul, since
Scripture declares the two to be different. Analogously
I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the sarira is not the
antaryamin, because the Madhyandinas, as well as the
Ka/zvas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena
enam adhiyate), and in 22 the sartra and the pradhana are
referred to as the two ‘ others ’ (itarau) of whom the text
predicates distinctive attributes separating them from the
highest Lord. The word * itara ’ (the other one) appears
in several other passages (I, 1, 16; I, 3, 16 ; II, 1, 21) as a
kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in con¬
tradistinction from the Lord. The .Sankaras indeed main¬
tain that all those passages refer to an unreal distinction
INTRODUCTION.
XC1X
due to avidya. But this is just what we should like to see
proved, and the proof offered in no case amounts to more
than a reference to the system which demands that the
Sutras should be thus understood. If we accept the inter¬
pretations of the school of Sankara, it remains altogether un¬
intelligible why the Sutrakara should never hint even at what
Sankara is anxious again and again to point out at length,
viz. that the greater part of the work contains a kind of
exoteric doctrine only, ever tending to mislead the student
who does not keep in view what its nature is. If other
reasons should make it probable that the Sutrakara was
anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a
sort of esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept
Sankara’s mode of interpretation. But no such reasons
are forthcoming; nowhere among the avowed followers of
the Sankara system is there any tendency to treat the
kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously
guarded and hidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gau-
dfapada down to the most modern writer, consider it their
most important, nay, only task to inculcate again and again
in the clearest and most unambiguous language that all
appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord
and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all
knowledge but this one knowledge is without true value.
There remains one more important passage concern¬
ing the relation of the individual soul to the highest Self,
a passage which attracted our attention above, when
we were reviewing the evidence for early divergence of
opinion among the teachers of the Vedanta. I mean
I, 4, 20-33, which three Sutras state the views of A^ma-
rathya, AuAdomi, and Ka^akr/tsna as to the reason why,
in a certain passage of the Br/hadara^yaka, characteristics
of the individual soul are ascribed to the highest Self. The
siddhanta view is enounced in Sutra 22, c avasthiter iti Klra-
krztsna^,’ i. e. Ka^akr/tsna (accounts for the circumstance
mentioned) on the ground of the ‘permanent abiding or
abode.’ By this ‘permanent abiding’ Sankara understands
the Lord’s abiding as, i. e. existing as—or in the condition of
—the individual soul, and thus sees in the Sutra an enuncia-
g 2
c
vedanta-s6tras.
tion of his own view that the individual soul is nothing but the
highest Self, ‘ avikrzta^ parame^varo j*ivo nanya^.’ Rama¬
nuja, on the other hand, likewise accepting Ka^akr/tsna’s
opinion as the siddhanta view, explains 4 avasthiti ’ as the
Lord’s permanent abiding within the individual soul, as de¬
scribed in the antaryamin-brahmazza.—We can hardly main¬
tain that the term ‘avasthiti’ cannot have the meaning
ascribed to it by Sankara, viz. special state or condition, but
so much must be urged in favour of Ramanuja’s interpreta¬
tion that in the five other places where avasthiti (or ana-
vasthiti) is met with in the Sutras (I, 2, 17; II, 2, 4 ; II, 2,
13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent
abiding or permanent abode within something.
If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the pre¬
ceding enquiry as to the teaching of the Sutras, I must
give it as my opinion that they do not set forth the distinc¬
tion of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman; that
they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and
i yvara in Sankara’s sense ; that they do not hold the
doctrine of the unreality of the world; and that they do
not, with Sankara, proclaim the absolute identity of the
individual and the highest Self. I do not wish to advance
for the present beyond these negative results. Upon
Ramanuja’s mode of interpretation—although I accept it
without reserve in some important details—I look on the
whole as more useful in providing us with a powerful means
of criticising Sankara’s explanations than in guiding us
throughout to the right understanding of the text. The
author of the Sutras may have held views about the nature
of Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of
Sankara, and yet not agreeing in all points with those of
Ramanuja. If, however, the negative conclusions stated
above should be well founded, it would follow even from
them that the system of Badaraya/za had greater affinities
with that of the Bhagavatas and Ramanuja than with the
one of which the Sankara-bhashya is the classical exponent.
It appears from the above review of the teaching of the
Sutras that only a comparatively very small proportion
of them contribute matter enabling us to form a judgment
INTRODUCTION. ci
as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine advocated
by Badariya^a. The reason of this is that the greater
part of the work is taken up with matters which, according
to .Sankara’s terminology, form part of the so-called lower
knowledge, and throw no light upon philosophical questions
in the stricter sense of the word. This circumstance is not
without significance. In later works belonging to .Sankara’s
school in which the distinction of a higher and lower vidyd
is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are
treated with great shortness; and rightly so, for they are
unable to accomplish the highest aim of man, i. e. final
release. When we therefore, on the other hand, find that
the subjects of the so-called lower vidyd are treated very
fully in the Vedanta-sutras, when we observe, for instance,
the almost tedious length to which the investigation of the
unity of vidyas (most of which are so-called sagu;za, i. e.
lower vidyas) is carried in the third adhyaya, or the fact of
almost the whole fourth adhyaya being devoted to the
ultimate fate of the possessor of the lower vidya; we cer¬
tainly feel ourselves confirmed in our conclusion that what
Sankara looked upon as comparatively unimportant formed
in Bcidaraya^a’s opinion part of that knowledge higher than
which there is none, and which therefore is entitled to the
fullest and most detailed exposition.
The question as to what kind of system is represented
by the Vedanta-sutras may be approached in another way
also. While hitherto we have attempted to penetrate to
the meaning of the Sutras by means of the different com¬
mentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the first
place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sutras
what doctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teach¬
ing the Sutras doubtless aim at systematising. If, it might
be urged, the Upanishads can be convincingly shown to
embody a certain settled doctrine, we must consider it at
the least highly probable that that very same doctrine—of
whatever special nature it may be—is hidden in the enig¬
matical aphorisms of Badaraya^a 1 .
I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation
1 Cp. Gough’s Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff.
Cll
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
a safe one. Even if it could be shown that the teaching of
all the chief Upanishads agrees in all essential points (a
subject to which some attention will be paid later on), we
should not on that account be entitled unhesitatingly to
assume that the Sutras set forth the same doctrine. What¬
ever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there
remains the undeniable fact that there exist and have
existed since very ancient times not one but several essen¬
tially differing systems, all of which lay claim to the dis¬
tinction of being the true representatives of the teaching of
the Upanishads as well as of the Sutras. Let us suppose,
for argument’s sake, that, for instance, the doctrine of Maya
is distinctly enunciated in the Upanishads ; nevertheless
Ramanuja and, for all we know to the contrary, the whole
series of more ancient commentators on whom he looked
as authorities in the interpretation of the Sutras, denied
that the Upanishads teach Maya, and it is hence by no
means impossible that Bidaraya/za should have done the
same. The a priori style of reasoning as to the teaching
of the Sutras is therefore without much force.
But apart from any intention of arriving thereby at the
meaning of the Sutras there, of course, remains for us the
all-important question as to the true teaching of the Upa¬
nishads, a question which a translator of the Sutras and
.Sankara cannot afford to pass over in silence, especially
after reason has been shown for the conclusion that the
Sutras and the vSankara-bhashya do not agree concerning
most important points of Vedantic doctrine. The Sutras
as well as the later commentaries claim, in the first place,
to be nothing more than systematisations of the Upani¬
shads, and for us a considerable part at least of their value
and interest lies in this their nature. Hence the further
question presents itself by whom the teaching of the Upa¬
nishads has been most adequately systematised, whether
by Badarayazza, or .Sankara, or Ramanuja, or some other
commentator. This question requires to be kept altogether
separate from the enquiry as to which commentator most
faithfully renders the contents of the Sutras, and it is by
no means impossible that .Sankara, for instance, should in
INTRODUCTION.
cm
the end have to be declared a more trustworthy guide with
regard to the teaching of the Upanishads than concerning
the meaning of the Sutras*
We must remark here at once that, whatever commenta¬
tor may be found to deserve preference on the whole, it
appears fairly certain already at the outset that none of the
systems which Indian ingenuity has succeeded in erecting
on the basis of the Upanishads can be accepted in its
entirety. The reason for this lies in the nature of the
Upanishads themselves. To the Hindu commentator and
philosopher the Upanishads came down as a body of
revealed truth whose teaching had, somehow or other, to
be shown to be thoroughly consistent and free from contra¬
dictions ; a system had to be devised in which a suitable
place could be allotted to every one of the multitudinous
statements which they make on the various points of
Vedantic doctrine. But to the European scholar, or in
fact to any one whose mind is not bound by the doctrine
of >Sruti, it will certainly appear that all such attempts stand
self-condemned. If anything is evident even on a cursory
review of the Upanishads—and the impression so created
is only strengthened by a more careful investigation—it is
that they do not constitute a systematic whole. They
themselves, especially the older ones, give the most unmis¬
takable indications on that point. Not only are the
doctrines expounded in the different Upanishads ascribed
to different teachers, but even the separate sections of one
and the same Upanishad are assigned to different authorities.
It would be superfluous to quote examples of what a
mere look at the KMndogya Upanishad, for instance,
suffices to prove. It is of course not impossible that even
a multitude of teachers should agree in imparting precisely
the same doctrine ; but in the case of the Upanishads that
is certainly not antecedently probable. For, in the first
place, the teachers who are credited with the doctrines
of the Upanishads manifestly belonged to different sec¬
tions of Brahminical society, to different Vedic j-akhas ;
nay, some of them the tradition makes out to have been
kshattriyas. And, in the second place, the period, whose
CIV
vedanta-sOtras.
mental activity is represented in the Upanishads, was a
creative one, and as such cannot be judged according to
the analogy of later periods of Indian philosophic de¬
velopment. The later philosophic schools as, for instance,
the one of which Sankara is the great representative,
were no longer free in their speculations, but strictly
bound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred,
which could not be changed or added to, but merely sys¬
tematised and commented upon. Hence the rigorous
uniformity of doctrine characteristic of those schools. But
there had been a time when, what later writers received as
a sacred legacy, determining and confining the whole course
of their speculations, first sprang from the minds of creative
thinkers not fettered by the tradition of any school, but
freely following the promptings of their own heads and
hearts. By the absence of school traditions, I do not in¬
deed mean that the great teachers who appear in the
Upanishads were free to make an entirely new start, and
to assign to their speculations any direction they chose ;
for nothing can be more certain than that, at the period as
the outcome of whose philosophical activity the Upanishads
have to be considered, there were in circulation certain
broad speculative ideas overshadowing the mind of every
member of Brahminical society. But those ideas were
neither very definite nor worked out in detail, and hence
allowed themselves to be handled and fashioned in different
ways by different individuals. With whom the few leading
conceptions traceable in the teaching of all Upanishads
first originated, is a point on which those writings themselves
do not enlighten us, and which we have no other means
for settling; most probably they are to be viewed not
as the creation of any individual mind, but as the gradual
outcome of speculations carried on by generations of
Vedic theologians. In the Upanishads themselves, at any
rate, they appear as floating mental possessions which
may be seized and moulded into new forms by any one
who feels within himself the required inspiration. A
certain vague knowledge of Brahman, the great hidden
being in which all this manifold world is one, seems to be
INTRODUCTION.
CV
spread everywhere, and often issues from the most unex¬
pected sources. SVetaketu receives instruction from his
father Uddalaka ; the proud G&rgya has to become the
pupil of A^ata^atru, the king of Ka st ; Bhu^yu Sahya-
yani receives answers to his questions from a Gandharva
possessing a maiden ; Satyakama learns what Brahman
is from the bull of the herd he is tending, from Agni
and from a flamingo; and Upako^ala is taught by the
sacred fires in his teacher’s house. All this is of course
legend, not history; but the fact that the philosophic
and theological doctrines of the Upanishads are clothed
in this legendary garb certainly does not strengthen the ex¬
pectation of finding in them a rigidly systematic doctrine.
And a closer investigation of the contents of the Upani¬
shads amply confirms this preliminary impression. If we
avail ourselves, for instance, of M. Paul Regnaud’s Materiaux
pour servir a l’Histoire de la Philosophic de Unde, in which
the philosophical lucubrations of the different Upanishads
are arranged systematically according to topics, we can see
with ease how, together with a certain uniformity of general
leading conceptions, there runs throughout divergence in
details, and very often not unimportant details. A look,
for instance, at the collection of passages relative to the
origination of the world from the primitive being, suffices to
show that the task of demonstrating that whatever the
Upanishads teach on that point can be made to fit into a
homogeneous system is an altogether hopeless one. The
accounts there given of the creation belong, beyond all doubt,
to different stages of philosophic and theological development
or else to different sections of priestly society. None but
an Indian commentator would, I suppose, be inclined and
sufficiently courageous to attempt the proof that, for in¬
stance, the legend of the atman purushavidha, the Self in
the shape of a person which is as large as man and woman
together, and then splits itself into two halves from which
cows, horses, asses, goats, &c. are produced in succession
(B ri. Up. I, i, 4), can be reconciled with the account given
of the creation in the iTMndogya Upanishad, where it is
said that in the beginning there existed nothing but the sat,
CV1
vedAnta-sOtras.
f that which is, 5 and that feeling a desire of being many it
emitted out of itself ether, and then all the other elements
in due succession. The former is a primitive cosmogonic
myth, which in its details shows striking analogies with the
cosmogonic myths of other nations; the latter account is
fairly developed Vedanta (although not Vedanta implying
the Maya doctrine). We may admit that both accounts
show a certain fundamental similarity in so far as they
derive the manifold world from one original being; but
to go beyond this and to maintain, as .Sankara does, that the
atman purushavidha of the Brfhadara^yaka is the so-called
Vira^ of the latter Vedanta—implying thereby that that
section consciously aims at describing only the activity of
one special form of livara, and not simply the whole pro¬
cess of creation—-is the ingenious shift of an orthodox
commentator in difficulties, but nothing more.
How all those more or less conflicting texts came
to be preserved and handed down to posterity, is not
difficult to understand. As mentioned above, each of the
great sections of Brahminical priesthood had its own
sacred texts, and again in each of those sections there
existed more ancient texts which it was impossible to dis¬
card when deeper and more advanced speculations began
in their turn to be embodied in literary compositions, which
in the course of time likewise came to be looked upon as
sacred. When the creative period had reached its termina¬
tion, and the task of collecting and arranging was taken in
hand, older and newer pieces were combined into wholes,
and thus there arose collections of such heterogeneous
character as the .Oandogya and Brfhadara^yaka Upani-
shads. On later generations, to which the whole body of
texts came down as revealed truth, there consequently
devolved the inevitable task of establishing systems on
which no exception could be taken to any of the texts ;
but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible one,
i. e. one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and
honestly, there really is no reason to deny.
For a comprehensive criticism of the methods which the
different commentators employ in systematising the contents
INTRODUCTION.
CV11
of the Upanishads there is no room in this place. In order,
however, to illustrate what is meant by the ‘ impossibility/
above alluded to, of combining the various doctrines of the
Upanishads into a whole without doing violence to a certain
number of texts, it will be as well to analyse in detail some
few at least of ^Sankara’s interpretations, and to render clear
the considerations by which he is guided.
We begin with a case which has already engaged our
attention when discussing the meaning of the Sfitras, viz.
the question concerning the ultimate fate of those who
have attained the knowledge of Brahman. As we have
seen, Sankara teaches that the soul of him who has risen to
an insight into the nature of the higher Brahman does
not, at the moment of death, pass out of the body, but is
directly merged in Brahman by a process from which all.
departing and moving, in fact all considerations of space,
are altogether excluded. The soul of him, on the other
hand, who has not risen above the knowledge of the lower
qualified Brahman departs from the body by means of the
artery called sushum^a, and following the so-called devayana,
the path of the gods, mounts up to the world of Brahman.
A review of the chief Upanishad texts on which .Sankara
founds this distinction will show how far it is justified.
In a considerable number of passages the Upanishads
contrast the fate of two classes of men, viz. of those
who perform sacrifices and meritorious works only, and of
those who in addition possess a certain kind of knowledge.
Men of the former kind ascend after death to the moon,
where they live for a certain time, and then return to the
earth into new forms of embodiment; persons of the latter
kind proceed on the path of the gods—on which the sun
forms one stage—up to the world of Brahman, from which
there is no return. The chief passages to that effect are
Kh . Up. V, io; Kaush. Up. I, 2 ff.; Mu nd. Up. I, 2 , 9 ff.;
B ri. Up. VI, 2, 15 ff.; Prama Up. I, 9 ff—In other passages
only the latter of the two paths is referred to, cp .Kh. Up.
IV, 15 ; VIII, 6, 5 ; Taitt. Up. I, 6 ; Bri. Up. IV, 4, 8, 9 ; V, 10;
Maitr.Up.VI, 30, to mention only the more important ones.
Now an impartial consideration of those passages shows
CV111
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
I think, beyond any doubt, that what is meant there by the
knowledge which leads through the sun to the world of
Brahman is the highest knowledge of which the devotee is
capable, and that the world of Brahman to which his know¬
ledge enables him to proceed denotes the highest state
which he can ever reach, the state of final release, if we
choose to call it by that name.— Kh. Up. V, 10 says , c Those
who know this (viz. the doctrine of the five fires), and those
who in the forest follow faith and austerities go to light/
&c.— Kh. Up. IV, 15 is manifestly intended to convey the
true knowledge of Brahman; Upako^ala’s teacher himself
represents the instruction given by him as superior to the
teaching of the sacred fires.— Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5 quotes the
old i'loka which says that the man moving upwards by the
artery penetrating the crown of the head reaches the Im¬
mortal.—Kaush. Up. I, %—which gives the most detailed
account of the ascent of the soul—contains no intimation
whatever of the knowledge of Brahman, which leads up to
the Brahman world, being of an inferior nature.—Mu nd. Up.
I, 2, 9 agrees with the Khandogya in saying that c Those
who practise penance and faith in the forest, tranquil, wise,
and living on alms, depart free from passion, through the
sun, to where that immortal Person dwells whose nature is
imperishable,’ and nothing whatever in the context coun¬
tenances the assumption that not the highest knowledge
and the highest Person are there referred to.—B ri. Up.
IV, 4, 8 quotes old jlokas clearly referring to the road
of the gods ( c the small old path ’), on which c sages who
know Brahman move on to the svargaloka and thence
higher on as entirely free.—That path was found by Brah¬
man, and on it goes whoever knows Brahman.’—B ri. Up.
VI, 2, 15 is another version of the Pa^agnividya, with the
variation, ‘Those who know this, and those who in the
forest worship faith and the True, go to light,’ &c.—Prama
Up. 1 , 10 says, £ Those who have sought the Self by penance,
abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path
Aditya, the sun. There is the home of the spirits, the im¬
mortal free from danger, the highest. From thence they do
not return, for it is the end.’—Maitr. Up. VI, 30 quotes
INTRODUCTION.
C1X
riokas, ‘ One of them (the arteries) leads upwards, piercing
the solar orb: by it, having stepped beyond the world of
Brahman, they go to the highest path.’
All these passages are as clear as can be desired. The
soul of the sage who knows Brahman passes out by the
sushumTZct, and ascends by the path of the gods to the
world of Brahman, there to remain for ever in some bliss¬
ful state. But, according to Sankara, all these texts are
meant to set forth the result of a certain inferior knowledge
only, of the knowledge of the conditioned Brahman. Even
in a passage apparently so entirely incapable of more than
one interpretation as B ru Up. VI, 2,15, the ‘True/ which
the holy hermits in the forest are said to worship, is not to
be the highest Brahman, but only Hira/zyagarbha!—And
why ?—Only because the system so demands it, the system
which teaches that those who know the highest Brahman
become on their death one with it, without having to resort
to any other place. The passage on which this latter tenet is
chiefly based is Bri. Up. IV, 4,6,7, where, with the fate of him
who at his death has desires, and whose soul therefore
enters a new body after having departed from the old one,
accompanied by all the pranas, there is contrasted the fate
of the sage free from all desires. ‘ But as to the man who does
not desire, who not desiring, freed from desires is satisfied in
his desires, or desires the Self only, the vital spirits of him
(tasya) do not depart—being Brahman he goes to Brahman.’
We have seen above (p. lxxx) that this passage is referred
to in the important Sutras on whose right interpretation it,
in the first place, depends whether or not we must admit
the Sutrakara to have acknowledged the distinction of a para
and an apari vidyct. Here the passage interests us as
throwing light on the way in which Sankara systematises.
He looks on the preceding part of the chapter as describing
what happens to the souls of all those who do not know the
highest Brahman, inclusive of those who know the lower
Brahman only. They pass out of the old bodies followed by
all pranas and enter new bodies. He, on the other hand,
section 6 continues, who knows the true Brahman, does not
pass out of the body, but becomes one with Brahman then
cx
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
and there. This interpretation of the purport of the entire
chapter is not impossibly right, although I am rather in¬
clined to think that the chapter aims at setting forth in its
earlier part the future of him who does not know Brahman
at all, while the latter part of section 6 passes on to him
who does know Brahman (i. e. Brahman pure and simple,
the text knowing of no distinction of the so-called lower
and higher Brahman). In explaining section 6 Sankara
lays stress upon the clause ‘na tasya prazza utkramanti/
‘ his vital spirits do not pass out,’ taking this to signify that
the soul with the vital spirits does not move at all, and
thus does not ascend to the world of Brahman; while the
purport of the clause may simply be that the soul and vital
spirits do not go anywhere else, i. e. do not enter a new
body, but are united, somehow or other, with Brahman.
On .Sankara’s interpretation there immediately arises a
new difficulty. In the ^lokas, quoted under sections 8
and 9, the description of the small old path which leads to
the svargaloka and higher on clearly refers—as noticed
already above—to the path through the veins, primarily
the sushumzza, on which, according to so many other pas¬
sages, the soul of the wise mounts upwards. But that path
is, according to .Sankara, followed by him only who has
not risen above the lower knowledge, and yet the ^lokas
have manifestly to be connected with what is said in the
latter half of 6 about the owner of the para vidya. Hence
.Sankara sees himself driven to explain the ^lokas in
8 and 9 (of which a faithful translation is given in Professor
Max Muller’s version) as follows:
8. ‘ The subtle old path (i. e. the path of knowledge on
which final release is reached; which path is subtle, i. e.
difficult to know, and old, i. e. to be known from the eternal
Veda) has been obtained and fully reached by me. On it
the sages who know Brahman reach final release (svarga-
lokai*abda^ samnihitaprakarazzat mokshabhidhayaka/^).
9. ‘ On that path they say that there is white or blue or
yellow or green or red (i. e. others maintain that the path
to final release is, in accordance with the colour of the
arteries, either white or blue, &c.; but that is false, for the
INTRODUCTION.
CXI
paths through the arteries lead at the best to the world of
Brahman, which itself forms part of the sa^sara); that
path (i. e. the only path to release, viz. the path of true
knowledge) is found by Brahman, i. e. by such Brahma^as
as through true knowledge have become like Brahman, 5 &c.
A significant instance in truth of the straits to which
thorough-going systematisers of the Upanishads see them¬
selves reduced occasionally!
But we return to the point which just now chiefly interests
us. Whether Sankara’s interpretation of the chapter, and
especially of section 6 , be right or wrong, so much is
certain that we are not entitled to view all those texts
which speak of the soul going to the world of Brah¬
man as belonging to the so-called lower knowledge, be¬
cause a few other passages declare that the sage does
not go to Brahman. The text which declares the sage
free from desires to become one with Brahman could not,
without due discrimination, be used to define and limit the
meaning of other passages met with in the same Upanishad
even—for as we have remarked above the Brzhadara?zyaka
contains pieces manifestly belonging to different stages of
development;—much less does it entitle us to put arbitrary
constructions on passages forming part of other Upanishads.
Historically the disagreement of the various accounts is
easy to understand. The older notion was that the soul of
the wise man proceeds along the path of the gods to Brah¬
man’s abode. A later—and, if we like, more philosophic—
conception is that, as Brahman already is a man’s Self,
there is no need of any motion on man’s part to reach
Brahman. We may even apply to those two views the
terms apara and para—lower and higher—knowledge. But
we must not allow any commentator to induce us to
believe that what he from his advanced standpoint looks
upon as an inferior kind of cognition, was viewed in the
same light by the authors of the Upanishads.
We turn to another Upanishad text likewise touching
upon the point considered in what precedes, viz. the second
Brahma^a of the third adhyaya of the Brzhadara/^yaka.
The discussion there first turns upon the grahas and ati-
CX11
vedanta-s6tras.
grahas, i.e. the senses and organs and their objects, and
Y&^avalkya thereupon explains that death, by which
everything is overcome, is itself overcome by water; for
death is fire. The colloquy then turns to what we must
consider an altogether new topic, Artabhaga asking, ‘ When
this man (ayam purusha) dies, do the vital spirits depart
from him or not?' and Yci^avalkya answering, ‘ No, they
are gathered up in him ; he swells, he is inflated; inflated
the dead (body) is lying.'—Now this is for .Sankara an
important passage, as we have already seen above (p. lxxxi);
for he employs it, in his comment on Ved.-shtra IV, 2,13,
for the purpose of proving that the passage Bri . Up. IV,
4, 6 really means that the vital spirits do not, at the moment
of death, depart from the true sage. Hence the present
passage also must refer to him who possesses the highest
knowledge; hence the ‘ ayam purusha ’ must be ‘ that man,'
i. e. the man who possesses the highest knowledge, and the
highest knowledge then must be found in the preceding
clause which says that death itself may be conquered by
water. But, as Rdmanu^a also remarks, neither does the
context favour the assumption that the highest knowledge
is referred to, nor do the words of section 11 contain
any indication that what is meant is the merging of the
Self of the true Sage in Brahman. With the interpretation
given by Ramanuja himself, viz. that the pranas do not
depart from the ^iva of the dying man, but accompany it
into a new body, I can agree as little (although he no doubt
rightly explains the ‘ ayam purusha 5 by ‘ man 5 in general),
and am unable to see in the passage anything more than a
crude attempt to account for the fact that a dead body
appears swollen and inflated.—A little further on (section
13) Artabh&ga asks what becomes of this man (ayam
purusha) when his speech has entered into the fire, his
breath into the air, his eye into the sun, &c. So much
here is clear that we have no right to understand by the
c ayam purusha 5 of section 13 anybody different from the
c ayam purusha 5 of the two preceding sections ; in spite of
this .Sankara—according to whose system the organs of the
true sage do not enter into the elements, but are directly
INTRODUCTION.
CX111
merged in Brahman—explains the ‘ ayam purusha 5 of sec¬
tion 13 to be the c asazzzyagdamn,’ i. e. the person who has
not risen to the cognition of the highest Brahman. And
still a further limiting interpretation is required by the
system. The asazzzyagdamn also—who as such has to
remain in the sazzzsara—cannot do without the organs, since
his ^iva when passing out of the old body into a new one
is invested with the subtle body; hence section 13 cannot
be taken as saying what it clearly does say, viz. that at
death the different organs pass into the different elements,
but as merely indicating that the organs are abandoned by
the divinities which, during lifetime, presided over them!
The whole third adhyaya indeed of the Brzhadarazzyaka
affords ample proof of the artificial character of .Sankara’s
attempts to show that the teaching of the Upanishads
follows a definite system. The eighth brahmazza, for in¬
stance, is said to convey the doctrine of the highest non-
related Brahman, while the preceding brahmazzas had treated
only of l^vara in his various aspects. But, as a matter of
fact, brahmazza 8, after having, in section 8, represented
Brahman as destitute of all qualities, proceeds, in the next
section, to describe that very same Brahman as the ruler of
the world, 4 By the command of that Imperishable sun and
moon stand apart/ &c.; a clear indication that the author
of the Upanishad does not distinguish a higher and lower
Brahman in .Sankaras sense.—The preceding brahmazza (7)
treats of the antaryamin, i. e. Brahman viewed as the internal
ruler of everything. This, according to .Sankara, is the
lower form of Brahman called l.rvara; but we observe that
the antaryamin as well as the so-called highest Brahman
described in section 8 is, at the termination of the two
sections, characterised by means of the very same terms
(7, 23 : Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, &c. There
is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, &c.;
and 8,11: That Brahman is unseen but seeing, unheard but
hearing, &c. There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that
hears but it, &c.).—Nothing can be clearer than that all
these sections aim at describing one and the same being,
and know nothing of the distinctions made by the developed
[34] h
CX1V
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Vedanta, however valid the latter may be from a purely
philosophic point of view.
We may refer to one more similar instance from the
Khkn dogya Upanishad. We there meet in III, 14 with
one of the most famous vidyas describing the nature of
Brahman, called after its reputed author the vSa^ilya-vidya.
This small vidyd is decidedly one of the finest and most
characteristic texts ; it would be difficult to point out
another passage setting forth with greater force and elo¬
quence and in an equally short compass the central doctrine
of the Upanishads. Yet this text, which, beyond doubt,
gives utterance to the highest conception of Brahman’s
nature that SAndilya’s thought was able to reach, is by
Sankara and his school again declared to form part of the
lower vidya only, because it represents Brahman as possess¬
ing qualities. It is, according to their terminology, not
^ana, i. e. knowledge, but the injunction of a mere upasana,
a devout meditation on Brahman in so far as possessing
certain definite attributes such as having light for its form,
having true thoughts, and so on. The Rdmanu^as, on the
other hand, quote this text with preference as clearly
describing the nature of their highest, i. e. their one Brah¬
man. We again allow that vSankara is free to deny that
any text which ascribes qualities to Brahman embodies abso¬
lute truth ; but we also again remark that there is no reason
whatever for supposing that Sandilya., or whoever may have
been the author of that vidya, looked upon it as anything
else but a statement of the highest truth accessible to man.
We return to the question as to the true philosophy of
the Upanishads, apart from the systems of the commen¬
tators.—From what precedes it will appear with sufficient
distinctness that, if we understand by philosophy a philo¬
sophical system coherent in all its parts, free from all
contradictions and allowing room for all the different state¬
ments made in all the chief Upanishads, a philosophy of
the Upanishads cannot even be spoken of. The various
lucubrations on Brahman, the world, and the human soul of
which the Upanishads consist do not allow themselves to
be systematised simply because they were never meant to
INTRODUCTION.
CXV
form a system. S&nd\\yd!s views as to the nature of
Brahman did not in all details agree with those of Ya^/za-
valkya, and Uddalaka differed from both. In this there is
nothing to wonder at, and the burden of proof rests alto¬
gether with those who maintain that a large number of
detached philosophic and theological dissertations, ascribed
to different authors, doubtless belonging to different periods,
and not seldom manifestly contradicting each other, admit
of being combined into a perfectly consistent whole.
The question, however, assumes a different aspect, if we
take the terms‘philosophy 5 and ‘philosophical system, 5 not
in the strict sense in which .Sankara and other commentators
are not afraid of taking them, but as implying merely an
agreement in certain fundamental features. In this latter
sense we may indeed undertake to indicate the outlines of
a philosophy of the Upanishads, only keeping in view that
precision in details is not to be aimed at. And here we
finally see ourselves driven back altogether on the texts
themselves, and have to acknowledge that the help we
receive from commentators, to whatever school they may
belong, is very inconsiderable. Fortunately it cannot be
asserted that the texts on the whole oppose very serious
difficulties to a right understanding, however obscure the
details often are. Concerning the latter we occasionally
depend entirely on the explanations vouchsafed by the
scholiasts, but as far as the general drift and spirit of the
texts are concerned, we are quite able to judge by our¬
selves, and are even specially qualified to do so by having
no particular system to advocate.
The point we will first touch upon is the same from which
we started when examining the doctrine of the Sutras, viz.
the question whether the Upanishads acknowledge a higher
and lower knowledge in .Sankaras sense, i.e. a knowledge
of a higher and a lower Brahman. Now this we find not to
be the case. Knowledge is in the Upanishads frequently
opposed to avidya, by which latter term we have to under¬
stand ignorance as to Brahman, absence of philosophic
knowledge; and, again, in several places we find the know¬
ledge of the sacrificial part of the Veda with its supple-
h 2
CXV1
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
mentary disciplines contrasted as inferior with the knowledge
of the Self; to which latter distinction the Mu/ft/aka Up.
(I, 4) applies the terms apara and para vidya. But a formal
recognition of the essential difference of Brahman being
viewed, on the one hand, as possessing distinctive attributes,
and, on the other hand, as devoid of all such attributes is not
to be met with anywhere. Brahman is indeed sometimes
described as sagu?za and sometimes as nirgu^a (to use later
terms); but it is nowhere said that thereon rests a distinc¬
tion of two different kinds of knowledge leading to altogether
different results. The knowledge of Brahman is one, under
whatever aspects it is viewed; hence the circumstance
(already exemplified above) that in the same vidyas it is
spoken of as sagu/za as well as nirgu^a. When the mind
of the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman is that from
which all this world originates, and in which it rests, he
naturally applies to it distinctive attributes pointing at its
relation to the world ; Brahman, then, is called the Self and
life of all, the inward ruler, the omniscient Lord, and so on.
When, on the other hand, the author follows out the idea
that Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious
reality of which the whole expanse of the world is only an
outward manifestation, then it strikes him that no idea or
term derived from sensible experience can rightly be applied
to it, that nothing more may be predicated of it but that it
is neither this nor that. But these are only two aspects of
the cognition of one and the same entity.
Closely connected with the question as to the double
nature of the Brahman of the Upanishads is the question
as to their teaching M&ya.—From Colebrooke downwards
the majority of European writers have inclined towards the
opinion that the doctrine of Maya, i.e. of the unreal illusory
character of the sensible world, does not constitute a feature
of the primitive philosophy of the Upanishads, but was
introduced into the system at some later period, whether by
Badaraya/^a or vSankara or somebody else. The opposite
view, viz. that the doctrine of Maya forms an integral
element of the teaching of the Upanishads, is implied in
them everywhere, and enunciated more or less distinctly in
INTRODUCTION.
CXVU
more than one place, has in recent times been advocated
with much force by Mr. Gough in the ninth chapter of his
Philosophy of the Upanishads.
In his Materiaux, &c. M. Paul Regnaud remarks that
‘the doctrine of Maya, although implied in the teaching
of the Upanishads, could hardly become clear and explicit
before the system had reached a stage of development
necessitating a choice between admitting two co-existent
eternal principles (which became the basis of the Sankhya
philosophy), and accepting the predominance of the intel¬
lectual principle, which in the end necessarily led to the
negation of the opposite principle.’—To the two alterna¬
tives here referred to as possible we, however, have to add
a third one, viz. that form of the Vedanta of which the
theory of the Bhagavatas or Ram&nu^as is the most
eminent type, and according to which Brahman carries
within its own nature an element from which the material
universe originates; an element which indeed is not an in¬
dependent entity like the pradhana of the Sankhyas, but
which at the same time is not an unreal M&ya but quite as real
as any other part of Brahman’s nature. That a doctrine of
this character actually developed itself on the basis of the Upa-
nishads, is a circumstance which we clearly must not lose sight
of, when attempting to determine what the Upanishads them¬
selves are teaching concerning the character of the world.
In enquiring whether the Upanishads maintain the Maya
doctrine or not, we must proceed with the same caution as
regards other parts of the system, i. e. we must refrain from
using unhesitatingly, and without careful consideration of the
merits of each individual case, the teaching—direct or inferred
—of any one passage to the end of determining the drift of
the teaching of other passages. We may admit that some
passages, notably of the Brzhadara^yaka, contain at any
rate the germ of the later developed Maya doctrine 1 , and
thus render it quite intelligible that a system like Sankara’s
1 It is well known that, with the exception of the 6vetajvatara and Maitra-
yaniya, none of the chief Upanishads exhibits the word ‘ may!’ The term indeed
occurs in one place in the Brzhadara^yaka; but that passage is a quotation
from the Rik Sa/^hita in which maya means ‘creative power.’ Cp. P. Regnaud,
La Maya, in the Revue de l’Histoire des Religions, tome xii, No. 3 (1885).
CXV111
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
should evolve itself, among others, out of the Upanishads;
but that affords no valid reason for interpreting Maya into
other texts which give a very satisfactory sense without that
doctrine, or are even clearly repugnant to it. This remark
applies in the very first place to all the accounts of the
creation of the physical universe. There, if anywhere, the
illusional character of the world should have been hinted at,
at least, had that theory been held by the authors of those
accounts ; but not a word to that effect is met with any¬
where. The most important of those accounts—the one
given in the sixth chapter of the KMndogya. Upanishad—
forms no exception. There is absolutely no reason to
assume that the ‘ sending forth’ of the elements from the
primitive Sat, which is there described at length, was by
the writer of that passage meant to represent a vivarta
rather than a parbzama, that the process of the origination
of the physical universe has to be conceived as anything else
but a real manifestation of real powers hidden in the
primeval Self. The introductory words, addressed to
SVetaketu by Uddalaka, which are generally appealed to as
intimating the unreal character of the evolution about to be
described, do not, if viewed impartially, intimate any such
thing 1 . For what is capable of being proved, and mani¬
festly meant to be proved, by the illustrative instances of
the lump of clay and the nugget of gold, through which
there are known all things made of clay and gold ? Merely
that this whole world has Brahman for its causal substance,
just as clay is the causal matter of every earthen pot, and
gold of every golden ornament, but not that the process
through which any causal substance becomes an effect is
an unreal one. We—including Uddalaka—may surely say
that all earthen pots are in reality nothing but earth—the
earthen pot being merely a special modification (vikara) of
clay which has a name of its own—without thereby com¬
mitting ourselves to the doctrine that the change of form,
which a lump of clay undergoes when being fashioned into
a pot, is not real but a mere baseless illusion.
In the same light we have to view numerous other passages
1 As is demonstrated very satisfactorily by Ramanuja.
INTRODUCTION.
CX1X
which set forth the successive emanations proceeding from
the first principle. When, for instance, we meet in the Ka/^a
Up. I, 3, io, in the serial enumeration of the forms of exist¬
ence intervening between the gross material world and the
highest Self (the Person), with the ‘avyakrzta,’ the Unde¬
veloped, immediately below the purusha; and when again
the Mum/aka Up. II, i, 2, speaks of the 4 high Imperishable’
higher than which is the heavenly Person; there is no
reason whatever to see in that ‘Undeveloped’ and that
‘high Imperishable’ anything but that real element in
Brahman from which, as in the Ramanuja system, the
material universe springs by a process of real development.
We must of course render it quite clear to ourselves in what
sense the terms ‘ real ’ and ‘ unreal ’ have to be understood.
The Upanishads no doubt teach emphatically that the
material world does not owe its existence to any principle
independent from the Lord like the pradhana of the
Sarikhyas; the world is nothing but a manifestation of the
Lord’s wonderful power, and hence is unsubstantial, if we
take the term ‘ substance’ in its strict sense. And, again,
everything material is immeasurably inferior in nature to the
highest spiritual principle from which it has emanated, and
which it now hides from the individual soul. But neither
unsubstantiality nor inferiority of the kind mentioned
constitutes unreality in the sense in which the Maya of
Sankara is unreal. According to the latter the whole
world is nothing but an erroneous appearance, as unreal as
the snake, for which a piece of rope is mistaken by the
belated traveller, and disappearing just as the imagined
snake does as soon as the light of true knowledge has risen.
But this is certainly not the impression left on the mind by
a comprehensive review of the Upanishads which dwells on
their general scope, and does not confine itself to the undue
urging of what may be implied in some detached passages.
The Upanishads do not call upon us to look upon the whole
world as a baseless illusion to be destroyed by knowledge;
the great error which they admonish us to relinquish is
rather that things have a separate individual existence, and
are not tied together by the bond of being all of them effects
cxx
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
of Brahman, or Brahman itself. They do not say that true
knowledge sublates this false world, as .Sankara says, but
that it enables the sage to extricate himself from the world
—the inferior murta rupa of Brahman, to use an expression
of the Br/hadara;^yaka—and to become one with Brahman
in its highest form. ‘ We are to see everything in Brahman,
and Brahman in everything the natural meaning of this is,
‘we are to look upon this whole world as a true manifesta¬
tion of Brahman, as sprung from it and animated by it.’
The mayavadin has indeed appropriated the above saying
also, and interpreted it so as to fall in with his theory; but
he is able to do so only by perverting its manifest sense.
For him it would be appropriate to say, not that every¬
thing we see is in Brahman, but rather that everything we
see is out of Brahman, viz. as a false appearance spread
over it and hiding it from us.
Stress has been laid 1 upon certain passages of the
Br/hadara^yaka which seem to hint at the unreality of
this world by qualifying terms, indicative of duality or plur¬
ality of existence, by means of an added c iva,’ i. e. e as it were’
(yatranyad iva syat; yatra dvaitam iva bhavati; atma
dhyayativa lelayativa). Those passages no doubt readily
lend themselves to Maya interpretations, and it is by no
means impossible that in their author’s mind there was
something like an undeveloped Maya doctrine. I must, how¬
ever, remark that they, on the other hand, also admit of
easy interpretations not in any way presupposing the
theory of the unreality of the world. If Ya^avalkya refers
to the latter as that 4 where there is something else as it
were, where there is duality as it were,’ he may simply mean
to indicate that the ordinary opinion, according to which
the individual forms of existence of the world are opposed
to each other as altogether separate, is a mistaken one, all
things being one in so far as they spring from—and are
parts of—Brahman. This would in no way involve duality
or plurality being unreal in .Sankara’s sense, not any more
than, for instance, the modes of Spinoza are unreal because,
according to that philosopher, there is only one universal
1 Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 243 ff.
INTRODUCTION.
CXX1
substance. And with regard to the clause 4 the Self thinks
as it were ’ it has to be noted that according to the com¬
mentators the 4 as it were ’ is meant to indicate that truly
not the Self is thinking, but the upadhis, i. e. especially the
manas with which the Self is connected. But whether
these upddhis are the mere offspring of Maya, as .Sankara
thinks, or real forms of existence, as Ramanuja teaches, is
an altogether different question.
I do not wish, however, to urge these last observations,
and am ready to admit that not impossibly those iva’s
indicate that the thought of the writer who employed them
was darkly labouring with a conception akin to—although
much less explicit than—the May 4 of Sankara. But
what I object to is, that conclusions drawn from a few
passages of, after all, doubtful import should be employed
for introducing the Maya doctrine into other passages which
do not even hint at it, and are fully intelligible without it \
The last important point in the teaching of the Upanishads
we have to touch upon is the relation of the ^rvas, the in¬
dividual souls to the highest Self. The special views
regarding that point held by Sankara and Ramanuja
have been stated before. Confronting their theories with
the texts of the Upanishads we must, I think, admit with¬
out hesitation, that Sankara’s doctrine faithfully represents
the prevailing teaching of the Upanishads in one important
point at least, viz. therein that the soul or Self of the sage
—whatever its original relation to Brahman may be—is in
the end completely merged and indistinguishably lost in the
universal Self. A distinction, repeatedly alluded to before,
has indeed to be kept in view here also. Certain texts
of the Upanishads describe the soul’s going upwards, on the
path of the gods, to the world of Brahman, where it dwells
for unnumbered years, i. e. for ever. Those texts, as a type
of which we may take the passage Kaushit. Up. I—the
fundamental text of the Rdmanu^as concerning the soul’s
1 I cannot discuss in this place the Maya passages of the .Sveta^vatara
and the Maitrayaniya Upanishads. Reasons which want of space prevents me
from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that neither of those two
treatises deserves to be considered by us when wishing to ascertain the true
unmixed doctrine of the Upanishads.
CXX11
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
fate after death—belong to an earlier stage of philosophic
development; they manifestly ascribe to the soul a con¬
tinued individual existence. But mixed with texts of
this class there are others in which the final absolute
identification of the individual Self with the universal Self
is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. ‘He who
knows Brahman and becomes Brahman‘he who knows
Brahman becomes all this;’ ‘ as the flowing rivers disappear
in the sea losing their name and form, thus a wise man goes
to the divine person.’ And if we look to the whole, to the
prevailing spirit of the Upanishads, we may call the doctrine
embodied in passages of the latter nature the doctrine of the
Upanishads. It is, moreover, supported by the frequently
and clearly stated theory of the individual souls being
merged in Brahman in the state of deep dreamless sleep.
It is much more difficult to indicate the precise teaching
of the Upanishads concerning the original relation of the
individual soul to the highest Self, although there can be
no doubt that it has to be viewed as proceeding from the
latter, and somehow forming a part of it. Negatively we
are entitled to say that the doctrine, according to which
the soul is merely brahma bhrantam or brahma mayopa-
dhikam, is in no way countenanced by the majority of the
passages bearing on the question. If the emission of the
elements, described in the ATMndogya and referred to
above, is a real process—of which we saw no reason to
doubt—the £iva atman with which the highest Self enters
into the emitted elements is equally real, a true part or
emanation of Brahman itself.
After having in this way shortly reviewed the chief ele¬
ments of Vedantic doctrine according to the Upanishads, we
may briefly consider .Sankara’s system and mode of inter¬
pretation—with whose details we had frequent opportunities
of finding fault—as a whole. It has been said before that
the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the Upa¬
nishads to a system consistent and free from contradic¬
tions is an intrinsically impossible one. But the task once
being given, we are quite ready to admit that .Sankara’s
system is most probably the best which can be devised.
INTRODUCTION.
CXXU1
While unable to allow that the Upanishads recognise a
lower and higher knowledge of Brahman, in fact the dis¬
tinction of a lower and higher Brahman, we yet acknowledge
that the adoption of that distinction furnishes the inter¬
preter with an instrument of extraordinary power for
reducing to an orderly whole the heterogeneous material
presented by the old theosophic treatises. This becomes
very manifest as soon as we compare .Sankara’s system
with that of Ram&nu^a. The latter recognises only one
Brahman which is, as we should say, a personal God, and
he therefore lays stress on all those passages of the Upani¬
shads which ascribe to Brahman the attributes of a personal
God, such as omniscience and omnipotence. Those passages,
on the other hand, whose decided tendency it is to represent
Brahman as transcending all qualities, as one undifferenced
mass of impersonal intelligence, Ramanuja is unable to
accept frankly and fairly, and has to misinterpret them
more or less to make them fall in with his system. The
same remark holds good with regard to those texts which
represent the individual soul as finally identifying itself
with Brahman ; Rclmanug*a cannot allow a complete identi¬
fication but merely an assimilation carried as far as possible.
Sankara, on the other hand, by skilfully ringing the changes
on a higher and a lower doctrine, somehow manages to find
room for whatever the Upanishads have to say. Where
the text speaks of Brahman as transcending all attributes,
the highest doctrine is set forth. Where Brahman is called
the All-knowing ruler of the world, the author means to
propound the lower knowledge of the Lord only. And
where the legends about the primary being and its way of
creating the world become somewhat crude and gross,
Hira/zyagarbha and Vira^* are summoned forth and charged
with the responsibility. Of Vira^ Mr. Gough remarks (p. 55)
that in him a place is provided by the poets of the Upani¬
shads for the purusha of the ancient rzshis, the divine being
out of whom the visible and tangible world proceeded.
This is quite true if only we substitute for the ‘ poets of
the Upanishads’ the framers of the orthodox Vedctnta
system—for the Upanishads give no indication whatever
CXX1V
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
that by their purusha they understand not the simple old
purusha but the Virdg* occupying a definite position in a
highly elaborate system ;—but the mere phrase, 4 providing a
place’ intimates with sufficient clearness the nature of the work
in which systematisers of the Vedantic doctrine are engaged.
Sankara’s method thus enables him in a certain way to
do justice to different stages of historical development, to
recognise clearly existing differences which other system¬
atisers are intent on obliterating. And there has yet to
be made a further and even more important admission in
favour of his system. It is not only more pliable, more
capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other
systems, but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in
greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upani-
shads than those of other Vedantic systems. Above we were
unable to allow that the distinction made by Sankara
between Brahman and l^vara is known to the Upanishads ;
but we must now admit that if, for the purpose of determining
the nature of the highest being, a choice has to be made
between those texts which represent Brahman as nirgu^a,
and those which ascribe to it personal attributes, Sankara
is right in giving preference to texts of the former kind.
The Brahman of the old Upanishads, from which the souls
spring to enjoy individual consciousness in their waking
state, and into which they sink back temporarily in the
state of deep dreamless sleep and permanently in death, is
certainly not represented adequately by the strictly per¬
sonal l^vara of Ramanuja, who rules the world in wisdom and
mercy. The older Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little
stress upon personal attributes of their highest being, and
hence Sankara is right in so far as he assigns to his hypo-
statised personal l^vara 1 a lower place than to his absolute
Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing
spirit of the Upanishads in his theory of the ultimate fate
1 The Uvara who allots to the individual souls their new forms of embodiment
in strict accordance with their merit or demerit cannot be called anything else
but a personal God. That this personal conscious being is at the same time iden¬
tified with the totality of the individual souls in the unconscious state of deep
dreamless sleep, is one of those extraordinary contradictions which thorough-going
systematisers of Vedantic doctrine are apparently unable to avoid altogether.
INTRODUCTION.
CXXV
of the soul, we have already remarked above. And although
the Maya doctrine cannot, in my opinion, be said to form
part of the teaching of the Upanishads, it cannot yet be
asserted to contradict it openly, because the very point
which it is meant to elucidate, viz. the mode in which the
physical universe and the multiplicity of individual souls
originate, is left by the Upanishads very much in the dark.
The later growth of the Maya doctrine on the basis of the
Upanishads is therefore quite intelligible, and I fully agree
with Mr. Gough when he says regarding it that there has
been no addition to the system from without but only a
development from within, no graft but only growth. The
lines of thought which finally led to the elaboration of the
full-blown Maya theory may be traced with considerable
certainty. In the first place, deepening speculation on
Brahman tended to the notion of advaita being taken in a
more and more strict sense, as implying not only the ex¬
clusion of any second principle external to Brahman, but
also the absence of any elements of duality or plurality in
the nature of the one universal being itself; a tendency
agreeing with the spirit of a certain set of texts from the
Upanishads. And as the fact of the appearance of a
manifold world cannot be denied, the only way open to
thoroughly consistent speculation was to deny at any rate
its reality, and to call it a mere illusion due to an unreal
principle, with which Brahman is indeed associated, but
which is unable to break the unity of Brahman’s nature
just on account of its own unreality. And, in the second
place, a more thorough following out of the conception
that the union with Brahman is to be reached through true
knowledge only, not unnaturally led to the conclusion that
what separates us in our unenlightened state from Brahman
is such as to allow itself to be completely sublated by an
act of knowledge; is, in other words, nothing else but an
erroneous notion, an illusion.—A further circumstance which
may not impossibly have co-operated to further the de¬
velopment of the theory of the world’s unreality will be
referred to later on 1 .
1 That section of the introduction in which the point referred to in the text
CXXV1
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
We have above been obliged to leave it an open question
what kind of Vedanta is represented by the Vedanta-stitras,
although reason was shown for the supposition that in some
important points their teaching is more closely related to
the system of Ramanuja than to that of Sankara. If so,
the philosophy of Sankara would on the whole stand
nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Sutras
of Badaraya^a. This would indeed be a somewhat un¬
expected conclusion—for, judging a priori, we should be
more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true
doctrine of the Upanishads through Badaraya^a to San¬
kara—but a priori considerations have of course no weight
against positive evidence to the contrary. There are, more¬
over, other facts in the history of Indian philosophy and
theology which help us better to appreciate the possibility
of B 4 daraya;za’s Shtras already setting forth a doctrine
that lays greater stress on the personal character of the
highest being than is in agreement with the prevailing
tendency of the Upanishads. That the pure doctrine of
those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent at a rather
early period amalgamations with beliefs which most pro¬
bably had sprung up in altogether different—priestly or
non-priestly—communities is a well-known circumstance ;
it suffices for our purposes to refer to the most eminent of
the early literary monuments in which an amalgamation of
the kind mentioned is observable, viz. the Bhagavadgita.
The doctrine of the Bhagavadgita represents a fusion of
the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in
a personal highest being— Krishna, or Vishnu—which in
many respects approximates very closely to the system of
the Bhagavatas; the attempts of a certain set of Indian
commentators to explain it as setting forth pure Vedanta,
i. e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply
be set aside. But this same Bhagavadgita is quoted in
Badaraya^a’s Sfttras (at least according to the unanimous
explanations of the most eminent scholiasts of different
schools) as inferior to 5 ruti only in authority. The Sutras,
is touched upon will I hope form part of the second volume of the translation.
The same remark applies to a point concerning which further information had
been promised above on page v.
INTRODUCTION.
CXXV11
moreover, refer in different places to certain Vedantic por¬
tions of the Mahabharata, especially the twelfth book,
several of which represent forms of Vedanta distinctly dif¬
fering from .Sankara’s teaching, and closely related to the
system of the Bhagavatas.
Facts of this nature—from entering into the details of
which we are prevented by want of space—tend to mitigate
the prima facie strangeness of the assumption that the
Vedanta-sutras, which occupy an intermediate position
between the Upanishads and .Sankara, should yet diverge
in their teaching from both. The Vedanta of Gaiu/apada
and Sankara would in that case mark a strictly orthodox
reaction against all combinations of non-Vedic elements of
belief and doctrine with the teaching of the Upanishads.
But although this form of doctrine has ever since Sankara’s
time been the one most generally accepted by Brahminic
students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching
influence on the masses of India. It is too little in sym¬
pathy with the wants of the human heart, which, after
all, are not so very different in India from what they are
elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India, are those
who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence
in which their own individuality is to be merged and lost
for ever, who think it sweet ‘ to be wrecked on the ocean of
the Infinite 1 .’ The only forms of Vedantic philosophy
which are—and can at any time have been—really popular,
are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads has
somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and
the devotee there can exist a personal relation, love and
faith on the part of man, justice tempered by mercy on the
part of the divinity. The only religious books of widespread
influence are such as the Ramayan of Tulsidas, which lay no
stress on the distinction between an absolute Brahman inac¬
cessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy
Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory prin¬
ciple of Maya, but love to dwell on the delights of devotion
Cosi tra questa
Immensita s’ annega il pensier mio,
E il naufrago m’ e dolce in questo mare.
Leopardi.
cxxviii
vedanta-s6tras.
to one all-wise and merciful ruler, who is able and willing to
lend a gracious ear to the supplication of the worshipper.
The present translation of the Vedanta-sutras does not
aim at rendering that sense which their author may have
aimed at conveying, but strictly follows Sankara’s inter¬
pretation. The question as to how far the latter agrees
with the views held by Badariyazza has been discussed
above, with the result that for the present it must, on the
whole, be left an open one. In any case it would not be
feasible to combine a translation of Sankara's commentary
with an independent version of the Sutras which it ex¬
plains. Similar considerations have determined the method
followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads re¬
ferred to in the Sutras and discussed at length by Sankara.
There also the views of the commentator have to be followed
closely ; otherwise much of the comment would appear de¬
void of meaning. Hence, while of course following on the
whole the critical translation published by Professor Max
Muller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not
inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render
intelligible Sankara’s explanations and reasonings. I hope
to find space in the introduction to the second volume of
this translation for making some general remarks on the
method to be followed in translating the Upanishads.
I regret that want of space has prevented me from
extracting fuller notes from later scholiasts. The notes
given are based, most of them, on the tfkas composed
by Anandagiri and Govindananda (the former of which is
unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhamati.
My best thanks are due to Pazzafits Rama Mirra 5 &strin
and Gangadhara Gastrin of the Benares Sanskrit College,
whom I have consulted on several difficult passages.
Greater still are my obligations to 'Pandit Ke^ava Gastrin,
of the same institution, who most kindly undertook to
read a proof of the whole of the present volume, and
whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more
than one passage more definite or correct.
VEDANTA-SUTRAS
WITH
SANKARA BHASHYA.
[ 34 ]
B
SANKARA’S INTRODUCTION.
FIRST ADHYAYA.
FIRST pAda.
Reverence to the August Vasudeva!
It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object
and the subject 1 whose respective spheres are the notion of
the ‘ Thou ’ (the Non-Ego 2 ) and the ‘ Ego/ and which are
opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are,
cannot be identified. All the less can their respective
attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong to
superimpose 3 upon the subject—whose Self is intelligence,
and which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego—the
object whose sphere is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the
attributes of the object, and vice versa to superimpose the
subject and the attributes of the subject on the object. In
spite of this it is on the part of man a natural 4 procedure—
1 The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence
(£it); the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature,
viz. bodies with their sense-organs, interna] organs, and the objects
of the senses, i. e. the external material world.
2 The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the * thou ’
(yushmat), not the notion of the 4 this ’ or ‘ that' (idam), in order
better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Lan¬
guage allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and
the third person (‘It is 1/ ‘I am he who/ &c.; ete vayam, ime
vayam asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the
first and second person.
3 Adhyasa, literally ‘ superimposition' in the sense of (mistaken)
ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or
attributes not belonging to it. See later on.
4 Natural, i. e. original, beginningless; for the modes of speech
B 2
4
VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
which has its cause in wrong knowledge—not to distinguish
the two entities (object and subject) and their respective
attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to
superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the
attributes of the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the
Unreal 1 , to make use of expressions such as ‘That am 1/
‘ That is mine 2 .’—But what have we to understand by the
term ‘ superimposition ? ’— The apparent presentation, in
the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something
previously observed, in some other thing 3 .
Some indeed define the term ‘ superimposition 5 as the
superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another
thing 4 . Others, again, define superimposition as the error
and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed,
with the latter, from all eternity.
1 I. e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real
objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong
knowledge.
2 ‘The body, &c. is my Self;’ ‘sickness, death, children, wealth,
&c., belong to my Self.’
3 Literally ‘ in some other place.’ The clause ‘ in the form of
remembrance ’ is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude
those cases where something previously observed is recognised in
some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic
character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow
again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Deva-
datta whom we first saw in Pa/aliputra again appears before us in
Mahishmati. These are cases of recognition where the object pre¬
viously observed again presents itself to our senses ; while in mere
remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed
contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in the case
of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is
at the time not present but remembered only.
4 The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act of
adhy&sa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are super¬
imposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother-
of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the
case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him
for a piece of silver). The atmakhyativadins maintain that in
adhyasa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ
I ADHYAYA, I PADA.
5
founded on the non-apprehension of the difference of that
which is superimposed from that on which it is super¬
imposed 1 . Others 2 , again, define it as the fictitious as¬
sumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing
on which something else is superimposed. But all these
definitions agree in so far as they represent superimposition
as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in
another thing. And therewith agrees also the popular view
which is exemplified by expressions such as the following :
‘ Mother-of-pearl appears like silver/ ‘ The moon although
one only appears as if she were double.’ But how is it
possible that on the interior Self which itself is not an
object there should be superimposed objects and their
attributes ? For every one superimposes an object only on
such other objects as are placed before him (i. e. in contact
with his sense organs), and you have said before that the
interior Self which is entirely disconnected from the idea of
the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never an object. It is not, we
reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the
object of the notion of the Ego 3 , and the interior Self is
well-known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive)
presentation 4 . Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects
is superimposed on the external thing mother-of-pearl and thus
itself appears external. Both views fall under the above definition.
1 This is the definition of the akhyativ&dins.
2 Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according
to Ananda Giri.
3 The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is svayam-
praklya, self-luminous, i. e. the subjective factor in all cognition.
But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is
limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Ne¬
science, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross
bodies, i. e. in so far as it is £iva, individual or personal soul. Cp.
Bh&mati, pp. 22, 23: ‘&datmaiva svayamprakjtro*pi buddhyadivi-
shayavi^Murawat katha^w^id asmatpratyayavishayoxha^kardspadaw
£iva iti kz, ^-antur iti kz, kshetra^a iti ^akhyayate.’
4 Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector
says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the
ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it
6
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
can be superimposed only on such other objects as are
before us, i. e. in contact with our sense-organs; for non¬
discerning men superimpose on the ether, which is not the
object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour.
Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self
being superimposed on the interior Self is not unreasonable.
This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider
to be Nescience (avidya), and the ascertainment of the true
nature of that which is (the Self) by means of the discrimi¬
nation of that (which is superimposed on the Self), they
call knowledge (vidya). There being such knowledge
(neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least
by any blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual
superimposition 1 . The mutual superimposition of the Self
and the Non-Self, which is termed Nescience, is the pre¬
supposition on which there base all the practical distinc¬
tions—those made in ordinary life as well as those laid
down by the Veda—between means of knowledge, objects
of knowledge (and knowing persons), and all scriptural
texts, whether they are concerned with injunctions and
prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious actions),
or with final release 2 .—But how can the means of right
may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown),
but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not mani¬
fested either by itself or by anything else.—It is known or mani¬
fest, the Vedantin replies, on account of its immediate presentation
(aparokshatvat), i. e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we
have of it. Ananda Giri construes the above clause in a different
way: asmatpratyayavishayatve^py aparokshatvad ekantenavishaya-
tv&bbavat tasminn ahankar&dyadhyasa ity artha^. Aparokshatvam
api kah&d atmano nesh/am ity sUahkyaha pratyagatmeti.
1 Tatraivazzz sati evambhutavastutattvavadharazze sati. Bha. Tas¬
minn adhyase uktaritya*vidyatmake sati. Go. Yatratmani bud-
dhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa^ tena buddhyadi-
na*tmana va krztemwanayadidoshezza jfcaitanyaguzzena Mtmanatmd
va vastuto na svalpenapi yu^yate. Ananda Giri.
2 Whether they belong to the karmakazz^a, i. e. that part of the
Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the ^zianakazz^a, i. e.
that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA.
7
knowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scrip¬
tural texts have for their object that which is dependent
on Nescience 1 ?—Because, we reply, the means of right
knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing per¬
sonality, and because the existence of the latter depends
on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so
on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing
person. For without the employment of the senses, per¬
ception and the other means of right knowledge cannot
operate. And without a basis (i. e. the body 2 ) the senses
cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body
on which the nature of the Self is not superimposed 3 .
Nor can, in the absence of all that 4 , the Self which, in its
own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing
agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of
right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence
perception and the other means of right knowledge, and
the Vedic texts have for their object that which is de¬
pendent on Nescience. (That human cognitional activity
has for its presupposition the superimposition described
above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect
of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other
sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other
senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived
from the sensation is a comforting or disquieting one. A
cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a
raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and
therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who
advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men
also—who possess a higher intelligence—run away when
1 It being of course the function of the means of right know¬
ledge to determine Truth and Reality,
2 The Bhamati takes adhish/Mnam in the sense of superintend¬
ence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a super¬
intending principle, i. e. the individual soul.
8 If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified
with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.
4 I. e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self
and the Non-Self and their attributes.
8
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with
shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently
approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour.
We thus see that men and animals follow the same course
of procedure with reference to the means and objects of
knowledge. Now it is well-known that the procedure of
animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and Non-
Self) ; we therefore conclude that, as they present the
same appearances, men also—although distinguished by
superior intelligence—proceed with regard to perception
and so on, in the same way as animals do; as long, that
is to say, as the mutual superimposition of Self and Non-
Self lasts. With reference again to that kind of activity
which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like), it is
true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter
on it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a
relation to another world; yet that qualification does not
depend on the knowledge, derivable from the Veddnta-
texts, of the true nature of the Self as free from all wants,
raised above the distinctions of the Br&hma^a and Kshat-
triya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory exis¬
tence. For such knowledge is useless and even contra¬
dictory to the claim (on the part of sacrificers, &c. to
perform certain actions and enjoy their fruits). And before
such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic texts
continue in their operation, to have for their object that
which is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as
the following, 4 A Brahma^a is to sacrifice,’ are operative
only on the supposition that on the Self are superimposed
particular conditions such as caste, stage of life, age, out¬
ward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition
we have to understand the notion of something in some
other thing we have already explained. (The superimpo¬
sition of the Non-Self will be understood more definitely
from the following examples.) Extra-personal attributes
are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself
sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife,
children, and so on are sound and entire or not. Attri¬
butes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
9
thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing,
walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if
he thinks ‘I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.’
Attributes of the internal organ when he considers himself
subject to desire, intention, doubt, determination, and so
on. Thus the producer of the notion of the Ego (i. e. the
internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self, which,
in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the
internal organ, and vice versa the interior Self, which is
the witness of everything, is superimposed on the internal
organ, the senses, and so on. In this way there goes on
this natural beginning—and endless superimposition, which
appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of
individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the
results of their actions), and is observed by every one.
With a view to freeing one’s self from that wrong notion
which is the cause of all evil and attaining thereby the
knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self the study of
the Vedanta-texts is begun. That all the Vedanta-texts
have the mentioned purport we shall show in this so-called
5&riraka-mim&MS& 1 .
Of this Vedanta -mtmkmsk about to be explained by us
the first Sfitra is as follows.
i. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.
The word c then ’ is here to be taken as denoting imme¬
diate consecution ; not as indicating the introduction of a
new subject to be entered upon; for the enquiry into
Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing Brahman)
is not of that nature 2 . Nor has the word ‘then’ the sense
1 The Mima/tfsa, i. e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show that
the embodied Self, i. e. the individual or personal soul is one with
Brahman. This Mimazrcsa being an enquiry into the meaning of the
Vedanta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedanta-mimawsa..
2 Nadhik&r&rtha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyartha^, kim
ayam atha^abdo brahma^ane^Mya# ki m vantarmtaviMrasya
athave^Mvheshafla^anasyarambhartha^. Nadya^ tasya mima/ra-
sapravartikayas tadapravartyatvad anarabhyatvat tasya ,s /fcottaratra
IO
vedanta-s(jtras.
of auspiciousness (or blessing); for a word of that meaning
could not be properly construed as a part of the sentence.
The word ‘then* rather acts as an auspicious term by
being pronounced and heard merely, while it denotes at
the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution as
said above. That the latter is its meaning follows more¬
over from the circumstance that the relation in which the
result stands to the previous topic (viewed as the cause of
the result) is non-separate from the relation of immediate
consecution x .
If, then, the word ‘ then 5 intimates immediate consecution
it must be explained on what antecedent the enquiry into
Brahman specially depends ; just as the enquiry into active
religious duty (which forms the subject of the Purva
Mima^s&) specially depends on the antecedent reading of
the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common
antecedent (for those who wish to enter on an enquiry into
religious duty as well as for those desirous of knowing
Brahman). The special question with regard to the enquiry
into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent
the understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is
acquired by means of the Purva Mima^sa). To this
question we reply in the negative, because for a man who
has read the Vedanta-parts of the Veda it is possible to
enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in
the enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of
the word c then ’ to indicate order of succession; a purport
which it serves in other passages, as, for instance, in the one
enjoining the cutting off of pieces from the heart and other
pratyadhikara^am apratipadanat. Na dvitiyo*tha.rabdenanantar-
yoktidvara vmsh/adhikaryasamarpa«e sddhana^atush/ayasampan-
nana m brahmadhitadvi^arayor anarthitvad viHranarambhan na ka
vi^aravidhiva^ad adhikart kalpya^ prarambhasyapi tulyatvad adhi-
kariwa^ ka vidhyapekshitopadhitvan na tritiyah brahma^anasya-
nandasakshatkaratvenadhik^ryatve^pyapradhanyad athasabdasam-
bandhat tasman narambharthateti. Ananda Giri.
1 Any relation in which the result, i. e. here the enquiry into
Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect
may be comprised under the relation of anantarya.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
1 I
parts of the sacrificial animal 1 . (For the intimation of order
of succession could be intended only if the agent in both
cases were the same; but this is not the case), because
there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious
duty and the enquiry into Brahman to stand in the rela¬
tion of principal and subordinate matter or the relation of
qualification (for a certain act) on the part of the person
qualified 2 ; and because the result as well as the object of
the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of
active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and
that again depends on the performance of religious acts.
The enquiry into Brahman, on the other hand, has for its
fruit eternal bliss, and does not depend on the performance
of any acts. Acts of religious duty do not yet exist at the
time when they are enquired into, but are something to
be accomplished (in the future) ; for they depend on the
activity of man. In the Brahma-mima^sa, on the other
hand, the object of enquiry, i. e. Brahman, is something
already accomplished (existent),—for it is eternal,—and
does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries
differ moreover in so far as the operation of their respective
fundamental texts is concerned. For the fundamental texts
on which active religious duty depends convey information
to man in so far only as they enjoin on him their own
particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.) ; while the fundamental
texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without lay¬
ing on him the injunction of being instructed, instruction
being their immediate result. The case is analogous to
that of the information regarding objects of sense which
ensues as soon as the objects are approximated to the
senses. It therefore is requisite that something should be
1 He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then from
the breast.
2 Where one action is subordinate to another as, for instance, the
offering of the pray&g-as is to the dar^apurwamasa-sacrifice, or where
one action qualifies a person for another as, for instance, the offering
of the darjapfin/amasa qualifies a man for the performance of the
Soma-sacrifice, there is unity of the agent, and consequently an inti¬
mation of the order of succession of the actions is in its right place,
vedanta-s6tras.
32
stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is pro¬
posed.—Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent condi¬
tions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is
non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit
(of one’s actions) both here and hereafter; the acquirement
of tranquillity, self-restraint, and the other means \ and the
desire of final release. If these conditions exist, a man
may, either before entering on an enquiry into active
religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into
Brahman and come to know it; but not otherwise. The
word ‘then 5 therefore intimates that the enquiry into
Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition of the above-
mentioned (spiritual) means.
The word 4 therefore 5 intimates a reason. Because the
Veda, while declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and
similar performances which are means of happiness is non¬
eternal (as, for instance, Kh . Up. VIII, i, 6, ‘ As here on earth
whatever has been acquired by action perishes so perishes
in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious
duty’), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is
realised by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt.
Up. II, i, ‘ He who knows Brahman attains the highest ’);
therefore the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken
subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned means.
By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of
which will be given in the next Sutra (I, i, 2); it is therefore
not to be supposed that the word Brahman may here denote
something else, as, for instance, the brahminical caste. In the
Sfitra the genitive case (‘of Brahman; 5 the literal translation
of the Sutra being ‘then therefore the desire of knowledge
of Brahman ’) denotes the object, not something generally
supplementary (jesha 1 2 ); for the desire of knowledge
1 The 4 means ’ in addition to jama and dama are discontinuance
of religious . ceremonies (uparati), patience in- suffering (titiksha),
attention and concentration of the mind (samadhana), and faith
(jraddha).
2 According to Pacini II, 3, 30 the sixth (genitive) case ex¬
presses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary
to, or connected with, some other thing.
I ADHyAyA, I PAD A, I.
13
demands an object of desire and no other such object is
stated.—But why should not the genitive case be taken as
expressing the general complementary relation (to express
which is its proper office) ? Even in that case it might
constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the
general relation may base itself on the more particular
one.—This assumption, we reply, would mean that we
refuse to take Brahman as the direct object, and then again
indirectly introduce it as the object; an altogether needless
procedure.—Not needless; for if we explain the words of
the Sutra to mean ‘ the desire of knowledge connected with
Brahman’ we thereby virtually promise that also all the
heads of discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.—
This reason also, we reply, is not strong enough to uphold
your interpretation. For the statement of some principal
matter already implies all the secondary matters connected
therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all
objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all
those objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman
presupposes, and those objects need therefore not be men¬
tioned, especially in the Stitra. Analogously the sentence
‘ there the king is going 5 implicitly means that the king
together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation
(according to which the Sfitra represents Brahman as the
direct object of knowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture,
which directly represents Brahman as the object of the
desire of knowledge; compare, for instance, the passage,
4 That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire to
know that. That is Brahman 5 (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1). With
passages of this kind the Sutra only agrees if the genitive
case is taken to denote the object. Hence we do take it
in that sense. The object of the desire is the knowledge of
Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires having
reference to results 1 . Knowledge thus constitutes the
1 In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be
separate; so, for instance, when it is said ‘ gr&mazra ga^ati/ the
village is the object of the action of going, and the arrival at the
village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring object and
result coincide.
14
vedanta-s6tras.
means by which the complete comprehension of Brahman
is desired to be obtained. For the complete comprehension
of Brahman is the highest end of man, since it destroys the
root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of the entire
Sa^sara. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be
entertained.
But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known
(previously to the enquiry into its nature)? If it is known
we need not enter on an enquiry concerning it; if it is
not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.
We reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is
all-knowing and endowed with all powers, whose essential
nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom, exists.
For if we consider the derivation of the word ‘ Brahman,’
from the root brzh, ‘to be great,’ we at once understand
that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman 1 . More¬
over the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of
its being the Self of every one. For every one is conscious
of the existence of (his) Self, and never thinks ‘ I am not. 5
If the existence of the Self were not known, every one
would think ‘ I am not. 5 And this Self (of whose existence
all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is generally
known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it!
Not so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its
special nature. Unlearned people and the Lokayatikas
are of opinion that the mere body endowed with the quality
of intelligence is the Self; others that the organs endowed
with intelligence are the Self; others maintain that the inter¬
nal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a mere
momentary idea ; others, again, that it is the Void. Others,
again (to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge
the authority of the Veda), maintain that there is a trans¬
migrating being different from the body, and so on, which is
both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of action); others teach
1 That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the
Brahma-mtmaffzsa, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c.,
and from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's
chief attributes.
I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 2.
15
that that being is enjoying only, not acting; others believe
that in addition to the individual souls, there is an all¬
knowing, all-powerful Lord 1 . Others, finally, (i. e. the
Vedantins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the en-i
joyer (i. e. of the individual soul whose individual existenceI
is apparent only, the product of Nescience).
Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of
them on sound arguments and scriptural texts, part of
them orl fallacious arguments and scriptural texts mis¬
understood 2 . If therefore a man would embrace some one
of these opinions without previous consideration, he would
bar himself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous
loss. For this reason the first Sutra proposes, under the
designation of an enquiry into Brahman, a disquisition of
the Vedanta-texts, to be carried on with the help of Con¬
formable arguments, and having for its aim the highest
beatitude.
So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired
into. The question now arises what the character is*ks»-of
that Brahman ar e, and the reverend author of the Sutras
therefore propounds the following aphorism.
2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c.
(i. e. the origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this
(world proceed).
The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption.
That the origin is mentioned first (of the three) depends
on the declaration of Scripture as well as on the natural
development of a substance. Scripture declares the order
1 The three last opinions are those of the followers of the
Nyaya, the Sankbya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The
three opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic
schools; the two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philo¬
sophers.
2 As, for instance, the passages ‘this person consists of the
essence of food‘the eye, &c. spoke; ’ ‘non-existing this was in
the beginning,’ &c.
16
VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the
passage, Taitt. Up. Ill, i, 4 From whence these beings are
born,’ &c. And with regard to the second reason stated, it
is known that a substrate of qualities can subsist and be
dissolved only after it has entered, through origination,
on the state of existence. The words ‘of this’ denote
that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by
perception and the other means of right knowledge; the
genitive case indicates it to be connected with origin,
&c. The words ‘ from which ’ denote the cause. The full
sense of the Sutra therefore is : That omniscient omnipotent
cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence, and dissolu¬
tion of this world—which world is differentiated by names
and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode
of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite
places, times, and causes 1 , and the nature of whose arrange¬
ment cannot even be conceived by the mind,—that cause,
we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of existence
(such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination,
subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred
to in the Sutra, As the six stages of existence enumerated
by Yaska 2 are possible only during the period of the
world’s subsistence, it might—were they referred to in the
Sutra—be suspected that what is meant are not the origin,
subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as dependent on
the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sutra is to
be taken as referring, in addition to the world’s origination
from Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and
final dissolution into Brahman.
The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes
stated above cannot possibly proceed from anything else
but a Lord possessing the stated qualities ; not either from
a non-intelligent pradhana 3 , or from atoms, or from non-
1 So the compound is to be divided according to An. Gi. and
Go.; the BhL proposes another less plausible division.
2 According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhavavikara^ are: origina¬
tion, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.
3 The pradh&na, called also prakrzti, is the primal causal matter
of the world in the Sankhya-system. It will be fully discussed in
I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 2.
17
being, or from a being subject to transmigration 1 ; nor,
again, can it proceed from its own nature (i. e. spontaneously,
without a cause), since we observe that (for the production
of effects) special places, times, and Causes have invariably
to be employed.
(Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause
of the world 2 , think that the existence of a Lord different
from mere transmigrating beings can be inferred by
means of the argument stated just now (without re¬
course being had to Scripture at all).—But, it might
be said, you yourself in the Sutra under discussion have
merely brought forward the same argument!—By no
means, we reply. The Sutras (i. e. literally £ the strings *)
have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers
of the Vedanta-passages. In reality the Vedanta-passages
referred to by the Sutras are discussed here. For the
comprehension of Brahman is effected by the ascertain¬
ment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the Vedanta-
texts, not either by inference or by the other means of
right knowledge. While, however, the Vedanta-passages
primarily declare the cause of the origin, &c., of the world,
inference also, being an instrument of right knowledge in
so far as it does not contradict the Vedanta-texts, is not to
be excluded as a means of confirming the meaning ascer¬
tained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation;
for the passages, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5 0 the Self is to be heard,
to be considered ’), and Kh . Up. VI, 14, % ( £ as the man,
&c., having been informed, and being able to judge for
himself, would arrive at Gandhdra, in the same way a man
who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge 5 ), declare
that human understanding assists Scripture 3 .
Scriptural text, &c. 4 , are not, in the enquiry into Brahman,
later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhSna
has been left untranslated. Cp. Sahkhya Karika 3.
1 Kekit tu hirawyagarbha/rc saws&rmm evagama^ ^agaddhetum
a^akshate. Ananda Giri.
2 Viz. the Vaueshikas.
3 Atmana^ jruter ity artha^. Ananda Giri.
4 Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga), syntactical
[ 34 ] C
1 8 VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
the only means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry
into active duty (i. e. in the Purva Mim kmsk), but scriptural
texts on the one hand, and intuition 1 , &c., on the other
hand, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion :
firstly, because intuition is the final result of the enquiry
into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the enquiry
is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of
the knowledge of Brahman were something to be accom¬
plished, there would be no reference to intuition, and text,
&c., would be the only means of knowledge. The origina¬
tion of something to be accomplished depends, moreover,
on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent
on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done
in a different way. A man, for instance, may move on either
by means of a horse, or by means of his feet, or by some
other means, or not at all. And again (to quote examples
of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture
with sentences such as the following : 4 At the atiratra he
takes the sho^in cup, 5 and 4 at the atirdtra he does not
take the shods.sin cup; 5 or, ‘he makes the oblation after
the sun has risen/ and, ‘he makes the oblation when the
sun has not yet risen. 5 Just as in the quoted instances,
injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional pro¬
cedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so
they would have their place with regard to Brahman also
(if the latter were a thing to be accomplished). But the
fact is that no option is possible as to whether a substance
is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All option
depends on the Motions of man; but the knowledge of the
real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of
man, but only on the thing itself. For to think with
regard to a post, ‘this is a post or a man, or something
else/ is not knowledge of truth ; the two ideas, ‘ it is a man
or something else/ being false, and only the third idea, ‘ it
connection (vakya), &c., being the means of proof made use of in
the Purva Mima/rcsd.
1 The so-called sakshatkara of Brahman. The &c. comprises
inference and so on.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3 .
19
is a post, 5 which depends on the thing itself, falling under
the head of true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all
existing things depends on the things themselves, and
hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether
on the thing, i. e. Brahman itself.—But, it might be said,
as Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object
of the other means of right knowledge also, and from this
it follows that a discussion of the Vedanta-texts is purpose¬
less.—This we deny; for as Brahman is not an object of
the senses, it has no connection with those other means of
knowledge. For the senses have, according to their nature,
only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If
Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive
that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect;
but as the effect only (i. e. the world) is perceived, it is
impossible to decide (through perception) whether it is
connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore
the Sutra under discussion is not meant to propound in¬
ference (as the means of knowing Brahman), but rather to
set forth a Vedanta-text.—Which, then, is the Vedanta-text
which the Sutra points at as having to be considered with
reference to the characteristics of Brahman?—It is the
passage Taitt. Up. Ill, 1, ‘ Bhrzgu V 4 ru ni went to his father
Vanina, saying, Sir, teach me ‘Brahman, 5 &c., up to c That
from whence these beings are born, that by which, when
born, they live, that into which they enter at their death,
try to know that. That is Brahman. 5 The sentence finally
determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6 : ‘ From
bliss these beings are born ; by bliss, when born, they live ;
into bliss they enter at their death. 5 Other passages also
are to be adduced which declare the cause to be the almighty
Being, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence,
and freedom.
That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer
from it being shown that it is the cause of the world. To
confirm this conclusion, the Sutrakara continues as follows :
3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its
being the source of Scripture.
c 2
20
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Brahman is the source, i. e. the cause of the great body
of Scripture, consisting of the Rtg-ve da and other branches,
which is supported by various disciplines (such as grammar,
nyaya, pura^a, &c.); which lamp-like illuminates all things;
which is itself all-knowing as it were. For the origin of a
body of Scripture possessing the quality of omniscience can¬
not be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is
generally understood that the man from whom some special
body of doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only
originates, as, for instance, grammar from Pkmni possesses
a more extensive knowledge than his work, comprehensive
though it be; what idea, then, shall we have to form of the
supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being,
which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his
breath, has produced the vast mass of holy texts known as the
Rzg-veda, &c., the mine of all knowledge, consisting of mani¬
fold branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different
classes and conditions of gods, animals, and men! See what
Scripture says about him, ‘The Rzg-ve da, &c., have been
breathed forth from that great Being’ (Brz. Up. II, 4,10).
Or else we may interpret the Sutra to mean that Scripture
consisting of the Rig-ve da, &c., as described above, is the
source or cause, i. e. the means of right knowledge through
which we understand the nature of Brahman. So that the
sense would be: through Scripture only as a means of know¬
ledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c.,
of the world. The special scriptural passage meant has been
quoted under the preceding Sutra ‘ from which these beings
are born/ &c.—But as the preceding Sutra already has pointed
out a text showing that Scripture is the source of Brahman,
of what use then is the present Sutra ?—The words of the pre¬
ceding Sutra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the scriptural
passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the
origin, &c., of the world were adduced merely as determining
an inference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this
suspicion the Sutra under discussion has been propounded.
But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means
of knowing Brahman ? Since it has been declared that
Scripture aims at action (according to the Purva Mima/^sa
I ADHyAyA, I PADA, 3 .
21
Sutra I, 2, 1,‘As the purport of Scripture is action, those
scriptural passages whose purport is not action are purport-
less’), the Vedanta-passages whose purport is not action
are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense,
they must either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or
the fruit of the action, form supplements to the passages en¬
joining actions, or serve the purpose of themselves enjoining
a new class of actions, such as devout meditation and the like.
For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying information
regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the
latter are the objects of perception and the other means of
proof (which give sufficient information about them ; while
it is the recognised object of the Veda to give information
about what is not known from other sources). And if it
did give such information, it would not be connected with
things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to
man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as ‘ he
howled, &c.,’ which at first sight appear purposeless, are
shown to have a purpose in so far as they glorify certain
actions (cp. Pu. Mi. Su. I, 2, 7,‘ Because they stand in syntac¬
tical connection with the injunctions, therefore their purport
is to glorify the injunctions ’). In the same way mantras are
shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far as
they notify the actions themselves and the means by which
they are accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, ‘ For
strength thee (I cut; ’ which accompanies the cutting of a
branch employed in the danrapunzamasa-sacrifice). In
short, no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have
a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action. And
injunctions which are defined as having actions for their
objects cannot refer to accomplished existent things.
Hence we maintain that the Vedanta-texts are mere
supplements to those passages which enjoin actions; noti¬
fying the agents, divinities, and results connected with
those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the
ground of its involving the introduction of a subject-matter
foreign to the Vedanta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of
the Karmak&zzz/a of the Veda), we must admit (the second
of the two alternatives proposed above, viz.) that the
22
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Vedanta-texts refer to devout meditation (upasana) and
similar actions which are mentioned in those very (Vedanta)
texts. The result of all of which is that Scripture is not
the source of Brahman.
To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows:
4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scrip¬
ture), because it is connected (with the Vedanta-texts)
as their purport.
The word 4 but 5 is meant to rebut the purva-paksha (the
prim a facie view as urged above). That all-knowing,all-
(powerful Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, sub-
jsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known from the
Vedanta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the
Vedanta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they
have for their purport, as they intimate that matter (viz.
Brahman). Compare, for instance, c Being only this was in
the beginning, one, without a second’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 2, 1);
4 In the beginning all this was Self, one only 5 (Ait. Ar. II, 4,
1, 1); e This is the Brahman without cause and without
effect, without anything inside or outside ; this Self is
Brahman perceiving everything’ {Bri, Up. II, 5, 19); 4 That
immortal Brahman is before 5 (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); and
similar passages. If the words contained in these passages
have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their
purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to
assume them to have a different sense; for that would
involve the fault of abandoning the direct statements of
the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can we con¬
clude the purport of these passages to be the intimation
of the nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts
of religious duty); for there are certain scriptural passages
which preclude all actions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance,
Bri . Up. II, 4, 13, ‘ Then by what should he see whom? 5
(which passage intimates that there is neither an agent, nor
an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor again can
Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished
thing, be the object of perception and the other means of
I ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 4 .
23
knowledge; for the fact of everything having its Self in
Brahman cannot be grasped without the aid of the scriptural
passage ‘That art thou 5 ( Kh . Up.VI, 8, 7). Nor can it
rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not
connected with something either to be striven after or
shunned; for from the mere comprehension of Brahman’s
Self, which is not something either to be avoided or
endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain, and
thereby the attainment of man’s highest aim. That
passages notifying certain divinities, and so on, stand in
subordinate relation to acts of devout meditation mentioned
in the same chapters may readily be admitted. But it is
impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous
relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the know¬
ledge of absolute unity has once arisen there exists no
longer anything to be desired or avoided, and thereby the
conception of duality, according to which we distinguish
actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the conception
of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute
unity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause
of Brahman being looked upon as the complementary
object of injunctions of devotion. Other parts of the Veda
may have no authority except in so far as they are con¬
nected with injunctions ; still it is impossible to impugn on
that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying
the knowledge of the Self; for such passages have their
own result. Nor, finally, can the authoritativeness of the
Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so that it would
be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all
which it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a
means of right knowledge of Brahman.
Here others raise the following objection :—Although the
Veda is the means of gaining a right knowledge of Brah¬
man, yet it intimates Brahman only as the object of certain
injunctions, just as the information which the Veda gives
about the sacrificial post, the ahavaniya-fire and other
objects not known from the practice of common life is
merely supplementary to certain injunctions 1 . Why so?
1 So, for instance, the passage ‘ he carves the sacrificial post and
24
VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
Because the Veda has the purport of either instigating to
action or restraining from it. For men fully acquainted
with the object of the Veda have made the following
declaration, c The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the
injunction of actions’ (Bhashya on Gaimini Sutra I, i, 1);
‘ Injunction means passages impelling to action ’ (Bh. on
Gaim. Sfi. I, 1,2); ‘ Of this (viz. active religious duty) the
knowledge comes from injunction * (part of Gaim. S&. 1 ,1,5);
c The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected
with (the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose pur¬
port is action ’ (Gaim. Su. 1 ,1, 25); c As action is the purport
of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is purport¬
less ’ (Gaim. Sti. I, 2, 1). Therefore the Veda has a purport
in so far only as it rouses the activity of man with regard
to some actions and restrains it with regard to others ;
other passages (i. e. all those passages which are not directly
injunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement
injunctions and prohibitions. Hence the Vedinta-texts
also as likewise belonging to the Veda can have a mean¬
ing in the same way only. And if their aim is injunc¬
tion, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites
are enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the
heavenly world, so the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined
as a means for him who is desirous of immortality.—But—
somebody might object—it has been declared that there is
a difference in the character of the objects enquired into,
the object of enquiry in the karma-ka^a (that part of
the Veda which treats of active religious duty) being some¬
thing to be accomplished, viz. duty, while here the object
is the already existent absolutely accomplished Brahman.
From this it follows that the fruit of the knowledge of
Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of
the knowledge of duty which depends on the performance
of actions 1 .—We reply that it must not be such because the
makes it eight-cornered/ has a purpose only as being supplementary
to the injunction ‘ he ties the victim to the sacrificial post/
1 If the fruits of the two jastras were not of a different nature,
there would be no reason for the distinction of two jastras; if they
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4.
25
Vedanta-texts give information about Brahman only in so
far as it is connected with injunctions of actions. We meet
with injunctions of the following kind, ‘ Verily the Self is to
be seen’ ( Bri . Up. II, 4, 5); ‘The Self which is free from
sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which
we must try to understand ’ ( Kh. Up. VIII, 7,1) ; * Let a
man worship him as Self’ (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7) ; ‘ Let a man
worship the Self only as his true state 5 (Bri. Up. 1 , 4 ,15);
‘ He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman , (Mu. Up. Ill,
2, 9). These injunctions rouse in us the desire to know
what that Brahman is. It, therefore, is the task of the
Ved&nta-texts to set forth Brahman’s nature, and they
perform that task by teaching us that Brahman is eternal,
all-knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, intelli¬
gent and free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss. From the
devout meditation on this Brahman there results as its
fruit, final release, which, although not to be discerned
in the ordinary way, is discerned by means of the
^astra. If, on the other hand, the Vedanta-texts were
considered to have no reference to injunctions of actions,
but to contain statements about mere (accomplished)
things, just as if one were saying ‘ the earth comprises seven
dvipas,’ ‘that king is marching on,’ they would be pur¬
portless, because then they could not possibly be connected
with something to be shunned or endeavoured after.—Per¬
haps it will here be objected that sometimes a mere state¬
ment about existent things has a purpose, as, for instance,
the affirmation, ‘This is a rope, not a snake,’ serves the
purpose of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous
opinion, and that so likewise the Veddnta-passages making
statements about the non-transmigrating Self, have a pur¬
port of their own (without reference to any action), viz.
in so far as they remove the erroneous opinion of the Self
being liable to transmigration.—We reply that this might
are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge of
Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same
way as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the
heavenly world and the like.
26
vedanta-s6tras.
be so if just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the
rope dispels the fear caused by the imagined snake, so the
mere hearing of the true nature of Brahman would dispel
the erroneous notion of one’s being subject to transmigration.
But this is not the case; for we observe that even men to
whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue
to be affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities
attaching to the transmigratory condition. Moreover, we
see from the passage, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5 > ‘The Self is to be
heard, to be considered, to be reflected upon,’ that con¬
sideration and reflection have to follow the mere hearing.
From all this it results that the i'astra can be admitted as
a means of knowing Brahman in so far only as the latter is
connected with injunctions.
To all this, we, the Vedantins, make the following
reply:—The preceding reasoning is not valid, on account
of the different nature of the fruits of actions on the one
side, and of the knowledge of Brahman on the other side.
The enquiry into those actions, whether of body, speech, or
mind, which are known from Sruti and Smrzti, and are
comprised under the name c religious duty’ (dharma), is
carried on in the Gaimini Sutra, which begins with the
words ‘ then therefore the enquiry into duty ; ’ the opposite
of duty also (adharma), such as doing harm, &c., which is
defined in the prohibitory injunctions, forms an object of
enquiry to the end that it may be avoided. The fruits of duty,
which is good, and its opposite, which is evil, both of which
are defined by original Vedic statements, are generally
known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which make them¬
selves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by
the contact of the organs of sense with the objects, and
affect all animate beings from Brahman down to a tuft of
grass. Scripture, agreeing with observation, states that
there are differences in the degree of pleasure of all em¬
bodied creatures from men upward to Brahman. From
those differences it is inferred that there are differences
in the degrees of the merit acquired by actions in accord¬
ance with religious duty; therefrom again are inferred
differences in degree between those qualified to perform
I ADHyAyA, I PADA, 4.
27
acts of religious duty. Those latter differences are more¬
over known to be affected by the desire of certain results
(which entitles the man so desirous to perform certain
religious acts), worldly possessions, and the like. It is
further known from Scripture that those only who perform
sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the pre-eminence of
their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of
the sun; Kh. Up. V, 10, 1), while mere minor offerings,
works of public utility and alms, only lead through smoke
and the other stages to the southern path. And that there
also (viz. in the moon which is finally reached by those
who have passed along the southern path) there are degrees
of pleasure and the means of pleasure is understood from
the passage 4 Having dwelt there till their works are con¬
sumed.’ Analogously it is understood that the different
degrees of pleasure which are enjoyed by the embodied
creatures, from man downward to the inmates of hell and
to immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit
as defined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from
the different degrees of pain endured by higher and lower
embodied creatures, there is inferred difference of degree
in its cause, viz. religious demerit as defined in the pro¬
hibitory injunctions, and in its agents. This difference in the
degree of pain and pleasure, which has for its antecedent
embodied existence, and for its cause the difference of de¬
gree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to
faults such as ignorance and the like, is well known—from
vSruti, Smrzti, and reasoning—to be non-eternal, of a fleeting,
changing nature (sa^sara). The following text, for instance,
4 As long as he is in the body he cannot get free from
pleasure and pain ’ {Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1), refers to the sa//z-
sara-state as described above. From the following passage,
on the other hand , 4 When he is free from the body then
neither pleasure nor pain touches him,’ which denies the
touch of pain or pleasure, we learn that the unembodied state
called ‘final release’ (moksha) is declared not to be the
effect of religious merit as defined by Vedic injunctions.
For if it were the effect of merit it would not be denied
that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said
28
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
that the very circumstance of its being an unembodied state
is the effect of merit, we reply that that cannot be, since
Scripture declares that state to be naturally and originally
an unembodied one. ‘The wise who knows the Self as
bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing
things, as great and omnipresent does never grieve’ (Ka.Up.
II, 22); ‘He is without breath, without mind, pure’(Mu.
Up, II, 1, 2); ‘That person is not attached to anything’
(B ri. Up. IV, 3, 15) 1 . All which passages establish the fact
that so-called release differs from all the fruits of action,
and is an eternally and essentially disembodied state.
Among eternal things, some indeed may be ‘eternal, al¬
though changing’ (pari/zaminitya), viz. those, the idea of
whose identity is not destroyed, although they may undergo
changes; such, for instance, are earth and the other ele¬
ments in the opinion of those who maintain the eternity
of the world, or the three guzzas in the opinion of the
Sankhyas. But this (moksha) is eternal in the true sense,
i. e. eternal without undergoing any changes (ku^astha-
nitya), omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications,
absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, of self-
luminous nature. That bodiless entity in fact, to which
merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold
time do not apply, is called release; a definition agreeing
with scriptural passages, such as the following: ‘ Different
from merit and demerit, different from effect and cause,
different from past and future’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14). It 2 (i. e.
moksha) is, therefore, the same as Brahman in the enquiry
into which we are at present engaged. If Brahman were
represented as supplementary to certain actions, and re-
1 The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the gross
body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the third
that is independent of either.
2 Ananda Giri omits ‘ 2X2J1! His comment is: przthagg-igraisa-
vishayatva^ £a dharmadyasprzsh/atvazzz brahma/zo yuktam ityaha I
tad iti 1 ata^ jabdapa/^e dharmadyasparre karmaphalavailakshazzyazzz
hetfikrz'tam.—The above translation follows Govindananda's first
explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva karmaphalavilakshazzatvad
ity artha^.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4.
29
lease were assumed to be the effect of those actions, it
would be non-eternal, and would have to be considered
merely as something holding a pre-eminent position among
the described non-eternal fruits of actions with their various
degrees. But that release is something eternal is acknow¬
ledged by whoever admits it at all, and the teaching con¬
cerning Brahman can therefore not be merely supplemen¬
tary to actions.
There are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages
which declare release to follow immediately on the cognition
of Brahman, and which thus preclude the possibility of an
effect intervening between the two; for instance, ‘ He who
knows Brahman becomes Brahman 5 (Mu. Up. Ill, 2,9); ‘All
his works perish when He has been beheld, who is the higher
and the lower 5 (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); ‘ He who knows the bliss of
Brahman fears nothing 5 (Taitt. Up. II, 9); ‘ O Ganaka, you
have indeed reached fearlessness 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 2,4); ‘ That
Brahman knew its Self only, saying, I am Brahman. From
it all this sprang 5 (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10); ‘What sorrow, what
trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity ? 5 ( Is . Up.
7.) We must likewise quote the passage, B ri. Up. I, 4, 10,
(‘ Seeing this the Rishi Vamadeva understood : I was Manu,
I was the sun, 5 ) in order to exclude the idea of any action
taking place between one’s seeing Brahman and becoming
one with the universal Self; for that passage is analogous
to the following one, ‘standing he sings, 5 from which we
understand that no action due to the same agent inter¬
venes between the standing and the singing. Other scrip¬
tural passages show that the removal of the obstacles
which lie in the way of release is the only fruit of the
knowledge of Brahman; so, for instance, ‘ You indeed are
our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the
other shore 5 (Pr. Up. VI, 8); ‘ I have heard from men like
you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in
grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine 5 (. Kh . Up. VII,
1,3); ‘To him after his faults had been rubbed out, the vener¬
able Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness 5 [Kh,
Up. VII, 26, 2). The same is the purport of the Sutra, sup¬
ported by arguments, of (Gautama) AHrya, ‘ Final release
30
VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.
results from the successive removal of wrong knowledge,
faults, activity, birth, pain, the removal of each later mem¬
ber of the series depending on the removal of the preceding
member’ (Nyay. Su. I, i, 2); and wrong knowledge itself is
removed by the knowledge of one’s Self being one with
the Self of Brahman.
Nor is this knowledge of the Self being one with Brahman
a mere (fanciful) combination \ as is made use of, for instance,
in the following passage, ‘ For the mind is endless, and the
VLvedevas are endless, and he thereby gains the endless
world ’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 1, g ) 1 2 ; nor is it an (in reality unfounded)
ascription (superimposition) 3 , as in the passages, ‘Let him
meditate on mind as Brahman,’ and ‘ Aditya is Brahman,
this is the doctrine’ (KA. Up. Ill, 18, 1 ; 19, 1), where the
contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the mind,
Aditya and so on; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception
of identity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed
as identical) with some special activity, as in the passage,
‘Air is indeed the absorber; breath is indeed the absorber 4 ’
( Kh . Up. IV, 3, 1; 3); nor is it a mere (ceremonial) purifi¬
cation of (the Self constituting a subordinate member) of
an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c., Brahman), in the
same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the sacri-
1 Sampat. Sampan namalpe vastuny alambane samanyena
kena&n mahato vastuna^ sampadanam. Ananda Giri.
2 In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on
account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is
identified with the Vhvedevas, which thereby constitute the chief
object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immor¬
tality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is
real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of
intelligence being common to both.
8 Adhyasa^ jastrato^tasmi^s taddhi^. Sampadi sampadyama-
nasya pradhanyenanudhyanam, adhyase tu alambanasyeti vhesha^.
Ananda Giri.
4 Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore,
designated by the same term ‘ absorber/ Seyaff* sa^vargadrfsh/ir
vayau pra«e ^a daj&ragata/tf ^agad darrayati yatha ^ivatmani b rim-
hawakriyaya brahmadr/sh/ir amrztatvaya phalaya kalpataiti. Bhamati.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4.
31
ficial butter 1 . For if the knowledge of the identity of the
Self and Brahman were understood in the way of combina¬
tion and the like, violence would be done thereby to the
connection of the words whose object, in certain passages, it
clearly is to intimate the fact of Brahman and the Self being
really identical; so, for instance, in the following passages,
* That art thou 5 ( Kh . Up. VI, 8, 7); ‘I am Brahman 3 (B ri. Up.
I, 4,10); ‘ This Self is Brahman 5 (B ri. Up. II, 5, 19). And
other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of
Brahman is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted
thereby; so, for instance, £ The fetter of the heart is broken,
all doubts are solved’(Mu. Up. II,2,8). Nor, finally, would it
be possible, in that case, satisfactorily to explain the passages
which speak of the individual Self becoming Brahman:
such as -He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman 5
(Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9). Hence the knowledge of the unity of
Brahman and the Self cannot be of the nature of figurative
combination and the like. The knowledge of Brahman
does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of man, but
is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the
objects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends
on the object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or
its knowledge it is impossible to establish, by reasoning,
any connection with actions.
Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by repre¬
senting it as the object of the action of knowing. For
that it is not such is expressly declared in two passages,
viz. e It is different from the known and again above (i. e.
different from) the unknown 5 (Ken. Up. I, 3); and ‘How
should he know him by whom he knows all this ? 3 (B ri. Up.
II, 4,13.) In the same way Brahman is expressly declared
not to be the object of the act of devout meditation, viz. in
the second half of the verse, Ken. Up. I, 5 > whose first half
1 The butter used in the upa^uya^a is ceremonially purified by
the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be said, the
Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as kartn*—agent—
stands in a subordinate anga-relation to the karman of meditation)
is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with Brahman.
32
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
declares it not to be an object (of speech, mind, and so on),
c That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which speech
is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that
on which people devoutly meditate as this/ If it should
be objected that if Brahman is not an object (of speech,
mind, &c.) the ^astra can impossibly be its source, we refute
this objection by the remark that the aim of the ^astra is
to discard all distinctions fictitiously created by Nescience.
The ^astra’s purport is not to represent Brahman definitely
as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that
Brahman as the eternal subject (pratyagatman, the inward
Self) is never an object, and thereby to remove the dis¬
tinction of objects known, knowers, acts of knowledge, &c.,
which is fictitiously created by Nescience. Accordingly the
^•astra says, ‘ By whom it is not thought by him it is
thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it; un¬
known by those who know it, it is known by those who do
not know it’ (Ken. Up. II, 3); and ‘Thou couldst not see the
seer of sight, thou couldst not hear the hearer of hearing,
nor perceive the perceiver of perception, nor know the
knower of knowledge’ (Bn. Up. Ill, 4, 2). As thereby (i. e.
by the knowledge derived from the ^astra) the imagination
of the transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience
is discarded, and Release is shown to be of the nature of
the eternally free Self, it cannot be charged with the im¬
perfection of non-eternality. Those, on the other hand, who
consider Release to be something to be effected properly
maintain that it depends on the action of mind, speech,
or body. So, likewise, those who consider it to be a mere
modification. Non-eternality of Release is the certain
consequence of these two opinions; for we observe in
common life that things which are modifications, such as
sour milk and the like, and things which are effects, such
as jars, &c., are non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said
that there is a dependance on action in consequence of
(Brahman or Release) being something which is to be
obtained 1 ; for as Brahman constitutes a person’s Self it is
1 An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4.
33
not something to be attained by that person. And even if
Brahman were altogether different from a person’s Self
still it would not be something to be obtained ; for as it is
omnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to
every one, just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again,
can it be maintained that Release is something to be cere¬
monially purified, and as such depends on an activity.
For ceremonial purification (sa^skara) results either from
the accretion of some excellence or from the removal of
some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to
Release as it is of the nature of Brahman, to which no
excellence can be added ; nor, again, does the latter alter¬
native apply, since Release is of the nature of Brahman,
which is eternally pure.—But, it might be said, Release
might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and
becomes manifest on the Self being purified by some
action; just as the quality of clearness becomes manifest
in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by means of the
action of rubbing.—This objection is invalid, we reply,
because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For
an action cannot exist without modifying that in which it
abides. But if the Self were modified by an action its
non-eternality would result therefrom, and texts such as
the following, ‘ unchangeable he is called,’ would thus be
stultified; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is
impossible to assume that any action should abide in the
Self. On the other hand, the Self cannot be purified by
actions abiding in something else as it stands in no relation
to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to point
out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self
(dehin, the individual soul) is purified by certain ritual
actions which abide in the body, such as bathing, rinsing
one’s mouth, wearing the sacrificial thread, and the like.
For what is purified by those actions is that Self merely
which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is
under the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of per-
obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results
from the two preceding hypotheses.
[34] D
34
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
ception that bathing and similar actions stand in the
relation of inherence to the body, and it is therefore only
proper to conclude that by such actions only that some¬
thing is purified which is joined to the body. If a person
thinks 4 I am free from disease, 5 he predicates health of
that entity only which is connected with and mistakenly
identifies itself with the harmonious condition of matter
(i. e. the body) resulting from appropriate medical treatment
applied to the body (i.e. the 4 I ’ constituting the subject of
predication is only the individual embodied Self). Analo¬
gously that I which predicates of itself, that it is purified by
bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to
the body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity
(aha^kartrz), the object of the notion of the ego and the
agent in all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and
enjoys their results. Thus the mantras also declare, 4 One
of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without
eating 5 (Mu. Up. Ill, i, i); and 4 When he is in union with
the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call
him the Enjoyer 5 (Ka. Up. Ill, i, 4). Of Brahman, on the
other hand, the two following passages declare that it is
incapable of receiving any accretion and eternally pure,
4 He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading,
the Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling
in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one; free
from qualities 5 (Sv. Up. VI, 11); and 4 He pervaded all,
bright, incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, un¬
touched by evil 5 ( ts . Up. 8). But Release is nothing but
being Brahman. Therefore Release is not something to be
purified. And as nobody is able to show any other way in
which Release could be connected with action, it is im¬
possible that it should stand in any, even the slightest,
relation to any action, excepting knowledge.
But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity
of the mind. By no means, we reply; since the two are
of different nature. An action is that which is enjoined as
being independent of the nature of existing things and de¬
pendent on the energy of some person’s mind ; compare, for
instance, the following passages, 4 To whichever divinity the
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4.
35
offering is made on that one let him meditate when about
to say vasha^’ (Ait. Brahm. Ill, 8,1); and ‘ Let him meditate
in his mind on the sandhya.’ Meditation and reflection
are indeed mental, but as they depend on the (meditating,
&c.) person they may either be performed or not be per¬
formed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the
result of the different means of (right) knowledge, and those
have for their objects existing things ; knowledge can there¬
fore not be either made or not made or modified, but
depends entirely on existing things, and not either on Vedic
statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it
thus widely differs from meditation and the like.
The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire,
which is founded on Kh . Up. V, 7, 1; 8, 1, ‘ The fire is man,
O Gautama; the fire is woman, O Gautama,’ is on account
of its being the result of a Vedic statement, merely an action
and dependent on man ; that conception of fire, on the other
hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is neither
dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a
real thing which is an object of perception; it is therefore
knowledge and not an action. The same remark applies to
all things which are the objects of the different means of
right knowledge. This being thus that knowledge also
which has the existent Brahman for its object is not de¬
pendent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative
and similar forms referring to the knowledge of Brahman
are found in the Vedic texts, yet they are ineffective because
they refer to something which cannot be enjoined, just as the
edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is applied to a stone.
For they have for their object something which can neither
be endeavoured after nor avoided.—But what then, it will
be asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any
rate, have the appearance of injunctions; such as,‘The Self is
to be seen,to be heard about?’—They have the purport, we
reply, of diverting (men) from the objects of natural activity.
For when a man acts intent on external things, and only
anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to eschew
the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the
highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it; such
36
vedAnta-s£jtras.
texts as the one quoted divert him from the objects of
natural activity and turn the stream of his thoughts on the
inward (the highest) Self. That for him who is engaged
in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self is
nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided,
we learn from texts such as the following: ‘This every¬
thing, all is that Self’ (B ri. Up. II, 4, 6 ); ‘ But when the
Self only is all this, how should he see another, how should
he know another, how should he know the knower ? ’
(Bn. Up. IV, 5, 15); ‘ This Self is Brahman ’ (Bn. Up.
II, 5 > T 9 )* That the knowledge of Brahman refers to
something which is not a thing to be done, and therefore
is not concerned either with the pursuit or the avoidance
of any object, is the very thing we admit; for just that
constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend
Brahman, all our duties come to an end and all our work
is over. Thus Sruti says, ‘ If a man understands the Self,
saying, “ I am he,” what could he wish or desire that he
should pine after the body?’ (Bn. Up. IV, 4, 13.) And
similarly Smnti declares, ‘Having understood this the
understanding man has done with all work, O Bharata ’
(Bha. Gita XV, 20). Therefore Brahman is not represented
as the object of injunctions.
We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who
maintain that there is no part of the Veda which has the
purport of making statements about mere existent things,
and is not either an injunction or a prohibition, or supple¬
mentary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the
soul (purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does
not constitute a complement to anything else. Of that soul
which is to be comprehended from the Upanishads only,
which is non-transmigratory, Brahman, different in nature
from the four classes of substances 1 , which forms a topic of
its own and is not a complement to anything else; of that
1 Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/azrc karoti), things
to be obtained (gramas ga^//ati), things to be modified (suvarna^
kutfdhlazrc karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrihin
prokshati).
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4 .
37
soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended;
for the passage, ‘That Self is to be described by No, no ! ’
(B ru Up. Ill, 9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the
Self is cannot be denied. The possible objection that
there is no reason to maintain that the soul is known from
the Upanishads only, since it is the object of self-conscious¬
ness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the
Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i. e. of the
object of self-consciousness, viz. the ^ivatman). For neither
from that part of the Veda which enjoins works nor from
reasoning, anybody apprehends that soul which, different
from the agent that is the object of self-consciousness,
merely witnesses it; which is permanent in all (transitory)
beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of
everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be repre¬
sented as the mere complement of injunctions ; for of that
very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it is
the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided.
All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere
modifications, up to (i. e. exclusive of) the soul. But the
soul is imperishable 1 , as there is no cause why it should
perish ; and eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for
its undergoing any modification ; hence it is in its essence
eternally pure and free. And from passages, such as
‘ Beyond the soul there is nothing; this is the goal, the
highest road’ (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and ‘That soul, taught in
the Upanishads, I ask thee’ (B ru Up. Ill, 9, 26), it appears
that the attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly
given to the soul, as it constitutes their chief topic. To
say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring
to existing things, is a mere bold assertion.
With regard to the quotations made of the views of men
acquainted with the purport of the Sastra (who alone were
stated to have declared that the Veda treats of actions) it is
to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry
into duty, refer to that part of the Sastra which consists of
1 Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like
transitory things.
38
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other
passage quoted (‘as action is the purport of the Veda, what¬
ever does not refer to action is purportless’) we remark
that if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense
(when it would mean that only those words which denote
action have a meaning), it would follow that all information
about existent things is meaningless 1 . If, on the other
hand, the Veda—in addition to the injunctions of activity and
cessation of activity—does give information about existent
things as being subservient to some action to be accom¬
plished, why then should it not give information also about
the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent
thing, about which information is given, does not become
an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).—
But, it will be said, although existent things are not acts, yet,
as they are instrumental to action, the information given
about such things is merely subservient to action.—This,
we reply, does not matter; for although the information
may be subservient to action, the things themselves about
which information is given are already intimated thereby as
things which have the power of bringing about certain
actions. Their final end (prayo£*ana) indeed may be sub¬
serviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease
to be, in the information given about them, intimated in
themselves.—Well, and if they are thus intimated, what is
gained thereby for your purpose 2 ? We reply that the
information about the Self, which is an existing thing not
comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature
(as the information about other existent things); for by
the comprehension of the Self a stop is put to all false
knowledge, which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a
1 That, for instance, in the passage ‘ he is to sacrifice with Soma/
the word ‘soma/ which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.
2 I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying in¬
formation about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the
objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing
information about existent things are admissible, if those things
have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information
about Brahman of which no purpose has been established ?
I ABHYAYA, I PADA, 4.
39
purpose is established which renders the passages relative
to Brahman equal to those passages which give information
about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are
found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions)
such passages as ‘ a Brahma^a is not to be killed, 5 which
teach abstinence from certain actions. Now abstinence from
action is neither action nor instrumental to action. If,
therefore, the tenet that all those passages which do not
express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it
would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which
teach abstinence from action, are devoid of purport—a con¬
sequence which is of course unacceptable. Nor, again, can
the connexion in which the word ‘ not 5 stands with the
action expressed by the verb c is to be killed 5 —which action
is naturally established 1 —be used as a reason for assuming
that ‘ not 5 denotes an action non-established elsewhere 2 ,
different from the state of mere passivity implied in the
abstinence from the act of killing. For the peculiar function
of the particle ‘ not 5 is to intimate the idea of the non¬
existence of that with which it is connected, and the concep¬
tion of the non-existence (of something to be done) is the
cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected
that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the
state of passivity will again make room for activity; for)
that idea itself passes away (only after having completely
destroyed the natural impulse prompting to the murder of
a Brahma^a, &c.), just as a fire is extinguished only after
having completely consumed its fuel. Hence we are of
opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as ‘ a
Brahma^a is not to be killed, 5 is a merely passive state,
consisting in the abstinence from some possible action;
excepting some special cases, such as the so-called Pra^apati-
vow, &c. 3 Hence the charge of want of purpose is to be
1 It is ‘ naturally established ’ because it has natural motives—
not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and
the like.
2 Elsewhere, i. e. outside the Veda.
3 The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda
40
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
considered as referring (not to the Vedanta-passages, but
only) to such statements about existent things as are of the
nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose
of man.
The allegation that a mere statement about an actually
existent thing not connected with an injunction of some¬
thing to be done, is purposeless (as, for instance, the state¬
ment that the earth contains seven dvipas) has already
been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist
in some such statements, as, for instance, ‘this is not a
snake, but a rope.’—But how about the objection raised
above that the information about Brahman cannot be held
to have a purpose in the same way as the statement about
a rope has one, because a man even after having heard
about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory
is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are differently
interpreted by the different commentators. *Sankara endeavours to
fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer to action by
an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin action but
abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might be
contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for
instance, ‘ a Brahma^a is not to be killed/) can be explained as
enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to
the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted
to mean * a determination, &c. of not killing a Brahmawa is to be
formed;' just as we understand something positive by the expression
‘ a non-Brahma«a/ viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something
else. To this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must at¬
tribute to the word ‘ not' its primary sense which is the absolute
negation of the word to which it is joined; so that passages where
it is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have
for their purport the entire absence of action. Special cases only
are excepted, as the one alluded to in the text where certain pro¬
hibited actions are enumerated under the heading of vows; for as
a vow is considered as something positive, the non-doing of some
particular action must there be understood as intimating the per¬
formance of some action of an opposite nature. The question as
to the various meanings of the particle ‘not' is discussed in all
treatises on the Pftrva Mimawsa; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha,
translation, p. 39 ff.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4.
41
world ?-—We reply as follows: It is impossible to show
that a man who has once understood Brahman to be the
Self, belongs to the transmigratory world in the same sense
as he did before, because that would be contrary to the
fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that
a person who imagines the body, and so on, to consti¬
tute the Self, is subject to fear and pain, but we have no
right to assume that the same person after having, by
means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the
Self, and thus having got over his former imaginings, will
still in the same manner be subject to pain and fear whose
cause is wrong knowledge. In the same way we see that a
rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of his wealth,
is grieved when his possessions are taken from him ; but we
do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him
after he has once retired from the world and put off the
conceit of his riches. And, again, we see that a person
possessing a pair of beautiful earrings derives pleasure
from the proud conceit of ownership; but after he has
lost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the
pleasure derived from them vanishes. Thus 5 ruti also
declares, c When he is free from the body, then neither
pleasure nor pain touches him y (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 1). If it
should be objected that the condition of being free from
the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause
of man being joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For
it is not possible to establish the state of embodiedness upon
anything else but wrong knowledge. And that the state
of disembodiedness is eternal on account of its not having
actions for its cause, we have already explained. The ob¬
jection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and
demerit effected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute
by remarking that as the (reality of the) conjunction of the
Self with the body is itself not established, the circumstance
of merit and demerit being due to the action of the Self is
likewise not established ; for (if we should try to get over
this difficulty by representing the Selfs embodiedness as
caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical
fault of making embodiedness dependent on merit and de-
42
V£DANTA-s(jTRAS.
merit, and again merit and demerit on embodiedness. And
the assumption of an endless retrogressive chain (of em¬
bodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than
a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another).
Moreover, the Self can impossibly become an agent, as it
cannot enter into intimate relation to actions. If it should
be said that the Self may be considered as an agent in the
same way as kings and other great people are (who without
acting themselves make others act) by their mere presence,
we deny the appositeness of this instance; for kings may
become agents through their relation to servants whom they
procure by giving them wages, &c., while it is impossible to
imagine anything, analogous to money, which could be the
cause of a connexion between the Self as lord and the
body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination, on the
other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be
joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of
the two (which is not based on any assumption). This ex¬
plains also in how far the Self can be considered as the agent
in sacrifices and similar acts 1 . Here it is objected that the
Self’s imagination as to the body, and so on, belonging to
itself is not false, but is to be understood in a derived
(figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate by the
remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses
of words is known to be applicable only where an actual
difference of things is known to exist. We are, for instance,
acquainted with a certain species of animals having a mane,
and so on, which is the exclusive primary object of the idea
and word ‘ lion, 5 and we are likewise acquainted with per¬
sons possessing in an eminent degree certain leonine quali¬
ties, such as fierceness, courage, &c.; here, a well settled
difference of objects existing, the idea and the name c lion 5
are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense.
In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects
is not well established, the transfer of the conception and
1 The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it
imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is finally
removed by the cognition of Brahman.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4 .
43
name of the one to the other is not figurative, but simply
founded on error. Such is, for instance, the case of a man
who at the time of twilight does not discern that the object
before him is a post, and applies to it the conception and
designation of a man; such is likewise the case of the con¬
ception and designation of silver being applied to a shell of
mother-of-pearl somehow mistaken for silver. How then
can it be maintained that the application of the word and the
conception of the Ego to the body, &c., which application
is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the Not-
Self, is figurative (rather than simply false) ? considering
that even learned men who know the difference of the
Self and the Not-Self confound the words and ideas just
as common shepherds and goatherds do.
As therefore the application of the conception of the
Ego to the body on the part of those who affirm the
existence of a Self different from the body is simply false,
not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness of the Self
is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence
that the person who has reached true knowledge is free
from his body even while still alive. The same is declared
in the 5 ruti passages concerning him who knows Brahman:
‘And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and
cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied
immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light * (Bn. Up.
IV, 4, 7); and c With eyes he is without eyes as it were,
with ears without ears as it were, with speech without
speech as it were, with a mind without mind as it were,
with vital airs without vital airs as it were. 5 Smrz’ti also,
in the passage where the characteristic marks are enume¬
rated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54),
declares that he who knows is no longer connected with
action of any kind. Therefore the man who has once com¬
prehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this
transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other
hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as
before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self
Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions.
With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not
44
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
fully determined in its own nature, but stands in a comple¬
mentary relation to injunctions, because the hearing about
Brahman is to be followed by consideration and reflection,
we remark that consideration and reflection are themselves
merely subservient to the comprehension of Brahman. If
Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a
subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be
said to be merely supplementary. But this is not the case,
since consideration and reflection no less than hearing are
subservient to comprehension. It follows that the .Sastra
cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in so far
as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that
on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta-texts,
an independent Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully
established. Hence there is room for beginning the new
*Sastra indicated in the first Sutra, ‘Then therefore the
enquiry into Brahman.’ If, on the other hand, the Veddnta-
texts were connected with injunctions, a new .Sastra would
either not be begun at all, since the .Sastra concerned with
injunctions has already been introduced by means of the
first Sutra of the Purva Mima^sa, ‘ Then therefore the
enquiry into dutyor if it were begun it would be intro¬
duced as follows: ‘ Then therefore the enquiry into the
remaining duties;’just as a new portion of the Purva
Mima^sa Sutras is introduced with the words, ‘Then
therefore the enquiry into what subserves the purpose of
the sacrifice, and what subserves the purpose of man ’ (Pu.
Mi. Sti. IV,-1, i). But as the comprehension of the unity
of Brahman and the Self has not been propounded (in
the previous Sk stra), it is quite appropriate that a new
6 astra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon.
Hence all injunctions and all other means of knowledge
end with the cognition expressed in the words, ‘ I am Brah¬
man for as soon as there supervenes the comprehension
of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to be
eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and
knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be
means of proof. In accordance with this, they (i. e. men
knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration:—
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4 .
45
‘When there has arisen (in a man’s mind) the knowledge,
“ I am that which is, Brahman is my Self,” and when,
owing to the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives,
and the like, the (imagination of) the figurative and the false
Self has come to an end 1 ; how should then the effect 2 (of
that wrong imagination) exist any longer ? As long as
the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture tells us to search
after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing subject;
but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz.
(the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as
the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in
ordinary life), so all the ordinary sources of knowledge
(perception and the like) are valid only until the one Self
is ascertained/
(Herewith the section comprising the four Sutras is
finished 3 .)
So far it has been declared that the Vedanta-passages,
whose purport is the comprehension of Brahman being the
Self, and which have their object therein, refer exclusively
to Brahman without any reference to actions. And it has
further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omni¬
potent cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of
the world. But now the Sankhyas and others being of
opinion that an existent substance is to be known through
other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer different
causes, such as the pradhana and the like, and there¬
upon interpret the Vedctnta-passages as referring to the
latter. All the Vedanta-passages, they maintain, which
treat of the creation of the world distinctly point out that
the cause (of the world) has to be concluded from the
effect by inference; and the cause which is to be inferred
is the connexion of the pradhana with the souls (purusha).
The followers of Ka/zada again infer from the very same
1 The figurative Self, i. e. the imagination that wife, children,
possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i. e. the
imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.
2 I. e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.
3 The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.
46
VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the
world while the atoms are its material cause. And thus
other argumentators also taking their stand on passages
apparently favouring their views and on fallacious argu¬
ments raise various objections. For this reason the teacher
(Vyasa)—thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, pas¬
sages, and means of proof—proceeds to state asprima facie
views, and afterwards to refute, all those opinions founded
on deceptive passages and fallacious arguments. Thereby
he at the same time proves indirectly that what the Vedanta-
texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.
The Sankhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pra¬
dhana consisting of three constituent elements (gu^a) is the
cause of the world argue as follows. The Vedanta-passages
which you have declared to intimate that the all-knowing
all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be
consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pra¬
dhana being the general cause. Omnipotence (more liter¬
ally: the possession of all powers) can be ascribed to the
pradhana in so far as it has all its effects for its objects. All-
knowingness also can be ascribed to it, viz. in the following
manner. What you think to be knowledge is in reality
an attribute of the guna, of Goodness 1 , according to the
Smrzti passage £ from Goodness springs knowledge 5 (Bha.
Gita XIV, 17). By means of this attribute of Goodness,
viz. knowledge, certain men endowed with organs which
are effects (of the pradhana) are known as all-knowing
Yogins; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected
with the very highest degree of c Goodness. 5 Now to the
soul (purusha) which is isolated, destitute of effected organs,
consisting of pure (undifferenced) intelligence it is quite
impossible to ascribe either all-knowingness or limited
knowledge; the pradhana, on the other hand, because
consisting of the three gu^as, comprises also in its pra¬
dhana state the element of Goodness which is the cause
of all-knowingness. The Vedanta-passages therefore in
1 The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose
state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.
I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 5 .
47
a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the
pradhana, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover
you (the Vedantin) also who assume an all-knowing Brah¬
man can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that
term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman
cannot always be actually engaged in the cognition of
everything; for from this there would follow the absolute
permanency of his cognition, and this would involve a want
of independence on Brahman’s part with regard to the
activity of knowing. And if you should propose to con¬
sider Brahman’s cognition as non-permanent it would follow
that with the cessation of the cognition Brahman itself
would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is possible only
in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you
assume that previously to the origination of the world
Brahman is without any instruments of action. But with¬
out the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments
of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being.
And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as con¬
sisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modi¬
fications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like
clay and other substances; while the uncompounded
homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.
To these conclusions he (Vy&sa) replies in the following
Sfitra.
5. On account of seeing (i. e. thinking being
attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the
world; the pradhana) is not (to be identified with
the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is
not founded on Scripture.
It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for
the non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sankhyas;
because it is not founded on Scripture. How so? Because
the quality of seeing, i. e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed
to the cause. For the passage, Kh . Up. VI, 2, (which
begins: ‘ Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning,
one only, without a second/ and goes on, c It thought (saw),
48
vedanta-sCtras.
may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire, 5 )
declares that this world differentiated by name and form,
which is there denoted by the word ‘this/ was before
its origination identical with the Self of that which is and
that the principle denoted by the term ‘the being’ (or
‘ that which is ’) sent forth fire and the other elements after
having thought. The following passage also (‘ Verily in the
beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing
else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth
worlds? He sent forth these worlds, 5 Ait. Ar. II, 4,1, 2) de¬
clares the creation to have had thought for its antecedent.
In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the person
of sixteen parts, ‘ He thought, &c. He sent forth Prazza. 5
By ‘ seeing 5 (i. e. the verb ‘ seeing 5 exhibited in the Sutra)
is not meant that particular verb only, but any verbs which
have a cognate sense; just as the verb ‘ to sacrifice 5 is
used to denote any kind of offering. Therefore other
passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an all¬
knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted
here, as, for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, c From him who
perceives all and who knows all, whose brooding consists
of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name and
form and food. 5
The argumentation of the Sankhyas that the pradhana
may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge con¬
stituting an attribute of the guzza Goodness is inadmissible.
For as in the pradhana-condition the three guzzas are in a state
of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only
is not possible 1 . Nor can we admit the explanation that the
pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity
for all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of
the guzzas, we term the pradhana all-knowing with reference
to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must
likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power
impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Dark-
1 Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant,
not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one an¬
other.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5 .
49
ness. Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not
connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin)
is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradhana
is destitute of such a principle. It is therefore impossible
to ascribe to the pradMna all-knowingness. The case
of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under
consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may,
owing to an excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to
omniscience 1 .—Well then (say those Sankhyas who believe
in the existence of a Lord) let us assume that the pradh&na
possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing
principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is im¬
parted to an iron ball by fire.—No, we reply; for if this
were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that that
which is the cause of the pradhana having the quality of
thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is
the cause of the world.
The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in
its primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity
of cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be con¬
sidered as independent with regard to it, we refute as
follows. In what way, we ask the Sankhya, is Brah¬
man’s all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent
cognitional activity? To maintain that he, who possesses
eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects,
is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge were
considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and
sometimes he would not know; from which it would
follow indeed that he is not all-knowing. This fault
is however avoided if we admit Brahman’s knowledge
to be permanent.—But, it may be objected, on this
latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as
independent with reference to the act of knowing.—Why
not ? we reply; the sun also, although his heat and light
are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent
1 The excess of Sattva in theYogin would not enable him to rise
to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle in¬
dependent of Sattva.
[34] *
50
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
when we say, { he burns, he gives light 1 /—But, it will
again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives
light when he stands in relation to some object to be
heated or illuminated ; Brahman, on the other hand, stands,
before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object
of knowledge. The cases are therefore not parallel.—This
objection too, we reply, is not valid ; for as a matter of fact
we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying ‘the sun shines/
even without reference to any object illuminated by him,
and hence Brahman also may be spoken of as an agent,
in such passages as ‘ it thought/ &c., even without reference
to any object of knowledge. If, however, an object is
supposed to be required (‘ knowing ’ being a transitive
verb while ‘shining’ is intransitive), the texts ascribing
thought to Brahman will fit all the better.—What then is
that object to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer
previously to the origin of the world ?—Name and form, we
reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with
Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to
be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-.s*astra
assume, the Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the
past and the future through the favour of the Lord; in
what terms shall we have to speak of the eternal cognition
of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the
creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The
objection that Brahman, previously to the origin of the
world, is not able to think because it is not connected with
a body, &c. does not apply; for Brahman, whose nature is
eternal cognition—as the sun’s nature is eternal luminous-
1 Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktanupapattim ni-
rasitum ])rikkhaX\ idam iti. Prakrz’tyarthabhavat pratyayarthabhavad
va brahmazzo sarvagTzateti pramam eva praka/ayatikatham iti. Pra-
thamazzz pratyaha yasyeti. Uktazzz vyatirekadvara vivrz/zoti anityatve
hlti. Dvitiyazzz jankate £$aneti. Svato nityasyapi ^zzanasya tatta-
darthava^^innasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam pratyayartho brah-
mazza^ sidhyatfty aha.—The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and
in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is in¬
dependent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the
verbal affix in ‘^anati' indicating the particularity of the act.
I ADHYAyA, I PAD A, 5 .
51
ness—can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of
knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa^sarin) indeed,
which is under the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a
body in order that knowledge may arise in it; but not so
the Lord, who is free from all impediments of knowledge.
The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does
not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any
obstructions. £ There is no effect and no instrument known
of him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power
is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as knowledge
and force. 5 £ Grasping without hands, hasting without feet,
he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows
what can be known, but no one knows him ; they call him
the first, the great person ’ (Sv. Up. VI, 8 ; III, 19).
But, to raise a new objection, there exists no trans¬
migrating soul different from the Lord and obstructed by
impediments of knowledge; for *Sruti expressly declares
that £ there is no other seer but he; there is no other
knower but he 5 (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 23). How then can it be
said that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating
soul depends on a body, while it does not do so in the case
of the Lord ?—True, we reply. There is in reality no
transmigrating soul different from the Lord. Still the
connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting
of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether
to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such
as jars, pots, caves, and the like. And just as in con¬
sequence of connexion of the latter kind such conceptions
and terms as £ the hollow (space) of a jar,’ &c. are generally
current, although the space inside a jar is not really
different from universal space, and just as in consequence
thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there
are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on ;
so there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord
and the transmigrating soul are different; a notion due to
the non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul
with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so
on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence,
imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like
52
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due
to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on
antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of the
soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that
its thought depends on a body and the like.
The averment that the pradhana, because consisting of
several elements, can, like clay and similar substances,
occupy the place of a cause while the uncompounded
Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the pra¬
dhana not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible
to establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but
not of the pradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara
will set forth in the second Adhy&ya (II, i, 4, &c.).
Here the Sankhya comes forward with a new objection.
The difficulty started by you, he says, viz. that the non-
intelligent pradhana cannot be the cause of the world,
because thought is ascribed to the latter in the sacred
texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the
ground that non-intelligent things are sometimes figura¬
tively spoken of as intelligent beings. We observe, for
instance, that people say of a river-bank about to fall, £ the
bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),’ and thus speak of a
non-intelligent bank as if it possessed intelligence. So the
pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may, when about
to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in
ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed,
and dined, and formed the purpose of driving in the after¬
noon to his village, necessarily acts according to his
purpose, so the pradhana also acts by the necessity of its
own nature, when transforming itself into the so-called great
principle and the subsequent forms of evolution; it may
therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent.—But what
reason have you for setting aside the primary meaning of
the word £ thought ’ and for taking it in a figurative sense ?
-—The observation, the Sankhya replies, that fire and water
also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings in the
two following scriptural passages, £ That fire thought; that
water thought’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 2, 3 5 4). We therefrom con¬
clude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6.
53
also where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned
in a chapter where (thought) is generally taken in a figura¬
tive sense l .
To this argumentation of the Sankhya the next Sutra
replies:
6. If it is said that (the word ‘seeing’) has a
figurative meaning, we deny that, on account of the
word Self (being applied to the cause of the world).
Your assertion that the term ‘Being’ denotes the non-
intelligent pradhana, and that thought is ascribed to it in a
figurative sense only, as it is to fire and water, is untenable.
Why so ? On account of the term ‘ Self.’ For the passage
Kh. Up. VI, a, which begins ‘ Being only, my dear, this
was in the beginning/ after having related the creation of
fire, water, and earth (‘ it thought/ &c.; ‘ it sent forth fire/
&c.), goes on—denoting the thinking principle of which the
whole chapter treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by
the term ‘ divinities’—as follows, ‘ That divinity thought:
Let me now enter those three divinities with this living Self
(gtva. citman) and evolve names and forms. 5 If we assumed that
in this passage the non-intelligent pradhana is figuratively
spoken of as thinking, we should also have to assume that
the same pradhana—as once constituting the subject-matter
of the chapter—is referred to by the term ‘ that divinity. 5
But in that case the divinity would not speak of the ^iva
as ‘ Self. 5 For by the term ‘ Civa 5 we must understand,
according to the received meaning and the etymology of
the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the
body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a
principle be the Self of the non-intelligent pradhana? By
‘ Self 5 we understand (a being’s) own nature, and it is clear
that the intelligent Giva cannot constitute the nature of
the non-intelligent pradhana. If, on the other hand, we
refer the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to
1 In the second Kha#da of the sixth Prapa/^aka of the Kh . Up.
‘ aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire
and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the
third passage also where it occurs.
54
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
which thought in its primary sense belongs, the use of the
word ‘Self’ with reference to the Gtv a is quite adequate.
Then again there is the other passage, * That which is that
subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the
true. It is the Self. That art thou, O SVetaketu 5 (Kh. Up.
VI, 8, 7, &c.). Here the clause ‘It is the Self’ designates
the Being of which the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle
Self, by the word ‘ Self,’ and the concluding clause, ‘ that
art thou, O SVetaketu,’ declares the intelligent SVetaketu
to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water, on the
other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of
the mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in
the evolution of names and forms. And as at the same
time there is no reason for ascribing to them thought in its
primary sense—while the employment of the word ‘Self’
furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat—the
thought attributed to them must be explained in a figura¬
tive sense, like the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover,
the thinking on the part of fire and water is to be under¬
stood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat.
On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on account of
the word ‘ Self, 5 not to be understood in a figurative sense 1 .
Here the Sankhya comes forward with a new objection.
The word f Self, 5 he says, may be applied to the pradhana,
although unintelligent, because it is sometimes figuratively
used in the sense of ‘that which effects all purposes of
another as, for instance, a king applies the word ‘ Self 5 to
some servant who carries out all the king’s intentions, ‘ Bha-
drasena is my (other) Self/ For the pradhana, which effects
the enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the
latter in the same way as a minister serves his king in the
affairs of peace and war. Or else, it may be said, the one
word ‘ Self’ may refer to non-intelligent things as well as
to intelligent beings, as we see that such expressions as
‘ the Self of the elements,’ ‘ the Self of the senses, 5 are made
use of, and as the one word ‘ light ’ (gy otis) denotes a certain
1 So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume
a figurative sense of the word ‘ thinking' in any of the three pas¬
sages.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 7.
55
sacrifice (the ^yotish/oma) as well as a flame. How then
does it follow from the word ‘ Self ’ that the thinking
(ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a
figurative sense ?
To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies:
7. (The pradh&na cannot be designated by the
term ‘ Self’) because release is taught of him who
takes his stand on that (the Sat).
The non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the object of the
term ‘ Self’ because in the passage Kh. Up. VI, % ff., where
the subtle Sat which is under discussion is at first referred to
in the sentence, ‘ That is the Self/ and where the subsequent
clause, ‘ That art thou, O SVetaketu/ declares the intelligent
SVetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a passage sub¬
sequent to the two quoted (viz. ‘ a man who has a teacher
obtains true knowledge; for him there is only delay as long
as he is not delivered, then he will be perfect’) declares
final release. For if the non-intelligent pradhana were
denoted by the term ‘Sat,’ and did comprehend—by means
of the phrase ‘ That art thou ’—persons desirous of final
release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only
be ‘ Thou art non-intelligent; ’ so that Scripture would
virtually make contradictory statements to the disadvantage
of man, and would thus cease to be a means of right know¬
ledge. But to assume that the faultless jastra is not a
means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason.
And if the sk stra, considered as a means of right knowledge,
should point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant
of the way to it, a non-intelligent Self as the real Self, he
would—comparable to the blind man who had caught hold
of the ox’s tail 1 —cling to the view of that being the Self,
1 A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost
his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of
doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of
the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place.
The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness,
led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through
which the ox drags him.
5<3
vedAnta-sOtras.
and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from
the false Self pointed out to him ; hence he would be de¬
barred from what constitutes man’s good, and would incur
evil. We must therefore conclude that, just as the j-astra
teaches the agnihotra and similar performances in their
true nature as means for those who are desirous of the
heavenly world, so the passage ‘ that is the Self, that art
thou, G *SVetaketu,’ teaches the Self in its true nature also.
Only on that condition release for him whose thoughts are
true can be taught by means of the simile in which the
person to be released is compared to the man grasping the
heated axe ( Kh . Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the
doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary
meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage ‘ that
art thou ’ would be of the nature of a fanciful combination
only 1 , like the knowledge derived from the passage, c I am
the hymn 5 (Ait. Ar. II, i, 2, 6), and would lead to a mere
transitory reward ; so that the simile quoted could not
convey the doctrine of release. Therefore the word ‘ Self’
is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense.
In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the
word c Self ’ can—in such phrases as ‘ Bhadrasena is my
Self’—be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference
between master and servant is well established by per¬
ception. Moreover, to assume that, because words are
sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative
sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also
for which words (i.e. Vedic words) are the only means of
knowledge, is altogether indefensible; for an assumption of
that nature would lead to a general want of confidence.
The assertion that the word ( Self 9 may (primarily) signify
what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as
the word c ^yotis ’ signifies a certain sacrifice as well as
light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute
to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather
assume that) the word ‘ Self 5 in its primary meaning refers
to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative
1 Cp. above, p. 30.
I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 8.
57
attribution of intelligence, applied to the elements and the
like also ; whence such phrases as ‘ the Self of the elements/
‘the Self of the senses/ And even if we assume that the
word ‘ Self ’ primarily signifies both classes of beings, we
are unable to settle in any special case which of the two
meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the
general heading under which it stands, or some determina¬
tive attributive word. But in the passage under discussion
there is nothing to determine that the word refers to
something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the
Sat distinguished by thought forms the general heading,
and *Svetaketu, i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is
mentioned in close proximity. That a non-intelligent Self
does not agree with 6Vetaketu, who possesses intelligence,
we have already shown. All these circumstances determine
the object of the word ‘ Self’ here to be something intelli¬
gent. The word ‘^yotis’ does moreover not furnish an
appropriate example ; for according to common use it has
the settled meaning of ‘light’ only, and is used in the
sense of sacrifice only on account of the arthavada assuming
a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.
A different explanation of the Sutra is also possible.
The preceding Sfttra may be taken completely to refute all
doubts as to the word ‘Self’ having a figurative or double
sense, and then the present Sfttra is to be explained as con¬
taining an independent reason, proving that the doctrine
of the pradhana being the general cause is untenable.
Hence the non-intelligent pradhana is not denoted by
the word ‘ Self/ This the teacher now proceeds to prove
by an additional reason.
8 . And (the pradh&na cannot be denoted by the
word 'Self') because there is no statement of its
having to be set aside.
If the pradhana which is the Not-Self were denoted by
the term ‘Being’ (Sat), and if the passage ‘That is the
Self, that art thou, O >SVetaketu/ referred to the pradhana ;
the teacher whose wish it is to impart instruction about the
58
vedanta-s6tras.
true Brahman would subsequently declare that the pradhana
is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be considered);
for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction
about the pradhana, might take his stand on the latter,
looking upon it as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who
wishes to point out to a friend the (small) star Arundhati
at first directs his attention to a big neighbouring star,
saying ‘ that is Arundhati,’ although it is really not so ;
and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points
out the real Arundhati. Analogously the teacher (if he
intended to make his pupil understand the Self through
the Non-Self) would in the end definitely state that the
Self is not of the nature of the pradhana. But no such
statement is made; for the sixth Prapa/^aka arrives at a
conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but
that which is (the Sat).
The word ‘ and’ (in the Sutra) is meant to notify that
the contradiction of a previous statement (which would be
implied in the rejected interpretation) is an additional
reason for the rejection. Such a contradiction would result
even if it were stated that the pradhana is to be set aside.
For in the beginning of the Prapa/^aka it is intimated that
through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes
known. Compare the following consecutive sentences,
‘Have you ever asked for that instruction by which we
hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what
cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot
be known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by
one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the
modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which
has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay
merely/ &c. Now if the term ‘ Sat ’ denoted the pradhana,
which is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects
of enjoyment, its knowledge, whether to be set aside or not
to be set aside, could never lead to the knowledge of the
aggregate of enjoyers (souls), because the latter is not an
effect of the pradhana. Therefore the pradhana is not
denoted by the term ‘ Sat.’—For this the Sutrakara gives
a further reason.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 9 .
59
9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to
the Self (the Self cannot be the pradhana).
With reference to the cause denoted by the word 4 Sat/
Scripture says, 4 When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he
becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self).
Therefore they say of him, 44 he sleeps ” (svapiti), because he
is gone to his own (svam apita)/ (Kk . Up. VI, 8,1.) This
passage explains the well-known verb 4 to sleep/ with refer¬
ence to the soul. The word, 4 his own/ denotes the Self which
had before been denoted by the word Sat; to the Self he (the
individual soul) goes, i.e. into it it is resolved, according to the
acknowledged sense of api-i, which means * to be resolved
into/ The individual soul (^iva) is called awake as long as
being connected with the various external objects by means
of the modifications of the mind—which thus constitute
limiting adjuncts of the soul—it apprehends those external
objects, and identifies itself with the gross body, which is
one of those external objects 1 . When, modified by the
impressions which the external objects have left, it sees
dreams, it is denoted by the term 4 mind 2 / When, on the
cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e. the subtle and
the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modi¬
fications due to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep,
merged in the Self as it were, then it is said to be asleep
(resolved into the Self). A similar etymology of the word
4 hrzdaya ’ is given by jruti, 4 That Self abides in the heart.
And this is the etymological explanation: he is in the
heart (hrzdi ayam)/ ( Kh . Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words
a^anaya and udanya are similarly etymologised : ‘ water is
carrying away what has been eaten by him; ’ 4 fire carries
away what has been drunk by him 5 (. Kh . Up. VI, 8, 3 ; 5).
Thus the passage quoted above explains the resolution (of
the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term 4 Sat/ by means
of the etymology of the word 4 sleep/ But the intelligent
1 So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance
in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A
simpler translation of the clause might however be given.
2 With reference to Kh, Up. VI, 8, 2 .
6o
VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
Self can clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent
pradhana. If, again, it were said that the pradhana is
denoted by the word ‘ own/ because belonging to the Self
(as being the Self’s own), there would remain the same ab¬
surd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into
a non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage
(viz. ‘ embraced by the intelligent— pr&gna .—Self he knows
nothing that is without, nothing that is within/ Bn. Up.
IV, 3, 21) declares that the soul in the condition of dream¬
less sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity. Hence that
into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an intelligent
cause of the world, denoted by the word ‘ Sat/ and not the
pradhana.—A further reason for the pradhana not being the
cause is subjoined.
io. On account of the uniformity of view (of the
Ved&nta-texts, Brahman is to be considered the
cause).
If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the
Vedanta-texts also, there were set forth different views con¬
cerning the nature of the cause, some of them favouring the
theory of an intelligent Brahman being the cause of the
world, others inclining towards the pradhana doctrine, and
others again tending in a different direction; then it might
perhaps be possible to interpret such passages as those, which
speak of the cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner
as to make them fall in with the pradhana theory. But the
stated condition is absent since all the Vedanta-texts uni¬
formly teach that the cause of the world is the intelligent
Brahman. Compare, for instance, ‘ As from a burning fire
sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the
pranas proceed each towards its place; from the pranas the
gods, from the gods the worlds ’ (Kau. Up. Ill, 3). And
‘from that Self sprang ether’ (Taitt. Up. II, i). And ‘all
this springs from the Self’ (. Kh . Up. VII, 26,1). And ‘this
pra^a is born from the Self’ (Pr. Up. Ill, 3); all which
passages declare the Self to he the cause. That the word
‘Self’ denotes an intelligent being, we have already shown.
I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, II.
61
And that all the Vedanta-texts advocate the same view as
to an intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their
claim to be considered a means of right knowledge, just
as the corresponding claims of the senses are strengthened
by their giving us information of a uniform character re-f
garding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman is\
therefore to be considered the cause of the world, ‘ on account \
of the uniformity of view (of the Vedanta^texts)/—A further /
reason for this conclusion is advanced.
ii. And because it is directly stated in Scripture
(therefore the all-knowing Brahman is the cause of
the world).
That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is
also declared in a text directly referring to him (viz. the
all-knowing one), viz. in the following passage of the man-
tropanishad of the 6Veta.svataras (VI, 9) where the word
‘ he ’ refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord,
‘He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and
there is of him neither parent nor lord.’ It is therefore
finally settled that the all-knowing Brahman is the general
cause, not the non-intelligent pradhana or anything else.
In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of
appropriate arguments, that the Vedanta^texts exhibited \
under Sutras I, 1-11, are capable of proving that the all- ;
knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause of the origin,
subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have
explained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view
( 1 ,10), that all Vedclnta-texts whatever maintain an intelli¬
gent cause. The question might therefore be asked, ‘ What
reason is there for the subsequent part of the Vedanta-
sfitras?’ (as the chief point is settled already.)
To this question we reply as follows : Brahman is appre¬
hended under two forms; in the first place as qualified by
limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of the evolu¬
tions of name and form (i. e. the multiformity of the created
world); in the second place as being the opposite of this,
i. e. free from all limiting conditions whatever. Compare
62
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
the following passages: B ri. Up. IV, 5, 15, ‘For where
there is duality as it were, then one sees the other; but
when the Self only is all this, how should he see another ? ’
Kh . Up. VII, 24, 1, ‘Where one sees nothing else, hears
nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the greatest.
Where one sees something else, hears something else, under¬
stands something else, that is the little. The greatest is
immortal; the little is mortal;’ Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7, ‘The
wise one, who having produced all forms and made all
names, sits calling (the things by their names 1 ); 5 Sv. Up.
VI, 19,‘Who is without parts, without actions, tranquil,
without faults, without taint, the highest bridge of immor¬
tality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel; 5 B ri. Up. II,
3, 6, ‘Not so, not so; 5 B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8, ‘It is neither
coarse nor fine, neither short nor long; 5 and ‘ defective is one
place, perfect the other.’ All these passages, with many
others, declare Brahman to possess a double nature, accord¬
ing as it is the object either of Knowledge or of Nescience.
As long as it is the object of Nescience, there are applied to
it the categories of devotee, object of devotion, and the
like 2 . The different modes of devotion lead to different
results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation,
some to success in works; those modes are distinct on
accouht of the distinction of the different qualities and
limiting conditions 3 * . And although the one highest Self
only, i. e. the Lord distinguished by those different qualities
constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits (of devotion)
are distinct, according as the devotion refers to different
qualities. Thus Scripture says, ‘According as man wor¬
ships him, that he becomes ; 5 and, ‘ According to what his
thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed
1 The wise one, i. e. the highest Self; which as givatman is con¬
versant with the names and forms of individual things.
2 I. e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of the
individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman
are one.
3 Qualities, i. e. the attributes under which the Self is meditated
on; limiting conditions, i. e. the localities—such as the heart and
the like—which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, II.
63
this life’ ( Kh . Up. Ill, 14, 1). Smrzti also makes an analo¬
gous statement, ‘ Remembering whatever form of being
he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters,
being impressed with it through his constant meditation ’
(Bha. Gita VIII, 6).
Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings
movable as well as immovable, yet owing to the gradual
rise of excellence of the minds which form the limiting
conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares that the Self,
although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals itself 1 2
in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of
various dignity and power; compare, for instance (Ait. Ar. II,
3, 2,1), ‘ He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self
in him V &c. Similarly Smrzti remarks, ‘ Whatever being
there is of power, splendour or might, know it to have
sprung from portions of my glory' (Bha. Gita X, 41); a
passage declaring that wherever there is an excess of power
and so on, there the Lord is to be worshipped. Accordingly
here (i. e. in the Sutras) also the teacher will show that the
golden person in the disc of the Sun is the highest Self, on ac¬
count of an indicating sign, viz. the circumstance of his being
unconnected with any evil (Ved. Su. 1,1,20); the same is to
be observed with regard to 1 ,1, 22 and other Sutras. And,
again, an enquiry will have to be undertaken into the meaning
of the texts, in order that a settled conclusion may be reached
concerning that knowledge of the Self which leads to instan¬
taneous release ; for although that knowledge is conveyed
by means of various limiting conditions, yet no special con¬
nexion with limiting conditions is intended to be intimated,
in consequence of which there arises a doubt whether it (the
1 Ananda Giri reads avish/asya for avishkrftasya.
2 Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of the
highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying differ¬
ent places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones, &c.
only the satt&, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants,
animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap;
in animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man
alone.
6 4
vedanta-s6tras.
knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for its
object; so, for instance, in the case of Sutra I, r, 12 1 . From
all this it appears that the following part of the Sastra has
a special object of its own, viz. to show that the Vedanta -
texts teach, on the one hand, Brahman as connected with
limiting conditions and forming an object of devotion, and
on the other hand* as being free from the connexion with
such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge.
The refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes different
from Brahman, which in I, 1,10 was based on the uniformity
of the meaning of the Vedanta-texts, will be further detailed
by the Sutrakara, who, while explaining additional passages
relating to Brahman, will preclude all causes of a nature
opposite to that of Brahman.
12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest
Self) on account of the repetition (of the word * bliss/
as denoting the highest Self).
The Taittiriya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enume¬
rated the Self consisting of food, the Self consisting of the
vital airs, the Self consisting of mind, and the Self consisting
of understanding, says, £ Different from this which consists of
understanding is the other inner Self which consists of bliss/
Here the doubt arises whether the phrase, ‘that which con¬
sists of bliss, 5 denotes the highest Brahman of which it had
been said previously, that £ It is true Being, Knowledge, with¬
out end/ or something different from Brahman, just as the
1 Ananda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from ‘thus
here also :* na kevalazra dvaividhyam brahmawa^ jrutismntyor eva
siddha/rc ki m tu sfitrakrzto^pi matam ity dha, evam iti, .mitismrz’tyor
iva prakrzte*pi .rastre dvairftpyam brahmawo bhavati; tatra sopa-
dhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmadhikara/zam udaharati adi-
tyeti; uktanyayazrc tulyade^eshu prasarayati evam iti; sopadhikopa-
dejavan nirupadhikopade^a^ dawayati evam ityadina, atma^anaw
nimetavyam iti sambandha^; nirwayaprasangam aha pareti; an-
namayddyupadhidvdroktasya katham paravidyavishayatva/ra tatraha
tfpddhiti; ninzayakramam dha vakyeti, uktartham adhikarazzaw kvd-
stity asahkyoktazrc yatheti.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12.
65
Self consisting of food, &c., is different from it.—The
purvapakshin maintains that the Self consisting of bliss is a
Secondary (not the principal) Self, and something different
from Brahman; as it forms a link in a series of Selfs,
beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are
not the principal Self. To the objection that even thus the
Self consisting of bliss may be considered as the primary
Self, since it is stated to be the innermost of all, he replies
that this cannot be admitted, because the Self of bliss is
declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and because it
is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary
Self, joy and the like would not touch it ; but the text
expressly says ‘Joy is its head; 5 and about its being em¬
bodied we read, ‘ Of that former one this one is the em¬
bodied Self 5 (Taitt. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that former Self of
Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self. And
of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot
be prevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is
nothing but the transmigrating Soul.
To this reasoning we make the following reply:—By the
Self consisting of bliss we have to understand the highest
Self, ‘on account of repetition. 5 For the word ‘bliss 5 is
repeatedly applied to the highest Self. So Taitt. Up. II,
7, where, after the clause ‘ That is flavour 5 —which refers
back to the Self consisting of bliss, and declares it to be of
the nature of flavour—we read, ‘For only after having
perceived flavour can any one perceive delight. Who could
breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in
the ether (of the heart) ? For he alone causes blessedness ;’
and again, II, 8, ‘Now this is an examination of Bliss; 5
‘ He reaches that Self consisting of Bliss ; 5 and again, II, 9,
‘ He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears nothing; 5 and
in addition, ‘ He understood that Bliss is Brahman 5 (III, 6).
And in another scriptural passage also (Bn. Up. Ill, 9, 28),
‘ Knowledge and bliss is Brahman, 5 we see the word ‘ bliss 5
applied just to Brahman. As, therefore, the word ‘bliss 5
is repeatedly used with reference to Brahman, we conclude
that the Self consisting of bliss is Brahman also. The
objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only denote
[34] F
66
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
the secondary Self (the SaMsarin), because it forms a
link in a series of secondary Selfs, beginning with the
one consisting of food, is of no force, for the reason that
the Self consisting of bliss is the innermost of all. The
.Sastra, wishing to convey information about the primary
Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it
at first refers to the body consisting of food, which,
although not the Self, is by very obtuse people identified
with it; it then proceeds from the body to another Self,
which has the same shape with the preceding one, just as
the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the
molten brass had been poured ; then, again, to another one,
always at first representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the
purpose of easier comprehension ; and it finally teaches that
the innermost Self 1 , which consists of bliss, is the real Self.
Just as when a man, desirous of pointing out the star
Arundhati to another man, at first points to several stars
which are not Arundhati as being Arundhati, while only the
star pointed out in the end is the real Arundhati; so here
also the Self consisting of bliss is the real Self on account of
its being the innermost (i. e. the last). Nor can any weight
be allowed to the objection that the attribution of joy and
so on, as head, &c., cannot possibly refer to the real Self;
for this attribution is due to the immediately preceding
limiting condition (viz. the Self consisting of understanding,
the so-called vi^anako^a), and does not really belong to the
real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed
to the Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link
in the chain of bodies which begins with the Self consisting
of food, and is not ascribed to it in the same direct sense in
which it is predicated of the transmigrating Self. Hence
the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Brahman.
13. If (it be objected that the term anandamaya,
consisting of bliss, can) not (denote the highest Self)
on account of its being a word denoting a modifica-
1 After which no other Self is mentioned.
I ADHyAyA, I PADA, 15 .
67
tion (or product); (we declare the objection to be)
not (valid) on account of abundance, (the idea of
which may be expressed by the affix maya.)
Here the pftrvapakshin raises the objection that the word
anandamaya (consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest
Self.—Why ?—Because the word anandamaya is understood
to denote something different from the original word (i. e.
the word ananda without the derivative affix maya), viz. a
modification; according to the received sense of the affix
maya. ‘Anandamaya ’ therefore denotes a modification, just
as annamaya (consisting of food) and similar words do.
This objection is, however, not valid, because 4 maya ’ is
also used in the sense of abundance, i. e. denotes that where
there is abundance of what the original word expresses. So,
for instance, the phrase 4 the sacrifice is annamaya ’ means
‘ the sacrifice is abounding in food 5 (not 4 is some modifica¬
tion or product of food ’). Thus here Brahman also, as
abounding in bliss, is called anandamaya. That Brahman
does abound in bliss follows from the passage (Taitt. Up.
II, 8), where, after the bliss of each of the different classes
of beings, beginning with man, has been declared to be a
hundred times greater than the bliss of the immediately
preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally proclaimed to
be absolutely supreme. Maya therefore denotes abundance.
14. And because he is declared to be the cause of
it, (i. e. of bliss ; therefore maya is to be taken as
denoting abundance.)
Maya must be understood to denote abundance, for that
reason also that Scripture declares Brahman to be the cause
of bliss, 4 For he alone causes bliss ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7).
For he who causes bliss must himself abound in bliss;
just as we infer in ordinary life, that a man who enriches
others must himself possess abundant wealth. As, there¬
fore, maya may be taken to mean 4 abundant, 5 the Self
consisting of bliss is the highest Self.
15. Moreover (the Anandamaya is Brahman be-
68
VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
cause) the same (Brahman) which had been referred
to in the mantra is sung, (i. e. proclaimed in the
Brahmazza passage as the anandamaya.)
The Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for
the following reason also h On the introductory words 4 he
who knows Brahman attains the highest 5 (Taitt. Up. II, i),
there follows a mantra proclaiming that Brahman, which
forms the general topic of the chapter, possesses the quali¬
ties of true existence, intelligence, infinity; after that it is
said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and
then all other moving and non-moving things, and that,
entering into the beings which it had emitted, Brahman
stays in the recess, inmost of all; thereupon, for its better
comprehension, the series of the different Selfs (‘ different
from this is the inner Self, 5 &c.) are enumerated, and then
finally the same Brahman which the mantra had proclaimed,
is again proclaimed in the passage under discussion, ‘different
from this is the other inner Self, which consists of bliss. 5
To assume that a mantra and the Brahma/za passage be¬
longing to it have the same sense is only proper, on account
of the absence of contradiction (which results therefrom);
for otherwise we should be driven to the unwelcome in¬
ference that the text drops the topic once started, and turns
to an altogether new subject.
Nor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from
the Self consisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self con¬
sisting of food, &c. 1 2 On the same (i. e. the Self consisting
of bliss) is founded, 4 This same knowledge of Bhrzgu and
Varu/za; he understood that bliss is Brahman 5 (Taitt. Up.
Ill, 6). Therefore the Self consisting of bliss is the highest
Self.
1 The previous proofs were founded on linga; the argument
which is now propounded is founded on prakara/za.
2 While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so on, a
further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot, there¬
fore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are likewise
identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 7.
69
16. (The Self consisting of bliss is the highest
Self,) not the other (i. e. the individual Soul), on
account of the impossibility (of the latter assump¬
tion).
And for the following reason also the Self consisting of
bliss is the highest Self only, not the other, i. e. the one
which is other than the Lord, i. e. the transmigrating in¬
dividual soul. The personal soul cannot be denoted by the
term ‘the one consisting of bliss/ Why? On account of
the impossibility. For Scripture says, with reference to the
Self consisting of bliss, ‘ He wished, may I be many, may
I grow forth. He brooded over himself. After he had thus
brooded, he sent forth whatever there is/ Here, the desire
arising before the origination of a body, &c., the non¬
separation of the effects created from the creator, and the
creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to
any Self different from the highest Self.
17. And on account of the declaration of the
difference (of the two, the anandamaya cannot be the
transmigrating soul).
The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the
transmigrating soul, for that reason also that in the section
treating of the Self of bliss, the individual soul and the Self
of bliss are distinctly represented as different; Taitt. Up.
II, 7,‘It (i. e. the Self consisting of bliss) is a flavour;
for only after perceiving a flavour can this (soul) perceive
bliss/ For he who perceives cannot be that which is per¬
ceived.—But, it may be asked, if he who perceives or
attains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how
about the following Sruti- and Smnti-passages, ‘ The Self
is to be sought‘ Nothing higher is known than the attain¬
ment of the Self 1 ?*—This objection, we reply, is legitimate
(from the point of view of absolute truth). Yet we see that
in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is never anything
1 Yadi labdM na labdhavyaA katha m tarhi paramatmano vastuto
Abhinnena ^ivatmana paramatm^ labhyata ity artha^. Bha,mati.
70
VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
but the Self, is, owing to non-comprehension of the truth,
identified with the Non-Self, i. e. the body and so on;
whereby it becomes possible to speak of the Self in so far
as it is identified with the body, and so on, as something
not searched for but to be searched for, not heard but to
be heard, not seized but to be seized, not perceived but to
be perceived, not known but to be known, and the like.
Scripture, on the other hand, denies, in such passages as
' there is no other seer but he 5 (B ru Up. Ill, 7, 23), that
there is in reality any seer or hearer different from the
all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor can it be said that the
Lord is unreal because he is identical with the unreal
individual soul; for) 1 the Lord differs from the soul(vi^a-
natman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the
product of Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler
who stands on the ground differs from the illusive juggler,
who, holding in his hand a shield and a sword, climbs up
to the sky by means of a rope; or as the free unlimited
ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is determined by
its limiting adjunct, (viz. the jar.) With reference to this
fictitious difference of the highest Self and the individual
Self, the two last Sutras have been propounded.
18. And on account of desire (being mentioned
as belonging to the anandamaya) no regard is to be
had to what is inferred, (i. e. to the pradh&na inferred
by the Sankhyas.)
Since in the passage ‘ he desired, may I be many, may
I grow forth/ which occurs in the chapter treating of the
anandamaya (Taitt. Up. II, 6), the quality of feeling desire
is mentioned, that which is inferred, i. e. the non-intelligent
pradhana assumed by the Sankhyas, cannot be regarded as
being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the
world. Although the opinion that the pradhana is the
1 Yatha parame^varad bhinno ^ivatma drash/a na bhavaty evam
£-ivatmano*pi drash/ur na bhinna^ paramewara iti ^ivasydnirva^-
yatve parame^varo^py anirva^ya^ syad ity ata aha parame^varas tv
avidyakalpitad iti. Ananda Giri.
I ADHYAYA, T PADA, 19.
71
cause of the world, has already been refuted in the Sutra I,
1, 5, it is here, where a favourable opportunity presents
itself, refuted for a second time on the basis of the scrip¬
tural passage about the cause of the world feeling desire,
for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all
scriptural passages).
19. And, moreover, it (i. e. Scripture) teaches the
joining of this (i.e. the individual soul) with that, (i.e.
the Self consisting of bliss), on that (being fully
known).
And for the following reason also the term, ‘the Self
consisting of bliss,’ cannot denote either the pradhana or the
individual soul. Scripture teaches that the individual soul
when it has reached knowledge is joined, i. e. identified,
with the Self of bliss under discussion, i. e. obtains final
release. Compare the following passage (Taitt. Up. II, 7),^
4 When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which ^
is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has
obtained the fearless. For if he makes but the smallest
distinction in it there is fear for him.’ That means, if he
sees in that Self consisting of bliss even a small difference
in the form of non-identity, then he finds no release from
the fear of transmigratory existence. But when he, by
means of the cognition of absolute identity, finds absolute
rest in the Self consisting of bliss, then he is freed from the
fear of transmigratory existence. But this (finding absolute
rest) is possible only when we understand by the Self con¬
sisting of bliss, the highest Self, and not either the pra¬
dhana or the individual soul. Hence it is proved that the
Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.
But, in reality, the following remarks have to be made
concerning the true meaning of the word ‘ dnandamaya h
On what grounds, we ask, can it be maintained that the
1 The explanation of the anandamaya given hitherto is here re¬
called, and a different one given. The previous explanation is
attributed by Go. An. to the vrfttikara.
72
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
affix ‘ maya ’ after having, in the series of compounds begin¬
ning with annamaya and ending with vi^anamaya, denoted
mere modifications, should all at once, in the word ananda-
maya, which belongs to the same series, denote abun¬
dance, so that anandamaya would refer to Brahman ? If
it should be said that the assumption is made on account of
the governing influence of the Brahman proclaimed in the
mantra (which forms the beginning of the chapter, Taitt.
Up. II), we reply that therefrom it would follow that also
the Selfs consisting of food, breath, &c., denote Brahman
(because the governing influence of the mantra extends to
them also).—The advocate of the former interpretation
will here, perhaps, restate an argument already made use
of above, viz. as follows : To assume that the Selfs consisting
of food., and so on, are not Brahman is quite proper, because
after each of them an inner Self is mentioned. After the
Self of bliss, on the other hand, no further inner Self is
mentioned, and hence it must be considered to be Brahman
itself; otherwise we should commit the mistake of dropping
the subject-matter in hand (as which Brahman is pointed
out by the mantra), and taking up a new topic.—But to this
we reply that, although unlike the case of the Selfs con¬
sisting of food, &c., no inner Self is mentioned after the Self
consisting of bliss, still the latter cannot be considered as
Brahman, because with reference to the Self consisting of
bliss Scripture declares, ‘Joy is its head. Satisfaction is its
right arm. Great satisfaction is its left arm. Bliss is its
trunk. Brahman is its tail, its support/ Now, here the
very same Brahman which, in the mantra, had been
introduced as the subject of the discussion, is called
the tail, the support ; while the five involucra, extending
from the involiicrum of food up to the involucrum of
bliss, are merely introduced for the purpose of setting
forth the knowledge of Brahman. How, then, can it be
maintained that our interpretation implies the needless
dropping of the general subject-matter and the introduction
of a new topic?—But, it may again be objected, Brahman
is called the tail, i. e. a member of the Self consisting of
bliss ; analogously to those passages in which a tail and
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 9 .
73
other members are ascribed to the Selfs consisting of food
and so on. On what grounds, then, can we claim to know
that Brahman (which is spoken of as a mere member, i. e. a
subordinate matter) is in reality the chief matter referred to ?
—From the fact, we reply, of Brahman being the general
subject-matter of the chapter.—But, it will again be said,
that interpretation also according to which Brahman is
cognised as a mere member of the anandamaya does not
involve a dropping of the subject-matter, since the ananda¬
maya himself is Brahman.—But, we reply, in that case one
and the same Brahman would at first appear as the whole,
viz. as the Self consisting of bliss, and thereupon as a mere
part, viz. as the tail; which is absurd. And as one of the
two alternatives must be preferred, it is certainly appro¬
priate to refer to Brahman the clause ‘ Brahman is the
tail 5 which contains the word ‘ Brahman,' and not the
sentence about the Self of Bliss in which Brahman is
not mentioned. Moreover, Scripture, in continuation
of the phrase, ‘ Brahman is the tail, the support,' goes
on, ‘ On this there is also the following .doka: He who
knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non¬
existing. He who knows Brahman as existing him we
know himself as existing.' As this .doka, without any refer¬
ence to the Self of bliss, states the advantage and disadvan¬
tage connected with the knowledge of the being and non-
being of Brahman only, we conclude that the clause,
‘ Brahman is the tail, the support, 5 represents Brahman as
the chief matter (not as a merely subordinate matter).
About the being or non-being of the Self of bliss, on the
other hand, a doubt is not well possible, since the Self of
bliss distinguished by joy, satisfaction, &c., is well known
to every one.—But if Brahman is the principal matter, how
can it be designated as the mere tail of the Self of bliss
(‘ Brahman is the tail, the support 5 ) ?—Its being called so,
we reply, forms no objection ; for the word tail here denotes
that which is/ of the nature of a tail, so that we have to
understand that the bliss of Brahman is not a member (in
its literal sense), but the support or abode, the one nest
(resting-place) of all worldly bliss. Analogously another
74
VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
scriptural passage declares, c All other creatures live on a
small portion of that bliss 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 32). Further,
if by the Self consisting of bliss we were to understand
Brahman, we should have to assume that the Brahman
meant is the Brahman distinguished by qualities (savi^esha),
because it is said to have joy and the like for its members.
But this assumption is contradicted by a complementary
passage (II, 9) which declares that Brahman is the object
neither of mind nor speech, and so shows that the Brahman
meant is the (absolute) Brahman (devoid of qualities),
‘ From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable
to reach it, he who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears
nothing.’ Moreover, if we speak of something as ‘abounding
in bliss 1 ,’ we thereby imply the co-existence of pain; for
the word c abundance ’ in its ordinary sense implies the
existence of a small measure of what is opposed to the
thing whereof there is abundance. But the passage so
understood would be in conflict with another passage ( Kh .
Up. VII, 24), c Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing
else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite; ’ which
declares that in the Infinite, i. e. Brahman, there is nothing
whatever different from it. Moreover, as joy, &c. differ in
each individual body, the Self consisting of bliss also is a
different one in each body. Brahman, on the other hand,
does not differ according to bodies ; for the mantra at the be¬
ginning of the chapter declares it to be true Being, knowledge,
infinite, and another passage says, c He is the one God, hidden
in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings ’ (Sv.
Up. VI, 11). Nor, again, does Scripture exhibit a frequent
repetition of the word ‘ anandamaya ; ’ for merely the radical
part of the compound (i. e. the word ananda without the
affix maya) is repeated in all the following passages: e It
is a flavour, far only after seizing flavour can any one seize
bliss. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that
bliss existed not in the ether? For he alone causes blessed¬
ness;’ ‘Now this is an examination of bliss; 5 ‘ He who
1 In which sense, as shown above, the word anandamaya must
be taken if understood to denote Brahman.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 9 .
75
knows the bliss of that Brahman fears nothing ‘He
understood that bliss is Brahman/ If it were a settled
matter that Brahman is denoted by the term, ‘ the Self
consisting of bliss, 5 then we could assume that in the subse¬
quent passages, where merely the word ‘ bliss 5 is employed,
the term ‘ consisting of bliss 5 is meant to be repeated ; but
that the Self consisting of bliss is not Brahman, we have
already proved by means of the reason of joy being its
head, and so on. Hence, as in another scriptural passage,
viz. ‘ Brahman is knowledge and bliss 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 28),
the mere word ‘ bliss 5 denotes Brahman, we must conclude
that also in such passages as, ‘ If that bliss existed not in
the ether, 5 the word bliss is used with reference to Brahman,
and is not meant to repeat the term ‘ consisting of bliss. 5
The repetition of the full compound, ‘ consisting of bliss, 5
which occurs in the passage, ‘ He reaches that Self consisting
of bliss 5 (Taitt. Up. II, 8), does not refer to Brahman, as it
is contained in the enumeration of Non-Selfs, comprising the
Self of food, &c., all of which are mere effects, and all of
which are represented as things to be reached.—But, it may
be said, if the Self consisting of bliss, which is said to have
to be reached, were not Brahman—just as the Selfs con¬
sisting of food, &c. are not Brahman—then it would not be
declared (in the passage immediately following) that he who
knows obtains for his reward Brahman.—This objection
we invalidate by the remark that the text makes its
declaration as to Brahman—which is the tail, the support—
being reached by him who knows, by the very means of
the declaration as to the attainment of the Self of bliss ; as
appears from the passage, ‘ On this there is also this ^loka,
from which all speech returns, 5 &c. With reference, again,
to the passage, ‘ He desired: may I be many, may I grow
forth/ which is found in proximity to the mention of the
Self consisting of bliss, we remark that it is in reality con¬
nected (not with the Self of bliss but with) Brahman, which
is mentioned in the still nearer passage, ‘ Brahman is the tail,
the support, 5 and does therefore not intimate that the Self
of bliss is Brahman. And, on account of its referring to
the passage last quoted (‘ it desired/ &c.), the later passage
vedanta-s(jtras.
76
also, ‘ That is flavour/ &c., has not the Self of bliss for its
subject.—But, it may be objected, the (neuter word) Brah¬
man cannot possibly be designated by a masculine word as
you maintain is done in the passage, c He desired/ &c.—In
reply to this objection we point to the passage (Taitt. Up.
II, 1), c From that Self sprang ether/ where, likewise, the
masculine word ‘Self’ can refer to Brahman only, since
the latter is the general topic of the chapter. In the know¬
ledge of Bhrzgu and Varu;/a finally ( £ he knew that bliss is
Brahman ’), the word ‘ bliss 5 is rightly understood to denote
Brahman, since we there meet neither with the affix £ maya/
nor with any statement as to joy being its head, and the
like. To ascribe to Brahman in itself joy, and so on, as its
members, is impossible, unless we have recourse to certain,
however minute, distinctions qualifying Brahman ; and that
the whole chapter is not meant to convey a knowledge of
the qualified (savbesha) Brahman is proved by the passage
(quoted above), which declares that Brahman transcends
speech and mind. We therefore must conclude that the
affix maya, in the word anandamaya, does not denote
abundance, but expresses a mere effect, just as it does in
the words annamaya and the subsequent similar com¬
pounds.
The Sutras are therefore to be explained as follows.
There arises the question whether the passage, ‘ Brahman
is the tail, the support/ is to be understood as intimating
that Brahman is a mere member of the Self consisting of
bliss, or that it is the principal matter. If it is said that it
must be considered as a mere member, the reply is, ‘ The
Self consisting of bliss on account of the repetition. 5 That
means: Brahman, which in the passage ‘ the Self con¬
sisting of bliss/ &c., is spoken of as the tail, the support,
is designated as the principal matter (not as something
subordinate). On account of the repetition ; for in the
memorial doka, ‘ he becomes himself non-existing/ Brah¬
man alone is reiterated. ‘ If not, on account of the word
denoting a modification ; not so, on account of abundance.’
In this Sutra the word c modification ’ is meant to convey
the sense of member. The objection that on account of
I ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 20.
77
the word 4 tail/ which denotes a mere member, Brahman
cannot be taken as the principal matter must be refuted.
This we do by remarking that there is no difficulty, since
a word denoting a member may be introduced into the
passage on account of pra/£urya*. Pra^urya here means a
phraseology abounding in terms denoting members. After
the different members, beginning with the head and ending
with the tail, of the Selfs, consisting of food, &c. have been
enumerated, there are also mentioned the head and the other
limbs of the Self of bliss, and then it is added, ‘ Brahman
is the tail, the support; ’ the intention being merely to intro¬
duce some more terms denoting members, not to convey
the meaning of 4 member/ (an explanation which is impos¬
sible) because the preceding Sutra already has proved
Brahman (not to be a member, but) to be the principal
matter. 4 And because he is declared to be the cause of it/
That means: Brahman is declared to be the cause of the
entire aggregate of effects, inclusive of the Self, consisting
of bliss, in the following passage, 4 He created all whatever
there is ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And as Brahman is the cause,
it cannot at the same time be called the member, in the
literal sense of the word, of the Self of bliss, which is nothing
but one of Brahman’s effects. The other Sutras also (which
refer to the Self of bliss 1 2 ) are to be considered, as well as
they may, as conveying a knowledge of Brahman, which
(Brahman) is referred to in the passage about the tail.
20. The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the
highest Lord), on account of his qualities being
declared 3 .
The following passage is found in Scripture ( Kh . Up. I,
6, 6 ff.), ‘ Now that persombright as gold who is seen within
1 I. e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.
2 See I, i, 15-19.
3 The preceding adhikara^a had shown that the five Selfs (con¬
sisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates,
are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of
Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities; while that Brahman
78
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold,
bright as gold altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose
eyes are like blue lotus ; his name is Ut, for he has risen
(udita) above all evil. He also who knows this rises above
all evil. So much with reference to the devas.’ And
further on, with reference to the body, ‘Now the person
who is seen in the eye,’ &c. Here the following doubt
presents itself. Do these passages point out, as the object
of devotion directed on the sphere of the sun and the eye,
merely some special individual soul, which, by means of
a large measure of knowledge and pious works, has raised
itself to a position of eminence ; or do they refer to the
eternally perfect highest Lord ?
The purvapakshin takes the former view. An individual
soul, he says, is referred to, since Scripture speaks of a
definite shape. To the person in the sun special features
are ascribed, such as the possession of a beard as bright as
gold and so on, and the same features manifestly belong to
the person in the eye also, since they are expressly trans¬
ferred to it in the passage, ‘ The shape of this person is the
same as the shape of that person.’ That, on the other
hand, no shape can be ascribed to the highest Lord, follows
from the passage (Kau. Up. I, 3,15), ‘That which is without
sound, without touch, without form, without decay.’ That
an individual soul is meant follows moreover from the fact
that a definite abode is mentioned, ‘ He who is in the sun ;
he who is in the eye.’ About the highest Lord, who has no
special abode, but abides in his own glory, no similar state¬
ment can be made ; compare, for instance, the two following
passages, ‘Where does he rest? In his own glory?’ (. Kh .
Up. VII, 24, 1); and ‘like the ether he is omnipresent,
eternal.’ A further argument for our view is supplied by
the fact that the might (of the being in question) is said to
be limited ; for the passage, ‘ He is lord of the worlds
beyond that, and of the wishes of the devas,’ indicates the
itself is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara^a un¬
dertakes to show that the passage about the golden person represents
he savhesha Brahman as the object of devout meditation.
T ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 20.
79
limitation of the might of the person in the sun; and the
passage, ‘He is lord of the worlds beneath that and of
the wishes of men, 5 indicates the limitation of the might
of the person in the eye. No limit, on the other hand, can
be admitted of the might of the highest Lord, as appears
from the passage (B ru Up. IV, 4, 22), ‘He is the Lord of all,
the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a
bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be
confounded ; 5 which passage intimates that the Lord is
free from all limiting distinctions. For all these reasons
the person in the eye and the sun cannot be the highest
Lord.
To this reasoning the Sutra replies, ‘The one within, on
account of his qualities being declared. 5 The person
referred to in the passages concerning the person within
the sun and the person within the eye is not a trans¬
migrating being, but the highest Lord. Why? Because
his qualities are declared. For the qualities of the highest
Lord are indicated in the text as follows. At first the
name of the person within the sun is mentioned—‘his
name is Ut 5 —and then this name is explained on the
ground of that person being free from all evil, ‘ He has
risen above all evil. 5 The same name thus explained is
then transferred to the person in the eye, in the clause,
‘ the name of the one is the name of the other. 5 Now,
entire freedom from sin is attributed in Scripture to the
highest Self only; so, for instance ( Kh . Up. VIII, 7, 1),
‘ The Self which is free from sin,’ &c. Then, again, there is
the passage, ‘ He is Ri k, he is Saman, Uktha, Ya^us, Brah¬
man, 5 which declares the person in the eye to be the Self
of the Rik, Saman, and so on; which is possible only if
that person is the Lord who, as being the cause of all, is
to be considered as the Self of all. Moreover, the text,
after having stated in succession Rik and Saman to have
earth and fire for their Self with reference to the Devas,
and, again, speech and breath with reference to the body,
continues, ‘ Rik and Saman are his joints, 5 with reference to
the Devas, and ‘ the joints of the one are the joints of the
other, 5 with reference to the body. Now this statement
8o
vedanta-s{jtras.
also can be made only with regard to that which is the
Self of all. Further, the passage, 4 Therefore all who sing
to the Vina sing him, and from him also they obtain
wealth/ shows that the being spoken of is the sole topic
of all worldly songs; which again holds true of the highest
Lord only. That absolute command over the objects of
worldly desires (as displayed, for instance, in the bestowal
of wealth) entitles us to infer that the Lord is meant,
appears also from the following passage of the Bhagavad-
gita (X, 41), 4 Whatever being there is possessing power,
glory, or strength, know it to be produced from a portion
of my energy 1 .’ To the objection that the statements
about bodily shape contained in the clauses, 4 With a
beard bright as gold/ &c., cannot refer to the highest
Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he
pleases, assume a bodily shape formed of Maya, in order
to gratify thereby his devout worshippers. Thus Snrn’ti
also says, 4 That thou seest me, O Narada, is the M&ya
emitted by me ; do not then look on me as endowed with
the qualities of all beings.’ We have further to note that
expressions such as, 4 That which is without sound, without
touch, without form, without decay/ are made use of where
instruction is given about the nature of the highest Lord in
so far as he is devoid of all qualities; while passages such
as the following one, 4 He to whom belong all works, all
desires, all sweet odours and tastes’ (Kk. Up. Ill, 14, 2),
which represent the highest Lord as the object of devotion,
speak of him, who is the cause of everything, as possessing
some of the qualities of his effects. Analogously he may
be spoken of, in the passage under discussion, as having a
beard bright as gold and so on. With reference to the
objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant because
an abode is spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of
devout meditation, a special abode may be assigned to
Brahman, although it abides in its own glory only; for as
Brahman is, like ether, all-pervading, it may be viewed as
1 So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes on poets
and singers is Brahman.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 22. 8i
being within the Self of all beings. The statement, finally,
about the limitation of Brahman’s might, which depends on
the distinction of what belongs to the gods and what to the
body, has likewise reference to devout meditation only.
From all this it follows that the being which Scripture
states to be within the eye and the sun is the highest Lord.
21. And there is another one (i. e. the Lord who
is different from the individual souls animating the
sun, &c.), on account of the declaration of distinc¬
tion.
There is, moreover, one distinct from the individual
souls which animate the sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord
who rules within; whose distinction (from all individual
souls) is proclaimed in the following scriptural passage, ‘ He
who dwells in the sun and within the sun, whom the sun
does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the
sun within; he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal 5
(B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 9). Here the expression, 4 He within the
sun whom the sun does not know,’ clearly indicates that the
Ruler within is distinct from that cognising individual soul
whose body is the sun. With that Ruler within we have to
identify the person within the sun, according to the tenet
of the sameness of purport of all Vedanta-texts. It thus
remains a settled conclusion that the passage under dis¬
cussion conveys instruction about the highest Lord.
22. The aka^a, i. e. ether (is Brahman) on account
of characteristic marks (of the latter being men¬
tioned).
In the .Oandogya (I, 9) the following passage is met with,
‘What is the origin of this world ? 5 ‘ Ether, 5 he replied. ‘For
all these beings take their rise from the ether only, and
return into the ether. Ether is greater than these, ether is
their rest. 5 —Here the following doubt arises. Does the word
‘ ether 5 denote the highest Brahman or the elemental ether ?
—Whence the doubt ?—Because the word is seen to be used
in both senses. Its use in the sense of ‘ elemental ether 5
is well established in ordinary as well as in Vedic speech;
[34] G
82
vedAnta-s^tras.
and, on the other hand, we see that it is sometimes used to
denote Brahman, viz. in cases where we ascertain, either
from some complementary sentence or from the fact of
special qualities being mentioned, that Brahman is meant.
So, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, J, i If that bliss existed not
in the ether; 5 and Kh . Up. VIII, 14, ‘ That which is called
ether is the revealer of all forms and names ; that within
which forms and names are 1 that is Brahman. 5 Hence the
doubt.—Which sense is then to be adopted in our case? —
The sense of elemental ether, the purvapakshin replies;
because this sense belongs to the word more commonly,
and therefore presents itself to the mind more readily.
The word ‘ ether 5 cannot be taken in both senses equally,
because that would involve a (faulty) attribution of several
meanings to one and the same word. Hence the term
{ ether 5 applies to Brahman in a secondary (metaphorical)
sense only; on account of Brahman being in many of its
attributes, such as all pervadingness and the like, similar to
ether. The rule is, that when the primary sense of a word
is possible, the word must not be taken in a secondary sense.
And in the passage under discussion only the primary sense
of the word ‘ ether 5 is admissible. Should it be objected
that, if we refer the passage under discussion to the ele¬
mental ether, a complementary passage (‘ for all these
beings take their rise from the ether only, &c.’) cannot be
satisfactorily accounted for; we reply that the elemental
ether also may be represented as a cause, viz. of air, fire, &c.
in due succession. For we read in Scripture (Taitt. Up.
II, 1), ‘ From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from
air fire, and so on. 5 The qualities also of being greater
and of being a place of rest may be ascribed to the elemental
ether, if we consider its relations to all other beings. There¬
fore we conclude that the word ‘ether 5 here denotes the
elemental ether.
To this we reply as follows :—The word ether must here
be taken to denote Brahman, on account of characteristic
marks of the latter being mentioned. For the sentence,
1 Or else ‘ that which is within forms and names.’
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2 2.
83
‘ All these beings take their rise from the ether only/ clearly
indicates the highest Brahman, since all Vedanta-texts
agree in definitely declaring that all beings spring from
the highest Brahman.—But, the opponent may say, we
have shown that the elemental ether also may be repre¬
sented as the cause, viz. of air, fire, and the other elements
in due succession.—We admit this. But still there remains
the difficulty, that, unless we understand the word to apply
to the fundamental cause of all, viz. Brahman, the affirmation
contained in the word ‘only 5 and the qualification expressed
by the word ‘ all 5 (in ‘ all beings ’) would be out of place.
Moreover, the clause, ‘ They return into the ether, 5 again
points to Brahman, and so likewise the phrase, ‘ Ether is
greater than these, ether is their rest;' for absolute supe¬
riority in point of greatness Scripture attributes to the
highest Self only; cp. Kh . Up. Ill, 14, 3, ‘ Greater than
the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater
than all these worlds. 5 The quality of being a place of rest
likewise agrees best with the highest Brahman, on account
of its being the highest cause. This is confirmed by the
following scriptural passage : ‘ Knowledge and bliss is Brah¬
man, it is the rest of him who gives gifts’ (Bn. Up. Ill, 9, 28).
Moreover, Caivali finding fault with the doctrine of Sala-
vatya, on account of (his saman) having an end (Kh. Up. I,
8, 8), and wishing to proclaim something that has no end
chooses the ether, and then, having identified the ether with
the Udgitha, concludes, ‘He is the Udgitha greater than
great; he is without end. 5 Now this endlessness is a
characteristic mark of Brahman. To the remark that
the sense of‘elemental ether 5 presents itself to the mind
more readily, because it is the better established sense of
the word akai-a, we reply, that, although it may present
itself to the mind first, yet it is not to be accepted, because
we see that qualities of Brahman are mentioned in the com¬
plementary sentences. That the word aka^a is also used
to denote Brahman has been shown already; cp. such
passages as, ‘ Ether is the revealer of all names and forms. 5
We see, moreover, that various synonyma of aka^a are
employed to denote Brahman. So, for instance ; Rik Sa//zh.
G 2
8 4
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
I, 164, 39, ‘In which the Vedas are 1 , in the Imperishable
one (i. e. Brahman), the highest, the ether (vyoman), on
which all gods have their seat/ And Taitt. Up. Ill, 6,
‘ This is the knowledge of Bhrzgu and Varuzza, founded on
the highest ether (vyoman)/ And again, ‘ Om, ka is Brah¬
man, ether (kha) is Brahman’ (Kh. Up. IV, 10, 5), and ‘the
old ether’ (Bri. Up. V, i) 2 . And other similar passages.
On account of the force of the complementary passage we
are justified in deciding that the word ‘ether/ although
occurring in the beginning of the passage, refers to Brahman.
The case is analogous to that of the sentence, ‘ Agni (lit.
the fire) studies a chapter,’ where the word agni, although
occurring in the beginning, is at once seen to denote a boy 3 .
It is therefore settled that the word ‘ ether’ denotes Brahman.
23. For the same reason breath (is Brahman).
Concerning the udgttha it is said (Kh. Up. I, 10, 9),
‘Prastot ri, that deity which belongs to the prastava, &c.,’
and, further on (I, 11, 4; 5), ‘Which then is that deity? He
said : Breath. For all these beings merge into breath alone,
and from breath they arise. This is the deity belonging to
the prastava/ With reference to this passage doubt and
decision are to be considered as analogous to those stated
under the preceding Sutra. For while in some passages—as,
for instance, ‘ For indeed, my son, mind is fastened to prazza/
Kh. Up. VI, 8, 2; and, ‘the praz^a of prazza/ Bri. Up. IV, 4,
18—the word ‘breath’ is seen to denote Brahman, its use
1 Viz. as intimating it. Thus An. Gi. and Go. An. against the
accent of rikih. Sayazza explains rik&h as genitive.
2 Ozzzkarasya pratikatvena va^akatvena lakshakatvena va brah-
matvam uktam, om iti, ka m sukha m tasyarthendriyayoga^atvazzz
varayituzzz kham iti, tasya bhutaka^atvaw vyaseddhum purazzam ity
uktam. An. Gi.
3 The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be
decided by means of a reference to preceding passages; where that
is not possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of
some new chapter) complementary, i. e. subsequent passages have
to be taken into consideration.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 23 .
85
in the sense of a certain modification of air is better estab¬
lished in common as well as in Vedic language. Hence
there arises a doubt whether in the passage under dis¬
cussion the word prazza denotes Brahman or (ordinary)
breath. In favour of which meaning have we then to
decide ?
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the word must be
held to denote the fivefold vital breath, which is a peculiar
modification of wind (or air); because, as has been re¬
marked already, that sense of the word prazza is the better
established one.—But no, an objector will say, just as in the
case of the preceding Sutra, so here also Brahman is meant,
on account of characteristic marks being mentioned; for
here also a complementary passage gives us to understand
that all beings spring from and merge into prazza; a process
which can take place in connexion with the highest Lord
only.—This objection, the purvapakshin replies, is futile,
since we see that the beings enter into and proceed from
the principal vital air also. For Scripture makes the fol¬
lowing statement (.Sat. Br. X, 3, 3, 6), 4 When man sleeps,
then into breath indeed speech merges, into breath the eye,
into breath the ear, into breath the mind ; when he awakes
then they spring again from breath alone/ What the Veda
here states is, moreover, a matter of observation, for during
sleep, while the process of breathing goes on uninterruptedly,
the activity of the sense organs is interrupted and again
becomes manifest at the time of awaking only. And as the
sense organs are the essence of all material beings, the com¬
plementary passage which speaks of the merging and
emerging of the beings can be reconciled with the principal
vital air also. Moreover, subsequently to prazza being
mentioned as the divinity of the prastava the sun and food
are designated as the divinities of the udgitha and the
pratihara. Now as they are not Brahman, the prazza also,
by parity of reasoning, cannot be Brahman.
To this argumentation the author of the Sutras replies:
For the same reason prazza—that means: on account of
the presence of characteristic marks—which constituted the
reason stated in the preceding Sutra—the word prazza also
86
VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
must be held to denote Brahman. For Scripture says of
prazza also, that it is connected with marks characteristic
of Brahman. The sentence, ‘ All these beings merge into
breath alone, and from breath they arise, 5 which declares
that the origination and retractation of all beings depend on
prazza, clearly shows prazza to be Brahman. In reply to the
assertion that the origination and retractation of all beings can
be reconciled equally well with the assumption of prazza de¬
noting the chief vital air, because origination and retractation
take place in the state of waking and of sleep also, we remark
that in those two states only the senses are merged into, and
emerge from, the chief vital air, while, according to the
scriptural passage, ‘For all these beings, &c., 5 all beings
whatever into which a living Self has entered, together with
their senses and bodies, merge and emerge by turns. And
even if the word ‘ beings 5 were taken (not in the sense of
animated beings, but) in the sense of material elements in
general, there would be nothing in the way of interpreting
the passage as referring to Brahman.—But, it may be said,
that the senses together with their objects do, during sleep,
enter into prazza, and again issue from it at the time of
waking, we distinctly learn from another scriptural passage,
viz. Kau. Up. Ill, 3, ‘When a man being thus asleep sees
no dream whatever, he becomes one with that prazza alone.
Then speech goes to him with all names, 5 &c.—True, we
reply, but there also the word prazza denotes (not the vital
air) but Brahman, as we conclude from characteristic marks
of Brahman being mentioned. The objection, again, that
the word prazza cannot denote Brahman because it occurs
in proximity to the words ‘ food 5 and ‘ sun 5 (which do not
refer to Brahman), is altogether baseless ; for proximity is
of no avail against the force of the complementary passage
which intimates that prazza is Brahman. That argument,
finally, which rests on the fact that the word prazza com¬
monly denotes the vital air with its five modifications, is to
be refuted in the same way as the parallel argument which
the purvapakshin brought forward with reference to the
word ‘ ether. 5 From all this it follows that the prazza, which
is the deity of the prastava, is Brahman.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 24 .
37
Some (commentators) 1 quote under the present Sfttra the
following passages, 4 the prazza of prazza ’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4,18),
and 4 for to prazza mind is fastened ’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 8, 2). But
that is wrong since these two passages offer no opportunity
for any discussion, the former on account of the separation
of the words, the latter on account of the general topic.
When we meet with a phrase such as ‘the father of the
father 5 we understand at once that the genitive denotes a
father different from the father denoted by the nominative.
Analogously we infer from the separation of words con¬
tained in the phrase, 4 the breath of breath,’ that the 4 breath
of breath’ is different from the ordinary breath (denoted
by the genitive 4 of breath ’). For one and the same thing
cannot, by means of a genitive, be predicated of—and thus
distinguished from—itself. Concerning the second passage
we remark that, if the matter constituting the general topic
of some chapter is referred to in that chapter under
a different name, we yet conclude, from the general topic,
that that special matter is meant. For instance, when we
meet in the section which treats of the ^yotish/oma sacrifice
with the passage, 4 in every spring he is to offer the ^yotis
sacrifice,’ we at once understand that the word ^yotis
denotes the ^yotish/oma. If we therefore meet with the
clause 4 to prazza mind is fastened ’ in a section of which
the highest Brahman is the topic, we do not for a moment
suppose that the word prazza should there denote the
ordinary breath which is a mere modification of air. The
two passages thus do not offer any matter for discussion,
and hence do not furnish appropriate instances for the
Sutra. We have shown, on the other hand, that the
passage about the prazza, which is the deity of the prastava,
allows room for doubt, purvapaksha and final decision.
24. The ‘ light ’ (is Brahman), on account of the
mention of feet (in a passage which is connected
with the passage about the light).
Scripture says {Kh. Up. Ill, 13, 7), 4 Now that light which
shines above this heaven, higher than all, higher than every-
1 The vmtMra, the commentators say.
88
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
thing, in the highest worlds beyond which there are no
other worlds, that is the same light which is within man.’
Here the doubt presents itself whether the word 4 light ’
denotes the light of the sun and the like, or the highest
Self. Under the preceding Sutras we had shown that some
words which ordinarily have different meanings yet in
certain passages denote Brahman, since characteristic marks
of the latter are mentioned. Here the question has to be
discussed whether, in connexion with the passage quoted,
characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned or not.
The purvapakshin maintains that the word 4 light ’ de¬
notes nothing else but the light of the sun and the like, since
that is the ordinary well-established meaning of the term.
The common use of language, he says, teaches us that the
two words 4 light ’ and 4 darkness ’ denote mutually opposite
things, darkness being the term for whatever interferes with
the function of the sense of sight, as, for instance, the gloom
of the night, while sunshine and whatever else favours the
action of the eye is called light. The word 4 shines ’ also,
which the text exhibits, is known ordinarily to refer to the
sun and similar sources of light; while of Brahman, which
is devoid of colour, it cannot be said, in the primary sense
of the word, that it 4 shines.’ Further, the word ^yotis
must here denote light because it is said to be bounded by
the sky ( 4 that light which shines above this heaven’).
For while it is impossible to consider the sky as being the
boundary of Brahman, which is the Self of all and the
source of all things movable or immovable, the sky may
be looked upon as forming the boundary of light, which is
a mere product and as such limited; accordingly the text
says, 4 the light beyond heaven.’—But light, although a
mere product, is perceived everywhere; it w^ould therefore
be wrong to declare that it is bounded by the sky!—Well,
then, the purvapakshin replies, let us assume that the light
meant is the first-born (original) light which has not yet
become tripartite 1 . This explanation again cannot be
1 I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth, according
to Kh. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was
I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 24.
89
admitted, because the non-tripartite light does not serve
any purpose.—But, the purvapakshin resumes, Why should
its purpose not be found therein that it is the object of
devout meditation ?—That cannot be, we reply ; for we see
that only such things are represented as objects of devotion
as have some other independent use of their own ; so, for
instance, the sun (which dispels darkness and so on). More¬
over the scriptural passage, ‘Let me make each of these
three (fire, water, and earth) tripartite/ does not indicate any
difference 1 . And even of the non-tripartite light it is not
known that the sky constitutes its boundary.—Well, then
(the purvapakshin resumes, dropping the idea of the non-
tripartite light), let us assume that the light of which the
text speaks is the tripartite (ordinary) light. The objection
that light is seen to exist also beneath the sky, viz. in the
form of fire and the like, we invalidate by the remark that
there is nothing contrary to reason in assigning a special
locality to fire, although the latter is observed everywhere;
while to assume a special place for Brahman, to which the
idea of place does not apply at all, would be most un¬
suitable. Moreover, the clause c higher than everything, in
the highest worlds beyond which there are no other worlds/
which indicates a multiplicity of abodes, agrees much better
with light, which is a mere product (than with Brahman).
There is moreover that other clause also, c That is the same
light which is within man/ in which the highest light is
identified with the gastric fire (the fire within man). Now
such identifications can be made only where there is a
certain similarity of nature ; as is seen, for instance, in the
passage, c Of that person Bhuk is the head, for the head is
one and that syllable is one 5 (B ri. Up. V, 5, 3). But that
the fire within the human body is not Brahman clearly
appears from the passage, ‘ Of this we have visible and
audible proof’ (Kk. Up. Ill, 13, 7; 8), which declares that
entirely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded
by the latter.
1 So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as non-tri¬
partite light exists at all.
90
VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
the fire is characterised by the noise it makes, and by heat;
and likewise from the following passage, { Let a man
meditate on this as that which is seen and heard.’ The
same conclusion may be drawn from the passage, { He who
knows this becomes conspicuous and celebrated,’ which
proclaims an inconsiderable reward only, while to the
devout meditation on Brahman a high reward would have
to be allotted. Nor is there mentioned in the entire
passage about the light any other characteristic mark of
Brahman, while such marks are set forth in the passages
(discussed above) which refer to pra^a and the ether. Nor,
again, is Brahman indicated in the preceding section, { the
Gayatri is everything whatsoever exists,’ &c. (Ill, 13); for
that passage makes a statement about the G&yatri metre
only. And even if that section did refer to Brahman, still
Brahman would not be recognised in the passage at present
under discussion; for there (in the section referred to) it is
declared—in the clause, 4 Three feet of it are the Immortal
in heaven ’—that heaven constitutes the abode ; while in
our passage the words { the light above heaven ’ declare
heaven to be a boundary. For all these reasons the word
^yotis is here to be taken in its ordinary meaning, viz.
light.
To this we make the following reply. The word ^yotis
must be held to denote Brahman. Why ? On account of
the feet (quarters) being mentioned. In a preceding
passage Brahman had been spoken of as having four feet
(quarters). 4 Such is the greatness of it; greater than it is
the Person (purusha). One foot of it are all the beings,
three feet of it are the Immortal in heaven.’ That which in
this passage is said to constitute the three-quarter part,
immortal and connected with heaven, of Brahman, which
altogether comprises four quarters; this very same entity
we recognise as again referred to in the passage under
discussion, because there also it is said to be connected
with heaven. If therefore we should set it aside in our
interpretation of the passage and assume the latter to refer
to the ordinary light, we should commit the mistake of
dropping, without need, the topic started and introducing
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 24.
91
a new subject. Brahman, in fact, continues to form the
subject-matter, not only of the passage about the light, but
likewise of the subsequent section, the so-called S&ndilya.-
vidya ( Kh . Up. Ill, 14). Hence we conclude that in our
passage the word £ light ’ must be held to denote Brahman.
The objection (raised above) that from common use the
words £ light 5 and 4 to shine ’ are known to denote effected
(physical) light is without force ; for as it is known from
the general topic of the chapter that Brahman is meant,
those two words do not necessarily denote physical light
only to the exclusion of Brahman 1 , but may also denote
Brahman itself, in so far as it is characterised by the
physical shining light which is its effect. Analogously
another mantra declares, £ that by which the sun shines
kindled with heat’ (Taitt. Br. Ill, 12, 9, 7). Or else we
may suppose that the word ^yotis here does not denote at
all that light on which the function of the eye depends.
For we see that in other passages it has altogether different
meanings ; so, for instance, B ri. Up. IV, 3, 5, £ With speech
only as light man sits,’ and Taitt. Sa. I, 6, 3, 3, £ May the
mind, the light, accept,’ &c. It thus appears that whatever
illuminates (in the different senses of the word) something
else may be spoken of as 4 light.’ Hence to Brahman also,
whose nature is intelligence, the term 4 light ’ may be
applied ; for it gives light to the entire world. Similarly,
other scriptural passages say, £ Him the shining one, every¬
thing shines after ; by his light all this is lighted 5 (Kau. Up.
II, 5, 15); and £ Him the gods worship as the light of
lights, as the immortal’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 16). Against the
further objection that the omnipresent Brahman cannot be
viewed as bounded by heaven we remark that the assign¬
ment, to Brahman, of a special locality is not contrary to
reason because it subserves the purpose of devout medita¬
tion. Nor does it avail anything to say that it is impossible
to assign any place to Brahman because Brahman is out of
connexion with all place. For it is possible to make such
1 Brahma^o vyava^idya te^*a^samarpakatvaw vkeshakatvam,
tadabhavoxvheshakatvam. An. Gi.
92
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
an assumption, because Brahman is connected with certain
limiting adjuncts. Accordingly Scripture speaks of different
kinds of devout meditation on Brahman as specially con¬
nected with certain localities, such as the sun, the eye, the
heart. For the same reason it is also possible to attribute
to Brahman a multiplicity of abodes, as is done in the
clause (quoted above) 4 higher than all.’ The further ob¬
jection that the light beyond heaven is the mere physical
light because it is identified with the gastric fire, which
itself is a mere effect and is inferred from perceptible marks
such as the heat of the body and a certain sound, is equally
devoid of force ; for the gastric fire may be viewed as the
outward appearance (or symbol) of Brahman, just as Brah¬
man's name is a mere outward symbol. Similarly in the
passage, 4 Let a man meditate on it (the gastric light) as
seen and heard/ the visibility and audibility (here implicitly
ascribed to Brahman) must be considered as rendered
possible through the gastric fire being the outward appear¬
ance of Brahman. Nor is there any force in the objection
that Brahman cannot be meant because the text mentions
an inconsiderable reward only ; for there is no reason com¬
pelling us to have recourse to Brahman for the purpose
of such and such a reward only, and not for the purpose of
such and such another reward. Wherever the text represents
the highest Brahman—which is free from all connexion
with distinguishing attributes—as the universal Self, it is
understood that the result of that instruction is one only,
viz. final release. Wherever, on the other hand. Brahman
is taught to be connected with distinguishing attributes or
outward symbols, there, we see, all the various rewards
which this world can offer are spoken of; cp. for instance,
B ri. Up. IV, 4, 34, 4 This is he who eats all food, the giver
of wealth. He who knows this obtains wealth. 5 Although
in the passage itself which treats of the light no charac¬
teristic mark of Brahman is mentioned, yet, as the Sutra
intimates, the mark stated in a preceding passage (viz. the
mantra, 4 Such is the greatness of it/ &c.) has to be taken
in connexion with the passage about the light as well.
The question how the mere circumstance of Brahman being
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 25 .
93
mentioned in a not distant passage can have the power
of divorcing from its natural object and transferring to
another object the direct statement about light implied in
the word £ light/ may be answered without difficulty. The
passage under discussion runs 1 , * which above this heaven,
the light/ The relative pronoun with which this clause
begins intimates, according to its grammatical force 2 , the
same Brahman which was mentioned in the previous
passage, and which is here recognised (as being the same
which was mentioned before) through its connexion with
heaven; hence the word ^yotis also—which stands in
grammatical co-ordination to £ which ’—must have Brahman
for its object. From all this it follows that the word
‘light’ here denotes Brahman.
25. If it be objected that (Brahman is) not(denoted)
on account of the metre being denoted; (we reply)
not so, because thus (i. e. by means of the metre) the
direction of the mind (on Brahman) is declared; for
thus it is seen (in other passages also).
We now address ourselves to the refutation of the asser¬
tion (made in the purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that
in the previous passage also Brahman is not referred to,
because in the sentence, £ Gayatri is everything whatsoever
here exists,’ the metre called Gayatri is spoken of.—How
(we ask the purvapakshin) can it be maintained that, on
account of the metre being spoken of, Brahman is not
denoted, while yet the mantra £ such is the greatness of
it,’ &c., clearly sets forth Brahman with its four quarters?
—You are mistaken (the purvapakshin replies). The
sentence, £ Gayatri is everything/ starts the discussion of
Gayatri. The same Gayatri is thereupon described under
the various forms of all beings, earth, body, heart, speech,
breath; to which there refers also the verse, £ that Gayatri
1 If we strictly follow the order of words in the original.
2 Svasamarthyena sarvanamna^ sannihitaparamamtvava^ena.
94
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
has four feet and is sixfold.’ After that we meet with the
mantra, 4 Such is the greatness of it,’ &c. How then, we
ask, should this mantra, which evidently is quoted with
reference to the Gayatri (metre) as described in the preceding
clauses, all at once denote Brahman with its four quarters ?
Since therefore the metre Gayatri: is the subject-matter of
the entire chapter, the term 4 Brahman ’ which occurs in a
subsequent passage (‘the Brahman which has thus been
described’) must also denote the metre. This is analogous
to a previous passage (Kh . Up. Ill, n, 3, 4 He who thus
knows this Brahma-upanishad’), where the word Brahma-
upanishad is explained to mean Veda-upanishad. As
therefore the preceding passage refers (not to Brahman,
but) to the Gayatri metre, Brahman does not constitute the
topic of the entire section.
This argumentation, we reply, proves nothing against our
position. ‘ Because thus direction of the mind is declared,’
i. e. because the Brahmazza passage, ‘ Gayatri indeed is all
this,’ intimates that by means of the metre Gayatri the mind
is to be directed on Brahman which is connected with that
metre. Of the metre Gayatri, which is nothing but a certain
special combination of syllables, it could not possibly be said
that it is the Self of everything. We therefore have to
understand the passage as declaring that Brahman, which, as
the cause of the world, is connected with that product also
whose name is Gayatri, is ‘ all this ; ’ in accordance with that
other passage which directly says, 4 All this indeed is
Brahman’ ( Kh . Up. Ill, 14, 1). That the effect is in
reality not different from the cause, we shall prove later on,
under Sutra II, 1, 14. Devout meditation on Brahman under
the form of certain effects (of Brahman) is seen to be men¬
tioned in other passages also, so, for instance, Ait. Ar. Ill,
3, 3, 12, 4 For the Bahvrz‘/£as consider him in the great
hymn, the Adhvctryus in the sacrificial fire, the iT^andogas
in the Mahavrata ceremony.’ Although, therefore, the
previous passage speaks of the metre, Brahman is what is
meant, and the same Brahman is again referred to in the
passage about the light, whose purport it is to enjoin
another form of devout meditation.
I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 26. 95
Another commentator 1 is of opinion that the term
Gayatri (does not denote Brahman in so far as viewed under
the form of Gciyatri, but) directly denotes Brahman, on
account of the equality of number ; for just as the Gayatri
metre has four feet consisting of six syllables each, so
Brahman also has four feet, (i. e. quarters.) Similarly we
see that in other psssages also the names of metres are used
to denote other things which resemble those metres in
certain numerical relations; cp. for instance, Kh. Up. IV,
3, 8, where it is said at first, ‘Now these five and the
other five make ten and that is the Krzta,’ and after that
‘these are again the Vira^* which eats the food.’ If we
adopt this interpretation, Brahman only is spoken of, and
the metre is not referred to at all. In any case Brahman is
the subject with which the previous passage is concerned.
26. And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that
Brahman is the subject of the previous passage), be¬
cause (thus only) the declaration as to the beings,
&c. being the feet is possible.
That the previous passage has Brahman for its topic, we
must assume for that reason also that the text designates
the beings and so on as the feet of Gayatri. For the text
at first speaks of the beings, the earth, the body, and the
heart 2 * , and then goes on ‘ that Gayatri has four feet and is
sixfold/ For of the mere metre, without any reference to
Brahman, it would be impossible to say that the beings and
so on are its feet. Moreover, if Brahman were not meant,
there would be no room for the verse, ‘ Such is the great¬
ness, 5 &c. For that verse clearly describes Brahman in its
own nature; otherwise it would be impossible to represent
the Gayatri as the Self of everything as is done in the words,
‘ One foot of it are all the beings ; three feet of it are what
is immortal in heaven.’ The purusha-sukta also {Rik
1 The vrfttikara according to Go. An. in his /ika on the bh­a
to the next Sutra.
2 Concerning the difficulty involved in this interpretation, cp.
Deussen, p. 183, note.
9 6
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Samh. X, 90) exhibits the verse with sole reference to
Brahman. Smrzti likewise ascribes to Brahman a like
nature, ‘ I stand supporting all this world by a single portion
of myself 5 (Bha. Gita X, 42). Our interpretation moreover
enables us to take the passage, ‘that Brahman indeed
which,’ &c. (Ill, 12, 7), in its primary sense, (i. e. to under¬
stand the word Brahman to denote nothing but Brahman.)
And, moreover, the passage, ‘these are the five men of
Brahman 5 (III, 13, 6), is appropriate only if the former
passage about the Gayatri is taken as referring to Brahman
(for otherwise the ‘ Brahman ’ in ‘ men of Brahman ’ would
not be connected with the previous topic). Hence Brahman
is to be considered as the subject-matter of the previous
passage also. And the decision that the same Brahman is
referred to in the passage about the light where it is recog¬
nised (to be the same) from its connexion with heaven,
remains unshaken.
27. The objection that (the Brahman of the former
passage cannot be recognised in the latter) on account
of the difference of designation, is not valid because
in either (designation) there is nothing contrary (to
the recognition).
The objection that in the former passage (‘three feet of
it are what is immortal in heaven 5 ), heaven is designated
as the abode, while in the latter passage (‘ that light which
shines above this heaven 5 ), heaven is designated as the
boundary, and that, on account of this difference of desig¬
nation, the subject-matter of the former passage cannot be
recognised in the latter, must likewise be refuted. This we
do by remarking that in either designation nothing is
contrary to the recognition. Just as in ordinary language
a falcon, although in contact with the top of a tree, is not
only said to be on the tree but also above the tree, so
Brahman also, although being in heaven, is here referred to
as being beyond heaven as well.
Another (commentator) explains : just as in ordinary
language a falcon, although not in contact with the top of a
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 28.
97
tree, is not only said to be above the top of the tree but also
on the top of the tree, so Brahman also, which is in reality
beyond heaven, is (in the former of the two passages) said
to be in heaven. Therefore the Brahman spoken of in the
former passage can be recognised in the latter also, and it
remains therefore a settled conclusion that the word £ light ’
denotes Brahman.
28. Pra/za (breath) is Brahman, that being under¬
stood from a connected consideration (of the passages
referring to pra^a).
In the Kaushitaki-brdhma/za-upanishad there is recorded
a legend of Indra and Pratardana which begins with the
words, £ Pratardana, forsooth, the son of Divodasa came by
means of fighting and strength to the beloved abode of
Indra 5 (Kau. Up. Ill, 1). In this legend we read: £ He
said: I am pra/za, the intelligent Self (pra^viatman), medi¬
tate on me as Life, as Immortality 5 (III, 2). And later on
(III, 3), £ Pra/za alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold
of this body, makes it rise up. 5 Then, again (III, 8), £ Let
no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the
speaker. 5 And in the end (III, 8), £ That breath indeed is
the intelligent Self, bliss, imperishable, immortal. 5 —Here the
doubt presents itself whether the word pra/za denotes
merely breath, the modification of air, or the Self of some
divinity, or the individual soul, or the highest Brahman.—
But, it will be said at the outset, the Sutra I, 1, 21 already
has shown that the word pra/za refers to Brahman, and as
here also we meet with characteristic marks of Brahman, viz.
the words £ bliss, imperishable, immortal, 5 what reason is there
for again raising the same doubt ?—We reply : Because there
are observed here characteristic marks of different kinds.
For in the legend we meet not only with marks indicating
Brahman, but also with marks pointing to other beings.
Thus Indra’s words, £ Know me only 5 (III, 1), point to the
Self of a divinity; the words, £ Having laid hold of this
body it makes it rise up, 5 point to the breath; the words,
£ Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know
[34] H
98
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
the speaker/ point to the individual soul. There is thus
room for doubt.
If, now, the purvapakshin maintains that the term prazza
here denotes the well-known modification of air, i. e. breath,
we, on our side, assert that the word prazza must be under¬
stood to denote Brahman.—For what reason?—On account
of such being the consecutive meaning of the passages.
For if we examine the connexion of the entire section
which treats of the prazza, we observe that all the single
passages can be construed into a whole only if they are
viewed as referring to Brahman. At the beginning of the
legend Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra to choose
a boon, mentions the highest good of man, which he
selects for his boon, in the following words, ‘ Do you your¬
self choose that boon for me which you deem most beneficial
for a man.’ Now, as later on prazza is declared to be what
is most beneficial for man, what should prizza denote but
the highest Self? For apart from the cognition of that
Self a man cannot possibly attain what is most beneficial
for him, as many scriptural passages declare. Compare, for
instance, 6Ve. Up. Ill, 8, ‘A man who knows him passes
over death; there is no other path to go. 5 Again, the
further passage, ‘ He who knows me thus by no deed of his
is his life harmed, not by theft, not by bhrfizzahaty 4 5 (III, i),
has a meaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the object
of knowledge. For, that subsequently to the cognition of
Brahman all works and their effects entirely cease, is well
known from scriptural passages, such as the following, ‘ All
works perish when he has been beheld who is the higher
and the lower’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Moreover, prazza can
be identified with the intelligent Self only if it is Brahman.
For the air which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the
intelligent Self. Those characteristic marks, again, which
are mentioned in the concluding passage (viz. those inti¬
mated by the words ‘ bliss/ ‘ imperishable/ ‘ immortal ’) can,
if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled with any being
except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following
passages, ‘ He does not increase by a good action, nor de¬
crease by a bad action. For he makes him whom he wishes
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 29.
99
to lead up from these worlds do a good deed ; and the same
makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds
do a bad deed ; 5 and, ‘ He is the guardian of the world, he
is the king of the world, he is the Lord of the world 5 (Kau.
Up. Ill, 8). All this can be properly understood only if the
highest Brahman is acknowledged to be the subject-matter
of the whole chapter, not if the vital air is substituted in its
place. Hence the word prazza denotes Brahman.
29. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted)
on account of the speaker denoting himself; (we
reply that this objection is not valid) because there
is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the
interior Self.
An objection is raised against the assertion that prazza de¬
notes Brahman. The word prazza, it is said, does not denote
the highest Brahman, because the speaker designates him¬
self. The speaker, who is a certain powerful god called
Indra, at first says, in order to reveal himself to Pratardana,
‘ Know me only, 5 and later on, ‘ I am pr&zza, the intelligent
Self. 5 How, it is asked, can the pr&zza, which this latter
passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the
Self of the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from
Scripture, the attribute of being a speaker cannot be
ascribed; compare, for instance, Bri, Up. Ill, 8,8, Tt is without
speech, without mind. 5 Further on, also, the speaker, i. e.
Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number of attri¬
butes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in
no way belong to Brahman, ‘ I slew the three-headed son
of Tvash tri ; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to
the wolves, 5 and so on. Indra may be called prazza on
account of his strength. Scripture says, ‘ Strength indeed
is pr&zza, 5 and Indra is known as the god of strength ; and
of any deed of strength people say, ‘ It is Indra’s work. 5
The personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an
intelligent Self; for the gods, people say, possess unob¬
structed knowledge. It thus being a settled matter that
some passages convey information about the personal Self
H 2
IOO
VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
of some deity, the other passages also—as, for instance, the
one about what is most beneficial for man—must be inter¬
preted as well as they may with reference to the same deity.
Hence prazza does not denote Brahman.
This objection we refute by the remark that in that
chapter there are found a multitude of references to the in¬
terior Self. For the passage,‘ As long as prana dwells in this
body so long surely there is life/ declares that that prazza
only which is the intelligent interior Self—and not some
particular outward deity—has power to bestow and to take
back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of
the pranas as founded on the existence of the prazza, it
shows that that prazza is meant which has reference to the
Self and is the abode of the sense-organs \
Of the same tendency is the passage, ‘ Prazza, the intel¬
ligent Self, alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise
up; 5 and the passage (which occurs in the passus, ‘Let no
man try to find out what speech is/ &c.), ‘ For as in a car
the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the
spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects
(the senses) and the subjects on the prazza. And that
prazza indeed is the Self of pragna, blessed, imperishable,
immortal. 5 So also the following passage which, referring
to this interior Self, forming as it were the centre of the
peripherical interaction of the objects and senses, sums up
as follows, ‘ He is my Self, thus let it be known ; 5 a summing
up which is appropriate only if prazza is meant to denote
not some outward existence, but the interior Self. And
another scriptural passage declares ‘this Self is Brahman,
omniscient 25 (B ri. Up. II, 5, 19). We therefore arrive at
1 The text runs, ‘ astitve ka prazzanazzz niArreyasam/ and Go. An.
explains ‘ astitve prazzasthitau prazzanazzz indriyazzam sthitir ity
arthata^ jrutrm aha.’ He as well as An. Gi. quotes as the text of
the scriptural passage referred to ‘athato ni/breyasadanam ity adi.’
But if instead of ‘ astitve ka ’ we read ‘ asti tv eva/ we get the con¬
cluding clause of Kau. Up. Ill, 2, as given in Cowell’s edition.
2 Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the
Kau. Up. is Brahman.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 30.
IOI
the conclusion that, on account of the multitude of references
to the interior Self, the chapter contains information regard¬
ing Brahman, not regarding the Self of some deity.—How
then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring
to himself be explained ?
30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself,
viz. that he is one with Brahman) (is possible) through
intuition vouched for by Scripture, as in the case of
Vamadeva.
The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by
means of rzshi-like intuition 1 —the existence of which is
vouched for by Scripture—its own Self to be identical with
the supreme Self, instructs Pratardana (about the highest
Self) by means of the words £ Know me only. 5
By intuition of the same kind the rzshi Vamadeva reached
the knowledge expressed in the words, c I was Manu and
Surya ; 5 in accordance with the passage, ‘ Whatever deva was
awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that ’
(B ri. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the
purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that Indra after saying,
‘ Know me only, 5 glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying
of Tvash/rz’s son and other deeds of strength, we refute as
follows. The death of Tvash/rz’s son and similar deeds are
referred to, not to the end of glorifying Indra as the object
of knowledge—in which case the sense of the passage would
be, c Because I accomplished such and such deeds, therefore
know me 5 —but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the
highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred
to the slaying of Tvash tri$> son and the like, goes on in the
clause next following to exalt knowledge, ‘ And not one
hair of me is harmed there. He who knows me thus by no*
deed of his is his life harmed. 5 —(But how does this passage
convey praise of knowledge ?)—Because, we reply, its
meaning is as follows: ‘ Although I do such cruel deeds,
1 I. e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth, rendered
possible through the knowledge acquired In former existences.
102
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
yet not even a hair of mine is harmed because I am one
with Brahman; therefore the life of any other person also
who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of his/
And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is
nothing else but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent
passage, 4 I am prazza, the intelligent Self/ Therefore the
entire chapter refers to Brahman.
31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on
account of characteristic marks of the individual soul
and the chief vital air (being mentioned); we say no,
on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation
(which would result from your interpretation); on
account of (the meaning advocated by us) being ac¬
cepted (elsewhere); and on account of (characteristic
marks of Brahman) being connected (with the pas¬
sage under discussion).
Although we admit, the pfirvapakshin resumes, that the
chapter about the prazza does not furnish any instruction
regarding some outward deity, since it contains a multitude
of references to the interior Self; still we deny that it is
concerned with Brahman.—For what reason?—Because it
mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the
one hand, and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The
passage, 4 Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him
know the speaker/ mentions a characteristic mark of the
individual soul, and must therefore be held to point
out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which
rules and employs the different organs of action such as
speech and so on. On the other hand, we have the passage,
4 But prazza alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of
this body makes it rise up/ which points to the chief vital
air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it sustains
the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital
airs (Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital
airs, 4 Then prazza (the chief vital air) as the best said to
them: Be not deceived; I alone dividing myself fivefold
support this body and keep it/ Those, again, who in the
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 31.
103
passage quoted above read c this one (masc.), the bodymust
give the following explanation, Prazza having laid hold of
this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of
the sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual
soul as well as the chief vital air may justly be designated
as the intelligent Self; for the former is of the nature of
intelligence, and the latter (although non-intelligent in
itself) is the abode of other prazzas, viz. the sense organs,
which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover,
if the word prazza be taken to denote the individual
soul as well as the chief vital air, the prazza and the
intelligent Self may be spoken of in two ways, either as
being non-different on account of their mutual concomit¬
ance, or as being different on account of their (essentially
different) individual character; and in these two different
ways they are actually spoken of in the two following
passages, £ What is prazza that is pra^vm, what is pra .gnk that
is prazzaand, ‘ For together do these two live in the body
and together do they depart.’ If, on the other hand, prazza
denoted Brahman, what then could be different from what?
For these reasons prazza does not denote Brahman, but
either the individual soul or the chief vital air or both.
All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, ‘ on account
of the threefoldness of devout meditation.’ Your inter¬
pretation would involve the assumption of devout medi¬
tation of three different kinds, viz. on the individual soul,
on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is inap¬
propriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin
three kinds of devout meditation; and that all the passages
about the prazza really constitute one single sentence (one
syntactical whole) appears from the beginning and the
concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause
c Know me only/ followed by ‘ I am prazza, the intelligent
Self, meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;’ and in
the end we read, c And that prazza indeed is the intelligent
Self, blessed, imperishable, immortal/ The beginning and
the concluding part are thus seen to be similar, and we
1 Imaz# jariram instead of idazzz jariram.
104
VEDANTA-sft TRAS.
therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the
same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman
be so turned as to be applied to something else; for the
ten objects and the ten subjects (subjective powers) 1 cannot
rest on anything but Brahman. Moreover, pr&zza must
denote Brahman ‘on account of (that meaning) being
accepted/ i. e. because in the case of other passages where
characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word
prazza is taken in the sense of ‘ Brahman. 5 And another
reason for assuming the passage to refer to Brahman is
that here also, i. e. in the passage itself there is ‘ connexion'
with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance, the
reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion
that the passage, ‘ Having laid hold of this body it makes
it rise up/ contains a characteristic mark of the chief vital
air, is untrue; for as the function of the vital air also
ultimately rests on Brahman it can figuratively be ascribed
to the latter. So Scripture also declares, ‘ No mortal lives
by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes
down. We live by another in whom these two repose 5
(Ka. Up. II, 5, 5 )* Nor does the indication of the in¬
dividual soul which you allege to occur in the passage,
‘Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know
the speaker/ preclude the view of prazza denoting Brahman.
For, as the passages, ‘ I am Brahman/ ‘ That art thou, 5 and
others, prove, there is in reality no such thing as an individual
soul absolutely different from Brahman r but Brahman, in
so far as it differentiates itself through the mind (buddhi)
and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul,
agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded
to, (viz. ‘ let no man try to find out what speech is, let him
know the speaker, 5 ) which, by setting aside all the dif¬
ferences due to limiting conditions, aim at directing the
mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the
1 Yanka j'abdadaya^ ^anka prfthivyadaya^ ka dasa bhutamatra^
^anka buddhindriyam ^anka buddhaya iti dasa. pra^amatra^.
Yadva ^anendriyartha^ ipanka karmendriyartha^ ka pa^eti da^a
bhfitamatra^ dvividhanindriyam pra^zzamatra dajeti bhavak. An. Gi.
I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 31.
105
individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of
place. That the Self which is active in speaking and the
like is Brahman appears from another scriptural passage also,
viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, ‘ That which is not expressed by speech
and by which speech is expressed that alone know as
Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark
that the statement about the difference of prazza and
pra^7?a (contained in the passage, ‘ Together they dwell
in this body, together they depart 5 ) does not agree with
that interpretation according to which prazza is Brahman,
is without force ; for the mind and the vital air which are
the respective abodes of the two powers of cognition
and action, and constitute the limiting conditions of the
internal Self may be spoken of as different. The internal
Self, on the other hand, which is limited by those twb
adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two
may be identified, as is done in the passage ‘pr&zza is
pra gn&
The second part of the Sutra is explained in a different
manner also 1 , as follows: Characteristic marks of the
individual soul as well as of the chief vital air are not
out of place even in a chapter whose topic is Brahman.
How so ? ‘ On account of the threefoldness of devout
meditation.’ The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds
of devout meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman
is viewed under the aspect of pr&zza, under the aspect
of pra^rn, and in itself. The passages, ‘ Meditate (on me)
as life, as immortality. Life is prazza,’ and ‘ Having laid
hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man
worship it alone as uktha,’ refer to the prazza aspect.
The introductory passage, ‘Now we shall explain how all
things become one in that pra gn&l and the subsequent
passages, ‘ Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the
word is its object placed outside •/ and, ‘ Having by pra^vza
taken possession of speech he obtains by speech all words
&c., } refer to the pra^a aspect. The Brahman aspect
finally is referred to in the following passage, ‘ These ten
1 Viz. by the vrz'ttik&ra.
io6
VEDANTA-sflTRAS.
objects have reference to pra gnk, the ten subjects have
reference to objects. If there were no objects there
would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects
there would be no objects. For on either side alone no¬
thing could be achieved. But that is not many. For as
in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes
and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on
the subjects and the subjects on the pr&zza.’ Thus we
see that the one meditation on Brahman is here repre¬
sented as threefold, according as Brahman is viewed either
with reference to two limiting conditions or in itself. In
other passages also we find that devout meditation on
Brahman is made dependent on Brahman being qualified
by limiting adjuncts ; so, for instance ( Kh . Up. Ill, 14, 2),
£ He who consists of mind, whose body is prazza.’ The
hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three
aspects perfectly agrees with the prazza chapter 1 ; as, on the
one hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the
concluding clauses we infer that the subject-matter of
the whole chapter is one only, and as, on the other hand,
we meet with characteristic marks of prazza, pra^Yia, and
Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled con¬
clusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.
1 Ihapi tad yugyate explaining the ‘ iha tadyogat' of the Sutra.
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I.
107
SECOND PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
In the first pada Brahman has been shown to be the cause
of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire
world, comprising the ether and the other elements. More¬
over, of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world,
certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared, such as all-
pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of
all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that
some words which are generally used in a different sense
denote Brahman also, we have been able to determine that
some passages about whose sense doubts are entertained
refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present
themselves which because containing only obscure indica¬
tions of Brahman give rise to the doubt whether they refer to
the highest Self or to something else. We therefore begin the
second and third padas in order to settle those doubtful points.
i. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) be¬
cause there is taught what is known from everywhere.
Scripture says, ‘All this indeed is Brahman, beginning,
ending, and breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate
with calm mind. Now man is made of determination
(kratu); according to what his determination is in this world
so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him there¬
fore form this determination : he who consists of mind, whose
body is breath (the subtle body),’ &c. (. Kh . Up. Ill, 14).
Concerning this passage the doubt presents itself whether
what is pointed out as the object of meditation, by means
of attributes such as consisting of mind, &c., is the embodied
(individual) soul or the highest Brahman.
The embodied Self, the purvapakshin says.—Why?—
Because the embodied Self as the ruler of the organs of
action is well known to be connected with the mind and so
on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in
several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1,2),
io8
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
£ He is without breath, without mind, pure.’—But, it may be
objected, the passage, ‘ All this indeed is Brahman,’mentions
Brahman directly; how then can you suppose that the
embodied Self forms the object of meditation ?—This objec¬
tion does not apply, the purvapakshin rejoins, because the
passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman,
but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being:
because Brahman is all this, ta^al&n, let a man meditate
with a calm mind. That is to say: because all this
aggregate of effects is Brahman only, springing from it,
ending in it, and breathing in it; and because, as everything
constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion ;
therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since
the sentence aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot
at the same time enjoin meditation on Brahman 1 ; but
meditation is separately enjoined in the clause, £ Let him
form the determination, i. e. reflection. 5 And thereupon
the subsequent passage, £ He who consists of mind, whose
body is breath, 5 &c. states the object of the meditation in
words indicatory of the individual soul. For this reason we
maintain that the meditation spoken of has the individual
soul for its object. The other attributes also subsequently
stated in the text, £ He to whom all works, all desires belong, 5
&c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul.
The attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and
of being extremely minute which are mentioned in the pas¬
sage, £ He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of
rice, smaller than a corn of barley, 5 may be ascribed to the
individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad,
but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected that the
immediately following passage, £ greater than the earth,’ &c.,
cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness
and greatness which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be
ascribed to one and the same thing; and that, if one attribute
1 The clause £ he is to meditate with a calm mind 5 if taken as a
guzzavidhi, i. e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness
of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin
meditation; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence
(vakyabheda).
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2.
109
only is to be ascribed to the subject of the passage, smallness
is preferable because it is mentioned first; while the great¬
ness mentioned later on may be attributed to the soul in so
far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the
whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that
the declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage,
f That is Brahman 5 (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual
soul 1 , as it is clearly connected with the general topic.
Therefore the individual soul is the object of meditation
indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind and so on.
To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what
is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes
of consisting of mind and so on.—Why ?— £ On account of
there being taught here what is known from everywhere. 5
What is known from all Vedanta-passages to be the sense
of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what
is mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage,
(‘ all this indeed is Brahman,’) the same we must assume to
be taught here as distinguished by certain qualities, viz.
consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid the fault of
dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly
introducing a new topic.—But, it may be said, it has been
shown that Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage,
introduced merely for the purpose of intimating the injunc¬
tion of calmness of mind, not for the purpose of intimating
Brahman itself.—True, we reply ; but the fact nevertheless
remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. are
spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i. e. mentioned not
far off so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred
to), while the individual soul is neither proximate nor
intimated by any word directly pointing to it. The cases
of Brahman and the individual soul are therefore not equal.
2. And because the qualities desired to be ex¬
pressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the
passage refers to Brahman).
1 Give *pi dehadibrz>#hana£- ^yastvanyayad va brahmatety artha/2.
An. Gi,
I TO
VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no
wish in the strict sense can be expressed 1 , there being no
speaker, still such phrases as ‘desired to be expressed/ may
be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. (mental)
comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak
of something which is intimated by a word and is to be
received (by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as
c desired to be expressed ; 5 so in the Veda also whatever is
denoted as that which is to be received is ‘desired to be
expressed/ everything else ‘not desired to be expressed/
What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic sentence,
and what not, is inferred from the general purport of
the passage. Those qualities which are here desired to
be expressed, i. e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in
meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c.
are possible in the highest Brahman; for the quality of
having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self
which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsist¬
ence, and reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities
of having true desires and true purposes are attributed to
the highest Self in another passage, viz. the one beginning,
‘The Self which is free from sin * ( Kh . Up. VIII, 7, 1).
The clause, ‘ He whose Self is the ether/ means ‘ he whose
Self is like the ether;’ for Brahman may be said to be
like the ether on account of its omnipresence and other
qualities. This is also expressed by the clause, ‘ Greater
than the earth/ And the other explanation also, accord¬
ing to which the passage means ‘he whose Self is the
ether ’ is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the
whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the
ether. For the same reasons he is called ‘ he to whom all
works belong, and so on/ Thus the qualities here intimated
as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman.
We further maintain that the terms ‘ consisting of mind/ and
‘ having breath for its body/ which the pfirvapakshin asserts
1 The discussion is brought on by the term ‘ vivakshita ’ in the
Sutra whose meaning is ‘ expressed, aimed at/ but more literally
‘ desired to be expressed/
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. Ill
cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is
the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind
and the like, which belong to the individual soul, belong to
Brahman also. Accordingly vSruti and Smrz’ti say of
Brahman, ‘ Thou art woman, thou art man ; thou art youth,
thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy
staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere 5 ( 5 ve.
Up. IV, 3), and ‘ its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes
and head are everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands
encompassing all in the world 5 (Bha. Gita III, 13).
The passage (quoted above against our view), ‘ Without
breath, without mind, pure, 5 refers to the pure (unrelated)
Brahman. The terms ‘ consisting of mind ; having breath for
its body, 5 on the other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished
by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible
in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman only is
represented as the object of meditation.
3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not
possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted
by manomaya, &c.).
The preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities
mentioned are possible in Brahman; the present Sutra
states that they are not possible in the embodied Self.
Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained, the
qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the em¬
bodied individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in
the words, ‘ He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the
ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is
greater than the earth, 5 cannot easily be attributed to the
embodied Self. By the term ‘ embodied 5 (^arira) we have
to understand ‘ residing 5 in a body. If it be objected that
the Lord also resides in the body 1 , we reply, True, he
does reside in the body, but not in the body only; for jruti
declares him to be all-pervading; compare, ‘ He is greater
than the earth; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent
like the ether, eternal. 5 The individual soul, on the other
1 Because he is vyapin.
I 12
VEDANTA-sflTRAS.
hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of
fruition it does not exist.
4. And because there is a (separate) denotation
of the object of activity and of the agent.
The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot
belong to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there
is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of
the agent. In the passage, 4 When I shall have departed
from hence I shall obtain him’ ( Kh . Up. Ill, 14, 4), the
word 4 him 5 refers to that which is the topic of discussion,
viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing
the attributes of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an
activity, viz. as something to be obtained ; while the words,
4 1 shall obtain, 5 represent the meditating individual Self as
the agent, i. e. the obtainer. Now, wherever it can be
helped, we must not assume that one and the same being is
spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the
same time. The relation existing between a person medi¬
tating and the thing meditated upon requires, moreover,
different abodes.—And thus for the above reason, also, that
which is characterised by the attributes of consisting of
mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.
5. On account of the difference of words.
That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind,
and so on, cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also
that there is a difference of words.
That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of
kindred subject-matter (Sat. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), 4 Like a rice
grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a
canary seed, thus that golden person is in the Self. 5 There
one word, i. e. the locative 4 in the Self, 5 denotes the embodied
Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative 4 person, 5
denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of con¬
sisting of mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two
are different.
6. And on account of Smrzti.
Smrz’ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7 .
113
and the highest Self, viz. Bha. Gita XVIII, 6r, ‘The Lord,
O Ar^una, is seated in the heart of all beings, driving round
by his magical power all beings (as if they were) mounted
on a machine.’
But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied
Self different from the highest Self which is to be set aside
according to the preceding Sutras ? vSruti passages, as well
as Smrzti , expressly deny that there is any Self apart from
the highest Self; compare, for instance, Brz. Up. Ill, 7, 23,
‘There is no other seer but he; there is no other hearer
but he;’ and Bha. Giti XIII, 2, ‘And know me also, O
BMrata, to be the kshetra^a in all kshetras.’
True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.)
But the highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts,
viz. the body, the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is,
by the ignorant, spoken of as if it were embodied. Simi¬
larly the ether, although in reality unlimited, appears limited
owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and other vessels.
With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self) the
distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be
practically assumed, as long as we have not learned—
from the passage, ‘That art thou’—that the Self is one
only. As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that there
is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole
practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage,
final release, and the like.
7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer
to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the
abode (mentioned), and on account of the denotations
of that (i. e* of minuteness) ; we say, no ; because
(Brahman) has thus to be contemplated, and be¬
cause the case is analogous to that of ether.
On account of the limitation of its abode, which is men¬
tioned in the clause, ‘ He is my Self within the heart,’ and
on account of the declaration as to its minuteness contained
in the direct statement, ‘ He is smaller than a grain of rice,’
&c.; the embodied soul only, which is of the size of an awl’s
point, is spoken of in the passage under discussion, and not
[34] I
ii4
vedanta-s£jtras.
the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the purva-
paksha of Sutra I, and restated in the purvapaksha of the
present Sutra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain
that the objection raised does not invalidate our view of the
passage. It is true that a thing occupying a limited space
only cannot in any way be spoken of as omnipresent; but,
on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and therefore
in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to
occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called
the ruler of Ayodhy£ although he is at the same time the
ruler of the whole earth.—But from what point of view can
the omnipresent Lord be said to occupy a limited space and
to be minute ?—He may, we reply, be spoken of thus, ‘because
he is to be contemplated thus.’ The passage under discus¬
sion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within
the lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and
similar qualities—which apprehension of the Lord is ren¬
dered possible through a modification of the mind—just as
Hari is contemplated in the sacred stone called 5 alagr 4 m.
Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when
meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is,
moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether.
The ether, although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited
and minute, if considered in its connexion with the eye of a
needle; so Brahman also. But it is an understood matter
that the attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness
depend, in Brahman’s case, entirely on special forms of con¬
templation, and are not real. The latter consideration dis¬
poses also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode
in the heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each
body, it would follow that it is affected by all the imper¬
fections which attach to beings having different abodes, such
as parrots shut up in different cages, viz. want of unity,
being made up of parts, non-permanency, and so on.
8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of
Brahman and the individual soul being one) there
follows fruition (on the part of Brahman); we say,
no ; on account of the difference of nature (of the two).
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 8 . I 1 5
But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether,
and therefore connected with the hearts of all living beings,
and as it is of the nature of intelligence and therefore not dif¬
ferent from the individual soul, it follows that Brahman also
has the same fruition of pleasure, pain, and so on (as the indi¬
vidual soul). The same result follows from its unity. For
in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different from
the highest Self; as appears from the text, ‘ There is no
other knower but he’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 7 > 23), and similar pas¬
sages. Hence the highest Self is subject to the fruition
connected with transmigratory existence.
This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of
nature. From the circumstance that Brahman is connected
with the hearts of all living beings it does not follow that it
is, like the embodied Self, subject to fruition. For, between
the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is the dif¬
ference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and
demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while
the latter is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being
free from all evil and the like. On account of this difference
of the two, the fruition of the one does not extend to the
other. To assume merely on the ground of the mutual
proximity of the two, without considering their essentially
different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in
Brahman’s case also), would be no better than to suppose
that space is on fire (when something in space is on fire).
The same objection and refutation apply to the case of
those also who teach the existence of more than one omni¬
present Self. In reply to the assertion, that because
Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside
it, Brahman must be subject to fruition since the individual
soul is so, we ask the question: How have you, our wise
opponent, ascertained that there is no other Self? You will
reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as, ‘ That art
thou,’ ‘I am Brahman/ 'There is no other knower but he, 5
and so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about
scriptural matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and
that Scripture is not sometimes to be appealed to, and on
other occasions to be disregarded.
I 2
VEDANTA-SfjTRAS.
116
Scriptural texts, such as ‘that art thou,’ teach that
Brahman which is free from all evil is the Self of the
embodied soul, and thus dispel even the opinion that the em¬
bodied soul is subject to fruition ; how then should fruition
on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the
part of Brahman ? —Let, then, the unity of the individual
soul and Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of
Scripture.—In that case, we reply, the fruition on the part
of the individual soul has wrong knowledge for its cause,
and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched thereby, not
any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in con¬
sequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For
this reason the Sutrakara says 1 ‘no, on account of the
difference.’ In spite of their unity, fruition on the part of
the soul does not involve fruition on the part of Brahman;
because there is a difference. For there is a difference
between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition
being the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of
the Self) is revealed by perfect knowledge. Now, as the
substance revealed by perfect knowledge cannot be affected
by fruition which is nothing but the figment of false
knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of
fruition on Brahman’s part.
9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is
movable and what is immovable is mentioned (as
his food).
We read in the Ka/^avalli (I, 3, 25), ‘ Who then knows
where He is, He to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas
are but food, and death itself a condiment ? 5 This passage
intimates, by means of the words ‘ food ’ and ‘ condiment,’
that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the
eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self;
for no distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as
well as the individual soul and the highest Self is observed
to form, in that Upanished, the subjects of questions 2 .
1 Another interpretation of the later part of Sutra.
2 Cp. Ka/^a Up. I, 1, 13; 20; I, 2, 14.
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IO.
II 7
The purvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire
being known from Scripture as well (cp. B rL Up. I, 4, 6)
as from ordinary life to be the eater of food. Or else
the individual soul may be the eater, according to the
passage, ‘ One of them eats the sweet fruit’ (Mu. Up. Ill,
1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman
on account of the passage (which forms the continuation
of the one quoted from the Mu. Up.), ‘The other looks
on without eating.’
The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self ‘ because
there is mentioned what is movable and what is immov¬
able.’ For all things movable and immovable are here
to be taken as constituting the food, while death is the
condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be
the consumer of all these things in their totality; the
highest Self, however, when reabsorbing the entire aggre¬
gate of effects may be said to eat everything. If it is
objected that here no express mention is made of things
movable and things immovable, and that hence we have
no right to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a
reason, we reply that this objection is unfounded; firstly,
because the aggregate of all living beings is seen to be
meant from the circumstance of death being the condiment;
and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may
here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed
as instances only (of all beings). Concerning the objection
that the highest Self cannot be an eater on account of the
passage quoted (‘the other looks on without eating’), we
remark that that passage aims at denying the fruition (on
the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such
fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but
is not meant to negative the reabsorption of the world
of effects (into Brahman); for it is well established by all
the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause of the
creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. There¬
fore the eater can here be Brahman only.
10. And on account of the topic under discussion.
That the highest Self only can be the eater referred to
VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
118
is moreover evident from the passage (Ka. Up. I, 3 , 18),
(‘ The knowing Self is not born, it dies not ’), which shows
that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere
to the general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the
clause, ‘ Who then knows where he is,’ shows that the
cognition is connected with difficulties; which circumstance
again points to the highest Self.
ii. The ‘two entered into the cave' (are the in¬
dividual soul and the highest Self), for the two are
(intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the same nature),
as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the
same nature).
In the same Ka/^avalli we read (I, 3, 1), f There are the
two drinking the reward of their works in the world, (i.e.
the body,) entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest
summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and
light; likewise those householders who perform the Tri;zcl-
£iketa sacrifice.’
Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and
the individual soul are referred to, or the individual soul
and the highest Self. If the mind and the individual soul,
then the individual soul is here spoken of as different from
the aggregate of the organs of action, (i. e. the body,) among
which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement
on this point is to be expected, as a question concerning
it is asked in a preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, ‘There is
that doubt when a man is dead—some saying he is ;
others, he is not. This I should like to know taught by
thee; this is the third of my boons.’ If, on the other
hand, the passage refers to the individual soul and the
highest Self, then it intimates that the highest Self is
different from the individual soul; and this also requires
to be declared here, on account of the question contained
in the passage (I, 2, 14), ‘ That which thou seest as different
from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause,
from the past and the future, tell me that.’
The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus
I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, II.
119
been stated, a caviller starts the following objection : neither
of the stated views can be maintained.—Why ?—On account
of the characteristic mark implied in the circumstance that
the two are said to drink, i. e. to enjoy, the fruit of their
works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent
individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi.
And as the dual form ‘drinking’ (pibantau) shows that
both are drinking, the view of the two being the
buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the
same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being
the individual soul and the highest Self, cannot be main¬
tained; for drinking (i. e. the fruition of reward) cannot
be predicated of the highest Self, on account of the mantra
(Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), ‘The other looks on without eating.’
These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just
as we see that in phrases such as ‘ the men with the
umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men) are walking, 5 the attri¬
bute of being furnished with an umbrella which properly
speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed
to many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking
because one of them is really drinking. Or else we may
explain the passage by saying that, while the individual
soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink because
he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may
also assume that the two are the buddhi and the individual
soul, the instrument being figuratively spoken of as the
agent—a figure of speech exemplified by phrases such as
‘ the fuel cooks (the food). 5 And in a chapter whose topic
is the soul no two other beings can well be represented
as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt
whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul,
or the individual soul and the highest Self.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the former of
the two stated views is the right one, because the two
beings are qualified as ‘entered into the cave.’ Whether
we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in either
case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken
of as ‘ entered into the cave. 5 Nor would it be appropriate,
as long as another interpretation is possible, to assume
120
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
that a special place is here ascribed to the omnipresent
Brahman. Moreover, the words ‘in the world of their
good deeds 5 show that the two do not pass beyond the
sphere of the results of their good works. But the highest
Self is not in the sphere of the results of either good or
bad works ; according to the scriptural passage, ‘ It does
not grow larger by works nor does it grow smaller.’ Further,
the words ‘shade and light’ properly designate what is
intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are
opposed to each other like light and shade. Hence we con¬
clude that the buddhi and the individual soul are spoken of.
To this we make the following reply:—In the passage
under discussion the individual soul (vi^&ncltman) and the
highest Self are spoken of, because these two, being both
intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature. For we see that
in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned, beings
of the same class are understood to be meant; when, for
instance, the order is given, ‘ Look out for a second (i. e. a
fellow) for this bull,’ people look out for a second bull, not
for a horse or a man. So here also, where the mention of
the fruition of rewards enables us to determine that the
individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when a
second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood ;
for the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same
nature as the soul.—But has it not been said above that the
highest Self cannot be meant here, on account of the text
stating that it is placed in the cave ?—Well, we reply, .sruti as
well as smrzti speaks of the highest Self as placed in the
cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2,12), ‘ The Ancient
who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;’ Taitt.
Up. II, 1, ‘ He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the
highest ether; ’ and, ‘ Search for the Self entered into the
cave.’ That it is not contrary to reason to assign to the omni¬
present Brahman a special locality, for the purpose of clearer
perception, we have already demonstrated. The attribute of
existing in the world of its good works, which properly belongs
to one of the two only, viz. to the individual soul, may be
assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one of
whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12.
I 2 I
and shade also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of
belonging and not belonging to this transmigratory world
are opposed to each other, like light and shade ; the quality
of belonging to it being due to Nescience, and the quality of
not belonging to it being real. We therefore understand by
the two ‘ entered into the cave, 5 the individual soul and the
highest Self.—Another reason for this interpretation follows.
12. And on account of the distinctive qualities
(mentioned).
Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text
agree only with the individual Self and the highest Self.
For in a subsequent passage (I, 3, 3), ‘ Know the Self to be
the charioteer, the body to be the chariot,’ which contains the
simile of the chariot, the individual soul is represented as a
charioteer driving on through transmigratory existence and
final release, while the passage (9), ‘ He reaches the end of
his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/zu/ repre¬
sents the highest Self as the goal of the driver’s course.
And in a preceding passage also, (I, 2,12, ‘The wise, who by
means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who
is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is
hidden in the cave, wffio dwells in the abyss, as God, he
indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,’) the same two
beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought.
The highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And fur¬
ther, the clause, f Those who know Brahman call them,’ &c.,
which brings forward a special class of speakers, is in its
place only if the highest Self is accepted (as one of the two
beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the passage
under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest
Self.
The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. Ill,
1, 1), ‘Two birds, inseparable friends/ &c. There also the
Self is the general topic, and hence no two ordinary birds
can be meant; we therefore conclude from the characteristic
mark of eating, mentioned in the passage, c One of them eats
the sweet fruit,’ that the individual soul is meant, and from
122
vedanta-s6tras.
the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and of in¬
telligence, implied in the words, 4 The other looks on without
eating,’ that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent
mantra again the two are distinguished as the seer and the
object of sight. 4 Merged into the same tree (as it were into
water) man grieves at his own impotence (anira), bewildered ;
but when he sees the other Lord (ua) contented and knows
his glory, then his grief passes away/
Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of
the mantra, 4 Two birds inseparable, 5 &c. To that mantra,
he says, the final decision of the present head of discussion
does not apply, because it is differently interpreted in the
Paingi-rahasya Brahma^a. According to the latter the being
which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other being which
looks on without eating, the individual soul (grid ); so that
the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetra^a).
The objection that the word sattva might denote the indi¬
vidual soul, and the word kshetra^a, the highest Self, is to
be met by the remark that, in the first place, the words
sattva and kshetra^a have the settled meaning of internal
organ and individual soul, and are, in the second place,
expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Paingi-rahasya,)
4 The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams;
the embodied one, the seer, is the kshetra^/m; the two are
therefore the internal organ and the individual soul. 5 Nor
does the mantra under discussion fall under the purvapaksha
propounded above. For it does not aim at setting forth
the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised
by the attributes connected with the transmigratory state,
such as acting and enjoying; but in so far rather as it
transcends all attributes connected with the sa^sdra and is
of the nature of Brahman, i. e. is pure intelligence; as is
evident from the clause, 4 The other looks on without eating. 5
That agrees, moreover, with iruti and smrzti passages, such
as, 4 That art thou, 5 and 4 Know me also to be the individual
soul ’ (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation
of the passage as the preceding one there is room for the
declaration made in the concluding passage of the section,
* These two are the sattva and the kshetra^vm; to him indeed
I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 1 3 .
123
who knows this no impurity attaches V—But how can, on
the above interpretation, the non-intelligent sattva (i. e. the
internal organ) be spoken of as an enjoyer, as is actually done
in the clause, ‘ One of them eats the sweet fruit ? ’—The whole
passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the fact
that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the
intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature
of Brahman. To that end 1 2 * * the passage under discussion
metaphorically ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to
the internal organ, in so far as it is modified by pleasure,
pain, and the like. For all acting and enjoying is at the
bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of
the respective nature of internal organ and soul; while in
reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or
enjoy ; not the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the
latter, because it is not capable of any modification. And
the internal organ can be considered as acting and enjoying,
all the less as it is a mere presentment of Nescience. In agree¬
ment with what we have here maintained, Scripture (‘ For
where there is as it were duality there one sees the other, 5
&c.; B ri. Up. IV, 5,15) declares that the practical assump¬
tion of agents, and so on—comparable to the assumption of
the existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream—
holds good in the sphere of Nescience only ; while the pas¬
sage, ‘ But when the Self only is all this, how should he see
another ? ’ declares that all that practically postulated exist¬
ence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative
knowledge.
13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on
account of the agreement (of the attributes of that
person with the nature of Brahman).
1 Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge
that the individual soul is in reality Brahman, The commentators
explain ra^as by avidyd.
2 Tadartham iti, ^ivasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yavat, ^aitany-
aMayapanna dhiA sukhadina pari/zamata iti, tatra purusho*pi bhak-
trz'tvam ivanubhavati na tattvata iti vaktum adhyaropayati, Ananda
Giri.
124
vedanta-sOtras.
Scripture says, £ He spoke : The person that is seen in the
eye that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this
is Brahman. Even though they drop melted butter or water
on it (the eye) it runs away on both sides/ &c. ( Kh . Up.
IV, 15, i).
The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the
reflected Self which resides in the eye, or to the individual
Self, or to the Self of some deity which presides over the
sense of sight, or to the Lord.
With reference to this doubt the purvapakshin argues as
follows: What is meant (by the person in the eye) is the
reflected Self, i. e. the image of a person (reflected in the eye
of another); for of that it is well known that it is seen, and
the clause, £ The person that is seen in the eye/ refers to it
as something well known. Or else we may appropriately
take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For
the individual Self (cognitional Self, vig'iianatman) which
perceives the colours by means of the eye is, on that account,
in proximity to the eye; and, moreover, the word £ Self’
(which occurs in the passage) favours this interpretation.
Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to the soul
animating the sun which assists the sense of sight; compare
the passage (Bri. Up. V, 5, 2), £ He (the person in the sun)
rests with his rays in him (the person in the right eye). 5 More¬
over, qualities such as immortality and the like (which are
ascribed to the subject of the scriptural passage) may some¬
how belong to individual deities. The Lord, on the other
hand 1 , cannot be meant, because a particular locality is
spoken of.
Against this we remark that the highest Lord only
can be meant here by the person within the eye.—Why ?—
4 On account of the agreement. 5 For the qualities men¬
tioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest
Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place,
belongs to the highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative
or non-derived) sense, as we know from such texts as £ That
1 Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here, because
immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow only,
but in their true sense.
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA 1 4 .
125
is the Self,’ c That art thou.’ Immortality and fearlessness
again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The location
in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the
highest Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scrip¬
ture declares to be free from all evil is not stained by any
imperfections, so the station of the eye also is declared
to be free from all stain, as we see from the passage, c Even
though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs away
on both sides.’ The statement, moreover, that he possesses
the qualities of sa/^yadvama, &c. can be reconciled with
the highest Lord only ( Kh . Up. IV. 15, 2, ‘They call him
Sa^yadvama, for all blessings (v&ma) go towards him
(sawyanti). He is also vamant, for he leads (nayati) all
blessings (vcima). He is also Bhamanl, for he shines (bhati)
in all worlds ’). Therefore, on account of agreement, the
person within the eye is the highest Lord.
14. And on account of the statement of place, and
so on.
But how does the confined locality of the eye agree
with Brahman which is omnipresent like the ether?—To
this question we reply that there would indeed be a want
of agreement if that one locality only were assigned to
the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so
on, are attributed to him in the passage, ‘ He who dwells
in the earth,’ &c. (B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 3). And among those
the eye also is mentioned, viz. in the clause, ‘ He who dwells
in the eye,’ &c. The phrase 4 and so on,’ which forms part
of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is assigned
to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that
also such things as name and form, although not appro¬
priate to Brahman which is devoid of name and form, are
yet seen to be attributed to it. That, in such passages as
c His name is ut, he with the golden beard ’ ( Kh . Up. I,
6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken
of, for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities
depending on name and form, we have already shown. And
we have, moreover, shown that to attribute to Brahman
126
vedanta-s£jtras.
a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence, subserves
the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not con¬
trary to reason 1 ; no more than to contemplate Vishnu in
the sacred ^alagram.
15. And on account of the passage referring to
that which is distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brah¬
man).
There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether
Brahman be meant in the passage under discussion or not,
because the fact of Brahman being meant is established
‘ by the reference to that which is distinguished by pleasure/
For the same Brahman which is spoken of as characterised
by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter 2 , viz. in the
clauses, ‘ Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brah¬
man/ that same Brahman we must suppose to be referred
to in the present passage also, it being proper to adhere
to the subject-matter under discussion; the clause. e The
teacher will tell you the way 3 / merely announcing that
the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a
new subject will be started].—How then, it may be asked,
is it known that Brahman, as distinguished by pleasure, is
spoken of in the beginning of the passage?—We reply:
On hearing the speech of the fires, viz.‘ Breath is Brahman,
Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman/ Upako^ala says, ‘I under¬
stand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand
that Ka or Kha is Brahman/ Thereupon the fires reply,
‘What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is Ka/ Now the word
Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether.
If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not
applied to qualify the sense of ‘ Kha/ we should conclude
1 The /ikas say that the contents of this last sentence are hinted
at by the word ‘ and ’ in the Sutra.
2 I. e. at the beginning of the instruction which the sacred fires
give to Upako^ala, Kh . Up. IV, 10 ff.
3 Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires, and
introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the passage
‘ the person that is seen in the eye/ &c. forms a part.
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 5 .
127
that the name Brahman is here symbolically 1 given to the
mere elemental ether as it is (in other places) given to
mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to the
word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect
pleasure springing from the contact of the sense-organs
with their objects. If the word Kha were not applied to
qualify the sense of Ka we should conclude that ordinary
pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two words
Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each
other, they intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure,
If 2 * in the passage referred to (viz. ‘ Breath is Brahman,
Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman’) the second Brahman
(i. e. the word Brahman in the clause ‘ Ka is Brahman ’)
were not added, and if the sentence would run ‘ Ka, Kha
is Brahman/ the word Ka would be employed as a mere
qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being a mere quality
would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To
prevent this, both words—Ka as well as Kha—are joined
with the word Brahman (‘ Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brah¬
man’). For the passage wishes to intimate that pleasure
also, although a quality, should be meditated upon as some¬
thing in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at
the beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised
by pleasure, is spoken of. After that the Garhapatya and
the other sacred fires proclaim in turns their own glory,
and finally conclude with the words,‘ This is our knowledge,
O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;’ wherein they point
back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words,‘ The
teacher will tell you the way ’ (which form the last clause
of the concluding passage), merely promise an explanation
of the way, and thus preclude the idea of another topic being
started. The teacher thereupon saying, ‘ As water does
not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who
knows it 5 (which words intervene between the concluding
1 A^rayantarapratyayasyasrayantare kshepa^ pratika^, yatha
brahma^abda^ paramatmavishayo namadishu kshipyate. Bha.
2 The following sentences give the reason why, although there is
only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.
128
vedanta-s6tras.
speech of the fires and the information given by the teacher
about the person within the eye) declares that no evil
attacks him who knows the person within the eye, and
thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus appears
that the teacher’s intention is to speak about that Brahman
which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires;
to represent it at first as located in the eye and possessing
the qualities of Sa^eyadvama and the like, and to point out
afterwards that he who thus knows passes on to light and
so on. He therefore begins by saying, ‘ That person that
is seen in the eye that is the Self.’
16. And on account of the statement of the way
of him who has heard the Upanishads.
The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for
the following reason also. From ^ruti as well as smrzti
we are acquainted with the way of him who has heard
the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i. e. who knows
Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is
described (Pra. Up. I, io), ‘ Those who have sought the
Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain
by the northern path the sun. This is the home of the
spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest. From
thence they do not returnand also (Bha. Gita VIII, 34),
4 Fire, light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the
northern progress of the sun, on that way those who know
Brahman go, when they have died, to Brahman.’ Now that
very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for him
who knows the person within the eye. For we read (Kk.
Up. IV, 15, 5), ‘Now whether people perform obsequies
for him or no he goes to light;’ and later on, ‘From the
sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon to lightning.
There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.
This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brah¬
man. Those who proceed on that path do not return to
the life of man.’ From this description of the way which
is known to be the way of him who knows Brahman we
ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7.
129
17. (The person within the eye is the highest),
not any other Self; on account of the non-perma¬
nency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the im¬
possibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye
being ascribed to the other Selfs).
To the assertion made in the purvapaksha that the
person in the eye is either the reflected Self or the cog-
nitional Self (the individual soul) or the Self of some deity
the following answer is given.—No other Self such as, for
instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on account
of non-permanency.—The reflected Self, in the first place,
does not permanently abide in the eye. For when some
person approaches the eye the reflection of that person
is seen in the eye, but when the person moves away
the reflection is seen no longer. The passage ‘That
person within the eye ’ must, moreover, be held, on the
ground of proximity, to intimate that the person seen in
a man’s own eye is the object of (that man’s) devout medi¬
tation (and not the reflected image of his own person which
he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then, another
tnan approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate
on the image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other
man only. No, we reply, for] we have no right to make
the (complicated) assumption that the devout man is, at
the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye another
man in order to produce a reflected image in his own
eye. Scripture, moreover, (viz. Kh. Up. VIII, 9, 1, ‘ It (the
reflected Self) perishes as soon as the body perishes,’)
declares the non-permanency of the reflected Self.—And,
further, ‘ on account of impossibility ’ (the person in the
eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and
the other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are
not to be perceived in the reflected Self.—Of the cogni-
tional Self, in the second place, which is in general con¬
nexion with the whole body and all the senses, it can
likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in
the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although
all-pervading may, for the purpose of contemplation, be
[34] K
130
VED ANT A-SU TR AS.
spoken of as connected with particular places such as the
heart and the like, we have seen already. The cognitional
Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility of
having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to
it. Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different
from the highest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed
to it (adhy&ropita) the effects of nescience, desire and
works, viz. mortality and fear; so that neither immortality
nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities of being the
sa^yadvama, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the
cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power
(abvarya).—In the third place, although the Self of a deity
(viz. the sun) has its station in the eye—according to the
scriptural passage, 4 He rests with his rays in him ’—still
Selfhood cannot be ascribed to the sun, on account of
his externality (paragrupatva). Immortality, &c. also cannot
be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks of his origin and
his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of the
gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And
their lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and
does not naturally belong to them ; as the mantra declares,
4 From terror of it (Brahman) the wind blows, from terror
the sun rises ; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death
runs as the fifth.’—Hence the person in the eye must be
viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this
explanation being adopted the mention (of the person in
the eye) as something well known and established, which
is contained in the words 4 is seen ’ (in the phrase ‘ the
person that is seen in the eye ’), has to be taken as referring
to (the mental perception founded on) the ^astra which
belongs to those who know ; and the glorification (of devout
meditation) has to be understood as its purpose.
18. The internal ruler over the devas and so on
(is Brahman), because the attributes of that (Brah¬
man) are designated.
In B ri. Up. Ill, 7, i ff. we read, 4 He who within rules
this world and the other world and all beings/ and later
on, 4 He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 18. 131
the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who
rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the
immortal,’ &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents)
speaks of a being, called the antaryamin (the internal ruler),
who, dwelling within, rules with reference to the gods,
the world, the Veda, the sacrifice, the beings, the Self.—
Here now, owing to the unusualness of the term (antar¬
yamin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self
of some deity which presides over the gods and so on,
or some Yogin who has acquired extraordinary powers,
such as, for instance, the capability of making his body
subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being. What
alternative then does recommend itself?
As the term is an unknown one, the purvapakshin says,
we must assume that the being denoted by it is also an
unknown one, different from all those mentioned above.—
Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we have no
right to assume something of an altogether indefinite
character, and that, on the other hand, the term antarya¬
min—which is derived from antaryamana (ruling within)—
cannot be called altogether unknown, that therefore antar¬
yamin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over
the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (Bri. Up. Ill, 9,
16), ‘He whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire,
whose mind is light, 5 &c. A god of that kind is capable of
ruling the earth, and so on, dwelling within them, because
he is endowed with the organs of action ; rulership is there¬
fore rightly ascribed to him.—Or else the rulership spoken
of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers
enable to enter within all things.—The highest Self, on the
other hand, cannot be meant, as it does not possess the organs
of action (which are required for ruling).
To this we make the following reply.—The internal ruler,
of whom Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must
be the highest Self, cannot be anything else.—Why so ?—
Because its qualities are designated in the passage under
discussion. The universal rulership implied in the statement
that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of created
beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate
K 2
132
vedanta-sGtras.
attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends
on (the omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created
things.—The qualities of Selfhood and immortality also,
which are mentioned in the passage, ‘ He is thy Self, the
ruler within, the immortal,’ belong in their primary sense to
the highest Self.—Further, the passage, 4 He whom the earth
does not know,’ which declares that the internal ruler is not
known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from
that deity ; for the deity of the earth knows itself to be the
earth.—The attributes ‘unseen,’ ‘unheard,’ also point to
the highest Self, which is devoid of shape and other sensible
qualities.—The objection that the highest Self is destitute
of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is
without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to
him owing to the organs of action of those whom he rules.—
If it should be objected that [if we once admit an internal
ruler in addition to the individual soul] we are driven to
assume again another and another ruler ad infinitum; we
reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no other
ruler (but the highest Self 1 ). The objection would be valid
only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing.
—For all these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the
highest Self.
19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the
Smrzti assumes, (viz. the pradhana,) on account of
the statement of qualities not belonging to it.
Good so far, a S&nkhya opponent resumes. The attributes,
however, of not being seen, &c., belong also to the pradhana
assumed by the S&nkhya-smrzti, which is acknowledged to
be devoid of form and other sensible qualities. For their
1 According to Scripture, Nirankuya/tf sarvaniyantritva;^ srautam
na ^a tadrhe sarvaniyantari bhedo na Mnumana^z mitibhaditam
uttish/$ati. Ananda Giri. Or else, as Go. An. remarks, we may ex¬
plain : as the highest Self is not really different from the individual
soul. So also Bhamati: Na Hnavastha, na hi niyantrantara;/* tena
niyamyate ki m tu yo £ivo niyanta lokasiddha^ sa paramatmevo-
padhyava^edakalpitabheda^.
i adhyAya, 2 PADA, 20.
133
Smr/ti says, 4 Undiscoverable, unknowable, as if wholly in
sleep 5 (Manu I, 5). To this pradhana also the attribute of
rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects. Therefore
the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana.
The pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the
Sutra 1 ,1, 5, but we bring it forward again, because we find
that attributes belonging to it, such as not being seen and
the like, are mentioned in Scripture.
To this argumentation the Sutrak&ra replies that the word
4 internal ruler’ cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities
not belonging to the latter are stated. For, although the
pradhana may be spoken of as not being seen, &c., it cannot
be spoken of as seeing, since the S&nkhyas admit it to be
non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage which forms the
complement to the passage about the internal ruler (B ri. Up.
Ill, 7, 23) says expressly, ' Unseen but seeing, unheard but
hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.’
—And Selfhood also cannot belong to the pradh&na.
Well, then, if the term 4 internal ruler 5 cannot be admitted
to denote the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self
nor seeing; let us suppose it to denote the embodied (indi¬
vidual) soul, which is intelligent, and therefore hears, sees,
perceives, knows; which is internal (pratya/?^), and there¬
fore of the nature of Self; and which is immortal, because
it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil actions.
It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not
being seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the
agent of an action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time
be the object of the action. This is declared in scriptural
passages also, as, for instance (B ri. Up. Ill, 4 ? 2 )> ‘Thou
couldst not see the seer of sight.’ The individual soul is,
moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the
organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal
ruler is the embodied soul.—To this reasoning the following
Sutra replies.
20, And the embodied soul (also cannot be under¬
stood by the internal ruler), for both also (i. e, both
*34
VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
recensions of the Brzhad Ara^yaka) speak of it as
different (from the internal ruler).
The word e not’ (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from
the preceding Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c.,
belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by
its adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of
dwelling completely within the earth and the other beings
mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of
both .Scikhcis, i. e. the Kazzvas as well as the Madhyandinas,
speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from
the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so
on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka/zvas read
(B ru Up. Ill, 7, 33), ‘He who dwells in knowledge;' the
Madhyandinas, ‘ He who dwells in the Self.’ If the latter
reading is adopted, the word ‘ Self 5 denotes the individual
soul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the
word £ knowledge ; 5 for the individual soul consists of
knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some
being different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is
denoted by the term ‘ internal ruler.’—But how, it may be
asked, is it possible that there should be within one body
two seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual
soul different from him?—Why—we ask in return—should
that be impossible?—Because, the opponent replies, it is
contrary to scriptural passages, such as, ‘ There is no other
seer but he , 5 &c., which deny that there is any seeing, hearing,
perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal ruler under dis¬
cussion.—May, we rejoin, that passage not have the purpose
of denying the existence of another ruler?—No, the opponent
replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and
therefore no occasion for denying his existence), and the
text does not contain any specification, (but merely denies
the existence of any other seer in general.)
We therefore advance the following final refutation of the
opponent’s objection.—The declaration of the difference of
the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in
the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, pre¬
sented by Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21.
135
Self within is one only; two internal Selfs are not possible.
But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically
treated as if it were two; just as we make a distinction
between the ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence
there is room for those scriptural passages which set forth
the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for per¬
ception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive
knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of
Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In
accordance with this, the scriptural passage, ‘ Where there
is duality, as it were, there one sees another, 5 declares that
the whole practical world exists only in the sphere of
Nescience; while the subsequent passage, ‘ But when the
Self only is all this, how should he see another? 5 declares
that the practical world vanishes in the sphere of true
knowledge.
21. That which possesses the attributes of invisi¬
bility and so on (is Brahman), on account of the
declaration of attributes.
Scripture says, ‘The higher knowledge is this by which
the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot
be seen nor seized, which is without origin and qualities,
without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal,
all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is im¬
perishable, that it is which the wise regard as the source
of all beings 5 (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5; 6).—Here the doubt arises
whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as
characterised by invisibility, &c. be the pradhana, or the
embodied soul, or the highest Lord.
We must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the
source of all beings the non-intelligent pradhana because
(in the passage immediately subsequent to the one quoted)
only non-intelligent beings are mentioned as parallel in¬
stances. ‘As the spider sends forth and draws in its
thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living
man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus
everything arises here from the Indestructible. 5 —But, it
136
vedanta-sOtras.
may be objected, men and spiders which are here quoted
as parallel instances are of intelligent nature.—No, the
purvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is
not the source of the threads and the hair, but everybody
knows that the non-intelligent body of the spider ruled
by intelligence is the source of the threads ; and so in the
case of man also.—While, moreover, in the case of the
preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be
accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such
as invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being
the seer and the like did not; we have here to do only
with attributes such as invisibility which agree with the
pradh&na, no attribute of a contrary nature being men¬
tioned.—But the qualities mentioned in the complementary
passage (Mu. Up. I, 1,9), ‘He who knows all and perceives
all, 5 do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhana; how,
then, can the source of all beings be interpreted to mean the
pradhana ?—To this the purvapakshin replies : The passage,
‘ The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible
is apprehended, that which cannot be seen/ &c., points, by
means of the term ‘ the Indestructible/ to the source of all
beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes.
This same ‘ Indestructible 5 is again mentioned later on in
the passage, c It is higher than the high Imperishable/
Now that which in this latter passage is spoken of as
higher than the Imperishable may possess the qualities
of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradMna
denoted by the term ‘the Imperishable 5 is the source of
all beings.—If, however, the word ‘ source 5 (yoni) be taken
in the sense of operative cause, we may by ‘ the source
of the beings 5 understand the embodied Self also, which,
by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin
of the complex of things.
To this we make the following reply.—That which here
is spoken of as the source of all beings, distinguished by
such qualities as invisibility and so on, can be the highest
Lord only, nothing else.—Whereupon is this conclusion
founded ?—On the statement of attributes. For the clause,
r He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving/ clearly states an
I ADHYAYA, 2 pad A, 21. 137
attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since the
attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be
predicated either of the non-intelligent pradhana or the
embodied soul whose power of sight is narrowed by its
limiting conditions. To the objection that the qualities
of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under
discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the
source of all beings—which latter is denoted by the term
‘the Imperishable 5 —not to the source itself, we reply that
this explanation is inadmissible because the source of all
beings, which—in the clause, ‘ From the Indestructible every¬
thing here arises ’—is designated as the material cause of
all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing,
and again as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the
passage (I, i, 9), ‘From him who knows all and perceives
all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is
bom that Brahman, name, form, and food.’ As therefore
the Indestructible which forms the general topic of dis¬
cussion is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised
(as being referred to in the later passage also), we understand
that it is the same Indestructible to which the attributes
of knowing and perceiving all are ascribed.—We further
maintain that also the passage, ‘ Higher than the high
Imperishable, 5 does not refer to any being different from
the imperishable source of all beings which is the general
topic of discussion. We conclude this from the circum¬
stance that the passage, ‘He truly told that knowledge
of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable
true person,’ (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the
passage about that which is higher than the Imperishable,)
merely declares that the imperishable source of all beings,
distinguished by invisibility and the like—which formed
the subject of the preceding chapter—will be discussed.
The reason why that imperishable source is called higher
than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the next
Sutra.—Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined
there (in the Upanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of
the lower one it is said that it comprises the is’zg-veda and
so on, and then the text continues, ‘ The higher knowledge
vedanta-sOtras.
138
is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended/ Here
the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of the
higher knowledge. If we now were to assume that the
Indestructible distinguished by invisibility and like qualities
is something different from the highest Lord, the know¬
ledge referring to it would not be the higher one. For
the distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on
account of the diversity of their results, the former leading
to mere worldly exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss ; and
nobody would assume absolute bliss to result from the know¬
ledge of the pradhana.— Moreover, as on the view we are
controverting the highest Self would be assumed to be
something higher than the imperishable source of all
beings, three kinds of knowledge would have to be ac¬
knowledged, while the text expressly speaks of two kinds
only.—Further, the reference to the knowledge of every¬
thing being implied in the knowledge of one thing—which
is contained in the passage (I, 1, 3), ‘ Sir, what is that
through which if it is known everything else becomes
known?’—is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman
the Self of all, and not either to the pradhana which com¬
prises only what is non-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed
apart from the objects of enjoyment.—The text, moreover,
by introducing the knowledge of Brahman as the chief
subject—which it does in the passage (I, 1, 1), i He told the
knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledge,
to his eldest son Atharvan 5 —and by afterwards declaring
that out of the two kinds of knowledge, viz. the lower
one and the higher one, the higher one leads to the com¬
prehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge
of the Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the
other hand, the term ‘ knowledge of Brahman 5 would
become meaningless if that Imperishable which is to be
comprehended by means of it were not Brahman. The
lower knowledge of works which comprises the AYg-veda,
and so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the knowledge of
Brahman for the mere purpose of glorifying the latter;
as appears from the passages in which it (the lower know¬
ledge) is spoken of slightingly, such as (I, 3, 7), ‘ But frail
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 2.
139
indeed are those boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen in
which this lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who
praise this as the highest good are subject again and again
to old age and death.’ After these slighting remarks the
text declares that he who turns away from the lower
knowledge is prepared for the highest one (I, 2, 12),
‘ Let a Brahma^a after he has examined all these worlds
which are gained by works acquire freedom from all desires.
Nothing that is eternal (not made) can be gained by what
is not eternal (made). Let him in order to understand this
take fuel in his hand and approach a guru who is learned
and dwells entirely in Brahman.’—The remark that, because
the earth and other non-intelligent things are adduced as
parallel instances, that also which is compared to them,
viz. the source of all beings must be non-intelligent, is
without foundation, since it is not necessary that two
things of which one is compared to the other should be
of absolutely the same nature. The things, moreover, to
which the source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth
and the like, are material, while nobody would assume the
source of all beings to be material.—For all these reasons
the source of all beings, which possesses the attributes
of invisibility and so on, is the highest Lord.
22. The two others (i. e. the individual soul and
the pradhana) are not (the source of all beings) be¬
cause there are stated distinctive attributes and
difference.
The source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either
of the two others, viz. the pradh&na and the individual soul,
on account of the following reason also. In the first place,
the text distinguishes the source of all beings from the
embodied soul, as something of a different nature ; compare
the passage (II, 1, 2), ‘That heavenly person is without
body, he is both without and within, not produced, with¬
out breath and without mind, pure.’ The distinctive attri¬
butes mentioned here, such as being of a heavenly nature,
and so on, can in no way belong to the individual soul,
140
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
which erroneously considers itself to be limited by name
and form as presented by Nescience, and erroneously imputes
their attributes to itself. Therefore the passage manifestly
refers to the Person which is the subject of all the Upanishads.
—In the second place, the source of all beings which forms
the general topic is represented in the text as something
different from the pradhdna, viz. in the passage, ‘ Higher
than the high Imperishable. 5 Here the term ‘ Imperishable 5
means that undeveloped entity which represents the seminal
potentiality of names and forms, contains the fine parts
of the material elements, abides in the Lord, forms his
limiting adjunct, and being itself no effect is high in com¬
parison to all effects ; the whole phrase, ‘ Higher than the
high Imperishable,’ which expresses a difference then
clearly shows that the highest Self is meant here.—We do
not on that account assume an independent entity called
pradhana and say that the source of all beings is stated
separately therefrom; but if a pradhana is to be assumed
at all (in agreement with the common opinion) and if being
assumed it is assumed of such a nature as not to be opposed
to the statements of Scripture, viz. as the subtle cause of all
beings denoted by the terms ‘the Undeveloped’ and so on,
we have no objection to such an assumption, and declare
that, on account of the separate statement therefrom, i. e.
from that pradhdna, ‘ the source of all beings 5 must mean
the highest Lord.—A further argument in favour of the
same conclusion is supplied by the next Sutra.
23. And on account of its form being mentioned.
Subsequently to the passage, ‘ Higher than the high
Imperishable,’ we meet (in the passage, ‘ From him is born
breath,’ &c.) with a description of the creation of all things,
from breath down to earth, and then with a statement of
the form of this same source of beings as consisting of
all created beings, ‘ Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and
the moon, the quarters his ears, his speech the Vedas dis¬
closed, the wind his breath, his heart the universe; from
his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of
all things. 5 This statement of form can refer only to the
I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 23 . I 4 I
highest Lord, and not either to the embodied soul, which,
on account of its small power, cannot be the cause of all
effects, or to the pradhana, which cannot be the inner Self
of all beings. We therefore conclude that the source of all
beings is the highest Lord, not either of the other two.—
But wherefrom do you conclude that the quoted declara¬
tion of form refers to the source of all beings ?—From the
general topic, we reply. The word ‘he 5 (in the clause, ‘ He
is indeed the inner Self of all things ’) connects the passage
with the general topic. As the source of all beings consti¬
tutes the general topic, the whole passage, from ‘ From him
is born breath, 5 up to, ‘ He is the inner Self of all beings, 5
refers to that same source. Similarly, when in ordinary
conversation a certain teacher forms the general topic of the
talk, the phrase, ‘ Study under him; he knows the Veda and
the Ved&ngas thoroughly, 5 as a matter of course, refers to
that same teacher.—But how can a bodily form be ascribed
to the source of all beings which is characterised by invisi¬
bility and similar attributes?—The statement as to its nature,
we reply, is made for the purpose of showing that the source
of all beings is the Self of all beings, not of showing that it is
of a bodily nature. The case is analogous to such passages
as, ‘ I am food, I am food, I am the eater of food 5 (Taitt.
Up. Ill, 10, 6).—Others, however, are of opinion 1 that the
statement quoted does not refer to the source of all beings,
because that to which it refers is spoken of as something
produced. For, on the one hand, the immediately pre¬
ceding passage (‘ From him is born health, mind, and all
organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the
support of all 5 ) speaks of the aggregate of beings from air
down to earth as something produced, and, on the other
1 Vrzftikrzdvyakhyam dftshayati, Go. An.; ekadednazzz dushayati,
Ananda Giri; tad etat paramatenakshepasamadhanabhyazzz vya-
khyaya svamatena vya^ash/e, puna^ ,rabdo*pi pftrvasmad vbeshazzz
dyotayann asyesh/atazzz sft/$ayati, Bhamati.—The statement of the
two former commentators must be understood to mean—in agree¬
ment with the Bhamati—that Aarikara is now going to refute the
preceding explanation by the statement of his own view. Thus
Go. An. later on explains ‘ asmin pakshe 5 by ‘svapakshe . 5
142
vedanta-sOtras.
hand, a passage met with later on (‘From him comes Agni,
the sun being his fuel,’ up to ‘ All herbs and juices ’) ex¬
presses itself to the same purpose. How then should all at
once, in the midst of these two passages (which refer to the
creation), a statement be made about the nature of the source
of all beings ?—The attribute of being the Self of all beings
(which above was said to be mentioned in the passage about
the creation,‘ Fire is his head , 5 &c., is not mentioned there but)
is stated only later on in a passage subsequent to that which
refers to the creation, viz. ‘ The Person is all this, sacrifice,’
&c. (II, i, io).—Now, we see that miti as well as smrz’ti
speaks of the birth of Pra£*&pati, whose body is this three¬
fold world; compare A?zg-veda Samh. X, 131, 1, ‘ Hira^ya-
garbha arose in the beginning ; he was the one born Lord
of things existing. He established the earth and this sky ;
to what God shall we offer our oblation ? ’ where the expres¬
sion ‘ arose ’ means c he was born.’ And in snmti we read,
‘ He is the first embodied one, he is called the Person ; as
the primal creator of the beings Brahman was evolved in
the beginning.’ This Person which is (not the original
Brahman but) an effect (like other created beings) may be
called the internal Self of all beings (as it is called in II, 1, 4),
because in the form of the Self of breath it abides in the
Selfs of all beings.—On this latter explanation (according to
which the passage, ‘ Fire is his head,’ &c., does not describe
the nature of the highest Lord, and can therefore not be
referred to in the Sutra) the declaration as to the Lord
being the ‘nature 5 of all which is contained in the passage,
‘ The Person is all this, sacrifice,’ &c., must be taken as the
reason for establishing the highest Lord, (i. e. as the passage
which, according to the Sutra, proves that the source of all
beings is the highest Lord 1 .)
1 The question is to what passage the ‘ rupopanyasat ’ of the
Sfitra refers.—According to the opinion set forth first it refers to
Mu. Up. II, 1, 4 ff.—But, according to the second view, II, 1, 4 to
II, 1, 9, cannot refer to the source of all beings, i. e. the highest
Self, because that entire passage describes the creation, the inner
Self of which is not the highest Self but Pra^apati, i. e. the Hirawya-
garbha or Sfitratman of the later Vedanta, who is himself an
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 24 .
143
24. VaLvanara (is the highest Lord) on account of
the distinction qualifying the common terms (VaLva-
nara and Self).
(In Kh . Up. V, 11 ff.) a discussion begins with the words,
‘What is our Self, what is Brahman? 5 and is carried on in
the passage,‘You know at present that Vauvanara Self,
tell us that; 5 after that it is declared with reference to
Heaven, sun, air, ether, water, and earth, that they are con¬
nected with the qualities of having good light, &c., and, in
order to disparage devout meditation on them singly, that
they stand to the Vahvanara in the relation of being his head,
&c., merely; and then finally (V, 18) it is said, ‘But he who
meditates on the VaLvanara Self as measured by a span, as
abhivimana 1 , he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all
Selfs. Of that VaLvanara Self the head is Sute^as (having
good light), the eye VLvarupa (multiform), the breath Przthag-
vartman (moving in various courses), the trunk Bahula (full),
the bladder Rayi (wealth), the feet the earth, the chest the
altar, the hairs the grass on the altar, the heart the Garhapatya
fire, the mind the Anv&harya fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya
fire. 5 —Here the doubt arises whether by the term ‘VaLva-
nara 5 we have to understand the gastric fire, or the elemental
fire, or the divinity presiding over the latter, or the embodied
soul, or the highest Lord.—But what, it may be asked, gives
rise to this doubt ?—The circumstance, we reply, of ‘ VaLrva-
nara 5 being employed as a common term for the gastric fire,
the elemental fire, and the divinity of the latter, while ‘Self 5
is a term applying to the embodied soul as well as to the
highest Lord. Hence the doubt arises which meaning of
the term is to be accepted and which to be set aside.
Which, then, is the alternative to be embraced?—Vai-
.rvanara, the purvapakshin maintains, is the gastric fire,
because we meet, in some passages, with the term used in
8 effect/ and who is called the inner Self, because he is the breath
of life (pra/za) in everything.—Hence the Sutra must be connected
with another passage, and that passage is found in II, 1,10, where
it is said that the Person (i. e. the highest Self) is all this, &c.
1 About which term see later on.
144
VED ANI'A-sft TR A S.
that special sense; so, for instance (B ri. Up. V, 9), ‘Agni
VaLyvanara is the fire within man by which the food that is
eaten is cooked. 5 —Or else the term may denote fire in general,
as we see it used in that sense also; so, for instance ( Rig -
veda Sa/7zh. X, 88, 12), 8 For the whole world the gods have
made the Agni VaLvanara a sign of the days. 5 Or, in the
third place, the word may denote that divinity whose body
is. fire. For passages in which the term has that sense are
likewise met with; compare, for instance, Rtg-vt da Sa^h. I,
98,1, 8 May we be in the favour of Vauvanara; for he is the
king of the beings, giving pleasure, of ready grace; 5 this
and similar passages properly applying to a divinity
endowed with power and similar qualities. Perhaps it
will be urged against the preceding explanations, that,
as the word VaLvanara is used in co-ordination with the
term 8 Self, 5 and as the term 8 Self 5 alone is used in the intro¬
ductory passage (‘What is our Self, what is Brahman? 5 ),
Vauv&nara has to be understood in a modified sense, so as
to be in harmony with the term Self. Well, then, the
purvapakshin rejoins, let us suppose that Vauvanara is
the embodied Self which, as being an enjoyer, is in close
vicinity to the VaLyvandra fire, 1 (i. e. the fire within the
body,) and with which the qualification expressed by
the term, 8 Measured by a span, 5 well agrees, since it is
restricted by its limiting condition (viz. the body and so
on).—In any case it is evident that the term Vauvanara
does not denote the highest Lord.
To this we make the following reply.—The word VaLsvci-
nara denotes the highest Self, on account of the distinction
qualifying the two general terms.—Although the term 8 Self, 5
as well as the term 8 VaLyvanara/ has various meanings—
the latter term denoting three beings while the former
denotes two—yet we observe a distinction from which we
conclude that both terms can here denote the highest Lord
only; viz. in the passage, 8 Of that VaLyvanara Self the head
is Sute^as, 5 &c. For it is clear that that passage refers to
the highest Lord in so far as he is distinguished by having
heaven, and so on, for his head and limbs, and in so far as
1 Sartre laksha;zaya vahvanarajabdopapattim aha tasyeti. An. Gi.
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 25 .
*45
he has entered into a different state (viz. into the state of
being the Self of the threefold world); represents him, in
fact, for the purpose of meditation, as the internal Self of
everything. As such the absolute Self may be represented,
because it is the cause of everything; for as the cause
virtually contains all the states belonging to its effects, the
heavenly world, and so on, may be spoken of as the members
of the highest Self.—Moreover, the result which Scripture
declares to abide in all worlds—viz. in the passage, ‘ He eats
food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs’—is possible only
if we take the term VaLvanara to denote the highest Self.—
The same remark applies to the declaration that all the sins
are burned of him who has that knowledge, ‘ Thus all his
sins are burned,’ &c. ( Kh . Up. V, 24, 3). —Moreover, we
meet at the beginning of the chapter with the words ‘ Self’
and ‘Brahman;’ viz. in the passage, ‘What is our Self,
what is Brahman ? ’ Now these are marks of Brahman, and
indicate the highest Lord only. Hence he only can be
meant by the term Vauvanara.
25. (And) because that which is stated by Smmi
(i. e. the shape of the highest Lord as described by
Smrzti) is an inference (i. e. an indicatory mark from
which we infer the meaning of .Sruti).
The highest Lord only is Vahvanara, for that reason also
that Smrzti ascribes to the highest Lord only a shape con¬
sisting of the threefold world, the fire constituting his mouth,
the heavenly world his head, &c. So, for instance, in the
following passage, ‘ He whose mouth is fire, whose head
the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose feet the
earth, whose eye the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence
to him the Self of the world.’ The shape described here in
Smrzti allows us to infer a .Sruti passage on which the Smrzti
rests, and thus constitutes an inference, i.e. a sign indicatory
of the word ‘ Vabvanara ’ denoting the highest Lord. For,
although the quoted Smr/ti passage contains a glorification 1 ,
1 And as such might be said not to require a basis for its
statements.
[34]
146
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
still even a glorification in the form in which it there appears
is not possible, unless it has a Vedic passage to rest on.—
Other Smr/ti passages also may be quoted in connexion
with this Sutra, so, for instance, the following one, ‘He
whose head the wise declare to be the heavenly world, whose
navel the ether, whose eyes sun and moon, whose ears the
regions, and whose feet the earth, he is the inscrutable
leader of all beings.’
26. If it be maintained that (Vabvanara is) not (the
highest Lord) on account of the term (viz. VaLvd,-
nara, having a settled different meaning), &c., and
on account of his abiding within (which is a charac¬
teristic of the gastric fire); (we say) no, on account
of the perception (of the highest Lord), being taught
thus (viz. in the gastric fire), and on account of the
impossibility (of the heavenly world, &c. being the
head, &c. of the gastric fire), and because they (the
Va^asaneyins) read of him (viz. the VaLvanara) as
man (which term cannot apply to the gastric fire).
Here the following objection is raised.—VaLsvanara can¬
not be the highest Lord, on account of the term, &c., and
on account of the abiding within. The term, viz. the term
Vabvanara, cannot be applied to the highest Lord, because
the settled use of language assigns to it a different sense.
Thus, also, with regard to the term Agni (fire) in the pas¬
sage (.Sat. Bra. X, 6, 1, 11), ‘ He is the Agni VaLsvanara.’
The word ‘ &c/ (in the Sutra) hints at the fiction concerning
the three sacred fires, the garhapatya being represented as
the heart, and so on, of the VaLsv&nara Self ( Kh . Up. V,
18, % 1 ).—Moreover, the passage, ‘Therefore the first food
which a man may take is in the place of homa ’ [Kh. Up. V,
19, 1), contains a glorification of (VaLsvanara) being the abode
of the oblation to Pra^a 2 . For these reasons we have to under-
1 Na fa garhapatyadihrfdayadita brahmawa^ sambhavini. Bhfi-
matf.
2 Na >£a pra^ahutyadhikarawata * nyatra ^a/^aragner yu^yate.
Bhamatl.
i adhyAya, 2 pAda, 26.
147
stand by VaLvanara the gastric fire.—Moreover, Scripture
speaks of the VaLvdnara as abiding within, ‘ He knows him
abiding within man ; 5 which again applies to the gastric fire
only.—With reference to the averment that on account of the
specifications contained in the passage, ‘His head is Sute£*as,’
&c., VaLsvanara is to be explained as the highest Self, we
(the purvapakshin) ask: How do you reach the decision
that those specifications, although agreeing with both inter¬
pretations, must be assumed to refer to the highest Lord
only, and not to the gastric fire ?—Or else we may assume
that the passage speaks of the elemental fire which abides
within and without; for that that fire is also connected with
the heavenly world, and so on, we understand from the mantra,
‘ He who with his light has extended himself over earth
and heaven, the two halves of the world, and the atmo¬
sphere ’ (A?zg-veda Sa^h. X, 88, 3).—Or else the attribute of
having the heavenly world, and so on, for its members may,
on account of its power, be attributed to that divinity which
has the elemental fire for its body.—Therefore VaLvanara
is not the highest Lord.
To all this we reply as follows.—Your assertions are
unfounded, ‘ because there is taught the perception in this
manner.’ The reasons (adduced in the former part of the
Sutra), viz. the term, and so on, are not sufficient to make
us abandon the interpretation according to which Vaiivanara
is the highest Lord.—Why?—On account of perception being
taught in this manner, i. e. without the gastric fire being set
aside. For the passages quoted teach the perception of the
highest Lord i n the gastric fire, analogously to such pas¬
sages as ‘ Let a man meditate on the mind as Brahman ’
(Kh. Up. Ill, 18,1).—Or else they teach that the object of
perception is the highest Lord, in so far as he has the
gastric fire called VaLvanara for his limiting condition; ana¬
logously to such passages as ‘ He who consists of mind,
whose body is breath, whose form is light’ (Kh. Up. Ill,
14, % 1 ). If it were the aim of the passages about the Vau-
1 According to the former explanation the gastric fire is to be
looked on as the outward manifestation (pratika) of the highest
Lord ; according to the latter as his limiting condition.
148
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
vanara to make statements not concerning the highest Lord,
but merely concerning the gastric fire, there would be no
possibility of specifications such as contained in the passage
‘ His head is Sute^as/ &c. That also on the assumption of
Vabvanara being either the divinity of fire or the elemental
fire no room is to be found for the said specifications, we
shall show under the following Sutra.—Moreover, if the
mere gastric fire were meant, there would be room only
for a declaration that it abides within man, not that it is
man. But, as a matter of fact, the Va^asaneyins speak of
him—in their sacred text—as man, ‘ This Agni VaLvanara
is man; he who knows this Agni VaLvanara as man-like, as
abiding within man/ &c. ( 5 at. Bra. X, 6,1, 11). The highest
Lord, on the other hand, who is the Self of everything, may
be spoken of as well as man, as abiding within man.—Those
who, in the latter part of the Sutra, read ‘ man-like ’ (puru-
shavidham) instead of ‘ man 5 (purusham), wish to express
the following meaning: If VaLvanara were assumed to be
the gastric fire only, he might be spoken of as abiding within
man indeed, but not as man-like. But the Va^asaneyins do
speak of him as man-like, ‘ He who knows him as man-like,
as abiding within man. 5 —The meaning of the term man-like
is to be concluded from the context, whence it will be seen
that, with reference to nature, it means that the highest Lord
has the heaven for his head, &c., and is based on the earth;
and with reference to man, that he forms the head, &c., and
is based on the chin (of the devout worshipper*).
27. For the same reasons (the VaLvanara) cannot
be the divinity (of fire), or the element (of fire).
The averment that the fanciful attribution of members
contained in the passage ‘His head is Sute^as/ &c. may
apply to the elemental fire also which from the mantras
is seen to be connected with the heavenly world, &c., or else
to the divinity whose body is fire, on account of its power,
is refuted by the following remark: For the reasons
1 I. e. that he may be fancifully identified with the head and so
on of the devout worshipper.
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 28 .
149
already stated VaLvanara is neither the divinity nor the
element. For to the elemental fire which is mere heat
and light the heavenly world and so on cannot properly
be ascribed as head and so on, because an effect cannot
be the Self of another effect.—Again, the heavenly world
cannot be ascribed as head, &c. to the divinity of fire, in
spite of the power of the latter; for, on the one hand, it is
not a cause (but a mere effect), and on the other hand
its power depends on the highest Lord. Against all these
interpretations there lies moreover the objection founded
on the inapplicability of the term c Self.’
28. (Taimini (declares that there is) no contradic¬
tion even on the assumption of a direct (worship of
the highest Lord as VaLvanara).
Above (Sutra 26) it has been said that VaLvanara is
the highest Lord, to be meditated upon as having the
gastric fire either for his outward manifestation or for his
limiting condition; which interpretation was accepted in
deference to the circumstance that he is spoken of as
abiding within—and so on.—The teacher Gaimini however
is of opinion that it is not necessary to have recourse to
the assumption of an outward manifestation or limiting
condition, and that there is no objection to refer the
passage about VaLvdnara to the direct worship of the
highest Lord.—But, if you reject the interpretation based
on the gastric fire, you place yourself in opposition to the
statement that VaLvanara abides within, and to the reasons
founded on the term, &c. (Sti. 26)—To this we reply that
we in no way place ourselves in opposition to the statement
that VaLvanara abides within. For the passage, ‘ He knows
him as man-like, as abiding within man,’ does not by any
means refer to the gastric fire, the latter being neither
the general topic of discussion nor having been mentioned
byname before.—What then does it refer to?—It refers to
that which forms the subject of discussion, viz. that similarity
to man (of the highest Self) which is fancifully found in the
members of man from the upper part of the head down to
the chin; the text therefore says, ‘ He knows him as man-like,
150 vedAnta-s6 tr as.
as abiding within man/ just as we say of a branch that it
abides within the tree 1 .—Or else we may adopt another
interpretation and say that after the highest Self has been
represented as having the likeness to man as a limiting
condition, with regard to nature as well as to man, the
passage last quoted (‘ He knows him as abiding within
man ’) speaks of the same highest Self as the mere witness
(sakshin; i. e. as the pure Self, non-related to the limiting
conditions).—The consideration of the context having thus
shown that the highest Self has to be resorted to for the
interpretation of the passage, the term ‘ Vaijvanara ’ must
denote the highest Self in some way or other. The word
‘Vhvanara’ is to be explained either as ‘ he who is all
and man (i. e. the individual soul)/ or ‘ he to whom souls
belong ’ (in so far as he is their maker or ruler), and thus
denotes the highest Self which is the Self of all. And the
form ‘VaLvanara 5 has the same meaning as ‘ VLvdnara/ the
taddhita-suffix, by which the former word is derived from
the latter, not changing the meaning; just as in the case
of rakshasa (derived from rakshas), and vayasa (derived
from vayas).—The word ‘Agni’ also may denote the
highest Self if we adopt the etymology agni = agra/d, i. e.
he who leads in front.—As the Garhapatya-fire finally, and
as the abode of the oblation to breath the highest Self
may be represented because it is the Self of all.
But, if it is assumed that Vahvanara denotes the highest
Self, how can Scripture declare that he is measured by a
span ?—On the explanation of this difficulty we now enter.
29. On account of the manifestation, so A^mara-
thya opines.
The circumstance of the highest Lord who transcends
all measure being spoken of as measured by a span has
for its reason * manifestation.’ The highest Lord manifests
1 Whereby we mean not that it is inside the tree, but that it
forms a part of the tree.—The Vahvanara Self is identified with the
different members of the body, and these members abide within,
i. e. form parts of the body.
I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3 1 .
151
himself as measured by a span, i. e. he specially manifests
himself for the benefit of his worshippers in some special
places, such as the heart and the like, where he may be
perceived. Hence, according to the opinion of the teacher
Amiarathya, the scriptural passage which speaks of him
who is measured by a span may refer to the highest Lord.
30. On account of remembrance; so Badari opines.
Or else the highest Lord may be called ‘ measured by
a span ’ because he is remembered by means of the mind
which is seated in the heart which is measured by a span.
Similarly, barley-corns which are measured by means of
prasthas are themselves called prasthas. It must be ad¬
mitted that barley-grains themselves have a certain size
which is merely rendered manifest through their being
connected with a prastha measure; while the highest Lord
himself does not possess a size to be rendered manifest
by his connexion with the heart. Still the remembrance
(of the Lord by means of the mind) may be accepted as
offering a certain foundation for the vSruti passage concern¬
ing him who is measured by a span.—Or else 1 the Sutra
may be interpreted to mean that the Lord, although not
really measured by a span, is to be remembered (meditated
upon) as being of the measure of a span ; whereby the
passage is furnished with an appropriate sense.—Thus the
passage about him who is measured by a span may, ac¬
cording to the opinion of the teacher Badari, be referred
to the highest Lord, on account of remembrance.
31. On the ground of imaginative identification
(the highest Lord may be called pradesamatra),
Gaimini thinks; for thus (Scripture) declares.
Or else the passage about him who is measured by a
span may be considered to rest on imaginative combin¬
ation.—Why?—Because the passage of the Va^asaneyi-
1 Parima^asya hrfdayadvararopitasya smaryama^e katham aropo
vishayavishayitvena bhedad ity a^ankya vyakhyantavam aha pra-
de^eti. Ananda GirL
152
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
brahmazza which treats of the same topic identifies heaven,
earth, and so on-—which are the members of Vauvanara
viewed as the Self of the threefold world—with certain
parts of the human frame, viz. the parts comprised between
the upper part of the head and the chin, and thus declares
the imaginative identity of Vaiiv&nara with something
whose measure is a span. There we read, ‘The Gods
indeed reached him, knowing him as measured by a span
as it were. Now I will declare them (his members) to
you so as to identify him (the Vauvinara) with that whose
measure is a span; thus he said. Pointing to the upper
part of the head he said : This is what stands above (i. e.
the heavenly world) as Vauv4nara (i. e. the head of Vais-
vanara x ). Pointing to the eyes he said: This is he with
good light (i. e. the sun) as Vauvanara (i. e. the eye of
V.). Pointing to the nose he said : This is he who moves
on manifold paths (i. e. the air) as Vai^vanara (i. e. the
breath of V.). Pointing to the space (ether) within his
mouth he said: This is the full one (i. e. the ether) as
Vafcvanara. Pointing to the saliva within his mouth he
said: This is wealth as Vafovanara (i. e. the water in the
bladder of V.). Pointing to the chin he said: This is
the base as Vauvanara (i. e. the feet of V.).’—Although
in the Va^asaneyi-brahmazza the heaven is denoted as
that which has the attribute of standing above and the
sun as that which has the attribute of good light, while
in the ATMndogya the heaven is spoken of as having good
light and the sun as being multiform; still this difference
does not interfere (with the unity of the vidya) 2 , because
both texts equally use the term ‘ measured by a span,’ and
because all ,yakh4s intimate the same.—The above explana¬
tion of the term ‘ measured by a span/ which rests on
imaginative identification, the teacher (Gaimini considers the
most appropriate one.
32. Moreover they (the Cabalas) speak of him
1 Atra sarvatra vahvanara^abdas tadangapara^. Go. An.
2 Which unity entitles us to use the passage from the *Sat. Brd.
for the explanation of the passage from the Kh . Up.
I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 3 2.
153
(the highest Lord) in that (i.e. the interstice between
the top of the head and the chin which is measured
by a span).
Moreover the Cabalas speak in their text of the highest
Lord as being in the interstice between the top of the head
and the chin. 4 The unevolved infinite Self abides in the
avimukta (i.e. the non-released soul). Where does that
avimukta abide? It abides in the Varava and the Nasi, in
the middle. What is that Varava, what is that Nasi ? 5 The
text thereupon etymologises the term Vara/za as that which
wards off (varayati) all evil done by the senses, and the
term Nasi as that which destroys (nlrayati) all evil done
by the senses; and then continues, 4 And what is its place ?
—The place where the eyebrows and the nose join. That is
the joining place of the heavenly world (represented by the
upper part of the head) and of the other (i. e. the earthly
world represented by the chin). 5 (Cabala Up. I.)—Thus
it appears that the scriptural statement which ascribes
to the highest Lord the measure of a span is appropriate.
That the highest Lord is called abhivimana refers to his
being the inward Self of all. As such he is directly
measured, i. e. known by all animate beings. Or else
the word may be explained as 4 he who is near everywhere
—as the inward Self—and w T ho at the same time is measure¬
less 5 (as being infinite). Or else it may denote the highest
Lord as him who, as the cause of the world, measures it
out, i. e. creates it. By all this it is proved that VaLvanara
is the highest Lord.
i54
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
THIRD PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
i. The abode of heaven, earth, and so on (is
Brahman), on account of the term ‘ own/ i. e. Self.
We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5), ‘ He in whom the heaven, the
earth, and the sky are woven, the mind also with all the
vital airs, know him alone as the Self, and leave off other
words ! He is the bridge of the Immortal. 5 —Here the doubt
arises whether the abode which is intimated by the state¬
ment of the heaven and so on being woven in it is the
highest Brahman or something else.
The purvapakshin maintains that the abode is something
else, on account of the expression, ‘ It is the bridge of the
Immortal. 5 For, he says, it is known from every-day ex¬
perience that a bridge presupposes some further bank to
which it leads, while it is impossible to assume something
further beyond the highest Brahman, which in Scripture is
called ‘endless, without a further shore 5 (B ri. Up. II, 4, 12).
Now if the abode is supposed to be something different
from Brahman, it must be supposed to be either the pra-
dhana known from Smrz’ti, which, as being the (general)
cause, may be called the (general) abode ; or the air known
from vSruti, of which it is said (B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 2, ‘ Air is that
thread, O Gautama. By air as by a thread, O Gautama,
this world and the other world and all beings are strung
together 5 ), that it supports all things; or else the embodied
soul which, as being the enjoyer, may be considered as an
abode with reference to the objects of its fruition.
Against this view we argue with the sutrakara as follows:—
6 Of the world consisting of heaven, earth, and so on, which
in the quoted passage is spoken of as woven (upon some¬
thing), the highest Brahman must be the abode. 5 —Why?—
On account of the word ‘ own, 5 i. e. on account of the word
‘ Self. 5 For we meet with the word ‘ Self 5 in the pas¬
sage, ‘ Know him alone as the Self.’ This term ‘Self 5 is
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, I.
155
thoroughly appropriate only if we understand the highest
Self and not anything else.—(To propound another inter¬
pretation of the phrase 4 sva.rabdat 5 employed in the Sutra.)
Sometimes also Brahman is spoken of in *Sruti as the
general abode by its own terms (i.e. by terms properly
designating Brahman), as, for instance ( Kh . Up. VI, 8, 4),
4 All these creatures, my dear, have their root in the being,
their abode in the being, their rest in the being 1 . 5 —(Or
else we have to explain 4 sva.rabdena 5 as follows), In
the passages preceding and following the passage under
discussion Brahman is glorified with its own names 2 ;
cp. Mu. Up. II, 1, 10, 4 The Person is all this, sacrifice,
penance, Brahman, the highest Immortal, 5 and II, 2, 11,
4 That immortal Brahman is before, is behind, Brahman is
to the right and left. 5 Here, on account of mention being
made of an abode and that which abides, and on account of
the co-ordination expressed in the passage, 4 Brahman is
all 5 (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11), a suspicion might arise that Brah¬
man is of a manifold variegated nature, just as in the case
of a tree consisting of different parts we distinguish branches,
stem, and root. In order to remove this suspicion the text
declares (in the passage under discussion), ‘Know him
alone as the Self. 5 The sense of which is : The Self is not
to be known as manifold, qualified by the universe of effects;
you are rather to dissolve by true knowledge the universe
of effects, which is the mere product of Nescience, and to
know that one Self, which is the general abode, as uniform.
Just as when somebody says, ‘Bring that on which Deva-
datta sits, 5 the person addressed brings the chair only (the
abode of Devadatta), not Devadatta himself; so the pas¬
sage, 4 Know him alone as the Self, 5 teaches that the object
to be known is the one uniform Self which constitutes the
general abode. Similarly another scriptural passage re¬
proves him who believes in the unreal world of effects,
1 From passages of which nature we may infer that in the
passage under discussion also the ‘ abode 5 is Brahman.
2 From which circumstance we may conclude that the passage
under discussion also refers to Brahman.
VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
156
‘ From death to death goes he who sees any difference
here’ (Ka. Up. II, 4, 11). The statement of co-ordination
made in the clause ‘ All is Brahman’ aims at dissolving (the
wrong conception of the reality of) the world, and not in any
way at intimating that Brahman is multiform in nature 1 ; for
the uniformity (of Brahman’s nature) is expressly stated in
other passages such as the following one, ‘ As a mass of salt
has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of
taste, thus indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside,
but is altogether a mass of knowledge’ (B ri. Up. IV, 5 > 13)-—
For all these reasons the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is the
highest Brahman.—Against the objection that on account
of the text speaking of a ‘ bridge,’ and a bridge requiring
a further bank, we have to understand by the abode of
heaven and earth something different from Brahman, we
remark that the word ‘bridge’ is meant to intimate only
that that which is called a bridge supports, not that it has
a further bank. We need not assume by any means that
the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of clay
and wood. For as the word setu (bridge) is derived from
the root si, which means ‘to bind,’ the idea of holding
together, supporting is rather implied in it than the idea of
being connected with something beyond (a further bank).
According to the opinion of another (commentator) the
word ‘ bridge ’ does not glorify the abode of heaven, earth,
&c., but rather the knowledge of the Self which is glorified
in the preceding clause, ‘ Know him alone as the Self,’ and
the abandonment of speech advised in the clause, ‘ leave off
other words;’ to them, as being the means of obtaining
immortality, the expression ‘the bridge of the immortal’
applies 2 . On that account we have to set aside the assertion
that, on account of the word ‘ bridge,’ something different
from Brahman is to be understood by the abode of heaven,
earth, and so on.
1 Yat sarvam avidyaropitazrc tat sarva m paramarthato brahma
na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity artha^. Bhamatf.
2 So that the passage would have to be translated, ‘That, viz.
knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.’
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2.
157
2. And on account of its being designated as that
to which the Released have to resort.
By the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, we have to
understand the highest Brahman for that reason also that
we find it denoted as that to which the Released have to
resort.—The conception that the body and other things
contained in the sphere of the Not-self are our Self,
constitutes Nescience; from it there spring desires with
regard to whatever promotes the well-being of the body
and so on, and aversions with regard to whatever tends to
injure it; there further arise fear and confusion when we
observe anything threatening to destroy it. All this con¬
stitutes an endless series of the most manifold evils with
which we all are acquainted. Regarding those on the other
hand who have freed themselves from the stains of Nescience
desire aversion and so on, it is said that they have to resort
to that, viz. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. which forms the
topic of discussion. For the text, after having said, £ The
fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his
works perish when He has been beheld who is the higher
and the lower ’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8), later on remarks, £ The wise
man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person
who is greater than the great* (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 8). That
Brahman is that which is to be resorted to by the released,
is known from other scriptural passages, such as £ When all
desires which once entered his heart are undone then does
the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman 5
(B ru Up. IV, 4, 7). Of the pradhana and similar entities,
on the other hand, it is not known from any source that they
are to be resorted to by the released. Moreover, the text
(in the passage, £ Know him alone as the Self and leave off
other words ’) declares that the knowledge of the abode of
heaven and earth, &c. is connected with the leaving off of
all speech ; a condition which, according to another scrip¬
tural passage, attaches to (the knowledge of) Brahman ; cp.
Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21, £ Let a wise Br&hma;za, after he has dis¬
covered him, practise wisdom. Let him not seek after many
words, for that is mere weariness of the tongue/—For that
I 58 VEDANTA-Stf TRAS.
reason also the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the
highest Brahman.
3. Not (i. e. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. can¬
not be) that which is inferred, (i. e. the pradhana), on
account of the terms not denoting it.
While there has been shown a special reason in favour of
Brahman (being the abode), there is no such special reason
in favour of anything else. Hence he (the sutrak&ra) says
that that which is inferred, i. e. the pradhana assumed by
the Solhkhya-smrzti, is not to be accepted as the abode of
heaven, earth, &c.—Why?—On account of the terms not
denoting it. For the sacred text does not contain any
term intimating the non-intelligent pradhana, on the ground
of which we might understand the latter to be the general
cause or abode; while such terms as 4 he who perceives all
and knows all’ (Mu. Up. 1 ,1, 9) intimate an intelligent being
opposed to the pradhana in nature.—For the same reason
the air also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven,
earth, and so on.
4. (Nor) also the individual soul (pra^abhrzt).
Although to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities
of Selfhood and intelligence do belong, still omniscience
and similar qualities do not belong to it as its knowledge
is limited by its adjuncts; thus the individual soul also
cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c.,
for the same reason, i. e. on account of the terms not
denoting it.—Moreover, the attribute of forming the abode
of heaven, earth, and so on, cannot properly be given to the
individual soul because the latter is limited by certain
adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not omnipresent) 1 .
—The special enunciation (of the individual soul) is caused
by what follows 2 .—The individual soul is not to be
1 Bhogyasya bhoktr Aeshatvat tasyayatanatvam uktam a^ankyaha
na keti, ^ivasyadrz'sh/advara dyubhvadinimittatvexpi na sakshat
tadayatanatvam aupadhikatvenavibhutvad ity artha^. Ananda Giri.
2 It would not have been requisite to introduce a special Sutra
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7 .
159
accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the follow¬
ing reason also.
5. On account of the declaration of difference.
The passage ‘Know him alone as the Self’ moreover
implies a declaration of difference, viz. of the difference of
the object of knowledge and the knower. Here the indi¬
vidual soul as being that which is desirous of release is the
knower, and consequently Brahman, which is denoted by
the word ‘ self 5 and represented as the object of knowledge,
is understood to be the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.
—For the following reason also the individual soul cannot be
accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c.
6. On account of the subject-matter.
The highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the
entire chapter), as we see from the passage, ‘ Sir, what is
that through which, when it is known, everything else
becomes known ? 5 (Mu. Up. 1 ,1, 3), in which the knowledge
of everything is declared to be dependent on the knowledge
of one thing. For all this (i.e. the entire world) becomes
known if Brahman the Self of all is known, not if only the
individual soul is known.—Another reason against the
individual soul follows.
7. And on account of the two conditions of stand¬
ing and eating (of which the former is characteristic
of the highest Lord, the latter of the individual soul).
With reference to that which is the abode of heaven,
earth, and so on, the text says, ‘Two birds, inseparable
friends/ &c. (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1). This passage describes
the two states of mere standing, i. e. mere presence, and of
eating, the clause, ‘One of them eats the sweet fruit, 5 refer¬
ring to the eating, i.e. the fruition of the results of works,
for the individual soul—which, like the air, is already excluded by
the preceding Sutra—if it were not for the new argument brought
forward in the following Sutra which applies to the individual soul
only.
160 VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
and the clause, ‘The other one looks on without eating/
describing the condition of mere inactive presence. The
two states described, viz. of mere presence on the one hand
and of enjoyment on the other hand, show that the Lord
and the individual soul are referred to. Now there is room
for this statement which represents the Lord as separate
from the individual soul, only if the passage about the
abode of heaven and earth likewise refers to the Lord; for
in that case only there exists a continuity of topic. On
any other supposition the second passage would contain a
statement about something not connected with the general
topic, and would therefore be entirely uncalled for.—But, it
may be objected, on your interpretation also the second
passage makes an uncalled-for statement, viz. in so far as it
represents the individual soul as separate from the Lord.—
Not so, we reply. It is nowhere the purpose of Scripture
to make statements regarding the individual soul. From
ordinary experience the individual soul, which in the different
individual bodies is joined to the internal organs and other
limiting adjuncts, is known to every one as agent and
enjoyer, and we therefore must not assume that it is
that which Scripture aims at setting forth. The Lord, on
the other hand, about whom ordinary experience tells
us nothing, is to be considered as the special topic of
all scriptural passages, and we therefore cannot assume
that any passage should refer to him merely casually 1 .—
1 If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven,
earth, &c., the statement regarding Lvara made in the passage
about the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground
objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with
regard to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well
known to everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may
be made.—I subjoin Ananda Giri’s commentary on the entire pas¬
sage : (rivasyopadhyaikyenavivakshitatvat tad^ane^pi sarvagTiana-
siddhes tasyayatanatvadyabhave hetvantarazra va/fyam ity fuankya
shtre^a pariharati kuta^etyadina. Tad vya/£ash/e dyubhvaditi.
Nirde^am eva dar^ayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham aha tabhyazra Mi.
Sthityei'varasyadana^- ^lvasa^grahe^pi katham fovarasyaiva vhva-
yatanatva/rc tadaha yaditi. Lvarasyayanatvenaprakrftatve ^ivaprf-
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7 .
l6l
That the mantra ‘ two birds/ &c. speaks of the Lord and
the individual soul we have already shown under I, 2, ii,
—And if, according to the interpretation given in the Paingi-
upanishad (and quoted under I, 2, 11), the verse is under¬
stood to refer to the internal organ (sattva) and the
individual soul (not to the individual soul and the Lord),
even then there is no contradiction (between that interpre¬
tation and our present averment that the individual soul is
not the abode of heaven and earth).—How so?—Here
(i. e. in the present Sutra and the Sutras immediately
preceding) it is denied that the individual soul which, owing
to its imagined connexion with the internal organ and other
limiting adjuncts, has a separate existence in separate
bodies—its division being analogous to the division of
universal space into limited spaces such as the spaces
within jars and the like—is that which is called the abode
of heaven and earth. That same soul, on the other hand,
which exists in all bodies, if considered apart from the limit¬
ing adjuncts, is nothing else but the highest Self. Just as
the spaces within jars, if considered apart from their limiting
conditions, are merged in universal space, so the individual
soul also is incontestably that which is denoted as the
abode of heaven and earth, since it (the soul) cannot really
be separate from the highest Self. That it is not the
abode of heaven and earth, is therefore said of the indi¬
vidual soul in so far only as it imagines itself to be con¬
nected with the internal organ and so on. Hence it follows
that the highest Self is the abode of heaven, earth, and so
on.—The same conclusion has already been arrived at
under I, a, 21 ; for in the passage concerning the source
of all beings (which passage is discussed under the Sutra
quoted) we meet with the clause, ‘ In which heaven and
thakkathananupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvaraha anyatheti.
Givasyayatanatvenaprakrftatve tulyanupapattir iti ^ahkate nanviti.
Tasyaikyarthaw lokasiddhasyanuvadatvan naivam ity aha neti.
Givasyapikvatvabhaven&pratipadyatvam eva praka/ayati kshetra^o
hiti. trvarasyapi lokavadisiddhatvad apratipadyatety a^ankyaha
uvaras tv iti.
[ 34 ]
M
162
VEDANTA-sdTRAS.
earth and the sky are woven/ In the present adhikara^a
the subject is resumed for the sake of further elucidation.
8 . The bhfiman (is Brahman), as the instruction
about it is additional to that about the state of deep
sleep (i. e. the vital air which remains awake even in
the state of deep sleep).
We read (Kk. Up. VII, 23; 24), ‘That which is much
(bhuman) we must desire to understand.—Sir, I desire to
understand it.—Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing
else, understands nothing else, that is what is much (bhuman).
Where one sees something else, hears something else, under¬
stands something else, that is the Little.’—Here the doubt
arises whether that which is much is the vital air (pr&/za) or
the highest Self.—Whence the doubt?—The word £ bhuman,’
taken by itself, means the state of being much, according to
its derivation as taught by Pacini, VI, 4, 158. Hence
there is felt the want of a specification showing what con¬
stitutes the Self of that muchness. Here there presents itself
at first the approximate passage, £ The vital air is more than
hope ’ (. Kh . Up. VII, 15, 1), from which we may conclude
that the vital air is bhuman.—On the other hand, we meet
at the beginning of the chapter, where the general topic is
stated, with the following passage, £ I have heard from men
like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am
in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine; ’ from which
passage it would appear that the bhuman is the highest
Self.—Hence there arises a doubt as to which of the two
alternatives is to be embraced, and which is to be set aside.
The purvapakshin maintains that the bhuman is the vital
air, since there is found no further series of questions and
answers as to what is more. For while we meet with a series
of questions and answers (such as, £ Sir, is there something
which is more than a name?’— £ Speech is more than name.’—
Ts there something which is more than speech?’— £ Mind is
more than speech ’), which extends from name up to vital air,
we do not meet with a similar question and answer as to what
might be more than vital air (such as, £ Is there something
I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 8 . 1 63
which is more than vital air ? ’—‘ Such and such a thing is
more than vital air ’). The text rather at first declares at
length (in the passage, 'The vital air is more than hope,’ &c.)
that the vital air is more than all the members of the series
from name up to hope; it then acknowledges him who
knows the vital air to be an ativadin, i. e. one who makes
a statement surpassing the preceding statements (in the
passage, ‘ Thou art an ativadin. He may say I am an ati¬
vadin ; he need not deny it ’) ; and it thereupon (in the
passage, ‘But he in reality is an ativadin who declares
something beyond by means of the True’ 1 ),—not leaving
off, but rather continuing to refer to the quality of an
ativctdin which is founded on the vital air,—proceeds, by
means of the series beginning with the True, to lead over to
the bhuman; so that we conclude the meaning to be
that the vital air is the bhuman.—But, if the bhuman is
interpreted to mean the vital air, how have we to explain
the passage in which the bhuman is characterised, c Where
one sees nothing else? 5 &c.—As, the purvapakshin replies,
in the state of deep sleep we observe a cessation of all
activity, such as seeing, &c., on the part of the organs
merged in the vital air, the vital air itself may be charac¬
terised by a passage such as, c Where one sees nothing else.’
Similarly, another scriptural passage (Pra. Up. IV, % \ 3) de¬
scribes at first (in the words,‘ He does not hear, he does not
see,’ &c.) the stateof deep sleep as characterised by the cessa¬
tion of the activity of all bodily organs, and then by declaring
that in that state the vital air, with its five modifications,
remains awake (‘ The fires of the pranas are awake in that
town ’), shows the vital air to occupy the principal position
in the state of deep sleep.—That passage also, which speaks
of the bliss of the bhuman (‘ The bhuman is bliss,’ Kh . Up.
VII, 23), can be reconciled with our explanation, because
Pra. Up. IV, 6 declares bliss to attach to the state of deep
sleep (‘ Then that god sees no dreams and at that time
that happiness arises in his body ’).—Again, the statement,
‘The bhuman is immortality’ ( Kh . Up. VII, 34, 1), may
1 As might be the prima facie conclusion from the particle ‘ but '*
introducing the sentence ‘ but he in reality/ &c.
M 2
164
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
likewise refer to the vital air; for another scriptural passage
says, ‘Pra;za is immortality’ (Kau. Up. Ill, %).—But how
can the view according to which the bhuman is the vital air
be reconciled with the fact that in the beginning of the
chapter the knowledge of the Self is represented as the
general topic (‘ He who knows the Self overcomes grief, 5 &c.) ?
—By the Self there referred to, the purvapakshin replies,
nothing else is meant but the vital air. For the passage,
‘ The vital air is father, the vital air is mother, the vital air
is brother, the vital air is sister, the vital air is teacher, the
vital air is Brahma/za’ (Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1), represents
the vital air as the Self of everything. As, moreover, the
passage, ‘As the spokes of a wheel rest in the nave, so
all this rests in prazza,’ declares the pr&zza to be the Self of
all—by means of a comparison with the spokes and the
nave of a wheel—the prazza may be conceived under the form
of bhuman, i. e. plenitude.—Bhuman, therefore, means the
vital air.
To this we make the following reply.—Bhuman can mean
the highest Self only, not the vital air.—Why?—‘ On account
of information being given about it, subsequent to bliss/
The word ‘ bliss 5 (samprasada) means the state of deep sleep,
as may be concluded, firstly, from the etymology of the
word (‘In it he, i.e. man, is altogether pleased—samprasi-
dati’)—and, secondly, from the fact of samprasada being
mentioned in the Brzhadara/zyaka together with the state
of dream and the waking state. And as in the state of
deep sleep the vital air remains awake, the word ‘ sampra¬
sada 5 is employed in the Sutra to denote the vital air; so
that the Sutra means, ‘on account of information being
given about the bhuman, subsequently to (the informa¬
tion given about) the vital air/ If the bhuman were the
vital air itself, it would be a strange proceeding to make
statements about the bhuman in addition to the statements
about the vital air. For in the preceding passages also we
do not meet, for instance, with a statement about name
subsequent to the previous statement about name (i. e. the
text does not say ‘ name is more than name ’), but after
something has been said about name, a new statement is
i adhyAya, 3 PADA, 8 . 165
made about speech, which is something different from name
(i. e. the text says, ‘ Speech is more than name ’), and so on
up to the statement about vital air, each subsequent state¬
ment referring to something other than the topic of the
preceding one. We therefore conclude that the bhuman
also, the statement about which follows on the statement
about the vital air, is something other than the vital air.—
But—it may be objected—we meet here neither with a ques¬
tion, such as, ‘ Is there something more than vital air? 5 nor
with an answer, such as, ‘ That and that is more than vital
air. 5 How, then, can it be said that the information about the
bhuman is given subsequently to the information about the
vital air ?—Moreover, we see that the circumstance of being
an ativ&din, which is exclusively connected with the vital
air, is referred to in the subsequent passage (viz. ‘ But in
reality he is an ativadin who makes a statement surpassing
(the preceding statements) by means of the True’). There
is thus no information additional to the information about
the vital air.—To this objection we reply that it is impos¬
sible to maintain that the passage last quoted merely con¬
tinues the discussion of the quality of being an ativadin, as con¬
nected with the knowledge of the vital air; since the clause,
‘ He who makes a statement surpassing, &c. by means of
the True/ states a specification.—But, the objector resumes,
this very statement of a specification may be explained as
referring to the vital air. If you ask how, we refer you to
an analogous case. If somebody says, ‘ This Agnihotrin
speaks the truth,’ the meaning is not that the quality of
being an Agnihotrin depends on speaking the truth; that
quality rather depends on the (regular performance of the)
agnihotra only, and speaking the truth is mentioned merely
as a special attribute of that special Agnihotrin. So
our passage also (‘ But in reality he is an ativadin who
makes a statement, &c. by means of the True’) does not
intimate that the quality of being an ativadin depends on
speaking the truth, but merely expresses that speaking
the truth is a special attribute of him who knows the vital
air; while the quality of being an ativadin must be con¬
sidered to depend on the knowledge of the vital air.—This
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
166
objection we rebut by the remark that it involves an aban¬
donment of the direct meaning of the sacred text. For
from the text, as it stands, we understand that the quality
of being an ativadin depends on speaking the truth; the sense
being : An ativadin is he who is an ativadin by means of the
True. The passage does not in any way contain a eulogisation
of the knowledge of the vital air. It could be connected
with the latter only on the ground of general subject-matter
(prakara^a)which would involve an abandonment of the di¬
rect meaning of the text in favour of prakara^a 1 2 .—Moreover,
the particle but (‘ But in reality he is,’ &c.), whose purport
is to separate (what follows) from the subject-matter of what
precedes, would not agree (with the pra^a explanation).
The following passage also, f But we must desire to know
the True’ (VII, 16), which presupposes a new effort, shows
that a new topic is going to be entered upon.—For these
reasons we have to consider the statement about the ati¬
vadin in the same light as we should consider the remark—
made in a conversation which previously had turned on the
praise of those who study one Veda—that he who studies
the four Vedas is a great Brahma^a; a remark which we
should understand to be laudatory of persons different from
those who study one Veda, i.e. of those who study all the
four Vedas. Nor is there any reason to assume that a new
topic can be introduced in the form of question and answer
only ; for that the matter propounded forms a new topic is
sufficiently clear from the circumstance that no connexion
can be established between it and the preceding topic.
The succession of topics in the chapter under discussion
is as follows: Narada at first listens to the instruction
which Sanatkumara gives him about various matters, the
last of which is Pra^a, and then becomes silent. Thereupon
Sanatkumara explains to him spontaneously (without being
1 It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be viewed
in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding part
of the chapter.
2 And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental principle
of the Mima^s^.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 8.
167
asked) that the quality of being an ativadin, if merely based
on the knowledge of the vital air—which knowledge has
for its object an unreal product,—is devoid of substance, and
that he only is an ativddin who is such by means of
the True. By the term ‘the True’ there is meant the
highest Brahman; for Brahman is the Real, and it is
called the ‘ True 5 in another scriptural passage also, viz.
Taitt. Up. II, 1, ‘ The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.’
Narada, thus enlightened, starts a new line of enquiry
(‘Might I, Sir, become an ativadin by the True?’) and
Sanatkumara then leads him, by a series of instrumental
steps, beginning with understanding, up to the knowledge
of bhuman. We therefrom conclude that the bhuman is
that very True whose explanation had been promised in
addition to the (knowledge of the) vital air. We thus see
that the instruction about the bhuman is additional to the
instruction about the vital air, and bhuman must therefore
mean the highest Self, which is different from the vital air.
With this interpretation the initial statement, according to
which the enquiry into the Self forms the general subject-
matter, agrees perfectly well. The assumption, on the
other hand (made by the purvapakshin), that by the Self
we have here to understand the vital air is indefensible.
For, in the first place, Self-hood does not belong to the
vital air in any non-figurative sense. In the second place,
cessation of grief cannot take place apart from the knowledge
of the highest Self; for, as another scriptural passage
declares, ‘There is no other path to go’ (SVet. Up. VI, 15).
Moreover, after we have read at the outset, ‘ Do, Sir, lead
me over to the other side of grief’ ( Kh . Up. VII, 1, 3), we
meet with the following concluding words (VII, 26, 2), ‘ To
him, after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable
Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness.’ The
term ‘ darkness ’ here denotes Nescience, the cause of grief,
and so on.—Moreover, if the instruction terminated with the
vital air, it would not be said of the latter that it rests on
something else. But the brahma^a (Kk. Up. VII, 26, 1)
does say, ‘The vital air springs from the Self.’ Nor can it
be objected against this last argument that the concluding
168
vedanta-s6tras.
part of the chapter may refer to the highest Self, while, all
the same, the bhuman (mentioned in an earlier part of the
chapter) may be the vital air. For, from the passage (VII,
24, 1), (‘ Sir, in what does the bhuman rest? In its own
greatness,’ &c.), it appears that the bhuman forms the con¬
tinuous topic up to the end of the chapter.—The quality of
being the bhuman — which quality is plenitude — agrees,
moreover, best with the highest Self, which is the cause of
everything.
9. And on account of the agreement of the
attributes (mentioned in the text).
The attributes, moreover, which the sacred text ascribes
to the bhuman agree well with the highest Self. The
passage, £ Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else,
understands nothing else, that is the bhuman,’ gives us to
understand that in the bhuman the ordinary activities of
seeing and so on are absent; and that this is characteristic
of the highest Self, we know from another scriptural passage,
viz. £ But when the Self only is all this, how should he see
another ? ’ &c. (B ri, Up. IV, 5,15). What is said about the
absence of the activities of seeing and so on in the state of
deep sleep (Pra. Up. IV, 2) is said with the intention of
declaring the non-attachedness of the Self, not of describing
the nature of the pra/za ; for the highest Self (not the vital
air) is the topic of that passage. The bliss also of which
Scripture speaks as connected with that state is mentioned
only in order to show that bliss constitutes the nature of
the Self. For Scripture says (B ri, Up. IV, 3, 32), £ This is
his highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small por¬
tion of that bliss.’—The passage under discussion also
( £ The bhuman is bliss. There is no bliss in that which is
little (limited). The bhuman only is bliss ’) by denying
the reality of bliss on the part of whatever is perishable
shows that Brahman only is bliss as bhuman, i. e. in its
plenitude.—Again, the passage, £ The bhuman is immor¬
tality,’ shows that the highest cause is meant; for the
immortality of all effected things is a merely relative one,
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, IO.
169
and another scriptural passage says that ‘ whatever is
different from that (Brahman) is perishable ’ ( Bri . Up.
Ill, 4, 3). —Similarly, the qualities of being the True, and of
resting in its own greatness, and of being omnipresent, and
of being the Self of everything which the text mentions (as
belonging to the bhuman) can belong to the highest Self
only, not to anything else.—By all this it is proved that
the bhuman is the highest Self.
10. The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of
(its) supporting (all things) up to ether.
We read (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 7; 8), ‘ In what then is the ether
woven, like warp and woof ?—He said : O G&rgi, the
Br^hma^as call this the akshara (the Imperishable). It is
neither coarse nor fine, 5 and so on.—Here the doubt arises
whether the word ‘ akshara 5 means ‘ syllable 5 or ‘the highest
Lord/
The purvapakshin maintains that the word ‘akshara’
means ‘ syllable 5 merely, because it has, in such terms as
akshara-samamnaya, the meaning of ‘ syllable; ’ because
we have no right to disregard the settled meaning of a word ;
and because another scriptural passage also (‘ The syllable
Om is all this,’ Kh . Up. II, 23,4) declares a syllable, repre¬
sented as the object of devotion, to be the Self of all.
To this we reply that the highest Self only is denoted by
the word ‘akshara.’—Why?—Because it (the akshara) is
said to support the entire aggregate of effects, from earth
up to ether. For the sacred text declares at first that the
entire aggregate of effects beginning with earth and differ¬
entiated by threefold time is based on ether, in which it is
‘ woven like warp and woof; ’ leads then (by means of the
question, ‘ In what then is the ether woven, like warp and
woof ? ’) over to the akshara, and, finally, concludes with the
words, ‘ In that akshara then, O G&rgi, the ether is woven,
like warp and woof.’—Now the attribute of supporting
everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being
but Brahman. The text (quoted from the Kh. Up.) says
indeed that the syllable Om is all this, but that statement
YEDANTA-SUTRAS.
170
is to be understood as a mere glorification of the syllable
Om considered as a means to obtain Brahman.—Therefore
we take akshara to mean either c the Imperishable’ or 4 that
which pervades ; ’ on the ground of either of which explana¬
tions it must be identified with the highest Brahman.
But—our opponent resumes—while we must admit that
the above reasoning holds good so far that the circum¬
stance of the akshara supporting all things up to ether is to
be accepted as a proof of all effects depending on a cause,
we point out that it may be employed by those also who
declare the pradh&na to be the general cause. How then
does the previous argumentation specially establish Brah¬
man (to the exclusion of the pradMna) ?—The reply to this
is given in the next Sutra.
11. This (supporting can), on account of the
command (attributed to the Imperishable, be the
work of the highest Lord only).
The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the
highest Lord only.—Why?—On account of the command.—
For the sacred text speaks of a command ( ; By the command
of that akshara, O G&rgt,sunand moon stand apart!’ 111,8,9),
and command can be the work of the highest Lord only, not
of the non-intelligent pradh&na. For non-intelligent causes
such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with
reference to their effects, such as jars and the like.
12. And on account of (Scripture) separating (the
akshara) from that whose nature is different (from
Brahman).
Also on account of the reason stated in this Sutra
Brahman only is to be considered as the Imperishable, and
the supporting of all things up to ether is to be looked
upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything else.
The meaning of the Sutra is as follows. Whatever things
other than Brahman might possibly be thought to be
denoted by the term c akshara, 5 from the nature of all those
things Scripture separates the akshara spoken of as the
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 3 .
171
support of all things up to ether. The scriptural passage
alluded to is III, 8, 11, ‘That akshara, 0 G&rgi, is unseen
but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving,
unknown but knowing/ Here the designation of being
unseen, &c. agrees indeed with the pradMna also, but not
so the designation of seeing, &c., as the pradMna is non-
intelligent.—Nor can the word akshara denote the embodied
soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following
on the one quoted declares that there is nothing different
from the Self (‘there is nothing that sees but it, nothing
that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, nothing that
knows but it ’); and, moreover, limiting conditions are
expressly denied (of the akshara) in the passage, ‘It is
without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind,’
&c. (Ill, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting con¬
ditions does not exist 1 .—It is therefore certain beyond
doubt that the Imperishable is nothing else but the highest
Brahman.
13. On account of his being designated as the
object of sight (the highest Self is meant, and) the
same (is meant in the passage speaking of the medi¬
tation on the highest person by means of the syllable
Om).
(In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set
forth in the words, ‘ O Satyakctma, the syllable Om is the
highest and also the other Brahman; therefore he who
knows it arrives by the same means at one of the two.’
The text then goes on, ‘ Again, he who meditates with this
syllable Om of three matras on the highest Person,’ &c.—
Here the doubt presents itself, whether the object of medi¬
tation referred to in the latter passage is the highest Brahman
or the other Brahman; a doubt based on the former pas¬
sage, according to which both are under discussion.
The purvapakshin maintains that the other, i. e. the lower
1 A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain the
passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.
172
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Brahman, is referred to, because the text promises only a
reward limited by a certain locality for him who knows it.
For, as the highest Brahman is omnipresent, it would be
inappropriate to assume that he who knows it obtains a
fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if
the lower Brahman were understood, there would be no
room for the qualification, c the highest person/ is not valid,
because the vital principle (prazza) may be called 4 higher 5
with reference to the body l .
To this we make the following reply: What is here taught
as the object of meditation is the highest Brahman only.
—Why?—On account of its being spoken of as the object of
sight. For the person to be meditated upon is, in a com¬
plementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act
of seeing, 4 He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of
the body ; purusham pumayam), higher than that one who
is of the shape of the individual soul, and who is himself
higher (than the senses and their objects). 5 Now, of an act
of meditation an unreal thing also can be the object, as, for
instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of the
act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know
from experience ; we therefore conclude, that in the passage
last quoted, the highest (only real) Self which corresponds
to the mental act of complete intuition 2 is spoken of as the
object of sight. This same highest Self we recognise in the
passage under discussion as the object of meditation, in conse¬
quence of the term, 4 the highest person. 5 —But—an objection
will be raised—as the object of meditation we have the
highest person, and as the object of sight the person higher
than that one who is himself higher, &c.; how, then, are we to
know that those two are identical ?—The two passages, we
1 Ymd&h sthulo deha^, prazza^z sutratma. Ananda Giri.—The
lower Brahman (hirazzyagarbha on sutratman) is the vital principle
(prazza) in all creatures.
2 Sazzzyagdanana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the same
term which in other places—where it is not requisite to insist on
the idea of 4 seeing ' in contradistinction from 4 reflecting 5 or 4 medi¬
tating'— is rendered by perfect knowledge.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 1 3 .
173
reply, have in common the terms c highest ’ (or £ higher/
para) and £ person/ And it must not by any means be
supposed that the term ^ivaghana 1 refers to that highest
person which, considered as the object of meditation, had
previously been introduced as the general topic. For the
consequence of that supposition would be that that highest
person which is the object of sight would be different from
that highest person which is represented as the object of
meditation. We rather have to explain the word ^ivaghana
as £ He whose shape 2 is characterised by the ^ivas so that
what is really meant by that term is that limited condition
of the highest Self which is owing to its adjuncts, and
manifests itself in the form of^ivas, i. e. individual souls; a
condition analogous to the limitation of salt (in general) by
means of the mass of a particular lump of salt. That limited
condition of the Self may itself be called ‘higher/ if viewed
with regard to the senses and their objects.
Another (commentator) says that we have to understand
by the word ‘^ivaghana ’ the world of Brahman spoken of
in the preceding sentence ( £ by the Saman verses he is led
up to the world of Brahman ’), and again in the following
sentence (v. 7), which may be called c higher/ because it is
higher than the other worlds. That world of Brahman may
be called ^ivaghana because all individual souls (^iva j with
their organs of action may be viewed as comprised (sanghata
= ghana) within Hira/zyagarbha, who is the Self of all organs,
and dwells in the Brahma-world. We thus understand that
he who is higher than that ^ivaghana, i. e. the highest Self,
which constitutes the object of sight, also constitutes the
object of meditation. The qualification, moreover, ex¬
pressed in the term £ the highest person’ is in its place
only if we understand the highest Self to be meant. For
the name, £ the highest person/ can be given only to the
highest Self, higher than which there is nothing. So another
scriptural passage also says, ‘ Higher than the person there
is nothing—this is the goal, the highest road.’ Hence the
1 Translated above by * of the shape of the individual soul/
2 Pacini III, 3, 77, ‘murttazrc ghana h*
174
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
sacred text, which at first distinguishes between the higher and
the lower Brahman (‘ the syllable Om is the higher and the
lower Brahman’), and afterwards speaks of the highest Person
to be meditated upon by means of the syllable Om, gives
us to understand that the highest Person is nothing else but
the highest Brahman. That the highest Self constitutes the
object of meditation, is moreover intimated by the passage
declaring that release from evil is the fruit (of medita¬
tion), ‘ As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from
evil.’—With reference to the objection that a fruit confined
to a certain place is not an appropriate reward for him who
meditates on the highest Self, we finally remark that the
objection is removed, if we understand the passage to refer
to emancipation by degrees. He who meditates on the
highest Self by means of the syllable Om, as consisting of
three matras, obtains for his (first) reward the world of
Brahman, and after that, gradually, complete intuition.
14. The small (ether) (is Brahman) on account of
the subsequent (arguments).
We read (Kh. Up. VIII, 1,1), ‘ There is this city of Brah¬
man, and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that
small ether. Now what exists within that small ether that
is to be sought for, that is to be understood,’ &c.—Here the
doubt arises whether the small ether within the small lotus
of the heart of which Scripture speaks, is the elemental
ether, or the individual soul (vi^Tzanatman), or the highest
Self. This doubt is caused by the words ‘ ether ’ and ‘ city
of Brahman.’ For the word ‘ ether,’ in the first place, is
known to be used in the sense of elemental ether as well
as of highest Brahman. Hence the doubt whether the
small ether of the text be the elemental ether or the highest
ether, i. e. Brahman. In explanation of the expression ‘ city
of Brahman,’ in the second place, it might be said either
that the individual soul is here called Brahman and the
body Brahman’s city, or else that the city of Brahman
means the city of the highest Brahman. Here (i. e. in con¬
sequence of this latter doubt) a further doubt arises as to
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4 .
175
the nature of the small ether, according as the individual
soul or the highest Self is understood by the Lord of the
city.
The purvapakshin maintains that by the small ether we
have to understand the elemental ether, since the latter
meaning is the conventional one of the word aka^a. The
elemental ether is here called small with reference to its
small abode (the heart).—In the passage, ‘As large as this
ether is, so large is that ether within the heart,’ it is repre¬
sented as constituting at the same time the two terms of a
comparison, because it is possible to make a distinction
between the outer and the inner ether 1 ; and it is said that
‘heaven and earth are contained within it,’ because the whole
ether, in so far as it is space, is one 2 .—Or else, the purva¬
pakshin continues, the ‘ small one ’ may be taken to mean
the individual soul, on account of the term, ‘the city of
Brahman.’ The body is here called the city of Brahman
because it is the abode of the individual soul; for it is
acquired by means of the actions of the soul. On this
interpretation we must assume that the individual soul is
here called Brahman metaphorically. The highest Brahman
cannot be meant, because it is not connected with the body
as its lord. The lord of the city, i. e. the soul, is represented
as dwelling in one spot of the city (viz. the heart), just as a
real king resides in one spot of his residence. Moreover, the
mind (manas) constitutes the limiting adjunct of the indi¬
vidual soul, and the mind chiefly abides in the heart;
hence the individual soul only can be spoken of as dwelling
in the heart. Further, the individual soul only can be
spoken of as small, since it is (elsewhere; vSVet. Up. V, 8)
compared in size to the point of a goad. That it is com¬
pared (in the passage under discussion) to the ether must be
understood to intimate its non-difference from Brahman.—
1 So that the interpretation of the purvapakshin cannot be
objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a
thing to itself.
2 So that no objection can be raised on the ground that heaven
and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.
176
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
Nor does the scriptural passage say that the 4 small ’ one is
to be sought for and to be understood, since in the clause,
£ That which is within that,’ &c., it is represented as a mere
distinguishing attribute of something else \
To all this we make the following reply:—The small ether
can mean the highest Lord only, not either the elemental
ether or the individual soul.—Why?—On account of the
subsequent reasons, i. e. on account of the reasons implied
in the complementary passage. For there, the text declares
at first, with reference to the small ether, which is enjoined
as the object of sight, 4 If they should say to him/ &c. ;
thereupon follows an objection, £ What is there that deserves
to be sought for or that is to be understood ? ’ and thereon
a final decisive statement, £ Then he should say: As large
as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart.
Both heaven and earth are contained within it/ Here the
teacher, availing himself of the comparison of the ether
within the heart with the known (universal) ether, precludes
the conception that the ether within the heart is small—
which conception is based on the statement as to the smallness
of the lotus, i. e. the heart—and thereby precludes the pos¬
sibility of our understanding by the term £ the small ether/
the elemental ether. For, although the ordinary use of
language gives to the word £ ether ’ the sense of elemental
ether, here the elemental ether cannot be thought of, because
it cannot possibly be compared with itself.—But, has it not
been stated above, that the ether, although one only, may
be compared with itself, in consequence of an assumed dif¬
ference between the outer and the inner ether ?—That
explanation, we reply, is impossible; for we cannot admit
that a comparison of a thing with itself may be based upon
a merely imaginary difference. And even if we admitted
1 Viz. of that which is within it. Ananda Giri proposes two
explanations: na £eti, paravhesha^atvenety atra paro daharak&ra
upadanat tasminn iti saptamyanta-ta^Mabdasyeti jesha^. Yadva
para^abdo * nta^sthavastuvishayas tadvuesha^atvena tasminn iti
daharaka^asyokter ity artha^. Ta^Mabdasya samnikrzsh/anvaya-
yoge viprakr/sh/anvayasya g-aghanyatvad ak&rantargataz# dhyeyam
iti bhava^.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4 .
I 77
the possibility of such a comparison, the extent of the outer
ether could never be ascribed to the limited inner ether.
Should it be said that to the highest Lord also the extent of
the (outer) ether cannot be ascribed, since another scriptural
passage declares that he is greater than ether (6a. Bra. X,
6, 3, 2), we invalidate this objection by the remark, that the
passage (comparing the inner ether with the outer ether) has
the purport of discarding the idea of smallness (of the inner
ether), which is prim a facie established by the smallness of
the lotus of the heart in which it is contained, and has not
the purport of establishing a certain extent (of the inner
ether). If the passage aimed at both, a split of the sen¬
tence 1 would result.—Nor, if we allowed the assumptive
difference of the inner and the outer ether, would it be
possible to represent that limited portion of the ether which
is enclosed in the lotus of the heart, as containing within
itself heaven, earth, and so on. Nor can we reconcile with
the nature of the elemental ether the qualities of Self-hood,
freeness from sin, and so on, (which are ascribed to the
£ small 5 ether) in the following passage, £ It is the Self free
from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from
hunger and thirst, of true desires, of true purposes. 5 —Al¬
though the term £ Self 5 (occurring in the passage quoted)
may apply to the individual soul, yet other reasons exclude
all idea of the individual soul being meant (by the small
ether). For it would be impossible to dissociate from the
individual soul, which is restricted by limiting conditions
and elsewhere compared to the point of a goad, the attri¬
bute of smallness attaching to it, on account of its being
enclosed in the lotus of the heart.—Let it then be assumed—
our opponent remarks—that the qualities of all-pervading-
ness, &c. are ascribed to the individual soul with the intention
of intimating its non-difference from Brahman.—Well, we
reply, if you suppose that the small ether is called all-
pervading because it is one with Brahman, our own suppo-
1 A vakyabheda—split of the sentence—takes place according
to the Mimatfzsa when one and the same sentence contains two
new statements which are different.
[34] N
178
vedAnta-s{jtras.
sition, viz. that the all-pervadingness spoken of is directly
predicated of Brahman itself, is the much more simple one.—
Concerning the assertion that the term ‘ city of Brahman ’
can only be understood, on the assumption that the indi¬
vidual soul dwells, like a king, in one particular spot of the
city of which it is the Lord, we remark that the term is
more properly interpreted to mean £ the body in so far as
it is the city of the highest Brahman ; ’ which interpretation
enables us to take the term £ Brahman ’ in its primary sense 1 .
The highest Brahman also is connected with the body, for
the latter constitutes an abode for the perception of Brah¬
man 2 . Other scriptural passages also express the same
meaning, so, for instance, Pra. Up. V, 5, £ He sees the highest
person dwelling in the city’ (purusha = pumaya), &c., and
Bn. Up. II, 5, 18, £ This person (purusha) is in all cities
(bodies) the dweller within the city (purisaya).’—Or else
(taking brahmapura to mean ^ivapura) we may understand
the passage to teach that Brahman is, in the city of the
individual soul, near (to the devout worshipper), just as
Vishnu is near to us in the *Salagrama-stone.—Moreover,
the text (VIII, 1, 6) at first declares the result of works
to be perishable ( £ as here on earth whatever has been
acquired by works perishes, so perishes whatever is acquired
for the next world by good actions/ &c.), and afterwards
declares the imperishableness of the results flowing from a
knowledge of the small ether, which forms the general sub¬
ject of discussion ( £ those who depart from hence after
having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them
there is freedom in all worlds’). From this again it is
manifest that the small ether is the highest Self.—We now
turn to the statement made by the purvapakshin, £ that the
sacred text does not represent the small ether as that
1 While the explanation of Brahman by giva, would compel us
to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual
soul.
8 Upalabdher adhish/Mnam brahmawa deha ishyate I
Tenasddharawatvena deho brahmaputam bhavet ll
Bhamatf.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 5 .
179
which is to be sought for and to be understood, because
it is mentioned as a distinguishing attribute of something
else/and reply as follows: If the (small) ether were not
that which is to be sought for and to be understood, the
description of the nature of that ether, which is given in
the passage ( £ as large as this ether is, so large is that ether
within the heart ’), would be devoid of purport.—But—the
opponent might say—that descriptive statement also has the
purport of setting forth the nature of the thing abiding
within (the ether) ; for the text after having raised an objec¬
tion (in the passage, ‘ And if they should say to him : Now
with regard to that city of Brahman and the palace in it, i. e.
the small lotus of the heart, and the small ether within the
heart, what is there within it that deserves to be sought for
or that is to be understood?’) declares, when replying to that
objection, that heaven, earth, and so on, are contained within
it (the ether), a declaration to which the comparison with
the ether forms a mere introduction.—Your reasoning, we
reply, is faulty. If it were admitted, it would follow that
heaven, earth, &c., which are contained within the small
ether, constitute the objects of search and enquiry. But
in that case the complementary passage would be out
of place. For the text carrying on, as the subject of dis¬
cussion, the ether that is the abode of heaven, earth, &c.—
by means of the clauses,‘ In it all desires are contained,’
‘It is the Self free from sin,’ &c., and the passage, 'But
those who depart from hence having discovered the Self,
and the true desires' (in which passage the conjunction ‘ and ’
has the purpose of joining the desires to the Self)—declares
that the Self as well, which is the abode of the desires, as
the desires which abide in the Self, are the objects of know¬
ledge. From this we conclude that in the beginning of the
passage also, the small ether abiding within the lotus of
the heart, together with whatever is contained within it as
earth, true desires, and so on, is represented as the object of
knowledge. And, for the reasons explained, that ether is
the highest Lord.
15. (The small ether is Brahman) on account of
N 2
i So
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
the action of going (into Brahman) and of the word
(brahmaloka); for thus it is seen (i. e. that the indi¬
vidual souls go into Brahman is seen elsewhere in
Scripture) ; and (this going of the souls into Brahman
constitutes) an inferential sign (by means of which
we may properly interpret the word ‘ brahmaloka').
It has been declared (in the preceding Sutra) that the
small (ether) is the highest Lord, on account of the reasons
contained in the subsequent passages. These subsequent
reasons are now set forth.—For this reason also the small
(ether) can be the highest Lord only, because the passage
complementary to the passage concerning the small (ether)
contains a mention of going and a word, both of which
intimate the highest Lord. In the first place, we read ( Kh .
Up. VIII, 3, a), c All these creatures, day after day going
into that Brahma-world, do not discover it/ This passage
which refers back, by means of the word c Brahma-world/
to the small ether which forms the general subject-matter,
speaks of the going to it of the creatures, i. e. the individual
souls, wherefrom we conclude that the small (ether) is
Brahman. For this going of the individual souls into
Brahman, which takes place day after day in the state of
deep sleep, is seen, i. e. is met with in another scriptural
passage, viz. Kh . Up. VI, 8, 1, c He becomes united with the
True, 5 &c. In ordinary life also we say of a man who lies
in deep sleep, ‘ he has become Brahman/ c he is gone into
the state of Brahman/—In the second place, the word
c Brahma-world, 5 which is here applied to the small (ether)
under discussion, excludes all thought of the individual
soul or the elemental ether, and thus gives us to understand
that the small (ether) is Brahman. — But could not the word
‘ Brahma-world 5 convey as well the idea of the world of him
whose throne is the lotus 1 ?—It might do so indeed, if we
explained the compound ‘ Brahma-world 5 as c the world of
Brahman/ But if we explain it on the ground of the co¬
ordination of both members of the compound—so that
1 I. e. Brahma, the lower Brahman.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PA DA, I 6. 1 8 1
‘ Brahma-world ’ denotes that world which is Brahman—
then it conveys the idea of the highest Brahman only.—
And that daily going (of the souls) into Brahman (mentioned
above) is, moreover, an inferential sign for explaining the
compound ‘ Brahma-world,’ on the ground of the co-ordina¬
tion of its two constituent members. For it would be
impossible to assume that all those creatures daily go into
the world of the effected (lower) Brahman ; which world is
commonly called the Satyaloka, i. e. the world of the True.
16. And on account of the supporting also (attri¬
buted to it), (the small ether must be the Lord)
because that greatness is observed in him (accord¬
ing to other scriptural passages).
And also on account of the £ supporting ’ the small ether
can be the highest Lord only.— How?—The text at first
introduces the general subject of discussion in the passage,
‘ In it is that small ether; 5 declares thereupon that the small
one is to be compared with the universal ether, and that
everything is contained in it; subsequently applies to it
the term ‘ Self,’ and states it to possess the qualities of
being free from sin, &c.; and, finally, declares with reference
to the same general subject of discussion, ‘ That Self is a
bank, a limitary support (vidhrzti), that these worlds may
not be confounded.’ As ‘ support 5 is here predicated of
the Self, we have to understand by it a supporting agent.
Just as a dam stems the spreading water so that the
boundaries of the fields are not confounded, so that Self
acts like a limitary dam in order that these outer and
inner worlds, and all the different castes and Isramas may
not be confounded. In accordance with this our text
declares that greatness, which is shown in the act of holding
asunder, to belong to the small (ether) which forms the subject
of discussion; and that such greatness is found in the highest
Lord only, is seen from other scriptural passages, such as ‘ By
the command of that Imperishable, O Gargt, sun and moon
are held apart’ (Bn. Up. Ill, 8, 9). Similarly, we read in
another passage also, about whose referring to the highest
182
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Lord there is no doubt, ‘ He is the Lord of all, the king of
all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a
limitary support, so that these worlds may not be con¬
founded’ (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2,2). —Hence, on account of the
‘supporting,’also the small (ether) is nothing else but the
highest Lord.
17. And on account of the settled meaning.
The small ether within cannot denote anything but the
highest Lord for this reason also, that the word ‘ether’
has (among other meanings) the settled meaning of ‘ highest
Lord.’ Compare, for instance, the sense in which the word
‘ ether ’ is used in Kh . Up. VIII, 14, ‘He who is called ether
is the revealer of all forms and names ;’ and Kh . Up. I, 9,
1, ‘All these beings take their rise from the ether,’ &c. On
the other hand, we do not meet with any passage in which
the word ‘ ether ’ is used in the sense of ‘ individual soul.’
—We have already shown that the word cannot, in our
passage, denote the elemental ether; for, although the
word certainly has that settled meaning, it cannot have it
here, because the elemental ether cannot possibly be com¬
pared to itself, &c. &c.
18. If it be said that the other one (i. e. the indi¬
vidual soul) (is meant) on account of a reference to
it (made in a complementary passage), (we say) no,
on account of the impossibility.
If the small (ether) is to be explained as the highest Lord on
account of a complementary passage, then, the purvapakshin
resumes, we point out that another complementary passage
contains a reference to the other one, i. e. to the individual
soul: ‘Now that serene being (literally : serenity, complete
satisfaction), which after having risen out from this earthly
body and having reached the highest light, appears in its true
form, that is, the Self; thus he spoke ’ {Kh. Up. VIII, 3,4).
For there the word ‘serenity,’ which is known to denote, in
another scriptural passage, the state of deep sleep, can
convey the idea of the individual soul only when it is in
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 19 . 183
that state, not of anything else. The ‘ rising from the body 5
also can be predicated of the individual soul only whose
abode the body is; just as air, &c., whose abode is the
ether, are said to arise from the ether. And just as
the word ‘ ether/ although in ordinary language not denoting
the highest Lord, yet is admitted to denote him in such
passages as,‘ The ether is the revealer of forms and names/
because it there occurs in conjunction with qualities of the
highest Lord, so it may likewise denote the individual soul.
Hence the term ‘ the small ether 5 denotes in the passage
under discussion the individual soul, ‘on account of the
reference to the other/
Not so, we reply, ( on account of the impossibility/ In
the first place, the individual soul, which imagines itself to
be limited by the internal organ and its other adjuncts, can¬
not be compared with the ether. And, in the second place,
attributes such as freedom from evil, and the like, cannot be
ascribed to a being which erroneously transfers to itself the
attributes of its limiting adjuncts. This has already been
set forth in the first Sutra of the present adhikara^a, and
is again mentioned here in order to remove all doubt
as to the soul being different from the highest Self. That
the reference pointed out by the purvapakshin is not to the
individual soul will, moreover, be shown in one of the next
Sutras (I, 3, 31).
19. If it be said that from the subsequent (chapter
it appears that the individual soul is meant), (we
point out that what is there referred to is) rather
(the individual soul in so far) as its true nature has
become manifest (i. e. as it is non-different from
Brahman).
The doubt whether, * on account of the reference to the
other,’ the individual soul might not possibly be meant, has
been discarded on the ground of ‘impossibility/ But, like
a dead man on whom amrzta has been sprinkled, that doubt
rises again, drawing new strength from the subsequent
chapter which treats of Pra^clpati. For there he (Pra^ 4 pati)
184
VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
at the outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin
and the like, is that which is to be searched out, that which
we must try to understand ( Kh . Up. VIII, 7, 1); after that
he points out that the seer within the eye, i. e. the individual
soul, is the Self (‘ that person that is seen in the eye is the
Self,’ VIII, 7, 3); refers again and again to the same entity
(in the clauses ‘I shall explain him further to you/ VIII, 9,
3 ; VIII, 10, 4); and (in the explanations fulfilling the given
promises) again explains the (nature of the) same individual
soul in its different states (‘He who moves about happy
in dreams is the Self/ VIII, 10, 1 ; ‘When a man being
asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest sees no dreams, that is
the Self/ VIII, 11, 1). The clause attached to both these
explanations (viz. ‘ That is the immortal, the fearless;
that is Brahman ’) shows, at the same time, the individual
soul to be free from sin, and the like. After that Pra^apati,
having discovered a shortcoming in the condition of deep
sleep (in consequence of the expostulation of Indra,‘ In that
way he does not know himself that he is I, nor does he
know these beings/ VIII, 11, 2), enters on a further expla¬
nation (‘ I shall explain him further to you, and nothing more
than this ’), begins by blaming the (soul’s) connexion with the
body, and finally declares the individual soul, when it has
risen from the body, to be the highest person. (‘ Thus does
that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own
form as soon as it has approached the highest light. That
is the highest person.’)—From this it appears that there is a
possibility of the qualities of the highest Lord belonging to the
individual soul also, and on that account we maintain that the
term,‘ the small ether within it/ refers to the individual soul.
This position we counter-argue as follows. ‘ But in so far
as its nature has become manifest. 5 The particle ‘ but 5 (in
the Sutra) is meant to set aside the view of the purvapakshin,
so that the sense of the Sutra is, ‘Not even on account of
the subsequent chapter a doubt as to the small ether being
the individual soul is possible, because there also that which
is meant to be intimated is the individual soul, in so far only
as its (true) nature has become manifest. 5 The Sutra uses
the expression ‘ he whose nature has become manifest/
I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 1 9 .
185
which qualifies ^iva, the individual soul, with reference to
its previous condition \ — The meaning is as follows.
Pra^dpati speaks at first of the seer characterised by the
eye (‘ That person which is within the eye/ &c.); shows
thereupon, in the passage treating of (the reflection in) the
waterpan, that he (viz. the seer) has not his true Self in
the body; refers to him repeatedly as the subject to be
explained (in the clauses ‘ I shall explain him further
to you ’); and having then spoken of him as subject to
the states of dreaming and deep sleep, finally explains
the individual soul in its real nature, i. e. in so far as
it is the highest Brahman, not in so far as it is indi¬
vidual soul (‘As soon as it has approached the highest
light it appears in its own form ’). The highest light
mentioned, in the passage last quoted, as what is to be
approached, is nothing else but the highest Brahman,
which is distinguished by such attributes as freeness from
sin, and the like. That same highest Brahman constitutes
—as we know from passages such as ‘ that art thou ’—the
real nature of the individual soul, while its second nature,
i. e. that aspect of it which depends on fictitious limiting
conditions, is not its real nature. For as long as the indi¬
vidual soul does not free itself from Nescience in the form of
duality—which Nescience may be compared to the mistake
of him who in the twilight mistakes a post for a man—and
does not rise to the knowledge of the Self, whose nature is
unchangeable, eternal Cognition—which expresses itself in
the form ‘ I am Brahman’—so long it remains the individual
soul. But when, discarding the aggregate of body, sense-
organs and mind, it arrives, by means of Scripture, at the
knowledge that it is not itself that aggregate, that it does
not form part of transmigratory existence, but is the True,
the Real, the Self, whose nature is pure intelligence; then
1 The masculine c avirbhutasvarupa^ ’ qualifies the substantive
^•iva^ which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the £iva whose
true nature has become manifest, i. e. which has become Brahman,
is no longer £iva; hence the explanatory statement that the term
g-iva is used with reference to what the £iva was before it became
Brahman.
i86
VEDANTA-SljTRAS,
knowing itself to be of the nature of unchangeable, eternal
Cognition, it lifts itself above the vain conceit of being one
with this body, and itself becomes the Self, whose nature is
unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in such
scriptural passages as £ He who knows the highest Brahman
becomes even Brahman ’ (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9). And this is
the real nature of the individual soul by means of which it
arises from the body and appears in its own form.
Here an objection may be raised. How, it is asked, can we
speak of the true nature (svarupa) of that which is unchanging
and eternal, and then say that‘ it appears in its own form
(true nature) ?’ Of gold and similar substances, whose true
nature becomes hidden, and whose specific qualities are
rendered non-apparent by their contact with some other
substance, it may be said that their true nature is rendered
manifest when they are cleaned by the application of some
acid substance; so it may be said, likewise, that the stars,
whose light is during daytime overpowered (by the superior
brilliancy of the sun), become manifest in their true nature
at night when the overpowering (sun) has departed. But it
is impossible to speak of an analogous overpowering of the
eternal light of intelligence by whatever agency, since, like
ether, it is free from all contact, and since, moreover, such
an assumption would be contradicted by what we actually
observe. For the (energies of) seeing, hearing, noticing,
cognising constitute the character of the individual soul,
and that character is observed to exist in full perfection,
even in the case of that individual soul which has not yet
risen beyond the body. Every individual soul carries on
the course of its practical existence by means of the activities
of seeing, hearing, cognising; otherwise no practical existence
at all would be possible. If, on the other hand, that character
would realise itself in the case of that soul only which has
risen above the body, the entire aggregate of practical exis¬
tence, as it actually presents itself prior to the soul’s rising,
would thereby be contradicted. We therefore ask : Wherein
consists that (alleged) rising from the body ? Wherein con¬
sists that appearing (of the soul) in its own form ?
To this we make the following reply.—Before the rise of
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9 .
187
discriminative knowledge the nature of the individual soul,
which is (in reality) pure light, is non-discriminated as it
were from its limiting adjuncts consisting of body, senses,
mind, sense-objects and feelings, and appears as consisting
of the energies of seeing and so on. Similarly—to quote an
analogous case from ordinary experience—the true nature
of a pure crystal, i. e. its transparency and whiteness, is,
before the rise of discriminative knowledge (on the part of
the observer), non-discriminated as it were from any limiting
adjuncts of red or blue colour; while, as soon as through
some means of true cognition discriminative knowledge has
arisen, it is said to have now accomplished its true nature,
i. e. transparency and whiteness, although in reality it had
already done so before. Thus the discriminative knowledge,
effected by 6ruti, on the part of the individual soul which
previously is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting
adjuncts, is (according to the scriptural passage under dis¬
cussion) the soul’s rising from the body, and the fruit of that
discriminative knowledge is its accomplishment in its true
nature, i. e. the comprehension that its nature is the pure
Self. Thus the embodiedness and the non-embodiedness of
the Self are due merely to discrimination and non-discrimi¬
nation, in agreement with the mantra, 4 Bodiless within the
bodies,’ &c. (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22), and the statement of Smrzti
as to the non-difference between embodiedness and non-
embodiedness 4 Though dwelling in the body, O Kaunteya,
it does not act and is not tainted’ (Bha. Gi. XIII, 31).
The individual soul is therefore called c That whose true
nature is non-manifest ’ merely on account of the absence of
discriminative knowledge, and it is called 4 That whose
nature has become manifest ’ on account of the presence of
such knowledge. Manifestation and non-manifestation of
its nature of a different kind are not possible, since its
nature is nothing but its nature (i. e. in reality is always the
same). Thus the difference between the individual soul and
the highest Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to
any reality, since, like ether, the highest Self is not in real
contact with anything.
And wherefrom is all this to be known?—From the instruc-
188
VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
tion given by Pra^apati who, after having referred to the
^iva (‘ the person that is seen in the eye,’ &c.), continues
‘ This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. 5 If
the well-known seer within the eye were different from
Brahman which is characterised as the immortal and fear¬
less, it would not be co-ordinated (as it actually is) with the
immortal, the fearless, and Brahman. The reflected Self, on
the other hand, is' not spoken of as he who is characterised
by the eye (the seer wdthin the eye), for that would render
Pra^&pati obnoxious to the reproach of saying deceitful
things.—So also, in the second section, the passage, ‘ He
who moves about happy in dreams,’ &c. does not refer to a
being different from the seeing person within the eye spoken
of in the first chapter, (but treats of the same topic) as
appears from the introductory clause, ‘ I shall explain him
further to you.’ Moreover 1 , a person who is conscious of
having seen an elephant in a dream and of no longer seeing
it when awake discards in the waking state the object which
he had seen (in his sleep), but recognises himself when awake
to be the same person who saw something in the dream.—
Thus in the third section also Pra^*apati does indeed
declare the absence of all particular cognition in the state
of deep sleep, but does not contest the identity of the
cognising Self (‘ In that way he does not know himself that
he is I, nor all these beings 5 ). The following clause also,
‘ He is gone to utter annihilation, 5 is meant to intimate only
the annihilation of all specific cognition, not the annihilation
of the cogniser. For there is no destruction of the knowing
of the knower as—according to another scriptural pas¬
sage (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 30)—that is imperishable.—Thus,
again, in the fourth section the introductory phrase
of Pra^apati is, ‘ I shall explain him further to you and
nothing different from this; 5 he thereupon refutes the con¬
nexion (of the Self) with the body and other limiting
conditions (‘ Maghavat, this body is mortal, 5 &c.), shows the
individual soul—which is there called ‘ the serene being 5 —
1 To state another reason showing that the first and second
chapters of Pra^apati’s instruction refer to the same subject.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9 .
189
in the state when it has reached the nature of Brahman
(‘ It appears in its own form ’), and thus proves the soul to
be non-different from the highest Brahman whose charac¬
teristics are immortality and fearlessness.
Some (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest
Self is meant (in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate
to understand the words c This (him) I will explain further/
&c., as referring to the individual soul, and therefore suppose
that the reference is (not to the individual soul forming the
topic of the three preceding sections, but) to the Self
possessing the qualities of freeness from sin, &c., which Self
is pointed out at the beginning of the entire chapter (VII,
1).—Against this interpretation we remark that, in the first
place, it disregards the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i. e.
the c this 5 in c this I will explain ’) which rests on something
approximate (i.e. refers to something mentioned not far off),
and, in the second place, is opposed to the word c further’ (or
‘ again ’) met with in the text, since from that interpretation it
would follow that what had been discussed in the preceding
sections is not again discussed in the subsequent section.
Moreover, if Pra^apati, after having made a promise in the
clause, c This I shall explain ’ (where that clause occurs for the
first time), did previously to the fourth section explain a
different topic in each section, we should have to conclude that
he acted deceitfully.—Hence (our opinion about the purport
of the whole chapter remains valid, viz. that it sets forth how)
the unreal aspect of the individual soul as such—which is a
mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by all the desires
and aversions attached to agents and enjoyers, and is con¬
nected with evils of various kinds—is dissolved by true
knowledge, and how the soul is thus led over into the
opposite state, i. e. into its true state in which it is one with
the highest Lord and distinguished by freedom from sin and
similar attributes. The whole process is similar to that by
which an imagined snake passes over into a rope as soon as
the mind of the beholder has freed itself from its erroneous
imagination.
Others again, and among them some of ours (asmadiyai*
kdi ke^it), are of opinion that the individual soul as such
190
VEDANTA-SfjTRAS.
is real. To the end of refuting all these speculators who
obstruct the way to the complete intuition of the unity
of the Self this ^ariraka-^stra has been set forth, whose
aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever
unchanging, whose substance is cognition x , and who, by
means of Nescience, manifests himself in various ways, just
as a thaumaturg appears in different shapes by means of his
magical power. Besides that Lord there is no other sub¬
stance of cognition.—If, now, the Stitrakara raises and
refutes the doubt whether a certain passage which (in
reality) refers to the Lord does refer to the individual soul,
as he does in this and the preceding Sutras 1 2 , he does so
for the following purpose. To the highest Self which is
eternally pure, intelligent and free, which is never changing,
one only, not in contact with anything, devoid of form, the
opposite characteristics of the individual soul are errone¬
ously ascribed; just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to
the colourless ether. In order to remove this erroneous
opinion by means of Vedic passages tending either to prove
the unity of the Self or to disprove the doctrine of duality
—which passages he strengthens by arguments—he insists
on the difference of the highest Self from the individual
soul, does however not mean to prove thereby that the soul
is different from the highest Self, but, whenever speaking of
the soul, refers to its distinction (from the Self) as forming
an item of ordinary thought, due to the power of Nescience.
For thus, he thinks, the Vedic injunctions of works which are
given with a view to the states of acting and enjoying,
natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not stultified.—
That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is the real
purport of the .yastra’s teaching, the Sutrakara declares, for
instance, in I, i, 30 3 . The refutation of the reproach of
1 I. e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.
2 Although in reality there is no such thing as an individual
soul.
3 Nanu ^ivabrahma/zor aikyam na kvapi sutrakaro mukhato
vadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, ato naikyam ish/am tatraha
pratipadyam tv iti.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 21.
IQI
futility raised against the injunctions of works has already
been set forth by us, on the ground of the distinction
between such persons as possess full knowledge, and such as
do not.
20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has
a different meaning.
The alleged reference to the individual soul which has
been pointed out (by the purvapakshin) in the passage
complementary to the passage about the small ether
(‘Now that serene being/ &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if the
small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither
the worship of the individual soul nor any qualification of
the subject under discussion (viz. the small ether), and is
therefore devoid of meaning.—On that account the Sutra
declares that the reference has another meaning, i. e. that
the reference to the individual soul is not meant to deter¬
mine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the nature
of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The indi¬
vidual soul which, in the passage referred to, is called the
serene being, acts in the waking state as the ruler of the
a gg re g ate comprising the body and the sense-organs;
permeates in sleep the nadis of the body, and enjoys the
dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking
state; and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises
in the state of deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion
with the gross and the subtle body, reaches the highest
light, i. e. the highest Brahman previously called ether, and
thus divesting itself of the state of specific cognition appears
in its own (true) nature. The highest light which the soul
is to reach and through which it is manifested in its true
nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there
represented as the object of worship.—In this sense the
reference to the individual soul can be admitted by those
also who maintain that in reality the highest Lord is
meant.
21. If it be said that on account of the scriptural
192
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
declaration of the smallness (of the ether) (the Lord
cannot be meant; we reply that) that has been ex¬
plained (before).
The purvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of
the ether stated by Scripture (‘ In it is that small ether ’)
does not agree with the highest Lord, that it may however
be predicated of the individual soul which (in another
passage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark
calls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted
already, it having been shown—under I, 2, 7—that a rela¬
tive smallness may be attributed to the Lord. The same
refutation is—as the Sutra points out—to be applied here
also.—That smallness is, moreover, contradicted by that
scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the
heart) with the known (universal) ether. (‘ As large as is
this ether, so large is the ether within the heart. 3 )
22. On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining
after), (that after which sun, moon, &c. are said to
shine is the highest Self), and (because by the light)
of him (all this is said to be lighted).
We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), ‘ The
sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor
these lightnings, much less this fire. After him when he
shines everything shines; by the light of him all this is
lighted. 3 The question here arises whether he ‘ after whom
when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all
this is lighted/ is some luminous substance, or the highest
Self (pra^a dtman).
A luminous substance, the pfirvapakshin maintains.—
Why?—Because the passage denies the shining only of
such luminous bodies as the sun and the like. It is known
(from every-day experience) that luminous bodies such as
the moon and the stars do not shine at daytime when the
sun, which is itself a luminous body, is shining. Hence we
infer that that thing on account of which all this, includ¬
ing the moon, the stars, and the sun himself, does not
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 22.
193
shine is likewise a thing of light. The * shining after 5
also is possible only if there is a luminous body already;
for we know from experience that ‘acting after 5 (imita¬
tion) of any kind takes place only when there are more
than one agent of similar nature; one man, for instance,
walks after another man who walks himself. Therefore
we consider it settled that the passage refers to some
luminous body.
To this we reply that the highest Self only can be
meant.—Why?—On account of the acting after. The
shining after mentioned in the passage, £ After him when
he shines everything shines, 5 is possible only if the pragma
Self, i. e. the highest Self, is understood. Of that pra^a
Self another scriptural passage says, £ His form is light,
his thoughts are true 5 ( Kh . Up. Ill, 14, 2). On the other
hand, it is not by any means known that the sun, &c. shines
after some other luminous body. Moreover, on account
of the equality of nature of all luminous bodies such as
the sun and the like, there is no need for them of any other
luminous body after which they should shine ; for we see
that a lamp, for instance, does not £ shine after 5 another
lamp. Nor is there any such absolute rule (as the ptir-
vapakshin asserted) that acting after is observed only
among things of similar nature. It is rather observed
among things of dissimilar nature also ; for a red-hot iron
ball acts after, i. e. burns after the burning fire, and the dust
of the ground blows (is blown) after the blowing wind.—
The clause £ on account of the acting after 5 (which forms
part of the Sutra) points to the shining after (mentioned
in the scriptural jloka under discussion); the clause £ and
of him 5 points to the fourth pada of the same jloka. The
meaning of this latter clause is that the cause assigned
for the light of the sun, &c. (in the passage £ by the light
of him everything is lighted 5 ) intimates the pra^Tza Self.
For of that Self Scripture says, ‘Him the gods worship
as the light of lights, as immortal time 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4,
16). That, on the other hand, the light of the sun, the
moon, &c. should shine by some other (physical) light is, in
the first place, not known ; and, in the second place, absurd
[34] o
194
vedanta-s6tras.
as one (physical) light is counteracted by another.—Or
else the cause assigned for the shining does not apply only
to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in thedoka;
but the meaning (of the last pada) rather is—as we may
conclude from the comprehensive statement £ all this ’—
that the manifestation of this entire world consisting of
names and forms, acts, agents and fruits (of action) has
for its cause the existence of the light of Brahman ; just
as the existence of the light of the sun is the cause of the
manifestation of all form and colour.—Moreover, the text
shows by means of the word £ there ’ ( £ the sun does not
shine there/ &c.) that the passage is to be connected with
the general topic, and that topic is Brahman as appears
from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5 > £ In whom the heaven, the earth, and
the sky are woven/ &c. The same appears from a passage
subsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately pre¬
ceding the passage under discussion). £ In the highest
golden sheath there is the Brahman without passion and
without parts; that is pure, that is the light of lights, that
is it which they know who know the Self.’ This passage
giving rise to the question, £ How is it the light of lights ? 5
there is occasion for the reply given in £ The sun does
not shine there,’ &c.—In refutation of the assertion that
the shining of luminous bodies such as the sun and the
moon can be denied only in case of there being another
luminous body—as, for instance, the light of the moon and
the stars is denied only when the sun is shining—we point
out that it has been shown that he (the Self) only can be
the luminous being referred to, nothing else. And it is
quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon, and so on
with regard to Brahman ; for whatever is perceived is
perceived by the light of Brahman only so that sun, moon,
&c. can be said to shine in it; while Brahman as self-
luminous is not perceived by means of any other light.
Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested
by anything else; according to such scriptural passages as,
£ By the Self alone as his light man sits/ &c. (B ri. Up.
IV, 3, 6), and £ He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be
comprehended 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 2, 4).
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 24 .
195
23. Moreover Smrzti also speaks of him (i. e. of
the prS^Tza Self as being the universal light).
Moreover that aspect of the pra^a Self is spoken of
in Smrzti also, viz. in the Bhagavad Gita (XV, 6, 12),
‘ Neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the fire illumines that;
having gone into which men do not return, that is my
highest seat. 5 And ‘ The light which abiding in the sun
illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon
and that which is in the fire, all that light know to be
mine. 5
24. On account of the term, (viz. the term ‘ lord ’
applied to it) the (person) measured (by a thumb) (is
the highest Lord).
We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), ‘The person of the size of
a thumb stands in the middle of the Self, 5 &c., and (II,
4, 13), ‘That person, of the size of a thumb, is like a light
without smoke, lord of the past and of the future, he is
the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that. 5 —The
question here arises whether the person of the size of a
thumb mentioned in the text is the cognitional (individual)
Self or the highest Self.
The pfirvapakshin maintains that on account of the
declaration of the person’s size the cognitional Self is
meant. For to the highest Self which is of infinite length
and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the measure of
a span; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which
is connected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size
of a span may, by means of some fictitious assumption, be
predicated. Smrzti also confirms this, ‘Then Yama drew
forth, by force, from the body of Satyavat the person of
the size of a thumb tied to Yama’s noose and helpless 5
(Mahabh. Ill, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by
force the highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer
to the transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a
thumb, and we thence infer that the same Self is meant in
the Vedic passage under discussion.
To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only
196
VED AN T A-s6 TR AS.
be the highest Lord.—Why?—On account of the term
‘ lord of the past and of the future.’ For none but the
highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past and the
future.—Moreover, the clause ‘this is that’ connects the
passage with that which had been enquired about, and
therefore forms the topic of discussion. And w T hat had
been enquired about is Brahman, ‘ That which thou seest
as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as
neither past nor future, tell me that ’ (I, 2, 14).—‘ On ac¬
count of the term,’ i. e. on account of the direct statement,
in the text, of a designation, viz. the term ‘ Lord,’ we under¬
stand that the highest Lord is meant 1 .—But still the question
remains how a certain extension can be attributed to the
omnipresent highest Self.—The reply to this is given in
the next Sutra.
25. But with reference to the heart (the highest
Self is said to be of the size of a span), as men are
entitled (to the study of the Veda).
The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord,
although omnipresent with reference to his abiding within
the heart; just as to ether (space) the measure of a cubit
is ascribed with reference to the joint of a bamboo. For,
on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be ascribed
directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure,
and, on the other hand, it has been shown that none but
the highest Lord can be meant here, on account of the
term ‘ Lord,’ and so on.—But—an objection may be raised—-
as the size of the heart varies in the different classes of
living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration
1 This last sentence is directed against the possible objection
that ‘^abda/ which the Sutra brings forward as an argument in
favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of ‘ sentence *
(vakya), and is therefore of less force than linga, i. e. indicatory or
inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the
ahgush/Zzamatratd of the purusha, and favours the ^iva-interpreta-
tion. *Sabda, the text remarks, here means miti, i. e. direct enun¬
ciation, and jruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than linga.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 25 .
197
of the highest Self being of the size of a thumb can be
explained with reference to the heart.—To this objection
the second half of the Sutra replies: On account of men
(only) being entitled. For the .rastra, although propounded
without distinction (i. e. although not itself specifying
what class of beings is to proceed according to its pre¬
cepts), does in reality entitle men 1 only (to act according to
its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are,
firstly, capable (of complying with the precepts of the
.yastra); are, secondly, desirous (of the results of actions
enjoined by the .y&stra); are, thirdly, not excluded by pro¬
hibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about
the upanayana ceremony and so on 2 * * . This point has been
explained in the section treating of the definition of adhi-
karA (P&rva Mim. S. VI, 1).—Now the human body has
ordinarily a fixed size, and hence the heart also has a fixed
size, viz. the size of a thumb. Hence, as men (only) are
entitled to study and practise the .yastra, the highest Self
may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart,
be spoken of as being of the size of a thumb.—In reply
to the purvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the
statement of size and on account of Smrfti we can under¬
stand by him who is of the size of a thumb the trans¬
migrating soul only, we remark that—analogously to such
passages as ‘That is the Self,’ ‘That art thou 5 —our passage
1 I. e. men belonging to the three tipper castes,
2 The first reason excludes animals, gods, and rfshis. Gods
cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of which
is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering meant
for the gods. ivVshis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of
whose performance the ancestral rfshis of the sacrificer are invoked.
—The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is
emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable
fruits of sacrifices.—The third and fourth reasons exclude the
ASftdras who are indirectly disqualified for gastric works because the
Veda in different places gives rules for the three higher castes only,
and for whom the ceremony of the upanayana—indispensable for
all who wish to study the Veda—is not prescribed.—Cp. Purva
Mima/rcsa Sfftras VI, i.
vedAnta-s^tras.
198
teaches that the transmigrating soul which is of the size
of a thumb is (in reality) Brahman. For the Vedanta-
passages have a twofold purport; some of them aim at
setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at
teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest
Self. Our passage teaches the unity of the individual
soul with the highest Self, not the size of anything. This
point is made clear further on in the Upanishad, ‘ The
person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always
settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self
forth from his body with steadiness, as one draws the pith
from a reed. Let him know that Self as the Bright, as the
Immortal’ (II, 6, 17).
26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are
qualified for the study and practice of the Veda),
on account of the possibility (of it), according to
BadarAya^a.
It has been said above that the passage about him who
is of the size of a thumb has reference to the human heart,
because men are entitled to study and act according to the
j-astra. This gives us an occasion for the following discussion.
—It is true that the ^astra entitles men, but, at the same time,
there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to the know¬
ledge of Brahman; the teacher, Badarayazza, rather thinks
that the .rastra entitles those (classes of beings) also which
are above men, viz. gods, and so on.—On what account?—
On the account of possibility.—For in their cases also the
different causes on which the qualification depends, such as
having certain desires, and so on, may exist. In the first
place, the gods also may have the desire of final release,
caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers
are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be
capable of it as their corporeality appears from mantras,
arthavadas, itihasas, purazzas, and ordinary experience. In
the third place, there is no prohibition (excluding them like
»Shdras). Nor does, in the fourth place, the scriptural rule
about the upanayana-ceremony annul their title; for that
I ADHyAyA, 3 PADA, 27 .
7 99
ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to
the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study).
That the gods, moreover, for the purpose of acquiring
knowledge, undergo discipleship, and the like, appears
from such scriptural passages as 4 One hundred and one
years Indra lived as a disciple with Pra^pati ’ (Kh. Up.
VIII, 11, 3), and 4 Bhrzgu Varu/zi went to his father Varu/za,
saying, 44 Sir, teach me Brahman” 5 (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1).—And
the reasons which have been given above against gods and
rishis being entitled to perform religious works (such as
sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there being no other gods
(to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of there being
no other ri shis (who could be invoked during the sacrifice),
do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra
and the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge,
have no acts to perform with a view to Indra, and so on ;
nor have Bhrigu and other n ’shis, in the same case, to do
anything with the circumstance of their belonging to the
same gotra as Bhrzgu, &c. What, then, should stand in
the way of the gods’ and ri shis’ right to acquire knowledge ?
—Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a
thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c.
is admitted ; it has then only to be explained in each par¬
ticular case by a reference to the particular size of the
thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).
27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality
of the gods involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial)
works; we deny that, on account of the observation
of the assumption (on the part of the gods) of several
(forms).
If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men,
to the acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption
of their corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in conse¬
quence of that corporeality, that Indra and the other gods
stand in the relation of subordinate members (anga) to
sacrificial acts, by means of their being present in person
200
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
just as the priests are. But this admission will lead to £ a
contradiction in the sacrificial acts,’ because the circumstance
of the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means
of their personal presence, is neither actually observed nor
possible. For it is not possible that one and the same
Indra should, at the same time, be present in person at many
sacrifices.
To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction.—
Why?—On account of the assumption of several (forms).
For it is possible for one and the same divine Self to assume
several forms at the same time.—How is that known ?—From
observation.—Fora scriptural passage at first replies to the
question how many gods there are, by the declaration that
there are £ Three and three hundred, three and three thou¬
sand/ and subsequently, on the question who they are,
declares £ They (the 303 and 3003) are only the various
powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods 5
(B ri. Up. Ill, 9,1,2); showing thereby that one and the
same divine Self may at the same time appear in many
forms. After that it proceeds to show that these thirty-
three gods themselves are in reality contained in six, five,
&c., and, finally, by replying to the question, ‘Who is the one
god? 5 that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are
all forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the
same time appear in many forms.—Smrz'ti also has a similar
statement, £ A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may, by his
power, multiply his Self in many thousand shapes, and in
them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy
the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and,
finally, he may again retract them all, just as the sun
retracts the multitude of his rays. 5 If such Smrzti pas¬
sages as the above declare that even Yogins, who have
merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as
subtlety of body, and the like, may animate several bodies
at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must
the gods be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers ?
The gods thus being able to assume several shapes, a god
may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation
with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the
x adhyaya, 3 pAda, 28.
201
while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to
render himself invisible.
The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a
different manner also, viz. as meaning that even beings
enjoying corporeal individuality are seen to enter into mere
subordinate relation to more than one action. Sometimes,
indeed, one individual does not at the same time enter into
subordinate relation to different actions ; one Brahma^a, for
instance, is not at the same time entertained by many enter¬
tainers. But in other cases one individual stands in subor¬
dinate relation to many actions at the same time; one
Brahma^a, for instance, may constitute the object of the
reverence done to him by many persons at the same time.
Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the
parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering)
with a view (to some divinity), many persons may at the
same time part with their respective offerings, all of them
having in view one and the same individual divinity. The
individuality of the gods does not, therefore, involve any
contradiction in sacrificial works.
28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result)
in respect of the word; we refute this objection on
the ground that (the world) originates from the
word, as is shown by perception and inference.
Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the
corporeal individuality of the gods, no contradiction will
result in the case of sacrificial works. Still a contradic¬
tion will result in respect of the ‘word’ (^abda).—How?—-
The authoritativeness of the Veda has been proved ‘ from
its independence,’ basing on the original (eternal) connexion
of the word with its sense (‘the thing signified ’) 1 . But now,
although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such
as admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural
powers, be able to enjoy at the same time the oblations
1 The reference is to Pfirva Mima/rcsa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2,
21, as stated in Muirs Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69),
202
vedanta-sOtras.
which form part of several sacrifices, yet it will, on account
of its very individuality, be subject to birth and death just
as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion of the
eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a
contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritative¬
ness proved to belong to the word of the Veda.
To this we reply that no such contradiction exists.—Why?
— 4 On account of their origin from it.’ For from that very
same word of the Veda the world, with the gods and other
beings, originates.—But—an objection will be raised—in
Sutra I, i, 2 (‘That whence there is the origin, &c. of this
world 5 ) it has been proved that the world originates from Brah¬
man ; how then can it be said here that it originates from the
word ? And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from
the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the contradiction
in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as the
Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the VLrvedevas, and the
Maruts 1 are non-eternal beings, because produced; and if
they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non-
eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them?
For it is known from every-day life that only when the son
of Devadatta is born, the name Ya^/vadatta is given to him
(lit. made for him) 2 . Hence we adhere to our opinion
that a contradiction does arise with regard to the ‘ word. 5
This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe
the eternity of the connexion between such words as cow,
and so on, and the things denoted by them. For, although
the individuals of the (species denoted by the word) cow
have an origin, their species 3 does not have an origin, since
of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions
the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is
with the species that the words are connected, not with the
individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not
capable of entering into that connexion. Hence, although
1 In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.
2 Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing
denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.
8 Akrfti, best translated by etdos.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28.
203
the individuals do not originate, no contradiction arises
in the case of words such as cow, and the like, since the
species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are
admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the
case of such words as Vasu, and the like, since the species
denoted by them are eternal. And that the gods, and so
on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from
the descriptions of their various personal appearance,
such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such
as ‘ Indra ’ rest on the connexion (of some particular being)
with some particular place, analogously to terms such as
‘ army-leader; ’ hence, whoever occupies that particular
place is called by that particular name.—The origination
of the world from the‘ word 5 is not to be understood in that
sense, that the word constitutes the material cause of the
world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the ever¬
lasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in
connexion with their eternal sense (i. e. the akrztis denoted),
the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable
of having those words applied to them is called an origina¬
tion from those words.
How then is it known that the world originates from
the word ?—‘ From perception and inference.’ Perception
here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative,
is independent (of anything else). ‘Inference’ denotes
Smr/ti which, in order to be authoritative, depends on
something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that
creation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural
passage says, ‘At the word these Pra^*apati created the
gods; at the words were poured out he created men ; at
the word drops he created the fathers; at the words
through the filter he created the Soma cups ; at the words
the swift ones he created the stotra; at the words to all
he created the i'astra ; at the word blessings he created
the other beings.’ And another passage says, ‘He with
his mind united himself with speech (i.e. the word of
the Veda .—Bru Up. I, 2,4). Thus Scripture declares in
different places that the word precedes the creation.—
Smrzti also delivers itself as follows, ‘In the beginning
204
vedanta-sOtras.
a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or end, formed
of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhu, from which
all activities proceeded.’ By the ‘uttering’ of the voice
we have here to understand the starting of the oral
tradition (of the Veda), because of a voice without
beginning or end ‘uttering 5 in any other sense cannot
be predicated.—Again, we read, ‘In the beginning Ma¬
li e.rvara shaped from the words of the Veda the names
and forms of all beings and the procedure of all actions.’
And again, ‘ The several names, actions, and conditions of
all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of the
Veda’ (Manu I, 21). Moreover,we all know from observa¬
tion that any one when setting about some thing which he
wishes to accomplish first remembers the word denoting
the thing, and after that sets to work. We therefore con¬
clude that before the creation the Vedic words became
manifest in the mind of Pra^*apati the creator, and that
after that he created the things corresponding to those
words. Scripture also, where it says (Taitt. Bra. II, 2, 4, 2)
‘uttering bhur he created the earth,’ &c., shows that the
worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e. were
created from the words bhur, &c. which had become mani¬
fest in the mind (of Pra^*apati).
Of what nature then is the ‘ word ’ with a view to which
it is said that the world originates from the ‘word?’—It
is the spho/a, the purvapakshin says 1 . For on the as-
1 The purvapakshin, i. e. here the grammarian maintains, for the
reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of
words a supersensuous entity called spho/a which is manifested by
the letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself mani¬
fests the sense of the word. The term spho/a may, according as it
is viewed in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or
that which is manifested.—The spho/a is a grammatical fiction, the
word in so far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we
cannot identify it with the ‘ notion ’ (as Deussen seems inclined to do,
p. 80) follows from its being distinctly called va^aka or abhidhayaka,
and its being represented as that which causes the conception
of the sense of a word (arthadhihetu).
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28.
205
sumption that the letters are the word, the doctrine that
the individual gods, and so on, originates from the eternal
words of the Veda could not in any way be proved,
since the letters perish as soon as they are produced
(i. e. pronounced). These perishable letters are more¬
over apprehended as differing according to the pronun¬
ciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are
able to determine, merely from the sound of the voice
of some unseen person whom we hear reading, who is
reading, whether Devadatta or Ya^/zadatta or some other
man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension
of difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one;
for we do not apprehend anything else whereby it is
refuted. Nor is it reasonable to maintain that the ap¬
prehension of the sense of a word results from the letters.
For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself
intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assump¬
tion 1 ; nor that there takes place a simultaneous appre¬
hension of the whole aggregate of letters; since the letters
succeed one another in time. Nor can we admit the explan¬
ation that the last letter of the word together with the im¬
pressions produced by the perception of the preceding
letters is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For
the word makes us apprehend the sense only if it is itself
apprehended in so far as having reference to the mental
grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and the
sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire
only when it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension
of the last letter combined with the impressions produced
by the preceding letters does not actually take place,
because those impressions are not objects of perception 2 .
Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those im-
1 For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not
observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have
to be declared useless.
2 In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the word,
there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus the
impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to
206
vedAnta-s6tras.
pressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be
inferred from their effects, and that thus) the actual per¬
ception of the last letter combined with the impressions
left by the preceding letters—which impressions are appre¬
hended from their effects—is that which intimates the sense
of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the
remembrance of the entire word, is itself something con¬
sisting of parts which succeed each other in time.—From
all this it follows that the spho/a is the word. After the
apprehending agent, i. e. the buddhi, has, through the ap¬
prehension of the several letters of the word, received
rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have
been matured through the apprehension of the last letter,
the spho/a presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the
object of one mental act of apprehension.—And it must not
be maintained that that one act of apprehension is merely
an act of remembrance having for its object the letters
of the word; for the letters which are more than one
cannot form the object of one act of apprehension.—As
that spho/a is recognised as the same as often as the word
is pronounced, it is eternal; while the apprehension of
difference referred to above has for its object the letters
merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature
of the spho/a and possesses denotative power, there is
produced the object denoted, i. e. this world which consists
of actions, agents, and results of action.
Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains
that the letters only are the word.—But—an objection is
raised—it has been said above that the letters no sooner
produced pass away!—That assertion is not true, we reply;
for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they
are produced anew).—Nor can it be maintained that the
recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs,
for instance; for the fact of the recognition being a re¬
cognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted
by any other means of proof.—Nor, again, can it be said
infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the
smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because
the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.
i adhyAya, 3 pAda, 28.
207
that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that
not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only
a letter belonging to the same species as other letters
heard before); for, as a matter of fact, the same individual
letters are recognised. That the recognition of the letters
rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever
the letters are pronounced different individual letters were
apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as
different individuals belonging to the same species. But
this is actually not the case ; for the (same) individual
letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced. If,
for instance, the word cow is pronounced twice, we think
not that two different words have been pronounced, but
that the same individual word has been repeated.—But,
our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that
the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences
of pronunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend
a difference when merely hearing the sound of Devadatta or
Ya^vzadatta reading.—Although, we reply, it is a settled
matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we
admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the
letters; but as the letters are articulated by means of the
conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate,
the teeth, &c.), those differences are rightly ascribed to the
various character of the articulating agents and not to
the intrinsic nature of the letters themselves. Those,
moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are
different have, in order to account for the fact of recogni¬
tion, to assume species of letters, and further to admit
that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by ex¬
ternal factors. Is it then not much simpler to assume,
as we do, that the apprehension of difference is conditioned
by external factors while the recognition is due to the
intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of
recognition is that mental process which prevents us from
looking on the apprehension of difference as having the
letters for its object (so that the opponent was wrong in
denying the existence of such a process). For how should,
for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in
208
vedAnta-s6tras.
the same moment by several persons, be at the same time
of different nature, viz. accented with the udatta, the
anudatta, and the Svarita and nasal as well as non-nasal 1 ?
Or else 2 —and this is the preferable explanation—we
assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not
by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we
have to understand that which enters the ear of a person
who is listening from a distance and not able to distinguish
the separate letters, and which, for a person standing near,
affects the letters with its own distinctions, such as high
or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone that all the
distinctions of udatta, anudatta, and so on depend, and not
on the intrinsic nature of the letters ; for they are recognised
as the same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory
only we gain a basis for the distinctive apprehension of
the udatta, the anudatta, and the like. For on the theory
first propounded (but now rejected), we should have to
assume that the distinctions of udatta and so on are due
to the processes of conjunction and disjunction described
above, since the letters themselves, which are ever re¬
cognised as the same, are not different. But as those
processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter
of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters
any differences based on those processes, and hence the
apprehension of the udatta and so on remains without
a basis.—Nor should it be urged that from the dif¬
ference of the udatta and so on there results also
a difference of the letters recognised. For a difference
in one matter does not involve a difference in some
other matter which in itself is free from difference.
Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the individuals
1 4 How should it be so?’ i.e. it cannot be so; and on that
account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters
themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.
2 With ‘ or else * begins the exposition of the finally accepted
theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as
different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the
upadhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between
articulated letters and non-articulated tone.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 28.
209
are different from each other the species also contains a
difference in itself.
The assumption of the spho/a is further gratuitous, be¬
cause the sense of the word may be apprehended from the
letters.—But—our opponent here objects—I do not assume
the existence of the spho/a. I, on the contrary, actually
perceive it; for after the buddhi has been impressed by the
successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the
spho/a all at once presents itself as the object of cognition.
—You are mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional
act of which you speak is simply the letters of the word.
That one comprehensive cognition which follows upon the
apprehension of the successive letters of the word has for
its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting the
word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the
circumstance that in that final comprehensive cognition
there are included those letters only of which a definite
given word consists, and not any other letters. If that
cognitional act had for its object the spho/a—i.e. something
different from the letters of the given word—then those
letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters
of any other word. But as this is not the case, it follows
that that final comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but
an act of remembrance which has the letters of the word
for its object.—Our opponent has asserted above that the
letters of a word being several cannot form the object of
one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas
which we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army,
or of the numbers ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show
that also such things as comprise several unities can become
the objects of one and the same cognitional act. The idea
which has for its object the word as one whole is a derived
one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one
sense in many letters 1 ; in the same way as the idea of a
3 I. e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its object more
than one letter; but it maybe called one in a secondary sense
because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the letters,
although more than one, express one sense only.
[34] P
210
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
wood, an army, and so on.—But—our opponent may here
object—if the word were nothing else but the letters which
in their aggregate become the object of one mental act,
such couples of words as ^"ara and ra^*a or pika and kapi
would not be cognised as different words ; for here the same
letters are presented to consciousness in each of the words
constituting one couple.—There is indeed, we reply, in
both cases a comprehensive consciousness of the same
totality of letters; but just as ants constitute the idea of a
row only if they march one after the other, so the letters
also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they follow
each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to
reason that the same letters are cognised as different words,
in consequence of the different order in which they are
arranged.
The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are
the word may therefore be finally formulated as follows.
The letters of which a word consists—assisted by a certain
order and number—have, through traditional use, entered
into a connexion with a definite sense. At the time when
they are employed they present themselves as such (i. e. in
their definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after
having apprehended the several letters in succession, finally
comprehends the entire aggregate, and they thus unerringly
intimate to the buddhi their definite sense. This hypothesis
is certainly simpler than the complicated hypothesis of the
grammarians who teach that the spho^a is the word. For
they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to
assume something which is never perceived; the letters
apprehended in a definite order are said to manifest the
spho/a, and the spho/a in its turn is said to manifest the
sense.
Or let it even be admitted that the letters are differ¬
ent ones each time they are pronounced; yet, as in that
case we necessarily must assume species of letters as
the basis of the recognition of the individual letters, the
function of conveying the sense which we have demon¬
strated in the case of the (individual) letters has then to be
attributed to the species.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 30.
21 I
From all this it follows that the theory according to which
the individual gods and so on originate from the eternal
words is unobjectionable.
29. And from this very reason there follows the
eternity of the Veda.
As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence
of the remembrance of an agent only, a doubt with regard
to it had been raised owing to the doctrine that the gods
and other individuals have sprung from it. That doubt
has been refuted in the preceding Sutra.—The present
Sutra now confirms the, already established, eternity of
the Veda. The eternity of the word of the Veda has to
be assumed for this very reason, that the world with its
definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on, originates
from it.—A mantra also (‘ By means of the sacrifice they
followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in
the rzshis,’ Rig-ve da Sawh. X, 71, 3) shows that the
speech found (by the rz'shis) was permanent.—On this
point Vedavyasa also speaks as follows: ‘Formerly the
great rishis , being allowed to do so by Svayambhu, ob¬
tained, through their penance, the Vedas together with
the itih&sas, which had been hidden at the end of the
yuga/
30. And on account of the equality of names and
forms there is no contradiction (to the eternity of
the word of the Veda) in the renovation (of the
world); as is seen from 6ruti and Smrzti.
If—the purvapakshin resumes—the individual gods and so
on did, like the individual animals, originate and pass away
in an unbroken succession so that there would be no break
of the course of practical existence including denominations,
things denominated and agents denominating; the con¬
nexion (between word and thing) would be eternal, and the
objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word
(raised in Sutra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if,
as 5 ruti and Smrz'ti declare, the whole threefold
212
vedanta-s(jtras.
world periodically divests itself of name and form, and is
entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and is after that
produced anew ; how can the contradiction be considered to
have been removed ?
To this we reply: 4 On account of the sameness of name
and form/—Even then the beginninglessness of the world
will have to be admitted (a point which the teacher will
prove later on: 11,1,36). And in the beginningless sa/^-
sara we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and the
dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light
in which we look on the sleeping and waking states, which,
although in them according to Scripture (a kind of) dis¬
solution and origination take place, do not give rise to
any contradiction, since in the later waking state (subse¬
quent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is carried
on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the
waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated
Kaush. Up. Ill, 3, 4 When a man being asleep sees no
dream whatever he becomes one with that pra^/a alone.
Then speech goes to him with all names, the eye with all
forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts.
And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks
proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pr&/zas
proceed, each towards its place; from the pranas the gods,
from the gods the worlds/
Well, the purvapakshin resumes, it may be that no
contradiction arises in the case of sleep, as during the sleep
of one person the practical existence of other persons suffers
no interruption, and as the sleeping person himself when
waking from sleep may resume the very same form of
practical existence which was his previously to his sleep.
The case of a mahapralaya (i. e. a general annihilation of
the world) is however a different one, as then the entire
current of practical existence is interrupted, and the form of
existence of a previous kalpa can be resumed in a subsequent
kalpa no more than an individual can resume that form of
existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.
This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a
mahapralaya does cut short the entire current of practical
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 30.
213
existence, yet, by the favour of the highest Lord, the Lords
(tsvara), such as Hirazzyagarbha and so on, may continue the
same form of existence which belonged to them in the
preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do
not, as we see, resume that form of existence which belonged
to them in a former birth; still we cannot judge of the
Lords as we do of ordinary beings. For as in the series
of beings which descends from man to blades of grass a
successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is
observed—although they all have the common attribute of
being animated—so in the ascending series extending from
man up to Hirazzyagarbha, a gradually increasing manifes¬
tation of knowledge, power, &c. takes place ; a circumstance
which 5 ruti and Smrzti mention in many places, and which
it is impossible to deny. On that account it may very well
be the case that the Lords, such as Hira/zyagarbha and so
on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by superior
knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in
the present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord,
continue (in the present kalpa) the same kind of existence
which they enjoyed in the preceding kalpa; just as a man
who rises from sleep continues the same form of existence
which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus Scripture
also declares, ‘ He who first creates Brahman (Hirazzya-
garbha) and delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is
the light of his own thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for
refuge 5 (vSVet. Up. VI, 18). vSaunaka and others more¬
over declare (in the Anukramazzis of the Veda) that the ten
books (of the Rig-ve da) were seen by Madhu^Mandas and
other ri shis 1 . And, similarly, Smrzti tells us, for every Veda,
of men of exalted mental vision (ri shis) who ‘ saw* 5 the sub¬
divisions of their respective Vedas, such as ka^as and so
on. Scripture also declares that the performance of the
sacrificial action by means of the mantra is to be preceded by
the knowledge of the rzshi and so on,‘ He who makes another
person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which he
1 Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge appertains
not only to Hirazzyagarbha, but to many beings.
214
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
does not know the rishi, the metre, the divinity, and the
Brahma^a, runs against a post, falls into a pit 1 , &c. &c.,
therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra’
(Arsheya Brahma^a, first section).—Moreover, religious duty
is enjoined and its opposite is forbidden, in order that the
animate beings may obtain pleasure and escape pain.
Desire and aversion have for their objects pleasure and
pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and
do not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore
each new creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious
merit and demerit (of the animated beings of the preceding
creation), it is produced with a nature resembling that of
the preceding creation. Thus Smrzti also declares, ‘To
whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had
turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when
created again and again. Whether those actions were
harmful or harmless, gentle or cruel, right or wrong, true
or untrue, influenced by them they proceed ; hence a cer¬
tain person delights in actions of a certain kind.’—More¬
over, this world when being dissolved (in a mahapralaya) is
dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (i*akti)
of the world remains, and (when it is produced again) it
is produced from the root of that potentiality; otherwise
we should have to admit an effect without a cause. Nor
have we the right to assume potentialities of different kind
(for the different periods of the world). Hence, although
the series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series
of different classes of animate beings such as gods, animals,
and men, and the different conditions based on caste,
a^rama, religious duty and fruit (of works), although all
these we say are again and again interrupted and thereupon
produced anew ; we yet have to understand that they are, in
the beginningless sa^sara, subject to a certain determinate¬
ness analogous to the determinateness governing the con¬
nexion between the senses and their objects. For it is
impossible to imagine that the relation of senses and sense-
objects should be a different one in different creations, so
1 Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 30.
215
that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth sense and a
corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest them¬
selves. As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in
all kalpas and as the Lords are able to continue their
previous forms of existence, there manifest themselves, in
each new creation, individuals bearing the same names and
forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and,
owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted
periodical renovations of the world in the form of general
pralayas and general creations do not conflict with the
authoritativeness of the word of the Veda. The permanent
identity of names and forms is declared in .Sruti as well as
Smriti; compare, for instance, Rik. Sawh. X, 190, 3, ‘As
formerly the creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky,
and the air, and the heavenly world ; ’ which passage means
that the highest Lord arranged at the beginning of the
present kalpa the entire world with sun and moon, and so
on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding kalpa.
Compare also Taitt. Brahm. Ill, 1, 4, 1, ‘Agni desired:
May I become the consumer of the food of the gods; for
that end he offered a cake on eight potsherds to Agni and
the K>/ttikas.’ This passage, which forms part of the
injunction of the ish/i to the Nakshatras, declares equality of
name and form connecting the Agni who offered and the
Agni to whom he offered \
Smriti also contains similar statements to be quoted
here; so, for instance, ‘Whatever were the names of the
rzshis and their powers to see the Vedas, the same the
Unborn one again gives to them when they are produced
afresh at the end of the night (the mahapralaya). As the
various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due
time, thus the same beings again appear in the different
yugas. And of whatever individuality the gods of the
1 Asmin kalpe sarvesh&m pramnam dahapakapraka^akari yo
sryam agnir drAyate so*yam agni^ purvasmin kalpe manushya^
san devatvapadaprapakaw karmanush/Myasmin kalpa eta g ^anma
labdhavan ata^ pfirvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhavini m saffzgmm
ajr/tyagnir iti vyapadhyate.—Sayawa on the quoted passage.
216
vedanta-sOtras.
past ages were, equal to them are the present gods in
name and form.’
31. On account of the impossibility of (the gods
being qualified) for the madhu-vidyi, &c. (Taimini
(maintains) the non-qualification (of the gods for
the Brahma-vidya).
A new objection is raised against the averment that the
gods, &c. also are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.
The teacher, Caimini, considers the gods and similar beings
not to have any claim.—Why?—On account of the impos¬
sibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidya, &c. If
their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted,
we should have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidya (‘the
knowledge of the honey ’) also, because that also is a kind
of knowledge not different (from the knowledge of Brahman).
But to admit this latter claim is not possible; for, according
to the passage, ‘ The Sun is indeed the honey of the devas ’
( Kh . Up. Ill, 1,1), men are to meditate on the sun (the
god Aditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the gods
themselves are admitted as meditating worshippers, can
Aditya meditate upon another Aditya ?—Again, the text,
after having enumerated five kinds of nectar, the red one,
&c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the five
classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Maruts, and
S&dhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 4 he
who thus knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with
Agni at their head, he sees the nectar and rejoices,’ &c., and
indicates thereby that those who know the nectars enjoyed
by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the Vasus, &c.
But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus
enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should
they desire to attain ?—We have also to compare the pas¬
sages ‘Agni is one foot, Aditya is one foot, the quarters are
one foot ’ (. Kh . Up. Ill, 18, 2); ‘Air is indeed the absorber ’
(Kh. Up. IV, 3,1); ‘ Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine.’
All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of
certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities them-
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32.
217
selves are not qualified.—So it is likewise impossible that the
ri shis themselves should be qualified for meditations con¬
nected with rzshis, such as expressed in passages like B ri.
Up. II, 2, 4, £ These two are the rzshis Gautama and Bharad-
vaga. ; the right Gautama, the left Bharadva^a.’—Another
reason for the non-qualification of the gods is stated in the
following Sutra.
32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on
account of (the words denoting the devas, &c.) being
(used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.
To that sphere of light, the purvapakshin resumes, which
is stationed in the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions
illumines the world, terms such as Aditya, i. e. the names of
devas, are applied, as we know from the use of ordinary
language, and from Vedic complementary passages 1 . But
of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it should
be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart
and the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming
wishes 2 . For mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely
devoid of intelligence. The same observation applies to
Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps be said that our
objection is not valid, because the personality of the devas
is known from the mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, purazzas,
and from the conceptions of ordinary life 3 ; but we contest
the relevancy of this remark. For the conceptions of ordi¬
nary life do not constitute an independent means of know¬
ledge ; we rather say that a thing is known from ordinary
life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of know¬
ledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means
of knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the
1 As, for instance, ‘ So long as Aditya rises in the east and sets
in the west' ( Kh. Up. Ill, 6 , 4).
2 Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings, and
therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.
3 Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a person
with a staff in his hand, Varuzza with a noose, Indra with a thunder¬
bolt, &c. Sec.
2 18
vedAnta-sutras.
matter under discussion. Itihasas and pura^as again being
of human origin, stand themselves in need of other means
of knowledge on which to base. The arthavada passages
also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the injunctory
passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is
enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute
by themselves reasons for the existence of the personality,
&c. of the devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground
of direct enunciation, &c., are to be employed (at the dif¬
ferent stages of the sacrificial action), have merely the
purpose of denoting things connected with the sacrificial
performance, and do not constitute an independent means
of authoritative knowledge for anything 1 .—For these reasons
the devas, and similar beings, are not qualified for the
knowledge of Brahman.
33. BAdaraya/za, on the other hand, (maintains)
the existence (of qualification for Brahma-vidyS, on
the part of the gods); for there are (passages
indicatory of that).
The expression ‘ on the other hand’ is meant to rebut
the purvapaksha. The teacher, Badaraya^a, maintains the
existence of the qualification on the part of the gods, &c.
For, although the qualification of the gods cannot be ad¬
mitted with reference to the madhu-vidya, and similar topics
of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated,
still they may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brah¬
man, qualification in general depending on the presence of
desire, capability, &c. 2 Nor does the impossibility of quali¬
fication in certain cases interfere with the presence of qualifi¬
cation in those other cases where it is not impossible. To the
case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the case of
men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything,
Brahma^as, for instance, not for the ra£*asuya-sacrifice 3 .
1 On the proper function of arthavada and mantra according to
the Mimatfzsa, cp. Arthasa/rcgraha, Introduction.
2 See above, p. 197.
3 Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33.
219
And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scrip¬
ture, moreover, contains express hints notifying that the
devas are qualified; compare, for instance, B ri, Up. 1 ,4,10,
‘ Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman)
he indeed became that; and the same with ri shis;’ Kh .
Up. VIII, J, <z, ‘They said : Well, let us search for that
Self by which, if one has searched it out, all worlds and all
desires are obtained. Thus saying, Indra went forth from
the Devas, Viro^ana from the Asuras/ Similar statements
are met with in Smrzti, so, for instance, in the colloquy of the
Gandharva and Ya^vliavalkya 1 .—Against the objection raised
in the preceding Sutra (32) we argue as follows. Words
like aditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having
reference to light and the like, yet convey the idea of
certain divine Selfs (persons) endowed with intelligence and
pre-eminent power; for they are used in that sense in
mantras and arthavada passages. For the devas possess,
in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of
residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form
they like. Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavada
passage explaining the words ‘ ram of Medhatithi/ which
form part of the Subrahma^ya-formula, that ‘ Indra, having
assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhatithi, the
descendant of Ka^va 5 (Shadv. Br. I, 1). And thus Smrz'ti
says that ‘Aditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came
to Kunti. 5 Moreover, even in such substances as earth, in¬
telligent ruling beings must be admitted to reside, for that
appears from such scriptural passages as ‘ the earth spoke/
‘ the waters spoke/ &c. The non-intelligence of light and
the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is
admitted in the case of the sun (aditya), &c. also ; but—as
already remarked—from the use of the words in mantras and
1 £rautalingen&num&naMdha/ft darrayitva smartenapi tadbadha/ra
dar-rayati smartam iti. Km atra brahma amritam ki m svid
vedyam anuttamam, ^intayet tatra vai gatvd gandharvo mam
a^rikkhala, Vbvavasus tato ragan vedanta^wanakovida iti moksha-
dharme ^anakaya^avalkyasazravadat prahlada^agarasa/^vada^ kok-
tanumanasiddhir ity artha^.
220
VEDANTA-sdTRAS.
arthavadas it appears that there are intelligent beings of
divine nature (which animate those material elements).
We now turn to the objection (raised above by the pur-
vapakshin) that mantras and arthavadas, as merely sub¬
serving other purposes, have no power of setting forth the
personality of the devas, and remark that not the cir¬
cumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some
other purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a
certain idea furnishes a reason for (our assuming) the
existence of something. This is exemplified by the case
of a person who, having set out for some other purpose,
(nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves,
grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.—But,
the pfirvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by
you is not strictly analogous. In the case of the wanderer,
perception, whose objects the grass and leaves are, is active,
and through it he forms the conception of their existence.
In the case of an arthavada, on the other hand, which, as
forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory
passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the
latter), it is impossible to determine any energy having a
special object of its own. For in general any minor syntac¬
tical unity, which is included in a more comprehensive
syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not
possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its
own. Thus, for instance, we derive, from the combination
of the three words constituting the negative sentence, 4 (Do)
not drink wine, 5 one meaning only, i. e. a prohibition of
drinking wine, and do not derive an additional meaning,
viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of the last
two words, ‘ drink wine. 5 —To this objection we reply, that
the instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter
under discussion). The words of the sentence prohibiting
the drinking of wine form only one whole, and on that
account the separate sense which any minor syntactical unity
included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be
accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavada, on the
other hand, the words constituting the arthavada form a
separate group of their own which refers to some accom-
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33.
221
plished thing 1 , and only subsequently to that, when it comes
to be considered what purpose they subserve, they enter on
the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine,
as an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, ‘He who
is desirous of prosperity is to offer to Vdyu a white animal/
All the words contained in this passage are directly con¬
nected with the injunction. This is, however, not the case
with the words constituting the corresponding arthavada
passage, ‘For Vayu is the swiftest deity; Vayu he ap¬
proaches with his own share; he leads him to prosperity/
The single words of this arthavada are not grammatically
connected with the single words of the injunction, but form
a subordinate unity of their own, which contains the praise
of Vayu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far as they
give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected
with a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the
subordinate (arthavada) passage can be known by some other
means of knowledge, the arthavada acts as a mere anuvada,
i. e. a statement referring to something (already known) 2 .
When its contents are contradicted by other means of
knowledge it acts as a so-called gu/zavada, i. e. a statement
of a quality 3 * * . Where, again, neither of the two mentioned
conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavdda
is to be taken as a guzzavada on account of the absence of
other means of knowledge, or as an arthav&da referring to
something known (i. e. an anuvada) on account of the ab¬
sence of contradiction by other means of proof. The latter
alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting people.
—The same reasoning applies to mantras also.
There is a further reason for assuming the personality of
the gods. The Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial
offerings to Indra and the other gods, presuppose certain
characteristic shapes of the individual divinities, because
1 As opposed to an action to be accomplished.
2 Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavada, ‘ Fire is a remedy
for cold/
3 Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 6 the sacrificial post
is the sun' (i. e. possesses the qualities of the sun, luminousness,
See .; a statement contradicted by perception).
222
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
without such the sacrificer could not represent Indra and
the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not
represented to the mind it would not be possible to make
an offering to it. So Scripture also says, ‘ Of that divinity
for which the offering is taken he is to think when about to
say vausha/’ (Ai. Br. Ill, 8, i). Nor is it possible to con¬
sider the essential form (or character) of a thing to consist
in the word only 1 ; for word (denoting) and thing (denoted)
are different. He therefore who admits the authorita¬
tiveness of the scriptural word has no right to deny
that the shape of Indra, and the other gods, is such as we
understand it to be from the mantras and arthavadas.—
Moreover, itihasas and pura;zas also—because based on
mantra and arthavada which possess authoritative power in
the manner described—are capable o r setting forth the per¬
sonality, &c. of the devas. Itihasa and pura^a can, besides,
be considered as based on perception also. For what is
not accessible to our perception may have been within the
sphere of perception of people in ancient times. Smrzti
also declares that Vyasa and others conversed with the gods
face to face. A person maintaining that the people of
ancient times were no more able to converse with the gods
than people are at present, would thereby deny the (incon¬
testable) variety of the world. He might as well maintain
that because there is at present no prince ruling over the
whole earth, there were no such princes in former times;
a position by which the scriptural injunction of the ra^asuya-
sacrifice 2 would be stultified. Or he might maintain that
in former times the spheres of duty of the different castes
and Isramas were as generally unsettled as they are now,
and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture which
define those different duties to be purposeless. It is there¬
fore altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of
ancient times, in consequence of their eminent religious
1 And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a
certain word forming part of a mantra.
2 The ragasuy a-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who wishes
to become the ruler of the whole earth.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34.
223
merit, conversed with the gods face to face. Smrzti also
declares that ‘ from the reading of the Veda there results
intercourse with the favourite divinity 5 (Yoga Sutra II, 44).
And that Yoga does, as Smrzti declares, lead to the
acquirement of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of
body, and so on, is a fact which cannot be set aside by a
mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also proclaims the great¬
ness of Yoga, ‘ When, as earth, water, light, heat, and ether
arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is
no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained
a body produced by the fire of Yoga’ (vSVet. Up. II, 12).
Nor have we the right to measure by our capabilities the
capability of the ri shis who see the mantras and brahmazza
passages (i. e. the Veda).—From all this it appears that the
itih&sas and purazzas have an adequate basis.—And the
conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to
be unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.
The general result is that we have the right to conceive
the gods as possessing personal existence, on the ground
of mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, purazzas, and ordinarily
prevailing ideas. And as the gods may thus be in the con¬
dition of having desires and so on, they must be considered
as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover,
the declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual
emancipation 1 agree with this latter supposition only.
34. Grief of him (i. e. of (Tanasruti) (arose) on
account of his hearing a disrespectful speech about
himself; on account of the rushing on of that (grief)
(Raikva called him .Sudra); for it (the grief) is
pointed at (by Raikva).
(In the preceding adhikarazza) the exclusiveness of the
claim of men to knowledge has been refuted, and it has
been declared that the gods, &c. also possess such a claim.
The present adhikarazza is entered on for the purpose of
removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the
1 In one of whose stages the being desirous of final emancipation
becomes a deva.
224
VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the
vSudras also possess such a claim.
The purvapakshin maintains that the vSudras also have
such a claim, because they may be in the position of
desiring that knowledge, and because they are capable of
it; and because there is no scriptural prohibition (ex¬
cluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text,
‘ Therefore 1 the vSudra is unfit for sacrificing 5 (Taitt. Sa^h.
VII, i, i, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the
vSudras for sacrificial works, viz. their being without the
sacred fires, does not invalidate their qualification for know¬
ledge, as knowledge can be apprehended by those also who
are without the fires. There is besides an inferential mark
supporting the claim of the vSudras ; for in the so-called
sa^/varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Cana^ruti
Pautraya^a, who wishes to learn from him, by the name
of vSudra 'Fie, necklace and carriage be thine, O vSudra,
together with the cows ’ (. Kh . Up. IV, 2, 3). Sm riti
moreover speaks of Vidura and others who were born from
vSudra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.—Hence
the vSudra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.
To this we reply that the vSudras have no such claim,
on account of their not studying the Veda. A person
who has studied the Veda and understood its sense is
indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a vSudra does not
study the Veda, for such study demands as its antecedent
the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to
the three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance
of being in a condition of desire does not furnish a
reason for qualification, if capability is absent. Mere
temporal capability again does not constitute a reason
for qualification, spiritual capability being required in
spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case
of the vSudras) excluded by their being excluded from
the study of the Veda.—The Vedic statement, moreover,
that the vSudra is unfit for sacrifices intimates, because
1 The commentaries explain 4 therefore 9 by ‘ on account of his
being devoid of the three sacred fires./ This explanation does not,
however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sazdi.
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34.
225
founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for knowledge also;
for the argumentation is the same in both cases 1 .—With
reference to the purvapakshin’s opinion that the fact of the
word ‘ *Sudra 5 being enounced in the sa//zvarga-knowledge
constitutes an inferential mark (of the .Sudra’s qualifica¬
tion for knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark
has no force, on account of the absence of arguments. For
the statement of an inferential mark possesses the power
of intimation only in consequence of arguments being
adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in
the passage quoted 2 * * . Besides, the word 6 S udra ’ which
occurs in the sa//zvarga-vidya would establish a claim on the
part of the .Sudras to that one vidyd only, not to all vidyas.
In reality, however, it is powerless, because occurring in an
arthavada, to establish the .SAdras’ claim to anything.—The
word ‘ vSiidra’ can moreover be made to agree with the con¬
text in which it occurs in the following manner. When
CanaiTuti Pautraya;za heard himself spoken of with dis¬
respect by the flamingo ( £ How can you speak of him, being
what he is, as if he were like Raikva with the car ? 5 IV, 1,3),
grief (ju£) arose in his mind, and to that grief the rzshi Raikva
alludes with the word .Sudra, in order to show thereby his
knowledge of what is remote. This explanation must be ac¬
cepted because a (real) born .Sudra is not qualified (for the
sa^varga-vidya). If it be asked how the grief (suk) which
had arisen in Gana.rruti*s mind can be referred to by means
of the word 5 udra, we reply: On account of the rushing
on (adravaTza) of the grief. For we may etymologise the
word vSudra by dividing it into its parts, either as ‘ he rushed
into grief’ (.Sudani abhidudrava) or as ‘grief rushed on
1 The Siidra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic matters
in the legitimate way, i. e. through the study of the Veda under the
guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidyd.
2 The linga contained in the word ‘-Siidra’ has no proving
power as it occurs in an arthavada-passage which has no authority
if not connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our
case the linga in the arthavada-passage is even directly contradicted
by those injunctions which militate against the -Sudras’ qualification
for Vedic matters.
[ 34 ] Q
226
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
him/ or as c he in his grief rushed to Raikva; ’ while on
the other hand it is impossible to accept the word in its
ordinary conventional sense. The circumstance (of the
king actually being grieved) is moreover expressly touched
upon in the legend 1 .
35. And because the kshattriyahood (of ^ctnamiti)
is understood from the inferential mark (supplied by
his being mentioned) later on with ATaitraratha (who
was a kshattriya himself).
Ganamiti cannot have been a Sudra by birth for that
reason also that his being a kshattriya is understood from
an inferential sign, viz. his being mentioned together (in one
chapter) with the kshattriya ATaitraratha Abhipratarin. For,
later on, i. e. in the passage complementary to the sawvarga-
vidyd, a kshattriya ATaitrarathi Abhipratarin is glorified,
‘Once while Saunaka K&peya and Abhipratarin KAkshaseni
were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged
of them 5 ( Kh . Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratarin was a
Afaitrarathi (i.e. a descendant of ATitraratha) we have to
infer from his connexion with a Kapeya. For we know
(from 5 ruti) about the connexion of ATitraratha himself with
the Kapeyas (‘ the Kctpeyas made ATitraratha perform that
sacrifice;’ T&ndya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule sacrifices
of one and the same family employ officiating priests of
one and the same family. Moreover, as we understand
from Scripture (‘from him a ATaitrarathi descended who was
a prince 2 * * ’) that he (ATaitraratha) was a prince, we must
1 Ha/rasavaky&d dtmano^nadaraw jrutva ^namite^ sug ut>
pannety etad eva katha m gamy ate yenasau .yfidra^abdena su^yate
tatraha sprz'jyate keti. Ananda Giri.
2 I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of -Sankara
consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read /fcaitrarathi-
namaika^). Ananda Giri expressly explains tasmad by /ritraratMd
ity artha^.—The text of the Ta«</ya Br. runs: tasmad ^aitrarathinam
eka^ kshatrapatir gayate, and the commentary explains: tasm&t
kdrawad adyapi ^itravamotpannanazra madhye eka eva ra^a kshatra-
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 36.
227
understand him to have been a kshattriya. The fact now
of (Janajruti being praised in the same vidyi with the
kshattriya Abhipratirin intimates that the former also was
a kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together
with equals. That (Jana^ruti was a kshattriya we more¬
over conclude from his sending his door-keeper and from
other similar signs of power (mentioned in the text).—
Hence the .Stidras are not qualified (for the knowledge of
Brahman).
36. On account of the reference to ceremonial
purifications (in the case of the higher castes) and
on account of their absence being declared (in the
case of the .Sudras).
That the .Sftdras are not qualified, follows from that
circumstance also that in different places of the vidy&s such
ceremonies as the upanayana and the like are referred to.
Compare, for instance, .Sat. Br. XI, 5, 3, 13, ‘He initiated
him as a pupil;’ Kh . Up. VII, 1, 1, ‘Teach me, Sir! thus
he approached him;’ Pra. Up. I, 1, ‘Devoted to Brahman,
firm in Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they,
carrying fuel in their hands, approached the venerable
Pippal&da, thinking that he would teach them all that.’—
Thus the following passage also, ‘ He without having made
them undergo the upanayana (said) to them’ (Kh. Up. V,
11, 7), shows that the upanayana is a well-established cere¬
mony 1 .—With reference to the 6udras, on the other hand,
the absence of ceremonies is frequently mentioned; so,
for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are spoken of as ‘once-
born ’ only (‘the .Stidra is the fourth caste, once-born ’), and
Manu X, 126, ‘ In the .Sudra there is not any sin, and
he is not fit for any ceremony.’
patir baladhipatir bhavati.—Grammar does not authorise the form
^aitraratha used in the Sfitra.
1 The king A,rvapati receives some Brdhmawas as his pupils
without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the
upanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the
general rule.
Q 2
228
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to
initiate Gabala) on the ascertainment of (his) not
being that (i.e. a 6udra).
The Gtidras are not qualified for that reason also that
Gautama, having ascertained Gabala not to be a Gfidra
from his speaking the truth, proceeded to initiate and
instruct him. ‘None who is not a Brahma^a would thus
speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you.
You have not swerved from the truth 5 (Kk. Up. IV, 4, 5) 5
w’hich scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of
the Gfidras not being capable of initiation).
38. And on account of the prohibition, in Srimti,
of (the 6udras’) hearing and studying (the Veda) and
(knowing and performing) (Vedic) matters.
The vSfidras are not qualified for that reason also that
Snmti prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the
Veda, and their understanding and performing Vedic matters.
The prohibition of hearing the Veda is conveyed by the
following passages : ‘ The ears of him who hears the Veda
are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac, 5 and ‘ For a
wSudra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be
read in the vicinity of a .Sudra. 5 From this latter passage
the prohibition of studying the Veda results at once; for
how should he study Scripture in whose vicinity it is not
even to be read ? There is, moreover, an express prohibition
(of the vSfidras studying the Veda). ‘ His tongue is to be
slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he
preserves it.’ The prohibitions of hearing and studying
the Veda already imply the prohibition of the knowledge
and performance of Vedic matters; there are, however,
express prohibitions also, such as ‘he is not to impart
knowledge to the 6udra, 5 and ‘ to the twice-born belong
study, sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts. 5 —From those
6udras, however, who, like Vidura and ‘the religious hunter, 5
acquire knowledge in consequence of the after effects of
former deeds, the fruit of their knowledge cannot be with-
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 39.
229
held, since knowledge in all cases brings about its fruit.
Smrzti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are
qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihasas and
purazzas; compare the passage, c He is to teach the four
castes’ (Mahabh.).—It remains, however, a settled point that
they do not possess any such qualification with regard to the
Veda.
39. (The pr&zza is Brahman), on account of the
trembling (predicated of the whole world).
The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge—
on which we entered as an opportunity offered—being
finished we return to our chief topic, i. e. the enquiry into
the purport of the Vedanta-texts.—We read (Ka. Up. II,
6, 2), ‘ Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth
trembles in the prazza. It (the prazza) is a great terror, a
raised thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal V
—This passage declares that this whole world trembles,
abiding in prazza, and that there is raised something very
terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that through its knowledge
immortality is obtained. But as it is not immediately clear
what the prazza is, and what that terrible thunderbolt, a
discussion arises.
The purvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of the term, pr&zza denotes the air with
its five modifications, that the word ‘ thunderbolt’ also is to
be taken in its ordinary sense, and that thus the whole
passage contains a glorification of air. For, he says, this
whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five forms
—which is here called prazza—and the terrible thunderbolts
also spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the
air, people say, when it manifests itself in the form of
Par^anya, lightning, thunder, rain, and thunderbolts manifest
themselves.—Through the knowledge of that air immortality
1 As the words stand in the original they might be translated
as follows (and are so translated by the pftrvapakshin), ‘ Whatever
there is, the whole world trembles in the piazza, there goes forth
(from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.’
230
vedAnta-sCtras.
also can be obtained; for another scriptural passage says,
4 Air is everything by itself, and air is all things together.
He who knows this conquers death.’—We therefore con¬
clude that the same air is to be understood in the passage
under discussion.
To this we make the following reply.—Brahman only can
be meant, on account of what precedes as well as what
follows. In the preceding as well as the subsequent part
of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of; how then can it
be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once the
air should be referred to? The immediately preceding
passage runs as follows, 4 That only is called the Bright, that
is called Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All
worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond it.’
That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our
passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and,
secondly, from the circumstance that in the clause, 4 The
whole world trembles in pra^a/ we recognise a quality of
Brahman, viz. its constituting the abode of the whole world.
That the word prcbza can denote the highest Self also,
appears from such passages as ‘the prd^a of prd/za’ (Brz.
Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, moreover,
is a quality which properly appertains to the highest Self
only, not to mere air. Thus Scripture says, 4 No mortal
lives by the pra^a and the breath that goes down. We
live by another in whom these two repose’ (Ka. Up. II, 5,
5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under
discussion, ( 4 From terror of it fire burns, from terror the
sun burns, from terror Indra and Viyu, and Death as the
fifth run away,’) Brahman, and not the air, must be sup¬
posed to be spoken of, since the subject of that passage is
represented as the cause of fear on the part of the whole
world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude
that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman,
firstly, on the ground of proximity; and, secondly, because
we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its being the cause
of fear, in the words, 4 A great terror, a raised thunderbolt.’
The word 4 thunderbolt ’ is here used to denote a cause of
fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man strictly
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40.
23I
carries out a king’s command because he fearfully considers
in his mind, ‘ A thunderbolt (i. e. the king’s wrath, or
threatened punishment) is hanging over my head; it might
fall if I did not carry out his command.’ In the same
manner this whole world inclusive of fire, air, sun, and so
on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from fear of
Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to
a thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose
topic is Brahman, declares, ‘From terror of it the wind
blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and
Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.’—That Brahman is what
is referred to in our passage, further follows from the declara¬
tion that the fruit of its cognition is immortality. For that
immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is
known, for instance, from the mantra, ‘ A man who knows
him only passes over death, there is no other path to go ’
(vSVet. Up. VI, 15).—That immortality which the purva-
pakshin asserts to be sometimes represented as the fruit of
the knowledge of the air is a merely relative one; for there
(i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is quoted) at first
the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic
being started (B ri. Up. Ill, 4), and thereupon the inferior
nature of the air and so on is referred to. (‘Everything
else is evil.’)—That in the passage under discussion the
highest Self is meant appears finally from the general subject-
matter ; for the question (asked by Na^iketas in I, 3 , 14,
‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither
effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that ’)
refers to the highest Self.
40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that
(Brahman) being seen (in the scriptural passage).
We read in Scripture, ‘ Thus does that serene being,
arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it
has approached the highest light’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3).
Here the doubt arises whether the word ‘ light ’ denotes the
(physical) light, which is the object of sight and dispels dark¬
ness, or the highest Brahman.
232
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
The pfirvapakshin maintains that the word c light 5 denotes
the well-known (physical) light, because that is the conven¬
tional sense of the world. For while it is to be admitted
that in another passage, discussed under I, i, 24, the word
‘light’ does, owing to the general topic of the chapter, divest
itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there
is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary
meaning aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter
treating of the naafts of the body, that a man going to final
release reaches the sun (‘ When he departs from this body
then he departs upwards by those very rays; ’ Kh . Up. VIII,
6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word ‘light 5 denotes,
in our passage, the ordinary light.
To this we make the following reply.—The word ‘light’
can denote the highest Brahman only, on account of that
being seen. We see that in the whole chapter Brahman is
carried on as the topic of discussion. For the Self, which
is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general subject-
matter in VIII, 7,1 (‘ the Self which is free from sin ’); it is
thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and
to be understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of
the clauses, ‘I shall explain that further to you’ (VIII, 9,
3 ff.); after that freedom from body is said to belong to it,
because it is one with light (‘ when he is free from the body
then neither pleasure nor pain touches him, 5 VIII, 12, 1)—
and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman—
and it is finally qualified as ‘the highest light, the highest
person 5 (VIII, 12, 3).—Against the statement, made by the
purvapakshin, that Scripture speaks of a man going to re¬
lease as reaching the sun, we remark that the release there
referred to is not the ultimate one, since it is said to be con¬
nected with going and departing upwards. That the ulti¬
mate release has nothing to do with going and departing
upwards we shall show later on.
41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as
something different, &c. (from name and form).
Scripture says, ‘ He who is called ether (aka.s*a) is the
revealer of all forms and names. That within which these
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42.
233
forms and names are contained is the Brahman, the Immor¬
tal, the Self' {Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1).
There arising a doubt whether that which here is called
ether is the highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental
ether, the purvapakshin declares that the latter alternative
is to be embraced, firstly, because it is founded on the con¬
ventional meaning of the word ‘ether;’ and, secondly, because
the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very well
be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords
room (for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no
clear indicatory mark of Brahman, such as creative power,
and the like.
To this we reply, that the word ‘ether’ can here denote
the highest Brahman only, because it is designated as a
different thing, &c. For the clause, ‘That within which
these two are contained is Brahman,’ designates the ether
as something different from names and forms. But,
excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different
from name and form, since the entire world of effects is
evolved exclusively by names and forms. Moreover, the
complete revealing of names and forms cannot be accom¬
plished by anything else but Brahman, according to the
text which declares Brahman’s creative agency, ‘ Let me
enter (into those beings) with this living Self (^*iva atman),
and evolve names and forms ’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 3, 2). But—it
may be said—from this very passage it is apparent that the
living Self also (i. e. the individual soul) possesses revealing
power with regard to names and forms.—True, we reply,
but what the passage really wishes to intimate, is the non¬
difference (of the individual soul from the highest Self).
And the very statement concerning the revealing of names
and forms implies the statement of signs indicatory of
Brahman, viz. creative power and the like.— Moreover,
the terms ‘the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self’ (VIII, 14)
indicate that Brahman is spoken of.
42. And (on account of the designation) (of the
highest Self) as different (from the individual soul)
in the states of deep sleep and departing.
234
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
In the sixth prapa/^aka of the Bnhadara^yaka there
is given, in reply to the question, ‘ Who is that Self ? ’ a
lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self, ‘ He who is
within the heart, among the pri/zas, the person of light,
consisting of knowledge’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the
doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making
an additional statement about the nature of the transmi¬
grating soul (known already from other sources), or at
establishing the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.
The pfirvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned
with the nature of the transmigrating soul, on account of
the introductory and concluding statements. For the intro¬
ductory statement, ‘ He among the prd«as who consists of
knowledge/ contains marks indicatory of the embodied
soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, ‘ And that
great unborn Self is he who consists of cognition/ &c.
(IV, 4, 22). We must therefore adhere to the same subject-
matter in the intermediate passages also, and look on them
as setting forth the same embodied Self, represented in
its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.
In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only
at giving information about the highest Lord, not at making
additional statements about the embodied soul.—Why?—
On account of the highest Lord being designated as different
from the embodied soul, in the states of deep sleep and of
departing from the body. His difference from the embodied
soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following
passage, ‘ This person embraced by the intelligent (prag-na.)
Self knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within.’
Here the term, ‘ the person/ must mean the embodied soul;
for of him it is possible to deny that he knows, because he,
as being the knower, may know what is within and without.
The ‘intelligent Self/ on the other hand, is the highest Lord,
because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i. e.—in his
case—all-embracing knowledge. — Similarly, the passage
treating of departure, i. e. death (‘ this bodily Self mounted
by the intelligent Self moves along groaning ’), refers to the
highest Lord as different from the individual Self. There
also we have to understand by the ‘ embodied one 5 the indi-
I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42.
235
vidual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the ‘ intel¬
ligent one ’ is again the Lord. We thus understand that
‘ on account of his being designated as something different,
in the states of deep sleep and departure,’ the highest Lord
forms the subject of the passage.—With reference to the
purvapakshin’s assertion that the entire chapter refers to
the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the latter
are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark
that in the first place the introductory passage (‘He
among the pranas who consists of cognition’) does not
aim at setting forth the character of the transmigrating
Self, but rather, while merely referring to the nature of
the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims
at declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for
it is manifest that the immediately subsequent passage,
‘as if thinking, as if moving 1 ,’ aims at discarding the
attributes of the transmigrating Self. The concluding pas¬
sage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words,
‘ And that great unborn Self is he who,’ &c., mean :
We have shown that that same cognitional Self, which is
observed among the pri^as, is the great unborn Self, i. e.
the highest Lord.—He, again, who imagines that the pas¬
sages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting
forth the nature of the transmigrating Self by represent¬
ing it in the waking state, and so on, is like a man who,
setting out towards the east, wants to set out at the same
time towards the west. For in representing the states of
waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing
the soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but
rather as free from all particular conditions and trans¬
migration. This is evident from the circumstance that
on Ganaka's question, which is repeated in every section,
‘ Speak on for the sake of emancipation/ Ya^viavalkya
replies each time, ‘ By all that he is not affected, for that
person is not attached to anything’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 14-16).
And later on he says (IV, 3, 22), ‘ He is not followed by
1 The stress lies here on the ‘ as if/ which intimate that the Self
does not really think or move.
236
vedanta-sIjtras.
good, not followed by evil, for he has then overcome all the
sorrows of the heart/ We have, therefore, to conclude that
the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the nature of
the non-transmigrating Self.
43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.
That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the
non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that
circumstance also that there occur in it terms such as Lord
and so on, intimating the nature of the non-transmigrating
Self, and others excluding the nature of the transmigrating
Self. To the first class belongs, for instance,‘ He is the lord
of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things/
To the latter class belongs the passage, £ He does not be¬
come greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works/—
From all which we conclude that the chapter refers to the
non-transmigrating highest Lord.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I.
237
FOURTH PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is
based on inference (i. e. the pradhana); we deny this,
because (the term alluded to) refers to what is con¬
tained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself);
and (that the text) shows.
In the preceding part of this work—as whose topic there
has been set forth an enquiry into Brahman—we have at
first defined Brahman (I, 1, <z ); we have thereupon refuted
the objection that that definition applies to the pradh&na
also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority for the
latter (1,1,5), and we have shown in detail that the common
purport of all Vedanta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that
Brahman, and not the pradhana, is the cause of the world.
Here, however, the Sankhya again raises an objection which
he considers not to have been finally disposed of.
It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there
is no scriptural authority for the pradhana; for some .yakhcts
contain expressions which seem to convey the idea of the
pradhana. From this it follows that Kapila and other
supreme rzshis maintain the doctrine of the pradhana
being the general cause only because it is based on the
Veda.—As long therefore as it has not been proved that
those passages to which the Sankhyas refer have a different
meaning (i. e. do not allude to the pradhana), all our previous
argumentation as to the omniscient Brahman being the cause
of the world must be considered as unsettled. We there¬
fore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving that
those passages actually have a different meaning.
The Sankhyas maintain that that also which is based on
inference, i. e. the pradhana, is perceived in the text of some
^akhas. We read, for instance, they say, in the Kanaka
(I, 3, 11), ‘Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped,
238
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.’ There we
recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the
same order, the three entities with which we are acquainted
from the Sdnkhya-smr/ti, viz. the great principle, the Un¬
developed (the pradMna), and the soul 1 . That by the Un¬
developed is meant the pradhana is to be concluded from
the common use of Smrz’ti and from the etymological inter¬
pretation of which the word admits, the pradMna being
called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other
qualities. It cannot therefore be asserted that there is no
scriptural authority for the pradMna. And this pradhana
vouched for by Scripture we declare to be the cause of the
world, on the ground of Scripture, Smr/ti, and ratiocination.
Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage
from the Kanaka quoted by you intimates by no means the
existence of that great principle and that Undeveloped
which are known from the Sankhya-smrzti. We do not
recognise there the pradhana of the ScLnkhyas, i. e. an inde¬
pendent general cause consisting of three constituting
elements; we merely recognise the word ‘ Undeveloped,’
which does not denote any particular determined thing, but
may—owing to its etymological meaning, ‘that which is
not developed, not manifest * — denote anything subtle
and difficult to distinguish. The Sankhyas indeed give to
the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to the
pradMna; but then that meaning is valid for their system
only, and has no force in the determination of the sense of
the Veda. Nor does mere equality of position prove
equality of being, unless the latter be recognised indepen¬
dently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a horse
because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We,
moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject-
matter, that the passage does not refer to the pradhana the
fiction of the Sankhyas, ‘ on account of there being referred
1 The Great one is the technical S&nkhya-term for buddhi,
avyakta is a common designation of pradhana or prakn'ti, and
purusha is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance,
Sankhya Kar. 2, 3.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I.
239
to that which is contained in the simile of the body/ This
means that the body which is mentioned in the simile of
the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We
infer this from the general subject-matter of the passage and
from the circumstance of nothing else remaining.—The
immediately preceding part of the chapter exhibits the
simile in which the Self, the body, and so on, are compared
to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, See., ‘ Know the Self to
be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the
intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses
they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads.
When he (the Self) is in union with the body, the senses
and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer/ The
text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c. are not
well controlled enters into sa^s&ra, while he who has them
under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest
place of Vish/zu. The question then arises: What is the end
of the journey, the highest place of Vishzzu? Whereupon
the text explains that the highest Self which is higher than
the senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the journey, the
highest place of Vishzzu. ‘ Beyond the senses there are the
objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the
mind there is the intellect, the great Self is beyond the in¬
tellect. Beyond the great there is the Undeveloped, beyond
the Undeveloped there is the Person. Beyond the Person
there is nothing—this is the goal, the highest Road/ In this
passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding
simile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus
avoid the mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and
taking up a new subject. The senses, the intellect, and the
mind are referred to in both passages under the same names.
The objects (in the second passage) are the objects which
are (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the
senses; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses
is known from the scriptural passage representing the senses
as grahas, i.e. graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i. e.
superior to the grahas (B ri. Up. Ill, 3). The mind (manas)
again is superior to the objects, because the relation of the
senses and their objects is based on the mind. The intellect
240
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
(buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects of enjoy¬
ment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect.
Higher than the intellect is the great Self which was repre¬
sented as the lord of the chariot in the passage, £ Know the
Self to be the lord of the chariot/ That the same Self is
referred to in both passages is manifest from the repeated
use of the word £ Self; 5 that the Self is superior to intelli¬
gence is owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is
naturally superior to the instrument of enjoyment. The
Self is appropriately called great as it is the master.—
Or else the phrase £ the great Self’ may here denote the
intellect of the first-born Hira/zyagarbha which is the basis
of all intellects ; in accordance with the following Smrz’ti-
passage f it is called mind, the great one; reflection, Brahman ;
the stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the Lord; highest
knowledge, consciousness ; thought, remembrance 1 / and like¬
wise with the following scriptural passage, £ He (Hira^ya-
garbha) who first creates Brahman and delivers the Vedas
to him’ (SVet. Up. VI, 18). The intellect, which in the
former passage had been referred to under its common name
buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since it may be repre¬
sented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter
explanation of the term £ the great Self, 5 we must assume
that the personal Self which in the simile had been compared
to the charioteer is, in the latter passage, included in the
highest person (mentioned last); to which there is no objec¬
tion, since in reality the personal Self and the highest Self
are identical.—Thus there remains now the body only which
had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore con-
1 Satfzkalpavikalparfipamananajaktya haira^yagarbhi buddhir
manas tasya^ vyash/imana^su samash/itaya vyaptim aha mahan
iti. Sa^kalpadi^aktitaya tarhi sawdehatmatva/^ tatraha matir iti.
Mahatvam upapadayati brahmeti. Bhogya^atadharatvam aha pur
iti. Ni^ayatmakatvam aha buddhir iti. Kirthaktimattvam aha
khyatir iti. Niyamanajaktimatvam aha favara iti. Loke yat
prakrfsh/affz £$anam tato*natirekam aha pra^eti. Tatphalam api
tato narthantaravishayam ity aha sawvid iti. A^itpradhanatvam
aha kitir iti. ^atasarvarthanusawdhana^aktim aha smr/th keti.
Ananda Giri.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 . 24 1
elude that the text after having enumerated the senses and
all the other things mentioned before, in order to point
out the highest place, points out by means of the one
remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only thing remaining out
of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the body.
The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the
unity of the inward Self and Brahman, by describing the
soul’s passing through sa^sara and release under the form
of a simile in which the body, &c. of the soul—which is
affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a body, senses,
mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c.—are compared to a
chariot, and so on.—In accordance with this the subsequent
verse states the difficulty of knowing the highest place of
Vishnu ( £ the Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine
forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and
subtle intellect ’), and after that the next verse declares Yoga
to be the means of attaining that cognition. 6 A wise man
should keep down speech in the mind, he should keep down
the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down
within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet
Self/—That means: The wise man should restrain the
activity of the outer organs such as speech, &c., and abide
within the mind only; he should further restrain the mind
which is intent on doubtful external objects within intelli¬
gence, whose characteristic mark is decision, recognising that
indecision is evil; he should further restrain intelligence
within the great Self, i. e. the individual soul or else the
fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self
on the calm Self, i. e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of
which the whole chapter treats.—If we in this manner review
the general context, we perceive that there is no room for
the pradhana imagined by the Sankhyas.
2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term
avyakta) on account of its capability (of being so
designated).
It has been asserted, under the preceding Sutra, that the
term c the Undeveloped’ signifies, on account of the general
[34] R
242
vedAnta-s£jtras.
subject-matter and because the body only remains, the
body and not the pradhana of the Sankhyas.—But here
the following doubt arises: How can the word ‘ unde¬
veloped 5 appropriately denote the body which, as a gross
and clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta,
i. e. that which is developed or manifested ?
To this doubt the Sutra replies that what the term
avyakta denotes is the subtle causal body. Anything
subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped. The gross
body indeed cannot directly be termed ‘undeveloped,’
but the subtle parts of the elements from which the gross
body originates may be called so, and that the term de¬
noting the causal substance is applied to the effect also is
a matter of common occurrence ; compare, for instance, the
phrase ‘ mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk ’ (Rig-ve da S. IX,
46,4). Another scriptural passage also—‘ now all this was
then undeveloped’ (B ru Up. I, 4, 7)—shows that this, i. e.
this developed world with its distinction of names and
forms, is capable of being termed undeveloped in so far
as in a former condition it was in a merely seminal or
potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of
name and form.
3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world
may be admitted) on account of its dependency on
him (the Lord); (for such an admission is) according
to reason.
Here a new objection is raised.—If, the opponent says,
in order to prove the possibility of the body being called
undeveloped you admit that this world in its antecedent
seminal condition before either names or forms are evolved
can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede the
doctrine that the pradhana is the cause of the world. For
we Sankhyas understand by the term pradhana nothing
but that antecedent condition of the world.
Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some
antecedent state of the world as the independent cause of
the actual world, we should indeed implicitly admit the
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 3.
243
pradhana doctrine. What we admit is, however, only a
previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an
independent state. A previous stage of the world such as
the one assumed by us must necessarily be admitted, since
it is according to sense and reason. For without it the
highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as he
could not become active if he were destitute of the po¬
tentiality of action. The existence of such a causal poten¬
tiality renders it moreover possible that the released souls
should not enter on new courses of existence, as it is
destroyed by perfect knowledge. For that causal potenti¬
ality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly denoted
by the term ‘ undeveloped; ’ it has the highest Lord for
its substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is
a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating
souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their
individual character 1 . This undeveloped principle is some¬
times denoted by the term &kai*a, ether; so, for instance,
in the passage, ‘ In that Imperishable then, O Gargi, the
ether is woven like warp and woof’ (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 11).
Sometimes, again, it is denoted by the term akshara, the
Imperishable; so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), ‘ Higher,
than the high Imperishable.’ Sometimes it is spoken of
as Mdya, illusion; so, for instance (Sve. Up. IV, 10), c Know
then PrakWti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is
affected with Mctya.’ For May4 is properly called un¬
developed or non-manifested since it cannot be defined
either as that which is or that which is not.—The statement
of the Kanaka that ‘ the Undeveloped is beyond the Great
1 Nanu na bi^a^aktir vidyaya dahyate vastutvad atmavan nety
&ha avidyeti. Ke&t tu prati^ivam avidya^aktibhedam i^anti
tan na avyaktavyakntadhabdayas tasya bhedakabhavad ekatve*pi
sva^aktya vi&trakaryakaratvad ity aha avyakteti. Na tasya
^ivajrayatvaflz giva^abdavaiyasya kalpitatvad avidyarupatvat ta^Ma-
bdalakshyasya brahmavyatirekad ity &ha parame^vareti. Maya-
vidyayor bhedad fovarasya maya^rayatva^ ^ivanam avidya^rayateti
vadanta/ra pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino maya paratantra
tathaish&pity artha^. Pratitau tasya j yfcetanapeksham aha mahasuptir
iti. Ananda Giri.
R 2
244
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
one ’ is based on the fact of the Great one originating from
the Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of
Hira^yagarbha. If, on the other hand, we understand by
the Great one the individual soul, the statement is founded
on the fact of the existence of the individual soul depending
on the Undeveloped, i. e. Nescience. For the continued
existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing
to the relation in which it stands to Nescience. The
quality of being beyond the Great one which in the first
place belongs to the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience, is attri¬
buted to the body which is the product of Nescience, the
cause and the effect being considered as identical. Al¬
though the senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience,
the term c the Undeveloped’ here refers to the body only,
the senses, &c. having already been specially mentioned
by their individual names, and the body alone being left.—-
Other interpreters of the two last Sutras give a somewhat
different explanation 1 .—There are, they say, two kinds of
body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body
is the one which is perceived; the nature of the subtle one
will be explained later on. (Ved. Su. Ill, i, i.) Both
these bodies together were in the simile compared to the
chariot; but here (in the passage under discussion) only
the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since
the subtle body only is capable of being denoted by that
term. And as the soul’s passing through bondage and
release depends on the subtle body, the latter is said to be
beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i. e. just as the
objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity
of the latter depends on the objects.—But how—we ask those
interpreters—is it possible that the word ‘ Undeveloped ’
should refer to the subtle body only, while, according to
your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been represented
as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the topic of
the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the
a 1 Sfitradvayasya vr/ttikrfdvyakhyanam utthapayati. Go. An,
AMryadeayamatam utthapayati. An. Gi.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 4.
245
passage under discussion)?—If you should rejoin that you
are authorised to settle the meaning of what the text
actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not
mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs in
the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the
gross body which is vyakta, i. e. developed or manifest; we
invalidate this rejoinder by remarking that the determin¬
ation of the sense depends on the circumstance of the
passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For
if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole
they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment
of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject.
But syntactical unity cannot be established unless it be
on the ground of there being a want of a complementary
part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the
connexion of the passages without having regard to the
fact that the latter passage demands as its complement
that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former
passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy
all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from
arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you
think that the second passage occupies itself with the subtle
body only, for that reason that the latter is not easily
distinguished from the Self, while the gross body is easily
so distinguished on account of its readily perceived loath¬
someness. For the passage does not by any means refer
to such a distinction—as we conclude from the circumstance
of there being no verb enjoining it—but has for its only
subject the highest place of Vishnu, which had been men¬
tioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a
series of things in which the subsequent one is always
superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying
that nothing is beyond the Person.—We might, however,
accept the interpretation just discussed without damaging
our general argumentation ; for whichever explanation we
receive, so much remains clear that the K£/^aka passage
does not refer to the pradhana.
4. And (the pradhina cannot be meant) because
246
vedAnta-sOtras.
there is no statement as to (the avyakta) being
something to be cognised.
The Sankhyas, moreover, represent the pradhina as some¬
thing to be cognised in so far as they say that from the
knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements
of the pradhana and of the soul there results the desired
isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of the
nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to
cognise the difference of the soul from them. And some¬
where they teach that the pradMna is to be cognised by
him who wishes to attain special powers.—Now in the
passage under discussion the avyakta is not mentioned
as an object of knowledge; we there meet with the mere
word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the
avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is
impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which
(knowledge) is not taught in the text is of any advantage
to man.—For this reason also we maintain that the word
avyakta cannot denote the pradhdna.—O u r interpretation,
on the other hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it
the passage mentions the body (not as an object of know¬
ledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on
the highest place of Vishnu, in continuation of the simile in
which the body had been compared to a chariot.
5. And if you maintain that the text does speak
(of the pradhAna as an object of knowledge) we deny
that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is meant,
on account of the general subject-matter.
Here the Sankhya raises a new objection, and maintains
that the averment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since
the text later on speaks of the pradhana—which had been
referred to as the Undeveloped—as an object of knowledge.
‘ He who has perceived that which is without sound, without
touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal,
without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the
great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death 5
(Ka. Up. II, 3,15). For here the text speaks of the pradh&na,
i adhyAya, 4 PADA, 6.
247
which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the
same qualities which the Sankhya-smr/ti ascribes to it, and
designating it as the object of perception. Hence we con¬
clude that the pradhana is denoted by the term avyakta.
To this we reply that the passage last quoted does repre¬
sent as the object of perception not the pradhana but the
intelligent, i. e. the highest Self. We conclude this from
the general subject-matter. For that the highest Self
continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the fol¬
lowing reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the
passage, ‘Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal,
the highest Road ; 5 it has further to be supplied as the
object of knowledge in the passage, ‘ The Self is hidden
in all beings and does not shine forth, 5 because it is there
spoken of as difficult to know; after that the restraint of
passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the
passage, ‘ A wise man should keep down speech within
the mind; 5 and, finally, release from the jaws of death is
declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sankhyas,
on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from
the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana, but
connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelli¬
gent Self.—The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all
Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are
mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of
sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhana is
in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor
denoted by the term avyakta.
6. And there is question and explanation relative
to three things only (not to the pradhana).
To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration
of the circumstance that the Ka/^avalli-upanishad brings
forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the
fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self.
These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby
the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions
of Na&ketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired
248
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is con¬
tained in the passage (Ka. Up. I, 1, 13), ‘Thou knowest, O
Death, the fire sacrifice which leads us to Heaven ; tell it
to me, who am full of faith.’ The question as to the indi¬
vidual soul is contained in I, 1, 20, ‘There is that doubt
when a man is dead, some saying, he is; others, he is not.
This I should like to know, taught by thee ; this is the third
of my boons. 5 And the question about the highest Self is
asked in the passage (I, 2, 14), ‘ That which thou seest as
neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither
past nor future, tell me that. 5 —The corresponding answers
are given in I, 1,15, ‘ Yama then told him that fire sacrifice,
the beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required
for the altar, and how many; 5 in the passage met with con¬
siderably later on (II, 5, 6 ; 7), ‘Well then, O Gautama, I shall
tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens
to the Self after reaching death. Some enter the womb
in order to have a body as organic beings, others go into
inorganic matter according to their work and according to
their knowledge; 5 and in the passage (I, 2,18), ‘The knowing
Self is not born nor does it die, 5 &c.; which latter passage
dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no ques¬
tion relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity
for any remarks on it.
Here the Sankhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks,
the question relative to the Self which is asked in the pas¬
sage, ‘ There is that doubt when a man is dead, 5 &c., again
resumed in the passage, ‘ That which thou seest as neither
this nor that, 5 &c., or does the latter passage raise a distinct
new question ? If the former, the two questions about the
Self coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether
two questions only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the
other relative to the Self. In that case the Sutra has no
right to speak of questions and explanations relating to
three subjects.—If the latter, you do not consider it a
mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of
boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we
assume an explanation about the pradhana in excess of the
number of questions asked.
I ADHYAYA, 4 pAdA, 6.
249
To this we make the following reply.—We by no means
assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted,
being prevented from doing so by the influence of the
opening part of that syntactical whole which constitutes the
Ka^avalli-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the topic
of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of
the Upanishad—which is thrown into the form of a colloquy
of Yama and Na^iketas—carries on that topic up to the very
end. Yama grants to Na^iketas, who had been sent by his
father, three boons. For his first boon Na^iketas chooses
kindness on the part of his father towards him, for his second
boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third boon
the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self
is the third boon appears from the indication contained in the
passage (I, 1, 20), ‘There is that doubt —; this is the third
of my boons/—If we therefore supposed that the passage,
‘ That which thou seest as neither this nor that/ &c., raises
a new question, we should thereby assume a question in
excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the
connexion of the entire Upanishad.—But—the S&nkhyawill
perhaps interpose—it must needs be admitted that the pas¬
sage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject
enquired about is a new one. For the former question refers
to the individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt ex¬
pressed in the words, ‘ There is that doubt when a man is
dead—some saying, he is; others, he is not/ Now this
individual soul, as having definite attributes, &c., cannot
constitute the object of a question expressed in such terms
as, ‘ This which thou seest as neither this nor that/ &c.;
the highest Self, on the other hand, may be enquired about
in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The appearance
of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ; for the
former question refers to existence and non-existence, while
the latter is concerned with an entity raised above all definite
attributes, &c. Hence we conclude that the latter question,
in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a separate
question, and does not merely resume the subject of the
former one.—All this argumentation is not valid, we reply,
since we maintain the unitv of the highest Self and the
250
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
individual Self. If the individual Self were different from
the highest Self, we should have to declare that the two
questions are separate independent questions, but the
two are not really different, as we know from other scrip¬
tural passages, such as £ Thou art that. 5 And in the Upani-
shad under discussion also the answer to the question, £ That
which thou seest as neither this nor that, 5 viz. the passage,
£ The knowing Self is not born, it dies not 5 —which answer
is given in the form of a denial of the birth and death of the
Self—clearly shows that the embodied Self and the highest
Self are non-different. For there is room for a denial of
something only when that something is possible, and the
possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self
only, since it is connected with the body, but not in the
highest Self.—There is, moreover, another passage conveying
the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, £ The wise when he knows
that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in
waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more. 5 This
passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the
knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses
the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby
declares that the individual Self is not different from the
highest Self. For that the cessation of all sorrow is con¬
sequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a recognised
Vedanta tenet.—There is another passage also warning
men not to look on the individual Self and the highest Self
as different entities, viz. II, 4, 10, £ What is here the same is
there; and what is there the same is here. He who sees
any difference here goes from death to death. 5 —The fol¬
lowing circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration. When
Na&ketas has asked the question relating to the existence or
non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce
him to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of
various objects of desire. But Na^iketas remains firm.
Thereupon Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good
and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom and ignor¬
ance, praises Na£iketas, £ I believe Na&ketas to be one who
desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear
thee away 5 (I, 2, 4); and later on praises the question
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6.
251
asked by Na^iketas, 4 The wise who, by means of meditation
on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be
seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the
cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy
and sorrow far behind ’ (I, 2 , 12). Now all this means to
intimate that the individual Self and the highest Self are
non-different. For if Na^iketas set aside the question, by
asking which he had earned for himself the praise of Yama,
and after having received that praise asked a new question,
all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly.
Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2 , 14, 4 That
which thou seest as neither this nor that/ merely resumes
the topic to which the question in I, 1, 20 had referred.—
Nor is there any basis to the objection that the two questions
differ in form. The second question, in reality, is concerned
with the same distinction as the first. The first enquires
about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c.;
the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being
subject to sa^sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so
long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c.; but
as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the soul is one
with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural texts
as 4 Thou art that/ But whether Nescience be active or
inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz.
the soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope
lying on the ground for a snake, and run away from it,
frightened and trembling; thereon another man may tell
him, 4 Do not be afraid, it is only a rope, not a snake; 5 and he
may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined snake,
and stop running. But all the while the presence and subse¬
quent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being
a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope itself.
Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which
is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience
makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained in
the passage, 4 It is not born, it dies not/ is also to be con¬
sidered as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I,
1, 20 .—The Sutra is to be understood with reference to the
distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which
252
VEDANTA-sOtRAS.
results from Nescience. Although the question relating to
the Self is in reality one only, yet its former part (I, i, 20)
is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since there a
doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at
the time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since
the specific marks of the sa^sara-state, such as activity, Sz:c.
are not denied; while the latter part of the question (I, 2,
14), where the state of being beyond all attributes is spoken
of, clearly refers to the highest Self.—For these reasons the
Sutra is right in assuming three topics of question and
explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul,
and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who
assume that the pradhana constitutes a fourth subject
discussed in the Upanishad, can point neither to a boon
connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an answer.
Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our
own.
7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that
of the term mahat.
While the Sankhyas employ the term c the Great one,’ to
denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence 1 (? viz.
the intellect), the term has a different meaning in Vedic use.
This we see from its being connected with the Self, See. in
such passages as the following, c The great Self is beyond
the Intellect ’ (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); ‘ The great omnipresent
Self 5 (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); ‘ I know that great person 5 ( 5 ve.
Up. Ill, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta
also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the
pradh&na.—The pradhana is therefore a mere thing of
inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.
8. (It cannot be maintained that a^a means the
1 The commentators give different explanations of the Satta-
matra of the text. — Sattamatre sattvapradhanaprakrfter adya-
pari^ame. Go. An. — Bhogapavargapurusharthasya maha/^^abdi-
tabuddhikaryatvat purushapekshitaphalakara^a^ sad u^yate tatra
bhavapratyayo * pi svarupartho na samanyava^i karyanumeyaw
mahan na pratyaksham iti matra^abda^. Ananda Giri.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 8.
253
pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated;
as in the case of the cup.
Here the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward
and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for
the pradhana is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the
following mantra (SVe. Up. IV, 5), ‘There is one red,
white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same
nature. There is one a^*a who loves her and lies by her;
there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.’—-
In this mantra the words £ red/ ‘ white/ and £ black ’ denote
the three constituent elements of the pradhana. Passion is
called red on account of its colouring, i. e. influencing pro¬
perty ; Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature
of Light; Darkness is called black on account of its covering
and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three
constituent elements, i. e. the pradhana, is denoted by the at¬
tributes of its parts, and is therefore called red—white—black.
It is further called a^d, i. e. unborn, because it is acknow¬
ledged to be the fundamental matter out of which everything
springs, not a mere effect.—But has not the word a^a the
settled meaning of she-goat ?—True; but the ordinary
meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place,
because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter.—
That pradh&na produces many creatures participating in its
three constituent elements. One unborn being loves her
and lies by her, i. e. some souls, deluded by ignorance,
approach her, and falsely imagining that they experience
pleasure or pain, or are in a state of dulness, pass through
the course of transmigratory existence. Other souls, again,
which have attained to discriminative knowledge, lose their
attachment to prakrzti, and leave her after having enjoyed
her, i. e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and release.
—On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the
1 As the meaning of the word a^a is going to be discussed, and
as the author of the Sfitras and -Sankara seem to disagree as to its
meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in
this place.—Sankara reads—and explains,—in the mantra, sarupa-6
(not sarfipam) and bhuktabhog&m, not bhuktabhogyam.
254
vedanta~s6tras.
followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their
pradhana hypothesis.
To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra
by no means proves the Sankhya doctrine to be based on
Scripture. That mantra, taken by itself, is not able to give
additional strength to any doctrine. For, by means of
some supposition or other, the terms a^a, &c. can be
reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for
the special assertion that the Sankhya doctrine only is meant.
The case is analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the
mantra, 4 There is a cup having its mouth below and its
bottom above’ (Bn.Up. II, 2, 3). Just as it is impossible to
decide on the ground of this mantra taken by itself what
special cup is meant—it being possible to ascribe, somehow
or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward
to any cup— ; so here also there is no special quality stated,
so that it is not possible to decide from the mantra itself
whether the pradhana is meant by the term aor some¬
thing else.—But in connexion with the mantra about the
cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn
what kind of cup is meant, ‘ What is called the cup having
its mouth below and its bottom above is this head.’—Whence,
however, can we learn what special being is meant by the
a^*i of the vSVetayvatara-upanishad ?—To this question the
next Stitra replies.
9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are
meant by the term a£*&); for some read so in their
text.
By the term agci. we have to understand the causal
matter of the four classes of beings, which matter has sprung
from the highest Lord and begins with light, i. e. comprises
fire, water, and earth.—The word 6 but ’ (in the Sutra) gives
emphasis to the assertion.—This aga is to be considered as
comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting of
three gu^as in the Sankhya sense. We draw this conclusion
from the fact that one sakha, after having related how fire,
water, and earth sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to
them red colour, and so on. ‘ The red colour of burning fire
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 9.
255
(agni) is the colour of the elementary fire (te^as), its white
colour is the colour of water, its black colour the colour of
earth, 5 &c. Now those three elements—fire, water, and earth—
we recognise in the vSVetajvatara passage, as the words red,
white, and black are common to both passages, and as these
words primarily denote special colours and can be applied
to the Sankhya gu/zas in a secondary sense only. That
passages whose sense is beyond doubt are to be used for the
interpretation of doubtful passages, is a generally acknow¬
ledged rule. As we therefore find that in the ^SVetlrvatara—
after the general topic has been started in I,1,‘ The Brahman-
students say, Is Brahman the cause? 5 —the text, previous
to the passage under discussion, speaks of a power of the
highest Lord which arranges the whole world (‘ the Sages
devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the
power belonging to God himself, hidden in its own
qualities 5 ); and as further that same power is referred
to in two subsequent complementary passages (‘ Know
then, Prakrzti is Mayd, and the great Lord he who is
affected with Maya; 5 ‘ who being one only rules over every
germ ; 5 IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be asserted that the
mantra treating of the a gk refers to some independent causal
matter called pradhdna. We rather assert, on the ground
of the general subject-matter, that the mantra describes
the same divine power referred to in the other passages, in
which names and forms lie unevolved, and which we assume
as the antecedent condition of that state of the world
in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine
power is represented as three-coloured, because its products,
viz. fire, water, and earth, have three distinct colours.—But
how can we maintain, on the ground of fire, water, and earth
having three colours, that the causal matter is appropriately
called a three-coloured a£*a ? if we consider, on the one hand,
that the exterior form of the genus a^d (i. e. goat) does not
inhere in fire, water, and earth ; and, on the other hand, that
Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been pro¬
duced, so that the word a^a cannot be taken in the sense
‘non-produced V—To this question the next Sutra replies.
1 Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the
256
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
10. And on account of the statement of the
assumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing con¬
trary to reason (in a^a denoting the causal matter);
just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and
similar cases.
The word a^a neither expresses that fire, water, and earth
belong to the goat species, nor is it to be explained as
meaning ‘unborn;’ it rather expresses an assumption, i. e.
it intimates the assumption of the source of all beings (which
source comprises fire, water, and earth), being compared to
a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be
partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many
young goats resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat
might love her and lie by her, while some other he-goat
might leave her after having enjoyed her; so the universal
causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising fire,
water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate
beings similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered
by Nescience, while it is abandoned by those souls which
have attained true knowlege.—Nor must we imagine that
the distinction of individual souls, which is implied in the
preceding explanation, involves that reality of the multi¬
plicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of other philo¬
sophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to
intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of
views of the Sfttra writer and -Sankara. Govindananda notes that
according to the Bhashyakrft a^a means simply maya—which
interpretation is based on prakarawa—while, according to the Sutra-
kr/t, who explains aga on the ground of the .Oandogya-passage
treating of the three primary elements, a^a denotes the aggregate of
those three elements constituting an avantaraprakrz'ti.—On -San¬
kara’s explanation the term aga presents no difficulties, for maya is
aga, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Shtra
writer, however, aga cannot mean unborn, since the three primary
elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the rh^i
signification of a^a, according to which it means she-goat. But
how can the avantara-prakrzti be called a she-goat? To this
question the next Shtra replies.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, II.
257
the states of bondage and release. This latter distinction
is explained with reference to the multiplicity of souls as
ordinarily conceived ; that multiplicity, however, depends
altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is the unreal product
of wrong knowledge merely ; as we know from scriptural
passages such as, ‘ He is the one God hidden in all beings,
all-pervading, the Self in all beings, 5 &c.—The words ‘ like
the honey 5 (in the Sutra) mean that just as the sun, although
not being honey, is represented as honey ( Kh . Up. Ill, 1),
and speech as a cow (B ri. Up. V, 8), and the heavenly
world, &c. as the fires (B ri. Up. VI, 2, 9), so here the
causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is metaphori¬
cally represented as one. There is therefore nothing con¬
trary to reason in the circumstance of the term a^*a being
used to denote the aggregate of fire, water, and earth.
11. (The assertion that there is scriptural autho¬
rity for the pradhana, &c. can) also not (be based)
on the mention of the number (of the Sankhya
categories), on account of the diversity (of the
categories) and on account of the excess (over the
number of those categories).
The attempt to base the Sankhya doctrine on the mantra
speaking of the a gk having failed, the Sankhya again comes
forward and points to another mantra: ‘ He in whom the five
“five-people” and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the
Self; I who know believe him to be Brahman’ (B ri. Up. IV,
4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which expresses
the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another
word, viz. five, which qualifies the former; these two words
together therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e.
twenty-five. Now as many beings as the number twenty-
five presupposes, just so many categories the Sankhya
system counts. Cp. Sankhya K&rika, 3: ‘ The funda¬
mental causal substance (i.e. the pradhana) is not an effect.
Seven (substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so
on, are causal substances as well as effects. Sixteen are
effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect. 5
[34] S
258
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
As therefore the number twenty-five, which occurs in the
scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the twenty-five
categories taught in the Sankhya-smrzti, it follows that the
doctrine of the pradhana, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.
To this reasoning we make the following reply.—It is
impossible to base the assertion that the pradhana, &c.
have Scripture in their favour on the reference to their
number which you pretend to find in the text, ‘ on account
of the diversity of the Sankhya categories. 5 The Sankhya
categories have each their individual difference, and there
are no attributes belonging in common to each pentad on
account of which the number twenty-five could be divided
into five times five. For a number of individually separate
things can, in general, not be combined into smaller groups
of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for
such combination.—Here the Sankhya will perhaps rejoin
that the expression five (times) five is used only to denote
the number twenty-five which has five pentads for its
constituent parts; just as the poem says, ‘five years and
seven Indra did not rain,’ meaning only that there was no
rain for twelve years.—But this explanation also is not
tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that
it has recourse to indirect indication 1 .—In the second
place, the second ‘ five 5 constitutes a compound with the
word ‘people,’ the Brahmazza-accent showing that the
two form one word only 2 . To the same conclusion we
are led by another passage also (Taitt. Samh. I, 6, 3, 2,
pankanam tva pa^a^ananam, &c.) where the two terms
constitute one word, have one accent and one case-
1 Indication (lakshazza, which consists in this case in five times five
being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an objectionable
mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in interpretation
only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct
meaning.
2 That is only one word appears from its having
only one accent, viz. the udatta on the last syllable, which udatta
becomes anudatta according to the rules laid down in the Bhashika
Sfitra for the accentuation of the *Satapatha-brahmazza.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, II.
259
termination. The word thus being a compound there
is neither a repetition of the word ‘five/ involving two
pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the
mere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified
by another word.—But as the people are already denoted
to be five by the compound ‘ five-people, 5 the effect of the
other ‘ five 5 qualifying the compound will be that we
understand twenty-five people to be meant; just as the
expression ‘five five-bundles’ (pa$£a pa#£apulya/z) conveys
the idea of twenty-five bundles.—The instance is not an
analogous one, we reply. The word ‘pa££apuli’ denotes
a unity (i. e. one bundle made up of five bundles), and hence
when the question arises, ‘ How many such bundles are
there ? ’ it can be qualified by the word ‘ five, 5 indicating
that there are five such bundles. The word pa^a^ana/j,
on the other hand, conveys at once the idea of distinction
(i.e. of five distinct things), so that there is no room at all
for a further desire to know how many people there are,
and hence no room for a further qualification. And if the
word ‘five’ be taken as a qualifying word it can only
qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection
against which assumption has already been stated.—For
all these reasons the expression the five five-people cannot
denote the twenty-five categories of the Sankhyas.—This
is further not possible ‘ on account of the excess.’ For on
the Sankhya interpretation there would be an excess over
the number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the
ether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self
is spoken of as the abode in which the five five-people rest,
the clause ‘Him I believe to be the Self 5 being connected
with the ‘in whom’ of the antecedent clause. Now the
Self is the intelligent soul of the Sankhyas which is
already included in the twenty-five categories, and which
therefore, on their interpretation of the passage, would
here be mentioned once as constituting the abode and once
as what rests in the abode! If, on the other hand, the
soul were supposed not to be comprised in the twenty-five
categories, the Sankhya would thereby abandon his own
doctrine of the categories being twenty-five. The same
26 o
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
remarks apply to the separate mention made of the ether.
—How, finally, can the mere circumstance of a certain
number being referred to in the sacred text justify the
assumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sankhya
categories of which Scripture speaks in no other place?
especially if we consider that the word ^ana has not the
settled meaning of category, and that the number may be
satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of the
passage.
How, then, the Sankhya will ask, do you interpret the
phrase ‘ the five five-people ? 5 —On the ground, we reply,
of the rule Pacini II, i, 50, according to which certain
compounds formed with numerals are mere names. The
word pa^a^ana^ thus is not meant to convey the idea of
the number five, but merely to denote certain classes of
beings. Hence the question may present itself, How many
such classes are there? and to this question an answer
is given by the added numeral ‘five.’ There are certain
classes of beings called five-people, and these classes are
five. Analogously we may speak of the seven seven-
rzshis, where again the compound denotes a class of beings
merely, not their number. — Who then are those five-
people?—To this question the next Sutra replies.
12. (The pa$/£a^ana/£ are) the breath and so
on, (as is seen) from the complementary passage.
The mantra in which the pa^a^ani^ are mentioned is
followed by another one in which breath and four other
things are mentioned for the purpose of describing the
nature of Brahman. ‘ They who know the breath of
breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of
food, the mind of mind V Hence we conclude, on the
ground of proximity, that the five-people are the beings
mentioned in this latter mantra.—But how, the Sankhya
asks, can the word ‘ people 5 be applied to the breath, the
eye, the ear, and so on ?—How, we ask in return, can it be
1 So in the Madhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the
Ka«va recension has not the clause f the food of food.'
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 12 .
26l
applied to your categories? In both cases the common
meaning of the word ‘ people ’ has to be disregarded;
but in favour of our explanation is the fact that the breath,
the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a complementary
passage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted by the
word ‘ people ’ because they are connected with people.
Moreover, we find the word ‘person/ which means as much
as ‘people/ applied to the pranas in the passage, ‘These
are the five persons of Brahman 5 ( Kh . Up. Ill, 13, 6); and
another passage runs, ‘ Breath is father, breath is mother, 5
&c. (Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1). And, owing to the force of
composition, there is no objection to the compound being
taken in its settled conventional meaning 1 .—But how can
the conventional meaning be had recourse to, if there is no
previous use of the word in that meaning?—That may be
done, we reply, just as in the case of udbhid and similar
words 2 * . We often infer that a word of unknown meaning
refers to some known thing because it is used in connexion
with the latter. So, for instance, in the case of the fol¬
lowing words : 4 He is to sacrifice with the udbhid ; he cuts
the yupa; he makes the vedi. 5 Analogously we conclude
that the term pa^a^ana/^, which, from the grammatical
rule quoted, is known to be a name, and which there¬
fore demands a thing of which it is the name, denotes
the breath, the eye, and so on, which are connected with
it through their being mentioned in a complementary
passage.—Some commentators explain the word pa&£a-
1 This in answer to the Sankhya who objects to ^ana when
applied to the prana, &c. being interpreted with the help of
lakshawa; while if referred to the pradhana, &c. it may be
explained to have a direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika
interpretation (the pradhana being ^ana because it produces, the
mahat &c. being ^ana because they are produced). The Vedantin
points out that the compound pa^a^ana^ has its own vudki-
meaning, just as a^vakarwa, literally horse-ear, which conventionally
denotes a certain plant.
2 We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because it is
mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that
the yfipa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.
262
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
ganak to mean the Gods, the Fathers, the Gandharvas,
the Asuras, and the Rakshas. Others, again, think that
the four castes together with the Nishadas are meant.
Again, some scriptural passage (.AYg-veda Sa^h. VIII, 53, 7)
speaks of the tribe of ‘ the five-people,’ meaning thereby
the created beings in general; and this latter explanation
also might be applied to the passage under discussion.
The teacher (the Sutrakara), on the other hand, aiming at
showing that the passage does not refer to the twenty-five
categories of the Sankhyas, declares that on the ground of
the complementary passage breath, &c. have to be under¬
stood.
Well, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned
in the Madhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text
mentions food also (and so makes up the number five).
But how shall we interpret the Ka;zva-text which does not
mention food (and thus altogether speaks of four things
only) ?—To this question the next Sutra replies.
13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Ka^vas)
where food is not mentioned, (the number five is
made full) by the light (mentioned in the preceding
mantra).
The Ka;/va-text, although not mentioning food, makes up
the full number five, by the light mentioned in the mantra
preceding that in which the five-people are spoken of. That
mantra describes the nature of Brahman by saying, ‘ Him
the gods worship as the light of lights.’—If it be asked
how it is accounted for that the light mentioned in both
texts equally is in one text to be employed for the expla¬
nation of the five-people, and not in the other text; we reply
that the reason lies in the difference of the requirements.
As the Madhyandinas meet in one and the same mantra
with breath and four other entities enabling them to interpret
the term, ‘the five-people,’ they are in no need of the light
mentioned in another mantra. The Ka^vas, on the other
hand, cannot do without the light. The case is analogous
to that of the Sho^adn-cup, which, according to different
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 14.
263
passages, is either to be offered or not to be offered at the
atiratra-sacrifice.
We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis
for the doctrine of the pradhana. That this doctrine can¬
not be proved either by Smrzti or by ratiocination will be
shown later on.
14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedanta-
passages with regard to the things created, such as)
ether and so on; (there is no such conflict with
regard to the Lord) on account of his being re¬
presented (in one passage) as described (in other
passages), viz. as the cause (of the world).
In the preceding part of the work the right definition of
Brahman has been established ; it has been shown that all the
Vedanta-texts have Brahman for their common topic; and
it has been proved that there is no scriptural authority for
the doctrine of the pradhana.—But now a new objection
presents itself
It is not possible—our opponent says—to prove either
that Brahman is the cause of the origin, &c. of the world,
or that all Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman; because we
observe that the Vedanta-texts contradict one another.
All the Vedanta-passages which treat of the creation
enumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in
reality speak of different creations. In one place it is said
that from the Self there sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, i);
in another place that the creation began with fire ( Kh . Up.
VI, 2, 3); in another place, again, that the Person created
breath and from breath faith (Pr. Up.VI, 4); in another place,
again, that the Self created these worlds, the water (above
the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), and the water (below
the earth) (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 2; 3). There no order is stated
at all. Somewhere else it is said that the creation origi¬
nated from the Non-existent. c In the beginning this was
non-existent; from it was born what exists’ (Taitt. Up. II, 7);
and, c In the beginning this was non-existent; it became
existent; it grew 5 (Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1). In another place,
264
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the ante¬
cedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent men¬
tioned in its stead. ‘ Others say, in the beginning there
was that only which is not; but how could it be thus, my
dear ? How could that which is be born of that which is
not? 5 ( Kh . Up. VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place, again,
the development of the world is spoken of as having taken
place spontaneously, ‘ Now all this was then undeveloped.
It became developed by form and name 5 (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).
—As therefore manifold discrepancies are observed, and
as no option is possible in the case of an accomplished
matter 1 , the Vedanta-passages cannot be accepted as
authorities for determining the cause of the world, but we
must rather accept some other cause of the world resting
on the authority of Smrz’ti and Reasoning.
To this we make the following reply.—Although the
Vedanta-passages may be conflicting with regard to the
order of the things created, such as ether and so on, they
do n o t conflict with regard to the creator, ‘ on account of
his being represented as described. 5 That means: such as
the creator is described in any one Vedanta-passage, viz. as
all-knowing, the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a
second, so he is represented in all other Vedanta-passages
also. Let us consider, for instance, the description of
Brahman (given in Taitt. Up. II, 1 ff.). There it is said at
first, c Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman. 5 Here the
word ‘ knowledge, 5 and so likewise the statement, made
later on, that Brahman desired (II, 6), intimate that Brah¬
man is of the nature of intelligence. Further, the text
declares 2 that the cause of the world is the general Lord, by
representing it as not dependent on anything else. It further
applies to the cause of the world the term ‘ Self 5 (II, 1), and
it represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths begin-
1 Option being possible only in the case of things to be accom¬
plished, i.e. actions.
2 According to Go. An. in the passage, ‘That made itself its
Self’ (II, 7); according to An. Giri in the passage, ‘He created
all ’ (II, 6).
I ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 14. 265
ning with the gross body; whereby it affirms it to be the
internal Self within all beings. Again—in the passage,
‘ May I be many, may I grow forth 5 —it tells how the Self
became many, and thereby declares that the creator is non-
different from the created effects. And—in the passage,
‘He created all this whatever there is’—it represents the
creator as the Cause of the entire world, and thereby declares
him to have been without a second previously to the
creation. The same characteristics which in the above
passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of
the world, we find to be predicated of it in other passages
also, so, for instance, ‘ Being only, my dear, was this in the
beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, may I
be man)^, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire 3 ( Kh . Up.
VI, 2, 1 ; 3), and ‘ In the beginning all this was Self, one
only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He
thought, shall I send forth worlds? ’ (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1 ; 2.)
The Ved&nta-passages which are concerned with setting
forth the cause of the world are thus in harmony through¬
out.—On the other hand, there are found conflicting state¬
ments concerning the world, the creation being in some
places said to begin with ether, in other places with fire, and
so on. But, in the first place, it cannot be said that the
conflict of statements concerning the world affects the
statements concerning the cause, i. e. Brahman, in which all
the Vedcinta-texts are seen to agree—for that would be an
altogether unfounded generalization;—and, in the second
place, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those con¬
flicting passages also which refer to the world. And, to
consider the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of state¬
ments regarding the world would not even matter greatly,
since the creation of the world and similar topics are not at
all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe
nor are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends
on those matters in any way; nor have we the right to
assume such a thing; because we conclude from the intro¬
ductory and concluding clauses that the passages about the
creation and the like form only subordinate members of
passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages
266
vedanta-sIjtras.
setting forth the creation and so on subserve the purpose of
teaching Brahman, Scripture itself declares; compare Kh .
Up. VI, 8, 4, 4 As food too is an offshoot, seek after its root,
viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek after its
root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after its
root, viz. the True/ We, moreover, understand that by-
means of comparisons such as that of the clay (Kh. Up. VI,
i, 4) the creation is described merely for the purpose of
teaching us that the effect is not really different from the
cause. Analogously it is said by those who know the sacred
tradition, 4 If creation is represented by means of (the
similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things; that is only
a means for making it understood that (in reality) there is
no difference whatever’ (Gaudap. Ka. Ill, 15).—On the
other hand, Scripture expressly states the fruits connected
with the knowledge of Brahman, 4 He who knows Brahman
obtains the highest ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 4 He who knows the
Self overcomes grief’ (Kh. Up. VII, 1, 3); 4 A man who
knows him passes over death 5 (vSVe. Up. Ill, 8). That
fruit is, moreover, apprehended by intuition (pratyaksha),
for as soon as, by means of the doctrine, 4 That art thou, 5 a
man has arrived at the knowledge that the Self is non¬
transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.
It remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such
as 4 Non-being this was in the beginning ’ contain conflicting
statements about the nature of the cause. This is done in
the next Sutra.
15. On account of the connexion (with passages
treating of Brahman, the passages speaking of the
Non-being do not intimate absolute Non-existence).
The passage 4 Non-being indeed was this in the beginning’
(Taitt. Up. II, 7) does not declare that the cause of the
world is the absolutely Non-existent which is devoid of
all Selfhood. For in the preceding sections of the Upani-
shad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the Non-existing,
and is defined to be that which is ( 4 He who knows the
Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I 5.
267
He who knows the Brahman as existing him we know
himself as existing ’); it is further, by means of the series
of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c., represented as the
inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again
referred to in the clause, ‘ He wished, may I be many;’
is declared to have originated the entire creation; and is
finally referred to in the clause, ‘ Therefore the wise call
it the true/ Thereupon the text goes on to say, with
reference to what has all along been the topic of discussion,
‘ On this there is also this jloka, Non-being indeed was
this in the beginning, 5 &c. If here the term ‘Non-being 5
denoted the absolutely Non-existent, the whole context
would be broken; for while ostensibly referring to one
matter the passage would in reality treat of a second
altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude
that, while the term ‘ Being 5 ordinarily denotes that which
is differentiated bynames and forms, the term ‘Non-being 5
denotes the same substance previous to its differentiation,
i. e. that Brahman is, in a secondary sense of the word,
called Non-being, previously to the origination of the world.
The same interpretation has to be applied to the passage
‘Non-being this was in the beginning 5 (. Kh . Up. Ill, 19, 1);
for that passage also is connected with another passage which
runs, ‘ It became being ; 5 whence it is evident that the ‘ Non-
being 5 of the former passage cannot mean absolute Non¬
existence. And in the passage, f Others say, Non-being
this was in the beginning 5 ( Kh . Up. VI, 2, 1), the reference
to the opinion of ‘ others 5 does not mean that the doctrine
referred to (according to which the world was originally
absolutely non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the
Veda; for option is possible in the case of actions but not
in the case of substances. The passage has therefore to
be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of primitive
absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some
teachers of inferior intelligence ; a refutation undertaken for
the purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world
has sprung from that which is.—The following passage
again, ‘ Now this was then undeveloped, 5 &c. ( Bri . Up. I,
4, 7), does not by any means assert that the evolution of
268
VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
the world took place without a ruler ; as we conclude from
the circumstance of its being connected with another
passage in which the ruler is represented as entering into
the evolved world of effects, £ He entered thither to the
very tips of the finger-nails,’ &c. If it were supposed that
the evolution of the world takes place without a ruler, to
whom could the subsequent pronoun £ he ’ refer (in the
passage last quoted) which manifestly is to be connected
with something previously intimated? And as Scripture
declares that the Self, after having entered into the body,
is of the nature of intelligence ( £ when seeing, eye by name;
when hearing, ear by name ; when thinking, mind by
name’), it follows that it is intelligent at the time of its
entering also.—We, moreover, must assume that the world
was evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same
way as it is at present seen to develop itself by names and
forms, viz. under the rulership of an intelligent creator;
for we have no right to make assumptions contrary to
what is at present actually observed. Another scriptural
passage also declares that the evolution of the world took
place under the superintendence of a ruler, £ Let me now
enter these beings with this living Self, and let me then
evolve names and forms 5 (. Kh . Up. VI, 3, 2). The in¬
transitive expression £ It developed itself’ (vyakriyata;
it became developed) is to be viewed as having reference to
the ease with which the real agent, viz. the Lord, brought
about that evolution. Analogously it is said, for instance,
that ‘the cornfield reaps itself’ (i. e. is reaped with the
greatest ease), although there is the reaper sufficient (to
account for the work being done).—Or else we may look
on the form vyakriyata as having reference to a necessarily
implied agent; as is the case in such phrases as £ the village
is being approached ’ (where we necessarily have to supply
£ by Devadatta or somebody else ’).
16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because
(the ‘ work ’) denotes the world.
In the Kaushitaki-brahma^a, in the dialogue of Bal&ki
and A^&tajatru, we read, £ O Balaki, he who is the maker of
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 16.
269
those persons, he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be
known’ (Kau. Up. IV, 19). The question here arises whether
what is here inculcated as the object of knowledge is the
individual soul or the chief vital air or the highest Self.
The purvapakshin maintains that the vital air is meant.
For, in the first place, he says, the clause ‘ of whom this
is the work 5 points to the activity of motion, and that
activity rests on the vital air. In the second place, we meet
with the word ‘ prazza 5 in a complementary passage (‘ Then
he becomes one with that prazza alone ’), and that word
is well known to denote the vital air. In the third place,
prazza is the maker of all the persons, the person in the
sun, the person in the moon, &c., who in the preceding part
of the dialogue had been enumerated by Balaki; for that
the sun and the other divinities are mere differentiations of
prazza we know from another scriptural passage, viz. ‘ Who
is that one god (in whom all the other gods are contained) ?
Prazza and he is Brahman, and they call him That ’ (Brz.
Up. Ill, 9, 9).—Or else, the purvapakshin continues, the
passage under discussion represents the individual soul as
the object of knowledge. For of the soul also it can be
said that ‘ this is the work,’ if we understand by ‘ this ’ all
meritorious and non-meritorious actions ; and the soul also,
in so far as it is the enjoyer, can be viewed as the maker
of the persons enumerated in so far as they are instru¬
mental to the soul’s fruition. The complementary passage,
moreover, contains an inferential mark of the individual
soul. For A^ata^atru, in order to instruct Balaki about
the c maker of the persons ’ who had been proposed as the
object of knowledge, calls a sleeping man by various names
and convinces Balaki, by the circumstance that the sleeper
does not hear his shouts, that the prazza and so on are not
the enjoyers ; he thereupon wakes the sleeping man by
pushing him with his stick, and so makes Balaki compre¬
hend that the being capable of fruition is the individual
soul which is distinct from the prazza. A subsequent passage
also contains an inferential mark of the individual soul, viz.
‘ And as the master feeds with his people, nay, as his people
feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with
270
vedAnta-sutras.
the other Selfs, thus those Selfs feed on the conscious
Self’ (Kau. Up. IV, 20). And as the individual soul is the
support of the pra/za, it may itself be called prazza.—We
thus conclude that the passage under discussion refers
either to the individual soul or to the chief vital air; but
not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential marks
whatever.
To this we make the following reply.—The Lord only
can be the maker of the persons enumerated, on account
of the force of the introductory part of the section. Bal&ki
begins his colloquy with A^*ata^atru with the offer, ‘ Shall
I tell you Brahman ? 5 Thereupon he enumerates some
individual souls residing in the sun, the moon, and so on,
which participate in the sight of the secondary Brahman,
and in the end becomes silent. A^ata^atru then sets aside
Balaki’s doctrine as not referring to the chief Brahman—
with the words, ‘ Vainly did you challenge me, saying, Shall
I tell you Brahman, 5 &c.—and proposes the maker of all
those individual souls as a new object of knowledge. If
now that maker also were merely a soul participating in
the sight of the secondary Brahman, the introductory
statement which speaks of Brahman would be futile.
Hence it follows that the highest Lord himself is meant.—
None, moreover, but the highest Lord is capable of being
the maker of all those persons as he only is absolutely
independent.—Further, the clause ‘of whom this is the
work 5 does not refer either to the activity of motion nor
to meritorious and non-meritorious actions; for neither
of those two is the topic of discussion or has been men¬
tioned previously. Nor can the term ‘work 5 denote the
enumerated persons, since the latter are mentioned separ¬
ately—in the clause, ‘ He who is the maker of those per¬
sons 5 —and as inferential marks (viz. the neuter gender and
the singular number of the word karman, work) contradict
that assumption. Nor, again, can the term ‘ work 5 denote
either the activity whose object the persons are, or the
result of that activity, since those two are already implied
in the mention of the agent (in the clause, ‘ He who is the
maker Thus there remains no other alternative than to
I ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, I 7.
27I
take the pronoun ‘ this 5 (in ‘ He of whom this is the work ’)
as denoting the perceptible world and to understand the
same world—as that which is made—by the term ‘ work.’
—We may indeed admit that the world also is not the
previous topic of discussion and has not been mentioned
before; still, as no specification is mentioned, we conclude
that the term ‘work’ has to be understood in a general
sense, and thus denotes what first presents itself to the
mind, viz. everything which exists in general. It is, more¬
over, not true that the world is not the previous topic of
discussion; we are rather entitled to conclude from the cir¬
cumstance that the various persons (in the sun, the moon,
&c.) which constitute a part of the world had been specially
mentioned before, that the passage in question is concerned
with the whole world in general. The conjunction ‘or’ (in
‘ or he of whom,’ &c.) is meant to exclude the idea of limited
makership ; so that the whole passage has to be inter¬
preted as follows, ‘ He who is the maker of those persons
forming a part of the world, or rather—to do away with
this limitation—he of whom this entire world without any
exception is the work. 5 The special mention made of the
persons having been created has for its purpose to show
that those persons whom B&laki had proclaimed to be
Brahman are not Brahman. The passage therefore sets
forth the maker of the world in a double aspect, at first as
the creator of a special part of the world and thereupon as
the creator of the whole remaining part of the world ; a way
of speaking analogous to such every-day forms of ex¬
pression as, ‘ The wandering mendicants are to be fed, and
then the Brahmazzas V And that the maker of the world
is the highest Lord is affirmed in all Vedanta-texts.
17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of
the inferential marks of the individual soul and the
chief vital air; we reply that that has already been
explained.
1 By the Brahmazzas being meant all those Brahmazzas who are
not at the same time wandering mendicants.
272
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
It remains for us to refute the objection that on account
of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the
chief vital air, which are met with in the complementary-
passage, either the one or the other must be meant in the
passage under discussion, and not the highest Lord.—We
therefore remark that that objection has already been
disposed of under I, L 3 1 * There it was shown that from
an interpretation similar to the one here proposed by the
purvapakshin there would result a threefold meditation,
one having Brahman for its object, a second one directed
on the individual soul, and a third one connected with the
chief vital air. Now the same result would present itself
in our case, and that would be unacceptable as we must
infer from the introductory as well as the concluding
clauses, that the passage under discussion refers to Brah¬
man. With reference to the introductory clause this has
been already proved; that the concluding passage also
refers to Brahman, we infer from the fact of there being
stated in it a pre-eminently high reward, ‘ Warding off all
evil he who knows this obtains pre-eminence among all
beings, sovereignty, supremacy. 5 —But if this is so, the
sense of the passage under discussion is already settled by
the discussion of the passage about Pratarda^a (I, t, 31);
why, then, the present Sutra?—No, we reply ; the sense of
our passage is not yet settled, since under I, 1, 31 it has
not been proved that the clause, e Or he whose work is this, 5
refers to Brahman. Hence there arises again, in con¬
nexion with the present passage, a doubt whether the
individual soul and the chief vital air may not be meant,
and that doubt has again to be refuted.—The word pra^a
occurs, moreover, in the sense of Brahman, so in the passage,
‘The mind settles down on pra^a 5 ( Kh. Up. VI, 8, 2).—
The inferential marks of the individual soul also have, on
account of the introductory and concluding clauses referring
to Brahman, to be explained so as not to give rise to any
discrepancy.
18. But (Taimini thinks that (the reference to the
individual soul) has another purport, on account of
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, l8. 273
the question and answer; and thus some also (read
in their text).
Whether the passage under discussion is concerned with
the individual soul or with Brahman, is, in the opinion of
the teacher £aimini, no matter for dispute, since the
reference to the individual soul has a different purport, i. e.
aims at intimating Brahman. He founds this his opinion
on a question and a reply met with in the text. After
A^dta^atru has taught Balaki, by waking the sleeping
man, that the soul is different from the vital air, he asks
the following question,‘ Balclki, where did this person here
sleep? Where was he? Whence came he thus back?’
This question clearly refers to something different from the
individual soul. And so likewise does the reply, ‘When
sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one with that
pra^a aloneand, ‘ From that Self all pranas proceed, each
towards its place, from the pranas the gods, from the gods
the worlds/—Now it is the general Vedanta doctrine that
at the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with the
highest Brahman, and that from the highest Brahman the
whole world proceeds, inclusive of pra«a, and so on. When
Scripture therefore represents as the object of knowledge
that in which there takes place the deep sleep of the soul,
characterised by absence of consciousness and utter tran¬
quillity, i. e. a state devoid of all those specific cognitions
which are produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul,
and from which the soul returns when the sleep is broken;
we understand that the highest Self is meant.—Moreover,
the Va^asaneyLrakha, which likewise contains the colloquy
of Balaki and A^ata^atru, clearly refers to the individual
soul by means of the term, ‘ the person consisting of cog¬
nition ’ (vi^anamaya), and distinguishes from it the highest
Self (‘ Where was then the person consisting of cognition ?
and from whence did he thus come back?’B/^'. Up. II, 1,
16); and later on, in the reply to the above question,
declares that ‘ the person consisting of cognition lies in the
ether within the heart.’ Now we know that the word 4 ether ’
may be used to denote the highest Self, as, for instance, in
[34] T
VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
274
the passage about the small ether within the lotus of the
heart ( Kh . Up. VIII, 1, 1). Further on the B ri, Up. says,
‘All the Selfs came forth from that Self; 5 by which state¬
ment of the coming forth of all the conditioned Selfs it
intimates that the highest Self is the one general cause.
—The doctrine conveyed by the rousing of the sleeping
person, viz. that the individual soul is different from the
vital air, furnishes at the same time a further argument
against the opinion that the passage under discussion refers
to the vital air.
19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the
highest Self) on account of the connected meaning
of the sentences.
We read in the Brzhadarazzyaka, in the Maitreyi-brah-
ma/za the following passage, ‘ Verily, a husband is not dear
that you may love the husband, &c. &c.; verily, everything
is not dear that you may love everything; but that you
may love the Self therefore everything is dear. Verily, the
Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be
marked, O Maitreyi! When the Self has been seen, heard,
perceived, and known, then all this is known ’ (B ri, Up. IV,
5 , 6).—Here the doubt arises whether that which is repre¬
sented as the object to be seen, to be heard, and so on, is
the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the highest
Self.—But whence the doubt?—Because, we reply, the
Self is, on the one hand, by the mention of dear things such
as husband and so on, indicated as the enjoyer whence it
appears that the passage refers to the individual soul; and
because, on the other hand, the declaration that through the
knowledge of the Self everything becomes known points to
the highest Self.
The phrvapakshin maintains that the passage refers to
the individual soul, on account of the strength of the initial
statement. The text declares at the outset that all the
objects of enjoyment found in this world, such as husband,
wife, riches, and so on, are dear on account of the Self, and
thereby gives us to understand that the enjoying (i. e. the
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 19.
275
individual) Self is meant; if thereupon it refers to the Self
as the object of sight and so on, what other Self should it
mean than the same individual Self?—A subsequent passage
also (viz. ‘ Thus does this great Being, endless, unlimited,
consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise from out of these
elements, and vanish again after them. When he has departed
there is no more knowledge’), which describes how the
great Being under discussion rises, as the Self of knowledge,
from the elements, shows that the object of sight is no
other than the cognitional Self, i. e. the individual soul.
The concluding clause finally, ‘ How, O beloved, should he
know the knower?’ shows, by means of the term ‘knower,’
which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is meant.
The declaration that through the cognition of the Self
everything becomes known must therefore not be inter¬
preted in the literal sense, but must be taken to mean that
the world of objects of enjoyment is known through its
relation to the enjoying soul.
To this we make the following reply.—The passage
makes a statement about the highest Self, on account of
the connected meaning of the entire section. If we consider
the different passages in their mutual connexion, we find
that they all refer to the highest Self. After Maitreyi has
heard from Ya^avalkya that there is no hope of immor¬
tality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in
the words, ‘ What should I do with that by which I do not
become immortal ? What my Lord knoweth tell that to
me;’ and thereupon Ya^zavalkya expounds to her the
knowledge of the Self. Now Scripture as well as Smrzti
declares that immortality is not to be reached but through
the knowledge of the highest Self.—The statement further
that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes
known can be taken in its direct literal sense only if by the
Self we understand the highest cause. And to take it in a
non-literal sense (as the purvapakshin proposes) is inad¬
missible, on account of the explanation given of that state¬
ment in a subsequent passage, viz. ‘ Whosoever looks for
the Brahman class elsewhere than in the Self, is aban¬
doned by the Brahman class.’ Here it is said that who-
2 76
VED AN TA-S^TR AS.
ever erroneously views this world with its Brahmans and so
on, as having an independent existence apart from the Self,
is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an
erroneous view; whereby the view that there exists any
difference is refuted. And the immediately subsequent
clause, ‘ This everything is the Self/ gives us to understand
that the entire aggregate of existing things is non-different
from the Self; a doctrine further confirmed by the similes
of the drum and so on.—By explaining further that the
Self about which he had been speaking is the cause of the
universe of names, forms, and works (‘ There has been
breathed forth from this great Being what we have as Rig*
veda/ &c.) Ya^/zavalkya again shows that it is the highest
Self.—To the same conclusion he leads us by declaring, in
the paragraph which treats of the natural centres of things,
that the Self is the centre of the whole world with the
objects, the senses and the mind, that it has neither inside
nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of knowledge.—
From all this it follows that what the text represents as the
object of sight and so on is the highest Self.
We now turn to the remark made by the purvapakshin
that the passage teaches the individual soul to be the
object of sight, because it is, in the early part of the chapter,
denoted as something dear.
20. (The circumstance of the soul being repre¬
sented as the object of sight) indicates the fulfil¬
ment of the promissory statement; so Asmarathya
thinks.
The fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight
that Self which is denoted as something dear indicates
the fulfilment of the promise made in the passages,
4 When the Self is known all this is known/ ‘ All this is
that Self.’ For if the individual soul were different from
the highest Self, the knowledge of the latter would not
imply the knowledge of the former, and thus the promise
that through the knowledge of one thing everything is
to be known would not be fulfilled. Hence the initial
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 21.
277
statement aims at representing the individual Self and the
highest Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling
the promise made.—This is the opinion of the teacher
A^marathya *.
21. (The initial statement identifies the individual
soul and the highest Self) because the soul when it
will depart (from the body) is such (i. e. one with the
highest Self); thus Au^ulomi thinks.
The individual soul which is inquinated by the contact
with its different limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and
mind (mano-buddhi), attains through the instrumentality
of knowledge, meditation, and so on, a state of complete
serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at some
future time out of the body, to become one with the
highest Self; hence the initial statement in which it is
represented as non-different from the highest Self. This
is the opinion of the teacher Au<Ailomi.—Thus Scrip¬
ture says, ‘That serene being arising from this body
appears in its own form as soon as it has approached
the highest light’ ( Kh . Up. VIII, 12, 3).— In another
place Scripture intimates, by means of the simile of the
rivers, that name and form abide in the individual soul, ‘ As
1 The comment of the Bhamati on the Sfttra runs as follows : As
the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the
fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire; and, on the
other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because
in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor
from each other; so the individual souls also—which are effects
of Brahman—are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for
that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence;
nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case
they could not be distinguished from each other, and because, if
they were identical with Brahman and therefore omniscient, it
would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the
individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and some¬
how non-different.—The technical name of the doctrine here
represented by Amarathya is bhedabhedav&da.
278
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their
name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and
form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great ’
(Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 8). I. e. as the rivers losing the names and
forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual
soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes
united with the highest person. That the latter half of the
passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows from
the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the
two members of the comparison \
22. (The initial statement is made) because (the
highest Self) exists in the condition (of the individual
soul); so Karakrztsna thinks.
Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the
individual soul, therefore, the teacher KArakrztsna thinks, the
initial statement which aims at intimating the non-difference
of the two is possible. That the highest Self only is that which
appears as the individual soul, is evident from the Brahma/za-
passage, ‘ Let me enter into them with this living Self and
evolve names and forms/ and similar passages. We have
also mantras to the same effect, for instance, ‘ The wise one
who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits
calling the things by their names 5 (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7) 1 2 .
1 Bhamati: The individual soul is absolutely different from the
highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting
adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as non-different
from the highest Self because after having purified itself by means
of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and
become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad
thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when
difference actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pa^aratrikas:
* Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the
highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer
different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of
difference/—The technical name of the doctrine advocated by
Au^ulomi is satyabhedavada.
2 Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under
I, 1, 11.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2.
2 79
And where Scripture relates the creation of fire and the
other elements, it does not at the same time relate a sepa¬
rate creation of the individual soul; we have therefore no
right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self,
different from the latter.—In the opinion of the teacher
Ka.rakr/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the
individual soul, not anything else. Ajmarathya, although
meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different
from the highest Self, yet intimates by the expression,
‘ On account of the fulfilment of the promise ’—which de¬
clares a certain mutual dependence—that there does exist
a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest
Self and the individual soul k The opinion of Au^ulomi
again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference
of the two depend on difference of condition 1 2 . Of these
three opinions we conclude that the one held by KcUa-
krztsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what
all the Vedanta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, ‘ That
art thou ’) aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion of
Ka^akr/tsna immortality can be viewed as the result of
the knowledge of the soul; while it would be impossible
to hold the same view if the soul were a modification
(product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its exist¬
ence by being merged in its causal substance. For the
same reason, name and form cannot abide in the soul (as
was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the
rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to
the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same
reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of
which Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the
issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based
only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.
The last three Sutras have further to be interpreted so as
to furnish replies to the second of the purvapakshin’s argu¬
ments, viz. that the BrzhadaraTzyaka passage represents as
1 And not the relation of absolute identity.
2 I. e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.
28 o
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares
that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of
these elements. £ There is an indication of the fulfilment
of the promise; so A^marathya thinks. 5 The promise is
made in the two passages, £ When the Self is known, all this
is known/ and £ All this is that Self. 5 That the Self is every¬
thing, is proved by the declaration that the whole world of
names, forms, and works springs from one being, and is
merged in one being 1 ; and by its being demonstrated, with
the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that effect
and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is,
then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great
Being rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these
elements ; thus the teacher Ajrnarathya thinks. For if the
soul and the highest Self are non-different, the promise that
through the knowledge of one everything becomes known
is capable of fulfilment.— £ Because the soul when it will
depart is such ; thus Au^/ulomi thinks. 5 The statement as
to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the
declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible,
because the soul when — after having purified itself by
knowledge, and so on — it will depart from the body, is
capable of becoming one with the highest Self. This
is Au<Ailomi 5 s opinion.— £ Because it exists in the con¬
dition of the soul; thus Klrakrztsna opines. 5 Because
the highest Self itself is that which appears as the indivi¬
dual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the
two is well-founded. This is the view of the teacher
KcLfakrztsna.
But, an objection may be raised, the passage, £ Rising from
out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When
he has departed there is no more knowledge/ intimates the
final destruction of the soul, not its identity with the highest
Self!—By no means, we reply. The passage means to say
1 Upapaditazra keti, sarvasyatmamatratvam iti ^esha^. Upapa-
danaprakaraw su^ayati eketi. Sa yathardrendhanagner ityadinai-
kaprasavatvam, ^atha sarvasam apam ityadina ^aikapralayatvaw
sarvasyoktam. An. Gi.
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2.
281
only that on the soul departing from the body all specific
cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For
an objection being raised—in the passage, ‘Here thou hast
bewildered me, Sir, when thou sayest that having departed
there is no more knowledge’—Scripture itself explains that
what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self, c I say nothing
that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is imperishable,
and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place non¬
connexion with the matras. 5 That means: The eternally
unchanging Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot
possibly perish; but by means of true knowledge there is
effected its dissociation from the m&tr&s, i. e. the elements
and the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience.
When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition,
which depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can
be said, that c When he has departed there is no more
knowledge. 5
The third argument also of the purvapakshin, viz. that
the word ‘ knower 5 —which occurs in the concluding pas¬
sage, ‘ How should he know the knower? 5 —denotes an agent,
and therefore refers to the individual soul as the object of
sight, is to be refuted according to the view of Kai-akrztsna.—
Moreover, the text after having enumerated—in the passage,
‘ For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the
other, 5 &c.—all the kinds of specific cognition which belong
to the sphere of Nescience declares—in the subsequent
passage, c But when the Self only is all this, how should he
see another? 5 —that in the sphere of true knowledge all
specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is absent. And,
again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence
of objects the knower might not know himself, Yd^iavalkya
goes on, c How, O beloved, should he know himself, the
knower? 5 As thus the latter passage evidently aims at
proving the absence of specific cognition, we have to con¬
clude that the word ‘ knower 5 is here used to denote that
being which is knowledge, i. e. the Self.—That the view of
KsLrakrztsna is scriptural, we have already shown above.
And as it is so, all the adherents of the Vedanta must admit
that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not
282
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz. the body, and so
on, which are the product of name and form as presented
by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation from
Scripture; compare, for instance, ‘ Being only, my dear, this
was in the beginning, one, without a second ’ (.Kh . Up. VI,
2, 1) ; ‘ The Self is all this ’ (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2); ‘ Brahman
alone is all this’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); ‘This everything is
that Self' (B ri. Up. II, 4, 6); ‘There is no other seer but
he 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 23); ‘ There is nothing that sees but it ’
(B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 11).—It is likewise confirmed by Smrz’ti;
compare, for instance, ‘V&sudeva is all this’ (Bha. Gi.
VII, 19); ‘Know me, O Bharata, to be the soul in all
bodies 3 (Bha. Gi. XIII, 2); * He who sees the highest Lord
abiding alike within all creatures 5 (Bha. Gi. XIII, 27).
—The same conclusion is supported by those passages
which deny all difference ; compare, for instance, ‘ If he
thinks, that is one and I another; he does not know 5 (B ri.
Up. I, 4, 10); ‘ From death to death he goes who sees here
any diversity 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 19). And, again, by those
passages which negative all change on the part of the Self;
compare, for instance, ‘ This great unborn Self, undecaying,
undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman ’ (B ri. Up.
IV, 24).—Moreover, if the doctrine of general identity were
not true, those who are desirous of release could not be in
the possession of irrefutable knowledge, and there would be
no possibility of any matter being well settled; while yet
the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to
be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and Scripture speaks
of those, ‘ Who have well ascertained the object of the
knowledge of the Vedanta * (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 6). Compare
also the passage, ‘ What trouble, what sorrow can there be
to him who has once beheld that unity? 5 (L. Up. 7.)—And
Smrzti also represents the mind of him who contemplates
the Self as steady (Bha. Gi. II, 54).
As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ
in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect know¬
ledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two ; it
is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selfs, and
to maintain that the individual soul is different from the
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 23.
283
highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul.
For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but
it is one only. Nor does the passage, ‘He who knows
Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the
cave* (Taitt. Up. II, i), refer to some one cave (different
from the abode of the individual soul) 1 . And that nobody
else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a
subsequent passage, viz. ‘ Having sent forth he entered into
it ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only
entered into the created beings.—Those who insist on the
distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose
themselves to the true sense of the Vedanta-texts, stand
thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which is the door
to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be
something effected, and therefore non-eternal 2 . (And if
they attempt to show that moksha, although effected, is
eternal) they involve themselves in a conflict with sound
logic.
23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on
account of (this view) not being in conflict with
the promissory statements and the illustrative in¬
stances.
It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to
be enquired into because it is the cause of an increase of
happiness, so Brahman has to be enquired into because it is fW
the cause of absolute beatitude. And Brahman has been |
defined as that from which there proceed the origination, f
sustentation, and retractation of this world. Now as this
definition comprises alike the relation of substantial caus¬
ality in which clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden
ornaments and earthen pots, and the relation of operative
1 So according to Go. An. and An. Gi., although their inter¬
pretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekam of the text.
—Katfz&d evaik&m iti ^ivasthanad anyam ity artha/L Go. An.—
Givabhavena pratibimbadharatiriktam ity arthaA An. Gi.
2 While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact
not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.
284
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
causality in which the potter and the goldsmith stand to
the things mentioned ; a doubt arises to which of these
two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.
( The purvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is
the operative cause of the world only, because Scripture
declares his creative energy to be preceded by reflection.
Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 354:* He reflected, he
created prazza. 5 For observation shows that the action of
operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is pre¬
ceded by reflection, and moreover that the result of some
activity is brought about by the concurrence of several
factors 1 . It is therefore appropriate that we should view
the prime creator in the same light. The circumstance of
his being known as ‘ the Lord 5 furnishes another argu¬
ment. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are
known only as operative causes, and the highest Lord also
must on that account be viewed as an operative cause
only.—Further, the effect of the creator’s activity, viz. this
world, is seen to consist of parts, to be non-intelligent and
impure ; we therefore must assume that its cause also is of
the same nature ; for it is a matter of general observation
that cause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman
j does not resemble the world in nature, we know from many
scriptural passages, such as 4 It is without parts, without
actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint ’ (.SVe. Up.
VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but to
admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material
cause of the world of impure nature, such as is known from
Smrzti 2 , and to limit the causality of Brahman, as declared
by Scripture, to operative causality.
To this we make the following reply.—Brahman is to be
acknowledged as the material cause as well as the operative
cause; because this latter view does not conflict with the
promissory statements and the illustrative instances. The
promissory statement chiefly meant is the following one,
1 I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause are
separate things.
2 Viz. the Sankhya-smrz'ti.
I ADHYAYA, 4 pAdA, 23. 285
‘ Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which
is not heard becomes heard ; that which is not perceived,
perceived; that which is not known, known? 5 (Kh. Up. VI,
1, 3.) This passage intimates that through the cognition of
one thing everything else, even if (previously) unknown,
becomes known. Now the knowledge of everything is
possible through the cognition of the material cause, since
the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the
other hand, effects are not non-different from their operative
causes; for we know from ordinary experience that the
carpenter, for instance, is different from the house he has
built.—The illustrative example referred to is the one
mentioned (Kh. Up. VI, 1, 4), ‘My dear, as by one clod
of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification
(i. e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in
speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely; 5 which
passage again has reference to the material cause. The
text adds a few more illustrative instances of similar
nature, ‘ As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold
is known; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of
iron is known. 5 —Similar promissory statements are made
in other places also, for instance, ‘ What is that through
which if it is known everything else becomes known? 5 (Mu.
Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is given in the
same place, ‘ As plants grow on the earth 5 (I, 1, 7).—Com¬
pare also the promissory statement in Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6,
‘When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and
known, then all this is known ; 5 and the illustrative instance
quoted (IV, 5, 8), ‘Now as the sounds of a drum if beaten
cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized when
the drum is seized or the beater of the drum. 5 —Similar
promissory statements and illustrative instances which are
to be found in all Vedanta-texts are to be viewed as
proving, more or less, that Brahman is also the material
cause of the world. The ablative case also in the passage,
‘ That from whence (yata h) these beings are born, 5 has to
be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings,
according to the grammatical rule, Vkn. I, 4, 30.— That
Brahman is at the same time the operative cause of the
286
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
world, we have to conclude from the circumstance that
there is no other guiding being. Ordinary material causes,
indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are
dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and
ornaments, on extraneous operative causes such as potters
and goldsmiths; but outside Brahman as material cause
there is no other operative cause to which the material cause
could look ; for Scripture says that previously to creation
Brahman was one without a second.—The absence of a
guiding principle other than the material cause can more¬
over be established by means of the argument made use of
in the Sutra, viz. accordance with the promissory state¬
ments and the illustrative examples. If there were ad¬
mitted a guiding principle different from the material
cause, it would follow that everything cannot be known
through one thing, and thereby the promissory statements
as well as the illustrative instances would be stultified.—The
Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no other
ruling principle, and the material cause because there is
no other substance from which the world could originate.
24. And on account of the statement of reflection
(on the part of the Self).
The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self
reflected likewise shows that it is the operative as well as
the material cause. Passages like ‘ He wished, may I be
many, may I grow forth/ and ‘ He thought, may I be many,
may I grow forth/ show, in the first place, that the Self is
the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by
the Self’s reflection; and, in the second place, that it is the
material cause also, since the words ‘ May I be many ’
intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying itself has
the inward Self for its object.
25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and
the dissolution of the world) being directly de¬
clared (to have Brahman for their material cause).
This Sutra supplies a further argument for Brahman’s
I ADIiYAYA, 4 PAD A, 26.
287
being the general material cause.—Brahman is the material
cause of the world for that reason also that the origination
as well as the dissolution of the world is directly spoken
of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their material
cause, ‘All these beings take their rise from the ether
and return into the ether * ( Kh . Up. I, 9, 1). That that
from which some other thing springs and into which it
returns is the material cause of that other thing is well
known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the material cause
of rice, barley, and the like.—The word ‘ directly’ (in the
Sutra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that
all this sprang from the ether only.—Observation further
teaches that effects are not re-absorbed into anything else
but their material causes.
26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account
of (the Self) making itself; (which is possible) owing
to modification.
Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that
Scripture—in the passage, ‘ That made itself its Self ’ (Taitt.
Up. II, 7)—represents the Self as the object of action as
well as the agent.—But how can the Self which as agent
was in full existence previously to the action be made out to
be at the same time that which is effected by the action ?—
Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full
existence previously to the action, modifies itself into some¬
thing special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that
causal substances, such as clay and the like, are, by under¬
going the process of modification, changed into their pro¬
ducts.—The word ‘itself’ in the passage quoted intimates
the absence of any other operative cause but the Self.
The word ‘ pari« 4 mat ’ (in the Sutra) may also be taken
as constituting a separate Sutra by itself, the sense of
which would be: Brahman is the material cause of the
world for that reason also, that the sacred text speaks
of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect
as co-ordinated, viz. in the passage, ‘ It became sat and
tyat, defined and undefined ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6).
288
vedanta-s6tras.
2 7. And because Brahman is called the source.
Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it
is spoken of in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare,
for instance, ‘ The maker, the Lord, the person who has his
source in Brahman 5 (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 3); and ‘ That which
the wise regard as the source of all beings’ (Mu. Up. I, 1,
6). For that the word ‘ source ’ denotes the material cause
is well known from the use of ordinary language; the
earth, for instance, is called the yoni of trees and herbs.
In some places indeed the word yoni means not source, but
merely place ; so, for instance, in the mantra, ‘ A yoni, O
Indra, was made for you to sit down upon 5 (Ri k. Sa/«h.
I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means ‘source’
follows from a complementary passage, ‘ As the spider sends
forth and draws in its threads,’ &c.—It is thus proved that
Brahman is the material cause of the world.—Of the ob¬
jection, finally, that in ordinary life the activity of operative
causal agents only, such as potters and the like, is preceded
by reflection, we dispose by the remark that, as the matter
in hand is not one which can be known through inferential
reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it.
For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on
Scripture altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be
appealed to. And that Scripture teaches that the Lord
who reflects before creation is at the same time the material
cause, we have already explained. The subject will, more¬
over, be discussed more fully later on.
28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the
origin of the world which are opposed to the
Ved&nta) are explained, are explained.
The doctrine according to which the pradhana is the
cause of the world has, in the Sutras beginning with I,
1, 5, been again and again brought forward and refuted.
The chief reason for the special attention given to that
doctrine is that the Vedanta-texts contain some passages
which, to people deficient in mental penetration, may
appear to contain inferential marks pointing to it. The
I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 28.
289
doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedanta
doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-difference
of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by
some of the authors of the Dharma-sutras, such as Devala,
and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special
trouble to refute the pradhana doctrine, without paying
much attention to the atomic and other theories. These
latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, as they
also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the
general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that
they also are referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence
the Sfttrak&ra formally extends, in the above Sutra, the
refutation already accomplished of the pradhana doctrine
to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in
detail after their great protagonist, the pradhana doctrine,
has been so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly,
not founded on any scriptural authority ; and are, secondly,
directly contradicted by various Vedic passages.—The
repetition of the phrase ‘ are explained 5 is meant to in¬
timate that the end of the adhyaya has been reached.
[ 34 ]
U
SECOND ADHYAYA.
FIRST PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
i. If it be objected that (from the doctrine ex¬
pounded hitherto) there would result the fault of
there being no room for (certain) Smrztis; we do
not admit that objection, because (from the rejection
of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want
of room for other Smrztis.
It has been shown in the first adhy&ya that the omniscient
Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the
same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of
golden ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of
the subsistence of this world once originated, just as the
magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical
illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted
world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the
four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It
has further been proved, by a demonstration of the connected
meaning of all the Ved&nta-texts, that the Lord is the Self
of all of us. Moreover, the doctrines of the pradhana, and
so on, being the cause of this world have been refuted as
not being scriptural.—The purport of the second adhyaya,
which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the
doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on
Smrzti and Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the
pradhana, &c. have only fallacious arguments to lean upon,
and that the different Vedanta-texts do not contradict one
another with regard to the mode of creation and similar
topics.—The first point is to refute the objections based on
Smritu
Your doctrine (the purvapakshin says) that the omniscient
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
291
Brahman only is the cause of this world cannot be main¬
tained, ‘because there results from it the fault of there
being no room for (certain) Smrztis.’ Such Smrztis are the
one called Tantra which was composed by a rzshi and
is accepted by authoritative persons, and other Smrztis
based on it 1 ; for all of which there would be no room if
your interpretation of the Veda were the true one. For
they all teach that the non-intelligent pradhana is the
independent cause of the world. There is indeed room (a
raison d’etre) for SriWtis like the Manu-smrzti, which
give information about matters connected with the whole
body of religious duty, characterised by injunction 2 and
comprising the agnihotra and similar performances. They
tell us at what time and with what rites the members of the
different castes are to be initiated; how the Veda has to be
studied; in what way the cessation of study has to take
place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They
further lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to
man, of the four castes and cLsramas 3 . The KApila Smrzti,
on the other hand, and similar books are not concerned with
things to be done, but were composed with exclusive refer¬
ence to perfect knowledge as the means of final release. If
then no room were left for them in that connexion also, they
would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain
the Vedanta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them
into conflict with the Smrztis mentioned 4 .—But how, some¬
body may ask the purvapakshin, can the eventual fault of
there being left no room for certain Smrztis be used as an
objection against that sense of 5 ruti which—from various
1 The Smn'ti called Tantra is the Sankhyajastra as taught by
Kapila; the Smrz'ti-writers depending on him are Asuri, Pawtoikha,
and others.
2 Mimawsa Sfl. I, 1, 2 : ^odanalakshawo^rtho dharma^. Com¬
mentary : £odana iti kriyaya^ pravartakaw va^anam &hu&
3 Purushartha; in opposition to the rules referred to in the
preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according
to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.
4 It having been decided by the Pfirva Mimazwsa already that
Smrztis contradicted by -Sruti are to be disregarded.
U 2
292 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
reasons as detailed under I, i and ff.—has been ascertained
by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman
alone is the cause of the world?—Our objection, the pur-
vapakshin replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons
of independent thought; but as most men depend in their
reasonings on others, and are unable to ascertain by them¬
selves the sense of Sruti, they naturally rely on Smrztis,
composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive at the
sense of Sruti with their assistance; while, owing to their
esteem for the authors of the Smrztis, they have no trust in
our explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila
Smr/ti declares to have been rzshi-like and unobstructed,
and moreover there is the following Sruti-passage, ‘ It is he
who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the son, the
ri ‘shi, kapila 1 , whom he wishes to look on while he is born ’
(Sve. Up. V, 2), Hence their opinion cannot be assumed
to be erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their
position by argumentation, the objection remains valid, and
we must therefore attempt to explain the Ved&nta-texts in
conformity with the Smrztis.
This objection we dispose of by the remark, ‘ It is not so
because therefrom would result the fault of want of room
for other Smrztis.’—If you object to the doctrine of the Lord
being the cause of the world on the ground that it would
render certain Smrztis purposeless, you thereby render
purposeless other Smrztis which declare themselves in
favour of the said doctrine. These latter Snwti-texts we
will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest
Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, ‘ That
which is subtle and not to be known; 5 the text then goes
on, ‘ That is the internal Self of the creatures, their soul,’
and after that remarks ‘From that sprang the Unevolved,
consisting of the three gu^as, O best of Brahma^as.’
And in another place it is said that ‘the Unevolved is
1 On the meaning of ‘ kapila' in the above passage, compare the
Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Muller, vol. ii,
p. xxxviii ff.—As will be seen later on, Sankara, in this bhashya,
takes the Kapila referred to to be some rfshi.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
293
dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brah-
ma^a.’—Thus we read also in the Pura;za, ‘ Hear thence
this short statement: The ancient Ndrdya^a is all this;
he produces the creation at the due time, and at the
time of reabsorption he consumes it again. 5 And so
in the Bhagavadgitd. also (VII, 6), ‘ I am the origin and
the place of reabsorption of the whole world. 5 And
Apastamba too says with reference to the highest Self,
‘From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause,
he is eternal, he is unchangeable 5 (Dharma Sutra I, 8,
23, 2). In this way Smrzti, in many places, declares the
Lord to be the efficient as well as the material cause
of the world. As the phrvapakshin opposes us on the
ground of Smrzti, we reply to him on the ground of Smrzti
only; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Now
it has been shown already that the 5 ruti-texts aim at con¬
veying the doctrine that the Lord is the universal cause, and
as wherever different Smrztis conflict those maintaining one
view must be accepted, while those which maintain the
opposite view must be set aside, those Smrztis which follow
vSruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others
are to be disregarded; according to the Shtra met with in
the chapter treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3,
3), ‘ Where there is contradiction (between 5 ruti and Smrzti)
(Smrzti) is to be disregarded; in case of there being no
(contradiction) (Smrzti is to be recognised) as there is infer¬
ence (of Smrzti being founded on vSruti ). 5 —Nor can we assume
that some persons are able to perceive supersensuous matters
without vSruti, as there exists no efficient cause for such per¬
ception. Nor, again, can it be said that such perception
may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who
possessed supernatural powers, and consequently unob¬
structed power of cognition. For the possession of super¬
natural powers itself depends on the performance of religious
duty, and religious duty is that which is characterised by
injunction 1 ; hence the sense of injunctions (i. e. of the Veda)
1 I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive passages
of the Veda.
294
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
which is established first must not be fancifully interpreted
in reference to the dicta of men ‘established 5 (i.e. made
perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) after¬
wards only. Moreover, even if those ‘perfect 5 men were
accepted as authorities to be appealed to, still, as there are
many such perfect men, we should have, in all those cases
where the Smratis contradict each other in the manner
described, no other means of final decision than an appeal
to Sruti.—As to men destitute of the power of inde¬
pendent judgment, we are not justified in assuming that
they will without any reason attach themselves to some
particular Smrz’ti; for if men’s inclinations were so alto¬
gether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the
multiformity of human opinion, become unstable. We
must therefore try to lead their judgment in the
right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the
Smratis, and the distinction founded on some of them
following Sruti and others not.—The scriptural passage
which the ptirvapakshin has quoted as proving the eminence
of Kapila’s knowledge would not justify us in believing in
such doctrines of Kapila (i. e. of some Kapila) as are contrary
to Scripture; for that passage mentions the bare name of
Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we
meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who
burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname Vasudeva.
That passage, moreover, serves another purpose, (viz. the
establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on
that account no force to prove what is not proved by any
other means, (viz. the supereminence of Kapila’s know¬
ledge.) On the other hand, we have a .Sruti-passage which
proclaims the excellence of Manu 1 i viz. ‘ Whatever Manu
said is medicine 5 (Taitt. Sarah. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu himself,
where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything
(‘ he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings
in the Self, he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-
1 After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavadin is not
mentioned in -Sruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvatmavadin is
mentioned there.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2.
295
luminousness, 5 i. e. becomes Brahman, Manu Smrz’ti XII,
91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila,
by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not admit the
doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Mahd-
bharata also the question is raised whether there are many
persons (souls) or one; thereupon the opinion of others is
mentioned,‘There are many persons, O King, according to
the Sankhya and Yoga philosophers; * that opinion is contro¬
verted ‘just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,)
for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal
person raised by his qualities; 5 and, finally, it is declared
that there is one universal Self, ‘ He is the internal Self of
me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal
witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one. He the
all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one
moves through all beings according to his will and
liking/ And Scripture also declares that there is one
universal Self, ‘ When to a man who understands the Self
has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can
there be to him who once beheld that unity? 5 (Is* Up.
7); and other similar passages. All which proves that the
system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of
Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality
of Selfs also, not only by the assumption of an independent
pradhana. The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard
to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just
as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge
of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on
the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it
depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not
immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and
tradition.
Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine)
is want of room for certain Smrztis, with regard to matters
contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection.—
An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the
following Sutra.
2. And on account of the non-perception of the
296
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
others (i.e. the effects of the pradhana, according
to the Sankhya system).
The principles different from the pradhana, but to be
viewed as its modifications which the (Sankhya) Smrfti
assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived
neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things
of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which
are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience,
may be referred to in Smrfti; but with regard to things which,
like Kapila’s great principle, are known neither from the Veda
nor from experience—no more than, for instance, the objects
of a sixth sense —Smritl is altogether impossible. That some
scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things
as the great principle have in reality quite a different
meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if
that part of Smrfti which is concerned with the effects
(i. e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority,
the part which refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be
so likewise. This is what the Sutra means to say.—We
have thus established a second reason, proving that the
circumstance of there being no room left for certain Smrztis
does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.—The
weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring
the S&nkhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1,
4<E
3. Thereby the Yoga (Smnti) is refuted.
This Sutra extends the application of the preceding argu¬
mentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the
Sankhya-smr/ti the Yoga-smnti also is to be considered
as refuted; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to
Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause of the world,
and the £ great principle/ &c. as its effects, although neither
the Veda nor common experience favour these views.—But,
if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter
system is already disposed of by the previous arguments;
of what use then is it formally to extend them to the
Yoga? (as the Sutra does.)—We reply that here an ad-
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3.
297
ditional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga
being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect
knowledge ; so, for instance, Bri . Up. II, 4, 5, ‘ (The Self) is
to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon V In
the S'veta^vatara Upanishad, moreover, we find various in¬
junctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption
of different positions of the body, &c.; so, for instance,
‘ Holding his body with its three erect parts even,’ &c. (II, 8).
Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which
(without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for
instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, ‘This, the firm holding back of
the senses, is what is called Yoga; 5 ‘ Having received this
knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga 5 (Ka. Up. II, 6,
18); and so on. And in the Yoga-^astra itself the passage,
‘Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth, 5 &c.
defines the Yoga as a means of reaching perfect knowledge.
As thus one topic of the ^astra at least (viz. the practice
of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the entire Yoga-
smrzti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just
as the Smrzti referring to the ash/akas 1 2 .—To this we reply
that the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments
primarily directed against the Sankhya) has the purpose
of removing the additional doubt stated in the above lines ;
for in spite of a part of the Yoga-smrzti being authoritative,
the disagreement (between Sni^zti and Sruti) on other topics
remains as shown above.—Although 3 there are many
Smrztis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refu¬
tation the Sankhya and Yoga because they are widely
known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest
1 In which passage the phrase ‘to be meditated upon’ (nidi-
dhydsd) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of
the Yoga.
2 The ash/akas (certain oblations to be made on the eighth days
after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and fifira) furnish the
stock illustration for the doctrine of the Purva Mim. that Smrz'ti
is authoritative in so far as it is based on *Sruti.
3 But why—it will be asked—do you apply yourself to the
refutation of the Sankhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of
other Smrztis conflicting with the Vedanta views?
298
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
end of man and have found favour with many competent
persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a
Vedic passage referring to them, ‘He who has known
that cause which is to be apprehended by S&nkhya and
Yoga he is freed from all fetters 5 (Sve. Up. VI, 13). (The
claims which on the ground of this last passage might be
set up for the Sankhya and Yoga-smrztis in their entirety)
we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the
highest aim of man) is not to be attained by the know¬
ledge of the S 4 nkhya-smrzti irrespective of the Veda, nor
by the road of Yoga-practice. For Scripture itself declares
that there is no other means of obtaining the highest beati¬
tude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is
conveyed by the Veda, ‘ Over death passes only the man
who knows him; there is no other path to go 5 ( 5 ve. Up.
Ill, 8). And the Sctnkhya and Yoga-systems maintain
duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the
passage quoted (‘ That cause which is to be apprehended
by Sctnkhya and Yoga ’) the terms ‘ Sankhya ’ and ‘ Yoga ’
denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from
proximity 1 . We willingly allow room for those portions
of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In
their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all
qualities the Sahkhyas are in harmony with the Veda
which teaches that the person (purusha) is essentially pure ;
cp. Bri. Up. IV, 3, 16, ‘For that person is not attached to
anything.’ The Yoga again in giving rules for the con¬
dition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that
state of retirement from the concerns of life which is known
from scriptural passages such as the following one, ‘ Then
the parivr^aka with discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven,
without any possessions,’ &c. (Cabala Upan. IV).
The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims
of all argumentative Smrztis. If it be said that those
Smrztis also assist, by argumentation and proof, the cogni¬
tion of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain
1 I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a passage
standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic knowledge.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4.
299
all the same that the truth can be known from the Ved&nta-
texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as
‘ None who does not know the Veda perceives that great
one 5 (Taitt. Br. Ill, 12, 9, 7) ; £ I now ask thee that person
taught in the Upanishads ’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 26); and others.
4. (Brahman can)not (be the cause of the world)
on account of the difference of character of that,
(viz. the world) ; and its being such, (i.e. different
from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.
The objections, founded on Smrzti, against the doctrine
of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of
this world have been refuted; we now proceed to refute
those founded on Reasoning.—But (to raise an objection at
the outset) how is there room for objections founded on
Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been
settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered
absolutely authoritative with regard to Brahman as well
as with regard to religious duty (dharma).—(To this the
purvapakshin replies), The analogy between Brahman and
dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be
known through the holy texts only, and could not be ap¬
proached by the other means of right knowledge also.
In the case of religious duties, i. e. things to be done, we
indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now we are
concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing
thing, and in the case of accomplished things there is room
for other means of right knowledge also, as, for instance,
the case of earth and the other elements shows. And
just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages
we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them
accord with one, so 5 ruti, if in conflict with other means
of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with
the latter. Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer
something not actually perceived in consequence of its
having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually
perceived, stands nearer to perception than .Sruti which
conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge
300
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final
release terminates in a perception (viz. the intuition—
Sakshatkara—of Brahman), and as such must be assumed
to have a seen result (not an unseen one like dharma) 1 .
Moreover, the scriptural passage, £ He is to be heard, to
be thought,’ enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and
thereby shows that Reasoning also is to be resorted to
with regard to Brahman. Hence an objection founded on
Reasoning is set forth, f Not so, on account of the difference
of nature of this (effect).’—The Vedantic opinion that the
intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world
is untenable because the effect would in that case be of
an altogether different character from the cause. For
this world, which the Vedantin considers as the effect
of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and im¬
pure, consequently different in character from Brahman;
and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be
of a character different from the world, viz. intelligent
and pure. But things of an altogether different character
cannot stand to each other in the relation of material
cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden orna¬
ments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is
1 The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of anubhava;
hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely con¬
nected with anubhava than *Sruti is, we have the right to apply
reasoning to 6 ruti.—Ananda Giri comments on the passage from
anubhavavasanam as follows: brahmasakshatkarasya mokshopa-
yataya pradhany&t tatra sabdad api parokshago^arad aparokshar-
thasadharmyago^aras tarko*ntarangam iti tasyaiva balavatvam ity
artha^. Aitihyamatrewa pravadaparamparyamatre/za parokshatayeti
yavat. Anubhavasya pradhanye tarkasyoktanyayena tasminn an-
tarangatvad agamasya £a bahirangatvad antarangabahirangayor
antaranga/ft balavad ity nyayad uktaw tarkasya balavattvam.
Anubhavapradhanyajyz tu nadyapi siddham ity Irankyahanubhaveti.
Nanu Brahma^anaffz vaidikatvad dharmavad adrfsh/aphalam
esh/avya^z tat kuto * syanubhavavasanavidyanivartakatvazra tatraha
moksheti. Adhish/^anasakshatkarasya juktyadi^ane tadavidyatat-
karyanivartakatvadrzsh/e^, brahma^«anasyapi tarkavarad asambha-
vanadinirasadvara sakshatkaravasayinas tadavidyadinivartakatve-
naiva muktihetuteti nadrzsh/aphalatety artha^.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4.
301
gold the material cause of earthen vessels; but effects of
an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the
nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this world,
which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and
dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-in-
telligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but
not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character.
The difference in character of this world from Brahman
must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want
of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made
up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight,
grief, despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself
abodes of various character such as heaven, hell, and so on.
It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand
to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency,
being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of
subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on
the basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be
said to be subservient to each other (both being equally
luminous).—But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument
also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as
an intelligent servant is subservient to his master.—
This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the
case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent
element in the former is subservient to the intelligent
master. For a being endowed with intelligence subserves
another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part
belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c.;
while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for
nor against any other being. For the Sahkhyas are of
opinion that the intelligent beings (i. e. the souls) are in¬
capable of either taking in or giving out anything 1 , and
are non-active. Hence that only which is devoid of in¬
telligence can be an instrument. Nor 2 is there anything
1 Niratbaya^, upa^anapayadharnmftnyatvaw niratbayatvam.
An. Gi.
2 A sentence replying to the possible objection that the world,
as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be
intelligent.
302
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth
are of an intelligent nature ; on the contrary, the dichotomy
of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and
such as are non-intelligent is well established. This world
therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from
which it is altogether different in character.—Here some¬
body might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this
world has originated from an intelligent cause; therefore,
starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause
survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be in¬
telligent. The absence of manifestation of intelligence
(in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of
the modification 1 . Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do
not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep,
swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is
not manifest (although it exists). In consequence of this
difference produced by the manifestation and non-mani¬
festation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c., on
the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and
in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in
the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the
instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to
the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing,
although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature.
And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the
like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the
relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally
they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of
earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, with¬
out there being done any violence to the well-known
distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent).—This
reasoning—the purvapakshin replies—if valid might remove
to a certain extent that difference of character between
1 In the case of things commonly considered non-intelligent,
intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ, and on that
account remains unperceived; samaste^agati sato*pi ^aitanyasya
tatra tatrdnta^karawapariwamdnuparagad anupalabdhir aviruddha.
An. Gi.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5 .
303
Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance
of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent;
there would, however, still remain that other difference which
results from the fact that the one is pure and the other
impure. But in reality the argumentation of the objector
does not even remove the first-named difference; as is
declared in the latter part of the Sutra, ‘ And its being such
we learn from Scripture.’ For the assumption of the in¬
tellectuality of the entire world—which is supported neither
by perception nor by inference, &c.—must be considered
as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks
of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause;
but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other
texts which declare the world to be ‘of such a nature/
i. e. of a nature different from that of its material cause.
For the scriptural passage, ‘ It became that which is know¬
ledge and that which is devoid of knowledge ’ (Taitt. Up.
II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of beings is of a
non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intel¬
ligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman.—But—
somebody might again object—the sacred texts themselves
sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs,
which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence,
as intelligent beings. The following passages, for instance,
attribute intelligence to the elements. ‘ The earth spoke; ’
‘The waters spoke 5 (.Sat. Br. VI, 1, 3, 3 ; 4); and, again,
‘ Fire thought; 5 ‘ Water thought 5 (. Kh . Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4).
Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs,
‘ These pranas when quarrelling together as to who was the
best went to Brahman’ (B ri. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again,
‘ They said to Speech: Do thou sing out for us’ (Br/. Up.
I, 3, 2). —To this objection the purvapakshin replies in the
following Sutra.
5. But (there takes place) denotation of the super¬
intending (deities), on account of the difference and
the connexion.
The word ‘ but 5 discards the doubt raised. We are
304
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
not entitled to base the assumption of the elements and
the sense organs being of an intellectual nature on such
passages as ‘the earth spoke/ &c. because ‘there takes
place denotation of that which presides.’ In the case of
actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require
intelligence, the scriptural passages denote not the mere
material elements and organs, but rather the intelligent
divinities which preside over earth, &c., on the one hand,
and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so ? ‘ On
account of the difference and the connexion.’ The
difference is the one previously referred to between the
enjoying souls, on the one hand, and the material elements
and organs, on the other hand, which is founded on the
distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent beings;
that difference would not be possible if all beings were
intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushitakins in their account of
the dispute of the prazzas make express use of the word
‘divinities’ in order to preclude the idea of the mere material
organs being meant, and in order to include the super¬
intending intelligent beings. They say, ‘The deities con¬
tending with each for who was the best;’ and, again, ‘All
these deities having recognised the pre-eminence in prazza ’
(Kau. Up. II, J4).—And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavadas,
Itihasas, Purazzas, &c. all declare that intelligent presiding
divinities are connected with everything. Moreover, such
scriptural passages as ‘ Agni having become Speech entered
into the mouth’ (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each
bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity.
And in the passages supplementary to the quarrel of the
prazzas we read in one place how, for the purpose of
settling their relative excellence, they went to Pra^apati,
and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of presence
and absence, each of them, as Pra^apati had advised, de¬
parting from the body for some time (‘ They went to their
father Pra^apati and said,’ See.; Kh. Up. V, 1, 7); and in
another place it is said that they made an offering to pr^zza
(Brz. Up. VI, 1, 13), See.; all of them proceedings which are
analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore strengthen
the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6.
305
deities. In the case of such passages as, £ Fire thought,’
we must assume that the thought spoken of is that of
the highest deity which is connected with its effects as
a superintending principle.—From all this it follows that
this world is different in nature from Brahman, and hence
cannot have it for its material cause.
To this objection raised by the purvapakshin the next
Sutra replies.
6 . But it is seen.
The word c but ’ discards the purvapaksha.
Your assertion that this world cannot have originated
from Brahman on account of the difference of its character
is not founded on an absolutely true tenet. For we see
that from man, who is acknowledged to be intelligent, non-
intelligent things such as hair and nails originate, and that,
on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter,
such as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are pro¬
duced.—But—to state an objection—the real cause of the
non-intelligent hair and nails is the human body which is
itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent bodies only of
scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung.—Even
thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character
(between the cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect,
for instance, the body of the scorpion), in so far as some
non-intelligent matter (the body) is the abode of an
intelligent principle (the scorpion’s soul), while other
non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the
difference of nature — due to the cause passing over
into the effect—between the bodies of men on the one
side and hair and nails on the other side, is, on account
of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable
after all. The same remark holds good with regard to
cow-dung and the bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute
equality were insisted on (in the case of one thing being
the effect of another), the relation of material cause and
effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two)
would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the
case of men and hair as well as in that of scorpions and
[34] X
3°6
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
cow-dung there is one characteristic feature, at least, which
is found in the effect as well as in the cause, viz. the quality
of being of an earthy nature; we reply that in the case of
Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz.
that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which are
the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).—
He, moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the
attributes tries to invalidate the doctrine of Brahman
being the cause of the world, must assert that he under¬
stands by difference of attributes either the non-occurrence
(in the world) of the entire complex of the characteristics
of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other)
characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic
of intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the
negation of the relation of cause and effect in general,
which relation is based on the fact of there being in the effect
something over and above the cause (for if the two were
absolutely identical they could not be distinguished). The
second assertion is open to the charge of running counter
to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked,
the characteristic quality of existence which belongs to
Brahman is found likewise in ether and so on. For the
third assertion the requisite proving instances are wanting ;
for what instances could be brought forward against the
upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general
assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not
to be an effect of Brahman ? (The upholder of Brahman
would simply not admit any such instances) because he
maintains that this entire complex of things has Brahman
for its material cause. And that all such assertions are
contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it
to be the purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause
and substance of the world. It has indeed been maintained
by the purvapakshin that the other means of proof also
(and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman, on
account of its being an accomplished entity (not something
to be accomplished as religious duties are); but such an
assertion is entirely gratuitous. For Brahman, as being
devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of
II ADHyAyA, I PADA, 6.
307
perception; and as there are in its case no characteristic
marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference
also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but,
like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground
of holy tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 4 That
doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is
declared by another then, O dearest! it is easy to under¬
stand ’ (Ka. Up. I, 3, 9). And again, 4 Who in truth knows
it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation
sprang ?’ (Rig-v. Sa^h. X, 129, 6.) These two mantras show
that the cause of this world is not to be known even by
divine beings (favara) 1 of extraordinary power and wisdom.
There are also the following Smrzti passages to the same
effect: 4 Do not apply reasoning to those things which are
uncognisable 2 ; ’ 4 Unevolved he is called, uncognisable,
unchangeable;’ 4 Not the legions of the gods know my
origin, not the great rzshis. For I myself am in every way
the origin of the gods and great r/shis 5 (Bha. Gi. X, 2).
—And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural
passage enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to
mere hearing (of the sacred texts treating of Brahman)
shows that reasoning also is to be allowed its place, we
reply that the passage must not deceitfully be taken
as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be
understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary
of intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type
we may, for instance, arrive at the following conclusions;
that because the state of dream and the waking state exclude
each other the Self is not connected with those states;
that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves the
phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that
whose Self is pure Being, it has for its Self pure Being
apart from the phenomenal world; that as the world
springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from Brahman,
1 On uvara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69,
note 41.
2 The line ‘ prakr/tibhya^ param,’ &c. is wanting in all MSS.
I have consulted.
X 2
3°8
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
according to the principle of the non-difference of cause
and effect, &C . 1 The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will
moreover be demonstrated later on (II, i, n).—He 2 , more¬
over, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition
about an intelligent cause of the world would assume this
entire world to be of an intellectual nature would find room
for the other scriptural passage quoted above (‘He became
knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge’) which
teaches a distinction of intellect and non-intellect; for
he could avail himself of the doctrine of intellect being
sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested. His
antagonist, on the other hand (i. e. the Sankhya), would not
be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly
teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the
entire world.
If, then, on account of difference of character that which
is intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent,
that also which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the
non-intelligent pradhana of the Sankhyas) cannot pass over
into what is intelligent.—(So much for argument’s sake,)
but apart from that, as the argument resting on difference
of character has already been refuted, we must assume an
intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.
1 Ananda Giri on the above passage: .mityakankshita/rc tarkam
eva mananavidhivishayam udaharati svapnanteti. Svapnag-agaritayor
mithovyabhi^arad atmana^ svabhavatas tadvattvabhavad avastha-
dvayena tasya svato * sa/Tzprz’ktatvam ato ^lvasyavasthavatvena
nabrahmatvam ity artha^. Tathapi dehaditadatmyen&tmano bhavan
na ni^prapaw^abrahmatety ^rankyaha sa^prasade keti. Sata somya
tada sawpanno bhavatiti svutek sushupte ni^prapa^asadatmatvava-
gamad atmanas tathavidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity artha/$. Dvaita-
grahipratyakshadivirodhat katham atmanoidvitiyabrahmatvam ity
^taankya ta^atvadihetuna brahmatiriktavastvabhavasiddher adhya-
kshadinam atatvavedakapramawyad avirodhad yuktam atmano
.*dvitiyabrahmatvam ity aha prapa^asyeti.
2 Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a
vailakshawya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire
whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an
intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8.
309
7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent
(before its origination); we do not allow that
because it is a mere negation (without an object).
If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of
qualities such as sound, and so on, is supposed to be the
cause of an effect which is of an opposite nature, i.e.
non-intelligent, impure, possessing the qualities of sound,
&c., it follows that the effect has to be considered as
non-existing before its actual origination. But this con¬
sequence cannot be acceptable to you—the Vedantin—
who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the
cause already.
This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force,
on account of its being a mere negation. If you negative
the existence of the effect previous to its actual origina¬
tion, your negation is a mere negation without an object to
be negatived. The negation (implied in ‘ non-existent ’)
can certainly not have for its object the existence of the
effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be
viewed as ‘ existent, 5 through and in the Self of the cause,
before its origination as well as after it; for at the present
moment also this effect does not exist independently, apart
from the cause; according to such scriptural passages as,
‘ Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self
is abandoned by everything 5 (Bn. Up. II, 4, 6). In so
far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self
of the cause, its existence is the same before the actual be¬
ginning of the effect (as after it).—But Brahman, which is
devoid of qualities such as sound, &c., is the cause of this
world (possessing all those qualities)!—True, but the effect
with all its qualities does not exist without the Self of the
cause either now or before the actual beginning (of the
effect); hence it cannot be said that (according to our
doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual begin¬
ning.—This point will be elucidated in detail in the section
treating of the non-difference of cause and effect.
8. On account of such consequences at the time
3io
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto)
is objectionable.
The p&rvapakshin raises further objections.—If an effect
which is distinguished by the qualities of grossness, con¬
sisting of parts, absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity,
&c., is admitted to have Brahman for its cause, it follows
that at the time of reabsorption (of the world into Brah¬
man), the effect, by entering into the state of non-division
from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties. As
therefore—on your doctrine—the cause (i. e. Brahman) as
well as the effect is, at the time of reabsorption, character¬
ised by impurity and similar qualities, the doctrine of the
Upanishads, according to which an omniscient Brahman is
the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.-—Another ob¬
jection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all
distinctions passing at the time of reabsorption into the
state of non-distinction there would be no special causes
left at the time of a new beginning of the world, and con¬
sequently the new world could not arise with all the
distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so
on (which are actually observed to exist).—A third ob¬
jection is that, if we assume the origin of a new world even
after the annihilation of all works, &c. (which are the causes
of a new world arising) of the enjoying souls which enter
into the state of non-difference from the highest Brahman,
we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which
have obtained final release again appear in the new world.—
If you finally say, ‘Well, let this world remain distinct from
the highest Brahman even at the time of reabsorption,’ we
reply that in that case a reabsorption will not take place
at all, and that, moreover, the effect’s existing separate
from the cause is not possible.—For all these reasons the
Vedanta doctrine is objectionable.
To this the next Sutra replies.
9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.
There is nothing objectionable in our system.—The
objection that the effect when being reabsorbed into its
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 9 .
31 I
cause would inquinate the latter with its qualities does not
damage our position ‘ because there are parallel instances,’
i. e. because there are instances of effects not inquinating
with their qualities the causes into which they are re¬
absorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots,
&c., which in their state of separate existence are of various
descriptions, do not, when they are reabsorbed into their
original matter (i. e. clay), impart to the latter their in¬
dividual qualities ; nor do golden ornaments impart their
individual qualities to their elementary material, i. e. gold,
into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the
fourfold complex of organic beings which springs from
earth impart its qualities to the latter at the time of re¬
absorption. You (i. e. the purvapakshin), on the other hand,
have not any instances to quote in your favour. For re¬
absorption could not take place at all if the effect when
passing back into its causal substance continued to subsist
there with all its individual properties. And 3 that in spite
of the non-difference of cause and effect the effect has its
Self in the cause, but not the cause in the effect, is a point
which we shall render clear later on, under II, 1, 14.
Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its
qualities to the cause at the time of reabsorption is formu¬
lated too narrowly because, the identity of cause and effect
being admitted, the same would take place during the time
of the subsistence (of the effect, previous to its reabsorption).
That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman and the
world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time
(not only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many
scriptural passages, as, for instance,‘ This everything is that
Self 5 (B ri. Up. II, 4, 6); ‘ The Self is all this 5 {Kh. Up.
VII, 25, 2); ‘The immortal Brahman is this before’ (Mu.
Up. II, 2, 11); ‘All this is Brahman 5 {Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1).
With regard to the case referred to in the .Sruti-passages
we refute the assertion of the cause being affected by the
1 Nanu pralayakale karyadharmas* ken navatishMeran na tarhi
kararcadharma api tish/Zzeyus tayor abhedat tatrahananyatve*piti.
An. Gi.
3T2
VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
effect and its qualities by showing that the latter are the
mere fallacious superimpositions of nescience, and the very
same argument holds good with reference to reabsorption
also.—We can quote other examples in favour of our
doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by
the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is un¬
real, so the highest Self is not affected by the world-
illusion. And as one dreaming person is not affected by
the illusory visions of his dream because they do not
accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless
sleep; so the one permanent witness of the three states
(viz. the highest Self which is the one unchanging witness of
the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world) is
not touched by the mutually exclusive three states. For
that the highest Self appears in those three states, is a mere
illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the
rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point
teachers knowing the true tradition of the Ved&nta have
made the following declaration, ‘When the individual soul
which is held in the bonds of slumber by the beginningless
Maya awakes, then it knows the eternal, sleepless, dream¬
less non-duality’ (Gau</ap. Kar. I, 16).
So far we have shown that—on our doctrine—there is no
danger of the cause being affected at the time of reabsorp¬
tion by the qualities of the effect, such as grossness and the
like.—With regard to the second objection, viz. that if we
assume all distinctions to pass (at the time of reabsorption)
into the state of non-distinction there would be no special
reason for the origin of a new world affected with dis¬
tinctions, we likewise refer to the ‘existence of parallel
instances.’ For the case is parallel to that of deep sleep
and trance. In those states also the soul enters into an
essential condition of non-distinction; nevertheless, wrong
knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old state of
distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes
from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage,
4 All these creatures when they have become merged in
the True, know not that they are merged in the True.
Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, IO. 313
wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a
musquito, that they become again J ( Kh . Up. VI, 9, 2 ; 3).
For just as during the subsistence of the world the phe¬
nomenon of multifarious distinct existence, based on wrong
knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like the vision of a dream,
although there is only one highest Self devoid of all dis¬
tinction ; so, we conclude, there remains, even after re-
absorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction)
founded on wrong knowledge.—Herewith the objection
that—according to our doctrine—even the finally released
souls would be born again is already disposed of. They
will not be bom again because in their case wrong know¬
ledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge.
—The last alternative finally (which the purvapakshin had
represented as open to the Vedantin), viz. that even at the
time of reabsorption the world should remain distinct from
Brahman, precludes itself because it is not admitted by the
Vedantins themselves.—Hence the system founded on the
Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.
10. And because the objections (raised by the
Sctnkhya against the Vedanta doctrine) apply to his
view also.
The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same
objections which he urges against us, viz. in the following
manner. — The objection that this world cannot have
sprung from Brahman on account of its difference of
character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhana
being the cause of the world ; for that doctrine also assumes
that from a pradhana devoid of sound and other qualities a
world is produced which possesses those very qualities.
The beginning of an effect different in character being thus
admitted, the Sankhya is equally driven to the doctrine
that before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent.
And, moreover, it being admitted (by the Sankhya also)
that at the time of reabsorption the effect passes back into
the state of non-distinction from the cause, the case of
the Sankhya here also is the same as ours.—And, further, if
3H
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
(as the Sankhya also must admit) at the time of reabsorp¬
tion the differences of all the special effects are obliterated
and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special
fixed conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the
causes of the different worldly existence of each soul, can,
at the time of a new creation, no longer be determined,
there being no cause for them ; and if you assume them to
be determined without a cause, you are driven to the
admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a
state of bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in
the case of the released and the non-released souls). And
if you try to avoid this conclusion by assuming that at the
time of reabsorption some individual differences pass into
the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply that in
that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the
pradhAna 1 .—It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised
by the Sankhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore
be urged against either only. But as either of the two
doctrines must necessarily be accepted, we are strengthened
—by the outcome of the above discussion—in the opinion
that the alleged difficulties are no real difficulties 2 .
11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-
foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our con¬
clusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus also there
would result non-release.
In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is
not to be relied on for the following reason also. As the
thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning which
disregards the holy texts and rests on individual opinion
only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments,
which some clever men had excogitated with great pains,
are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and
how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn
1 For if they are effects of the pradhana they must as such be
reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.
2 And that the Vedanta view is preferable because the nullity of
the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, II.
315
by other men ; so that, on account of the diversity of men’s
opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having
a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this difficulty by
accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of
recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or any¬
body else; since we observe that even men of the most
undoubted mental eminence, such as Kapila, Ka^ada, and
other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted
one another.
But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will
fashion our reasoning otherwise, i. e. in such a manner as
not to lay it open to the charge of having no proper foun¬
dation. You cannot, after all, maintain that no reasoning
whatever is well-founded ; for you yourself can found your
assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only;
your assumption being that because some arguments are seen
to be devoid of foundation other arguments as belonging to
the same class are likewise devoid of foundation. Moreover,
if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of practical
human life would have to come to an end. For we see that
men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding
pain in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the
present, and the future are uniform.—Further, in the case of
passages of Scripture (apparently) contradicting each other,
the ascertainment of the real sense, which depends on a
preliminary refutation of the apparent sense, can be effected
only by an accurate definition of the meaning of sentences,
and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also
expresses himself: { Perception, inference, and the j&stra
according to the various traditions, this triad is to be known
well by one desiring clearness in regard to right.—He who
applies reasoning not contradicted by the Veda to the Veda
and the (Smrzti) doctrine of law, he, and no other, knows the
law 5 (Manu Smrzti XII, 105, 106). And that { want of
foundation/ to which you object, really constitutes the beauty
of reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjection¬
able arguments by means of the previous refutation of
objectionable arguments 1 . (No fear that because the
1 The whole style of argumentation of the Mimaz^sa would be
3i6
vedanta-sOtras.
pfirvapaksha is ill-founded the siddh&nta should be ill-
founded too;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that
a man must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid.
—For all these reasons the want of foundation cannot be
used as an argument against reasoning.
Against this argumentation we remark that thus also
there results ‘ want of release.’ For although with regard
to some things reasoning is observed to be well founded,
with regard to the matter in hand there will result ‘ want of
release, 5 viz. of the reasoning from this very fault of ill-
foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world
on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of
its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the
help of the holy texts ; for, as already remarked, it cannot
become the object of perception, because it does not possess
qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of
characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to inference and
the other means of right knowledge.—Or else (if we adopt
another explanation of the word ‘ avimoksha 5 ) all those who
teach the final release of the soul are agreed that it results
from perfect knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the cha¬
racteristic mark of uniformity, because it depends on accom¬
plished actually existing things; for whatever thing is
permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged
to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about
such is called perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the
knowledge embodied in the proposition, ‘fire is hot. 5 Now,
it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual
conflict of men’s opinions is impossible. But that cognitions
founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for
we continually observe that what one logician endeavours
to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another,
who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How therefore
can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose
object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect
knowledge?—Nor can it be said that he who maintains the
impossible, if all reasoning were sound; for then no pflrvapaksha
view could be maintained.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12.
317
pradhana to be the cause of the world (i. e. the Sankhya) is
the best of all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philoso¬
phers; which would enable us to accept his opinion as perfect
knowledge.—Nor can we collect at a given moment and on
a given spot all the logicians of the past, present, and future
time, so as to settle (by their agreement) that their opinion
regarding some uniform object is to be considered perfect
knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal
and the source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for
its object firmly established things, and hence the perfection
of that knowledge which is founded on the Veda cannot be
denied by any of the logicians of the past, present, or future.
We have thus established the perfection of this our know¬
ledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from
it perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead
to ‘absence of final release’ of the transmigrating souls.
Our final position therefore is, that on the ground of Scrip¬
ture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelli¬
gent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance
of the world.
12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not
accepted by competent persons are explained.
Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the
Vedanta-texts which, based on reasoning, take their stand
on the doctrine of the pradh&na being the cause of the world ;
(which doctrine deserves to be refuted first), because it stands
near to our Vedic system, is supported by somewhat weighty
arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been adopted by
some authorities who follow the Veda.—But now some dull-
witted persons might think that another objection founded
on reasoning might be raised against the Vedanta, viz. on the
ground of the atomic doctrine. The Sutrakara, therefore,
extends to the latter objection the refutation of the former,
considering that by the conquest of the most dangerous
adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is already
virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance,
the atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
318
either Manu or Vyasa or other authorities, are to be con¬
sidered as ‘ explained/ i. e. refuted by the same reasons
which enabled us to dispose of the pradhana doctrine. As
the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same,
there is no room for further doubt. Such common argu¬
ments are the impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth
of the transcendental cause of the world, the ill-foundedness
of mere Reasoning, the impossibility of final release, even
in case of the conclusions being shaped ‘ otherwise ’ (see the
preceding Sutra), the conflict of Scripture and Reasoning,
and so on.
13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the
objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer
(and vice versa) there would result non-distinction
(of the two); we reply that (such distinction) may exist
(nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.
Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against
the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world.—
Although Scripture is authoritative with regard to its own
special subject-matter (as, for instance, the causality of
Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a secondary sense
in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of its
grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras
and arthavadas have occasionally to be explained in a
secondary sense (when the primary, literal sense is rendered
impossible by other means of right knowledge 1 ). Ana¬
logously reasoning is to be considered invalid outside its
legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of religious
duty and its opposite 2 .—Hence Scripture cannot be acknow¬
ledged to refute what is settled by other means of right
knowledge. And if you ask, * Where does Scripture oppose
itself to what is thus established ?’ we give you the fol-
1 The following arthavada-passage, for instance, ‘the sacrificial
post is the sun/ is to be taken in a metaphorical sense; because
perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its literal
meaning.
2 Which are to be known from the Veda only.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 13.
319
lowing instance. The distinction of enjoyers and objects
of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience, the
enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and
the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance,
is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoy¬
ment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to
non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object
of enjoyment, and vice versa. Now this passing over of
one thing into another would actually result from the doc¬
trine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the
sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable,
not only with regard to the present time when that distinc¬
tion is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past
and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of
Brahman’s causality must therefore be abandoned, as it
would lead to the sublation of the well-established dis¬
tinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.
To the preceding objection we reply, ‘ It may exist as in
ordinary experience.’ Even on our philosophic view the dis¬
tinction may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with
analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam,
bubbles, and other modifications of the sea, although they
really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes
in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of
conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different
from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over
into each other; and, again, although they do not pass
over into each other, still they are not different from the
sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The
enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over
into each other, and yet they are not different from the
highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really
an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified creator himself,
in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer
(according to the passage, ‘ Having created he entered into
it,’ Taitt. Up. II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its
effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of
the effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal
ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting
320
vedAnta-s(jtras.
adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers
and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-
different from Brahman, their highest cause, as the analogous
instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.
14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and
effect) results from such terms as ‘ origin ’ and the
like.
The 1 refutation contained in the preceding Sutra was set
forth on the condition of the practical distinction of en¬
joyers and objects of enjoyment being acknowledged. In
reality, however, that distinction does not exist because
there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of cause
and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of
ether and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of
the effect it is understood that in reality it is non-dififerent
from the cause, i. e. has no existence apart from the cause.—
How so?—‘ On account of the scriptural word “ origin ” and
others.’ The word ‘origin’ is used in connexion with a
simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through the
knowledge of one thing everything is known; viz. Kh . Up.
VI, 1, 4, ‘As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made
of clay is known, the modification (i. e. the effect; the thing
made of clay) being a name merely which has its origin
in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely; thus,’
&c.—The meaning of this passage is that, if there is known
a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay 2 ,
there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay,
such as jars, dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in
having clay for their true nature. For these modifications
or effects are names only, exist through or originate
from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing
as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual
effects distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far
1 Pari^amavadam avalambyapatato virodha/ft samadhaya vivar-
tavadam arritya paramasamadhanam aha. An. Gi.
2 Ananda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti, paramarthato
vi^-watam iti sambandha^.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 14.
321
as they are clay they are true.—This parallel instance is given
with reference to Brahman ; applying the phrase £ having its
origin in speech 9 to the case illustrated by the instance quoted
we understand that the entire body of effects has no existence
apart from Brahman.—Later on again the text, after having
declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of Brahman,
maintains that the effects of these three elements have no
existence apart from them, £ Thus has vanished the specific
nature of burning fire, the modification being a mere name
which has its origin in speech, while only the three colours
are what is true ’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 4, 1).—Other sacred texts
also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self
are to be quoted here, in accordance with the £ and others’
of the Sfitra. Such texts are, £ In that all this has its Self;
it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that 5 (Kh. Up. VI,
8, 7) ; ‘ This everything, all is that Self’ (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6);
‘Brahman alone is all this 5 (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11) ; £ The Self
is all this’ (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2) ; £ There is in it no diversity’
(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25).—On any other assumption it would
not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one
thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above
declares). We therefore must adopt the following view.
In the same way as those parts of ethereal space which
are limited by jars and waterpots are not really different
from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of a
mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty
steppe—for the nature of that water is that it is seen in
one moment and has vanished in the next, and moreover,
it is not to be perceived by its own nature (i. e. apart from
the surface of the desert 1 )—; so this manifold world with its
objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence
apart from Brahman.—But—it might be objected—Brah¬
man has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree
has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers
1 Drfsh/eti kada&d drfsh/aw punar nash/am anityam iti yavat.—
Drfsh/agraha«asu£ita/tf pratitikale*pi sattarahityaw tatraiva hetvan-
taram aha svarfipeweti. An. Gi.
[34] Y
322
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and mani¬
foldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered
in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having
branches ; so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having
waves and foam; so the clay in itself is one, but manifold
if viewed with regard to the jars and dishes made of it.
On this assumption the process of final release resulting
from right knowledge may be established in connexion
with the element of unity (in Brahman), while the two
processes of common worldly activity and of activity ac¬
cording to the Veda—which depend on the karmaki;/</a—
may be established in connexion with the element of mani¬
foldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay
&c. agree very well.
This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the in¬
stance (quoted in the Upanishad) the phrase ‘as clay they
are true ’ asserts the cause only to be true while the phrase
‘ having its origin in speech 5 declares the unreality of all
effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated by the
instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read,
‘ In that all this has its Self; ’ and, again, ‘ That is true; ’
whereby it is asserted that only the one highest cause is
true. The following passage again, ‘ That is the Self; thou
art that, O .SVetaketu ! ’ teaches that the embodied soul
(the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must note
that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the em¬
bodied soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established,
not to be accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of
the individual soul having its Self in Brahman, if once
accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does away with the
independent existence of the individual soul, just as the
idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake
(for which the rope had been mistaken). And if the
doctrine of the independent existence of the individual
soul has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire
phenomenal world—which is based on the individual soul—
having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside.
But only for the establishment of the latter an element
of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman, in
II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 14.
323
addition to the element of unity.—Scriptural passages also
(such as, 4 When the Self only is all this, how should he see
another?’ B ri. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for him who sees
that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole
phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of
actions is non-existent. Nor can it be said that this
non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by
Scripture) to be limited to certain states; for the passage
4 Thou art that 5 shows that the general fact of Brahman
being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state.
Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief
(Kh. VI, 16) that the false-minded is bound while the true-
minded is released, declares thereby that unity is the one
true existence while manifoldness is evolved out of wrong
knowledge. For if both were true how could the man
who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world
be called false-minded 1 ? Another scriptural passage ( £ from
death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity, 5
B ri. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares the same, by blaming those
who perceive any distinction.—Moreover, on the doctrine,
which we are at present impugning, release cannot result
from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknow¬
ledge that some kind of wrong knowledge, to be removed
by perfect knowledge, is the cause of the phenomenal
world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the
cognition of manifoldness if both are true ?
Other objections are started.—If we acquiesce in the
doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right
knowledge, perception, &c., become invalid because the
absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects;
just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right
idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a
man) has presented itself. Moreover, all the texts em¬
bodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose their pur¬
port if the distinction on which their validity depends
1 In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication, being
compared to the ‘ false-minded ’ thief who, knowing himself to be
guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.
Y 2
324
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
does not really exist. And further, the entire body of
doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the
distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is
not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how
can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the
Self, which forms an item of that doctrine ?
These objections, we reply, do not damage our position
because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is
considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman
being the Self of all has not arisen; just as the phantoms
of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper
wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true
knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not
enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and
objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is
untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks
on mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as
forming part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of
Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long
as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason
why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity
should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to
that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold
things, and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that
his ideas are produced by real perception without sus¬
pecting the perception to be a merely apparent one.—But
how (to restate an objection raised above) can theVedanta-
texts if untrue convey information about the true being
of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man
bitten by a rope-snake (i. e. a snake falsely imagined in
a rope) dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used
for drinking or bathing 1 .—This objection, we reply, is with¬
out force (because as a matter of fact we do see real effects
to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death
sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man
imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,)
1 I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects
spring from unreal causes.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4 . 325
and effects (of what is perceived in a dream) such as the
bite of a snake or bathing in a river take place with regard
to a dreaming person.—But, it will be said, these effects
themselves are unreal!—These effects themselves, we reply,
are unreal indeed; but not so the consciousness which the
dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real
result; for it is not sublated by the waking consciousness.
The man who has risen from sleep does indeed consider
the effects perceived by him in his dream such as being
bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal, but
he does not on that account consider the consciousness he
had of them to be unreal likewise.—(We remark in passing
that) by this fact of the consciousness of the dreaming
person not being sublated (by the waking consciousness)
the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to be con¬
sidered as refuted h—Scripture also (in the passage, ‘ If a
man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some
special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer there¬
from success in his work ’) declares that by the unreal
phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may
be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage, after
having declared that from the observation of certain un¬
favourable omens a man is to conclude that he will not
live long, continues ‘ if somebody sees in his dream a black
man with black teeth and that man kills him,’ intimating
thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real fact, viz.
death, is notified.—It is, moreover, known from the ex¬
perience of persons who carefully observe positive and
negative instances that such and such dreams are auspicious
omens, others the reverse. And (to quote another example
that something true can result from or be known through
something untrue) we see that the knowledge of the real
sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written
letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the
1 Svapna^agraddehayor vyabhi/£are*pi pratyabhi^Mnat tadanu-
gatatmaikyasiddhes ^aitanyasya £a dehadharmatve rftpadivat tadanu-
palabdhiprasangad avagates Mbadhat tadrfipasyatmano dehadvayati-
rekasiddher dehamatratmavado na yukta ity artha^. An. Gi.
326
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Self are altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing
more is required for full satisfaction 1 . An injunction as,
for instance, ‘ He is to sacrifice ’ at once renders us desirous
of knowing what is to be effected, and by what means and in
what manner it is to be effected ; but passages such as, ‘Thou
art that,’ ‘ I am Brahman,’ leave nothing to be desired because
the state of consciousness produced by them has for its object
the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else
remains a desire is possible ; but there is nothing else which
could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brah¬
man. Nor can it be maintained that such states of con¬
sciousness do not actually arise; for scriptural passages
such as, ‘He understood what he said ’ ( Kh . Up. VII, 18, 2),
declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to
bring them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from
a teacher) and the recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again,
can such consciousness be objected to on the ground either
of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen
to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because,
secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it
could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the
unity of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal
course of ordinary life, worldly as well as religious, goes on
unimpeded, we have already explained. When, however, final
authority having intimated the unity of the Self, the entire
course of the world which was founded on the previous
distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any oppor¬
tunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various
elements.
But—it may be said—(that would not be a mere assump¬
tion, but) Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances
of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman
1 As long as the ‘vyavahara’presents itself to our mind, we might
feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness
whereby to account for the vyavahara; but as soon as we arrive
at true knowledge, the vyavahara vanishes, and there remains no
longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of
Brahman.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4 .
327
capable of modification ; for we know from experience that
clay and similar things do undergo modifications.—This
objection—we reply—is without force, because a number
of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brah¬
man, teach it to be absolutely changeless (ku/astha). Such
passages are, ‘ This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying,
immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 25);
‘That Self is to be described by No, no 5 (B ri. Up. Ill,
9, 26); ‘ It is neither coarse nor fine 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8).
For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject
to modification and of being free from it cannot both be
ascribed. And if you say, ‘Why should they not be both
predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the
subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of
reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated
(of one body at different times) ? 5 we remark that the quali¬
fication, ‘ absolutely changeless 5 (ku/astha), precludes this.
For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of
varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation
of all attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless
has already been demonstrated. — Moreover, while the
cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final
release, there is nothing to show that any independent
result is connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing
a modification, passing over into the form of this world.
Scripture expressly declares that the knowledge of the
changeless Brahman being the universal Self leads to a
result; for in the passage which begins, ‘ That Self is to
be described by No, no, 5 we read later on, ‘ O Canaka, you
have indeed reached fearlessness ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 2, 4). We
have then 1 to accept the following conclusion that, in the
sections treating of Brahman, an independent result belongs
only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of all attributes
and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as having
no special fruit of its own—as, for instance, the passages
about Brahman modifying itself into the form of this
1 Tatreti, srzsh/yadkrutinazrc svarthe phalavaikalye satiti yavat.
An. Gi.
328
VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
world—is merely to be applied as a means for the cogni¬
tion of the absolute Brahman, but does not bring about
an independent result; according to the principle that
whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in con¬
nexion with something else which has such a result, is
subordinate to the latter x . For to maintain that the result
of the knowledge of Brahman undergoing modifications
would be that the Self (of him who knows that) would
undergo corresponding modifications 1 2 would be inappro¬
priate, as the state of final release (which the soul obtains
through the knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.
But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brah¬
man to be changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental
tenet according to which the Lord is the cause of the world,
since the doctrine of absolute unity leaves no room for the
distinction of a Ruler and something ruled.—This objection
we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i. e. those
qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is
related to a world) depend on the evolution of the germinal
principles called name and form, whose essence is Nescience.
The fundamental tenet which we maintain (in accordance
with such scriptural passages as, c From that Self sprang
ether,’ &c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1) is that the creation, sustentation,
and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient,
omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhana or
any other principle. That tenet we have stated in I, i, 4,
and here we do not teach anything contrary to it.—But
how, the question may be asked, can you make this last
assertion while all the while you maintain the absolute unity
and non-duality of the Self?—Listen how. Belonging to
the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name
and form, the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either
1 A Mimawsa principle. A sacrificial act, for instance, is inde¬
pendent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred texts;
an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely
auxiliary to another act.
2 According to the *$ruti ‘in whatever mode he worships him
into that mode he passes himself.’
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4 .
329
as being (i. e. Brahman), nor as different from it 1 , the
germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called
in vSruti and Smrzti the illusion (maya), power (^akti), or
nature (prakrzti) of the omniscient Lord. Different from
them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scrip¬
tural passages such as the following, ‘ He who is called
ether is the revealer of all forms and names; that within
which these forms and names are contained is Brahman’ (. Kh .
Up. VIII, 14,1); ‘Let me evolve names and forms 5 (Kh. Up.
VI, 3, 2) ; 6 He, the wise one, who having divided all forms
and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)’ (Taitt.
Ar. Ill, 12, 7); c He who makes the one seed manifold ’ (Sve.
Up. VI, 12).—Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the
limiting adjuncts of name and form, the products of Nes¬
cience ; just as the universal ether depends (as limited
ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the limiting ad¬
juncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands
in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to
the so-called ^ivas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs
(vi^anatman), which indeed are one with his own Self—just
as the portions of ether enclosed in jars and the like are
one with the universal ether—but are limited by aggregates
of instruments of action (i. e. bodies) produced from name
and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the
Lord’s being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence,
&c. all depend on the limitation due to the adjuncts whose
Self is Nescience; while in reality none of these qualities
belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared, by right
knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture
also says, ‘ Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else,
understands nothing else, that is the Infinite’ ( Kh . Up. VII,
24,1); 4 But when the Self only has become all this, how
should he see another?’ (B rL Up. II, 4, 13.) In this manner
the Vedanta-texts declare that for him who has reached the
1 Tattvanyatvabhyam iti, na hfovaratvena te niru^yete ^a^a^a^ayor
abhedayogat napi tato^nyatvena niruktim arhata^ svatantryewa
sattasphfirtyasambhav&t na hi g-adam a^a</anapekshyaw sattasphur-
timad upalakshyate ^adatvabhangaprasangat tasmad avidyatmake
namarfipe ity artha^. An. Gi.
330
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does
not exist. The Bhagavadgita also (‘ The Lord is not the
cause of actions, or of the capacity of performing actions, or
of the connexion of action and fruit; all that proceeds
according to its own nature. The Lord receives no one’s
sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance ; hence
all creatures are deluded; 5 Bha. Gi. V, 14; 15) declares
that in reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist.
That, on the other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as
far as the phenomenal world is concerned, Scripture as well
as the Bhagavadgita states; compare Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22,
' He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector
of all things ; he is a bank and boundary, so that these
worlds may not be confounded; 5 and Bha. Gi. XVIII,
61, ‘The Lord, O Ar^una, is seated in the region of the
heart of all beings, turning round all beings, (as though)
mounted on a machine, by his delusion/ The Sfitrakara
also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only with
regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the pre¬
ceding Sutra, where he looked to the phenomenal world,
compared Brahman to the ocean, &c., that comparison
resting on the assumption of the world of effects not yet
having been refuted (i. e. seen to be unreal).—The view of
Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of
use in the devout meditations on the qualified (sagu;za)
Brahman.
15, And because only on the existence (of the
cause) (the effect) is observed.
For the following reason also the effect is non-different from
the cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is
observed to exist, not when it does not exist. For instance,
only when the clay exists the jar is observed to exist, and
the cloth only when the threads exist. That it is not a gene¬
ral rule that when one thing exists another is also observed
to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a horse
which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist
only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist
only when the potter exists ; for in that case non-difference
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 5 .
331
does not exist, although the relation between the two is that of
an operative cause and its effect 1 .—But—it maybe objected
—even in the case of things other (i. e. non-identical) we
find that the observation of one thing regularly depends on
the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is observed
only when fire exists.—We reply that this is untrue, because
sometimes smoke is observed even after the fire has been ex¬
tinguished ; as, for instance, in the case of smoke being kept
by herdsmen in jars.—Well, then—the objector will say—let
us add to smoke a certain qualification enabling us to say that
smoke of such and such a kind 2 does not exist unless fire
exists.—Even thus, we reply, your objection is not valid,
because we declare that the reason for assuming the non-dif¬
ference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ
(buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect
jointly 3 . And that does not take place in the case of fire
and smoke.—Or else we have to read (in the Sfitra) ‘bhavat,’
and to translate, ‘ and on account of the existence or obser¬
vation/ The non-difference of cause and effect results not
only from Scripture but also from the existence of percep¬
tion. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for
instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not per¬
ceive a thing called ‘ cloth/ in addition to the threads, but
merely threads running lengthways and crossways. So
again, in the threads we perceive finer threads (the aggre-
1 So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot
conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta
and naimittika, not that of non-difference.
2 For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base
is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.
3 I.e. (as An. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation of
cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence
of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional
ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one
not being possible without the consciousness of the other.—Tad-
bhavanuvidhayibMvatvam tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvaz# £a kar-
yasya karawananyatve hetur dhumavbeshasya /fcagnibhavanuvi-
dhayibhavatve*pi na tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya
dhfimabhanadhmatvat.
332
vedAnta-s6tras.
gate of which is identical with the grosser threads), in them
again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our
perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can
perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red,
white, and black (the colours of fire, water, and earth,
according to Kh . Up. VI, 4); those, again, with air, the latter
with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is one and
without a second. That all means of proof lead back to
Brahman (as the ultimate cause of the world ; not to pra-
dhana, &c.), we have already explained.
16. And on account of that which is posterior
(i. e. the effect) being that which is.
For the following reason also the effect is to be con¬
sidered as non-different (from the cause). That which is
posterior in time, i. e. the effect, is declared by Scripture to
have, previous to its actual beginning, its Being in the
cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For in passages
like, 4 In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which
is’ (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1); and, 4 Verily, in the beginning this
was Self, one only 5 (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is
denoted by the word 4 this 5 appears in grammatical co-ordi¬
nation with (the word denoting) the cause (from which it
appears that both inhere in the same substratum). A thing,
on the other hand, which does not exist in another thing
by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other
thing; for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence
as there is non-difference before the production (of the
effect), we understand that the effect even after having been
produced continues to be non-different from the cause. As
the cause, i. e. Brahman, is in all time neither more nor less
than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in all
time only that which is. But that which is is one only;
therefore the effect is non-different from the cause.
17. If it be said that on account of being denoted
as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before
it is actually produced); (we reply) not so, (because
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 7 .
333
the term ‘that which is not’ denotes) another
quality (merely); (as appears) from the comple¬
mentary sentence.
But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture
speaks of the effect before its production as that which is
not; so, for instance, ‘ In the beginning this was that only
which is not’ ( Kh . Up. Ill, 19, 1); and ‘Non-existent 1
indeed this was in the beginning 5 (Taitt. Up. II, 7). Hence
Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its
production.
This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect
previous to its production is not meant absolute Non¬
existence, but only a different quality or state, viz. the state
of name and form being unevolved, which state is different
from the state of name and form being evolved. With
reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to
its production, non-existent although then also it existed
identical with its cause. We conclude this from the
complementary passage, according to the rule that the
sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful meaning
is determined by its complementary part. With reference
to the passage, ‘ In the beginning this was non-existent
only, 5 we remark that what is there denoted by the word
‘Non-existing 5 is—in the complementary passage, ‘That
became existent’ — referred to by the word ‘that, 5 and
qualified as ‘ Existent. 5
The word ‘ was 5 would, moreover, not apply to the
(absolutely) Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as
connected with prior or posterior time.—Hence with refer¬
ence to the other passage also, 4 Non-existing indeed, 5
&c., the complementary part, ‘That made itself its Self, 5
shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute
Non-existence is not meant—It follows from all this that
the designation of ‘ Non-existence 5 applied to the effect
before its production has reference to a different state of
being merely. And as those things which are distinguished
1 For simplicity’s sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non¬
existing.
334
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
by name and form are in ordinary language called ‘ existent/
the term "non-existent’ is figuratively applied to them to
denote the state in which they were previously to their
differentiation.
18. From reasoning and from another Vedic
passage.
That the effect exists before its origination and is non-
different from the cause, follows from reasoning as well as
from a further scriptural passage.
We at first set forth the argumentation.—Ordinary expe¬
rience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain
effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments,
employ for their purpose certain determined causal sub¬
stances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to
produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who
intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according
to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent
(before its actual production), all this should be possible.
For if before their actual origination all effects are equally
non-existent in any causal substance, why then should curds
be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars
from clay only and not from milk as well?—Let us then main¬
tain, the asatkaryavctdin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal
non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same
time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching
beyond itself (atLaya) for some particular effect only and not
for other effects ; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay,
has a certain capacity for curds ; and clay only, and not milk,
an analogous capacity for jars.—What, we ask in return, do
you understand by that £ atLaya ? ’ If you understand by it
the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origi¬
nation), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not
exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which
it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by
the atuaya a certain power of the cause assumed to the end
of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect
springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8 .
335
determine the particular effect only if it neither is other
(than cause and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either,
it would not be different from anything else which is either
non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then
should it alone be able to produce the particular effect?)
Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of
the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that
power.—Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one
hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are
not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and
a buffalo, it follows that the identity of the cause and the
effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be
admitted. (Let it then be assumed, the opponent rejoins,
that the cause and the effect, although really different, are
not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the
so-called samavaya connexion 1 .) —If, we reply, you assume
the samavaya connexion between cause and effect, you have
either to admit that the samavaya itself is joined by a
certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by
samavaya, and then that connexion will again require a new
connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds
together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an
infinite series of connexions ; or else you will have to main¬
tain that the samavaya is not joined by any connexion to the
terms which it binds together, and from that will result the
dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of
the samavaya relation 2 .—Well then, the opponent rejoins,
let us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a
connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins
without the help of any further connexion.—Then, we reply,
conjunction (sa/zzyoga) also must be connected with the two
terms which it joins without the help of the samavaya
1 Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate rela¬
tion, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole and
its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.
2 Samavayasya svatantryapakshazzz diishayati anabhyupagamya-
mane^eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi^ sambandho neshyate kim
tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyaguzzadina/ra ka.
viprakarsha^ syat sazzmidhayakabhavad ity artha^. An. Gi.
336
vp:danta-s6tr as .
connexion ; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion 1 .—
Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended
as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of the
samavaya relation has really no purport.
In what manner again do you—who maintain that the
cause and the effect are joined by the samavaya relation—
assume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to
abide in its causes, i. e. in the material parts of which it
consists ? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or
in each particular part?—If you say that it abides in all
parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be
perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in
contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be
objected that the whole may be apprehended through some
of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its
substrates together (i. e. in all the many things), is not
apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are
apprehended.—Let it then be assumed that the whole
abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening
aggregates of parts 2 .—In that case, we reply, we should
have to assume other parts in addition to the primary
originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of
those other parts the whole could abide in the primary
parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that
one thing which abides in another abides there by means
of parts different from those of that other thing), that the
sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts
different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption
of that kind would lead us into a regress us in infinitum,
because in order to explain how the whole abides in certain
1 A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyaya tenet that
sawyoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground
on which it stands, is a quality (guzza) inherent in the two conjoined
substances by means of the samavaya relation.
2 So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we
apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending
the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as
we apprehend some few of the flowers.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8 .
337
given parts we should always have to assume further parts 1 .
—Well, then, let us maintain the second alternative, viz. that
the whole abides in each particular part.—That also cannot
be admitted; for if the whole is present in one part it cannot
be present in other parts also ; not any more than Devadatta
can be present in .Srughna and in Pa^aliputra on one and
the same day. If the whole were present in more than one
part, several wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta
and Yagviadatta, who, as being two different persons, may
live one of them at 5 rughna and the other at Pa/aliputra.—
If the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully
present in each part, just as the generic character of the cow
is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that
the generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in
each individual cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived
in each particular part. If the whole were fully present in
each part, the consequence would be that the whole would
produce its effects indifferently with any of its parts ; a cow,
for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail. But
such things are not seen to take place.
We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed
to the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause.—
That doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origi¬
nation of an effect is without an agent and thus devoid of
substantial being. For origination is an action, and as such
requires an agent 2 , just as the action of walking does. To
speak of an action without an agent would be a contradic-
1 Kalpantaram utthapayati atheti, tatha ka yathavayavai/^ sutraw
kusumani vyapnuvat katipayakusumagraha^e *pi gnhyate tatha
katipayavayavagraha7ze*pi bhavaty avayavino graha/zarn ity artha^.
Tatra kim arambhakavayavair eva teshv avayavi vartteta kim va
tadatiriktavayavair iti vikalpyadyam pratyaha tadapiti. Yatra yad
varttate tat tadatiriktavayavair eva tatra vartamana^ drfsh/am iti
dr/sh/antagarbhaztf hetum a^ash/e ko^eti. Dvitiyam dushayati
anavastheti. Kalpitanantavayavavyavahitataya prakrftavayavino
duraviprakarshat tantunish/^atvam pa/asya na syad iti bhava^.
An. Gi.
2 I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal
agent.
[34] Z
338
vedanta-sOtras.
tion. But if you deny the pre-existence of the effect in the
cause, it would have to be assumed that whenever the origi¬
nation of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not the
jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something
else, and again that when the origination of the two halves
of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but
something else. From this it would follow that the sentence,
4 the jar is originated, 5 means as much as 4 the potter and
the other (operative) causes are originated V But as a
matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to
mean the latter ; and it is, moreover, known that at the time
when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in exist¬
ence.—Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origi¬
nation is the connexion of the effect with the existence of
its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self.—How, we
ask in reply, can something which has not yet obtained
existence enter into connexion with something else? A
connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one
existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing
things. To something non-existing which on that account
is indefinable, it is moreover not possible to assign a limit
as the opponent does when maintaining that the effect is
non-existing before its origination; for experience teaches
us that existing things only such as fields and houses have
limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use,
for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 4 The son
of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of
Phraavarman,’ the declaration of a limit in time implied in
that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of the
barren woman, i.e. a mere non-entity, either was or is or will
be king. If the son of a barren woman could become an
existing thing subsequently to the activity of some causal
1 Every action, ^Sankara says, requires an agent, i.e. a substrate
in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar exists in
the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the substrate
for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence (for the
non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and have
to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative
causes of the jar.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8 .
339
agent, in that case it would be possible also that the non¬
existing effect should be something existing, subsequently
to the activity of some causal agent. But we know that the
one thing can take place no more than the other thing; the
non-existing effect and the son of the barren woman are
both equally non-entities and can never be.—But, the
asatkaryavadin here objects, from your doctrine there
follows the result that the activity of causal agents is alto¬
gether purposeless. For if the effect were lying already
fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from
it, nobody would endeavour to bring it about, no more than
anybody endeavours to bring about the cause which is
already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour.
But as a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring
about effects, and it is in order not to have to condemn
their efforts as altogether useless that we assume the non¬
existence of the effect previously to its origination.—Your
objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the
endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having
a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in
the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the
effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs
to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of
Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown
above.—Nor does a substance become another substance
merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta
may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely
drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and
legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial
being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also
by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers,
brothers, &c., remain the same, although we see them in
continually changing states and attitudes; for they are
always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on.
If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on
the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the
same substantial beings, because the different states in which
they appear are not separated from each other by birth or
death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after
340
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction
as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as some¬
thing altogether different from the cause); we rebut this
objection by remarking that causal substances also such as
milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they
have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and
the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause
undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the
continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for
instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there
spring sprouts and trees, the term ‘ birth 5 (when applied to
the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the
seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the
continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and
the term c death 5 only means that, through the secession of
those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of
visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by
birth and death as described just now it follows that the
non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non¬
existing ; for if that were so, it would also follow that the
unborn child in the mothers womb and the new-born babe
stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.
It would further follow that a man is not the same person
in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as
father and the like are illegitimately used.—The preceding
arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine)
of all existence being momentary only \
The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to
its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that
the activity of the causal agent has no object; for what does
not exist cannot possibly be an object; not any more than
the ether can be cleft by swords and other weapons for
striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the
inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous con¬
clusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has
for its object the inherent cause, there results something else
1 Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada of
this adhy&ya.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 8 .
34*
(viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous
conclusion) the opponent should say that the effect is (not
something different from the cause, but) a certain relative
power (atuaya) of the inherent cause ; he thereby would
simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect
exists in the cause already.
We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk
and other substances are called effects when they are in the
state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even
within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which
is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all
appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last
effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and
costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current
notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world.
The conclusion here established, on the ground of rea¬
soning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origina¬
tion, and is non-different from its cause, results also from
a different scriptural passage. As under the preceding
Sutra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of the
non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present
Sutra is the one ( Kh . Up. VI, a, i) which refers to that
which is. That passage begins, 4 Being only was this in the
beginning, one without a second,’ refers, thereupon, to
the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the
world ( 4 Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning’),
raises an objection against that doctrine ( 4 How could that
which is be born of that which is not?’), and, finally, re¬
affirms the view first set forth, 4 Only Being was this in the
beginning.’ The circumstance that in this passage the
effect, which is denoted by the word 4 this,’ is by Scripture,
with reference to the time previous to its origination, co¬
ordinated with the cause denoted by the term 4 Being,’
proves that the effect exists in—and is non-different from—
the cause. If it were before its origination non-existing
and after it inhered in its cause by samavaya, it would be
something different from the cause, and that would virtually
imply an abandonment of the promise made in the passage,
4 That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,’ &c.
34 2
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
(VI, i, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other
hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in—
and is not different from—the cause.
19. And like a piece of cloth.
As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly
whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on
its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing
was a piece of cloth ; and as, so long as it is folded, we per¬
haps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite
length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know
these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not
different from the folded object; in the same way an effect,
such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists
in its causes, i. e. the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes
manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the
operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on.—Applying
this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded and then
unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we con¬
clude that the latter is non-different from the former.
20. And as in the case of the different vital
aifs.
It is a matter of observation that when the operations of
the different kinds of vital air—such as prazza the ascending
vital air, apana the descending vital air, &c.—are suspended,
in consequence of the breath being held so that they exist in
their causes merely, the only effect which continues to be ac¬
complished is life, while all other effects, such as the bending
and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped. When,
thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects
also are brought about, in addition to mere life.—Nor must
the vital airs, on account of their being divided into classes,
be considered as something else than vital air ; for wind (air)
constitutes their common character. Thus (i. e. in the
manner illustrated by the instance of the vital airs) the non¬
difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived.—
As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and
II ADHyAyA, I PADA, 21 .
343
non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural
passage that ‘ What is not heard is heard, what is not per¬
ceived is perceived, what is not known is known 5 ( Kh. Up.
VI, i, 3) is fulfilled 1 .
2i. On account of the other (i.e. the individual
soul) being designated (as non-different from Brah¬
man) there would attach (to Brahman) various
faults, as, for instance, not doing what is bene¬
ficial.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an
intelligent cause of the world.—If that doctrine is accepted,
certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial,
will attach (to the intelligent cause, i. e. Brahman), ‘on ac¬
count of the other being designated/ For Scripture declares
the other, i. e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman,
as is shown by the passage, c That is the Self; that art thou,
O .SVetaketu ! 5 {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7.)—Or else (if we interpret
‘ the other ’ of the Sutra in a different way) Scripture declares
the other, i. e. Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied
soul. For the passage, c Having created that he entered
into it/ declares the creator, i. e. the unmodified Brahman,
to constitute the Self of the embodied soul, in consequence
of his entering into his products. The following passage
also, ‘ Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve
names and forms’ {Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest
divinity designates the living (soul) by the word ‘ Self,’
shows that the embodied Self is not different from Brahman.
Therefore the creative power of Brahman belongs to the
embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an inde¬
pendent agent, might be expected to produce only what is
beneficial to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such
as birth, death, old age, disease, and whatever may be the
other meshes of the net of suffering. For we know that no
free person will build a prison for himself, and take up his
abode in it. Nor would a being, itself absolutely stainless,
1 Because it has been shown that cause and effect are identical;
hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.
344
vedanta-s6tras.
look on this altogether unclean body as forming part of
its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its
liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions
which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of
those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Fur¬
ther, it would remember that it had created this manifold
world; for every person who has produced some clearly
appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it.
And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the
magical illusion which he had emitted, so the embodied
soul also would be able to reabsorb this world into itself. The
fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its
own body even. As we therefore see that c what would be
beneficial is not done/ the hypothesis of the world having
proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.
22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman
separate from the individual souls) (is the creator);
(the existence of which separate Brahman we learn)
from the declaration of difference.
The word ‘but’ discards the purvapaksha.—We rather
declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose
essence is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which
is additional to, i. e. different from the embodied Self, is the
creative principle of the world. The faults specified above,
such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do not
attach to that Brahman; for as eternal freedom is its charac¬
teristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done
by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there
any impediment to its knowledge and power; for it is
omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the
other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned
faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the
creator of the world, on account of ‘the declaration of
difiference. , For scriptural passages (such as, ‘ Verily, the
Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked/
Brt. Up. II, 4, 5; ‘The Self we must search out, we must
try to understand/ Kh . Up. VIII, 7, 1; ‘ Then he becomes
II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 23 .
345
united with the True, 5 Kh. Up. VI, 8,1; 4 This embodied
Self mounted by the intelligent Self, 5 Bri. Up. IV, 3, 35)
declare differences founded on the relations of agent, object,
and so on, and thereby show Brahman to be different from
the individual soul.—And if it be objected that there are
other passages declaratory of non-difference (for instance,
4 That art thou ’), and that difference and non-difference
cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the
possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the
parallel instance of the universal ether and the ether limited
by a jar.—Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the decla¬
ration of non-difference contained in such passages as 4 that
art thou, 5 the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the
transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative
quality of Brahman vanish at once, the whole phenomenon of
plurality, which springs from wrong knowledge, being sub-
lated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of the
creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and
the like ? For that this entire apparent world, in which good
and evil actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to
the non-discrimination of (the Self’s) limiting adjuncts, viz. a
body, and so on, which spring from name and form the pre¬
sentations of Nescience, and does in reality not exist at all,
we have explained more than once. The illusion is analogous
to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the dying, being
born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; while in
reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with
regard to the state in which the appearance of plurality is
not yet sublated, it follows from passages declaratory of
such difference (as, for instance, 4 That we must search for,’
&c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul;
whereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.
23. And because the case is analogous to that
of stones, &c. (the objections raised) cannot be
established.
As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of
earth, nevertheless great variety is observed, some being
346
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
precious gems, such as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others,
such as crystals and the like, being of medium value, and
others again stones only fit to be flung at dogs or crows;
and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same
ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandal¬
wood and cucumbers, which show the greatest difference
in their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragrancy, juice, &c.; and
as one and the same food produces various effects, such
as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may contain
in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the highest
Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objec¬
tions imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman
being the cause of the world) cannot be maintained.—Fur¬
ther 1 arguments are furnished by the fact of all effects
having, as Scripture declares, their origin in speech only,
and by the analogous instance of the variety of dream phan¬
toms (while the dreaming person remains one).
24. If you object on the ground of the observation
of the employment (of instruments); (we say), No;
because as milk (transforms itself, so Brahman
does).
Your assertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without
a second, is the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on
account of the observation of employment (of instruments).
For in ordinary life we see that potters, weavers, and other
handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and the like, after having
put themselves in possession of the means thereto by pro¬
viding themselves with various implements, such as clay,
staffs, wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand,
you conceive to be without any help ; how then can it act as
a creator without providing itself with instruments to work
with ?—We therefore maintain that Brahman is not the cause
of the world.
This objection is not valid, because causation is possible
1 Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by the
‘ and ’ of the Sutra.
II APHYAYA, I PADA, 25.
347
in consequence of a peculiar constitution of the causal sub¬
stance, as in the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn
into curds and ice respectively, without any extraneous
means, so it is in the case of Brahman also. And if you
object to this analogy for the reason that milk, in order to
turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent, viz. heat,
we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount
of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated
by heat. If milk did not possess that capability of itself,
heat could not compel it to turn ; for we see that air or ether,
for instance, is not compelled by the action of heat to turn
into sour milk. By the co-operation of auxiliary means the
milk's capability of turning into sour milk is merely com¬
pleted. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on
the other hand, does not require to be supplemented by any
extraneous help. Thus Scripture also declares, ‘There is no
effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like
unto him or better ; his high power is revealed as manifold,
as inherent, acting as force and knowledge’ (Sve. Up. VI,
8 ). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to
its manifold powers, able to transform itself into manifold
effects ; just as milk is.
25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of
gods and other beings in ordinary experience.
Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelli-
gent things have the power of turning themselves into sour
milk, &c. without any extraneous means, since it is thus
observed. But we observe, on the other hand, that intelli¬
gent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed to their several
work only after having provided themselves with a complete
set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that
Brahman, which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should
proceed without any auxiliary ?
We reply, c Like gods and others.’ As gods, fathers, rfshis,
and other beings of great power, who are all of intelligent
nature, are seen to create many and various objects, such
as palaces, chariots, &c., without availing themselves of any
348
VEDANTA-sfi TRA?,
extraneous means, by their mere intention, which is effective
in consequence of those beings peculiar power—a fact
vouchsafed by mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, and pura?zas ;—
and as the spider emits out of itself the threads of its
web ; and as the female crane conceives without a male;
and as the lotus wanders from one pond to another without
any means of conveyance ; so the intelligent Brahman also
may be assumed to create the world by itself without ex¬
traneous means.
Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the
following style.—The go 's and other beings, whom you
have quoted as parallel instances, are really of a nature
different from that of Brahman. For the material causes
operative in the production of palaces and other material
things are the bodies of the gods, and not their intelligent
Selfs. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva
which, owing to the spiders devouring small insects, acquires
a certain degree of consistency. And the female crane con¬
ceives from hearing the sound of thunder. And the lotus
flower indeed derives from its indwelling intelligent principle
the impulse of movement, but is not able actually to move
in so far as it is a merely intelligent being ! ; it rather wanders
from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body,
just as the creeper climbs up the tree.—Hence all these
illustrative examples cannot be applied to the case of
Brahman.
To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the
case of Brahman is different from that of potters and similar
agents. For while potters, &c., on the one side, and gods,
&c., on the other side, possess the common attribute of intelli¬
gence, potters require for their work extraneous means (i. e.
means lying outside their bodies) and gods do not. Hence
Brahman also, although intelligent, is assumed to require
no extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show
by the parallel instance of the gods, &c. Our intention is
to point out that a peculiarly conditioned capability which
1 The right reading appears to be ‘ svayam eva ^etana ’ as found
in some MSS. Other MSS. read ^etana h.
II ADHYAyA, I PADA, 26 .
349
is observed in some one case (as in that of the potter) is not
necessarily to be assumed in all other cases also.
26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brah¬
man undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else
a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be
without parts.
Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman,
intelligent, one, without a second, modifying itself without
the employment of any extraneous means, is the cause of the
world.—Now, another objection is raised for the purpose of
throwing additional light on the point under discussion.—
The consequence of the Vedanta doctrine, it is said, will be
that we must assume the entire Brahman to undergo the
change into its effects, because it is not composed of parts.
If Brahman, like earth and other matter, consisted of
parts, we might assume that a part of it undergoes the
change, while the other part remains as it is. But Scripture
distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Com¬
pare, ‘ He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil,
without fault, without taint’ (Sve. Up. VI, 19); ‘That
heavenly person is without body, he is both without and
within, not produced’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); ‘That great Being
is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge ’
(B ri. Up. II, 4, 12); ‘He is to be described by No, no*
(B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 26); ‘It is neither coarse nor fine’ (Bn.
Up. Ill, 8, 8); all which passages deny the existence of
any distinctions in Brahman.—As, therefore, a partial modi¬
fication is impossible, a modification of the entire Brahman
has to be assumed. But that involves a cutting off of
Brahman from its very basis.—Another consequence of the
Vedantic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive ‘ to
see ’ Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman
may be seen without any endeavour, and apart from them
no Brahman exists.—And, finally, the texts declaring Brah¬
man to be unborn are contradicted thereby.—If, on the other
hand—in order to escape from these difficulties—we assume
Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do violence to those
texts which declare Brahman not to be made up of parts.
350
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it
is non-eternal.—Hence theVedantic point of view cannot be
maintained in any way.
27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural
passages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on
Scripture (only).
The word ‘but’ discards the objection.—We deny this
and maintain that our view is not open to any objections.—
That the entire Brahman undergoes change, by no means
follows from our doctrine, 6 on account of sacred texts/ For
in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of the
world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting
apart from its effects. This appears from the passages
indicating the difference of cause and effect (‘ That divinity
thought) let me enter into these three divinities with this
living Self and evolve names and forms; 5 and, ‘Such is
the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot
of him are all things, three feet are what is immortal in
heaven 5 ( Kh . Up. Ill, 12, 6); further, from the passages
declaring the unmodified Brahman to have its abode in
the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless sleep)
the individual soul is united with the True. For if the
entire Brahman had passed into its effects, the limitation
(of the soul’s union with Brahman) to the state of dreamless
sleep which is declared in the passage, ‘ then it is united
with the True, my dear, 5 would be out of place; since the
individual soul is always united with the effects of Brah¬
man, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on
that hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahman
becoming the object of perception by means of the senses
is denied while its effects may thus be perceived. For
these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman has
to be admitted.—Nor do we violate those texts which
declare Brahman to be without parts ; we rather admit
Brahman to be without parts just because Scripture reveals
it. For Brahman which rests exclusively on the holy texts,
and regarding which the holy texts alone are authori-
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 27 .
351
tative—not the senses, and so on—must be accepted such
as the texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare,
on the one hand, that not the entire Brahman passes over
into its effects, and, on the other hand, that Brahman is
without parts. Even certain ordinary things such as gems,
spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to
difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce
various opposite effects, and nobody unaided by instruc¬
tion is able to find out by mere reflection the number
of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects,
their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to
conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of
Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought! As
the Pura^a says: ‘ Do not apply reasoning to what is
unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is
above all material causes 1 .’ Therefore the cognition of
what is supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.
But—our opponent will say—even the holy texts can¬
not make us understand what is contradictory. Brahman,
you say, which is without parts undergoes a change, but
not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is without parts, it
does either not change at all or it changes in its entirety.
If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and
persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that
it follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters
connected with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two
Vedic injunctions ‘ at the atiratra he is to take the sho^a^in-
cup,’ and ‘ at the atiratra he is not to take the sho^ajin-cup’)
any contradiction which may present itself to the under¬
standing is removed by the optional adoption of one of
the two alternatives presented as action is dependent on
man ; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of
the alternatives does not remove the contradiction because
an existent thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action
which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are
therefore met here by a real difficulty.
1 Prakr/tibhya iti, pratyakshadrfsh/apadarthasvabhavebhyo yat
parazrc vilaksha^am a^dryadyupade^agamyaw tad a/£intyam ity
artha^. An. Gi.
352
VE D ANT A-sft TR AS.
No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one;
as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman’s
nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of
that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not
any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing
double to a person of defective vision. By that element
of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is
characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well
as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the
Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis
of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on,
while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains
unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as
the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience,
originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate
against the fact of Brahman being without parts.—Nor
have the scriptural passages which speak of Brahman as
undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of
change; for such instruction would have no fruit. They
rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman’s Self
as raised above this apparent world; that being an in¬
struction which we know to have a result of its own. For
in the scriptural passage beginning ‘ He can only be
described by No, no’ (which passage conveys instruction
about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in
the words c O Canaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness 5
(B ri. Up. IV, 2, 4).—Hence our view does not involve any
real difficulties.
28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also,
and various (creations exist in gods \ &c.).
Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine
that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self,
without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches
us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self
1 This is the way in which Sankara divides the Sutra; An. Gi.
remarks to ‘loke^pi, &c.: atmani £eti vyakhyaya vi&traj* ka, hiti
vya/fcash/e/
II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 29 .
353
of a dreaming person, ‘ There are no chariots in that state,
no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses,
and roads’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too
multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are
seen to exist in gods, &c., and magicians without in¬
terfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform
creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it is, without
divesting it of its character of unity.
29. And because the objection (raised against
our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view
likewise.
Those also who maintain that the world has sprung
from the pradhana implicitly teach that something not
made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other
qualities—viz. the pradMna—is the cause of an effect—viz.
the world—which is made up of parts, is limited and is
characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows
from that doctrine also either that the pradhana as not
consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety,
or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be
abandoned.—But—it might be pleaded in favour of the
Sankhyas—they do not maintain their pradhana to be with¬
out parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium
of the three guzzas, Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, so
that the pradhana forms a whole containing the three
guzzas as its parts.—We reply that such a partiteness as
is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand
because still each of the three qualities is declared to be
in itself without parts 1 . And each guzza by itself assisted
merely by the two other guzzas constitutes the material
cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its
nature 2 .—So that the objection lies against the Sankhya
1 So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in
its entirety, or else—against the assumption—consist of parts.
2 The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the
stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three guzzas in
combination only to undergo modification; if this were so the
inequality of the different effects could not be accounted for.
[34] a a
354
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
view likewise.—Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the
doctrine of the impartiteness of the pradhana rests) is not
absolutely safe, let us assume that the pradhana consists
of parts.—If you do that, we reply, it follows that the
pradhana cannot be eternal, and so on.—Let it then be said
that the various powers of the pradhana to which the
variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.—Well, we
reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who
see the cause of the world in Brahman.
The same objections lie against the doctrine of the
world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine
one atom when combining with another must, as it is not
made up of parts, enter into the combination with its
whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place
we do not get beyond the first atom 1 . If, on the other
hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the com¬
bination with a part only, you offend against the assumption
of the atoms having no parts.
As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objec¬
tions raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view
in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently
cleared his doctrine.
30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all
(powers) because that is seen (from Scripture).
We have stated that this multiform world of effects is
possible to Brahman, because, although one only, it is
endowed with various powers.—How then—it may be
asked—do you know that the highest Brahman is endowed
with various powers ?—He is, we reply, endowed with all
powers, ‘ because that is seen.’ For various scriptural pas¬
sages declare that the highest divinity possesses all powers,
‘ He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes
belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is
1 As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact
with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is
entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of
two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 31.
355
never surprised 5 (Kh . Up. Ill, 14, 4); ‘He who desires
what is true and imagines what is true 5 (. Kh . Up. VIII, 7,
1) ; ‘ He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in
its detail 5 ) (Mu. Up. 1 ,1,9); ‘ By the command of that Im¬
perishable, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart 5 (Bri. Up.
Ill, 8, 9); and other similar passages.
31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of
powers) on account of the absence of organs; (we
reply that) this has been explained (before).
Let this be granted.—Scripture, however, declares the
highest divinity to be without (bodily) organs of action 1 ;
so, for instance, in the passage, ‘ It is without eyes, without
ears, without speech, without mind 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8).
Being such, how should it be able to produce effects,
although it may be endowed with all powers ? For we
know (from mantras, arthav&das, &c.) that the gods and
other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers,
are capable of producing certain effects only because they are
furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover,
how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural passage, ‘ No,
no, 5 denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers ?
The appropriate reply to this question has been already
given above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be
fathomed by means of Scripture only, not by mere reasoning.
Nor are we obliged to assume that the capacity of one being
is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has
likewise been explained above that although all qualities are
denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be
endowed with powers, if we assume in its nature an element
of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience.
Moreover, a scriptural passage (‘Grasping without hands,
hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears
without ears, 5 Sve. Up. Ill, 19) declares that Brahman,
1 The Sfitra is concerned with the body only as far as it is an
instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already
been disposed of in Sutra 24.
A a 2
356
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
although devoid of bodily organs, possesses all possible
capacities.
32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world),
on account of (beings engaging in any action) having
a motive.
Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an
intelligent cause of the world.—The intelligent highest Self
cannot be the creator of the sphere of this world, ‘ on account
of actions having a purpose/—We know from ordinary ex¬
perience that man, who is an intelligent being, begins to act
after due consideration only, and does not engage even in
an unimportant undertaking unless it serves some purpose
of his own ; much less so in important business. There is
also a scriptural passage confirming this result of common
experience, ‘Verily everything is not dear that you may love
everything; but that you may love the Self therefore every¬
thing is dear 9 (Bri . Up. II, 4, 5). Now the undertaking of
creating the sphere of this world, with all its various con¬
tents, is certainly a weighty one. If, then, on the one hand,
you assume it to serve some purpose of the intelligent highest
Self, you thereby sublate its self-sufficiency vouched for by
Scripture; if, on the other hand, you affirm absence of
motive on its part, you must affirm absence of activity
also.—Let us then assume that just as sometimes an intel-
gent person when in a state of frenzy proceeds, owing to
his mental aberration, to action without a motive, so the
highest Self also created this world without any motive.—
That, we reply, would contradict the omniscience of the
highest Self, which is vouched for by Scripture.—Hence
the doctrine of the creation proceeding from an intelligent
Being is untenable.
33, But (Brahman’s creative activity) is mere
sport, such as we see in ordinary life.
The word ‘but’ discards the objection raised.—We see in
every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men
of high position who have no unfulfilled desires left have no
II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 34 .
357
reference to any extraneous purpose, but proceed from mere
sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations in places of
amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation
and exhalation is going on without reference to any
extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own
nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be
supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature
without reference to any purpose. For on the ground
neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other
purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned 1 2 .—
Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty
and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose
power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might pos¬
sibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for
sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions
of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.
•—Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like
a senseless person ; for Scripture affirms the fact of the crea¬
tion on the one hand, and the Lord’s omniscience on the
other hand. And, finally, we must remember that the scrip¬
tural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality;
it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by
name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover,
aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.
34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the
Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of
1 The nature (svabhava) of the Lord is, the commentators say,
Maya joined with time and karman.
2 This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might
remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and
the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction
with Maya the creation is unavoidable. Go. An. Avidya naturally
tends towards effects, without any purpose. Bha.
An. Gi. remarks: Nanu liladav asmadadinam akasmad eva
nivn'tter api danranad Lvarasyapi mayamayya m lilaya m tatha-
bhave vinapi sawyag^ana^ sa^sarasamu^ittir iti tatraha na £eti.
Anirva^ya khalv avidya parasye^varasya £a svabhavo lileti koky&te
tatra na pratitikasvabhavayam anupapattir avataratity artha^.
358
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
his regarding (merit and demerit); for so (Scripture)
declares.
In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present
defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole
planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly
planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine
of the Lord being the cause of the world.—The Lord, it is
said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that
hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and
cruelty would attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods
and others, he renders eminently happy; others, as for
instance the animals, eminently unhappy; to some again, as
for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To a
Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things,
passion and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to
any common person acting similarly; which attributes
would be contrary to the essential goodness of the Lord
affirmed by .Sruti and Smrz'ti. Moreover, as the infliction of
pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form
part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with
great cruelty, a quality abhorred by low people even. For
these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.
The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality
of dispensation and cruelty, ‘ because he is bound by regards.’
If the Lord on his own account, without any extraneous
regards, produced this unequal creation, he would expose
himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he is bound
by certain regards, i. e. he has to look to merit and demerit.
Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due
to the merit and demerit of the living creatures created, and
is not a fault for which the Lord is to blame. The position
of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous to that of
Par^anya, the Giver of rain. For as Par^anya is the com¬
mon cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants,
while the difference between the various species is due to the
various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds,
so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods,
men, &c., while the differences between these classes of beings
II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 35 .
359
are due to the different merit belonging to the individual
souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot be
reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.—
And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord,
in creating this world with its various conditions, is bound
by regards, we reply that Scripture declares that; compare,
for instance, the two following passages, ‘ For he (the Lord)
makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds,
do a good deed ; and the same makes him, whom he wishes
to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed ’ (Kaush.
Up. Ill, 8) 1 ; and, ‘A man becomes good by good work,
bad by bad work’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 3, 13). Smrz’ti passages
also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite to de¬
pend on the different quality of the works of living beings ;
so, for instance, ‘ I serve men in the way in which they
approach me’ (Bha. Gi. IV, 11).
35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord’s
having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible
on account of the non-distinction (of merit and
demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute
the objection on the ground of (the world) being
without a beginning.
But—an objection is raised—the passage, ‘ Being only
this was in the beginning, one, without a second,’ affirms
that before the creation there was no distinction and conse¬
quently no merit on account of which the creation might
have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to have
been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living
beings subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in
the circular reasoning that work depends on diversity of
1 From this passage we must not—the commentators say—infer
injustice on the part of the Lord ; for the previous merit or demerit
of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which he
performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common
cause only (as Par^anya does).
360
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
condition of life, and diversity of condition again on work.
The Lord may be considered as acting with regard to reli¬
gious merit after distinction had once arisen; but as before
that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist, it
follows that the first creation must have been free from
inequalities.
This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmi-
gratory world is without beginning.—The objection would
be valid if the world had a beginning; but as it is without
beginning, merit and inequality are, like seed and sprout,
caused as well as causes, and there is therefore no logical
objection to their operation.—To the question how we know
that the world is without a beginning, the next Sutra replies.
36. (The beginninglessness of the world) recom¬
mends itself to reason and is seen (from Scripture).
The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to
reason. For if it had a beginning it would follow that, the
world springing into existence without a cause, the released
souls also would again enter into the circle of transmigratory
existence; and further, as then there would exist no deter¬
mining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and
pain, we should have to acquiesce in the doctrine of rewards
and punishments being allotted, without reference to previous
good or bad actions. That the Lord is not the cause of the
inequality, has already been remarked. Nor can Nescience
by itself be the cause, as it is of a uniform nature. On
the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of inequality,
if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from
action produced by the mental impressions of wrath, hatred,
and other afflicting passions h Without merit and demerit
nobody can enter into existence, and again, without a body
merit and demerit cannot be formed; so that—on the doc-
1 Ragadveshamoha r&gadayas te ka, purushaw dukhadibhi^
klhyantiti kle^as tesha/rc vasana^ karmapravrfttyanuguwas t&bhir
dkshipta m dharm&dilaksha«aw karma tadapekshavidya. An. Gi.
II ADHyAyA, I PADA, 37 .
361
trine of the world having a beginning—we are led into a
logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand,
explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the
seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains.—Moreover,
the fact of the world being without a beginning, is seen in
*Sruti and Smrzti. In the first place, we have the scriptural
passage, { Let me enter with this living Self (^iva), 3 &c. ( Kh .
Up. VI, 3, a). Here the circumstance of the embodied
Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to creation,
c the living Self 5 —a name applying to it in so far as it is
the sustaining principle of the pranas — shows that this
phenomenal world is without a beginning. For if it had a
beginning, the pranas would not exist before that beginning,
and how then could the embodied Self be denoted, with
reference to the time of the world’s beginning, by a name
which depends on the existence of those pranas? Nor can
it be said that it is so designated with a view to its future
relation to the pra/zas; it being a settled principle that a
past relation, as being already existing, is of greater force than
a mere future relation.—Moreover, we have the mantra,‘As
the creator formerly devised (akalpayat) sun and moon’
(. Ri . Saz^h. X, 190, 3), which intimates the existence of
former Kalpas. Smrzti also declares the world to be
without a beginning, ‘ Neither its form is known here, nor
its end, nor its beginning, nor its support ’ (Bha. Gi. XV,
3). And the Pur&zza also declares that there is no measure
of the past and the future Kalpas.
37. And because all the qualities (required in the
cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).
The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as
difference of character, and the like, which other teachers
have brought forward against what he had established as
the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman
is the cause and matter of this world.
Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it
will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teach¬
ers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which
362
vedanta-sOtras.
it was to show why his view should be accepted.—Because,
if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world,
all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen
to be present—Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful,
and possessing the great power of Maya,—on that account
this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to
any objections.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I.
363
SECOND PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
1. That which is inferred (by the Sankhyas, viz.
the pradhana) cannot be the cause (of the world),
on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world)
being impossible (on that hypothesis).
Although it is the object of this system to define the true
meaning of the Vedanta-texts and not, like the science of
Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocin¬
ation, still it is incumbent on thorough students of the
Vedanta to refute the Sankhya and other systems which
are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this
purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that
the refutation of the other systems ought to have preceded
the establishment of the Vedanta position; for) as the
determination of the sense of the Vedcinta-passages directly
subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first, by means of
such a determination, established our own position, since
this is a task more important than the refutation of the
views entertained by others.
Here an opponent might come forward and say that we
are indeed entitled to establish our own position, so as to
define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to
those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refuta¬
tion of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing
but hate and anger.—There is a use, we reply. For there
is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon
the Sankhya and similar systems as requisite for perfect
knowledge, because those systems have a weighty appear¬
ance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and
profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might
therefore think that those systems with their abstruse argu-
364
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
ments were propounded by omniscient sages, and might on
that account have faith in them. For this reason we must
endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness.
But, it might be said, the Sankhya and similar systems
have already been impugned in several Sutras of the first
adhydya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4, 38); why, then, controvert them
again ?—The task—we reply—which we are now about to
undertake differs from what we have already accomplished.
As the Sankhyas and other philosophers also quote, in
order to establish their own positions, the Vedanta-passages
and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree
with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to
show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious.
Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an
independent manner, without any reference to the Vedanta-
texts.
The Sctnkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue
as follows.—Just as jars, dishes, and other products which
possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen
to have for their cause clay in general; so we must suppose
that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and ani¬
mate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of
pleasure, pain, and dulness 1 have for their causes pleasure,
pain, and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in
their generality together constitute the threefold pradhana.
This pradhana which is non-intelligent evolves itself spon¬
taneously into multiform modifications 2 , in order thus to
effect the purposes (i.e. enjoyment, release, and so on) of
the intelligent soul.—The existence of the pradhana is to
be inferred from other circumstances also, such as the limita¬
tion of all effects and the like 3 .
Against this doctrine we argue as follows.—If you San¬
khyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point
1 The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the
three constituent elements (gu«a) of the pradhana. Sa. K£. 12, 13.
2 Viz. the great principle (mahat), ahankara, &c. S L Ka. 3.
8 The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the S&. K&.
15 ; Sa. Sfitras I, 129 ff.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I.
365
out that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided
by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects
capable of subserving the purposes of some particular
person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather
observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and
the like—things which according to circumstances afe con¬
ducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of
pain—are made by workmen endowed with intelligence.
Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one
hand, as external (i. e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the
other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of
their various actions, and, on the other hand, as animate, in
the form of bodies which belong to the different classes of
beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are
therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition;
look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious
workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and
then say if a non-intelligent principle like the pradhana is
able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent things such as
stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess
analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as
clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves
into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like,
so the pradh&na also (when modifying itself into its effects)
is ruled by some intelligent principle. When endeavouring
to determine the nature of the primal cause (of the world),
there is no need for us to take our stand on those attributes
only which form part of the nature of material causes such
as clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to
extraneous agents such as potters, &c. 1 Nor (if remem¬
bering this latter point) do we enter into conflict with any
means of right knowledge ; we, on the contrary, are in direct
agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent
If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from
its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that
of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember
that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of
an intelligent being, viz. the potter.
366
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
cause exists.—For the reason detailed in the above, i. e. on
account of the impossibility of the 4 orderly arrangement 5
(of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to
be inferred.—The word £ and’ (in the Sutra) adds other
reasons on account of which the pradhana cannot be inferred,
viz. £ on account of the non-possibility of endowment/ &c.
For it cannot be maintained 1 that all outward and inward
effects are £ endowed ’ with the nature of pleasure, pain, and
dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental)
states, while sound, &c. (i. e. the sense-objects) are known
as being of a different nature (i. e. as outward things), and
moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c. 2
And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and
so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of
the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in
the effects it produces, one person being affected by it
pleasantly, another painfully, and so on 3 .—(Turning to the
next Sarikhya argument which infers the existence of the
pradhana from the limitation of all effects), we remark that
he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend
on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited
(a conclusion based on the observation that some limited
effects such as root and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunc¬
tion of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the
three constituents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion,
and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several
1 As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring there¬
from, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect,
the existence of the three constituents of the pradhana.
2 And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause.
3 Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sarikhya
hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain,
&c.— £ If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then
sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in
summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is
anything but sandal.—And as thistles never are anything but
thistles they ought, on the Sarikhya hypothesis, to be eaten with
enjoyment not only by camels but by men also/ Bh L
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2.
367
antecedents 1 ; for they also are limited 2 .—Further 3 , it is
impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason
for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent
principle for their antecedent; for we have shown already
that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs
also, over whose production intelligence presides.
2. And on account of (the impossibility of) ac¬
tivity.
Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to
the activity by which it is produced.—The three gu;zas,
passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the
condition of mutual subordination and superordination,
originate activities tending towards the production of
particular effects.—Now these activities also cannot be
ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no
such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in
chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the
like, and chariots—which are in their own nature non-
intelligent—enter on activities tending towards particular
effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings
such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like
in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is
not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not
to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity
without which the world cannot be produced would be
impossible.
But, the Sankhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe
activity on the part of mere intelligent beings.—True; we
however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things
such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction
with intelligent beings.—But, the Sankhya again objects,
we never actually observe activity on the part of an intel-
1 Sawsargapurvakatvaprasanga iti guninam sa^srfsh/anekava-
stuprakrz'tikatvaprasaktir ity artha^. An. Gi.
2 For they limit one another.
3 To proceed to the argument ‘from the separateness of cause
and effect' (Sa. K L 15).
368
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
ligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent
thing.—Very well; the question then arises: Does the
activity belong to that in which it is actually observed (as
the Sankhya says), or to that on account of the conjunction
with which it is observed (as the Vedantin avers)?—We
must, the Sankhya replies, attribute activity to that in
which it is actually seen, since both (i. e. the activity and its
abode) are matter of observation. A mere intelligent
being, on the other hand, is never observed as the abode of
activity while a chariot is. The 1 existence of an intelligent
Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of
activity can be established (by inference) only; the inference
being based on the difference observed between living bodies
and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like.
For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only
where a body is observed while it is never seen without a
body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere
attribute of the body.—Hence activity belongs only to
what is non-intelligent.
To all this we—the Vedantins—make the following
reply.—We do not mean to say that activity does not
belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed;
it does indeed belong to them; but it results from an
intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is
present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just
as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode
in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when
there is mere fire (i. e. are not due to mere fire; as mere
fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not exist), but at the
same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire
is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the
Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed
1 The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how
the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of per¬
ception.—Pratyakshatvabhave katham atmasiddhir ity asankya
anuman&d ity aha, pravrz'ttiti. Anumanasiddhasya Manasya na
pravrfttyiyrayateti dar^ayitum evakara^. Katham anumanam ity
apekshayazrc tatprakaraw su^ayati kevaleti. Vailakshawyaw prsba-
dimattvam. An. Gi.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3.
369
to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent
things. The motive power of intelligence is therefore
incontrovertible.—But—an objection will be raised—your
Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising mov¬
ing power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature
of which is pure intelligence.—A thing, we reply, which is
itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things.
The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves
iron; and colours and the other objects of sense, although
themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the
eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who
is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful
may, although himself unmoving, move the universe.—If it
finally be objected that (on the Vedanta doctrine) there is
no room for a moving power as in consequence of the
oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place;
we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted
by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously
connected with Maya, which consists of name and form
presented by Nescience.—Hence motion can be reconciled
with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not
with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.
3. If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like
milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion
is due to intelligence).
Well, the Sankhya resumes, listen then to the following
instances.—As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own
nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and
as non-sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for
the benefit of mankind ; so the pradhana also, although non-
intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature
merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.
This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as
the adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not
observed in the case of merely non-intelligent things such
as chariots, &c., we infer that water and milk also move
only because they are directed by intelligent powers.
Scriptural passages, moreover (such as ‘ He who dwells in
[34] b b
37°
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
the water and within the water, who rules the water within, 5
Bri . Up. Ill, 7, 4; and, 4 By the command of that Akshara,
O Gargt, some rivers flow to the East, 5 &c., Bri . Up. Ill, 8,9),
declare that everything in this world which flows is directed
by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and water as
belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our
general principle 1 cannot be used to show that the latter is
too wide.—Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being
and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do
so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking
of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute
independence—for its flow depends on the declivity of the
soil and similar circumstances—or independently of an
intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is
present in all cases.—If, finally, our opponent should point
to Sutra II, 1, 2,4 as contradicting the present Sutra, we
remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of
ordinary experience that an effect may take place in itself
independently of any external instrumental cause; a con¬
clusion which does not contradict the doctrine, based on
Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord.
4. And because (the pradhana), on account of
there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no rela¬
tion ; (it cannot be active.)
The three gu/zas of the Sankhyas when in a state of equi¬
poise form the pradhana. Beyond the pradMna there
exists no external principle which could either impel the
pradhana to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul
(purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to—nor
restrains from—action. As therefore the pradhana stands
in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes
modify itself into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes
not. The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord,
1 Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence
of intelligence.—Sadhyapakshanikshiptatvazra sadhyavati pakshe
pravish/atvam eva tak ka sapakshanikshiptatvasyapy upalakshazzam,
anupanyaso na vyabhi&trabhumir ity avthah. An. Gi.
IT ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 5.
371
on the other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account
of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being con¬
nected with the power of illusion (maya).
5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies
itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into
milk); for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in
the female animal).
Let this be (the Sankhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs,
water, &c. independently of any other instrumental cause
transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk; so,
we assume, the pradhana also transforms itself into the
great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know
that grass transforms itself independently of any instru¬
mental cause; we reply, 4 Because no such cause is ob¬
served.’ For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly
should apply it to grass, &c. according to our liking, and
thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no
such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like
must be considered to be due to its own nature merely;
and we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the
pradhana is of the same kind.
To this we make the following reply.—The transformation
of the pradhana might be ascribed to its own nature merely
if we really could admit that grass modifies itself in the
manner stated by you; but we are unable to admit that,
since another instrumental cause is observed. How?
4 Because it does not exist elsewhere.’ For grass becomes
milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female
animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull.
If the transformation had no special cause, grass would
become milk even on other conditions than that of entering
a cow’s body. Nor would the circumstance of men not
being able to produce milk according to their liking prove
that there is no instrumental cause; for while some effects
can be produced by men, others result from divine action
only 1 . The fact, however, is that men ako are able, by
1 It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk
no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow’s
B b 2
37 2
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
applying a means in their power, to produce milk from
grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more
abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully
and thus obtain more milk from her.—For these reasons
the spontaneous modification of the pradhana cannot be
proved from the instance of grass and the like.
6 . Even if we admit (the Sankhya position refuted
in what precedes, it is invalidated by other ob¬
jections) on account of the absence of a purpose
(on the part of the pradhana).
Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the San-
khya’s) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the
preceding Sutra, viz. that the pradhana is spontaneously
active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection ‘on
account of the absence of a purpose/ For if the spontaneous
activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to
any thing else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding
principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and conse¬
quently your doctrine that the pradh&na is active in order
to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you
reply that the pradhana does not indeed regard any aiding
principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in
that case we must distinguish between the different pos¬
sible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the
soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoy¬
ment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally
incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain) 1 ? Moreover,
there would in that case be no opportunity for release 2 .
—If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be
purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the
body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the
omniscient Lord is active. Bha.
1 Anadheyatbayasya sukhadukhapraptiparihararfipati.yaya.dinyas-
yety artha^. An. Gi.
2 For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of
itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims—ex hypothesi—
only at the soul’s undergoing varied experience.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7.
373
state of release; moreover, there would then be no occasion
for the perception of sounds, &C . 1 —If both, then, on account
of the infinite number of the objects of pradhana to be
enjoyed (by the soul) 2 , there would be no opportunity for
final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be con¬
sidered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana ; for
neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially
pure soul can feel any desire.—If, finally, you should assume
the pradhctna to be active, because otherwise the power of
sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent
nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhana)
would be purposeless ; it would follow that, as the creative
power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more
than the soul’s power of sight does, the apparent world
would never come to an end, so that no final release of the
soul could take place 3 .—It is, therefore, impossible to
maintain that the pradhana enters on its activity for the
purposes of the soul.
7. And if you say (that the soul may move the
pradh&na) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one)
or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also (the
difficulty is not overcome).
Well then—the Sankhya resumes, endeavouring to defend
his position by parallel instances—let us say that, as some
lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing
the power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind
man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter
move; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron,
so the soul moves the pradhana.—Thus also, we reply, you
do not free your doctrine from all shortcomings ; for this
your new position involves an abandonment of your old
1 I. e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.
2 Tritiye * pi katipayajabdadyupalabdhir va samastatadupalabdhir
v& bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva mukti^ syad iti
manvano dvitiyaz# pratyaha ubhayarthateti. An. Gi.
8 The MSS. of Ananda Giri omit sawsaranu^edat; the Bh&-
mati’s reading is: Sarga^aktyanu^^edavad drz’kraktyanuM^edat.
374
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
position, according to which the pradhana is moving of
itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no
moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move
the pradhana ? A man, although lame, may make a blind
man move by means of words and the like ; but the soul
which is devoid of action and qualities cannot possibly put
forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves
the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves
the iron; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul
and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow. The
proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to the iron), is
not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the
adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence
the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really
parallel instances.—The pradhana then being non-intelligent
and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle
to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If
we attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of
capability (of being seen on the part of the pradhana, of
seeing on the part of the soul), the permanency of such
capability would imply the impossibility of final release.—
Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra)
the different alternatives connected with the absence of
purpose (on the pradhana’s part) have to be considered h—
The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of
the world, according to the Vedantins), is characterised by
non-activity inherent in its own nature, and, at the same
time, by moving power inherent in Miya and is thus
superior (to the soul of the Sankhyas).
8 . And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active)
because the relation of principal (and subordinate
matter) is impossible (between the three gu/zas).
For the following reason also activity on the part of the
pradhana is not possible.—The condition of the pradhana
1 On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhana’s
activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for the
soul’s enjoyment or for its release, &c.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9.
375
consists in the three guzzas, viz. goodness, passion, and
darkness, abiding in themselves in a state of equipoise
without standing to one another in the relation of mutual
superiority or inferiority. In that state the guzzas cannot
possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency
because thereby they would forfeit their essential character¬
istic, viz. absolute independence. And as there exists no
extraneous principle to stir up the guzzas, the production of
the great principle and the other effects—which would
require for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the
guzzas—is impossible.
9. And although another inference be made, (the
objections remain in force) on account of the (pra-
dh&na) being devoid of the power of intelligence.
But—the Sankhya resumes—we draw another inference,
so as to leave no room for the objection just stated. We do
not acknowledge the guzzas to be ch iracterised by absolute
irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof
for such an assumption. We rather infer the character¬
istics of the guzzas from those of their effects, presuming
that their nature must be such as to render the production
of the effects possible. Now the guzzas are admitted to be
of an unsteady nature; hence the guzzas themselves are
able to enter into the relation of mutual inequality, even
while they are in a state of equipoise.
Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above
which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly
arrangement of the world, &c., remain in force on account
of the pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence.
And if (to escape those objections) the Sankhya should
infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that
the primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an
antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent
cause of this multiform world would be nothing else but the
Vedantic doctrine of Brahman.—Moreover, if the guzzas
were capable of entering into the relation of mutual in¬
equality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two
376
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
things would happen; they would either not be in the con¬
dition of inequality on account of the absence of an opera¬
tive cause; or else, if they were in that condition, they
would always remain in it; the absence of an operative
cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the
doctrine would again be open to the objection stated
before 1 .
io. And moreover (the Sankhya doctrine) is ob¬
jectionable on account of its contradictions.
The doctrine of the Sankhyas, moreover, is full of contra¬
dictions. Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, some¬
times eleven 2 . In some places they teach that the subtle
elements of material things proceed from the great prin¬
ciple, in other places again that they proceed from self-
consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal
organs, sometimes of one only 3 . That their doctrine, more¬
over, contradicts Sruti, which teaches that the Lord is the
cause of the world, and Smrzti, based on vSruti, is well
known.—For these reasons also the Sankhya system is
objectionable.
Here the Sankhya again brings a countercharge.—The
system of the Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to
be objectionable ; for it does not admit that that which suffers
and that which causes suffering 4 are different classes of
things (and thereby renders futile the well-established dis¬
tinction of causes of suffering and suffering beings). For
1 Anantaro dosho mahadddikaryotpadayoga^. An. Gi.
2 In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon
as mere modifications of the sense of touch.
3 Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi,
ahankara, and manas.
4 Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal
rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is,
the context has necessitated its retention in some places.—The
sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world
in which the souls live.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, IO.
377
those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of every¬
thing and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also
that the two attributes of being that which causes suffering
and that which suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not
to different classes of beings). If, then, these two attributes
belong to one and the same Self, it never can divest itself of
them, and thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge
for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its
meaning. For—to adduce a parallel case—a lamp as long
as it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities
of giving heat and light. And if the Vedantin should
adduce the case of water with its waves, ripples, foam,
&C. 1 , we remark that there also the waves, &c. constitute
attributes of the water which remain permanently, although
they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into
the state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never
really destitute of waves, not any more than the lamp is
ever destitute of heat and light.—That that which causes
suffering, and that which suffers constitute different classes
of things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experi¬
ence. For (to consider the matter from a more general
point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired 2
are understood to be separate existences. If the object
of desire were not essentially different and separate from
the person desiring, the state of being desirous could not be
ascribed to the latter, because the object with reference to
which alone he can be called desiring would already essen¬
tially be established in him (belong to him). The latter
state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for
instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence
the latter never can stand in want of light; for want or
desire can exist only if the thing wanted or desired is not
yet obtained.
1 In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly
essential; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the
sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes
pass away while the substance remains.
2 ‘ Artha/ a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.
378
vedAnta-s^tras.
(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the
object of desire and the desiring person were not essentially
separate), so the object of desire also would cease to be an
object for the desiring person, and would be an object for
itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the
case ; for the two ideas (and terms), ‘ object of desire' and
‘ desiring person , 5 imply a relation (are correlative), and a
relation exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the
desiring person and the object of desire are separate.—The
same holds good with regard to what is not desired (object
of aversion ; anartha)and the non-desiring person (anarthin).
An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the de¬
siring person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvan¬
tage ; with both one person enters into relation by turns.
On account of the comparative paucity of the objects of
desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of
aversion, both may be comprised under the general term,
£ object of aversion . 5 Now, these objects of aversion we
mean when we use the term < causes of suffering , 5 while by
the term ‘ sufferer 5 we understand the soul which, being
one, enters into successive relations with both (i. e. the
objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the
causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self
(as the Vedanta teaches), it follows that final release is im¬
possible.—But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to
constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not
excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz.
wrong knowledge) may be removed.
All this reasoning—we, the Vedantins, reply—is futile,
because on account of the unity of the Self the relation,
whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the suf¬
ferer cannot exist (in the Self).—Our doctrine would be
liable to your objection if that which causes suffering and
that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same
Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and sub¬
ject. But they do not stand in that relation just because they
are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes,
such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither
burn nor illumine itself since it is one only; how can the
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IO.
379
one unchangeable Brahman enter with reference to itself into
the relation of cause of suffering and sufferer?—Where then,
it may be asked, does the relation discussed (which after all
cannot be denied altogether) exist ?—That, we reply, is not
difficult to see 1 . The living body which is the object of the
action of burning is the sufferer ; the sun, for instance, is
a cause of suffering (burning).—But, the opponent rejoins,
burning is a pain, and as such can affect an intelligent being
only, not the non-intelligent body; for if it were an affection
of the mere body, it would, on the destruction of the body,
cease of itself, so that it would be needless to seek for
means to make it cease.—But it is likewise not observed, we
reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is
burned and suffers pain.—Nor would you (the Sankhya)
also assume that the affection called burning belongs to a
mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit 2 a real connexion
of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion
impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the
soul 3 . Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how
then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a
sufferer and the causes of suffering ? If (as a last refuge) you
should maintain that the sattva-gu«a is that which suffers,
and the gu?za called passion that which causes suffering, we
again object, because the intelligent principle (the soul) can¬
not be really connected with these two 4 . And if you should
say that the soul suffers as it were because it leans towards 5 6
the sattva-gu^a, we point out that the employment of the
phrase, ‘as it were,’shows that the soul does not really suffer.
1 In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedantin
had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of
course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in
the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.
2 In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.
3 And that would be against the Sankhya dogma of the soul’s
essential purity.
4 So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart
from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.
6 Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti jankate
sattveti. An. Gi.
380
vedanta-s^tras.
If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not
object to the phrase ‘ as it were V For the amphisbena also
does not become venomous because it is ‘ a serpent as it
were 5 ( £ like a serpent 5 ), nor does the serpent lose its venom
because it is ‘like an amphisbena . 5 You must therefore
admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers
is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit
that, then my (the Veddntic) doctrine also is free from
objections 1 2 .
But perhaps you (the Sankhya) will say that, after all,
suffering (on the part of the soul) is real 3 . In that case,
however, the impossibility of release is all the more unde¬
niable 4 , especially as the cause of suffering (viz. the pra¬
dhana) is admitted to be eternal.—And if (to get out of this
difficulty) you maintain that, although the potentialities of
suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering
(on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet suffering, in
order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the two
—which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason,
viz. the non-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul—
and that hence, when that reason no longer exists, the con¬
junction of the two comes to an absolute termination,
whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes possible ;
we are again unable to accept your explanation, because
that on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu^a,
called Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.
1 For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.
2 The Sankhya Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedanta
doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known
from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and
things causing suffering.—The Vedantin in his turn endeavours to
show that on the Sankhya doctrine also the fact of suffering
remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real,
but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.
3 Not only ‘ suffering as it were/ as it had been called above.
4 For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive
knowledge on which—according to the Sankhya also—release
depends.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II. 38 1
And as 1 there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and
sinking of the influence of the particular gu/zas, there is also
no fixed rule for the termination of the cause which
effects the conjunction of soul and pradhana (i. e. non-dis¬
crimination) ; hence the disjunction of the two is uncer¬
tain, and so the Sankhyas cannot escape the reproach of
absence of final release resulting from their doctrine. To
the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release
being impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the
Self he acknowledges to be one only, and one thing cannot
enter into the relation of subject and object, and Scripture,
moreover, declares that the plurality of effects originates
from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the other
hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering
just as it is observed, and need neither object to it nor
refute it.
Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the
pradhana to be the cause of the world. We have now to
dispose of the atomic theory.
We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists
against the upholders of Brahman.—The VaLreshikas argue
as follows : The qualities which inhere in the substance con¬
stituting the cause originate qualities of the same kind in
the substance constituting the effect; we see, for instance,
that from white threads white cloth is produced, but do not
observe what is contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a
piece of cloth of a different colour). Hence, if the intelli¬
gent Brahman is assumed as the cause of the world, we
should expect to find intelligence inherent in the effect also,
viz. the world. But this is not the case, and consequently
the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.
—This reasoning the Sutrakara shows to be fallacious, on the
ground of the system of the VaLreshikas themselves.
11. Or (the world may originate from Brahman)
1 This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of
soul and pradhana may come to an end when the influence
of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of
Truth.
382
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
as the great and the long originate from the short
and the atomic.
The system of the VaLeshikas is the following:—The
atoms which possess, according to their special kind 1 , the
qualities of colour, &c., and which are of spherical form 2 ,
subsist during a certain period 3 without producing any
effects 4 . After that, the unseen principle (adrzsh/a), &c. 5 ,
acting as operative causes and conjunction constituting the
non-inherent cause 6 , they produce the entire aggregate of
effected things, beginning with binary atomic compounds.
At the same time the qualities of the causes (i.e. of the
simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects.
Thus, when two atoms produce a binary atomic compound,
the special qualities belonging to the simple atoms, such as
white colour, &c., produce a corresponding white colour in
the binary compound. One special quality, however, of the
simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce cor¬
responding sphericity in the binary compound; for the
forms of extension belonging to the latter are said to be
minuteness (a^utva) and shortness. And, again, when two
binary compounds combining produce a quaternary atomic
compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, &c., inherent in
the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities
in the quaternary compounds ; with the exception, however,
of the two qualities of minuteness and shortness. For it is
1 I. e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or air.
2 Parima^d/ala, spherical is the technical term for the specific
form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms
themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely
small spheres. Cp. Vais*. Sut. VII, 1, 20.
3 Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all the
atoms are isolated and motionless.
4 When the time for a new creation has come.
5 The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.
6 The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are the
constituent atoms, the non-inherent cause the conjunction of those
atoms, the operative causes the adr/sh/a and the Lord’s activity
which make them enter into conjunction.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I I.
383
admitted that the forms of extension belonging to quater¬
nary compounds are not minuteness and shortness, but
bigness (mahattva) and length. The same happens 1 when
many simple atoms or many binary compounds or a simple
atom and a binary compound combine to produce new
effects.
Well, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary
compounds are produced, which are minute and short, and
ternary compounds which are big and long, but not anything
spherical; or as from binary compounds, which are minute
and short, ternary compounds, &c., are produced which are
big and long, not minute and short; so this non-intelligent
world may spring from the intelligent Brahman. This is a
doctrine to which you—the Vai^eshika—cannot, on your
own principles, object.
Here the VaLreshika will perhaps come forward with the
following argumentation 2 . As effected substances, such as
binary compounds and so on, are engrossed by forms of
extension contrary to that of the causal substances, the
forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz. sphericity
and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects.
The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any
quality contrary to intelligence owing to which the intelli¬
gence inherent in the cause should not be able to originate
a new intelligence in the effect. For non-intelligence is not a
quality contrary to intelligence, but merely its negation.
As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel
one, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to
itself.
This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the
qualities of sphericity and so on, although existing in the
cause, do not produce corresponding effects, so it is with
1 I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the effect
depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the number
of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).
2 In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance
of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a funda¬
mental Vaheshika principle.
384
vedanta-sOtras.
intelligence also; so that the two cases are parallel so far.
Nor can the circumstance of the effects being engrossed by
a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of
sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to them¬
selves ; for the power of originating effects belongs to
sphericity, &c. before another form of extension begins
to exist. For it is admitted that the substance pro¬
duced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that
thereupon only (i. e. after that moment) its qualities begin
to exist. Nor, again, can it be said that sphericity, &c.
concentrate their activity on originating other forms of
extension 1 2 * * , and therefore do not originate forms of exten¬
sion belonging to the same class as their own ; for it is
admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other
causes; as the Sutras of Kazzabhu^* (Ka/zada) themselves
declare (Va is. Sut. VII, 1, 9, ‘Bigness is produced from
plurality inherent in the causes, from bigness of the cause
and from a kind of accumulation; 5 * * * * * * * * * * VII, 1, 10, ‘The con¬
trary of this (the big) is the minute; 5 VII, 1, 17, ‘ Thereby
length and shortness are explained 25 ).—Nor, again, can it
be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate
(like effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in
which they are supposed to stand to the effected substance),
while sphericity, &c. (not standing in a like proximity) do
not; for when a new substance or a new quality is origin-
1 I. e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.
2 The first of the three Sfttras quoted comprises, in the present text
of the Vaheshika-sfitras, only the following words, ‘ Kdrazzabahutva^
>6a the kz, of the Sutra implying, according to the commentators,
mahattva and pra^aya.—According to the Vaheshikas the form of
extension called ami, minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent
in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms from which the minute
binary atomic compound originates.—The form of extension called
mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva, i.e. the
plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting ‘big 5
thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound,
for instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms.
In other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others
to pra^aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upask&ra on Va is. Sht. VII,
1, 9; 10.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, II.
385
ated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same rela¬
tion of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance
in which they inhere). For these reasons the fact of
sphericity, &c. not originating like effects can be explained
from the essential nature of sphericity, &c. only, and the
same may therefore be maintained with regard to intelli¬
gence 1 . Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from
conjunction (sawyoga) there originate substances, &c. be¬
longing to a class different (from that to which conjunction
itself belongs), it follows that the doctrine of effects belong¬
ing to the same class as the causes from which they spring
is too wide. If you remark against this last argument that,
as we have to do at present with a substance (viz. Brah¬
man), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. con¬
junction) as a parallel case; we point out that at present
we only wish to explain the origination of effects belonging
to a different class in general. Nor is there any reason for
the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as
examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities.
Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a
parallel case for a substance (Vary. Sut. IV, 2, 2, ‘On
account of the conjunction of things perceptible and things
imperceptible being imperceptible the body is not com¬
posed of five elements ’). Just as the conjunction which
inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether
is not perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent
cause the five elements which are part of them perceptible,
part of them imperceptible, would itself be imperceptible ;
but, as a matter of fact, it is perceptible; hence it is not
composed of the five elements. Here conjunction is a
quality and the body a substance.—The origin of effects
different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been
already treated of under II, 1, 6.—Well then, this being so,
the matter has been settled there already (why then is it
again discussed here?)—Because, we reply, there we argued
1 I.e. if the Vabeshikas have to admit that it is the nature of
sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedantin also may
maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the non-
intelligent world.
[34] C c
386
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
against the Sankhya, and at present we have to do with
the Vabeshika.—But, already once before (II, i, 3) a line
of argument equally applicable to a second case was simply
declared to extend to the latter also ; (why then do you
not simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the
Sankhya are equally valid against the Vabeshika ?) —
Because here, we reply, at the beginning of the examina¬
tion of the Vabeshika system we prefer to discuss the
point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of
the Vabeshikas.
12. In both cases also (in the cases of the adrzsh/a
inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of
the atoms) is not (possible) ; hence absence of that
(viz. creation and pralaya).
The Sutrakara now proceeds to refute the doctrine of
atoms being the cause of the world.—This doctrine arises
in the following manner. We see that all ordinary sub¬
stances which consist of parts as, for instance, pieces of
cloth originate from the substances connected with them by
the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunc¬
tion co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We
thence draw the general conclusion that whatever consists
of parts has originated from those substances with which it
is connected by the relation of inherence, conjunction co¬
operating. That thing now at which the distinction of whole
and parts stops and which marks the limit of division into
minuter parts is the atom.—This whole world, with its
mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts ; because
it is composed of parts it has a beginning and an end 1 ; an
effect may not be assumed without a cause; therefore the
atoms are the cause of the world. Such is Ka/zada’s
doctrine.—As we observe four elementary substances con¬
sisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind), we have
to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms
marking the limit of subdivision into minuter parts can-
1 Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of
parts.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12.
387
not be divided themselves; hence when the elements are
destroyed they can be divided down to atoms only; this
state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the
pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After
that when the time for creation comes, motion (karman)
springs up in the aerial atoms. This motion which is due
to the unseen principle 1 joins the atom in which it resides to
another atom; thus binary compounds, &c. are produced,
and finally the element of air. In a like manner are pro¬
duced fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus
the whole world originates from atoms. From the qualities
inhering in the atoms the qualities belonging to the binary
compounds are produced, just as the qualities of the cloth
result from the qualities of the threads.—Such, in short, is
the teaching of the followers of Ka;zada.
This doctrine we controvert in the following manner.—It
must be admitted that the atoms when they are in a state
of isolation require action (motion) to bring about their
conjunction; for we observe that the conjunction of threads
and the like is effected by action. Action again, which is
itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which it is
brought about; for unless some such cause exists, no original
motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative
cause is assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some
cause analogous to seen causes, such as endeavour or impact.
But in that case original motion could not occur at all in
the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at the time, im¬
possible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a
quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists
then. For the quality of the soul called endeavour origi¬
nates when the soul is connected with the internal organ
which abides in the body. The same reason precludes the
assumption of other seen causes such as impact and the
like. For they all are possible only after the creation of
the world has taken place, and cannot therefore be the
1 Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms with
the souls to which merit and demerit belong.—Adrzsh/apeksham
adnsh/avatkshetra^«asa/^yogapeksham iti yavat. An. Gi.
C c 2
3§8
VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.
causes of the original action (by which the world is
produced).—If, in the second place, the unseen principle is
assumed as the cause of the original motion of the atoms,
we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as
inhering in the soul or in the atom ? In both cases it can¬
not be the cause of motion in the atoms, because it is non-
intelligent. For, as we have shown above in our examina¬
tion of the Sankhya system, a non-intelligent thing which
is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself
either act or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be
the guiding principle of the adrzsh/a because at the time of
pralaya its intelligence has not yet arisen 1 . If, on the other
hand, the unseen principle is supposed to inhere in the soul,
it cannot be the cause of motion in the atoms, because there
exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you say that
the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected
with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity
of connexion 2 , continuity of action, as there is no other
restricting principle.—Hence, there being no definite cause
of action, original action cannot take place in the atoms;
there being no action, conjunction of the atoms which
depends on action cannot take place; there being no con¬
junction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the formation
of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.
How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with
another to be imagined ? Is it to be total interpenetration
of the two or partial conjunction? If the former, then no
increase of bulk could take place, and consequently atomic
size only would exist; moreover, it would be contrary to
what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place
between substances having parts (prade^a). If the latter,
it would follow that the atoms are composed of parts.—Let
then the atoms be imagined to consist of parts.—If so,
imagined things being unreal, the conjunction also of the
atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the non-
1 According to the Vafreshikas intelligence is not essential to
the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when the soul
is joined to an internal organ.
2 The soul being all-pervading.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 3 .
389
inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent
causes effected substances such as binary compounds, &c.
could not originate. And just as at the time of the first
creation motion of the atoms leading to their conjunction
could not take place, there being no cause of such motion;
thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action could
take place leading to their separation, since for that occur¬
rence also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor
could the unseen principle be adduced as the cause, since its
purport is to effect enjoyment (of reward and punishment
on the part of the soul), not to bring about the pralaya.
There being then no possibility of action to effect either the
conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither conjunc¬
tion nor separation would actually take place, and hence
neither creation nor pralaya of the world.—For these reasons
the doctrine of the atoms being the cause of the world must
be rejected.
13. And because in consequence of samaviya
being admitted a regressus in infinitum results
from parity of reasoning.
You (the Vabeshika) admit that a binary compound which
originates from two atoms, while absolutely different from
them, is connected with them by the relation of inherence;
but on that assumption the doctrine of the atoms being the
general cause cannot be established, £ because parity involves
here a retrogressus ad infinitum.’ For just as a binary
compound which is absolutely different from the two con¬
stituent atoms is connected with them by means of the
relation of inherence (samavaya), so the relation of inherence
itself being absolutely different from the two things which
it connects, requires another relation of inherence to connect
it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases.
For this second relation of inherence again, a third relation
of inherence would have to be assumed and so on ad
infinitu m.—But—the Vabeshika is supposed to reply—we
are conscious of the so-called samavaya relation as eternally
connected with the things between which it exists, not as
390
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
either non-connected with them or as depending on another
connexion; we are therefore not obliged to assume another
connexion, and again another, and so on, and thus to allow
ourselves to be driven into a regressus in infinitum.—
Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it would involve the
admission that conjunction (sa;/zyoga) also as being eternally
connected with the things which it joins does, like samavaya,
not require another connexion 1 . If you say that conjunc¬
tion does require another connexion because it is a different
thing 2 , we reply that then samavaya also requires another
connexion because it is likewise a different thing. Nor can
you say that conjunction does require another connexion
because it is a quality (gu/za), and samavaya does not
because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference)
the reason for another connexion being required is the same
in both cases 3 , and not that which is technically called
£ quality 5 is the cause (of another connexion being required) 4 .
—For these reasons those who acknowledge samavaya to be
a separate existence are driven into a regressus in infini¬
tum, in consequence of which, the impossibility of one term
involving the impossibility of the entire series, not even the
origination of a binary compound from two atoms can be
accounted for.—For this reason also the atomic doctrine is
inadmissible.
14. And on account of the permanent existence
(of activity or non-activity).
Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either
1 Which is inadmissible on Vaireshika principles, because sa m-
yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by
samavaya.
2 Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The
argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires
another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each
other in the way of conjunction.
3 Viz. the absolute difference of samavaya and sawyoga from
the terms which they connect.
4 Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavaya relation
to their substrates.
II ADHYAyA, 2 PADA, 15 . 39 I
essentially active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both
or neither; there being no fifth alternative. But none of the
four alternatives stated is possible. If they were essentially
active, their activity would be permanent so that no pralaya
could take place. If they were essentially non-active, their
non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could take
place. Their being both is impossible because self-con¬
tradictory. If they were neither, their activity and non¬
activity would have to depend on an operative cause, and
then the operative causes such as the adrzshfe being in
permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity
would result; or else the adrzshfe and so on not being taken
as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent
non-activity on the part of the atoms.—For this reason also
the atomic doctrine is untenable.
15. And on account of the atoms having colour,
&c., the reverse (of the Vaiseshika tenet would take
place); as thus it is observed.
Let us suppose, the Vaueshikas say, all substances com¬
posed of parts to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit
will finally be reached beyond which the process of disin¬
tegration cannot be continued. What constitutes that limit
are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent), belong to
four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c.,
and are the originating principles of this whole material
world with its colour, form, and other qualities.
This fundamental assumption of the Vaheshikas we
declare to be groundless because from the circumstance of
the atoms having colour and other qualities there would
follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and perma¬
nency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate
cause, they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary
experience teaches that whatever things possess colour and
other qualities are, compared to their cause, gross and non¬
permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is gross compared
to the threads of which it consists, and non-permanent;
and the threads again are non-permanent and gross com-
392
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
pared to the filaments of which they are made up.
Therefore the atoms also which the Vakeshikas admit to
have colour, &c. must have causes compared to which
they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason
also which Kazzada gives for the permanence of the atoms
(IV, i, i, ‘that which exists without having a cause is
permanent ’) does not apply at all to the atoms because, as
we have shown just now, the atoms are to be considered as
having a cause.—The second reason also which Kazzada
brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in
IV, i, 4, ‘the special negation implied in the term non¬
eternal would not be possible 1 ’ (if there did not exist some¬
thing eternal, viz. the atoms), does not necessarily prove the
permanency of the atoms; for supposing that there exists
not any permanent thing, the formation of a negative com¬
pound such as ‘non-eternal’ is impossible. Nor does the
existence of the word ‘ non-permanent 5 absolutely pre¬
suppose the permanency of atoms ; for there exists (as we
Vedantins maintain) another permanent ultimate Cause,
viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of anything be
established merely on the ground of a word commonly
being used in that sense, since there is room for common
use only if word and matter are well-established by some
other means of right knowledge.—The third reason also
given in the Vak. Sutras (IV, i, 5) for the permanency of
the atoms (‘and Nescience’) is unavailing. For if we
explain that Sutra to mean ‘the non-perception of those
actually existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience,’
it would follow that the binary atomic compounds also are
permanent 2 . And if we tried to escape from that difficulty
by including (in the explanation of the Sutra as given above)
the qualification ‘there being absence of (originating) sub-
1 Our Vakeshika-sutras read ‘ pratishedhabhava^;' but as all
MSS. of -Sankara have ‘ pratishedhabhava^ * I have kept the latter
reading and translated according to Anandagiri's explanation:
K&ryam anityam iti karye vkeshato nityatvanishedho na sy&d yadi
k&razze*py anityatvam ato*zzunaz?z k&razz&nazzz nityateti shtrartha^.
2 Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary aggregates,
the so-called trasare/zus, constituting the minima perceptibilia.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 6 .
393
stances/ then nothing else but the absence of a cause would
furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and
as that reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, i,
i) the Sutra IV, i, 5 would be a useless restatement.—Well,
then (the Vai^eshika might say), let us understand by
‘Nescience’ (in the Sutra) the impossibility of conceiving a
third reason of the destruction (of effects), in addition to
the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the
destruction of the causal substance; which impossibility
involves the permanency of the atoms 1 .—There is no neces¬
sity, we reply, for assuming that a thing when perishing
must perish on account of either of those two reasons.
That assumption would indeed have to be made if it were
generally admitted that a new substance is produced only
by the conjunction of several causal substances. But if it
is admitted that a causal substance may originate a new
substance by passing over into a qualified state after having
previously existed free from qualifications, in its pure
generality, it follows that the effected substance may be
destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the hard¬
ness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire 2 .—Thus there
would result, from the circumstance of the atoms having
colour, &c., the opposite of what the Vahreshikas mean.
For this reason also the atomic doctrine cannot be main¬
tained.
16. And as there are difficulties in both cases.
Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch,
and is gross; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine ;
fire has colour and touch, and is finer yet; air is finest of
all, and has the quality of touch only. The question now
arises whether the atoms constituting the four elements are
to be assumed to possess the same greater or smaller
1 As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated or
destroyed.
2 This according to the Ved&nta view. If atoms existed they
might have originated from avidyd by a mere parbz&ma and might
again be dissolved into avidyd, without either disintegration or
destruction of their cause taking place.
394
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
number of qualities as the respective elements.—Either
assumption leads to unacceptable consequences. For if we
assume that some kinds of atoms have more numerous
qualities, it follows that their solid size (murti) will be
increased thereby, and that implies their being atoms no
longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place
without a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our
observations concerning effected material bodies.—If, on the
other hand, we assume, in order to save the equality of
atoms of all kinds, that there is no difference in the number
of their qualities, we must either suppose that they have all
one quality only; but in that case we should not perceive
touch in fire nor colour and touch in water, nor taste,
colour, and touch in earth, since the qualities of the effects
have for their antecedents the qualities of the causes. Or
else we must suppose all atoms to have all the four quali¬
ties ; but in that case we should necessarily perceive what
we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in water, smell and
taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air.—Hence on this
account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be unac¬
ceptable.
17. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted
(by any authoritative persons) it is to be disregarded
altogether.
While the theory of the pradhana being the cause of the
world has been accepted by some adherents of the Veda—
as, for instance, Manu—with a view to the doctrines of the
effect existing in the cause already, and so on, the atomic
doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of authority
in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded
entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.
There are, moreover, other objections to the Vaheshika
doctrine.—The Vaheshikas assume six categories, which
constitute the subject-matter of their system, viz. substance,
quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence.
These six categories they maintain to be absolutely dif¬
ferent from each other, and to have different characteristics;
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I 7 .
395
just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another.
Side by side with this assumption they make another which
contradicts the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c.
have the attribute of depending on substance. But that is
altogether inappropriate; for just as ordinary things, such
as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being absolutely
different from each other do not depend on each other, so
the qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from sub¬
stance, cannot depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities,
&c. depend on substance; then it follows that, as they are
present where substance is present, and absent where it is
absent, substance only exists, and, according to its various
forms, becomes the object of different terms and conceptions
(such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for instance,
according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the
object of various conceptions and names. But this latter
alternative would involve the acceptation of the Sankhya
doctrine 1 and the abandonment of the Vai^eshika stand¬
point.—But (the VaLreshika may say) smoke also is different
from fire and yet it is dependent on it.—True, we reply;
but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire from the
fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance
and quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived; for
when we are conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or
a blue lotus, the substance is in each case cognised by means
of the quality; the latter therefore has its Self in the sub¬
stance. The same reasoning applies to action, generality,
particularity, and inherence.
If you (the Vaueshika) say that qualities, actions, &c.
(although not non-different from substances) may yet
depend on the latter because substances and qualities stand
in the relation of one not being able to exist without the
other (ayutasiddhi 2 ); we point out that things which are
1 The Sankhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as
being the pradhana in various forms.—There is no need of
assuming with Govindananda that by the Sankhya of the text we
have to understand the Vedanta.
2 Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina^yad aparamtam evava-
tish/^ate tav ayutasiddhau yathavayavavayavinau.
396
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or non¬
separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none
of these alternatives agrees with VaLreshika principles. For
the first alternative contradicts your own assumptions ac¬
cording to which the cloth originating from the threads
occupies the place of the threads only, not that of the cloth,
while the qualities of the cloth, such as its white colour,
occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the threads.
So the Vafyeshika-sfitras say (I, i, io), ‘ Substances originate
another substance and qualities another quality.’ The
threads which constitute the causal substance originate the
effected substance, viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the
threads, such as white colour, &c., produce in the cloth new
corresponding qualities. But this doctrine is clearly contra¬
dicted by the assumption of substance and quality being
non-separate in place.—If, in the second place, you explain
ajaitasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also
that, for instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would
be ayutasiddha.—And if, finally, you explain it to mean
£ non-separation in character,’ it is impossible to make any
further distinction between the substance and the quality, as
then quality is conceived as being identical with substance.
Moreover, the distinction which the Vaii'eshikas make
between conjunction (sa^yoga) as being the connexion of
things which can exist separately, and inherence (samav&ya)
as being the connexion of things which are incapable of
separate existence is futile, since the cause which exists
before the effect 1 cannot be said to be incapable of separate
existence. Perhaps the Vau-eshika will say that his defi¬
nition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavaya
is the connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is
incapable of separate existence. But this also is of no
avail; for as a connexion requires two terms, the effect as
long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be con¬
nected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing
to say that the effect enters into the connexion after it has
begun to exist; for if the Vaueshika admits that the effect
1 The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavaya.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 7 .
397
may exist previous to its connexion with the cause, it is
no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of separate existence), and
thereby the principle that between effect and cause con¬
junction and disjunction do not take place is violated 1 .
And 2 just as conjunction, and not samavaya, is the con¬
nexion in which every effected substance as soon as it has
been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as
ether, &c.—although no motion has taken place on the part
of the effected substance—so also the connexion of the
effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not sama¬
vaya.
Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion,
samavaya or sa^yoga, apart from the things which it con¬
nects. If it should be maintained that sa/^yoga and sama¬
vaya have such an existence because we observe that there
are names and ideas of them in addition to the names and
ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and
the same thing may be the subject of several names and
ideas if it is considered in its relations to what lies without
it. Devadatta although being one only forms the object of
many different names and notions according as he is con¬
sidered in himself or in his relations to others ; thus he is
thought and spoken of as man, Brahma^a, learned in the
Veda, generous, boy, young man, old man, father, son,
grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again, one and the
same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with,
spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred,
or thousand, &c. Analogously, two connected things are
not only conceived and denoted as connected things, but
in addition constitute the object of the ideas and terms
‘conjunction’ or ‘inherence/ which however do not prove
1 If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion
with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer
samavaya but sa^yoga; and that contradicts a fundamental Vahe-
shika principle.
2 This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions
which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered
conjunctions.
39§
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
themselves to be separate entities.—Things standing thus,
the non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c.),
which entities would have to be established on the ground
of perception, follows from the fact of their non-perception.
—Nor, again 1 , does the circumstance of the word and idea
of connexion having for its object the things connected
involve the connexion’s permanent existence, since we have
already shown above that one thing may, on account of its
relations to other things, be conceived and denoted in dif¬
ferent ways.
Further 2 , conjunction cannot take place between the
atoms, the soul, and the internal organ, because they have
no parts; for we observe that conjunction takes place only
of such substances as consist of parts. If the Vaueshika
should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may be
assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction),
we remark that the assumption of actually non-existing
things would involve the result that anything might be
established; for there is no restrictive rule that only such
and such non-existing things—whether contradictory to
reason or not—should be assumed and not any other, and
assumptions depend on one’s choice only and may be carried
to any extent. If we once allow assumptions, there is no
reason why there should not be assumed a further hundred
or thousand things, in addition to the six categories assumed
by the VaLfeshikas. Anybody might then assume anything,
and we could neither stop a compassionate man from
assuming that this transmigratory world which is the cause
of so much misery to living beings is not to be, nor a
malicious man from assuming that even the released souls
are to enter on a new cycle of existences.
1 A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent
existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence
of the connexion.
2 It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into
sazwyoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/rcyoga of the soul
with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter,
and that sazrcyoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of
cognition.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 7 .
399
Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound,
which consists of parts, should be connected with the simple
indivisible atoms by an intimate connexion (sa^lesha)
any more than they can thus be connected with ether; for
between ether and earth, &c. there does not exist that kind
of intimate connexion which exists, for instance, between
wood and varnish 1 .
Let it then be said (the VaLeshiko, resumes) that the
samavaya relation must be assumed, because otherwise
the relation of that which abides and that which forms the
abode—which relation actually exists between the effected
substance and the causal substance—is not possible.—That
would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence ; for
only when the separateness of cause and effect is established,
the relation of the abode and that which abides can be
established ; and only when the latter relation is esta¬
blished, the relation of separateness can be established.
For the Vedantins acknowledge neither the separateness
of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in the
relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their
doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the cause 2 .—
Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite exten¬
sion), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we
acknowledge regions of space 3 , whether those be six or
eight or ten, and consequently they cannot be permanent;
conclusions contrary to the VaLeshika doctrine of the indi¬
visibility and permanency of the atoms.—If the VaLeshika
replies that those very parts which are owing to the exist¬
ence of the different regions of space are his (indestructible)
1 Ekasambandhyakarsha/ze yatra sambandhyantarakarshawa^
tatra samlesha^, sa tu savayav&nazrc ^atukash/Mdinaw dnsh/o
na tu niravayavai^ savayavanam, ato dvyamikasya savayavasya
niravayavena parama^una sa nopapadyate. Brahmavidyabh.
2 In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically
recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause and
the effect is accounted for.
3 For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern
end, &c.
400
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
atoms; we deny that because all things whatever, forming
a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are
capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is
reached. Earth—which is, in comparison with a binary com¬
pound, the grossest thing of all—undergoes decomposition ;
so do the substances following next which belong to the
same class as earth ; so does the binary compound ; and so
does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest thing of
all) still belongs to the same general class (i. e. matter) with
earth, &c. The objection (which the Vaheshika might pos¬
sibly raise here again) that things can be decomposed only
by the separation of their parts 1 , we have already disposed of
above, where we pointed out that decomposition may take
place in a manner analogous to the melting of ghee. Just as
the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is destroyed in con¬
sequence of those substances being rendered liquid by their
contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all
the while; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be
decomposed by their passing back into the indifferenced
condition of the highest cause. In the same way the origi¬
nation of effects also is brought about not merely in the
way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for
instance, and water originate effects such as sour milk and
ice without there taking place any conjunction of parts.
It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by
very weak arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural
passages which declare the Lord to be the general cause, and
is not accepted by any of the authorities taking their stand
on Scripture, such as Manu and others. Hence it is to be
altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a
regard for their own spiritual welfare.
18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates
with its two causes, (there takes place) non-estab¬
lishment of those (two aggregates).
The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the
1 And that on that account the atoms which he considers as the
ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 8 . 401
VaLreshikas cannot be accepted have been stated above.
That doctrine may be called semi-destructive (or semi-
nihilistic 1 ). That the more thorough doctrine which teaches
universal non-permanency is even less worthy of being
taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.
That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due
either to the difference of the views (maintained by Buddha
at different times), or else to the difference of capacity on
the part of the disciples (of Buddha). Three principal
opinions may, however, be distinguished; the opinion of
those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists,
sarvastitvavadin); the opinion of those who maintain that
thought only is real (Idealists, vi^anavadin); and the
opinion of those who maintain that everything is void (un¬
real; Nihilists, .runyavidin 2 ).—We first controvert those
1 Because according to their opinion difference of size constitutes
difference of substance, so that the continuous change of size in
animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of old
and the continual origination of new substances.
2 The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively
from the commentaries on the £ankarabhashya, and no attempt
has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts
of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha
books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the
Bauddha chapter of the Sarvadarsa«asaz»graha.—The Nihilists are
the Madhyamikas; the Idealists are the YogaMras; the Sautran-
tikas and the Vaibhashikas together constitute the class of the
Realists.—I subjoin the account given of those sects in the Brah-
mavidyabhara^a.—Buddhasya hi madhyamika-yoga/Sara-sautran-
tika-vaibhashikasam^aka^ ^atvara^ sishyaA Tatra buddhena
prathamazrc yan prati sarva?/z sunyam ity upadish/aw te madhya-
mik&s te hi guru«a yathokta/ra tathaiva sraddhaya grz'hitavanta iti
krftva napakrfsh/a>^ punas ka taduktasyarthasya buddhyanusa-
re/zakshepasyakn’tatvan notkrzsh/abuddhaya iti madhyamika^.
Anyais tu sishyair guru^a sarvasunyatva upadish/e ^anatiriktasya
sarvasya sunyatvam astu named guruktir yoga iti bauddai^ pari-
bhashitopeta^ tad upari £a ^Mnasya tu sunyatvaw na sawbhavati
tathatve ^agadandhyaprasangat sunyasiddher apy asawbhava^ keti
buddhamate a/$aratvena paribhashita akshepo*pi krz’ta iti yoga-
kara/i, vi^anamatrastitvavadina/^. Tadanantaram anyais sishyaiA
[34] D d
402
VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
who maintain that everything, external as well as internal, is
real. What is external is either element (bhftta) or elementary
(bhautika); what is internal is either mind (kitta) or mental
(£aitta). The elements are earth,water, and so on ; elemental
are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye and the other
sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three
elements arise from the aggregation of the four different
kinds of atoms ; the atoms of earth being hard, those of
water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile.—The
inward world consists of the five so-called ‘groups’ (skan-
dha), the group of sensation (rupaskandha), the group of
knowledge (vi^anaskandha), the group of feeling (vedand-
skandha), the group of verbal knowledge (sam^zzaskandha),
and the group of impressions (saz^skaraskandha ) 1 ; which
pratitisiddhasya kathaw .mnyatvazzz vaktu m jakyam ato ^anavad
vahydrtho^pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva so*stu, parazzz tu so
.*numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathangikrz’tyaivazzz jishyamatim
anusrz’tya kiyatparyantazzz sfitrazzz bhavishyatiti tai^ przsh/am atas
te sautrantika^. Anye punar yady ayazzz gha/a iti pratitibalad
vahyo^rtha upeyate tarhi tasyd eva pratiter aparokshatvat sa
kathazzz paroksho*to vahyo^rtho na pratyaksha iti bhasha viruddh-
ety akshipann atas te vaibhashikaA
1 The rupaskandha comprises the senses and their objects,
colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here
re-appear as ^aittika on account of their connexion with thought.
Their objects likewise are classed as ^aittika in so far as they are
perceived by the senses.—The vi^wanaskandha comprises the
series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ity alayavi^anapravaha^),
according to all commentators ; and in addition, according to the
Brahmavidyabhara/za, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate,
of external things (savikalpakazzz nirvikalpakazzz £a pravrz'ttivi^a-
nasam^itam).—The vedanaskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.
—The sam^askandha comprises the cognition of things by their
names (gaur a^va ityaduabdasam^alpitapratyaya^, An. Gi.; gaur
a^va ityevazzz n&mavmsh/asavikalpakai pratyaya/^, Go. An.; samgna
ya^adattadipadatadullekht savikalpapratyayo va, dvitiyapakshe
vi^anapadena savikalpapratyayo na grahya^, Brahmavidyabh.).
The sawskaraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma
and adharma.—Compare also the Bhamatf.—The vi^anaskandha
is £itta, the other skandhas £aitta.
II ADHVAYA, 2 PADA, 1 8 .
403
taken together constitute the basis of all personal exist¬
ence \
With reference to this doctrine we make the following
remarks.—Those two aggregates, constituting two different
classes, and having two different causes which the Bauddhas
assume, viz. the aggregate of the elements and elementary
things whose cause the atoms are, and the aggregate of the
five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on Baud-
dha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained
how the aggregates are brought about. For the parts con¬
stituting the (material) aggregates are devoid of intelligence,
and the kindling (abhi^valana) of intelligence depends on an
aggregate of atoms having been brought about previously 1 2 .
And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelli¬
gent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord,
which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can
the atoms and skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on
their own account; for that would imply their never ceasing
to be active 3 . Nor can the cause of aggregation be looked
for in the so-called abode (i. e. the alayavi^ana-pravaha,
the train of self-cognitions); for the latter must be described
either as different from the single cognitions or as not dif¬
ferent from them. (In the former case it is either permanent,
and then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the
Vedantins ; or non-permanent;) then being admitted to be
momentary merely, it cannot exercise any influence and
cannot therefore be the cause of the motion of the atoms 4 .
1 It has to be kept in view that the sarvastitvavadins as well as
the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (kshamkatva),
the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground
controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.
2 Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of
an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.
3 In consequence of which no release could take place.
4 The Brahmavidyabhara/za explains the last clause—from ksha-
zzikatva/fc fa —somewhat differently: Api fa paramazzunam api
kshamkatvabhyupagam&n melanazzz na sambhavati, paramazzunaw
melanazzz paramazzukriyadhinam, tatha fa svakriyazzz prati parama-
zzunazzz kara/zatvat kriyapurvakshazze paramamibhir bhavyam, kriya
D d 2
404
VEDANTA-SfJTRAS.
(And in the latter case we are not further advanced than
before.)—For all these reasons the formation of aggregates
cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there
would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which
presupposes those aggregates.
19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates
maybe explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing
in the relation of mutual causality; we say ‘ No/
because they merely are the efficient causes of the
origin (of the immediately subsequent links).
Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle
of the nature either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul,
under whose influence the formation of aggregates could
take place, yet the course of mundane existence is rendered
possible through the mutual causality 1 of Nescience and
so on, so that we need not look for any other combining
principle.
The series beginning with Nescience comprises the fol¬
lowing members : Nescience, impression, knowledge, name
and form, the abode of the six, touch, feeling, desire,
activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation,
pain, mental affliction, and the like 2 . All these terms con-
jrayataya kriyaksha^e^pi tesham avasthanam apekshitam eva m
melanakshane*pi, nahi melanajrayasyabhave melanarupa pravrz'ttir
upapadyate, tatha ka, sthiraparamamisadhyfi melanarftpa pravn'tti^
katha m tesham ksha^ikatve bhavet.—Ananda Giri also divides and
translates differently from the translation in the text.
1 The karaTzatv&t of -Sankara explains the pratyayatvat of the
Sutra; \axyam praty ayate ^anakatvena gakkhaX\.
2 The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of
the terms of this series.—The following is the substance of the
comment of the Brahmavidyabhara^a: Nescience is the error of
considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent,
pure, &c. — Impression (affection, sa^skara) comprises desire,
aversion, &c., and the activity caused by them. — Knowledge
(vign&na) is the self-consciousness (aham ity alayavi^Mnasya
vrfftilabha^) springing up in the embryo.—Name and form is the
rudimentary flake- or bubble-like condition of the embryo.—The
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 9 .
405
stitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the
Bauddha system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length.
They are, moreover, all acknowledged as existing, not by
the Bauddhas only, but by the followers of all systems.
And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming uninterrupted
chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like water¬
wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute
bodies and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such
Nescience and so on could not take place.
This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to
accept, because it merely assigns efficient causes for the
origination of the members of the series, but does not
intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggre¬
gates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made
above that the existence of aggregates must needs be
inferred from the existence of Nescience and so on, we
point out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so
on cannot exist without aggregates and hence require the
existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause for
the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already
shown—when examining the VaLeshika doctrine—that the
formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for even on
the assumption of permanent atoms and individual souls in
abode of the six (sha^/ayatana) is the further developed stage of
the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses.—
Touch (spai\ya) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the
embryo’s part.—Feeling (vedana) the sensations of pleasure and
pain resulting therefrom.—Desire (trzsh/za) is the wish to enjoy
the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones.—Activity
(upadana) is the effort resulting from desire.—Birth is the passing
out from the uterus.—Species (g&ti) is the class of beings to which
the new-born creature belongs.—Decay (^ara).—Death (marazzam)
is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die
(mumftrsha).—Grief (soka) the frustration of wishes connected
therewith.—Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that ac¬
count.—Pain (du^kha) is such pain as caused by the five senses.—
Durmanas is mental affliction.—The ‘ and the like ’ implies death,
the departure to another world and the subsequent return from
there.
406
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
which the adrzsh/a abides 1 ; how much less then are aggre¬
gates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not
connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i. e.
souls), and that which abides in them (the adrzsh/a).—Let
us then assume (the Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c.
themselves are the efficient cause of the aggregate.—But
how—we ask—can they be the cause of that without which
—as their abode—they themselves are not capable of exist¬
ence? Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sawsara
the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain,
and hence also Nescience, and so on, which abide in those
aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume
either that each aggregate necessarily produces another
aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled
rule, it may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the
former case a human body could never pass over into that
of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions; in
the latter case a man might in an instant be turned into an
elephant or a god and again become a man ; either of which
consequences would be contrary to your system.—Moreover,
that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is
formed is. according to your doctrine, not a permanent
enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and
cannot be desired by anything else; hence final release also
must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself
A # A A
1 Ananda Giri and Go. Ananda explain : Ajrayajrayibhftteshv
iti bhoktrzVkeshazzam adrzsh/ajrayeshv ity artha^.—The Brahma-
vidyabharazza says : Nityeshv ajrayajrayibhftteshv azzushv abhyupa-
gamyamaneshu bhoktrzshu ^a satsv ity anvaya^. Ajrayajrayibhft-
teshv ity asyopakaryopakarakabhavaprapteshv ity arthaA—And with
regard to the subsequent ajrayajrayijftnyeshu: ajrayajrayitvajft-
nyeshu, ayazzz bhava^, sthireshu paramazzushu yadanvaye parama-
zzftnazzz saz/zghatapatti^ yadvyatireke ^a na tad upakarakam upakar-
ya h paramazzava/fc yena tatkrz’to bhoga^ prarthyate sa tatra karteti
grahituzzz jakyate, kshazzikeshu tu paramazzushu anvayavyatireka-
grahasyanekakshazzasadhyasyasazzzbhavan nopakaryopakarakabhavo
nirdharayitu m jakya^.—Ananda Giri remarks on the latter: Adrz-
sh/ajrayakartrzrahityam ahajrayeti. Another reading appears to be
ajayajrayajftnyeshu.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 20. 407
only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If
a being desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be
conceived as permanently existing up to the time of enjoy¬
ment and release, and that would be contrary to your
doctrine of general impermanency.—There may therefore
exist a causal relation between the members of the series
consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a
permanent enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on
that ground the existence of aggregates.
20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between
Nescience, &c.), because on the origination of the
subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.
We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand
in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they can¬
not be made to account for the existence of aggregates; we
are now going to prove that they cannot even be considered
as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series
to which they belong.
Those who maintain that everything has a momentary
existence only admit that when the thing existing in the
second moment 1 enters into being the thing existing in the
first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is impossible
to establish between the two things the relation of cause and
effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases
or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of
non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary
existence.—Let it then be said that the former momentary
existence when it has reached its full development becomes
the cause of the later momentary existence.—That also is
impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed
existence exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion
that it is connected with a second moment (which contra¬
dicts the doctrine of universal momentariness).—Then let
the mere existence of the antecedent entity constitute its
1 Bauddhanaw kshawapadena gha/adir eva padartho vyavahriyate
na tu tadatirikta/^ ka^it ksha^o nama kalo*sti. Brahmavidylbh.
408
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
causal energy.—That assumption also is fruitless, because we
cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not imbued
with the nature of the cause (i. e. in which the nature of the
cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the
nature of the cause does continue to exist in the effect is im¬
possible (on the Bauddha doctrine), as that would involve the
permanency of the cause, and thus necessitate the abandon¬
ment of the doctrine of general non-permanency.—Nor can it
be admitted that the relation of cause and effect holds good
without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the effect;
for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all cases \—
Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which the
Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing’s own form or
another state of it, or an altogether different thing. But
none of these alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha
principles. If, in the first place, origination and cessation
constituted the form of a thing, it would follow that the
word ‘ thing 5 and the words ‘ origination 5 and ‘ cessation ’
are interchangeable (which is not the case).—Let then,
secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed,
in consequence of which the terms ‘ origination ’ and 6 cessa¬
tion ’ may denote the initial and final states of that which in
the intermediate state is called thing.—In that case, we
reply, the thing will be connected with three moments, viz.
the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so that the
doctrine of general momentariness will have to be abandoned.
—Let then, as the third alternative, origination and cessation
be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo
is from a horse.—That too cannot be, we reply; for it would
lead to the conclusion that the thing, because altogether
disconnected with origination and cessation, is everlasting.
And the same conclusion would be led up to, if we under¬
stood by the origination and cessation of a thing merely its
perception and non-perception; for the latter are attributes
of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.—Hence
1 And whereupon then could be established the difference of
mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material
causes such as clay, &c. ?
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21.
409
we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be
untenable.
21. On the supposition of there being no (cause ;
while yet the effect takes place), there results con¬
tradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise
simultaneousness (of cause and effect).
It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non¬
permanency, the former momentary existence, as having
already been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause
of the later one.—Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that
an effect may arise even when there is no cause.—That, we
reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted by
yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications
originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes 1 .
Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there
would be nothing to prevent that anything might originate
at any time.—If, on the other hand, you should say that
we may assume the antecedent momentary existence to last
until the succeeding one has been produced, we point out
that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and
effect, and so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz.
that all things 2 are momentary merely.
1 These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipati-
pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakaripratyaya), the immediate
cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (alambana-
pratyaya).—-I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyabharawa :
Adhipatir indriya/ra tad dhi ^akshuradirfipam utpannasya gnanasya
rupadivishayata^ niyakMati niyamaka^ ^a lokeadhipatir ity u^yate.
SahaMri &\oka/i. Samanantarapratyaya^ purva^/zanam,bauddhamate
hi kshamka^anasa/fttatau purva^anam uttara^anasya karanaw
tad eva ha mana ity ukyate. Alambana/rc gha/adiA Etan hetfin
pratiya pr&pya ^akshuradi^anyam ity adi.
2 Sa/flskara iti, tanmate purvaksha^a eva hetubhfita^ sa^skaro
vasaneti ha vyavahriyate kavyam tu tadvishayataya karmavyutpattya
sa/rcskara^, tatha ha karyakara^atmaka^ sarva/rc bhavarupa/rc ksha-
mkam iti prati^artha^. Brahmavidyabharawa.
4io
vedanta-sCtras.
22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the
mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be
established, there being no (complete) interruption.
The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is
going on constantly, assume that £ whatever forms an object
of knowledge and is different from the triad is produced
(samskrzta) and momentary/ To the triad there mentioned
they give the names £ cessation dependent on a sublative act
of the mind/ £ cessation not dependent on such an act/ and
‘space.’ This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a
merely negative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all
positive characteristics. By £ cessation dependent on a sub¬
lative act of the mind/ we have to understand such destruc¬
tion of entities as is preceded by an act of thought 1 ; by
£ cessation not so dependent 5 is meant destruction of the
opposite kind 2 ; by ‘ space ’ is meant absence in general of
something covering (or occupying space). Out of these
three non-existences £ space ’ will be refuted later on (Sfttra
24); the two other ones are refuted in the present Sutra.
Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the
mind, and cessation which is not so dependent are both
impossible, £ on account of the absence of interruption/
For both kinds of cessation must have reference either to the
series (of momentary existences) or to the single members
constituting the series.—The former alternative is impossible,
because in all series (of momentary existences) the members
of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and
effect so that the series cannot be interrupted 3 * .—The latter
1 As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the
intention of doing so.
2 I. e. the insensible continual decay of things.—Viparita iti
pratiksha«a/ft gha/adinazra yuktya sadhyamano * kmalair avagantum
asakyah sukshmo vina.ro *pratisawkhyanirodha^. Brahmav.
3 A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of
causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last
momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect
or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued;
the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23 .
411
alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to
maintain that any momentary existence should undergo
complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected
(with the previous state of existence), since we observe that
a thing is recognised in the various states through which it
may pass and thus has a connected existence 1 . And in
those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised
(after having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the
ground of actual observations made in other cases, that one
and the same thing continues to exist without any interrup¬
tion.—For these reasons the two kinds of cessation which
the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.
23. And on account of the objections presenting
themselves in either case.
The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption
of the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation
discussed hitherto, must take place either in consequence of
perfect knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of
its own accord. But the former alternative would imply
the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction
takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would
involve the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to
the ‘path’ 2 . As therefore both alternatives are open to
objections, the Bauddha doctrine must be declared unsatis¬
factory.
exist, since the Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal
efficiency (cp. Sarvadana/zasawgraha). And the non-existence of
the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the
whole series.
1 Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form
of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the
powder into which the potsherds are ground.—Analogously we
infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as
a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to
exist in some form.
2 The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.
412
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of
its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of
its not differing (from the two other kinds of non¬
entity).
We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the
Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and
therefore non-definable, two (viz. prati-sa/^khyavirodha and
aprati 0 ) cannot be shown to be such; we now proceed to
show the same with regard to space (ether, akasa).
With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that
it is non-definable, since substantiality can be established in
the case of space no less than in the case of the two so-
called non-entities treated of in the preceding Sutras. That
space is a real thing follows in the first place from certain
scriptural passages, such as ‘ space sprang from the Self. 5 —
To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us
as to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that
the real existence of space is to be inferred from the quality
of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things
are the abodes of smell and the other qualities.—Moreover,
if you declare that space is nothing but the absence in
general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow
that while one bird is flying—whereby space is occupied—
there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at
the same time. And if you should reply that the second
bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering
body, we point out that that something by which the
absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a
positive entity, viz. space in our sense, and not the mere
non-existence of covering bodies —Moreover, the Bauddha
places himself, by his view of space, in opposition to other
parts of his system. For we find, in the Bauddha Scriptures,
a series of questions and answers (beginning, ‘ On what, O
reverend Sir, is the earth founded?’), in which the following
1 What does enable us to declare that there is avara^abhava in
one place and not in another ? Space; which therefore is some¬
thing real.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 25 .
413
question occurs, ‘ On what is the air founded?’ to which it
is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it
is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the sup¬
position of space being a positive entity, not a mere
negation.—Further, there is a self-contradiction in the
Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of nega¬
tive entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are
not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they
are eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non¬
eternity can be predicated, since the distinction of subjects
and predicates of attribution is founded entirely on real
things. Anything with regard to which that distinction
holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and
the like are. not a mere undefinable negation.
25. And on account of remembrance.
The philosopher who maintains that all things are
momentary only would have to extend that doctrine to
the perceiving person (upalabdhrz) also; that is, however,
not possible, on account of the remembrance which is con¬
sequent on the original perception. That remembrance can
take place only if it belongs to the same person who pre¬
viously made the perception; for we observe that what one
man has experienced is not remembered by another man.
How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed
in the sentences, ‘ I saw that thing, and now I see this
thing,’ if the seeing person were not in both cases the same ?
That the consciousness of recognition takes place only in
the case of the observing and remembering subject being
one, is a matter known to every one; for if there were, in
the two cases, different subjects, the state of consciousness
arising in the mind of the remembering person would be, ‘I
remember; another person made the observation.’ But no
such state of consciousness does arise.—When, on the other
hand, such a state of consciousness does arise, then every¬
body knows that the person who made the original observa¬
tion, and the person who remembers, are different persons,
and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows,
‘ I remember that that other person saw that and that.’—
4*4
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
In the case under discussion, however, the Vainai*ika him¬
self—whose state of consciousness is, ‘ I saw that and that ’
—knows that there is one thinking subject only to which
the original perception as well as the remembrance belongs,
and does not think of denying that the past perception
belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire
is hot and gives light.
As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of
perception and subsequent remembrance, the VainsLrika has
necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentari¬
ness. And if he further recognises all his subsequent
successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong to one
and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute
all his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the
same Self, how can he maintain, without being ashamed of
himself, that everything has a momentary existence only?
Should he maintain that the recognition (of the subject as
one and the same) takes place on account of the similarity
(of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being
momentary only), w T e reply that the cognition of similarity
is based on two things, and that for that reason the advo¬
cate of universal momentariness who denies the existence of
one (permanent) subject able mentally to grasp the two
similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense when
asserting that recognition is founded on similarity.
Should he admit, on the other hand, that there is one
mind grasping the similarity of two successive momen¬
tary existences, he would thereby admit that one entity
endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of
universal momentariness.—Should it be said that the cog¬
nition ‘this is similar to that’ is a different (new) cognition,
not dependent on the apperception of the earlier and
later momentary existences, we refute this by the remark
that the fact of different terms—viz. ‘ this 5 and ‘ that ’—
being used points to the existence of different things (which
the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the
mental act of which similarity is the object were an
altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate
similar entities), the expression ‘this is similar to that’
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 26.
415
would be devoid of meaning ; we should in that case rather
speak of ‘similarity’ only.—Whenever (to add a general
reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary
experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed
establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion
by means of words, but they thereby neither convince
others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained
to be such and such must also be represented as such and
such; attempts to represent it as something else prove
nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those
attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being
cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for
(in recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that
which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely
similar to that. We admit that sometimes with regard to
an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or
merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be made
concerning what lies outside our minds. But the con¬
scious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or
only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that
it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a
certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation.—
For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to
be rejected.
26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on
account of that not being observed.
The system of the Vainankas is objectionable for this
reason also that those who deny the existence of permanent
stable causes are driven to maintain that entity springs from
non-entity. This latter tenet is expressly enunciated by
the Bauddhas where they say, ‘ On account of the mani¬
festation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of
the cause).’ For, they say, from the decomposed seed only
the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds,
and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it
becomes a jar. If effects did spring from the unchanged
causes, all effects would originate from all causes at once,
4 i 6
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
as then no specification would be required l . Hence, as we
see that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after
the latter have been merged in non-existence, we hold that
entity springs from non-entity.
To this Bauddha tenet we reply, (‘ Entity does) not
(spring) from non-entity, on account of that not being
observed.’ If entity did spring from non-entity, the as¬
sumption of special causes would be purportless, since
non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the
non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been
destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of horns
of hares and the like, i. e. non-existence is in all cases
nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and
hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination
from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced
from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And
if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have
causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that
sprouts, &c. originate from the horns of hares, &c.—a thing
certainly not actually observed.—If, again, it should be
assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence
having special distinctions—just as, for instance, blueness
and the like are special qualities of lotuses and so on—
we point out that in that case the fact of there being such
special distinctions would turn the non-entities into entities
no less real than lotuses and the like. In no case non¬
existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because,
like the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.—Further,
if existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be
affected with non-existence; while as a matter of fact they
are observed to be merely positive entities distinguished by
their various special characteristics. Nor 2 does any one
1 If the cause were able, without having undergone any change,
to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the
effects of which it is'capable.—Cp. on this point the Sarvadarrazza-
sazzzgraha.
2 This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general
rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that
therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 27 .
417
think that things of the nature of clay, such as pots and
the like, are the effects of threads and the like ; but every¬
body knows that things of the nature of clay are the effects
of clay only. — The Bauddha’s tenet that nothing can
become a cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has
to that end to undergo destruction, and that thus existence
springs from non-existence only is false; for it is observed
that only things of permanent nature which are always
recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c., are the causes
of effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those
cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the
cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds, for
instance, we have to acknowledge as the cause of the sub¬
sequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier condition
in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent
particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed
as a whole undergoes decomposition).—Hence as we see
on the one hand that no entities ever originate from non¬
entities such as the horns of a hare, and on the other hand
that entities do originate from entities such as gold and the
like, the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing
from non-existence has to be rejected.—We finally point
out that, according to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental
modifications spring from the four skandhas discussed
above and all material aggregates from the atoms; why
then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful
assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus
needlessly perplex the mind of every one ?
27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be
an accomplishment (of ends) in the case of non¬
active people also.
If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity,
lazy inactive people also would obtain their purposes, since
{ non-existence ’ is a thing to be had without much trouble.
Rice would grow for the husbandman even if he did not
cultivate his field ; vessels would shape themselves even if
the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver too
[34] e e
418
vedAnta-sOtras.
lazy to weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless
have in the end finished pieces of cloth just as if he had
been weaving. And nobody would have to exert himself
in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for
obtaining final release. All which of course is absurd and
not maintained by anybody.—Thus the doctrine of the
origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to
be futile.
28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot
be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of
them).
There having been brought forward, in what precedes,
the various objections which lie against the doctrine of the
reality of the external world (in the Bauddha sense), such
as the impossibility of accounting for the existence of
aggregates, &c., we are now confronted by those Bauddhas
who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vi^dna)
exist.—The doctrine of the reality of the external world
was indeed propounded by Buddha conforming himself to
the mental state of some of his disciples whom he perceived
to be attached to external things ; but it does not represent
his own true view according to which cognitions alone are real.
According to this latter doctrine the process, whose con¬
stituting members are the act of knowledge, the object of
knowledge, and the result of knowledge \ is an altogether
internal one, existing in so far only as it is connected with
the mind (buddhi). Even if external things existed, that
process could not take place but in connexion with the
mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that
that entire process is internal and that no outward things
exist apart from consciousness, we reply that we base our
1 According to the vig-Mnava,din the cognition specialised by its
various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the
object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness
(avabhasa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it
is power is ma,na, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of that
power it is pramatrf, knowing subject.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 28 .
419
doctrine on the impossibility of external things. For if
external things are admitted, they must be either atoms or
aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But atoms
cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the
like, it being impossible for cognition to represent (things
as minute as) atoms. Nor, again, can the outward things
be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because
those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor
as non-dififerent from the atoms 1 .—In the same way we
can show that the external things are not universals and
so on 2 ,
Moreover, the cognitions—which are of a uniform nature
only in so far as they are states of consciousness—undergo,
according to their objects, successive modifications, so that
there is presented to the mind now the idea of a post, now
the idea of a wall, now the idea of a jar, and so on. Now
this is not possible without some distinction on the part of
the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit
that the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if
we make this admission, from which it follows that the form
of the objects is determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of
the existence of external things becomes altogether gratuit¬
ous. From the fact, moreover, of our always being con¬
scious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge
simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality identical.
When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other
also ; and that would not happen if the two were essentially
distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent
our being conscious of one apart from the other. For this
reason also we maintain that there are no outward things.—
1 If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no
longer be considered as composed of atoms ; if they are non-
different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental
representations of gross non-atomic bodies.
2 Avayavavayavirfipo vahyo^rtho nasti £en m& bhfid ^ativyaktya-
dirfipas tu syad ity a^ankyaha evam iti. (-ratyadmazra vyaktyadinam
^atyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasangad atyantabhinnatve tadvade-
vatadbhavad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhe-
dava^ gativyaktyadibhedo*pi nastity artha^.
e e 2
420
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and
the like. The ideas present to our minds during a dream, a
magical illusion, a mirage and so on, appear in the twofold
form of subject and object, although there is all the while
no external object; hence we conclude that the ideas of
posts and the like which occur in our waking state are like¬
wise independent of external objects; for they also are
simply ideas.—If we be asked how, in the absence of ex¬
ternal things, we account for the actual variety of ideas,
we reply that that variety is to be explained from the
impressions left by previous ideas *. In the beginningless
sawsara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other
as causes and effects, just as the plant springs from the seed
and seeds are again produced from the plant, and there
exists therefore a sufficient reason for the variety of ideas
actually experienced. That the variety of ideas is solely
due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas
follows, moreover, from the following affirmative and
negative judgments: we both (the Vedantins as well as
the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there presents
itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental im¬
pressions, without any external object; we (the Bauddhas)
do not admit that any variety of ideas can arise from
external objects, without mental impressions.—Thus we
are again led to conclude that no outward things exist.
To all this we (the Vedantins) make the following reply.—
The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained
because we are conscious of external things. In every act
of perception we are conscious of some external thing cor¬
responding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a
piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious
cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the
words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing
through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is
conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists,
1 Vasan&, above translated by mental impression, strictly means
any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the
present actual idea.
II ADHyAyA, 2 PAD A, 28.
421
any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating
and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he
does not eat and does not feel satisfied?—If the Bauddha
should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of
no object but only that he is conscious of no object apart
from the act of consciousness, we answer that he may
indeed make any arbitrary statement he likes, but that he
has no arguments to prove what he says. That the out¬
ward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily
to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness
itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious
of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts and
walls and the like as objects of their perceptions. That such
is the consciousness of all men, appears also from the fact that
even those who contest the existence of external things bear
witness to their existence when they say that what is an
internal object of cognition appears like something external.
For they practically accept the general consciousness which
testifies to the existence of an external world, and being at
the same time anxious to refute it they speak of the external
things as 4 like something external/ If they did not them¬
selves at the bottom acknowledge the existence of the ex¬
ternal world, how could they use the expression ‘like
something external ? 5 No one says, ‘ Vishmimitra appears
like the son of a barren mother/ If we accept the truth as
it is given to us in our consciousness, we must admit that
the object of perception appears to us as something external,
not like something external.—But—the Bauddha may reply
—we conclude that the object of perception is only like
something external because external things are impossible.
—This conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility
or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the
ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of
right knowledge; while, on the other hand, the operation
and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not
to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or
impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by
perception or some other means of proof; impossible is
what is not so apprehended. Now the external things are,
422
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
according to their nature, apprehended by all the instru¬
ments of knowledge ; how then can you maintain that they
are not possible, on the ground of such idle dilemmas as
that about their difference or non-difference from atoms?—-
Nor, again, does the non-existence of objects follow from
the fact of the ideas having the same form as the objects;
for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the
forms of the objects, and the objects are actually appre¬
hended as external.—For the same reason (i. e. because the
distinction of thing and idea is given in consciousness) the
invariable concomitance of idea and thing has to be con¬
sidered as proving only that the thing constitutes the means
of the idea, not that the two are identical. Moreover, when
we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of cloth,
consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what
varies are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness;
just as when we see at first a black and then a white cow, the
distinction of the two perceptions is due to the varying
blackness and whiteness while the generic character of the
cow remains the same. The difference of the one per¬
manent factor (from the two—or more—varying factors) is
proved throughout by the two varying factors, and vice
versa the difference of the latter (from the permanent factor)
by the presence of the one (permanent factor). Therefore
thing and idea are distinct. The same view is to be held
with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a
jar; there also the perception and the remembrance only
are distinct while the jar is one and the same; in the same
way as when conscious of the smell of milk and the taste of
milk we are conscious of the smell and taste as different
things but of the milk itself as one only.
Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of
time and pass away as soon as they have become objects
of consciousness cannot apprehend—or be apprehended by
—each other. From this it follows that certain doctrines
forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld; so
the doctrine that ideas are different from each other; the
doctrine that everything is momentary, void, &c.; the doc¬
trine of the distinction of individuals and classes; the
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 28.
423
doctrine that a former idea leaves an impression giving rise
to a later idea ; the doctrine of the distinction, owing to
the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and
non-existence; the doctrine of bondage and release (de¬
pending on absence and presence of right knowledge) \
Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you
must admit that we are also conscious of the external thing.
And if you rejoin that we are conscious of the idea on its
own account because it is of a luminous nature like a lamp,
while the external thing is not so; we reply that by main¬
taining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make your¬
self guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire
burns itself. And at the same time you refuse to accept
the common and altogether rational opinion that we are
conscious of the external thing by means of the idea
different from the thing! Indeed a proof of extraordinary
philosophic insight!—It cannot, moreover, be asserted in
any way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of
our consciousness ; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as
the object of its own activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha)
will rejoin that, if the idea is to be apprehended by some¬
thing different from it, that something also must be appre¬
hended by something different and so on ad infinitum.
And, moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cogni¬
tion is of an essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the
assumption of a further cognition is uncalled for; for as
they are both equally illuminating the one cannot give
light to the other.—But both these objections are unfounded.
As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently
no necessity to assume something to apprehend the Self
which witnesses the idea (is conscious of the idea), there re¬
sults no regressus ad infinitum. And the witnessing Self
and the idea are of an essentially different nature, and may
therefore stand to each other in the relation of knowing
subject and object known. The existence of the witness-
1 For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas
which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject
in addition to the transitory ideas.
424
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
ing Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied.—
Moreover, if you maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests
itself without standing in need of a further principle to
illuminate it, you maintain thereby that ideas exist which
are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge,
and which are without a knowing being; which is no better
than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some
impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves. And if
you should maintain that thereby we admit your doctrine,
since it follows from what we have said that the idea itself
implies consciousness; we reply that, as observation shows,
the lamp in order to become manifest requires some other
intellectual agent furnished with instruments such as the
eye, and that therefore the idea also, as equally being a thing
to be illuminated, becomes manifest only through an ulterior
intelligent principle. And if you finally object that we,
when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely
express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea
is self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your
ideas have the attributes of originating, passing away, being
manifold, and so on (while our Self is one and permanent).—
We thus have proved that an idea, like a lamp, requires an
ulterior intelligent principle to render it manifest.
29. And on account of their difference of nature
(the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of
a dream.
We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment
made by the Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of
which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in
the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream,
both being ideas alike.—The two sets of ideas, we maintain,
cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the
difference of their character. They differ as follows.—
The things of which we are conscious in a dream are
negated by our waking consciousness. 4 1 wrongly thought
that I had a meeting with a great man ; no such meeting
took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so the
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 30 .
425
false idea arose/ In an analogous manner the things of
which we are conscious when under the influence of a magic
illusion, and the like, are negated by our ordinary con¬
sciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we
are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like,
are never negated in any state.—Moreover, the visions of a
dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the
waking state are acts of immediate consciousness; and
the distinction between remembrance and immediate con¬
sciousness is directly cognised by every one as being
founded on the absence or presence of the object. When,
for instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not
directly perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive
him. As thus the distinction between the two states is
evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the
inference that waking consciousness is false because it is
mere consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness ; for
we certainly cannot allow would-be philosophers to deny
the truth of what is directly evident to themselves. Just
because they feel the absurdity of denying what is evident
to themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate
the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those
ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their
having certain attributes in common with the ideas of the
dreaming state. But if some attribute cannot belong to a
thing on account of the latter’s own nature, it cannot belong
to it on account of the thing having certain attributes in
common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt to be
hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of
its having attributes in common with water. And the dif¬
ference of nature between the waking and the sleeping state
we have already shown.
30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not
possible (on the Bauddha view) on account of the
absence of perception (of external things).
We now proceed to that theory of yours, according
to which the variety of ideas can be explained from the
426
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
variety of mental impressions, without any reference to
external things, and remark that on your doctrine the
existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you
do not admit the perception of external things. For the
variety of mental impressions is caused altogether by
the variety of the things perceived. How, indeed, could
various impressions originate if no external things were
perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of
mental impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus
ad i nfinitum, sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and
would in no way establish your position.—The same argu¬
ment, i. e. the one founded on the impossibility of mental
impressions which are not caused by external things, refutes
also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground of
which the denier of an external world above attempted to
show that ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by
external things. We rather have on our side a positive and
a negative judgment whereby to establish our doctrine of
the existence of external things, viz. ‘ the perception of
external things is admitted to take place also without
mental impressions/ and ‘mental impressions are not ad¬
mitted to originate independently of the perception of
external things.’—Moreover, an impression is a kind
of modification, and modifications cannot, as experi¬
ence teaches, take place unless there is some substratum
which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such a
substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that
it cannot be cognised through any means of knowledge.
31. And on account of the momentariness (of the
alayavi^ana, it cannot be the abode of mental
impressions).
If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition
(alayavi^ana 1 ) assumed by you may constitute the abode
1 The vi^anaskandha comprises vi^anas of two different kinds,
the alayavig^ana and the pravrAtivi^ana. The alayavi^ana com¬
prises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego; the
pravn’ttivi^ana comprises those ideas which refer to apparently
external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas of the
II ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 32. 427
of the mental impressions, we deny that, because that
cognition also being admittedly momentary, and hence
non-permanent, cannot be the abode of impressions any
more than the quasi-external cognitions (pravr/tti-vi^ana).
For unless there exists one continuous principle equally
connected with the past, the present, and the future 1 , or an
absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything,
we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and
so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent
on place, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you
declare your alayavi^ana to be something permanent,
you thereby abandon your tenet of the alayavi^Tzana as
well as everything else being momentary.—Or (to explain
the Sutra in a different way) as the tenet of general momen¬
tariness is characteristic of the systems of the idealistic
as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward
against the doctrines of the former all those arguments
dependent on the principle of general momentariness which
we have above urged against the latter.
We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the
doctrine which maintains the (momentary) reality of the ex¬
ternal world, and the doctrine which asserts that ideas only
exist. The third variety of Bauddha doctrine, viz. that
everything is empty (i. e. that absolutely nothing exists), is
contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and therefore
requires no special refutation. For this apparent world,
whose existence is guaranteed by all the means of know¬
ledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find out
some new truth (based on which he could impugn its
existence)—for a general principle is proved by the absence
of contrary instances.
32. And on account of its general deficiency in
probability.
No further special discussion is in fact required. From
latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the antecedent
ideas of the former class.
1 Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself
to consciousness is not non-existent.
428
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
whatever new points of view the Bauddha system is tested
with reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like
the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foun¬
dation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use
it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly.
—Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually
contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of
the external world, the reality of ideas only, and general
nothingness, has himself made it clear either that he
was a man given to make incoherent assertions, or
else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound
absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become
thoroughly confused.—So that—and this the Sutra means
to indicate—Buddha’s doctrine has to be entirely dis¬
regarded by all those who have a regard for their own
happiness.
33. On account of the impossibility (of contra¬
dictory attributes) in one thing, (the Gaina doctrine
is) not (to be accepted).
Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn
to the system of the Gymnosophists (Gainas).
The Gainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz.
soul (^iva), non-soul (a^iva), the issuing outward (asrava),
restraint (sawvara), destruction (nir^ara), bondage (bandha),
and release (moksha) 1 . Shortly it may be said that they
acknowledge two categories, viz. soul and non-soul, since
the five other categories may be subsumed under these two.
—They also set forth a set of categories different from the
two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called
1 Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects of
their enjoyment; asrava is the forward movement of the senses
towards their objects; sazrcvara is the restraint of the activity of the
senses; nir^ara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed;
the works constitute bondage; and release is the ascending of the
soul, after bondage has ceased, to the highest regions.—For the
details, see Professor Cowell’s translation of the Arhata chapter
of the Sarvadarjawasa^graha.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 33. 429
astikayas (‘existing bodies,’ i.e. categories), viz. the cate¬
gories of soul (^lva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma),
demerit (adharma), and space (akai*a). All these categories
they again subdivide in various fanciful ways l .—To all things
they apply the following method of reasoning, which they
call the saptabhanginaya: somehow it is; somehow it is
not; somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescrib¬
able ; somehow it is and is indescribable; somehow it is
not and is indescribable; somehow it is and is not and is
indescribable.
To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even
such conceptions as that of unity and eternity 2 .
This doctrine we meet as follows.—Your reasoning, we
say, is inadmissible ‘ on account of the impossibility in one
thing.’ That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory
attributes such as being and non-being should at the same
time belong to one and the same thing; just as observation
teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same
moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either
be so many and such or not be so many and such; the
third alternative expressed in the words ‘they either are
such or not such ’ results in a cognition of indefinite nature
which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is.
If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of
more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of
true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion
that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself some¬
thing, falls as such under the alternative predications ‘some¬
how it is,’ ‘ somehow it is not,’ and so ceases to be a definite
assertion. The same happens to the person making the
assertion and to the result of the assertion; partly they are,
partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the
object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of
knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tirthakara
(Cina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his
followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether
1 Cp. translation of Sarvadarrazzasaffzgraha, p. 59.
2 And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.
430
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
indeterminate ? Observation shows that only when a course
of action is known to have a definite result people set about
it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doc¬
trine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be
listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman.—
Again, if we apply the China reasoning to their doctrine of
the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the
matter they are five and on another view they are not five;
from which latter point of view it follows that they are
either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare
the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they
cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact, they are
described so that to call them indescribable involves a
contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories
on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and
at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such,
and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect
knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect
knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not
the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or
insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person.—If you
further maintain that the heavenly world and final release
exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the
absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied in
such statements will result in nobody’s acting for the
purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release.
And, moreover, it follows from your doctrine that soul, non¬
soul, and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained,
and which you describe as having existed from all eternity,
relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indeter¬
mination.—As therefore the two contradictory attributes of
being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories
—being excluding non-being and vice versa non-being ex¬
cluding being—the doctrine of the Arhat must be rejected,
—The above remarks dispose likewise of the assertions
made by the Chinas as to the impossibility of deciding
whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or
plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or
non-separateness, and so on.—The China doctrine that
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 34.
431
a gg re g ates are formed from the atoms—by them called
pudgalas—we do not undertake to refute separately as its
refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic
doctrine given in a previous part of this work.
34. And likewise (there results from the (Taina
doctrine) non-universality of the Self.
We have hitherto urged against the Gaina doctrine an
objection resulting from the sy&dvada, viz. that one thing
cannot have contradictory attributes. We now turn to the
objection that from their doctrine it would follow that the
individual Self is not universal, i.e. not omnipresent.—The
Gainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size as the
body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of
infinite extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like
jars and similar things. Further, as the bodies of different
classes of creatures are of different size, it might happen
that the soul of a man—which is of the size of the human
body—when entering, in consequence of its former deeds, on
a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would
not be able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human
soul being relegated to the body of an ant would not be
able to find sufficient room in it. The same difficulty would,
moreover, arise with regard to the successive stages of one
state of existence, infancy, youth, and old age.—But why,
the Gaina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as
consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of under¬
going compression in a small body and dilatation in a big
one ?—Do you, we ask in return, admit or not admit that
those countless particles of the soul may occupy the same
place or not ?—If you do not admit it, it follows that the
infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body
of limited dimensions.—If you do admit it, it follows that,
as then the space occupied by all the particles may be the
space of one particle only, the extension of all the par¬
ticles together will remain inconsiderable, and hence the
soul be of minute size (not of the size of the body).
You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body
432
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
of limited size contains an infinite number of soul par¬
ticles.
Well then, the Gaina may reply, let us assume that by
turns whenever the soul enters a big body some particles
accede to it while some withdraw from it whenever it
enters a small body.—To this hypothesis the next Sfitra
furnishes a reply.
35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from
the succession (of parts acceding to and departing
from the soul), on account of the change, &c. (of
the soul).
Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as
the body be satisfactorily established by means of the
hypothesis of the successive accession and withdrawal of
particles. For this hypothesis would involve the soul’s
undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually
being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and
withdrawal of parts, it of course follows that it undergoes
change, and if it is liable to change it follows that it is non¬
permanent, like the skin and similar substances. From that,
again, it follows that the £aina doctrine of bondage and
release is untenable; according to which doctrine ‘ the soul,
which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad
of works and sunk in the ocean of sa^sara, rises when its
bonds are sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the
water when it is freed from the encumbering clay 1 .’—
Moreover, those particles which in turns come and depart
have the attributes of coming and going, and cannot, on
that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the
body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some
permanently remaining parts, we remark that it would be
impossible to determine which are the permanent and which
the temporary parts.—We have further to ask from whence
those particles originate when they accede to the soul, and
into what they are merged when they detach themselves
from it. They cannot spring from the material elements
1 Cp. Sarvadamtfasa/rcgraha translation, p. 58.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 36.
433
and re-enter the elements; for the soul is immaterial. Nor
have we any means to prove the existence of some other,
general or special, reservoir of soul-particles.—Moreover, on
the hypothesis under discussion the soul would be of in¬
definite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and
departing is itself indefinite.—On account of all these and
similar difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain
particles by turns attach themselves to, and detach them¬
selves from, the soul.
The Sfitra may be taken in a different sense also. The
preceding Sutra has proved that the soul if of the same
size as the body cannot be permanent, as its entering into
bigger and smaller bodies involves its limitation. To
this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that
although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be
permanent, just as the stream of water is permanent (al¬
though the water continually changes). An analogous
instance would be supplied by the permanency of the
stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red
cloth and so on, are non-permanent.—To this rejoinder
our Sutra replies that if the stream is not real we are
led back to the doctrine of a general void, and that, if it
is something real, the difficulties connected with the soul's
changing, &c. present themselves and render the Caina
view impossible.
36. And on account of the permanency of the
final (size of the soul) and the resulting permanency
of the two (preceding sizes) there is no difference (of
size, at any time).
Moreover, the Fainas themselves admit the permanency
of the final size of the soul which it has in the state of
release. From this it follows also that its initial size and
its intervening sizes must be permanent 1 , and that hence
1 The inference being that the initial and intervening sizes of the
soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul, like its
final size.
[ 34 ]
Ff
434
VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
there is no difference between the three sizes. But this
would involve the conclusion that the different bodies of
the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul
cannot enter into bigger and smaller bodies.—Or else (to
explain the Sfitra in a somewhat different way) from the
fact that the final size of the soul is permanent, it follows
that its size in the two previous conditions also is perma¬
nent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always
of the same size—whether minute or infinite—and not of
the varying size of its bodies.—For this reason also the
doctrine of the Arhat has to be set aside as not in any way
more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.
37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world),
on account of the inappropriateness (of that doc¬
trine).
The Sutrak&ra now applies himself to the refutation of
that doctrine, according to which the Lord is the cause of
the world only in so far as he is the general ruler.—But how
do you know that that is the purport of the Sutra (which
speaks of the Lord ‘without any qualification 5 ) ?—From the
circumstance, we reply, that the teacher himself has proved,
in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord is the
material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if
the present Sutra were meant to impugn the doctrine of
the Lord in general, the earlier and later parts of the
work would be mutually contradictory, and the Sutrakdra
would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore must
assume that the purport of the present Sutra is to make
an energetic attack on the doctrine of those who main¬
tain that the Lord is not the material cause, but merely
the ruler, i.e. the operative cause of the world; a doctrine
entirely opposed to the Vedantic tenet of the unity of
Brahman.
The theories about the Lord which are independent of
the Vedanta are of various nature. Some taking their
stand on the Sankhya and Yoga systems assume that the
Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the
II ADHYAYA, 2 pAdA, 37.
435
pradh&na and of the souls, and that pradMna, soul, and
Lord are of mutually different nature.—The Mihe^varas
(Saivas) maintain that the five categories, viz. effect, cause,
union, ritual, the end of pain, were taught by the Lord
Pajupati (Siva) to the end of breaking the bonds of the
animal (i.e. the soul); Pa^upati is, according to them,
the Lord, the operative cause.—Similarly, the Vaueshikas
and others also teach, according to their various systems,
that the Lord is somehow the operative cause of the
world.
Against all these opinions the Sutra remarks ‘ the Lord,
on account of the inappropriateness. , I.e. it is not possible
that the Lord as the ruler of the pradhana and the soul
should be the cause of the world, on account of the inap¬
propriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is supposed
to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low,
intermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it
follows that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on,
is hence like one of us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we
get over this difficulty by assuming that he makes his
dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of the
living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a
logical see-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living
beings having to be considered in turns both as acting and
as acted upon. This difficulty is not removed by the con¬
sideration that the works of living beings and the result¬
ing dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has
no beginning; for in past time as well as in the present
mutual interdependence of the two took place, so that the
beginningless series is like an endless chain of blind men
leading other blind men. It is, moreover, a tenet set forth
by the Naiyayikas themselves that ‘ imperfections have the
characteristic of being the causes of action’ (Nyaya Sutra
I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they
be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of
something else, are impelled to action by some imperfection.
And even if it is admitted that an agent even when acting
for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by an intrinsic
motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for the
436
vedanta-s(jtras.
Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic
motives only (such as the desire of removing the painful
feeling connected with pity).—Your doctrine is finally
inappropriate for that reason also that you maintain the
Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it follows
that he must be devoid of all activity.
38. And on account of the impossibility of the
connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the
pradhana).
Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing
there lies the further objection that a Lord distinct from
the pradhana and the souls cannot be the ruler of the latter
without being connected with them in a certain way. But
of what nature is that connexion to be ? It cannot be con¬
junction (sawyoga), because the Lord, as well as the pra-
dhcina and the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of
parts. Nor can it be inherence, since it would be impossible
to define who should be the abode and who the abiding
thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other connexion,
the special nature of which would have to be inferred from
the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just
what is not settled as yet 1 .—How, then, it may be asked,
do you—the Ved&ntins—establish the relation of cause and
effect (between the Lord and the world)?—There is, we
reply, no difficulty in our case, as the connexion we assume
is that of identity (tad&tmya). The adherent of Brahman,
moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the
basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his
tenets throughout conformable to observation. Our adver¬
sary, on the other hand, who defines the nature of the cause
and the like according to instances furnished by experience,
1 The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and
the pradhana and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world
considered as the effect of the pradhana acted upon by the Lord;
for that the world is the effect of the pradhana is a point which
the Vedantins do not accept as proved.
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 40.
437
may be expected to maintain only such doctrines as agree
with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that
Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient
Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as that
of the VedAntin; for that would involve him in a logical
see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord being established on
the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture
again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.—
For all these reasons the Sankhya-yoga hypothesis about
the Lord is devoid of foundation. Other similar hypotheses
which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted
by corresponding arguments.
39. And on account of the impossibility of ruler-
ship (on the part of the Lord).
The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an un¬
tenable hypothesis, for the following reason also.—Those
philosophers are obliged to assume that by his influence
the Lord produces action in the pradhana, &c. just as the
potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot
be admitted; for the pradhana, which is devoid of colour
and other qualities, and therefore not an object of percep¬
tion, is on that account of an altogether different nature
from clay and the like, and hence cannot be looked upon
as the object of the Lord’s action.
40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by
the soul so the pradhana is ruled by the Lord), we
deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.
Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the
Lord rules the pradhana in the same way as the soul rules
the organ of sight and the other organs which are devoid
of colour, and so on, and hence not objects of perception.
This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we
infer that the organs are ruled by the soul, from the
observed fact that the soul feels pleasure, pain, and the like
(which affect the soul through the organs). But we do not
observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c. caused
43§
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
by the pradh&na. If the analogy between the pradh&na
and the bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow
that the Lord is affected by pleasure and pain no less than
the transmigrating souls are.
Or else the two preceding Sutras may be explained in a
different way. Ordinary experience teaches us that kings,
who are the rulers of countries, are never without some
material abode, i. e. a body; hence, if we wish to infer the
existence of a general Lord from the analogy of earthly
rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to
serve as the substratum of his organs. But such a body
cannot be ascribed to the Lord, since all bodies exist only
subsequently to the creation, not previously to it. The
Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid of a
material substratum; for experience teaches us that action
requires a material substrate. — Let us then arbitrarily
assume that the Lord possesses some kind of body serving
as a substratum for his organs (even previously to creation).
—This assumption also will not do ; for if the Lord has a
body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary transmigra-
tory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.
41. And (there would follow from that doctrine)
either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on
the Lord’s part).
The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is
invalid, for the following reason also.—They teach that
the Lord is omniscient and of infinite duration, and like¬
wise that the pradhana, as well as the individual souls, is
of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord either
defines the measure of the pradhana, the souls, and himself,
or does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doc¬
trine under discussion. For, on the former alternative, the
pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, being all of them of
definite measure, must necessarily be of finite duration;
since ordinary experience teaches that all things of definite
extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease to exist.
The numerical measure of pradhana, souls, and Lord is
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 42.
439
defined by their constituting a triad, and the individual
measure of each of them must likewise be considered as
defined by the Lord (because he is omniscient). The
number of the souls is a high one \ From among this
limited number of souls some obtain release from the
sa^sara, that means their sa^sara comes to an end, and
their subjection to the sawsara comes to an end. Gra¬
dually all souls obtain release, and so there will finally be
an end of the entire sa^sara and the sa/^sara state of all
souls. But the pradh&na which is ruled by the Lord and
which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is
meant by sa^sara. Hence, when the latter no longer
exists, nothing is left for the Lord to rule, and his om¬
niscience and ruling power have no longer any objects.
But if the pradMna, the souls, and the Lord, all have an
end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they
have a beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the
doctrine of a general void.—Let us then, in order to avoid
these untoward conclusions, maintain the second alternative,
i. e. that the measure of the Lord himself, the pradhana,
and the souls, is not defined by the Lord.—But that
also is impossible, because it would compel us to aban¬
don a tenet granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is
omniscient.
For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative
philosophers, according to which the Lord is the operative
cause of the world, appears unacceptable.
42. On account of the impossibility of the ori¬
gination (of the individual soul from the highest
Lord, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas cannot be
accepted).
We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those
who think that the Lord is not the material cause but only
the ruler, the operative cause of the world. We are now
1 I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient
Lord knows its measure.
440
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
going to refute the doctrine of those according to whom he
is the material as well as the operative cause.—But, it may
be objected, in the previous portions of the present work a
Lord of exactly the same nature, i. e. a Lord who is the
material, as well as the operative, cause of the world, has
been ascertained on the basis of Scripture, and it is a recog¬
nised principle that Smrzti, in so far as it agrees with
Scripture, is authoritative; why then should we aim at
controverting the doctrine stated ?—It is true, we reply,
that a part of the system which we are going to discuss
agrees with the Vedanta system, and hence affords no
matter for controversy; another part of the system, how¬
ever, is open to objection, and that part we intend to
attack.
The so-called Bhagavatas are of opinion that the one holy
(bhagavat) Vasudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is
what really exists, and that he, dividing himself fourfold,
appears in four forms (vyuha), as Vasudeva, Sankarsha/za,
Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vasudeva denotes the highest
Self, Sankarshazza the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind
(manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (ahankara).
Of these four Vasudeva constitutes the ultimate causal
essence, of which the three others are the effects.—The
believer after having worshipped Vasudeva for a hundred
years by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana),
procuring of things to be offered (upadana), oblation (i^ya),
recitation of prayers, &c. (svadhyaya), and devout meditation
(yoga), passes beyond all affliction and reaches the highest
Being.
Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend
to controvert the doctrine that Naraya/za, who is higher
than the Undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the
Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple
ways ; for various scriptural passages, such as ‘ He is one¬
fold, he is threefold’ ( Kh . Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that
the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we
mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentra¬
tion of mind on the highest Being which appears in the
Bhagavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach,
ii adhyaya, 2 pAda, 44. 441
&c.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know
full well from Smrzti and Scripture. We, however, must
take exception to the doctrine that Sankarshaz/a springs
from Vasudeva, Pradyumna from Sankarshazza, Aniruddha
from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from Vasudeva,
i.e. the highest Self, there should originate Sankarshazza, i.e.
the individual soul; for if such were the case, there would
attach to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imper¬
fections which belong to things originated. And thence
release, which consists in reaching the highest Being,
could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by
entering into its cause.—That the soul is not an originated
thing, the teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this
reason the Bhagavata hypothesis is unacceptable.
43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument
is produced from the agent*
The Bhigavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that
reason also, that observation never shows us an instrument,
such as a hatchet and the like, to spring from an agent such
as Devadatta, or any other workman. But the Bhagavatas
teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul termed
Sankarsha/za, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal
organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of
the agent another instrument, viz. the ahankara termed
Aniruddha. Such doctrines cannot be settled without
observed instances. And we do not meet with any scriptural
passage in their favour.
44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of
knowledge, &c. (Visudeva, &c. be taken as Lords),
yet there is non-exclusion of that (i. e. the objection
raised in Shtra 42).
Let us then—the Bhagavatas may say—understand by
Sankarshazza, and so on, not the individual soul, the mind,
&c., but rather Lords, i. e. powerful beings distinguished by
all the qualities characteristic of rulers, such as pre-eminence
of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory.
442
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
All these are Vasudevas free from faults, without a sub¬
stratum (not sprung from pradhana), without any imper¬
fections. Hence the objection urged in Sutra 42 does
not apply.
Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply,
the‘non-exclusion of that/ i. e. the non-exclusion of the
impossibility of origination, can be established.—Do you, in
the first place, mean to say that the four individual Lords,
Vasudeva, and so on, have the same attributes, but do not
constitute one and the same Self?—If so, you commit the
fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all
the work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you
offend thereby against your own principle, according to
which there is only one real essence, viz. the holy Vasu¬
deva.—Or do you perhaps mean to say that from the one
highest Being there spring those four forms possessing equal
attributes ?—In that case the objection urged in Sfitra 42
remains valid. For Sankarsha/za cannot be produced
from Vdsudeva, nor Pradyumna from Sankarsha^a, nor
Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the attributes of all of
them being the same) there is no supereminence of any one
of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and
effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause—
as, for instance, in the case of the clay and the jar (where
the cause is more extensive than the effect)—and that
without such superiority the relation is simply impossible.
But the followers of the Pa^aratra do not acknowledge any
difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c.
between Vasudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that
they all are forms of Vasudeva, without any special distinc¬
tions. The forms of Vasudeva cannot properly be limited
to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a blade
of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme
Being.
45. And on account of contradictions.
Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the
Bhagavata system, with reference to the assumption of
qualities and their bearers. Eminence of knowledge and
II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 45.
443
ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory are enumerated
as qualities, and then they are in some other place spoken
of as Selfs, holy Vasudevas, and so on.—Moreover, we
meet with passages contradictory of the Veda. The follow¬
ing passage, for instance, blames the Veda, ‘ Not having
found the highest bliss in the Vedas Sa^ilya studied this
•rastra.’—For this reason also the Bhagavata doctrine can¬
not be accepted.
SECOND ADHYAYA.
THIRD PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
i. Ether 1 (does) not (originate), on account of
the absence of scriptural statement.
In the Vedanta-texts we meet in different places with
different statements concerning the origination of various
things. Some of those passages declare that ether origi¬
nated ; some do not. Some record the origination of air;
others do not. Other passages again make analogous
statements concerning the individual soul and the vital
airs.—Similarly we observe that other scriptural texts con¬
tradict one another concerning order of succession and the
like.—Now, as we ourselves have inferred the worthless¬
ness of other philosophical doctrines from their mutual
contradictions, a suspicion might arise that our doctrine
is equally worthless, owing to its intrinsic contradictions.
Hence a new discussion is begun in order to clear from all
doubt the sense of all those Vedanta-texts which refer to
creation, and thus to remove the suspicion alluded to.
Here we have to consider in the first place the question
1 Here, as generally in the preceding parts of this translation,
akjua is rendered by ‘ ether.’ There is no doubt that occasionally
the appropriate—and in some cases the only possible—rendering is
not * ether ’ but ‘ space; ’ but the former rendering, after all, best
agrees with the general Vedantic view of aka^a. The Vedantins
do not clearly distinguish between empty space and an exceedingly
fine matter filling all space, and thus it happens that in many
cases where we speak of the former they speak of aka^a, i.e. the
all-pervading substratum of sound; which howsoever attenuated
is yet one of the material elements, and as such belongs to the same
category as air, fire, water, and earth.
B 2
4
vedanta-sOtras.
whether ether has an origin or not.—The purvapakshin
maintains that ether does not originate, since there is no
scriptural statement to that effect. For in the chapter
which treats of the origin (of the world) ether is not
mentioned at all. In the passage ‘ In the beginning there
was that only which is, one only, without a second* the
iTMndogya at first introduces Brahman as the general
subject-matter, by means of the clause ‘that which is,' and
thereupon (in the passages ‘ It thought,* c It sent forth fire,*
&c.) records the origin of three elements, viz. fire, water,
and earth; giving the first place to fire which (ordinarily)
occupies the middle place among the five elements 1 .
Now, as scriptural statement is our (only) authority in the
origination of the knowledge of supersensuous things, and
as there is no scriptural statement declaring the origin of
ether, ether must be considered to have no origin.
2. But there is (a scriptural statement of the
origination of ether).
The conjunction 6 but 5 indicates the adoption of another
alternative.—The origin of ether may not be stated in the
A^Mndogya; but it is stated in other scriptural passages.
For the text of the Taittiriyakas, after having introduced
Brahman as the general subject-matter,—in the words, ‘ The
true, knowledge, without end is Brahman,’—goes on to say,
‘From that Self sprang ether’ (Taitt. Up. II, i).—Hence
there arises a conflict of scriptural passages, the creation
sometimes being said to begin with fire, sometimes with
ether.—But may we not appropriately assume the two
scriptural passages to form one syntactical whole?—It
would be well indeed if we could do so, but a unity of the
kind desired cannot be admitted, because the creator who
is mentioned only once—in the passage c he sent forth fire*
—cannot be connected with two things to be created, as
if the construction were ‘ He sent forth fire, he sent forth
ether.*—But—an objection may be raised—we see that
sometimes an agent, although mentioned once only, is yet
1 The usual order being ether, air, fire, water, earth.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 3.
5
connected with two objects ; as when we say c after having
cooked broth he now cooks rice.’ We therefore may
combine the two scriptural sentences into one, ‘ Brahman
having created ether created fire.’—Such a combination of
sentences, we reply, is not admissible here, because the
.Oandogya intimates that fire was created first, while the
Taittiriyaka assigns the same position to ether, and be¬
cause it is impossible that both should have been created
first.—The same remarks apply to a further contradiction
involved in the other scriptural passage, ‘ From that Self
sprang ether,’ &c.; for there also the material cause and
the fact of origination, being mentioned only once, cannot
be connected with fire as well as ether, so as to effect a
sentence of the following kind, 4 from that there sprang
ether, from that there sprang fire.’ Moreover the Taittiri¬
yaka states separately that 4 fire (sprang) from air V—With
regard to this conflict of statements somebody now main¬
tains the following view.
3. (The Vedic statement concerning the origination
of ether) has a secondary sense, on account of the
impossibility (of the origination of ether).
The ether does not originate on account of the absence
of scriptural statement.—That other passage which (ap¬
parently) declares the origination of the ether must be
taken as having a secondary (figurative) meaning.—Why ?
—On account of the impossibility. The origination of
ether cannot be shown to be possible as long as there
exist followers of the opinion of the reverend Ka^abhu^
(Ka;zada). For the latter deny the origination of ether
on the ground that it is impossible to demonstrate the
existence of the required apparatus of causes. Whatever
is originated, they say, is originated from inherent causes,
non-inherent causes, and operative causes. Of a substance
the inherent causes are substances belonging to the same
class and more than one in number. But for ether there
are no such originating substances, belonging to the same
1 While the jOand. says that fire sprang from the Self.
6
vedAnta-s^tras.
class and more than one in number, from which, as its
inherent cause, it could originate, and consequently there
also exists no non-inherent cause of ether; for the latter
would have to be looked for in the conjunction of the
primary substances. And as thus there exist no inherent
cause and no non-inherent cause, there is absolutely no
room for an operative cause; for the only function of the
latter is to assist the two other causes. Those elements
moreover which have an origin, as fire and the like, we
may conceive to exist in different conditions at an earlier
and a later time; we may conceive e. g. that fire, pre¬
viously to its origination, did not give light or produce
any other effects, while it does do so subsequently to its
origination. Of the ether, on the other hand, no such
difference between an earlier and a later period can be
conceived ; for, we ask, would it be possible to maintain
that before its alleged origination there were no large,
minute, and atomic spaces?—That ether is without an
origin further follows from its characteristic qualities, such
as all-pervadingness and so on, which altogether distinguish
it from earth and the other elements.—Hence, as the word
‘ ether ’ (aka.ra) is used in a secondary sense in such phrases
as ‘ make room ’ ( 4 kl?a), 4 there is room/ and as space
although one only is designated as being of different kinds
when we speak of the space of a jar, the space of a house,
&c.—a form of expression met with even in Vedic passages
such as ‘he is to place the wild animals in the spaces’
(aka^eshu) ’—we conclude that those Vedic passages also
which speak of its origination must be supposed to have a
secondary meaning.
4. And on account of the word (of the Veda).
The word of the Veda also proclaims the non-originated-
ness of ether; for it declares that ‘air and ether (antariksha)
are immortal 5 (B ri. Up. II, 3, 3), and what is immortal
cannot have an origin. Another scriptural passage (‘ omni¬
present and eternal like ether’), by comparing two attri¬
butes of Brahman, viz. omnipresence and eternity with the
other, intimates that those qualities belong to the ether
II ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 5.
7
also; in which case no beginning can be attributed to it.
Other passages to be quoted in this connexion are, ‘ As
this ether is infinite, so the Self is to be known as infinite ; *
and ‘ Brahman has the ether for its body, the ether is the
Self.’ For if the ether had a beginning, it could not be
predicated of Brahman (as is done in the last passage), as
we predicate blueness of a lotus (‘ the lotus is blue ’).
Hence we understand that the eternal Brahman is of the
same nature as ether.
5. The one (word ‘sprang’) may be (taken in its
secondary as well as in its primary sense), like the
word ‘ Brahman.’
This Sutra contains the reply to a doubt.—If we admit
the opinion maintained hitherto, how can one and the same
word 4 sprang ’ from that Self sprang the ether ’) be used,
in the same chapter, in its primary (real) meaning with
regard to fire and so on, and in a secondary meaning with
regard to ether ?—The answer to this objection is that the
one word ‘ sprang ’ may, according to the nature of the
things to which it refers, be used in its primary as well as
its secondary sense, just as the word ‘Brahman’ is used.
For the one word ‘ Brahman’ is, in the passage Taitt. Up.
Ill, 2-6 (‘ Try to know Brahman by penance, for penance
is Brahman ’), used in a secondary sense with regard to
food, &c., and in its primary sense with regard to bliss;
and the same word Brahman is, in the way of figurative
identification (bhakti), applied to penance, which is merely
the means of knowing Brahman, and again directly to
Brahman as the object of knowledge.—But how—to raise
another question—can we, on the supposition of ether
having no beginning, uphold the validity of the statement
made in the clause ‘ one only, without a second ? ’ For if
ether is a second entity (co-existing with Brahman from
eternity), it follows that Brahman has a second. And if so,
how can it be said that when Brahman is known everything
is known? ( Kh . Up. VI, 1).—The word ‘one,’ the purva-
pakshin replies, may be used with reference to (the absence
of) effects. As in ordinary life a person, who on a certain
8
vedanta-sOtras.
day sees in a potter’s house a lump of clay, a staff, a wheel
and so on, and on the following day a number of finished
vessels, might say, ‘Yesterday there was only clay,’ mean¬
ing thereby only that on the preceding day there were no
things made of clay, not that there were no staff, wheel and
the like; so the passage under discussion also is to be
understood.—The term ‘ without a second 5 (does not ex¬
clude the existence from eternity of ether, but) excludes
the existence of any other superintending being (but
Brahman). While there is a superintending potter in addi¬
tion to the material cause of the vessels, i. e. the clay, there
is no other superintendent in addition to Brahman, the
material cause of the world. Nor does the existence of
ether as a second entity involve Brahman’s being associated
with a second (and therefore not being of a simple nature).
For diversity is founded on difference of characteristic
attributes, and before the origin (of the creation) no differ¬
ence of attributes separating Brahman and ether exists;
the two being mixed like water and milk, and having the
common attributes of all-pervadingness, immateriality and
so on. At the time of creation however a certain diver¬
sity of the two determines itself, Brahman putting forth
energy in order to produce the world, while the ether re¬
mains immoveable.—And also from the passages quoted
above—such as ‘ Brahman has the ether for its body ’—it
follows that the two are identical. Thence again it follows
that through the knowledge of Brahman everything is
known.—Moreover every effect, which is produced, is pro¬
duced in such a way as not to be separated from ether in
place as well as in time, and ether itself is non-separated in
place and time from Brahman ; hence, if there are known
Brahman and its effects, the ether also is known. The
case is similar to that of a few drops of water poured
into a jug full of milk. Those drops are taken when the
milk is taken ; the taking of the drops does not constitute
something additional to the taking of the milk. Analo¬
gously the ether, as being non-separate in place and time
from Brahman and its effects, is comprised within Brahman,
and consequently we have to understand the passages
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 6.
9
about the origin of the ether in a secondary sense.—To
this argumentation we make the following reply.
6 . The non-abandonment of the promissory state¬
ments (results only) from the non-difference (of the
entire world from Brahman), according to the words
of the Veda.
In all the Vedanta-texts we meet with promissory
statements of the following nature:—‘ That by which we
hear what is not heard, perceive what is not perceived,
know what is not known 5 {Kh. Up. VI, i, 3); ‘When
the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known,
then all this is known’ (B ru Up. IV, 5, 6); c Sir, what is
that through which if it is known everything else becomes
known? 5 (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3); f Outside that which is there is
no knowledge/ These promissory statements are not
abandoned, i. e. not stultified, only if the entire aggregate
of things is non-different from Brahman, the object of
knowledge ; for if there were any difference, the affirmation
that by the knowledge of one thing everything is known,
would be contradicted thereby. Non-difference again of
the two is possible only if the whole aggregate of things
originates from the one Brahman. And we understand
from the words of the Veda that that affirmation can be
established only through the theory of the non-difference
of the material cause and its effects. For the affirmation
contained in the clause ‘ That by which we hear what is
not heard,’ &c., is proved by the analogous instances of
clay, &c., which all aim at showing the identity of effect
and cause. In order to establish this, the subsequent
clauses also (‘ Being only, my dear, this was in the begin¬
ning, one only, without a second ; it thought; it sent forth
fire,’ &c.) at first state that the aggregate of effects belongs
to Brahman, and then declare its identity with Brahman,
viz. from the passage ‘ In it all that exists has its Self’
(VI, 8, 7), up to the end of the prapa/^aka.—If, now, the
ether were not one of the effects of Brahman, it could not
be known by Brahman being known, and that would
involve an abandonment of a (previous) affirmation ; an
IO
VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
alternative which, as invalidating the authoritativeness of
the Veda, is of course altogether unacceptable.—Similarly
in all the Vedanta-texts certain passages are to be found
which, by means of various instances, make the same
affirmation, so e. g. 4 This everything, all is that Self ’ ( Bri .
Up. II, 4, 6); ‘Brahman alone is that Immortal before'
(Mu. Up. II, 2 , ii).—H ence, like fire and the other sub¬
stances, the ether also is a product.—The averment
made by the purvapakshin that on account of the ab¬
sence of scriptural statements the ether is not a product
is unfounded, since a scriptural passage referring to the
origin of ether has already been pointed out, viz. ‘ from
that Self sprang ether. 5 —True,—the purvapakshin may
reply,—such a statement has indeed been pointed out, but
it is contradicted by another statement, viz. 4 It sent forth
fire,’ &c. Should it be alleged that there can be no con¬
tradiction, because all scriptural passages form one whole,
the reply is that all non-contradictory passages form a
whole; in the present case, however, a contradiction has
been shown to exist, because the creator, who is mentioned
only once, cannot be connected with two things created ;
because two things cannot both be created first; and
because an option is, in that case, inadmissible 1 .—This
reply, we rejoin, is without force. It is indeed true that it
is impossible to explain the passage of the Taittiriyaka in
any modified sense; for it distinctly declares that fire was
produced in the third place, 4 From that Self sprang the
ether, from ether air, from air fire. 5 But, on the other
hand, it is possible to give a different turn to the passage
from the iTMndogya, which may be explained to mean
that 4 Brahman, after having created ether and air, created
fire. 5 For as the purport of this passage is to relate the
origin of fire, it cannot at the same time impugn the
account of the origin of ether given in another passage;
according to the principle that to one and the same sen¬
tence a double purport must not be ascribed. As, on the
1 For we cannot maintain that optionally either the one or the
other was created first.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 6.
I I
other hand, one creator may successively create more than
one thing, and as on that ground the combination of the
two passages into one syntactical whole is possible, we
are not obliged to disregard any scriptural statement on
account of its meaning being contradicted (by other scrip¬
tural passages). Nor do we mean to say that a creator
mentioned only once is to be connected with two created
things ; for the other (second) created thing is supplied
from another scriptural passage. And, in the same way as
the fact of the whole aggregate of things being produced
from Brahman—which is stated directly in the passage
‘ Let a man meditate with calm mind on that as begin¬
ning, ending and breathing in it 5 ( Kh . Up. Ill, 14, 1)—
does not impugn the order of creation stated elsewhere to
begin with fire; so also the statement as to fire being pro¬
duced from Brahman has no force to impugn the order of
creation which, in another scriptural passage, is said to
begin with ether.
But, it may be objected, the passage ‘ Let a man
meditate with calm mind/ &c. has the purpose of enjoin¬
ing calmness, and does not state anything with regard
to creation; it need not therefore adapt itself to the
order (of creation) established by another passage 1 . On
the other hand, the passage c It sent forth fire 5 refers to
the creation, and we must therefore accept the order
exactly as stated there.—This objection we refute by the
remark that it is not legitimate to abandon, from deference
to the circumstance of fire occupying the first place (in the
Kh. Up.), the thing, viz. the ether which is known (to
have been created) from another passage ; for order of
succession is a mere attribute of things (and therefore
subordinate to the latter). Moreover, in the passage c It
sent forth fire ’ we meet with no word directly indicating
the order of succession ; but we merely infer the latter
from the sense, and this (merely inferred) order is impugned
by the order established by another direct scriptural state-
1 Yatpara^ jabda^ sa jabdartho na >£aya m jabda^ srfsh/iparo*to
na prasiddhaw kramam badhitum alam iti. An. Gi.
12
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
ment, viz. ‘ From air there sprang fire/ Now with regard
to the question whether ether or fire were created first,
neither option nor addition are permissible, because the
former is impossible in itself, and the latter non-admitted
by the texts \ Hence the two scriptural passages are not
contradictory.—Moreover, in order to justify the promise
made in the ATMndogya in the beginning of the chapter
(‘ That instruction by which we hear what is not heard ’),
we have to count the ether, although ‘ not heard 5 (i. e. not
mentioned in the text) among the things produced ; how
much more impossible then is it for us not to accept the
statement actually made about the ether in the Taitti-
riyaka!—To the assertion, made above by the purvapak-
shin, that the ether as occupying the same space with
everything is known together with Brahman and its effects,
and that thus the assertion (of everything being known
through Brahman) is not contradicted; and that moreover
the scriptural passage ‘ one only, without a second ’ is not
contradicted, because Brahman and the ether may be con¬
sidered as non-separate, like milk and water, we make the
following reply. That knowledge of everything through
the knowledge of one thing (of which scripture speaks)
cannot be explained through the analogy of milk mixed
with water, because we understand from the parallel
instance of a piece of clay being brought forward ( Kh . Up.
VI, i, 4) that the knowledge of everything has to be ex¬
plained through the relation of the material cause and the
material effect (the knowledge of the cause implying the
knowledge of the effect). Moreover, the knowledge of every¬
thing, if assumed to be analogous to the case of the know¬
ledge of milk and water, could not be called a perfect
knowledge (samyag-vi^ana), because the water which is
1 An optional proceeding, i.e. the doctrine that either ether or
fire was the first product is impossible because only actions to be
done, not existing things, fall within the sphere of option ; addition,
i.e. the fact of fire and ether together being the first creation is not
admitted by scripture, which teaches a successive creation of the
elements.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7.
13
apprehended only through the knowledge of the milk (with
which it is mixed) is not grasped by perfect knowledge h
Nor can Vedic affirmations about things be viewed, like
ordinary human statements, as mixed up with error, un¬
truth, and deceit 1 2 * . And we should do violence to the
emphatic assertion made in the passage ‘ one only, without
a second,’ if we explained it according to the analogy of
milk mixed with water.—Nor must we explain the cog¬
nition of everything (through one thing), and the assertion
as to the one without a second, as referring only to a part
of existing things, viz. the avowed effects of Brahman (to
the exclusion of ether), on the ground that such is the case
in the parallel instances of clay and the like. For what is
said about clay and the like is not something altogether
new and independent; but has to be understood in con¬
nexion with the previous passage ‘ vSVetaketu, as you are
so conceited/ &c. We therefore must conclude that the
‘ knowledge of everything ’ has all things whatever for its
objects, and is here introduced with a view to showing that
everything is the effect of Brahman.
The next Sutra replies to the assertion, made by the
purvapakshin, that the passage which speaks of the origin
of ether is to be understood in a secondary sense, on
account of the impossibility (of ether having an origin).
7. But wherever there are effects, there is division ;
as in ordinary life.
The conjunction 4 but ’ is meant to exclude the suspicion
of impossibility.—We must not imagine the origin of ether
to be impossible, because wherever we observe effects
(modifications of a substance), such as jars, pots and urns,
or bracelets, armlets and earrings, or needles, arrows and
swords, we also observe division ; while, on the other hand,
1 For the water, although mixed with the milk, yet is different
from it.
2 But the promise that through the knowledge of one thing every¬
thing becomes known is to be taken in its full literal meaning.
vedanta-s6tras.
H
nothing which is not an effect is seen to be divided \ Now,
we apprehend ether as divided from earth and so on ; hence
ether also must be an effect. Thereby (i. e. by the circum¬
stance of their being divided) place (dL), time, mind
(manas) and the atoms also are shown to be effects.
But—an objection may be raised—the Self also is divided
from ether and so on, and hence it follows that it is an
effect like jars and the like.—This objection we refute by
pointing to the scriptural statement that ‘ ether sprang from
the Self’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1). For if the Self also were a mere
modification (of something else), it would follow that all
effects such as the ether and so on are without a Self 1 2 ; for
scripture mentions nothing beyond the Self, and that Self
itself would (on the supposition stated) be a mere effect.
And thus we should be driven to the hypothesis of a general
void (i-unyavada). Just because it is the Self, it is impos¬
sible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable
of refutation. For the (knowledge of the) Self is not, in any
person’s case, adventitious, not established through the so-
called means of right knowledge; it rather is self-established.
The Self does indeed employ perception and the other means
of right knowledge for the purpose of establishing previously
non-established objects of knowledge ; for nobody assumes
such things as ether and so on to be self-established inde¬
pendently of the means of right knowledge. But the Self,
as being the abode of the energy that acts through the
means of right knowledge, is itself established previously
to that energy. And to refute such a self-established entity
is impossible. An adventitious thing, indeed, may be re¬
futed, but not that which is the essential nature (of him
who attempts the refutation); for it is the essential nature
of him who refutes. The heat of a fire is not refuted (i. e.
sublated) by the fire itself.—Let us further consider the
relation expressed in the following clauses : 4 1 know at the
present moment whatever is present; I knew (at former
moments) the nearer and the remoter past; I shall know
1 Whatever is divided, is an effect, as jars, pots, &c. Whatever
is not an effect, is not divided, as the Self.
2 I. e. without a material cause.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7.
15
(in the future) the nearer and the remoter future/ Here
the object of knowledge changes according as it is some¬
thing past or something future or something present; but
the knowing agent does not change, since his nature is
eternal presence. And as the nature of the Self is eternal
presence, it cannot undergo destruction even when the
body is reduced to ashes; nay we cannot even conceive
that it ever should become something different from what
it is.—It thus follows from the essential irrefutability of its
nature that the Self is not an effect. The ether, on the
other hand, falls under the category of effected things.
To the objection, raised above by the purvapakshin,
that there is no plurality of homogeneous substances out of
which the ether could originate, we reply that it is not an
absolute law that effects should originate only from things
belonging to the same genus, not from such as belong to
different genera. Threads for instance and the conjunc¬
tions of threads 1 do not belong to the same genus, the
former being admitted to belong to the genus ‘substance/
the latter to the genus £ quality. 5 Nor again is there a
binding rule that the operative causes such as the shuttle,
the loom and so on should belong to the same genus.—
Well then let the doctrine that the causes must belong to
the same genus extend to the inherent causes only, not to
the other causes 2 .—But here also there is no absolute rule.
For we see that one and the same rope is made of things
belonging to different genera, such as threads and cow-
hair, and several kinds of cloth are woven of vegetable
thread and wool.—If it were assumed that the postulate of
the inherent causes belonging to the same genus refers
only to the genera of essentiality, substantiality, &c., the
rule would be a superfluous one; for in that sense every
inherent cause belongs to the same genus as every other 3 * .
1 Threads are the inherent cause of a piece of cloth; the con¬
junction of the threads constitutes the non-inherent cause ; the
loom, shuttle, &c. are the operative causes.
2 So much only was in fact insisted upon by the pflrvapakshin,
n, 3> 3-
8 An inherent cause is always a substance (dravya), and as such
i6
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
—Nor again is there an absolute rule that only a plurality
of inherent causes, not one such cause, is able to originate
an effect. For it is admitted that an atom as well as the
mind (manas) originate their first activity; i. e. one atom
by itself, and also the mind by itself, give rise to their
primary actions, without being in conjunction with other
substances.—And, should it be said that there is an absolute
rule as to several causes only having originating power in
the case of the origination of substances only (not in the
case of the origination of actions, &c.), we again deny that,
because it is admitted that there is such a thing as change
(transformation). An absolute rule, such as maintained by
you, would exist if substances did originate other sub¬
stances, only when assisted by conjunction (a non-inherent
cause). But, as a matter of fact, one and the same sub¬
stance, when passing over into a different state distin¬
guished by peculiar characteristic marks, is admitted to be
an effect. In some cases more substances than one undergo
the change, as when a young plant springs from seed and
earth ; in other cases one substance only changes, as when
milk turns into curds.—In short it is none of the Lord’s
laws that only several causes in conjunction should produce
an effect. We therefore decide, on the authority of scrip¬
ture, that the entire world has sprung from the one Brah¬
man, ether being produced first and later on the other
elements in due succession. A statement to that effect
has already been made above (II, i, 24).
The further assertion made by the purvapakshin, that on
the assumption of ether having had an origin it is impos¬
sible to conceive a difference between the former and later
periods (the time before and after the origination of ether)
is likewise unfounded; for we have to understand that that
very specialising difference 3 , from which we ascertain at
present that there is a thing such as ether, different from
earth and the other elements, did not exist before the
always falls under the notion of essentiality (satta), which constitutes
the summum genus for substances, qualities, and actions.
1 Viz. the quality of sound.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 7 .
17
origination of ether. And just as Brahman’s nature does
not participate in the nature of earth and the other ele¬
ments characterised by grossness and similar qualities,—
according to such scriptural passages as ‘ It is not gross, it
is not subtle,’—so also it does not participate in the nature
of ether, as we understand from the passage ‘ it is without
ether’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8). It therefore remains a settled
conclusion that, before ether was produced, Brahman existed
without ether.
The inference, drawn by the pftrvapakshin, that ether
has no beginning, because it differs in nature from those
substances which avowedly have a beginning, such as earth
and so on, is without any value; for, as it is contradicted
by scripture, it must be considered fallacious. We, on our
part, have brought forward arguments showing that ether
is an originated thing; and we may moreover reason as
follows : Ether is non-eternal, because it is the substratum
of a non-eternal quality, viz. sound, just as jars and other
things, which are the substrata of non-eternal qualities,
are themselves non-eternal.—Nor is there any danger of
this latter reasoning being extended to the Self also, for the
philosopher who takes his stand on the Upanishads does
not admit that the Self is the substratum of non-eternal
qualities. Moreover, those who teach ether to have an
origin do not consider it proved that it is all-pervading
and so on.
In reply to the remarks made under II, 3, 4 we point
out that those scriptural passages which speak of the
‘immortality of ether’ are to be understood in the same
way as the analogous statements about the immortality of
the gods \ since the origin and destruction of the ether have
been shown to be possible. And if it is said of Brahman
that c it is omnipresent and eternal like ether,’ Brahman is
there compared to ether, whose greatness is well known,
merely in order to indicate its supereminent greatness, not
in order to maintain its being equal to ether. Similarly,
when we say that the sun moves with the speed of an
1 I.e. as referring to a relative immortality only.
[38]
C
i8
vedanta-sCtras.
arrow, we merely mean that he moves fast, not that he
moves at the same rate as an arrow. This remark explains
that scriptural passage also in which Brahman is declared
to be infinite like ether.—On the other hand, such passages
as 4 It is greater than ether 5 prove that the extent of ether
is less than that of Brahman ; passages like 4 there is no
image of him ’ (Sve. Up. IV, 19) show that there is nothing
to compare Brahman to; and passages like 4 Everything
else is of evil’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 4, 2) show that everything
different from Brahman such as ether, &c. is of evil.—All
which serves to refute the assertion that the passage which
declares ether to have originated has to be taken in a
secondary sense, as the word Brahman actually has to be
taken in some passages. Scripture and reasoning in com¬
bination rather show that ether has an origin, and the final
conclusion therefore is that ether is an effect of Brahman.
8. Hereby air (also) is explained.
The present Sutra extends the reasoning concerning ether
to the air of which the ether is the abode.—The different
views about air also are to be arranged in an analogous
manner. The purvapakshin maintains that the air is not a
product, because it is not mentioned in that chapter of the
A 7 /andogya which treats of the origination of things.—
The opposite opinion is, that the air is mentioned in the
parallel chapter of the Taittiriyaka ( 4 from the ether sprang
the air ’).—The two scriptural passages being of a conflict¬
ing nature, the purvapakshin maintains that the passage
which declares the air to have originated must be taken in
a secondary sense; firstly on account of the impossibility
(of the literal sense being adopted), as shown (in the adhi-
kara;za treating of the ether); secondly on account of that
passage which denies that it ever sets, 4 Vctyu (the air) is the
deity that never sets’ (B ru Up. I, 5, 22); and thirdly on
account of those passages which declare it to be immortal.
The final opinion on the other hand is, that air is a pro¬
duct ; in the first place because this conclusion is conform¬
able to the general tendency of scripture ; and, in the
second place, because it is generally admitted that whatever
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 9 .
19
is divided is an effect.—The denial of its ever setting refers
to the lower knowledge (apara vidya J ) and is merely a
relative one, Vayu not setting in the same way as fire,
&c. The statement as to the immortality, &c. of air has
already received its reply (in the adhikara^a treating of
the ether).—Here it may be asked why, ether and air being
equally mentioned and not mentioned in the chapters
treating of the origin of the world, one adhikara;/a is not
considered to suffice for both, and why instead of that there
is made a formal extension of the former reasoning to the
latter case, although there is no difference between the two
cases.—To this w r e reply that there is indeed some reason
for the question; that, however, the formal extension is
made for the purpose of removing any doubts which might
possibly be engendered in the minds of slow-witted people
by mere words 1 2 . For as, in the S a varga vidya and other
passages, the glory of Vayu is referred to as an object of
worship ; and as scripture says that he never sets, &c.,
some men might think that he is eternal.
9. But there is no origin of that which is (i.e. of
Brahman), on account of the impossibility (of such
an origin).
Somebody, who has learned from scripture that ether
and air, although not in themselves likely to have originated,
yet actually are things with a beginning, might feel inclined
to suspect that Brahman itself has sprung from something
else.—And further somebody, who has learned from scripture
that from ether and the other elements which are themselves
mere effects further effects are produced, might think that
also Brahman, from which ether has sprung, is a mere effect.
—In order to remove this doubt the Sutra declares that Brah¬
man, whose Self is Being, must not be suspected to have
sprung from anything else ‘ on account of the impossibility/
Brahman which is mere Being cannot spring from mere
1 In which Brahman is spoken of as to be meditated upon under
the form of Vayu.
2 -Sabdanurodhiny eva janka na vastvanurodhiniti. An. Gi.
20
vedanta-sOtras.
being, since the relation of cause and effect cannot exist
without a certain superiority (on the part of the cause).
Nor again can Brahman spring from that which is some¬
thing particular, since this would be contrary to experience.
For we observe that particular forms of existence are pro¬
duced from what is general, as, for instance, jars and pots
from clay, but not that what is general is produced from
particulars. Nor again can Brahman spring from that which
is not (asat), for that which is not is without a Self 1 , and
moreover scripture expressly rejects that view, in the pas¬
sage f How could that which is spring from that which is
not?’ (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 2). Another passage, moreover,
expressly denies that Brahman has any progenitor, £ He is
the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is
of him neither progenitor nor lord’ (SVe. Up. VI, 9).—With
regard to ether and air the possibility of an origin has been
shown ; but in Brahmans case there is no such possibility ;
hence the cases are not parallel. Nor does the fact of other
effects springing from effects imply that Brahman also must
be an effect; for the non-admission of a fundamental causal
substance would drive us to a retrogressus in infinitum. And
that fundamental causal substance which as a matter of
fact is generally acknowledged to exist, just that is our
Brahman.—Thus there is not any contradiction.
10. Fire (is produced) thence (i.e. from air); for
thus (the text) declares.
In the TTMndogya it is said that fire has for its source
that which is (Brahman), in the Taittiriyaka that it has the
air for its source. There being thus a conflict of scriptural
passages with regard to the origin of fire, the pur-
vapakshin maintains that fire has Brahman for its source.
—Why?—Because the text, after having stated at the outset
that there existed only that which is, teaches that it sent
forth fire; and because the assertion of everything being
known through Brahman is possible only in case of every-
1 And cannot therefore constitute a cause; for a cause is the
Self of its effects.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, IO.
21
thing being produced from Brahman; and because the
scriptural statement as to the ‘ Tag^alan ’ ( Kh . Up. Ill,
14, x) specifies no difference 1 ; and because another scrip¬
tural passage (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) teaches that everything
without exception is born from Brahman. The Taittiriyaka
also makes a statement about the entire world without any
exception, ‘after having brooded he sent forth all whatever
there is’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6). Hence the statement that
‘fire was produced from air 5 (Taitt. Up. II, 1) must be
considered to teach the order of succession only ‘ fire was
produced subsequently to air/
To this the Sutra replies that fire was produced thence,
i. e. from air, because the text declares it to be so—‘ from
air sprang fire/ For if fire had sprung directly from Brah¬
man and not from air, the scriptural statement that ‘ fire
sprang from air ’ would be contradicted thereby. That
that statement should intimate the order of succession
merely, as maintained by the purvapakshin, we cannot admit.
For as in the preceding sentence (‘from that Self sprang
ether ’) the fifth case (atmana^) denotes the Self as that
from which the origination proceeds, and as the same verb
( c sprang ’) governs our sentence also, and as in the following
sentences also—such as ‘ from earth the herbs ’—the fifth
case (pnthivya/z) denotes that from which something pro¬
ceeds, we understand that in our sentence also the fifth case
(vayo^) denotes that from which fire proceeds. Moreover,
if we should explain our sentence to mean ‘ after air fire was
produced,’ we should have to supply some preposition
(or adverb as ‘after,’ ‘subsequently’), while that construction
which rests on the proper sense of the fifth case-affix is
ready made at hand and does not require anything to be
supplied. The passage therefore intimates that fire springs
from air.—But, it may be said, the other scriptural passage
(‘it sent forth fire’) intimates that fire springs from Brahman.
—Not so, we reply; for this latter passage remains uncon¬
tradicted, even if we assume that fire sprang from Brahman
only through intermediate links (not directly).
1 But implies the whole world to have sprung from Brahman.
22
vedanta-sOtras.
Even the supposition that Brahman, after having created
ether and air, assumed the form of air and thus created fire
would not be opposed to fire having sprung from Brahman;
for we may say equally that milk comes from the cow, that
curds come from the cow, that cheese comes from the cow.
There is, moreover, a scriptural passage declaring that Brah¬
man abides as the Self of its effects, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 7,
4 That made itself its Self.’ And analogously Smrzti—in
the passage beginning £ Cognition, knowledge, steadiness of
mind’ (Bha. Gi. X, 4) — says about the Lord, ‘From me
only spring the manifold states of the beings.’ For
although cognition and so on are observed to spring
directly from their immediate causes, yet (the assertion
made in the passage quoted holds good), since the entire
aggregate of beings is, directly or indirectly, derived from
the Lord.—Thereby those scriptural passages are accounted
for which speak of the creation (on the whole) without
specifying the order of succession 1 ; for they may be ex¬
plained anyhow, while on the other hand the passages
specifying the order of creation cannot be turned in any
other way (i.e. not away from their direct sense). The
general assertion, moreover, of everything springing from
Brahman requires only that all things should ultimately
proceed from that which is, not that they should be its
immediate effects.—Thus there remains no difficulty.
11. Water (is produced from fire).
We have to supply from the preceding Sutra the words
‘ thence ’ and ‘ for thus the text declares.’—Water is pro¬
duced from fire; for the text says, ‘ it sent forth water ’
(Kk. Up. VI, 2, 3), and c from fire (sprang) water’ (Taitt.
Up. II, 1). These explicit statements allow no room for
doubt 2 . The Sutrakara, however, having explained the
creation of fire, and being about to explain the creation of
1 I.e. it appears from the preceding discussion that those passages
have to be explained in such a way as to agree with those other
passages which state the order of the created beings.
2 So that the Sfitra might possibly be looked upon as not
called for.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 12.
23
earth, propounds this Sutra in order to insert water (and
thus to point out its position in the srzsh/ikrama).
12. The earth (is meant by the word 'anna'), on
account of the subject-matter, the colour, and other
passages.
We read, 4 Water thought, may I be many, may I grow
forth. It sent forth food (anna) ’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 2, 4).—
Here a doubt arises, whether the word ‘ anna 5 denotes
things fit to be used as food, such as rice, barley and the
like ; or cooked food ; or else the earth.
The purvapakshin maintains that the word is to be
understood in the former sense; for, he says, the word
‘ anna ’ means ‘ food ’ in ordinary language, and is moreover
confirmed in that sense by the complementary passage,
‘ Therefore whenever it rains anywhere, most food is then
produced; 5 for when it rains, rice, barley and the like, but
not earth, are produced in abundance.
To this we reply that by the word ‘ anna 5 we have to
understand earth as being produced from water.—Why ?—
On account of the subject-matter, on account of the colour,
and on account of other passages.—The subject-matter, in
the first place, is clearly connected with the elements, as we
see from the preceding passages, ‘ it sent forth fire, it sent
forth water.’ It would therefore be improper to pass over
a further element, viz. earth, when its turn has come, and
to assume without reason that rice and the like are meant
by the word 4 anna. 5 —In the second place, we find that in a
complementary passage there is mentioned a colour which
agrees with earth, 4 the black colour (of fire) is the colour
of anna. 5 Eatable things on the other hand, such as cooked
dishes, and rice, barley and the like, are not necessarily
black.—But earth too is not necessarily black ; for the soil
of some fields has a whitish colour like milk, and that of
others looks red like glowing coals !—True, but that does
not affect our argument, since what we have to look to is
the predominant colour. Now the predominant colour of
earth is black, not either white or red. The Pauramkas also
designate the colour of the earth by the term ‘ night 5
24
VEDANTA-stlTRAS.
(jarvarf); now the night is black, and we therefore conclude
that black is the colour of earth also.—In the third
place other scriptural passages also, which refer to the same
subject, declare that 4 from water (sprang) earth ’ (Taitt. Up.
II, i), and that 4 what was there as the froth of the water,
that was hardened and became the earth ’ (B ri. Up. I, 2, 2)4
On the other hand the text declares that rice and the like
were produced from the earth, ‘ From earth sprang herbs,
from herbs food ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1).—As, thus, the general
subject-matter as well as other arguments clearly proves
that the word 4 anna ’ here denotes earth, we can in no way
accept the view that rice and the like are referred to. The
common use of language to which the purvapakshin appeals
is of no avail against the arguments favouring our interpre¬
tation. The complementary passage also ( 4 whenever it
rains,’ &c.) is to be viewed as pointing out that, owing to
the earthy nature of food (rice, &c.), earth itself mediately
springs from water.—For all these reasons the word 4 anna 5
denotes this earth.
13. But on account of the indicatory mark supplied
by their reflecting (i.e. by the reflection^ attributed
to the elements), he (i.e. the Lord is the creative
principle abiding within the elements).
A doubt here arises whether ether and the other elements
do themselves send forth their effects, or if the highest
Lord abiding within certain Selfs produces, after reflection,
certain effects.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the elements them¬
selves send forth, because the texts speak of them as acting
independently; compare, for instance, 'from ether sprang air,
from air fire,’ &c. The objection that non-intelligent beings
cannot enter on independent activity is invalidated by the
fact that the elements also are spoken of in the sacred texts
as endowed with intelligence, cf. for instance, 4 fire thought/
4 water thought ’ (Kk. Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4).
To this we reply that the highest Lord himself abiding
within certain Selfs sends forth, after reflection, certain
effects.—Why ?—On account of the indicatory marks. For
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4 .
25
texts such as * he who dwells in the earth, and within the
earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth
is and who rules the earth within 5 show that the elements
enter on their activity only if presided over by an intelligent
principle. Texts such as ‘ He became sat and tyat ’ (which
occurs in the passage, ‘ he wished may I be many, may I
grow forth/ Taitt. Up. II, 6) and ‘ It made itself its Self’ (i. e.
the Self of everything which exists ; II, 7) show that he
(the highest Lord) is the Self of everything. The thinking
and hearing which the texts attribute to water and fire must
be viewed as due to the fact of the highest Lord having
entered them; for the passage, ‘ there is no other seer but
he/ denies there being any other seer (thinker), and that
which is (i.e. Brahman), in the character of seer (or thinker),
constitutes the subject-matter of the whole chapter; as we
conclude from the introductory passage, f It thought, may I
be many, may I grow forth ’ (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3).
14. The order (in which the elements are retracted
into Brahman) is the reverse of that (i.e. the order
in which they are created); this is proved (by its
agreement with observation).
Having considered the order of the creation of the
elements we now proceed to consider the order of their
retractation.—The question here is whether their retracta¬
tion takes place in an indefinite order, or in the order of
the creation, or in the inverse order. That the origin, the
subsistence and the retractation of the elements all depend
on Brahman, scripture declares ‘ That from whence these
beings are born, that by which when born they live, that
into which they enter at their death/
The purvapakshin maintains that the retractation of the
elements is not bound to any definite order, because scrip¬
ture contains no specific information on the point. Or else,
he says, let him who wishes to know the order of the re¬
tractation accept the order of creation, since the latter is
expressly mentioned in the texts.
To this we reply that the order of retractation must be
viewed as the reverse of the order of creation. For we see
26
VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.
in ordinary life that a man who has ascended a stair has, in
descending, to take the steps in the reverse order. More¬
over we observe that things made of clay, such as jars,
dishes, &c., on being destroyed pass back into clay, and that
things which have originated from water, such as snow and
hailstones, again dissolve into water. Hence we rightly
assume that earth which has (according to scripture) sprung
from water passes back into water when the period of its
subsistence comes to an end, and that water which has
sprung from fire passes back into fire. In this way each
particular effect passes back into its immediately antece¬
dent cause—each cause being of a subtler nature than its
effect—until in the end the last cause is refunded into
Brahman, the ultimate and most subtle of all causes. It
certainly would be irrational to assume that an effect, pass¬
ing over its immediate cause, should at once refund itself
into the cause of the cause. Smrz'ti also declares that the
order of retractation is the order of origination inverted,
‘ The earth, the basis of the world, is dissolved into water,
O divine Ri : shi, the water into fire, the fire into air/ The
order of creation is indeed stated in the sacred texts, but
that statement refers to creation only, and can therefore
not be extended to retractation. We, moreover, cannot
even desire to apply the order in which the elements are
created to their retractation also since it is clearly unsuit¬
able in the latter case. For, as long as an effect subsists, it
is impossible to assume the dissolution of the cause, since
on the dissolution of the latter the effect also cannot exist.
On the other hand, we may assume a continued existence
of the cause although the effect be destroyed ; for that is
actually observed in the case of clay (and the things made
of it).
15. If it be said that between (Brahman and the
elements) the intellect and mind (are mentioned ;
and that therefore their origination and retractation
are to be placed) somewhere in the series, on
account of there being inferential signs (whereby the
order of the creation of the elements is broken); we
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 5 .
27
deny that, on account of the non-difference (of the
organs and the elements).
In what precedes we have said that the creation and the
retractation of the elements take place in direct and reverse
order; further that the creation proceeds from the Self,
and that the retractation terminates in the Self.—Now
*Sruti as well as Smrzti enlightens us concerning the exist¬
ence of the mind (manas) together with the senses, and of
the intellect (buddhi); compare, for instance, the indicatory
marks contained in the passage, Ka.Up. 1,3, 3.4, ‘ Know the
intellect to be the charioteer and the mind the reins; the
senses they call the horses/ &c. And as the whole aggre¬
gate of beings avowedly springs from Brahman, we must
assume that the mind, the intellect and the senses also
originate from it and are again merged in it in due order,
occupying a definite place among the things created and
retracted. Moreover the Atharvazza (Muzz^aka), in the
chapter treating of the creation, mentions the organs
between the Self and the elements, ‘ From him is born
breath, mind and all organs of sense, ether, air, light,
water and the earth the support of all ’ (II, 1, 3). And
from this there results a break in the previously stated
order of the creation and the retractation of the elements.
This we deny, on account of the non-difference (of the
organs from the elements). If the organs themselves are of
the nature of the elements, their origination and retracta¬
tion are the same as those of the elements, and we therefore
have not to look out in their case for a different order.
And that the organs are of the nature of the elements, for
that we have inferential marks, in passages such as the
following, 4 for mind, my child, consists of earth, breath of
water, speech of fire 5 ( Kh . Up. VI, 6, 5). That the organs
(although in reality belonging to the elements) are some¬
times mentioned separately from them, is to be understood
in the same way as when the Parivra^akas (mendicant
Brahmazzas) are spoken of separately from the Br&hmazzas.
And supposing even that the organs are not of the nature
of the elements, still the order of the origin of the elements
28
VEDANTA-Stj'TRAS.
would not be interfered with by the organs; for we might
assume either that the organs are produced first and the
elements last; or else that the elements are produced first
and the organs last. In the Atharva^a-upanishad quoted
above we have merely a serial enumeration of the organs
and the elements, not a statement as to the order of their
origination. Similarly in other places also the series of the
organs is recorded apart from the series of the elements ; so,
for instance, in the following passage, £ Pra^apati indeed was
all this in the beginning, he reflected on himself; he sent
forth mind ; there was mind only ; mind reflected on itself; it
sent forth speech,’ &c.—Hence the origination of the organs
does not cause a break in the order of the origination of the
elements.
16. But the designation (as being born and dying)
abides in the (bodies of beings) moving and non¬
moving ; it is secondary (metaphorical) if applied to
the soul, as the existence (of those terms) depends
on the existence of that (i.e. the body).
On account of certain popular modes of expression such
as £ Devadatta is born,’ £ Devadatta has died,’ and the like,
and on account of certain ceremonies such as the Gataka-
karman, some people might fall into the error of thinking
that the individual soul has a beginning, and in the end
undergoes destruction. This error we are going to dispel.
—The individual soul has no beginning and is not subject
to dissolution, since thus only it can be connected with the
results of actions, as the 6astra teaches. If the individual
soul perished after the body, there would be no sense
in the religious injunctions and prohibitions referring to
the enjoyment and avoidance of pleasant and unpleasant
things in another body (another birth). And scripture says,
£ This body indeed dies when the living soul has left it, the
living soul does not die’ (Kh. Up. VI, n, 3).—But it has
been pointed out above that ordinary language speaks of
the birth and the death of the individual soul!—True ; but
the terms £ birth ’ and £ death,’ if applied to the soul, have to
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7 .
29
be taken in a secondary sense.—What then is that thing to
which those words apply in their primary sense, and with
reference to which we can speak of a secondary sense ?—
They apply, we answer, to whatever moves and whatever
does not move. The words ‘ birth ’ and ‘ death ’ have refer¬
ence to the bodies of moving and non-moving beings; for
such beings are born (produced) and die. To them the
terms ‘birth' and ‘death' apply in their primary sense;
while they are used metaphorically only with reference to
the soul dwelling in them. For their existence (i. e. their
being used) depends on the existence of the body ; i. e.
the words ‘ birth ’ and ‘ death ’ are used where there take
place the manifestation and disappearance of bodies, not
where they are absent. For nobody ever observes a soul
being born or dying, apart from its connexion with a body.
That the words ‘ birth ’ and ‘ death ’ have reference to the
conjunction with—and separation from—a body merely, is
also shown by the following passage : ‘ On being born that
person assuming his body, &c.; when he passes out (of the
body) and dies,’ &c. (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 8). The ^ata-ceremony
also is to be viewed as having reference to the manifestation
of the body only ; for the soul is not manifested.—Whether
the individual soul is produced from the highest Self like
ether, &c. or not, will be discussed in the next Sutra; the
present Sutra merely states that the gross origination and
dissolution which belong to the body do not affect the
soul.
17. The (living) Self is not (produced) as there is
no scriptural statement, and as it is eternal according
to them (i. e. scriptural passages).
There is a Self called the living one (the individual soul),
which rules the body and the senses, and is connected with
the fruits of actions. With regard to that Self the con¬
flict of scriptural passages suggests the doubt, whether it is
produced from Brahman like ether and the other elements,
or if, like Brahman itself, it is unproduced. Some scrip¬
tural passages, by comparing it to sparks proceeding from
a fire and so on, intimate that the living soul is produced
30
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
from Brahman; from others again we learn that the
highest Brahman, without undergoing any modification,
passes, by entering into its effects (the elements), into the
condition of the individual soul. These latter passages do
not thus record an origination of the individual soul.
The purvapakshin maintains that the individual soul is
produced, because on that view the general promissory
statement is not contradicted. For the general assertion
that 4 by one thing being known all this is known ’ is not
contradicted, only if the entire aggregate of things springs
from Brahman ; while it would be contradicted by the
assumption of the individual soul being a thing of a dif¬
ferent kind. Nor can the individual soul be conceived as
mere unmodified highest Self, on account of the difference
of their respective characteristics. For the highest Self is
characterised by freedom from sin and so on, while the
individual soul possesses the opposite attributes. That it
is an effect, follows moreover from its being divided. For
ether and all other things, in so far as divided, are effects,
and we have concluded therefrom that they have an origin.
Hence the soul also, which is distributed through all the
bodies, doing good and evil and experiencing pleasure and
pain, must be considered to originate at the time when
the entire world is produced. We have moreover the fol¬
lowing scriptural passage, ‘As small sparks come forth
from fire, thus from that Self all vital airs/ &c. (B ri. Up.
II, i, 20). This text teaches first the creation of the
aggregate of objects of fruition, beginning with the vital
airs, and then (in the words, ‘all the Selfs’) separately
teaches the creation of all the enjoying souls. Again we
have the passage, ‘As from a blazing fire sparks, being of
the same nature as fire, fly forth a thousandfold, thus are
various beings brought forth from the Imperishable, my
friend, and return hither also ’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 1); a passage
descriptive of the origin and the retractation of the souls, as
we infer from the statement about the sameness of nature 1 .
1 That the word bhava h ‘ beings' here means ‘ individual souls/
we conclude from their being said to have the same nature as the
Imperishable.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7 .
31
For the individual souls are of the same nature as Brahman,
because they are endowed with intelligence. Nor can the
fact that in some places (as, for instance, in the accounts of
the creation of the elements) the creation of the soul is
not mentioned, invalidate what is stated about it in other
places; it being a general principle of interpretation that
whatever new, and at the same time non-contradictory,
matter is taught in some scriptural passage has to be com¬
bined with the teaching of all other passages. Hence that
passage also which speaks of the Self entering (into its
effects and thus becoming ^iva) must be explained as
stating the Self’s passing over into an effect (viz. the soul),
analogously to such passages as ‘that made itself its Self,’
&c. (Taitt. Up. II, 7).—From all which it follows that the
individual soul is a product.
To all this we reply, that the individual soul is not a
product.—Why ?—On account of the absence of scriptural
statement. For in the chapters which treat of the creation,
the production of the soul is, in most cases, not mentioned.
—But, it was admitted above that the circumstance of some¬
thing not being stated in some places does not invalidate
the statements made about it elsewhere.—True, that was
admitted; but we now declare that the production of the
soul is not possible.—Why ?—‘ On account of the eternity,
&c., resulting from them’ (i. e. the scriptural passages).
The word ‘ &c.’ implies non-originatedness and similar
attributes. For we know from scriptural passages that the
soul is eternal, that it has no origin, that it is unchanging,
that what constitutes the soul is the unmodified Brahman,
and that the soul has its Self in Brahman. A being of
such a nature cannot be a product. The scriptural
passages to which we are alluding are the following:—
‘The living Self dies not’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 11, 3); ‘ This great
unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is
indeed Brahman ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 25); ‘ The knowing Self
is not born, it dies not’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); ‘The Ancient
is unborn, eternal, everlasting ’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); ‘ Having
sent forth that he entered into it’ (Taitt. Up. II, 6); ‘Let
me now enter those with this living Self and let me then
32
VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.
evolve names and forms ’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 3, 2) ; £ He entered
thither to the very tips of the finger-nails ’ (B ri. Up. I, 4, 7);
‘ Thou art that ’ [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); £ I am Brahman ’ (B ri.
Up.I,4,io); £ This Self is Brahman knowing all* (Bn.Up.
II, 5,19).—All these texts declare the eternity of the soul,
and thus militate against the view of its having been pro¬
duced.—But it has been argued above that the soul must
be a modification because it is divided, and must have an
origin because it is a modification !—It is not, we reply, in
itself divided ; for scripture declares that £ there is one God
hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all
beings’ (Sve. Up. VI, 11); it only appears divided owing
to its limiting adjuncts, such as the mind and so on, just
as the ether appears divided by its connexion with jars
and the like. Scripture (viz. B ri. Up. IV, 4, 5, £ that Self
is indeed Brahman, made up of knowledge, mind, life, sight,
hearing,’ &c.) also declares that the one unmodified Brah¬
man is made up of a plurality of intellects (buddhi), &c. By
Brahman being made up of mind and so on is meant, that its
nature is coloured thereby, while the fact of its being entirely
separate from it is non-apparent. Analogously we say that
a mean, cowardly fellow is made up of womanishness.—
The casual passages which speak of the soul’s production
and dissolution must therefore be interpreted on the ground
of the soul’s connexion with its limiting adjuncts ; when the
adjunct is produced or dissolved, the soul also is said to be
produced or dissolved. Thus scripture also declares, £ Being
altogether a mass of knowledge, having risen from out of
these elements it again perishes after them. When he has
departed there is no more knowledge’ (B ru Up. IV, 5,13).
What is meant there, is only the dissolution of the limiting
adjuncts of the Self, not the dissolution of the Self itself 1 .
The text itself explains this, in reply to Maitreyfs ques-
1 Hence the phrase, £ there is no more knowledge,’—which seems
to contradict the term £ a mass of knowledge,’—only means that,
on the limiting adjuncts being dissolved, there is no longer any
knowledge of distinctions.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8 .
33
tion ( £ Here, Sir, thou hast landed me in utter bewilder¬
ment. Indeed I do not understand him, that when he has
departed there is no more knowledge 5 ), in the words, £ I say-
nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is
imperishable and of an indestructible nature. But it enters
into contact with the sense organs. 5 — Non-contradiction
moreover of the general assertion (about everything being
known through one) results only from the acknowledgment
that Brahman is the individual soul. The difference of the
attributes of both is also owing to the limiting adjuncts
only. Moreover the words e Speak on for the sake of final
deliverance 5 (uttered by Canaka with reference to the in¬
struction he receives from Ya^avalkya about the vi^ana-
maya atman) implicitly deny that the Self consisting of
knowledge (i.e. the individual soul) possesses any of the
attributes of transitory existence, and thus show it to be
one with the highest Self.—From all this it follows that
the individual soul does not either originate or undergo
destruction.
18. For this very reason (the individual soul is)
intelligent.
Owing to the conflicting views of the philosophical
schools there arises a doubt whether, as the followers
of Ka//ada think, the soul is in itself non-intelligent, so
that its intelligence is merely adventitious; or if, as the
Sankhyas think, eternal intelligence constitutes its very
nature.
The purvapakshin maintains that the intelligence of the
Self is adventitious, and is produced by the conjunction of the
Self with the mind (manas),just as, for instance, the quality
of redness is produced in a jar by the conjunction of the jar
with fire. For if the soul were of eternal (essential) intel¬
ligence, it would remain intelligent in the states of deep
sleep, swoon, and possession, while as a matter of fact, men
when waking from sleep and so on declare in reply to
questions addressed to them that they were not conscious
of anything. Men in their ordinary state, on the other hand,
are seen to be (actively) intelligent. Hence, as intelli-
34
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
gence is clearly intermittent, we conclude that the Self’s
intelligence is adventitious only.
To this we reply that the soul is of eternal intelligence,
for that very reason that it is not a product but nothing
else but the unmodified highest Brahman which, owing to
the contact with its limiting adjuncts, appears as individual
soul. That intelligence constitutes the essential nature of
the highest Brahman, we know from scriptural passages
such as ‘Brahman is knowledge and bliss’ (B ri. Up. Ill,
9, 28, 7); ‘Brahman is true, knowledge, infinite’ (Taitt.
Up. II, 1); ‘Having neither inside nor outside, but being
altogether a mass of knowledge’ (B ri. Up. IV, 5, 13).
Now, if the individual soul is nothing but that highest
Brahman, then eternal intelligence constitutes the soul’s
essential nature also, just as light and heat constitute the
nature of fire. In the chapter treating of that which con¬
sists of knowledge, there are, moreover, passages (directly
declaring that the individual soul is of the nature of self-
luminous intelligence), ‘ He not asleep himself looks down
upon the sleeping (senses)’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 11); ‘That
person is self-illuminated 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14); ‘For there
is no intermission of the knowing of the knower’ (B ri. Up.
IV, 3, 30). That the soul’s nature is intelligence, follows
moreover from the passage (. Kh . Up. VIII, 12, 4) where
it is represented as connected with knowledge through all
sense-organs, ‘ He who knows, let me smell this, he is the
Self,’ &c. &c.—From the soul’s essential nature being
intelligence it does not follow that the senses are useless ;
for they serve the purpose of determining the special object
of each sense, such as smell and so on. This is expressly
declared by scripture, ‘ Smell is for the purpose of per¬
ceiving odour’ (. Kh . Up. VIII, 12, 4).—The objection that
sleeping persons are not conscious of anything is refuted
by scripture, where we read concerning a man lying in
deep sleep, ‘And when there he does not see, yet he is
seeing though he does not see. For there is no inter¬
mission of the seeing of the seer, because it cannot perish.
But there is then no second, nothing else different from
him that he could see’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 23). That means:
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9 .
35
The absence of actual intelligising is due to the absence of
objects, not to the absence of intelligence ; just as the light
pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of
things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature.
—The reasoning of the VaLreshikas and others is, as contra¬
dicting scripture, merely fallacious, and we therefore decide
that eternal intelligence is the essential nature of the soul.
19. (On account of the scriptural declarations) of
(the souls) passing out, going and returning, (the
soul is of atomic size).
We now have to consider of what size the soul is,
whether of atomic size or of a medium size, or of great
(infinite) size.—But, it has been shown above that the soul
is not a product and that eternal intelligence constitutes
its nature, whence it follows that it is identical with the
highest Self. Now the infinity of the highest Self is clearly
stated in scripture ; what need then is there of a discussion
of the soul’s size?—True, we reply; but certain scriptural
passages which speak of the soul’s passing out, going and
returning, establish the prima facie view that the soul is
of limited size, and moreover in some places scripture
expressly declares it to be of atomic size. The present
discussion is therefore begun for the purpose of clearing up
this doubtful point.
The purvapakshin maintains that, on account of its being
said to pass out, go and return, the soul must be held to
be of limited, atomic size. Its passing out is mentioned
(Kau. Up. Ill, 3), ‘And when he passes out of this body
he passes out together with all these; ’ its going (Kau.
Up. I, 2), ‘All who depart from this world go to the
moon ; * its returning (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6), ‘ From that world
he returns again to this world of action.’ From these
statements as to the soul’s passing out, going and re¬
turning it follows that it is of limited size. For motion
is impossible in the case of an all-pervading being. And
a limited size being once admitted, we have to conclude
more especially that the size is atomic, since the hypothesis
D 2
36
VEDANTA-SfJTRAS.
of the soul being of the same size as the body has already
been refuted in our examination of the Arhata-system.
20. And on account of the two latter (i.e. going
and returning) being connected with their Self (i.e.
the agent), (the soul is of atomic size).
We admit that ‘passing out’ might possibly be at¬
tributed to the soul even if it does not move, viz. if that
expression be taken to mean the soul’s ceasing to be the
ruler of the body, in consequence of the results of its
former actions having become exhausted ; just as some¬
body when ceasing to be the ruler of a village may be said
to ‘go out.’ But the two latter activities, viz. going and
returning, are not possible in the case of something which
does not move; for they are both connected with the own
Self (of the agent), going (and coming back) being activi¬
ties abiding in the agent 1 . Now going and coming are
possible for a being that is not of medium size, only if it
is of atomic size. And as going and coming must be taken
in their literal sense, we conclude that the passing out also
means nothing but the soul’s actual moving out of the
body. Tor the soul cannot go and return without first
having moved out of the body. Moreover certain parts
of the body are mentioned as the points from which the
soul starts in passing out, viz. in the following passage,
‘ Either from the eye or from the skull or from other
places of the body (the Self passes out) ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 2).
Other passages mention that the embodied soul goes and
comes within the body also; so, for instance, ‘ He taking
with him those elements of light descends into the heart ’
(B ri. Up. IV, 4, 1); ‘ Having assumed light he again goes to
his place* (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 11).—Thereby the atomic size
of the soul is established as well.
21. If it be said that (the soul is) not atomic, on
account of scriptural statements about what is not
that (i.e. what is opposed to atomic size); we deny
1 Going is known to be an activity inherent in the agent, from
the fact of its producing effects inherent in him, such as his con¬
junction with—or disjunction from—other things.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2 2.
37
that, on account of the other one (the highest Self)
being the subject-matter (of those passages).
Nevertheless, it may be objected, the soul cannot be of
atomic size, because there are scriptural statements of what
is not that, i.e. because there are scriptural statements of
its size being the opposite of atomic size. So that by
accepting the alternative of atomic size we should place
ourselves in opposition to scriptural passages such as the
following, 4 He is that great unborn Self who consists of
knowledge, is surrounded by the Pranas, the ether within
the heart ’ (B ru Up. IV, 4, 22); 4 Like the ether he is omni¬
present, eternal‘Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman’
(Taitt. Up. II. 1).
This objection, the purvapakshin replies, is not valid
‘on account of the other one forming the subject of dis¬
cussion. 5 For those statements about a size different (from
the atomic one) occur under the heading of the highest
Self which on account of its pre-eminence constitutes the
general object of knowledge in all Vedanta-texts; and
moreover the passage, ‘ It is spotless, beyond the ether ’
(Bn. Up. IV, 4, 20), specially proves that the highest
Self constitutes the subject-matter (in the passage quoted
above from the Bri. Up.). Thus with regard to the other
passages also.—But from the expressions, ‘consisting of
knowledge, surrounded by the pranas,’ it appears that
the embodied Self only (not the highest Self) is designated
as connected with greatness.—That designation, the purva¬
pakshin replies, is founded on an intuition, vouched for by
scripture, as in the case of Vamadeva 1 .—As therefore the
statements of a different size refer to the highest Self
(pra^Tza), they do not militate against the view of the in¬
dividual soul being of atomic size.
22. And also on account of direct statement, and
of inference.
The soul is of atomic size for that reason also that
scripture contains a direct statement to that effect, ‘ By
1 Who ‘ paramarthadr/sh/ya ’ identifies himself with everything
in the universe. (Afrg-veda Sa^hita IV, 26. 1 ff.).
38
vedanta-sCtras.
thought is to be known that atomic Self into which
breath has entered fivefold 5 (Mu. Up. Ill, i, 9). That the
Self spoken of there as atomic is the living Self, i.e. the
individual soul, we see from its connexion with breath.—
Inference also favours the conclusion that the soul is of
atomic size ; i.e. we infer that from such passages as ‘ That
living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part
of the point of a hair divided a hundred times ’ (vSVe. Up.
V, 9), and, c That lower one also is seen small even like the
point of a goad.’—But, an objection may here be raised,
if the soul is assumed to be of atomic size, and therefore
to occupy one point of the body only, the fact of sensation
extending over the whole body would appear contrary to
reason. And yet it is a matter of experience that men
bathing in the Ganges or in a pond experience the sen¬
sation of cold over their whole bodies, and again that in
summer people feel hot all over the body.—To this ob¬
jection the following Sutra replies.
23. There is no contradiction, as in the case of
sandal-ointment.
Just as a drop of sandal-ointment, although in actual
contact with one spot of the body only, yet produces a
refreshing sensation extending over the whole body ; so the
soul, although abiding in one point of the body only, may
be the cause of a perception extending over the entire body.
And as the soul is connected with the skin (which is the seat
of feeling), the assumption that the soul’s sensations should
extend over the whole body is by no means contrary to
reason. For the connexion of the soul and the skin abides
in the entire skin, and the skin extends over the whole
body.
24. If it be said (that the two cases are not
parallel), on account of the specialisation of abode
(present in the case of the sandal-ointment, absent in
the case of the soul); we deny that, on account of
the acknowledgment (by scripture, of a special place
of the soul), viz. within the heart.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 25 .
39
Here it may be objected that the argumentation relied
upon in the last Sutra is not admissible, because the two
cases compared are not parallel. If it were a settled
mfetter that the soul dwells in one point of the body, the
drop of sandal-ointment might be adduced as a parallel
instance. But, as a matter of fact, we know from per¬
ception that the drop of sandal-ointment is in contact with
one spot of the body only, just as we know that it refreshes
the whole body; while in the case of the soul observation
tells us only that it is percipient all over the body, but
not that it abides in one spot.—Should it be said that the
latter point must be settled by inference, we reply that
inference is here of no use, because it is not capable of
removing the doubt whether the perception extending over
the whole body belongs to a soul which extends over the
whole body like the skin and the sense of touch inhering
in it, or to a soul which is all-pervading like ether, or to
a soul which, like a drop of ointment, is minute and abides
in one spot only h
This objection, the purvapakshin replies, is unfounded ‘on
account of the acknowledgment of a speciality of abode,’
an abiding in one spot of the body being admitted in the
case of the soul no less than in the case of a drop of
ointment. For we read in the Vedanta-texts that the soul
abides within the heart; cp. for instance, the information
given (in Pr. Up. Ill, 6), ‘ The Self is in the heart( Kh . Up.
VIII, 3, 3), ‘That Self abides in the heart(Bn. Up. IV,
3, 7), ‘ Who is that Self?—He who is within the heart,
surrounded by the Pranas, the person of light, consisting
of knowledge.’—As therefore the two cases compared are
not devoid of parallelism, the argumentation resorted to
in Sutra 23 is unobjectionable.
25. Or on account of (its) quality (viz. intelligence),
as in cases of ordinary experience.
1 We cannot reason as follows, ‘ The soul is atomic because it
produces effects extending (over the whole body), like a drop of
sandal-ointment; ’ for that reasoning would apply to the sense of
touch (the skin) also, which we know not to be of atomic size.
40
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
That the soul although atomic produces effects extend¬
ing over the whole body, is not contrary to reason, on
account of the pervadingness of intellect which is its
quality. From ordinary experience we know that luminous
things, such as lamps or gems, although occupying only
one spot of a chamber, produce, by means of their light
which fills the chamber, an effect in every part of the
chamber.—This Sutra has the purpose of removing the
doubts of those who might object that sandal-ointment,
because consisting of parts, may perhaps refresh the entire
body by the diffusion of imperceptible particles; that,
however, the soul as a mere atom does not possess any
parts by means of which it could diffuse itself through the
whole body.—But how can a quality extend beyond that
in which it inheres, and abide elsewhere? We certainly
do not see that the whiteness which is the quality of a
piece of cloth extends beyond that piece of cloth to other
places. Nor must you say that the case of the soul is
analogous to that of the light diffused from a lamp; for
that light itself is admitted to be (not a quality but) a sub¬
stance. The flame of a lamp is substantial light with its
particles crowded close to one another; the light diffused
from that flame is substantial light whose particles are thin
and scattered.—The reply to this objection is given in the
next Sutra.
26. The extending beyond is as in the case of
odour.
Just as odour, although a quality, extends beyond the
odorous substance—as appears from the fact of our per¬
ceiving odour even without actually grasping flowers which
are the seat of odour—so the quality of intelligence also
may extend beyond the soul although the latter be atomic.
It therefore is an undue stretch of inference to maintain
that a quality, such as colour and the like, cannot separate
itself from the substratum in which it inheres, because it
is a quality; for we see that odour although a mere
quality does separate itself from its substratum.—The ob¬
jection that odour also separates itself from its substance
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 27 . 41
only with the substance (i. e. parts of the substance) we do
not admit, because that would involve the dwindling away
of the fundamental substance from which the separation of
parts takes place. But that it does not so dwindle away,
we conclude from its remaining in its former condition ;
otherwise it would lose the heaviness and other qualities
belonging to it in its former state.—Well, but perhaps the
separation of the particles in which odour resides is not
noticed on account of their minuteness. Nevertheless the
fact may be that minute odorous atoms spreading in all
directions enter the cavity of the nose and there produce
the sensation of smell.—This we cannot admit, because the
atoms are suprasensible, and because in some cases, as, for
instance, from the blossoms of the nagakei-ara-tree, a very
strong odour is perceived \ According to the generally pre¬
vailing idea, moreover, it is not the odorous substance which
is smelled, but ordinary people rather think that they smell
the odour only.—The objection that, because we do not
perceive colour and so on to extend beyond their sub¬
stratum, we have no right to assume that odour does
so, we cannot admit, because there is no room for that
conclusion 1 2 , on account of the (actually existing) per¬
ception (of the smell apart from the odorous substance).
Logicians must shape their inferences in such a way as to
make them agree with ordinary observation, not in any
other way. For, to quote another instance, the circum¬
stance that one of the qualities, viz. taste, is perceived by
the tongue, certainly does not entitle us to draw the general
inference that colour and the other qualities also are per¬
ceived by means of the tongue.
27. And thus (scripture also) declares.
Scripture also, after having signified the soul’s abiding
in the heart and its atomic size, declares by means of such
1 Single atoms could not produce any sensations; trasarewus,
i.e. combinations of three atoms even could not produce lively
sensations.
2 Viz. that smell cannot exist apart from the odorous substance,
because it is a quality like colour.
42
vedanta-sOtras.
passages as ‘Up to the hairs, up to the tips of the nails’
(Kau. Up. IV, 20; B ri. Up. I. 4, 7), that the soul pervades
the entire body by means of intelligence which is its
quality.
28. On account of the separate statement (of soul
and intelligence).
From the passage ‘ Having by knowledge taken possession
of the body ’ which represents the soul and intelligence as
separate, viz. as respectively the agent and the instrument
of action, we understand that the soul pervades the body
only by means of intelligence, its quality. Again the pas¬
sage ‘ Then (the intelligent person) having through the
intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all
intelligence’ (B ri. Up. II, 1, 17) shows intelligence to be
different from the agent, i. e. the embodied soul, and so
likewise confirms our view.—The reply to all this is as
follows.
29. But it is designated thus (i.e. as atomic), on
account of its having for its essence the qualities of
that (i.e. the buddhi); as in the case of the intelli¬
gent Self (i.e. Brahman).
The word ‘but ’ is meant to set aside the opinion main¬
tained hitherto.—The soul is not of atomic size, since
scripture does not declare it to have had an origin. On
the contrary, as scripture speaks of the highest Brahman
entering into the elements and teaches that it is their Self,
the soul is nothing else but the highest Brahman. And if
the soul is the highest Brahman, it must be of the same
extent as Brahman. Now scripture states Brahman to be
all-pervading. Therefore the soul also is all-pervading.—
On that view all the statements about the all-pervadingness
of the soul made in Sruti and Smrzti are justified, so, for in¬
stance, the passage, ‘ He is that great unborn Self who consists
of knowledge, is surrounded by the pra/zas &c.’ (Brz.Up. IV,
4, 22). Nor again could the soul, if it were of atomic size,
experience sensations extending over the whole body. If
it be said that that is possible owing to the soul’s connexion
II ADHYAYA, 3 PA DA, 29 .
43
with the sense of touch (the skin), we deny that assertion.
For from that it would follow that, when we tread on a
thorn, the sensation extends over the whole body, since the
connexion of the thorn and the skin abides in the entire
skin, and the skin extends over the whole body. While
as a matter of fact, when treading on a thorn we experience
a sensation in the sole of the foot only.—Nor again is it
possible that a quality of an atom should diffuse itself beyond
the atom. For qualities occupy the same place with the
substances of which they are qualities, and a quality not
abiding in its substance would no longer be a quality.
Concerning the light emitted from a lamp we have already
shown that it is, not a quality, but rather a different kind
of substance. Hence odour also, being avowedly a quality,
can exist in so far only as it inheres in its substance; other¬
wise it would cease to be odour. Thus the reverend Dvai-
payana also says, ‘ Having perceived odour in water some
unthinking people ascribe it to the latter; but know that it
is in the earth only, and (merely) passes over into air and
water.’ If the intelligence of the soul pervades the whole
body, the soul cannot be atomic ; for intelligence consti¬
tutes the soul’s proper nature, just as heat and light con¬
stitute that of fire. A separation of the two as quality
and that which is qualified does not exist. Now it has
already been shown (II, 2, 34) that the soul is not
of the same size as the body; the only remaining alternative
therefore is that it is all-pervading (infinite). But why
then, our opponent asks, is the soul designated (in some
scriptural passages) as being of atomic size, &c. ?—It is
designated as such ‘ on account of being of the nature of
the essence of that (i.e. the buddhi).’—The Self is here said
to be of the nature of the essence of the mind’s (buddhi)
qualities, because those qualities, such as desire, aversion,
pleasure, pain and so on, constitute the essence, i.e. the
principal characteristics of the Self as long as it is impli¬
cated in transmigratory existence. Apart from the quali¬
ties of the mind the mere Self does not exist in the saz/zsara
state; for the latter, owing to which the Self appears as an
agent and enjoyer, is altogether due to the circumstance of
44
VEDANTA-S(JTRAS.
the qualities of the buddhi and the other limiting adjuncts
being wrongly superimposed upon the Self. That the
non-transmigrating eternally free Self which neither acts nor
enjoys is declared to be of the same size as the buddhi, is
thus due only to its having the qualities of the buddhi for
its essence (viz. as long as it is in fictitious connexion with
the buddhi). Moreover we have the scriptural passage,
4 That living soul is to be known as part of the hundredth
part of the point of a hair, divided a hundred times, and
yet it is to be infinite ’ ( 5 ve. Up. V, 9), which at first states
the soul to be atomic and then teaches it to be infinite.
Now this is appropriate only in the case of the atomicity of
the soul being metaphorical while its infinity is real; for
both statements cannot be taken in their primary sense at
the same time. And the infinity certainly cannot be under¬
stood in a metaphorical sense, since all the Upanishads aim
at showing that Brahman constitutes the Self of the soul.
—The other passage also (Sve. Up. V, 8) which treats of
the measure of the soul, ‘ The lower one, endowed with the
quality of mind and the quality of body, is seen small even
like the point of a goad,’ teaches the soul’s small size to
depend on its connexion with the qualities of the buddhi,
not upon its own Self. The following passage again, ‘ That
small (a//u) Self is to be known by thought ’ (Mu. Up. Ill,
1, 9), does not teach that the soul is of atomic size, since the
subject of the chapter is Brahman in so far as not to be
fathomed by the eye, &c., but to be apprehended by the
serene light of knowledge, and since moreover the soul
cannot be of atomic size in the primary sense of the word.
Hence the statement about a;zutva (smallness, subtlety) has
to be understood as referring either to the difficulty of
knowing the soul, or else to its limiting adjuncts. Similarly
such passages as ‘ Having by knowledge taken possession
of the whole body ’ (Kau. Up. Ill, 6), which mention a
difference (between the soul and knowledge), must be under¬
stood to mean that the soul takes possession of the whole
body through the buddhi, its limiting adjunct; or else they
must be considered as mere modes of expression, as when
we speak of the body of a stone statue. For we have
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 30.
45
already shown that the distinction of quality and thing
qualified does not exist in the case of the soul.—The state¬
ments as to the soul abiding in the heart are likewise to
be explained on the ground of the buddhi abiding there.—
That also the soul’s passing out and so on depend on
the limiting adjuncts, is shown by the passage, ‘What
is it by whose passing out I shall pass out, and by whose
staying I shall stay? He sent forth prazza,’ &c. (Pr. Up. VI,
3, 4). For where there is no passing out, no going and
returning are known ; for what has not left the body cannot
go and return l .—As thus the soul (as long as involved in
the saz/zsara) has for its essence the qualities of its limiting
adjuncts, it is spoken of as minute. The case is analogous
to that of Brahman (pra^zza). Just as in those chapters
whose topic is the meditation on the qualified Brahman, the
highest Self is spoken of as possessing relative minuteness
and so on, because it has the qualities of its limiting adjuncts
for its essence (cp . t Smaller than a grain of rice or barley
‘ He who consists of mind, whose body is prazza,’ &c., Kh .
Up. Ill, 14, 2 ; 3); so it is also with the individual soul.—
Very well, let us then assume that the transmigratory con¬
dition of the soul is due to the qualities of the buddhi form¬
ing its essence. From this, however, it will follow that, as
the conjunction of buddhi and soul—which are different
entities—must necessarily come to an end, the soul when
disjoined from the buddhi will be altogether undefinable and
thence non-existing or rather non-existing in the sazzzs&ra
state 2 .—To this objection the next Sutra replies.
30. The objection (raised above) is not valid, since
(the connexion of the soul with the buddhi) exists as
long as the soul; it being thus observed (in scripture).
We need not fear that the objection formulated above
can be proved.—Why ?—‘ On account of the existence of
the connexion of the soul with the buddhi, as long as the
1 So that the distinction insisted on in Sutra 20 is not valid.
2 Katham asattvazzz svarupena sattvad ity asankhyaha sazzzsaritvazra
veti. An. Gi.
46
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
soul exists.’ That means : as long as this Self is in the
sawsara-state, as long as the sa^sara-state is not brought
to an end by means of perfect knowledge, so long the con¬
nexion of the soul with the buddhi does not cease. And
as long as its connexion with the buddhi, its limiting
adjunct, lasts, so long the individual soul remains indi¬
vidual soul, implicated in transmigratory existence. In
reality, however, there is no individual soul but in so far
as it is fictitiously hypostatized by the buddhi, its limiting
adjunct. For in attempting to determine the object of the
Vedanta-texts we meet with no other intelligent substance
but the one omniscient Lord whose nature is eternal free¬
dom. This appears from innumerable texts, such as the
following:—‘ There is no other seer but he, there is no
other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he,
there is no other knower but he’ (Bn. Up. Ill, 7, 23);
‘ There is nothing that sees, hears, perceives, knows but it ’
(B ri. Up. Ill, 8,11) ; ‘Thou art that’ (. Kh . Up. VI, 8, 7);
‘I am Brahman’ (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10).—How again is it
known that the soul is connected with the buddhi as long
as it exists ?—We reply: because that is seen (viz. in
scripture). For scripture makes the following declaration :
‘ He who is within the heart, consisting of knowledge, sur¬
rounded by the pranas, the person of light, he remaining
the same wanders along the two worlds as if thinking, as
if moving’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the term ‘consisting
of knowledge ’ means ‘ consisting of buddhi,’ as we infer
from another passage, viz. ‘ The Self consisting of know¬
ledge, mind, life, sight, hearing’ ( Bri . Up. IV, 4, 5), where
knowledge is enumerated among mind and so on h By
‘ being made up of buddhi 5 is meant ‘ having for one’s
essence the qualities of buddhi.’ Similarly a phrase like
‘ Devadatta is made up of womanishness,’ which may be
made use of in ordinary language, means that in Devadatta
feminine attributes such as softness of voice and the like
prevail. Moreover, the passage, ‘ He remaining the same
wanders along the two worlds,’ declares that the Self, even
1 And therefore has to be understood in the sense of buddhi.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 31.
47
when going to another world, is not separated from the
buddhi, &c. For if we ask whereby it does remain the
same, the answer, based on proximity *, is ‘ by means of
the buddhi.’—Further, such modes of expression, ‘ as if
thinking/ ‘ as if moving/ lead us to the same conclusion ;
for they mean that the Self does not think and move on its
own account, but thinks as it were and moves as it were,
because the buddhi to which it is joined really moves and
thinks.—Moreover, the connexion of the Self with the
buddhi, its limiting adjunct, depends on wrong knowledge,
and wrong knowledge cannot cease except through perfect
knowledge; hence as long as there does not rise the cog¬
nition of Brahman being the universal Self, so long the
connexion of the soul with the buddhi and its other limit¬
ing adjuncts does not come to an end. Thus scripture
also says, ‘ I know that great person of sunlike lustre
beyond the darkness. A man who knows him passes over
death; there is no other path to go 5 (Sve. Up. Ill, 8).
But, an objection is raised, in the states of deep sleep
and retractation (pralaya) no connexion of the Self with
the buddhi can be acknowledged, since scripture declares
that { then he becomes united with the True, he is gone to
his own’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 8, 1), and as then all modifications
have avowedly passed away. How then can it be said
that the connexion with the buddhi exists as long as the
Self?—To this objection the following Sutra replies.
31. On account of the appropriateness of the
manifestation of that (connexion) which exists
(potentially); like virile power.
As in ordinary life virile power and so on, existing
potentially only in young children, and being then looked
upon as non-existing, become manifest at the time of
puberty—and do not originate at that time from previous
non-existence, because in that case they might originate in
eunuchs also—; so the connexion of the soul with the
1 I.e. on the proximity of terms clearly indicating the buddhi, viz.
vi£-«ana-maya^ praweshu.
4 8
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
buddhi exists potentially merely during deep sleep and
the period of general retractation, and again becomes
manifest at the time of waking and the time of creation.—
This explanation is appropriate, because nothing can be
assumed to spring up unless from something else ; other¬
wise we should have to suppose that effects spring up
without causes. That the rising from deep sleep is due to
the existence of potential avidya, scripture also declares,
4 Having become merged in the True they know not that
they are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures
are here, whether a lion or a wolf/ &c. ( Kh . Up. VI, 9, 2;
3).—It is therefore a proved matter that the connexion of
the soul with the buddhi and the other adjuncts lasts as
long as the soul (in its sawsdra-state).
32. Otherwise (if no manas existed) there would
result either constant perception or constant non¬
perception, or else a limitation of either of the two
(i.e. of the soul or of the senses).
The internal organ which constitutes the limiting ad¬
junct of the soul is called in different places by different
names, such as manas (mind), buddhi (intelligence), vi^w&na
(knowledge), £itta (thought). This difference of nomen¬
clature is sometimes made dependent on the difference of
the modifications of the internal organ which is called
manas when it is in the state of doubt, &c., buddhi when it
is in the state of determination and the like.—Now we must
necessarily acknowledge the existence of such an internal
organ ; because otherwise there would result either per¬
petual perception or perpetual non-perception. There
would result perpetual perception whenever there is a con¬
junction of the soul, the senses and the objects of sense—the
three together constituting the instruments of perception;
or else, if on the conjunction of the three causes the effect
did not follow, there would take place perpetual non¬
perception. But neither of these two alternatives is actually
observed.—Or else we should have to assume that there
are obstacles in the way of the energy either of the Self or
the sense-organs. But the former is not possible, as the
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34 .
49
Self is not capable of any modification; nor the latter, as
we cannot assume that the energy of the sense-organ which
is non-obstructed in the preceding and the following mo¬
ment should, without any cause, be obstructed (in the
intervening moment). Hence we have to acknowledge
the existence of an internal organ through whose attention
and non-attention perception and non-perception take
place. Thus scripture declares, ‘ My mind was elsewhere,
I did not see; my mind was elsewhere, I did not hear; for
a man sees with his mind and hears with his mind ’ (B ri.
Up. I, 5, 3). Scripture moreover shows that desire and
similar states are modifications of the mind, £ Desire, repre¬
sentation, doubt, faith, want of faith, memory, forgetfulness,
shame, reflection, fear, all this is mind.’ The explanation
given in Sutra 29 is therefore an appropriate one.
33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of scripture
having a purport (thereby).
In connexion with the doctrine that the soul possesses
for its essence the qualities of the buddhi, another attribute
of the soul is set forth.—The individual soul is an agent,
because thus scripture has a purport. For only on that
assumption scriptural injunctions (such as ‘ He is to sacrifice,’
‘ He is to make an oblation into the fire,’ ‘ He is to give,’
&c.) acquire a purport ; otherwise they would be purport¬
less. For they all teach special acts to be done by agents ;
which would not be possible if the soul did not possess the
quality of being an agent.—On that supposition a meaning
belongs to the following passage also, £ For it is he who
sees, hears, perceives, conceives, acts, he the person whose
Self is knowledge ’ (Pr. Up. IV, 9).
34. And on account of (the text) teaching its
wandering about.
The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the
soul for that reason also, that, in a chapter treating of the
soul, the text declares it to wander about in the state of
sleep, ‘ The immortal one goes wherever he likes ’ (B ri. Up.
[38] E
50
vedanta-sCtras.
IV, 3, 12); and again, ‘ He moves about, according to his
pleasure, within his own body' ( Bri . Up. II, 1,18).
35. On account of its taking.
The quality of being an agent has to be attributed to the
soul for that reason also that in the same chapter treating
of the soul the text speaks of the soul taking its instru¬
ments, ‘ Having taken, through the intelligence of the
senses, intelligence/ and ‘ having taken the senses * (Bri. Up.
II, 1, 18; 17).
36 . (The soul is an agent) also because it is
designated as such with regard to actions ; if it were
not such, there would be a change of designation.
The quality of being an agent belongs to the soul for
that reason also that the sacred texts speak of its agency
in sacred and secular actions, ‘Understanding performs
the sacrifice, it performs all acts’ (Taitt. Up. II, 5).—But,
an objection may here be raised, we have seen that the
word c understanding * applies to the buddhi ; how then
can it indicate the circumstance of the soul being an agent?
—The soul only, we reply, is designated there, not the
buddhi. If the soul were not meant to be designated,
there would be a change in the designation, i. e. the passage
would run, ‘ through understanding it performs/ &c. For
we see that in another passage where the buddhi is meant
the word c understanding ’ is exhibited in the instrumental
form, ‘ Having through the understanding (intelligence) of
these senses taken all understanding’ (Bri. Up. II, 1, 17).
In the passage under discussion, on the other hand, the
word ‘ understanding ’ is given in the case characteristic of
the agent (viz. the nominative), and therefore indicates the
Self which is distinct from the buddhi. Hence your ob¬
jection is not valid.—Another objection is raised. If the
soul in so far as distinct from the buddhi were the agent,
it would, because it is independent, bring about exclusively
what is pleasant and useful to itself, not the opposite. We,
however, observe that it does bring about the opposite
also. But such an unrestricted proceeding does not become
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 38.
5 1
the independent Self.—To this objection the following
Sutra replies.
37. The absence of restriction is as in the case of
perception.
Just as this Self, although free with regard to perception,
yet perceives unrestrictedly what is unpleasant as well as
what is pleasant, so we assume that it also brings about
what is unpleasant as well as what is pleasant.—The
objection that in the act of perception also the soul is not
free because it depends on the employment of the causes
of perception (i.e. the sense-organs), we invalidate by the
remark that the use of the causes of perception is merely
to present the objects of perception, that however in the
act of perception the soul because endowed with intelli¬
gence does not depend on anything else 1 .—Moreover in
actions also the soul is not absolutely free, as it depends
on differences of place, time, and efficient causes. But an
agent does not cease to be so because he requires assistance.
A cook remains the agent in the action of cooking although
he requires fuel, water, and so on. The presence of a
plurality of co-operating factors is therefore not opposed
to the activity of the soul unrestrictedly extending to
actions productive of pleasant as well as unpleasant
results.
38. On account of the reversal of power.
The soul distinct from ‘ understanding ’ has to be viewed
as an agent for the following reason also. If the buddhi
which is denoted by the term ‘understanding 5 were the
agent, there would take place a reversal of power, i. e. the
instrumental power which appertains to the buddhi would
have to be set aside, and to be replaced by the power of an
agent. But if the buddhi has the power of an agent, it
must be admitted that it is also the object of self-conscious-
1 ATakshuradina/rc vishayopanayakatvat tadupalabdhau Htmana^
^etanatvena svatantryad udahara«asiddhir ity aha neti. An. Gi.
E 2
52
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
ness (ahampratyaya) 1 , since we see that everywhere activity
is preceded by self-consciousness//go, / come, / eat, / drink,’
&c. But if the buddhi is endowed with the power of an
agent and effects all things, we have to assume for it
another instrument by means of which it effects everything.
For we see that agents although themselves capable of
acting yet become really active only through making use
of instruments.—Hence the whole dispute is about a name
only, and there is no real difference, since in either case that
which is different from the instrument of action is admitted
to be the agent.
39. And on account of the impossibility of medi¬
tation (samadhi).
Moreover the meditation taught in the Vedanta-texts,
whose aim is the realisation of the Self as represented by
the Upanishads, is possible only if the Self is the agent 2 * .
Compare the following passages, 4 Verily, the Self is to be
seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked’ (B ri. Up.
II, 4, 5); ‘The Self we must seek out, we must try to
understand’ (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1); ‘Meditate on the Self
as Om’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 6).—Therefrom also it follows that
the Self is an agent.
40. And as the carpenter, in double fashion.
That the embodied Self is an agent, has been proved by
the reasons set forth in Sutra 33, &c. We now have to
consider whether this agency depends on the fundamental
nature of the Self, or is due to its limiting adjuncts.—If here
it be maintained that for the same reasons which were
employed to prove the Self’s being an agent its agency
must be held to be natural, there being no reasons to the
contrary, we reply as follows.
1 And that would virtually identify the buddhi with the g-iva, the
individual soul.
2 The Self which enjoys the fruit of final release must be the
agent in the meditation which is instrumental in bringing about
final release.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40.
53
The Self’s being an agent cannot be founded on its real
nature, because (if it were so) the impossibility of final
release would follow. For if being an agent belongs to
the soul’s nature, it can never free itself from it—no more
than fire can divest itself of heat,—and as long as man has
not freed himself from activity he cannot obtain his highest
end, since activity is essentially painful.—But, an objection
will be raised, the end of man may be obtained, even as long
as the potentiality of activity remains, viz. by man avoiding
the effects of activity, and this he may accomplish by avoid¬
ing its occasions, just as fire, for instance, although endowed
with the potentiality of burning, does, if fuel is withheld
from it, not produce its natural effect, i. e. burning.—This
objection we invalidate by the remark that the occasions,
because connected (with the soul) by means of the peculiar
connexion called ‘ potentiality 5 (power), cannot be avoided
absolutely 1 .—Nor can it be said that release will be
obtained through the means effecting it being employed,
because whatever depends on means to be employed is
non-eternal. Scripture moreover declares that release
results from the instruction about the eternally pure, intel¬
ligent, free Self. Now instruction of this nature would not
be possible, if the agentship of the Self formed part of its
nature. The agentship of the Self is therefore due to the
attributes of its adjuncts being ascribed to it, and does not
form part of its nature. Hence scripture says of the Self,‘ As
if thinking, as if moving’ (B ru Up. IV, 3, 7), and ‘He (the
Self) when in union with the body, the senses, and the
mind, is called the enjoyer by wise people’ (Ka. Up. I,
3, 4); which passages show that the Self passes into the
special condition of being an enjoyer, &c., only through its
1 Kartr/tvasya dharmadini nimittani tesha/# ^ananivartyatve
muktav api sambhavat kart/Ytvazra syat £ 7 /anena tannivr/ttau tesham
a^anak&ryatvat kn'tam kartrftvam api tatha syat, ^akte^ ka. jakta-
j'akyasapekshataya sanimittakriyalaksha/maky apekshakatvad anir-
mokshas tasman nimittapariharasya duranush/^anatvan na ^aktivade
muktir iti. An. Gi.
Aakta^akyajraya jakti^ svasattayava^yaw jakyam akshipati. Bha.
54
vedanta-sOtras.
connexion with the limiting adjuncts. For to the discern¬
ing there is no Self called the living Self and being either
agent or enjoyer, apart from the highest Self; according to
the scriptural passage 6 There is no other seer but he/ &c.
(B ri. Up. III. 7, 23). Nor must we suppose that, if there
were no intelligent individual Soul, different from the
highest Self and distinct from the aggregate consisting of
buddhi, &c., it would follow that the highest Self is involved
in the sawsara-state as agent and enjoyer. For the condi¬
tions of being agent and enjoyer are presented by Nescience
merely. Scripture also, after having declared (in the passage,
4 For where there is duality, as it were, there one sees the
other/ &c., B ri. Up. IV, 5, 15) that the conditions of being
an agent and an enjoyer belong to the state of Nescience only,
excludes them from the state of knowledge, ‘ But where the
Self only is all this, how should he see another?’ And again,
after having declared that the Self, in the states of w T aking
and of dreaming, suffers weariness owing to the contact with
its limiting adjuncts, like a falcon flying about in the air,
scripture teaches that that fatigue ceases in deep sleep when
the soul is embraced by the intelligent (highest) Self. 4 This
indeed is his true form in which his wishes are fulfilled, in
which the Self only is his wish, in which no wish is left,—
free from any sorrow ’—up to 4 This is his highest goal, this
is his highest success, this is his highest world, this is his
highest bliss’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 21-32).—This the teacher
intimates in the Sutra, c and as the carpenter in both ways.’
4 And ’ is here used in the sense of ‘ but.’ It is not to be
supposed that the agentship of the Self belongs to its true
nature, as heat belongs to the nature of fire. But just as in
ordinary life a carpenter as long as working with his axe and
other tools undergoes pain, while on the other hand he enjoys
ease and leisure after having finished his work, laid his tools
aside and returned to his home ; so the Self also, as long as
it is joined with duality presented by Nescience and is an
agent in the states of waking and dreaming, undergoes pain ;
but as soon as, for the purpose of shaking off its weariness,
it enters into its own highest Self, it frees itself from the
complex of effects and instruments, and enjoys full ease in
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40.
55
the state of deep sleep. And in the state of final release
also, the Self, having dispelled the darkness of ignorance
by the light of knowledge, and having reached the state
of absolute isolation and rest, enjoys full ease.—The case
of the carpenter must be considered as being parallel to
the following extent. The carpenter is, in certain kinds
of work, such as cutting wood, &c., an agent with regard to
certain definite tools, such as the axe and so on, but a non¬
agent with his mere body; so this Self also is an agent in
all its functions with regard to its instruments, such as the
mind, &c., but is a non-agent by its own Self. On the
other hand, the Self has no parts corresponding to the
hands and other limbs of the carpenter, by means of which
it could take up or put aside its instruments, as the car¬
penter takes up and puts aside his tools.
In reply to the reasons brought forward in favour of the
soul's agentship being natural, as, for instance, the reason
based on scripture having a purport, we remark that the
scriptural injunctions in prescribing certain acts presuppose
an agentship established somehow, but do not themselves
aim at establishing the (direct) agentship of the Self. Now
we have shown that the agentship of the Self does not consti¬
tute part of its real nature because scripture teaches that its
true Self is Brahman; we therefore conclude that the
Vedic injunctions are operative with reference to that agent-
ship of the soul which is due to Nescience. Such scrip¬
tural passages also as 4 The agent, the person whose Self is
understanding 9 (Pr. Up. IV, 9), must be assumed, because
being of the nature of anuvadas 1 , to refer to an agentship
already established elsewhere, and being the product of
Nescience.
The preceding remarks refute also the reasons founded
on 4 the wandering about 5 and the 4 taking ’ (Sfitras 34,35), as
the statements about them also are mere anuvadas.—But,
an objection may be raised, the passage which teaches that
the soul while its instruments are asleep, 4 moves about,
1 I.e. being only incidental remarks about matters established or
taught elsewhere.
56
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
according to its pleasure, within its own body* (Bn. Up. II.
i, 18), clearly implies that the pure Self is an agent. And
in the passage relative to the taking (‘ (the purusha) having
through the intelligence of the senses absorbed all intel¬
ligence 5 ), the fact of the instruments appearing in the
objective and instrumental cases likewise intimates that
the pure Self is the agent.—To this we reply that even in
the state of dream the instruments of the Self are not
altogether at rest; for scripture states that even then it is
connected with the buddhi, ‘Having become a dream,
together with buddhi it passes beyond this world. 5 Smrz'ti
also says, ‘When, the senses being at rest, the mind not
being at rest is occupied with the objects, that state know
to be a dream. 5 And scripture says that desire, &c., are
modifications of the mind (cp. Bri. Up. I, 5, 3). Now these
are observed in dreams ; therefore the Self wanders about
in dreams together with the mind only. That wandering
about moreover is founded on the mental impressions
(vasana) only, is not real. Thus scripture also in describ¬
ing our doings in dreams qualifies them by an c as it were: 5
‘ As it were rejoicing together with women, or laughing as
it were, or seeing terrible sights 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 13).
Ordinary people also describe their dreams in the same
manner, ‘I ascended as it were the summit of a moun¬
tain, 5 ‘I saw a tree as it were. 5 —And although it is true
that, in the statement about the taking, the instruments are
exhibited in the objective and instrumental cases, still the
agentship of the Self must be considered as connected
with those instruments, since we have shown that the pure
Self cannot be an agent.
In ordinary language also we meet with similar variations
of expression ; the two sentences, for instance, ‘ the warriors
fight 5 and ‘ the king fights by means of his warriors, 5 really
have the same meaning. Moreover, the statement about
the taking means to express only the cessation of activity
on the part of the instruments, not the independent activity
of any one.—The passage referred to above, ‘ understanding
performs the sacrifice, 5 establishes the agentship of the
buddhi merely, as the word ‘understanding’ is known to
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40. 5 7
have that sense, and as the mind is mentioned close by,
and as in the passage, ‘ Faith is its head/ &c., faith and so
on are declared to be the members of the Self which con¬
sists of understanding, and as faith, &c., are known to be
attributes of the buddhi. Another reason is furnished by
the complementary sentence, ‘All gods worship under¬
standing as the oldest, as Brahman 5 (Taitt. Up. II, 5), for
buddhi is known to be the oldest, i. e. the first produced h
Another scriptural passage also avers that that sacrifice is
accomplished by means of speech and buddhi, ‘ The
sacrifice is what results from speech and mind.’ Nor can
it rightly be maintained (cp. Siitra 38) that to view the
instruments as agents would lead to an exchange of power
on the part of the buddhi; for all instruments must neces¬
sarily be considered as agents in regard of their special
functions 1 2 . But with reference to perception (upalabdhi)
those instruments are (not agents, but) mere instruments,
and perception belongs to the Self. Nor can agentship
be ascribed to the Self on account of perception, since
permanent perception constitutes its nature (and hence can¬
not be viewed as a mere transitory activity). Nor can the
agentship which has self-consciousness for its antecedent
belong to the perceiving principle (upalabdhrz); for self-
consciousness itself is an object of perception (on the part
of the upalabdh ri, i. e. the pure, isolated, intelligent Self).
And on this doctrine there is no occasion for assuming a
further instrument, as we maintain the buddhi itself to be
the instrument.
The objection founded on the impossibility of meditation
(Sfitra 39) is already refuted by the fact, pointed out above,
of scripture having a purport, meditation being enjoined by
scripture with reference to such agentship as is already
established by other passages.—The result of all this is
1 According to the .sruti: mahad yaksham prathamaga/rc veda yo
ha vai gyeshtham ka sresh/ham ka veda.
2 Wood, for instance, is an ‘ agent' in regard of the function of
burning, while it is a mere instrument with reference to the
action of cooking.
5*
VEDANTA-S0TRAS.
that the agentship of the Self is due to its limiting adjuncts
only.
41. But from the highest (Lord there result
sa/^sara and moksha), because scripture teaches
that.
We now enter on the discussion whether the agentship,
characterising the individual soul in the state of Nescience
and founded on its limiting adjuncts, is independent of the
Lord or dependent on him.
The purvapakshin maintains that the soul as far as it
is an agent does not depend on the Lord, because the
assumption of such a dependence would serve no purpose.
For as the individual soul has motives in its own im¬
perfections, such as passion, aversion, and so on, and is
furnished with the whole apparatus of the other con¬
stituents of action x , it is able to occupy on its own account
the position of an agent; and what then should the Lord
do for it? Nor does ordinary experience show that in
addition to the oxen which are required for such actions
as ploughing and the like the Lord also is to be depended
upon. Moreover (if all activity depended on the Lord) it
would follow that the Lord is cruel because imposing on
his creatures activity which is essentially painful, and at
the same time unjust because allotting to their activities
unequal results.—But it has already been shown (II, 1,
34) that the Lord cannot be taxed with cruelty and in¬
justice, on account of his dependence.—True, that has
been shown, but only on the condition of the dependence
on the Lord being possible. Now such dependence is
possible only if there exist religious merit and demerit on
the part of the creatures, and these again exist if the
soul is an agent; if then the agentship of the soul
again depends on the Lord, whereupon will the Lord's
dependence depend? And (if we should assume the Lord
to determine the souls without reference to their merits and
demerits) it would follow that the souls have to undergo
1 I.e. the constituents of action such as instrument, object, &c.,
exclusive of the agent.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42 .
59
consequences not due to their actions.—Hence the soul’s
activity is independent.
Setting aside this prima facie view by means of the word
‘ but/ the Sutrakara asserts ‘ from the highest.' For the
soul which in the state of Nescience is blinded by the
darkness of ignorance and hence unable to distinguish
itself from the complex of effects and instruments, the
sa^Sclra-state in which it appears as agent and enjoyer is
brought about through the permission of the Lord who
is the highest Self, the superintendent of all actions, the
witness residing in all beings, the cause of all intelligence;
and we must therefore assume that final release also is
effected through knowledge caused by the grace of the
Lord.
Why so ?—‘ Because scripture teaches that.’ For al¬
though the soul has its own imperfections, such as passion
and so on, for motives, and is furnished with the whole
apparatus of action, and although ordinary experience does
not show that the Lord is a cause in occupations such as
ploughing and the like, yet we ascertain from scripture
that the Lord is a causal agent in all activity. For scrip¬
ture says, ‘ He makes him whom he wishes to lead up
from these worlds do a good deed ; and the same makes
him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do
a bad deed' (Kau. Up. Ill, 8); and again, ‘He who
dwelling within the Self pulls the Self within' (Sat Br.
XIV, 6, 7, 30).
But if causal agency thus belongs to the Lord, it follows
that he must be cruel and unjust, and that the soul has
to undergo consequences of what it has not done.—This
objection the following Sutra refutes.
42. But with a view to the efforts made (by the
soul) (the Lord makes it act), on account of the
(otherwise resulting) purportlessness of the injunc¬
tions and prohibitions, &c.
The word ‘but' removes the objections started.—The
Lord makes the soul act, having regard to the efforts made
by it, whether meritorious or non-meritorious. Hence
6 o
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
there is no room for the objections raised. Having regard
to the inequality of the virtuous and vicious actions of the
souls, the Lord, acting as a mere occasional cause, allots
to them corresponding unequal results. An analogous case
is furnished by rain. As rain constitutes the common
occasional cause for shrubs, bushes, corn, and so on, which
belong to different species and spring each from its par¬
ticular seed—for the inequality of their sap, flowers, fruits,
and leaves results neither when rain is absent nor when
the special seeds are absent—; so we also must assume
that the Lord arranges favourable or unfavourable circum¬
stances for the souls with a view to their former efforts.—
But if the activity of the soul is dependent on something
else, this having regard (on the part of the Lord) to
former effort is inappropriate.—By no means, we reply;
for although the activity of the soul is not independent,
yet the soul does act. The Lord indeed causes it to act,
but it acts itself. Moreover, the Lord in causing it to act
now has regard to its former efforts, and he caused it to
act in a former existence, having regard to its efforts
previous to that existence; a regressus against which, con¬
sidering the eternity of the sawsara, no objections can be
raised.—But how is it known that the Lord has regard
to the efforts made (in former existences) ?—The Sutra
replies: from the purportlessness, &c., of injunctions and
prohibitions. For thus (i. e. if the Lord has regard to
former actions) injunctions such as ‘he who is desirous of
the heavenly world is to sacrifice, 5 and prohibitions such as
‘ a Brahma^a must not be killed, 5 are not devoid of purport.
On the other alternative they would be without purport,
and the Lord would in fact be enjoined in the place of
injunctions and prohibitions 1 9 since the soul would be
absolutely dependent. And then the Lord might requite
with good those who act according to the injunctions, and
with evil men doing what is forbidden; which would
1 Irvara eva vidhinishedhayo^ sthane niyu^yeta yad vidhinishedha-
yo h phala m tad uvarewa tatpratipaditadharmadharmanirapekshe«a
kn’tam iti. Bha.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 43 . 6 1
subvert the authoritativeness of the Veda. Moreover, if
the Lord were absolutely without any regard, it would
follow that also the ordinary efforts of men are without
any purport; and so likewise the special conditions of
place, time, and cause. And also the difficulty mentioned
above 1 would present itself.—All these latter difficulties the
Sutrakara comprises in his ‘ &c.’
43. (The soul is) a part of the Lord, on account of
the declarations of difference, and (because) in a
different way also some record that (Brahman) is of
the nature of slaves, fishers, and so on.
We have shown that the individual soul and the Lord
stand to each other in the relation of what is being acted
upon and what is acting upon. This relation is observed in
ordinary life to exist only between things connected, such
as a master and a servant, or a fire and its sparks. Now
as the soul and the Lord also are acknowledged to stand
in the relation of what is acted upon and what is acting,
a doubt arises whether their connexion is analogous to
that of a master and a servant, or to that of a fire and
its sparks.
The purvapakshin maintains that either the matter is
to be considered as undetermined, or that the connexion
is like that of master and servant, because that connexion
only is well known to be the relation of ruler (Lord) and
subject ruled.
To this the Sutra replies that the soul must be con¬
sidered a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of
the fire. By ‘ part ’ we mean ‘ a part as it were/ since a
being not composed of parts cannot have parts in the
literal sense.—Why, then, do we not view the Lord, who
is not composed of parts, as identical with the soul ?— c On
account of the declarations of difference.’ For such scrip¬
tural passages as ‘That (self) it is which we must search
out, that it is which we must try to understand ’ ( Kh . Up.
1 I.e. the objectionable assumption that men have to undergo
consequences not resulting from their own former actions.
62
vedanta-sCtras.
VIII, 7) ; ‘He who knows him becomes a muni’ (B ri. Up.
IV, 4, 22); ‘ He who dwelling within the Self pulls the
Self within' (B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 23); which all of them refer
to a difference (between the highest and the individual
Self) would be inappropriate, if there were no difference.—
But, it may be said, these statements of difference would
agree better with a relation similar to that of master
and servant.—Hence the sutrakara adds, ‘and otherwise
also.’ That the soul is a part (of the Lord) we learn not
only from the passages declaring their difference, but there
are other statements also which teach their non-difference.
The members of a certain jakha of the Atharva-veda
record in a Brahma-sukta that ‘ Brahman are the fisher¬
men, Brahman the slaves, Brahman these gamblers,' &c.
Here low creatures such as fishermen, and slaves de¬
pending on their masters, and gamblers are called Brah¬
man ; whence it appears that all individual souls which
have entered into aggregates of effects and instruments
(i. e. bodies) depending on name and form are Brah¬
man. The same view is set forth in other passages such
as ‘ Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou
art maiden ; thou as an old man totterest along on thy
staff, thou art born with thy face turned everywhere ’
( 5 ve. Up. IV, 3), and 5 The wise one who, having produced
all forms and made all names, sits calling (the things by
their names)' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7). Passages such as ‘ There
is no other seer but he ’ and other similar ones establish
the same truth.—Non-differenced intelligence belongs to
the soul and the Lord alike, as heat belongs to the sparks
as well as the fire.—From these two views of difference
and non-difference there results the comprehensive view
of the soul being a part of the Lord.—The following Sutra
supplies a further reason.
44. And on account of the mantra.
A mantra also intimates the same view. ‘ Such is the
greatness of it ; greater than it is the Person. One foot
of it are all beings, three feet of it are the Immortal in
heaven’ (Kh. Up. Ill, 12, 6). Here the word ‘beings'
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 46. 63
denotes all moving and non-moving things, among which
the souls occupy the first place ; in accordance with the
use of the word in the following passage/ Not giving pain to
any being (bhfita) except at the tirthas’ ( Kh . Up. VIII,
35). Herefrom also we conclude that the individual soul
is a part of the Lord.—And again from the following
reason.
45. Moreover it is so stated in Smrzti.
In the l^varagitas (Bhagavad-gita) also it is said that the
soul is a part of the Lord, £ an eternal part of me becomes
the individual soul in the world of life 9 (Bha. Gi. XV, J 7 ).
With regard to the assertion made above, viz. that in ordi¬
nary life the relation of ruler and ruled is known to hold
good in the case of master and servant &c. only, we remark
that, although that may be the case in ordinary life, we
ascertain from scripture that the relation of part and whole
and that of ruler and ruled may go together. Nor is there
anything contradictory in assuming that the Lord who is
provided with superexcellent limiting adjuncts rules the
souls which are connected with inferior adjuncts only.
Here the purvapakshin raises another objection. If we
admit that the souls are parts of the Lord, it follows that
the Lord also, whose part the soul is, will be afflicted by the
pain caused to the soul by its experience of the sa^sara-
state; as we see in ordinary life that the entire Devadatta
suffers from the pain affecting his hand or foot or some
other limb. Herefrom it would follow that they who obtain
Brahman obtain a greater pain 1 ; so that the former saw-
sara-condition would be preferable, and complete knowledge
be devoid of purpose.—To this the following Sutra replies.
46. (As the soul is affected by pleasure and pain)
not so the highest (Lord); as in the case of light and
so on.
We maintain that the highest Lord does not feel the pain
of the sa^sara-state in the same way as the soul does. The
soul being engrossed by Nescience identifies itself as it were
1 Viz. by participating in all pain.
64
vedanta-s£jtras.
with the body and so on, and imagines itself to be affected
by the experience of pain which is due to Nescience, ‘I am
afflicted by the pain due to the bodythe highest Lord, on
the other hand, neither identifies himself with a body, nor
imagines himself to be afflicted by pain. The pain of the
individual soul also is not real, but imaginary only, caused
by the error consisting in the non-discrimination of (the
Self from) the body, senses, and other limiting adjuncts which
are due to name and form, the effects of Nescience. And as
a person feels the pain of a burn or cut which affects his
body by erroneously identifying himself with the latter, so
he feels also the pain affecting others, such as sons or friends,
by erroneously identifying himself with them, entering as it
were into them through love, and imagining £ I am the son,
I am the friend/ Wherefrom we infer with certainty that
the feeling of pain is due merely to the error of false imagi¬
nation. At the same conclusion we arrive on the ground of
negative instances. Let us consider the case of many men,
each of whom possesses sons, friends, &c., sitting together,
some of them erroneously imagining that they are connected
with their sons, friends, &c., while others do not. If then
somebody calls out ‘ the son has died/ ‘ the friend has died/
grief is produced in the minds of those who are under the
imagination of being connected with sons and friends, but
not in the minds of religious mendicants who have freed
themselves from that imagination. From this it appears
that perfect knowledge is of use even to an ordinary man ;
of how much greater use then will it be to him (i.e. the
Lord) whose nature is eternal pure intelligence, who sees
nothing beside the Self for which there are no objects.
Hence it follows that perfect knowledge is not purposeless.
—To illustrate this view the Sutra introduces a comparison
4 like light,’ &c. Just as the light of the sun or the moon
which pervades the entire space becomes straight or bent
as it were when the limiting adjuncts with which it is in
contact, such as a finger, for instance, are straight or bent, but
does not really become so; and just as the ether, although
imagined to move as it were when jars are being moved,
does not really move; and as the sun does not tremble,
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 47.
65
although its image trembles when you shake the cup filled
with water in which the sun’s light is reflected ; thus the
Lord also is not affected by pain, although pain be felt
by that part of him which is called the individual soul,
is presented by Nescience, and limited by the buddhi and
other adjuncts. That also the soul’s undergoing pain is
due to Nescience only, we have already explained. Accord¬
ingly the Vedanta-texts teach that, when the soul’s individual
state, due to Nescience, is sublated, it becomes Brahman,
‘ Thou art that &c.’—Thus there is no occasion to conclude
that the highest Self is affected by the pain of the individual
soul.
47. And the Smmis state (that).
Vyasa and others state in their smrztis that the highest
Self is not afflicted by the pain of the individual soul, 1 That
highest Self is said to be eternal, devoid of qualities, nor is
it stained by the fruits of actions any more than a lotus
leaf by water. But that other Self whose essence is action
is connected with bondage and release ; again and again
it is joined with the seventeenfold aggregate 1 .’—On the
ground of the particle ‘ and ’ (in the Sutra) we have to supply
4 and scripture also records that.’ So, for instance, ‘ One of
them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating ’
(Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), and ‘The one Self within all things is
never contaminated by the misery of the world, being him¬
self without ’ (Ka. Up. II, 5, 11).
Here the purvapakshin raises a new objection.—If there
is only one internal Self of all beings, what room is there
for permissions and prohibitions, worldly as well as Vedic ?
You must not reject this objection on the ground of your
having proved that the individual soul is a part of the Lord,
and that thus injunctions and prohibitions may, without any
mutual interference, apply to the soul which is different from
the Lord. For there are other scriptural passages which teach
that the soul is not different from the Lord, and therefore
not a part of him, as, for instance, the following ones :
1 I. e. the subtle body consisting of the ten sense-organs, the five
prawas, manas, and buddhi.
[38] F
66
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
4 Having sent forth that he entered into it' (Taitt.Up. 11 , 6 );
4 There is no other seer but he 5 (B ri, Up. Ill, 7, 23); 4 From
death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity ’
(B ri, Up. IV, 4, 19); 4 Thou art that ’ (Kk, Up. VI, 8, 7) ;
4 1 am Brahman’ (B ri, Up. I, 4, 10). Should you say that
just from this concurrence of intimations of difference on the
one hand and non-difference on the other hand it follows
that the soul is a part of the Lord, we reply that such might
be the case if the intention of the texts were to teach differ¬
ence as well as non-difference. But the fact is that the texts
aim solely at teaching non-difference, because through the
knowledge of Brahman being the universal Self the highest
end of man is obtained. About difference on the other
hand mere occasional statements (anuvada) are made as
about something already established naturally (i.e. apart
from scripture). Moreover, we have already maintained
that Brahman as not composed of parts can have no parts.
Hence it follows that the one highest Self which is within
all beings appears as individual soul, and it therefore remains
to show how injunctions and prohibitions are possible.
48. (The possibility of) injunctions and prohibi¬
tions (results) from the connexion (of the Self) with
bodies ; as in the case of light and so on.
Passages such as 4 He is to approach his wife at the
proper time,’ and 4 he is not to approach the wife of his
guru/ are examples of permissions (or injunctions) and
prohibitions ; or again passages such as 4 He is to kill the
animal devoted to Agnishomau,’ and 4 He is not to hurt any
being.’ Corresponding examples from ordinary life are :
4 A friend is to be served/ and ‘Enemies are to be shunned.’
Permissions and prohibitions of this kind are possible, be¬
cause the Self although one only is connected with various
bodies.—Of what kind then is that connexion ?—It consists
in the origination in the Self of the erroneous notion that
the Self is the aggregate consisting of the body and so on.
This erroneous notion is seen to prevail in all living beings,
and finds its expression in thoughts such as the following :
' / go/ 4 1 come,’ 4 / am blind,’ 4 1 am not blind/ 4 / am con-
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 48.
67
fused/ ‘ I am not confused.* That erroneous notion cannot
be removed by anything but perfect knowledge, and before
the latter supervenes, it remains spread among all living
beings. And thus, although the Self must be admitted to
be one only, injunctions and prohibitions are possible owing
to the difference effected by its connexion with bodies and
other limiting adjuncts, the products of Nescience.—It then
follows that for him who has obtained perfect knowledge,
injunctions and prohibitions are purportless.— No, we reply,
(they are not purportless for him, but they do not refer to
him), since to him who has obtained the highest aim no
obligation can apply. For obligations are imposed with
reference to things to be avoided or desired ; how then
should he, who sees nothing, either to be wished or avoided,
beyond the universal Self, stand under any obligation?
The Self certainly cannot be enjoined on the Self.—Should
it be said that injunctions and prohibitions apply to all
those who discern that the soul is something different from
the body (and therefore also to him who possesses perfect
knowledge), we reply that (such an assertion is too wide,
since) obligation depends on a man’s imagining his Self to
be (actually) connected with the body. It is true that
obligation exists for him only who views the soul as some¬
thing different from the body; but fundamentally all obli¬
gation is an erroneous imagination existing in the case of
him only who does not see that his Self is no more con¬
nected with a body than the ether is with jars and the
like. For him, on the other hand, who does not see that
connexion no obligation exists, much less, therefore, for him
who discerns the unity of the Self.—Nor does it result from
the absence of obligation, that he who has arrived at perfect
knowledge can act as he likes ; for in all cases it is only the
wrong imagination (as to the Self’s connexion with a body)
that impels to action, and that imagination is absent in the
case of him who has reached perfect knowledge.—From all
this it follows that injunctions and prohibitions are based on
the Self s connexion with the body ; 4 as in the case of
light.’ The case under discussion is analogous to cases
such as the following: Light is one only, and yet we shun
68
vedanta-s(jtras.
a fire which has consumed dead bodies, not any other fire.
The sun is one only; yet we shun only that part of his
light which shines on unholy places, not that part which
falls on pure ground. Some things consisting of earth are
desired, e.g. diamonds and beryls; other things likewise
consisting of earth are shunned, e.g. dead bodies. The
urine and dung of cows are considered pure and used as
such ; those of other animals are shunned. And many
similar cases.
49. And on account of the non-extension (of the
individual soul), there is no confusion (of the results
of actions).
Well, let it be granted that injunctions and prohibitions
are valid, because the Self although one is joined with
particular bodies.—From the admission, however, of the
unity of the Self it follows that there must be a con¬
fusion of the fruits of actions, there being only one master
(i.e. one soul to enjoy the fruits of action).—This is not so,
we reply, because there is no extension of the acting and
enjoying Self, i.e. no connexion on its part with all bodies.
For, as we have shown, the individual soul depends on its
adjuncts, and owing to the non-extension of those adjuncts
there is also non-extension of the soul. Hence there is no
confusion of actions or fruits of actions.
50. And (the individual soul is) an appearance
(reflection) only.
And that individual soul is to be considered a mere
appearance of the highest Self, like the reflection of the
sun in the water ; it is neither directly that (i.e. the highest
Self), nor a different thing. Hence just as, when one re¬
flected image of the sun trembles, another reflected image
does not on that account tremble also ; so, when one soul
is connected with actions and results of actions, another
soul is not on that account connected likewise. There is
therefore no confusion of actions and results. And as that
‘appearance’ is the effect of Nescience, it follows that the
sa;^sara which is based on it (the appearance) is also the
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 50.
69
effect of Nescience, so that from the removal of the latter
there results the cognition of the soul being in reality
nothing but Brahman.
For those, on the other hand, who maintain that there
are many Selfs and all of them all-pervading, it follows
that there must be a confusion of actions and results.—In
what way?—According to the opinion of the Sankhyas
there exist many all-pervading Selfs, whose nature is pure
intelligence, devoid of qualities and of unsurpassable ex¬
cellence. For the common purpose of all of them there
exists the pradhana, through which the souls obtain enjoy¬
ment and release.—According to the followers of Ka?/ada
there exist many all-pervading Selfs, but they are, like so
many jars or stools, mere substances and unintelligent in
themselves. With those Selfs there co-operate the internal
organs (manas), atomic and also unintelligent. From the
conjunction of these two classes of substances, viz. the
Selfs and the internal organs, there spring the nine special
qualities of the Selfs, viz. desire, &C. 1 These qualities
inhere in the individual Selfs separately, without any
confusion, and that constitutes the sawsara-state. Final|
release, on the other hand, consists in the absolute non-j
origination of those nine qualities.
With regard to these opinions we remark that, as far as
the Sankhyas are concerned, their doctrine that all Selfs
are of the nature of intelligence, and that there is no
difference between them in the point of proximity (to the
pradhana), &c. 2 , implies that, if one Self is connected with
pleasure and pain, all Selfswill be so connected.—Well but,
the Sankhya might reply, a difference (in the connexion
of the individual Selfs with pleasure and pain) may result
from the circumstance that the activity of the pradhana
aims at the isolation (emancipation) of the Selfs 3 . Other-
1 Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, endeavour, merit,
demerit, and bhavana.
2 The &c. implies the non-activity (audasinya) of the Selfs.
3 And therefore proceeds in a special definite direction capable
of effecting in the end the emancipation of some particular Self.
70
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
wise the activity of the pradhana would serve no other
end but to manifest the pradhana’s power, in consequence
whereof no final release would ever take place.—This argu¬
mentation, we reply, is not sound. For we have no right
to assume a difference which has for its only motive the
accomplishment of an end desirable (to us, viz. the emanci¬
pation of the Selfs), but we must rather bring forward
some proof for that difference. If no such proof can be
brought forward, the desired end, i. e. the emancipation
of the soul, must be supposed not to take place; while
at the same time the absence of any cause of difference
establishes the confusion of actions and their results.—
Against the Kazzadas we urge that if, on their theory, the
internal organ is connected with one soul, it must in the
same way be connected with all other souls as well, as
there is no difference in the point of proximity, &C. 1
Hence, there being no difference of cause and consequently
no difference of effect, it follows that, when one soul is
connected with pleasure and pain, all souls are thus con¬
nected.—But may not the limitation (of actions and their
results) be caused by the unseen principle (adrzsh/a) ? By
no means, the following Sutra replies.
51. On account of the unseen principle being non-
limitative.
While there are many souls, all-pervading like ether,
and in equal proximity to all bodies from within as well
as without, the so-called unseen principle (adrzsh/a), which
is of the nature of religious merit or demerit, is acquired
through mind, speech, and body (i. e. thoughts, words, and
actions).—Now, according to the Sankhyas, that principle
inheres not in the Self, but abides in the pradhana and
cannot, on account of the pradhana being the same (for
all souls), be the limitative cause of the enjoyment of
pleasure and pain for each individual Self.—And according
to the Kazzadas also the unseen principle is due to the
non-particular conjunction of the Selfs with the internal
1 The 4 &c.’ implies substantiality and so on.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 53.
71
organs, and as thus there is no limitative reason for any
particular adrzsh/a belonging to any particular soul, the
doctrine is open to the same objection.—Well, but there
are at work in every particular Self resolutions, &c., such
as, ‘ I wish to obtain that result/ ‘ I wish to avoid that
other result/ 4 1 am striving for that purpose/ ‘ I wish to
act in that way/ &c. &c., and these may, we assume,
define the relation of ownership in which particular Selfs
stand to particular adrzsh/as.—This objection is negatived
in the following Sutra.
52. And this is also the case in resolutions, &c.
The objection pointed out before applies also to resolu¬
tions, &c., for they also are made through the non¬
particular conjunction of the internal organ and the Self,
in proximity to all Selfs. Hence they also cannot furnish
a reason for limitation.
53. (Should it be said that distinction of pleasure,
pain, &c., results) from (difference of) place; we say
no, on account of the (Selfs) being within (all
things).
Here it might be objected that, although all Selfs are
all-pervading, yet their conjunction with the internal organ
which is seated in the body must take place in that part
of each Self which is limited by the body; and that thus
there may result from difference of locality a limitative
distinction of resolutions, &c., of the adrzsh/a, and of
pleasure and pain.—This also, we reply, is not possible
‘on account of the being within/ For, as being equally
infinite, all Selfs are within all bodies. Thus the Vabe-
shikas have no right whatever to assume any part of the
Self to be limited by the body. And if they do assume
such a part of the Self which in reality is without any
parts, that part because merely assumptive will be in¬
capable of limiting a real effect. Moreover, it is impossible
to limit the body which originates in proximity to all
(omnipresent) Selfs to one particular Self to the exclusion
of all others. Moreover, on the doctrine of limitation due
72
vedanta-sOtras.
to difference of place, it would follow that sometimes two
Selfs enjoying the same pleasure or pain might effect their
fruition by one and the same body, since it may happen
that the unseen principle of two Selfs occupies the same
place. For we may observe, e. g. that after Devadatta’s
body has moved away from a certain spot in which Deva-
datta had enjoyed a certain amount of pleasure or pain,
and the body of Ya^vzadatta has moved into that very same
place, Ya^adatta enjoys an equal amount of pleasure or
pain; a thing which (on the theory discussed) could not
happen if the unseen principles of the two men did not
occupy the same place. From the doctrine that the unseen
principles occupy fixed places it would, moreover, follow
that no enjoyment of the heavenly world, &c. can take
place; for the adrzshfe is effected in definite places such
as e. g. the body of a Brahma/za, and the enjoyment of the
heavenly world is bound to a definite different place.—It
further 1 is impossible to maintain that there exist many
all-pervading Selfs 2 , as there are no parallel instances.
Mention if you can a plurality of other things occupying
the same place!—You will perhaps bring forward colour
and so on 3 . But we refuse to accept that instance as
parallel, because colour, &c., although non-different in so
far as they are attributes of one substance, yet differ
through their essential characteristics. On the other hand
there is no difference of characteristics between your
(alleged) many Selfs. If you say that a difference of
characteristics can be established on the ground of the
ultimate special differences (of all substances), we point
out that you implicate yourself in a logical circle as the
assumption of difference of characteristics and the as¬
sumption of ultimate differences presuppose each other.
1 And this is an attack on the basis of the position of the Sankhyas
as well as of the Vaheshikas.
2 Which being equally omnipresent would all occupy the same
space.
3 Many attributes such as colour, smell, touch, &c. reside in one
place as belonging to one material object.
II ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 53.
73
Should you adduce as parallel instances the all-pervading-
ness of ether, &c. (the ‘ &c.’ implying place and time), we
reply that their all-pervadingness is not proved for him
who holds the doctrine of Brahman and looks upon ether
and so on as mere effects.
All which establishes the conclusion that the only doc¬
trine not open to any objections is the doctrine of the unity
of the Self.
74
vedanta-s6tras.
FOURTH PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
i. Thus the vital airs.
In the third p&da it has been shown that a conflict of
Vedic passages as to ether, &c., does not exist. The same
is now done in this fourth pada with regard to the vital
airs. On the one hand the chapters treating of the origin of
things do not record an origin of the vital airs ; so e.g.
(Kh . Up. VI, 2 , 3) ‘ It sent forth fire/ &c. ; and (Taitt. Up.
II, 1) ‘ From that Self sprang ether/ &c. On the other
hand it is said expressly in some places that the vital airs
were not produced. The following passage, e.g. ‘Non-
being indeed was this in the beginning; they say : what
was that non-being? those rishis indeed were the non-being
in the beginning; they say: who are those rzshis ? the
vital airs indeed are the rzshis ’ (Sat Br. VI, 1, 1, 1), states
that the vital airs existed before the origin of things.—In
other passages again we read of the origin of the vital
airs also, so e. g. ‘ As small sparks come forth from fire,
thus do all vital airs come forth from that Self’ (Br/. Up.
II, 1, 20); ‘From that is born the vital air, mind, and all
organs of sense 5 (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3); ‘The seven vital airs
also spring from him 5 (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8); ‘ He sent forth
the vital air; from the vital air .sraddha, ether, air, light,
water, earth, sense, mind, food 5 (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Hence
as there is a conflict of scriptural passages, and as no
reason can be made out for deciding in favour of either
alternative, the purvapakshin thinks that either no opinion
can be formed, or that the passages relative to the origin
of the vital airs must be taken in a metaphorical sense, since
scripture expressly states the pranas to have existed before
the creation.
In reply to this the author of the Sutras says, ‘ thus the
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I.
75
pranas.’—What then, it will be asked, is the fitness of the
word ‘thus/ as there is no point of comparison with the
matter under discussion ? The matter under discussion at
the conclusion of the preceding pada was the refutation
of those who maintain a plurality of omnipresent Selfs, and
with this no comparison can be instituted because there is
no similarity. For a comparison is possible only where
there is similarity ; as when we say, e.g. c as a lion so is Bala-
varman.’ Possibly it might be said that the comparison is
meant to intimate similarity with the adrzshfe ; the meaning
being that as the adrzsh/a is not limited because it is pro¬
duced in proximity to all Selfs, so the pranas also are not
limited with regard to all the different Selfs. But, on that
explanation, the Sutra would be an idle repetition, as it has
already been explained that that absence of limitation is due
to the non-limitation of bodies.—Nor can the prazzas be com¬
pared with the individual soul, because that would be con¬
trary to the conclusion about to be established. For it has
been shown that the individual soul is without an origin,
while the intention is to declare that the prazzas have an
origin. Hence it appears that the word ‘ so * is devoid of
connexion.—Not so, we reply. A connexion may be
established by means of a comparison based on the exem¬
plifying passages. Under that category fall those passages
which state the origin of the prazzas, as e.g. ‘From that
Self come forth all prazzas, all worlds, all gods, all beings’
(B ri. Up. II, 1, 20) ; which passage means that as the worlds
and so on are produced from the highest Brahman so the
prazzas also. Such passages also as (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3)
‘ From him are born prazza, mind and all organs of sense,
ether, air, light, water, and the earth the support of all,’ are
to be considered as intimating that the origin of the prazzas
is analogous to that of the ether, &c.—Or else, as a con¬
nexion with a somewhat remote object of comparison is
resorted to in such cases as the one treated of in Pti. Mi.
Su. Ill, 4, 32 (‘ and the accident in drinking Soma, in the
same manner’) 1 , we may construe our Sutra in the following
1 The ‘ tadvat 5 in the quoted Sutra refers not to the immediately
preceding adhikarazza but to Sfttra III, 4, 28.
7 6
VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
way: in the same way as ether and so on, which are men¬
tioned in the beginning of the preceding pada, are under¬
stood to be effects of the highest Brahman, so the pranas
also are effects of the highest Brahman. And if it be
asked what reason we have for assuming the pranas to be
so, we reply : the fact of this being stated by scripture.—
But it has been shown above that in some places the
origin of the pranas is not mentioned.—That is of no
weight, we reply, as it is mentioned in other places. For
the circumstance of a thing not being stated in some
places has no power to invalidate what is stated about it
in other places. Hence, on account of equality of scrip¬
tural statement, it is proper to maintain that the pranas
also are produced in the same way as ether and so on.
2. On account of the impossibility of a secondary
(origin of the pranas).
Against the objection that the origin of the pranas must
be understood in a secondary sense because the text states
that they existed before the origin of the world, the Sutra-
kara declares ‘ on account of the impossibility of a
secondary origin/ The statement as to the origin of the
pranas cannot be taken in a secondary sense because
therefrom would result the abandonment of a general
assertion. For after the text has asserted that the know¬
ledge of everything depends on the knowledge of one
(‘ What is that through which when it is known everything
else becomes known? ’ Mu. Up. I, i, 3), it goes on to say,
in order to prove that assertion, that 4 From him is born
prazza,’ &c. (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3). Now the assertion is made
good only if the whole world including the pranas is an
effect of Brahman, because then there is no effect in¬
dependent of the material cause ; if on the other hand the
statement as to the origin of the pra/zas were taken in a
secondary sense, the assertion would thereby be stultified.
The text, moreover, makes some concluding statements
about the matter asserted, 4 The Person is all this, sacrifice,
penance, Brahman, the highest Immortal’ (II, 1, 10), and
4 Brahman alone is all this ; it is the Best/—That same
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 3.
77
assertion is to be connected with such passages as the
following, ‘ When we see, hear, perceive, and know the Self,
then all this is known ’ (B ri. Up. II, 4, 5).—How then
have we to account for the statement that the pranas
existed before the creation ?—That statement, we reply,
does not refer to the fundamental causal substance ; for we
ascertain from scriptural passages, such as Mu. Up. II, 1, 2
(‘ That heavenly Person is without breath and without mind,
pure, higher than the high Imperishable ’), that the funda¬
mental causal substance is devoid of all distinctions such
as breath and the like. We must rather view the statement
about the existence of the pranas before the creation as
having for its object a subordinate causal substance 1 , and
being made with reference to the effects of the latter only.
For it is known from Sruti and Smrzti that even in the
universe of evolved things many states of being may stand
to each other in the relation of causal substance and effect.
— In the adhikarazza treating of the ether there occurred a
Sutra (composed of the same syllables) 4 gauzzyasambhavat/
which as being the purvapaksha-sutra had to be explained
as 4 gauzzi asambhavat,’ 4 the statement about the origin
of ether must be taken in a secondary sense on account of
the impossibility (of the primary sense)/ There the final
conclusion was established by means of the abandonment
of the general assertion. Here on the other hand the Sutra
is the Siddhanta Sutra and we have therefore explained
it as meaning 4 on account of the impossibility of a secondary
meaning/—Those who explain the present Sutra in the
same way as the previous Sutra overlook the fact of the
general assertion being abandoned (viz. if the passages
referring to the origin of the prazzas were taken in a
secondary sense).
3. O11 account of that (word which indicates origin)
being enunciated at first (in connexion with the
pranas).
That the scriptural statement about the origin of the
1 Such as Hirazzyagarbha.
78
vedanta-sOtras.
pranas is to be taken in its literal sense just as the state¬
ments about the ether, &c., appears from that circumstance
also that the one word which (in the passage from the Mu.
Up.) indicates origination, viz. ‘is born ’ (^dyate), is in the
first place connected with the pranas and has afterwards to
be joined with ether, &c., also (‘ from him is born breath,
mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air/ &c.). Now as it is
a settled matter that the phrase ‘ is born ’ must be taken in
its primary sense with reference to ether and so on, it
follows that the origin of the pranas also to which the same
word is applied must be understood as a real origin. For
it would be impossible to decide that a word enunciated
once only in one chapter and one sentence, and connected
with many other words, has in some cases to be taken in its
primary sense, and in others in a secondary sense ; for such
a decision would imply want of uniformity.—So likewise in
the passage, ‘ He sent forth prazza, from prazza jraddha/ &c.
(Pr. Up. VI, 4), the phrase ‘he sent forth’ which the text
exhibits in conjunction with the pranas has to be carried
on to jraddha and the other things which have an origin.—
The same reasoning holds good in those cases where the
word expressing origination occurs at the end and has to be
connected with the preceding words ; as e.g. in the passage
ending ‘ all beings come forth from the Self/ where the
word ‘ come forth 5 must be connected with the pranas, &c.,
mentioned in the earlier part of the sentence.
4. Because speech is preceded by that (viz. fire
and the other elements).
Although in the chapter, ‘ That sent forth fire/ &c., the
origin of the pranas is not mentioned, the origin of the
three elements, fire, water, and earth only being stated,
nevertheless, the fact of the text declaring that speech,
prazza, and mind presuppose fire, water, and earth—which in
their turn have Brahman for their causal substance—proves
that they—and, by parity of reasoning, all prazzas—have
sprung from Brahman. That speech, prazza, and mind
presuppose fire, water, and earth is told in the same chapter,
‘ For truly, my child, mind consists of earth, breath of water,
II ADHYAYA, 4 pAdA, 5.
79
speech of fire’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 5, 4). If their consisting of
earth and so on is taken literally, it follows at once that
they have sprung from Brahman. And if it be taken in a
metaphorical sense only, yet, as the sentence forms part of
the chapter which treats of the evolution of names and
forms effected by Brahman ; and as the introductory phrase
runs, ‘ That by which we hear what is not heard ’ ( Kh. Up.
VI, 1, 3) ; and as the concluding passage is ‘In it all that
exists has its Self’ [Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); and as the matter is
moreover known from other scriptural passages ; we under¬
stand that also the statement about mind and so on
consisting of earth, &c., is meant to teach that they are
products of Brahman.—It is therefore an established con¬
clusion that the pranas also are effects of Brahman.
5. (The prazzas are) seven, on account of this
being understood (from scriptural passages) and of
the specification (of those seven).
So far we have shown that there is in reality no conflict
of scriptural passages regarding the origin of the prazzas.
It will now be shown that there is also no conflict regarding
their number. The chief vital air (mukhya prazza) will be
discussed later on. For the present the Sutrakara defines
the number of the other prazzas. A doubt arises here
owing to the conflicting nature of the scriptural passages.
In one place seven prazzas are mentioned, ‘ The seven prazzas
spring from him’ (Mu. Up. II, t, 8). In another place
eight prazzas are mentioned as being grahas, ‘ Eight grahas
there are and eight atigrahas ’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 2, 1). In
another place nine, ‘ Seven are the prazzas of the head, two
the lower ones’ (Taitt. Sazzzh. V, 3, 2, 5). Sometimes ten,
‘Nine prazzas indeed are in men, the navel is the tenth’
(Taitt. Sazzzh. V, 3, 2, 3). Sometimes eleven, ‘ Ten are these
prazzas in man, and Atman is the eleventh’ (B ri. Up. Ill,
9, 4). Sometimes twelve, ‘ All touches have their centre in
the skin,’ &c. (B ri. Up. II, 4, 11). Sometimes thirteen,
‘ The eye and what can be seen,’ &c. (Pr. Up. IV, 8).—Thus
the scriptural passages disagree about the number of the
prazzas.
8 o
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the pranas are in
reality seven in number, on account of understanding, i. e.
because they are understood to be so many, from passages
such as c The seven pranas spring from him/ &c. These
seven pranas are moreover specified in the other passage
quoted above, ‘ Seven indeed are the pranas of the head.’
—But in the same passage we meet with the following
reiteration, ‘ Resting in the cave they are placed there seven
and seven/ which intimates that there are pr&zzas in addition
to the seven.—No matter, we reply ; that reiteration is
made with reference to the plurality of men, and means
that each man has seven pranas; it does not mean that
there are two sets of seven prazzas each of different nature.
—But, another objection will be raised, other scriptural
passages speak of the prazzas as eight in number; how then
should they be seven ?—True, we reply, the number of eight
also is stated; but on account of the contradictory nature
of the statements we have to decide in favour of either of
the two numbers ; hence we decide in favour of the number
seven, in deference to the (simpler) assumption of a low
number, and consider the statements of other numbers to
refer to the difference of modifications (of the fundamental
seven prazzas).—To this argumentation the next Sutra replies.
6 . But (there are also, in addition to the seven
pranas mentioned,) the hands and so on. This being
a settled matter, therefore (we must) not (conclude)
thus (viz. that there are seven pra/zas only).
In addition to the seven prazzas scripture mentions other
pra/zas also, such as the hands, &c., ‘ The hand is one graha
and that is seized by work as the atigraha ; for with the
hands one does work’ (Bri. Up. Ill, 2, 8), and similar pas¬
sages. And as it is settled that there are more than seven,
the number seven may be explained as being contained
within the greater number. For wherever there is a conflict
between a higher and a lower number, the higher number
has to be accepted because the lower one is contained within
it; while the higher is not contained within the lower. We
therefore must not conclude that, in deference to the lower
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6.
81
number, seven pranas have to be assumed, but rather that
there are eleven prazzas, in deference to the higher number.
This conclusion is confirmed by one of the passages quoted,
‘ Ten are these prazzas in man, and Atman is the eleventh.’
By the word Atman we have to understand the internal
organ, on account of its ruling over the organs. Should it
be objected that scripture also mentions numbers higher
than eleven, viz. twelve and thirteen, we admit that, but
remark that there are no objective effects in addition to the
eleven (well-known) objective effects on account of which
additional organs would have to be assumed. There are five
distinctions of buddhi having for their respective objects
sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell, and on their account
there are the five intellectual organs; again there are five
classes of action, viz. speaking, taking, going, evacuation,
and begetting, and on their account there are the five organs
of action ; finally there is the manas which has all things
for its objects and extends to the past, the present, and the
future; it is one only but has various functions. On account
of the plurality of its functions we find it designated by
different terms in different places, as manas or buddhi or
ahazzzkara or £itta. Thus scripture also after having enu¬
merated the various functions such as desire, &c., says at
the end, ‘Allthis is manas only.’—That passage again which
speaks of the prazzas of the head as seven means four prazzas
only, which on account of the plurality of their places may
be counted as seven ; viz. the two ears, the two eyes, the
two nostrils, and speech.—Nor can it be maintained that
there are in reality only so many (i.e. seven), the other
prazzas being mere functions of the seven ; for the functions
of the hands and so on are absolutely different (from the
functions of the seven senses admitted by the purvapakshin).
—Again, in the passage ‘ Nine prazzas indeed are in man, the
navel is the tenth,’ the expression ‘ ten prazzas ’ is used to
denote the different openings of the human body, not the
difference of nature of the prazzas, as we conclude from the
navel being mentioned as the eleventh. For no prazza is
known that bears the name of navel; but the navel as being
one of the special abodes of the chief prazza is here enu-
[33] G
82
vedanta-s6tras.
merated as a tenth prazza.—In some places so and so many
are counted for the purpose of meditation ; in other places
so and so many for the purpose of illustration h As the
statements concerning the number of the pranas are of so
varying a nature we must therefore distinguish in each case
what the object of the statement is. Meanwhile it remains
a settled conclusion that that statement which makes the
pranas to be eleven is authoritative, on account of the
objective effects (being eleven also).
The two Sutras (referring to the number of the prazzas)
may be construed in the following manner also. The
prazzas are seven because scripture mentions the going
(gati) of seven only, ‘ When he thus departs life departs
after him, and when life thus departs all the other pr&zzas 1 2 *
depart after it 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 2).—But, it may be objected,
this passage says c all the other prazzas ;’ how then does it
declare the going of seven only ?—The Sutra replies, ‘ on
account of their being specified/ Seven senses only, from
seeing up to feeling, are specified there because so many
only are under discussion ; as we see from the enumeration
given in the passage, ‘ When that person in the eye turns
away then he ceases to know any forms. He has become
one they say, he does not see’ &c. The word ‘ all ’ refers
here only to what is under discussion, i.e. only to the seven
prazzas mentioned before, not to any other. Analogously
when we say ‘ all the Brahmazzas have been fed/ we mean
only those Brahmazzas who have been invited and concern
us at the time, not any other.—If it be objected that the
passage quoted mentions understanding (vi^ana) as the
eighth thing departing, and that we therefore have no right
to speak of the departing of seven only, we reply that
manas and understanding differ not in essential nature but
only in function, and that on this account we are entitled
to speak of seven prazzas only.—The answer to this
1 Sapta pra n&h prabhavantity ader gatim aha kva^id iti, ash/au
graha ityader gatizzz sfi^ayati gatim iti. An. Gi.
2 I.e. seeing, smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, feeling, and
the manas.
ii adhyAya, 4 pAda, 6.
83
purvapaksha is as follows.— In addition to the severe
senses, other pranas also, such as the hands, are known
to exist, as we see from such passages as ‘ The hands are
one graha/ &c. (B ri. Up. Ill, 2, 8). By their being a graha
(seizer) is meant that they are bonds by which the indivi¬
dual soul (kshetra^vza) is tied. Now the individual soul is
tied not in one body only, but is equally tied in other bodies
also. Hence it follows that that bond called graha (i.e.
among other things the hands) moves over into other bodies
also. Smrz'ti also (‘ He—the Self—is joined with the aggre¬
gate of eight, comprising breath, &c. 1 , as his mark; his
bondage consists in being bound by it, his release in being
freed from it’) shows that the Self is, previous to final
release, not freed from the bonds called grahas. And also
in the enumeration of the senses and their objects given
by the Atharvazza Upanishad (‘ The eye and what can be
seen,’ &c., Pr. Up. IV, 8), the organs of action such as the
hands and so on, together with their objects, are specified
as well,‘the hands and what can be grasped ; the member and
what can be delighted; the anus and what can be evacuated;
the feet and what can be walked/ Moreover the passage,
‘ These ten vital breaths and atman as the eleventh ; when
they depart from this mortal body they make us cry’ (B ri.
Up. Ill, 9,4), shows that eleven prazzas depart from the body.
—Moreover the word c all ’ (which occurs in the passage, Bri.
Up. IV, 4,2) must, because connected with the word ‘pranas/
denote all pr&zzas, and cannot, on the ground of general sub¬
ject-matter, be limited to the seven pranas ; for a direct state¬
ment has greater force than the subject-matter. Even in the
analogous sentence, ‘all Brahmazzas have been fed/ we have,
on the ground of the words, to understand all Brahmazzas
living on the earth ; but because it is impossible to feed all
Brahmazzas in the latter sense, we accept that meaning of
1 The eightfold aggregate of which the Self is freed in final
release only comprises the five pranas (vital airs), the pentad of the
five subtle elements, the pentad of the organs of intellect, the pentad
of the organs of action, the tetrad of internal organs (manas, &c.),
avidya, desire (kama), and karman.
G 2
8 4
VEDANTA-s£jTRAS.
‘all/ according to which it denotes all invited Brahmazzas.
In our case on the other hand there is no reason whatever
for narrowing the meaning of ‘ all.’—Hence the word £ all ’
includes all pranas without exception. Nothing on the
other hand prevents the enumeration of seven prazzas being
taken as illustrative only. It is therefore an established
conclusion, resting on the number of the effects as well
as on Vedic statement, that there are eleven pranas.
7. And (they are) minute.
The author of the Sutras adds another characteristic
quality of the pranas. The pranas under discussion must
be viewed as minute. By their minuteness we have to
understand subtilty and limited size; but not atomic size,
as otherwise they would be incapable of producing effects
which extend over the whole body. They must be subtle;
for if they were big the persons surrounding a dying man
would see them coming out from the body at the moment
of death, as a snake comes out of its hole. They must be
limited; for if they were all-pervading the scriptural
statements as to their passing out of the body, going and
coming, would be contradicted thereby, and it could not
be established that the individual soul is c the essence of
the qualities of that ’ (i. e. the manas; cp. II, 3, 29).
Should it be said that they may be all-pervading, but at
the same time appear as functions [vri tti) in the body only,
we rejoin that only a function can constitute an instru¬
ment. Whatever effects perception, may it be a function
or something else, just that is an instrument for us. The
disagreement is therefore about a name only, and the
assumption of the instruments (pranas) being all-pervading
is thus purposeless.—Hence we decide that the pranas are
subtle and of limited size.
8. And the best (i.e. the chief vital air).
The Sutra extends to the chief vital air (mukhya prazza)
a quality already asserted of the other prazzas, viz. being an
effect of Brahman.—But, an objection may be raised, it has
already been stated of all prazzas without difference that
they are effects of Brahman ; e. g. the passage, c From him
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 9.
85
is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense’ (Mu. Up. II,
1, 3), states the origin of prazza separately from the senses
and the manas ; and there are other passages also such
as ‘ He sent forth prazza ’ (Pr. Up. VI, 4). Why then the
formal extension?—We reply: For the purpose of re¬
moving further doubt. For in the Nasadiya-sukta whose
subject is Brahman there occurs the following mantra:
‘There was neither death nor the Immortal; nor mani¬
festation of either night or day. By its own law the One
was breathing without wind ; there was nothing differ¬
ent from that or higher than it 5 (Hi. Sazzzh. X, 129, 2).
Here the words, ‘was breathing,’ which denote the
proper function of breath, intimate that breath existed as
it were before the creation. And therefrom it might be
concluded that prazza is not produced ; an idea which the
Sutrak&ra discards by the formal extension (to prazza of
the quality of having originated from Brahman).—Moreover
the word ‘ breathed ’ does not intimate that prazza existed
before the creation; for in the first place it is qualified by
the addition ‘without wind,’ and in the second place
scriptural passages—such as ‘ He is without breath, without
mind, pure’ (Mu. Up. II, I, 2)—declare expressly that the
causal substance is without any qualifications such as
prazza and so on. Hence the word ‘breathed’ has merely
the purpose of setting forth the existence of the cause.—
The term ‘the best’ (employed in the Sutra) denotes the
chief vital air, according to the declaration of scripture,
‘ Breath indeed is the oldest and the best ’ (Kh. Up. V, 1,1).
The breath is the oldest because it begins its function from
the moment when the child is conceived ; the senses of
hearing, &c., on the other hand, begin to act only when
their special seats, viz. the ears, &c., are formed, and they
are thus not ‘the oldest.’ The designation ‘the best’
belongs to the prazza on account of its superior qualities
and on account of the passage, ‘We shall not be able to
live without thee’ (B ri. Up. VI, 1, 13).
9. (The chief prazza is) neither air nor function,
on account of its being mentioned separately.
86
vedanta-sOtras.
An inquiry is now started concerning the nature of that
chief prazza.—The purvapakshin maintains that the prazza
is, according to .Sruti, nothing but air. For 5 ruti says,
‘ Breath is air; that air assuming five forms is prazza,
apana, vyana, udana, samana.’—Or else the purvapaksha
may be formulated according to the view of another
philosophical doctrine, and prdzza may be considered as
the combined function of all organs. For so the followers
of another doctrine (viz. the Sankhyas) teach, ‘The five
airs, pra/za,&c., are the common function of the instruments 1 .’
To this we reply that the prazza is neither air nor the
function of an organ ; for it is mentioned separately.
From air prazza is distinguished in the following passage,
‘ Breath indeed is the fourth foot of Brahman. That foot
shines as Agni with its light and warms. 5 If prazza were
mere air, it would not be mentioned separately from air.—
Thus it is also mentioned separately from the functions of
the organs ; for the texts enumerate speech and the other
organs and mention prazza separately from them, and the
function and that to which the function belongs (the organ)
are identical. If it were a mere function of an organ, it
would not be mentioned separately from the organs.
Other passages also in which the prazza is mentioned
separately from air and the organs are here to be con¬
sidered so, e.g. ‘From him is born breath, mind, and all
organs of sense, ether, air,’ &c. (Mu. Up. II, i, 3). Nor is
it possible that all the organs together should have one func¬
tion (and that that function should be the pr&zza); for each
organ has its own special function and the aggregate of
them has no active power of its own.—But—an objection
may be raised—the thing may take place in the manner of
the moving bird-cage. Just as eleven birds shut up in one
cage may, although each makes a separate effort, move the
cage by the combination of their efforts; so the eleven
1 Sankhya Su. II, 31 ; where, however, the reading is ‘ samanya-
karazzavz'z'tti^/ explained by the Comm, as sadharazzi karazzasya anta^-
karazzatrayasya \rill\h parizzamabheda iti. *Sankara, on the other
hand, understands by karazza the eleven prazzas discussed previously.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 9.
87
pr&zzas which abide in one body may, although each has
its own special function, by the combination of these
functions, produce one common function called prazza.—
This objection, we reply, is without force. The birds
indeed may, by means of their separate subordinate efforts,
which all favour the movement of the cage, move the
cage by combination; that is a matter of observation.
But we have no right to assume that the different pranas
with their subordinate functions such as hearing &c. can,
by combination, produce the function of vital breath; for
there is no means to prove this, and the vital breath is in
kind absolutely different from hearing and so on.—More¬
over, if the vital breath were the mere function of an organ
(or the organs) it could not be glorified as the c best/ and
speech and so on could not be represented as subordinate
to it. Hence the vital breath is different from air and the
functions (of the organs).—How then have we to under¬
stand the scriptural passage, ‘ The pr&zza is air/ &c.?—
The air, we reply, passing into the adhyatma-state, dividing
itself fivefold and thus abiding in a specialized condition is
called prazza. It therefore is neither a different being nor
is it mere air. Hence there is room for those passages as
well which identify it with air as those which do not.—
Well, let this be granted. The prazza then also must be
considered to be independent in this body like the
individual soul, as scripture declares it to be the ‘best*
and the organs such as speech, &c., to be subordinate to it.
For various powers are ascribed to it in scriptural passages.
It is said, for instance, that when speech and the other
(organs) are asleep the prazza alone is awake; that the
pr&zza alone is not reached by death; that the prazza is the
absorber, it absorbs speech, &c.; that the prazza guards
the other senses (prazzas) as a mother her sons 1 . Hence
it follows that the prazza is independent in the same way
as the individual soul.—This view is impugned in the next j
Sutra. *
1 Cp. Ka. Up. II, 5, 8; Bn. Up. I, 5, 21; Kh. Up. IV, 3, 3 ; Pr.
Up. II, 13.
88
vedanta-sOtras.
10. But (the prd/za is subordinate to the soul) like
the eye, &c., on account of being taught with them
(the eye, &c.), and for other reasons.
The word c but ’ sets aside the independence of the prawa.
As the eye and so on stand, like the subjects of a king, in
mere subordinate relation to the acting and enjoyingof the
soul and are not independent, so the chief vital air also,
occupying a position analogous to that of a kings minister,
stands in an entirely subordinate relation to the soul and
is not independent.—Why ?—Because it is taught (spoken
of) together with them, i. e. the eye and the other organs,
in such passages as the colloquy of the pr&zzas, &c. For
to be mentioned together is appropriate only in the case
of things with the same attributes, as e. g. the Brzhat-
saman and the Rathantara-saman h The words ‘and so
on’ (in the Sutra) indicate other reasons refuting the
independence of the pra/za, such as its being composed of
parts, its being of a non-intelligent nature and the like.—
Well, but if it be admitted that the pr&/za stands to the
soul in the relation of an instrument as the eye and so on,
it will follow that we must assume another sense-object
analogous to colour and so on. For the eyes, &c., occupy
their specific subordinate position with regard to the soul
through their functions which consist in the seeing of
colour and so on. Now we can enumerate only eleven
classes of functions, viz. the seeing of colour and so on,
on whose account we assume eleven different pranas, and
there is no twelfth class of effects on account of which a
twelfth prazza could be assumed.—To this objection the
following Sutra replies.
ii. And on account of (its) not being an instru¬
ment the objection is not (valid); for thus (scripture)
declares.
The objection urged, viz. that there would result another
sense-object, is not valid ; because the prazza is not an
1 Which go together because they are both samans.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 12 .
89
instrument. For we do not assume that the prazza is, like
the eye, an organ because it determines a special sense-
object. Nor is it on that account devoid of an effect;
since scripture declares that the chief vital air has a specific
effect which cannot belong to the other prazzas. For in
the so-called colloquies of the prazzas we read in the be¬
ginning, ‘The prazzas quarrelled together who was best;’
after that we read, ‘ He by whose departure the body seems
worse than worst, he is the best of you ; ’ thereupon the
text, after showing how, on the successive departure of
speech and so on, the life of the body, although deprived
of one particular function, went on as before, finally relates
that as soon as the chief prazza was about to depart all
other prazzas became loosened and the body was about to
perish ; which shows that the body and all the senses sub¬
sist by means of the chief prazza. The same thing is de¬
clared by another passage, ‘ Then pr&zza as the best said to
them : Be not deceived ; I alone dividing myself fivefold
support this body and keep it’ (Pr. Up. II, 3). Another
passage, viz. ‘ With prazza guarding the lower nest ’ (B ri. Up.
IV, 3, 12), shows that the guarding of the body depends on
prazza. Again, two other passages show that the nourish^
ing of the body depends on prazza, ‘ From whatever limb
prazza goes away that limb withers 5 (Bz^z. Up. I, 3, 19), and
‘ What we eat and drink with it supports the other vital
breaths.’ And another passage declares that the soul’s
departing and staying depend on prazza, ‘ What is it by
whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying
I shall stay?—The created prazza' (Pr. Up. VI, 3 ; 4).
12. It is designated as having five functions like
mind.
The chief vital air has its specific effect for that reason
also that in scripture it is designated as having five
functions, prazza, apana, vyana, udana, samana. This dis¬
tinction of functions is based on a distinction of effects.
Pr&zza is the forward-function whose work is aspiration, &c.;
apana is the backward-function whose work is inspiration,
&c.; vyana is that which, abiding in the junction of the two,
90
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
is the cause of works of strength 1 ; udana is the ascending
function and is the cause of the passing out (of the soul);
samana is the function which conveys the juices of the
food equally through all the limbs of the body. J Thus the
pra;za has five functions just as the mind (manas) has.
The five functions of the mind are the five well-known
ones caused by the ear, &c., and having sound and so on
for their objects. By the functions of the mind we cannot
here understand those enumerated (in Bri. Up. I, 5, 3),
'desire, representation/ &c., because those are more than
five.—But on the former explanation also there exists yet
another function of the mind which does not depend on
the ear, &c., but has for its object the past, the future, and
so on ; so that on that explanation also the number five
is exceeded.—Well, let us then follow the principle that
the opinions of other (systems) if unobjectionable may be
adopted, and let us assume that the five functions of the
manas are those five which are known from the Yoga^istra,
viz. right knowledge, error, imagination, slumber, and re¬
membrance. Or else let us assume that the Sutra quotes
the manas as an analogous instance merely with reference
to the plurality (not the fivefoldness) of its functions.—
In any case the Sutra must be construed to mean that the
prana’s subordinate position with regard to the soul follows
from its having five functions like the manas.
13. And it is minute.
And the chief vital air is to be considered as minute like
the other pranas.—Here also we have to understand by
minuteness that the chief vital air is subtle and of limited
size, not that is of atomic size; for by means of its five
functions it pervades the entire body. It must be viewed
as subtle because when passing out of the body it is not
perceived by a bystander, and as limited because scripture
speaks of its passing out, going and coming.—But, it may
be said, scripture speaks also of its all-pervadingness; so,
1 Viz. the holding in of the breath ; cp. Kh . Up. I, 3, 3-5.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 14.
91
e. g. ‘ He is equal to a grub, equal to a gnat, equal to an
elephant, equal to these three worlds, equal to this
Universe’ (B ri. Up. I, 3, 22 ).—To this we reply that the
all-pervadingness of which this text speaks belongs to the
Self of the prana, in its adhidaivata relation, according to
which it appears as Hirazzyagarbha in his double—universal
and individual—form, not in its adhyatma relation. More¬
over the statements of equality ‘equal to a grub/ &c.,
just declare the limited size of the prazza which abides
within every living being.—Thus there remains no difficulty.
14. But there is guidance (of the pr&zzas) by fire,
&c., on account of that being declared by scripture.
Here there arises a discussion whether the prazzas of
which we have been treating are able to produce their
effects by their own power or only in so far as guided by
divinities.—The purvapakshin maintains that the prazzas
being endowed with the capacity of producing their effects
act from their own power. If we, moreover, admitted that
the prazzas act only in so far as guided by divinities, it
would follow that those guiding divinities are the enjoyers
(of the fruits of the actions), and the individual soul would
thus cease to be an enjoyer. Hence the prazzas act from
their own power.—To this we reply as follows. ‘ But there
takes place guidance by fire/ &c.—The word ‘ but 5 excludes
the purvapaksha. The different classes of organs, speech,
&c., the Sutra says, enter on their peculiar activities, guided
by the divinities animating fire, and so on. The words,
‘ on account of that being declared by scripture/ state the
reason. For different passages declare this, cp. Ait. Ar. II,
4, 2 , 4, ‘ Agni having become speech entered the mouth/
This statement about Agni (fire) becoming speech and
entering the mouth is made on the assumption of Agni
acting as a ruler with his divine Self (not as a mere
element). For if we abstract from the connexion with the
divinity we do not see that there is any special con¬
nexion of fire either with speech or the mouth. The sub¬
sequent passages, c Vayu having become breath entered
into the nostrils/ &c., are to be explained in the same way.
92
vedAnta-s^tras.
—This conclusion is confirmed by other passages also, such
as ‘ Speech is indeed the fourth foot of Brahman; that foot
shines with Agni as its light and warms ’ ( Kh . Up. IV,
18, 3)) which passage declares that speech is made of the
light of Agni. Other passages intimate the same thing by
declaring that speech, &c., pass over into Agni, &c., cp.
Bri. Up. I, 3, 12, ‘ He carried speech across first.; when
speech had become freed from death it became Agni/
Everywhere the enumeration of speech and so on on the
one side and Agni and so on on the other side—wherein is
implied a distinction of the personal and the divine element
—proceeds on the ground of the same relation (viz. of that
which is guided and that which guides). Smr/ti-passages
also declare at length that speech, &c., are guided by
Agni and the other divinities, cp. for instance, £ Brahma^as
knowing the truth call speech the personal element, that
which is spoken the natural element and fire (Agni) the
divine element.’—The assertion that the pr&zzas being
endowed with the capability of producing their effects act
from their own power is unfounded, as we see that some
things which possess the capability of motion, e. g. cars,
actually move only if dragged by bulls and the like.
Hence, as both alternatives are possible \ we decide on the
ground of scripture that the pranas act under the guidance
of the divinities.—The next Sutra refutes the assertion that
from the fact of the divinities guiding the pranas it would
follow that they—and not the embodied soul—are the
enjoyers.
15. (It is not so) (because the pranas are con¬
nected) with that to which the pranas belong (i.e.
the individual soul), (a thing we know) from scrip¬
ture.
Although there are divinities guiding the pranas, yet we
learn from scripture that those pranas are connected with
the embodied soul which is the Lord of the aggregate of
1 Viz. that something should act by itself, and that it should act
under guidance only.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I 7.
93
instruments of action. The following passage, e.g. ‘where
the sight has entered into the void there is the person of
the eye; the eye itself is the instrument of seeing. He
who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self; the nose is
the instrument of smelling/ declares that the pranas are
connected with the embodied soul only. Moreover the
plurality of the divinities guiding the organs renders it
impossible that they should be the enjoyers in this body.
For that there is in this body only one embodied enjoyer
is understood from the possibility of the recognition of
identity and so on x .
16. And on account of the permanence of this
(viz. the embodied soul).
This embodied soul abides permanently in this body as
the enjoyer, since it can be affected by good and evil
and can experience pleasure and pain. Not so the gods;
for they exist in the state of highest power and glory and
cannot possibly enter, in this wretched body, into the con¬
dition of enjoyers. So scripture also says, ‘ Only what is
good approaches him; verily evil does not approach the
devas’ (B ri. Up. I, 5, 20).—And only with the embodied
soul the pranas are permanently connected, as it is seen
that when the soul passes out &c. the prd/zas follow it.
This we see from passages such as the following : ‘ When
it passes out the prazza passes out after it, and when the
prazza thus passes out all the other pra/zas pass after it’
(B ri. Up. IV, 4, 2). Hence although there are ruling divi¬
nities of the organs, the embodied soul does not cease to be
the enjoyer; for the divinities are connected with the organs
only, not with the state of the soul as enjoyer.
17. They (the pranas) are senses, on account of
being so designated, with the exception of the best
(the mukhya pra/za).
We have treated of the mukhya pra/za and the other
1 Yo*hazzz rfipam adrakshaw so * haw srmomity ekasyaiva praty-
abhi^anam pratisamdhanam. Go. An.
94
vedanta-sCtras.
eleven pranas in due order.-—Now there arises another
doubt, viz. whether the other pranas are functions of the
mukhya prazza or different beings.—The purvapakshin main¬
tains that they are mere functions, on account of scriptural
statement. For scripture, after having spoken of the chief
prazza and the other prazzas in proximity, declares that those
other prazzas have their Self in the chief prazza, £ Well, let us
all assume his form. Thereupon they all assumed his form *
(B ri. Up. I, 5 > 2i).—Their unity is moreover ascertained
from the unity of the term applied to them, viz. pr&zza.
Otherwise there either would result the objectionable cir¬
cumstance of one word having different senses, or else the
word would in some places have to be taken in its primary
sense, in others in a derived sense. Hence, as prazza, apana,
&c. are the five functions of the one chief prazza, so the eleven
prazzas also which begin with speech are mere functions of
the chief prazza.—To this we reply as follows. Speech and
so on are beings different from the chief prazza, on account
of the difference of designation.—Which is that difference
of designation ?—The eleven prazzas remaining if we abstract
from the best one, i.e. the chief prazza, are called the sense-
organs (indriya), as we see them designated in .Sruti, ‘ from
him is born breath, mind, and all organs of sense’ (Mu.
Up. II, i, 3). In this and other passages prazza and the
sense-organs are mentioned separately.—But in that case
the mind also would have to be excluded from the class of
sense-organs, like the prazza; as we see that like the latter
it is separately mentioned in the passage, ‘ The mind and all
organs of sense.’ True; but in Smrzti eleven sense-organs
are mentioned, and on that account the mind must, like the
ear, and so on, be comprised in the sense-organs. That the
prazza on the other hand is a sense-organ is known neither
from Smrzti nor .Sruti.—Now this difference of designation
is appropriate only if there is difference of being. If there
were unity of being it would be contradictory that the prazza
although one should sometimes be designated as sense¬
-organ and sometimes not. Consequently the other prazzas
Vre different in being from the chief prazza.—For this con¬
clusion the following Sutra states an additional reason.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 1 9 .
95
18. On account of the scriptural statement of
difference.
The prazza is everywhere spoken of as different from
speech, &c. The passage, e.g. beginning with ‘ They said
to speech 5 (B ri. Up. I, 3, 2), enumerates speech, &c., which
were overwhelmed by the evil of the Asuras, concludes
thereupon the section treating of speech, &c., and then
specially mentions the mukhya prazza as overcoming the
Asuras, in the paragraph beginning ‘ Then they said to the
breath in the mouth/—Other passages also referring to that
difference maybe quoted, so, for instance, £ He made mind,
speech, and breath for himself* (B ri. Up. I, 5, 3).—For this
reason also the other pranas are different in being from the
chief prazza.—Another reason follows.
19. And on account of the difference of character¬
istics.
There is moreover a difference of characteristics between
the chief prazza and the other prazzas. When speech &c. are
asleep, the chief pr&zza alone is awake. The chief prazza
alone is not reached by death, while the other prazzas are.
The staying and departing of the chief prazza—not that of
the sense-organs—is the cause of the maintenance and the
destruction of the body. The sense-organs, on the other
hand, are the cause of the perception of the sense-objects,
not the chief prazza. Thus there are manifold differences
distinguishing the prazza from the senses, and this also shows
the latter to be different in being from the prazza.—To infer
from the passage, ‘ thereupon they all assumed his form,’
that the sense-organs are nothing but prazza is wrong,
because there also an examination of the context makes us
understand their difference. For there the sense-organs are
enumerated first Voice held, I shall speak/ &c.); after
that it is said that speech, &c. were seized by death in the
form of weariness (‘ Death having become weariness held
them back ; therefore speech grows weary ’); finally prazza
is mentioned separately as not having been overcome by
death (‘ but death did not seize the central breath *), and is
96
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
asserted to be the best (‘ he is the best of us ’). The assum¬
ing of the form of pra^a has therefore, in accordance with
the quoted passages, to be understood to mean that
the energizing of speech and so on depends on the
pra^a, but not that they are identical with it.—Hence it
follows that the word c pra?za’ is applied to the sense-organs
in a secondary sense. Thus *Sruti also says, ‘Thereupon
they all assumed his form, and therefore they are called
after him pranas;’ a passage declaring that the word pra^a,
which properly refers to the chief pra//a, is secondarily
applied to the sense-organs also. Speech and the other
sense-organs are therefore different in being from the pra^a.
20. But the fashioning of names and forms belongs
to him who renders tripartite, on account of the
teaching (of scripture).
In the chapter treating of the Being (sat), subsequently
to the account of the creation of fire, water, and food (earth),
the following statement is made, ‘ That divinity thought,
let me now enter those three beings with this living Self
(£*iva atma), and let me then evolve names and forms 1 ;—
let me make each of these three tripartite’ (Kk. Up. VI,
3, 2 ; 3).—Here the doubt arises whether the agent in that
evolution of names and forms is the^iva (the living, i.e. the
individual Self or soul) or the highest Lord.—The purva-
pakshin maintains the former alternative, on account of the
qualification contained in the words ‘with this living Self.’
The use of ordinary language does, in such phrases as
‘ Having entered the army of the enemy by means of a spy
I count it,’ attribute the counting of the army in which the.
spy is the real agent to the Self of the king who is the
causal agent; which attribution is effected by means of the
use of the first person, ‘ I count.’ So here the sacred text
attributes the evolving of names and forms—in which the
^iva is the real agent—to the Self of the divinity which is
the causal agent; the attribution being effected by means
Literally, with this living Self having entered let me evolve, &c.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20.
97
of the use of the first person, ‘ let me evolve/—Moreover
we see in the case of names such as Z>ittha, Z>avittha, &c.,
and in the case of forms such as jars, dishes and the like
that the individual soul only is the evolving agent 1 . Hence
the evolution of names and forms is the work of the £*iva.
To this the Sutra replies: ‘But the fashioning of names and
forms belongs to him who renders tripartite/ The particle
‘ but 5 discards the purvapaksha. Fashioning means evolv¬
ing. The term ‘he who renders tripartite’ denotes the
highest Lord, his agency being designated as beyond con¬
tradiction in the case of the rendering tripartite (of fire, &c.).
The entire evolution of names and forms which is seen, e.g.
in fire, sun, moon, lightning, or in different plants such as
ku^a-grass, ka^a-grass, pakha-trees, or in various living
beings such as cattle, deer, men, all this manifold evolution
according to species and individuals can surely be the
work of the highest Lord only, who fashioned fire, water,
and earth.—Why?—On account of the teaching of the
sacred text.—For the text says at first c that divinity/ &c.,
and then goes on in the first person ‘ let me evolve ; ’ which
implies the statement that the highest Brahman only is the
evolving agent.—But we ascertain from the qualification
contained in the words c with this living Self/ that the agent
in the evolution is the living Self!—No, we reply. The
words 'with this living Self’ are connected with the words
‘ having entered/ in proximity to which they stand; not
with the clause ‘let me evolve/ If they were connected
with the former words, we should have to assume that the
first person, which refers to the divinity—viz. ‘let me
evolve ’—is used in a metaphorical sense. And with regard
to all the manifold names and forms such as mountains,
rivers, oceans, &c., no soul, apart from the Lord, possesses
the power of evolution; and if any have such power, it is
dependent on the highest Lord. Nor is the so-called
‘ living Self’ absolutely different from the highest Lord, as
the spy is from the king ; as we see from its being qualified
1 Names being given and vessels being shaped by a class of
£-ivas, viz. men.
[38] H
9 8
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
as the living Self, and as its being the^iva (i.e. an individual
soul apparently differing from the universal Self) is due to
the limiting adjuncts only. Hence the evolution of names
and forms which is effected by it is in reality effected by
the highest Lord. And that the highest Lord is he who
evolves the names and forms is a principle acknowledged
by all the Upanishads ; as we see from such passages as 4 He
who is called ether is the evolver of all forms and names 5
( Kh . Up. VIII, 14). The evolution of names and forms,
therefore, is exclusively the work of the highest Lord, who
is also the author of the tripartite arrangement.—The
meaning of the text is that the evolution of names and
forms was preceded by the tripartition, the evolution of
each particular name and form being already explained by
the account of the origin of fire, water, and earth. The act
of tripartition is expressly described by Sruti in the cases
of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, ‘ The red colour of burning
fire is the colour of fire, the white colour of fire is the colour
of water, the black colour of fire the colour of earth/ &c.
In this way there is evolved the distinctive form of fire, and
in connexion therewith the distinctive name ‘ fire/ the name
depending on the thing. The same remarks apply to the
cases of the sun, the moon, and lightning. The instance
(given by the text) of the tripartition of fire implies the
statement that the three substances, viz. earth, water, fire,
were rendered tripartite in the same manner; as the begin¬
ning as well as the concluding clause of the passage equally
refers to all three. For the beginning clause says, ‘ These
three beings became each of them tripartite; 5 and the con¬
cluding clause says, ‘Whatever they thought looked red
they knew was the colour of fire/ &c. &c., up to ‘ Whatever
they thought was altogether unknown they knew was some
combination of these three beings/ Having thus described
the external tripartition of the three elements the text goes
on to describe another tripartition with reference to man,
‘ those three beings when they reach man become each of
them tripartite/ This tripartition in man the teacher sets
forth (in the following Sutra) according to scripture, with a
view to the refutation of some foreseen objection.
II ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2.
99
21. The flesh, &c., originates from earth, accord¬
ing to the scriptural statement; and (so also) in the
case of the two other (elements).
From tripartite earth when assimilated by man there are
produced as its effects flesh, &c., according to scripture.
For the text says, ‘ Food (earth) when eaten becomes three¬
fold ; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion
flesh, its subtlest portion mind/ The meaning is that the
tripartite earth is eaten in the shape of food such as rice,
barley, &c.; that its grossest parts are discharged in the
form of feces, that its middle parts nourish the flesh of the
body, and its subtlest parts feed the mind. Analogously
we have to learn from the text the effects of the two other
elements, viz. fire and water; viz. that urine, blood, and
breath are the effects of water; bone, marrow, and speech
those of fire.—Here now an objection is raised. If all
material things are tripartite (i.e. contain parts of the three
elements alike)—according to the indifferent statement, ‘ He
made each of these tripartite’—for what reason then has
there been made the distinction of names, ‘ this is fire, this
is water, this is earth?’ And again, why is it said that
among the elements of the human body, flesh, &c., is the
effect of the eaten earth only; blood, &c., the effect of the
water drunk; bone, &c., the effect of the fire eaten?—To
this objection the next Sutra replies.
22. But on account of their distinctive nature
there is a (distinctive) designation of them.
The word ‘but’ repels the objection raised. By ‘dis¬
tinctive nature’ we have to understand preponderance.
Although all things are tripartite, yet we observe in
different places a preponderance of different elements;
heat preponderates in fire, water in all that is liquid, food
in earth. This special tripartition aims at rendering possible
the distinctions and terms of ordinary life. For if the
tripartition resulted in sameness, comparable to that of the
three strands of a tripartite rope, we could not distinguish—
and speak of as distinguished—the three elements.—Hence,
H 2
IOO
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
although there is a tripartition, we are enabled ‘ on account
of distinctive nature* to give special designations to the
three elements, viz. fire, water, and earth and their pro¬
ducts.—The repetition (of ‘ designation of them ’) indicates
the termination of the adhyaya.
THIRD ADHYAYA.
FIRST PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
i. In obtaining a different (body) (the soul) goes
enveloped (by subtle parts of the elements), (as
appears from) question and explanation.
In the second adhyaya we have refuted the objections
raised against the Vedantic view of Brahman on the ground
of Smrz’ti and reasoning; we have shown that all other
opinions are devoid of foundation, and that the alleged
mutual contradictions ofVedic texts do not exist. Further
we have demonstrated that the entities different from—but
subordinate to—the individual soul (such as pra^a, &c.)
spring from Brahman.—Now in the third adhyaya we shall
discuss the following subjects: the manner in which the
soul together with its subordinate adjuncts passes through
the sa/^sara (III, i); the different states of the soul and
the nature of Brahman (III, 2); the separateness or non¬
separateness of the vidyas and the question whether the
qualities (of Brahman) have to be cumulated or not (III, 3);
the accomplishment of man’s highest end by means of per¬
fect knowledge (sa/^yagdarsana), the different injunctions
as to the means of perfect knowledge and the absence of
certain rules as to release which is the fruit (of perfect
knowledge*) (III, 4). As occasion leads some other matters
also will be explained.—The first pada explains, on the ground
of the so-called vidya of the five fires ( Kh . Up. V, 3-10), the
different modes of the soul’s passing through the sawsara ;
the reason of that doctrine being (the inculcation of) absence
1 I.e. the absence of a rule laying down that release consequent
on knowledge takes place in the same existence in which the means
of reaching perfect knowledge are employed.
102
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
of all desire (vairagya), in accordance with the scriptural
remark at the end (of the vidya), { hence let a man take care
to himself.'—The soul accompanied by the chief vital air,
the sense-organs and the mind, and taking with itself
nescience (avidya), moral good or ill-desert (karman), and
the impressions left by its previous existences 1 , leaves its
former body and obtains a new body; this is known from
the scriptural passage extending from Bri. Up. IV, 4, 1
Then those pranas gather around him ’) up to IV, 4, 4
(‘ It makes to itself another newer and more beautiful
shape'); which passage forms part of a chapter treating of
the sa^sara-state. And it moreover follows from the pos¬
sibility (thus resulting) of the soul enjoying the fruits of
good and evil actions.—Here the question arises whether
the soul when going to the new body is enveloped or not by
subtle parts of the elements constituting the seeds of the
body.—It is not so enveloped, the purvapakshin says.—
Why?—Because scripture, while stating that the soul takes
the organs with itself, does not state the same with regard
to the elements. For the expression c those parts of light ’
(te^omatra^) which occurs in the passage c He taking with
him those parts of light, 5 &c., intimates that the organs only
are taken (and not the elements), since in the complement¬
ary portion of the passage the eye, &c.^ are spoken of, and
not the subtle parts of the elements. The subtle parts of
the elements can moreover easily be procured anywhere ;
for wherever a new body is to be originated they are pre¬
sent, and the soul’s taking them with itself would, therefore,
be useless. Hence we conclude that the soul when going
is not enveloped by them.
To this the teacher replies, ‘ in obtaining another it goes
enveloped. 5 That means: we must understand that the soul
when passing from one body to another is enveloped by the
subtle parts of the elements which are the seeds of the new
3 I read avidya with the commentators (Go. An., however, mentions
the reading ‘ vidyd 5 also); although vidya appears preferable. Cp.
Max Mullers note 2, p. 175, Upan. II; Deussen, p. 405.—Purva-
pragna ^anmantariya-sa^skara^. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.
103
body.—How do we know this?—‘From the question and
the explanation.' The question is, ‘ Do you know why in
the fifth libation water is called man ? 5 (V, 3, 3.) The
explanation, i.e. answer, is given in the entire passage which,
after having explained how the five libations in the form of
^raddha. Soma, rain, food, seed are offered in the five fires,
viz. the heavenly world, Par^anya, the earth, man and
woman, concludes, ‘ For this reason is water in the fifth obla¬
tion called man.’ Hence we understand that the soul goes
enveloped by water.—But—an objection will be raised—
another scriptural passage declares that like a caterpillar
the soul does not abandon the old body before it makes an
approach to another body 1 . (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 3, ‘And as a
caterpillar.')—We reply that what there is compared to the
(action of the) caterpillar is (not the non-abandonment of
the old body but) merely the lengthening out of the crea¬
tive effort whose object is the new body to be obtained,
which (new body) is presented by the karman of the soul 2 .
Hence there is no contradiction.—As the mode of obtaining
a new body is thus declared by 6ruti, all hypotheses
which owe their origin to the mind of man only are to be
set aside because they are contradicted by scripture. So
e.g. the opinion (of the Sankhyas) that the Self and the
organs are both all-pervading 3 , and when obtaining a new
body only begin to function in it in consequence of the kar¬
man ; or the opinion (of the Bauddhas) that the Self alone
1 Evaw hi sftkshmadehaparishvakto rawhet yady asya sthula///
sarivam rawhato na bhavet, asti tv asya vartamanasthhla^arirayoga^
adehantarapraptes tn^a^alayukanidanranena, tasman nidarsawa-
^rutivirodhan na sukshmadehaparishvakto rawhatiti. Bha.
2 Pratipattavya^ praptavyo yo dehas tadvishayaya bhavanaya
utpadanaya dirghibhavamatraw ^alukayopamiyate. Bha.—An. Gi.
explains: praptavyo yo dehas tadvishayabhavanaya devo*ham
ityadikaya dirghibhavo vyavahitarthalambanatvaw tavanmatram
ityadi.
3 Kara^anam ahawkarikatvat tasya vyapitvat tesham api tadat-
makanaw vyapitvam. Go. An.—The organs are, according to the
Sankhya, the immediate effects of the ahawkara, but why all-
pervading on that account?
104
vedanta-sOtras.
(without the organs) begins to function in a new body, and
that as the body itself, so new sense-organs also are pro¬
duced in the new abode of fruition 1 ; or the opinion (of the
Vabeshikas) that the mind only proceeds to the new abode
of fruition 2 ; or the opinion (of the Digambara Gainas) that
the individual soul only flying away from the old body
alights in the new one as a parrot flies from one tree to
another.—But—an objection will be raised—from the
quoted question and answer it follows that the soul goes
enveloped by water only, according to the meaning of the
word made use of by scripture, viz. water. How then can
the general statement be maintained that the soul goes
enveloped by subtle parts of all elements?—To this doubt
the next Sutra replies.
2. But on account of (water) consisting of three
(elements) (the soul is enveloped not by water
merely; the latter alone is, however, mentioned)
on account of preponderance.
The word ‘but 5 disposes of the objection raised.—Water
consists of three elements, as we know from the scriptural
statement regarding tripartition. If, therefore, water is
admitted to originate (the new body) the other two elements
also have necessarily to be admitted (as taking part in the
origination). The body moreover consists of three elements,
as the effects of the three, i.e. fire, water, and earth, are
observed in it, and further as it contains three materials,
viz. wind, bile, and phlegm 3 . Being such it cannot originate
from mere water, the other elements being left aside.
Hence the term water made use of in the scriptural ques¬
tion and answer refers to the fact of water preponderating,
1 Atma khalv alaya^anasamtanas tasya vrfttaya^ ^abdadi^anani
tallabha^ jarirantare bhavati, kevala^abdas tu kara^asahityam atmano
varayati. Go. An.
2 Kevalaw kara^air atmana £a rahitam iti yavat, kara/zani nfitan-
any eva tatrarabhyante atma tu vibhutvad akriyo*pi tatra wYttima-
tram apnoti. An. Gi.
3 The last of which only is of prevailingly watery character.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4 .
105
not to its being the only element. As a matter of fact we
see that in all animated bodies liquid substances such as
juices, blood, and the like preponderate.—But we likewise
observe in bodies a large amount of earthy matter!—True,
but the amount of water is larger than that of any other
matter. Moreover, liquid matter prevails in that which is
the seed of the body. Further, we know that works (kar-
man) constitute the efficient cause for the origination of a
new body, and (sacrificial) works such as the agnihotra, &c.,
consist in the offering of liquid substances such as Soma,
butter, milk and the like. Thereby also the preponder¬
ance of water is established. And on account of that
preponderance the word * water’ implies the subtle parts of
all the elements which constitute the seed of the body.
3. And on account of the going of the pranas.
Scripture states that, when a new body is obtained, the
pranas also go (from the old body to the new one). Cp.
‘ When he thus departs the (chief) pr&zza departs after him,
and when the prazza thus departs all the other pranas
depart after it ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 2), and similar passages.
Now this going of the pranas is not possible without a base ;
hence we infer that water also—mixed with parts of the
other elements—goes (from the old body to the new one),
serving the purpose of supplying a base for the moving
pranas. For the prazzas cannot, without such a base, either
move or abide anywhere; as we observe in living beings.
4. If it be said (that the prazzas do not go) on
account of the scriptural statement as to entering
into Agni, &c., we deny this on account of the
metaphorical nature (of those statements).
Well, the purvapakshin resumes, we deny that at the
time when a new body is obtained the prazzas go with the
soul, because scripture speaks of their going to Agni, &c.
For that at the time of death speech and the other prazzas
go to Agni and the other gods the following passage ex¬
pressly declares: ‘When the speech of the dead person
1 06 VEDANTA-Stf TRAS.
enters into the fire, breath into the air/ &c. (B ru Up. Ill, 2,
13).—To this we reply that the objection is of no force on
account of the metaphorical character of those statements.
The entering of speech, &c., into Agni is metaphorical,
because we observe no such entering in the case of the
hairs of the head and body. For although the text says
that ‘ the hairs of the body enter into the shrubs and the
hairs of the head into the trees ; ’ still we cannot under¬
stand this to mean that the hairs actually fly away from the
body and enter into trees and shrubs. On the other hand,
the soul could not go at all if we denied to it the limiting
adjunct formed by the pranas, and without the latter it
could not, in the new body, enter into the state of fruition.
Besides, other passages distinctly declare that the pranas
go with the soul.—From all this we conclude that the
passage about speech, &c. entering into Agni, metaphoric¬
ally expresses that Agni and the other divinities who act as
guides of the pranas and co-operate with them stop their
co-operation at the time of death.
5. If an objection be raised on the ground of
(water) not being mentioned in the first fire, we
refute it by remarking that just it (viz. water) (is
meant), on the ground of fitness.
Well, the purvapakshin resumes, but how can it be
ascertained that £ in the fifth oblation water is called man/
considering that water is not mentioned by scripture with
reference to the first fire (altar) ? For the text enumerates
five fires—the first of which is the heavenly world—as the
abodes of the five oblations. With reference to the first of
those fires—introduced by the words ‘ The fire is that
world, O Gautama/ it is stated that iraddha (faith) is the
material constituting the oblation (‘ on that altar the devas
offer jraddha 5 ); while nothing is said about water being
the offered material. If, with reference to the four follow¬
ing fires, viz. Par^anya, &c., water is assumed to constitute
the offering, we have no objection because in the substances
stated there as forming the oblations, viz. Soma, and so on,
water may preponderate. But to set aside, in the case of
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5 . 107
the first fire, jraddha (i.e. faith) which is directly mentioned
in the text, and to substitute in its place the assumption of
water, about which the text says nothing, is an arbitrary
proceeding. In reality jraddha must be explained, in con¬
formity with its ordinary meaning, as a kind of mental
state, viz. faith. Hence it is objectionable to maintain that
water, in the fifth oblation, becomes man.
To this view of the purvapakshin we demur, because, in
the case of the first fire, the word ^raddhi is to be taken in
the sense of ‘water/—On what ground ?—On the ground of
fitness. For on that explanation only beginning, middle,
and end of the passage harmonise so that the syntactical
unity of the whole remains undisturbed. On the other
explanation (i. e. ^raddha being taken in the sense of
‘ faith’), if the question were asked how water, in the fifth
oblation, can be called man, and if, in way of reply, the
text could point only to faith, i.e. something which is not
water, as constituting the material of the oblation; then
question and answer would not agree, and so the unity of
the whole passage would be destroyed. The text, moreover,
by concluding ‘ For this reason is water in the fifth oblation
called man,’ indicates the same interpretation 1 .—Further,
the text points out, as effects of jraddha, substances in
which water in its gross form preponderates, viz. Soma,
rain, &c. And this again furnishes a reason for interpreting
jraddha as water, because the effect generally is cognate in
nature to the cause. Nor again can the mental conception
called faith be taken out from the mind or soul, whose
attribute it is, and be employed as an offering, as the heart
can be cut out of the sacrificial animal. For this reason
also the word .sraddha must be taken to mean ‘water/
Water can, moreover, be fitly called by that name, on the
ground of Vedic usage, cp. ‘ jraddha indeed is water ’ (Taitt.
Sa^h. I, 6, 8, 1). Moreover, water when forming the seed
of the body enters into the state of thinness, subtilty, and
herein again resembles faith, so that its being called ^raddha
1 Upasaz/zharalo^anayam api jraddhavrabdatvam apam evety aha
tv iti. An. Gi.
io8
vedanta-sOtras.
is analogous to the case of a man who is as valiant as a lion
being himself called a lion.—Again, the word .yraddha may
fitly be applied to water, because water is intimately con¬
nected with religious works (sacrifices, &c.) which depend
on faith; just as the word c platform * is applied to men
(standing on the platform). And finally the waters may
fitly be called jraddha, on account of their being the cause
of faith, according to the scriptural passage, ‘ Water indeed
produces faith in him for holy works V
6 . (Should it be said that the souls are not en¬
veloped by water) on account of this not being
stated by scripture, we refute the objection on the
ground of those who perform ish/is, &c., being
understood.
Well, let it be granted that, on account of question and
answer, water, passing through the forms of jraddha, &c.,
may in the fifth oblation obtain the shape of man. But
still we cannot allow that the souls when moving from one
body into another are enveloped by water. For this is not
directly stated by scripture, there being in the whole
passage no word referring to the souls, while there are
words referring to water. Hence the assertion that the
soul goes enveloped by water is unfounded.—This objection
is invalid, we reply ,* on account of those who perform ish/is,
&c., being understood.’ For in the passage beginning c But
they who living in a village practise sacrifices, works of
public utility and alms, they go to the smoke’ (V, 3, 10), it
is said that those who perform ishds reach, on the road of
the fathers leading through smoke, &c., the moon, ‘From
ether they go to the moon ; that is Soma, the king.’ Now
these same persons are meant in the passage about the five
fires also, as we conclude from the equality of scriptural
statement in the passage, £ In that fire the devas offer
1 Apo heti, asmai puz?zse*dhikari/ze sa/rcnamante ^anayanti
dananamatre^a snanadipu^yakarmasiddhyarthaw jraddham ity
artha^. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6. 109
^raddhi. From that oblation rises Soma the king 1 / To
those 2 (persons who have performed ish/is, &c.) water is
supplied in the shape of the materials employed to perform
the agnihotra, the danapurzzamasa and other sacrifices,
viz. sour milk, milk, &c., which substances, as consisting
mostly of water, may directly be considered as water. Of
these, when offered in the ahavaniya, the subtle parts
assume the form of an apurva resulting from the oblation 3 ,
and attach themselves to the performer of the sacrifice.
Then (when the sacrificer dies) the priests offer his body,
with the funeral ceremonies 4 , into the crematory fire, with
the mantra, ‘(may) he (go) to the heavenly world, svaha/
Then the water forming the oblation—which was connected
with deeds resulting from faith 5 —having assumed the form
of an apurva envelops the souls of those who had performed
the sacrifices, and leads them up to the heavenly world to
receive their reward.—In accordance with the preceding
interpretation scripture says in the agnihotra chapter also—
in the complementary passage constituting the reply to the
six questions—that the two agnihotra-oblations go up to
the other world in order to originate the fruit (of the work
of the sacrificer), £ Those two oblations when offered go up,
&c/ (vSat. Br. XI, 6 , 2, 6).— Hence we conclude that the
1 Both passages speak of something reaching, i.e. becoming
the moon. Now, as that something is, in the passage about the road
of the fathers, the £ivas of those who have performed ish/is, &c., we
conclude that by the jraddha also, from which in the other passage
the moon is said to rise, those g-tvas are meant, or, properly speak¬
ing, the subtle body of water which envelops those ^ivas.—Dhftmadi-
vakye pawMgnivakye £a somara^atvaprapthravazzavheshad ish/adi-
kari/za h ^raddha^abditadbhir vesh/Ma dyulokaw yantiti bhatity
artha^. An. Gi.
2 An. Gi. introduces this clause by: nanu mahad iha jrutyor vaila-
ksha«yaw, .sraddhisabditanam apa m kva/£id dyuloke homa^ jruta^
kva&d ish/adikarMm dhumadikrame^aka^apraptir na H tesham
apa^ santi yena tadveshMitanazzz gatis tatraha tesham £eti.
3 I read, with a MS. of An. Gi., ahutyaphrvarupa^.
4 The so-called antyesh/i.
5 And is on that account properly called jraddha.
I IO
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
souls, when going to the enjoyment of the fruits of their
works, are enveloped by the water of which the oblations
consist 1 .
But how can it be maintained that those who perform
sacrifices, &c., go to the enjoyment of the fruit of their
works, considering that scripture declares them when having
reached the moon—by the path leading through smoke,
&c.—to become food, 4 That is Soma the king ; that is the
food of the gods; the gods do eat it’ ( Kh . Up. V, 10, 4);
and the corresponding passage, ‘ Having reached the moon
they become food, and then the Devas feed on them there
as sacrificers feed on Soma as it increases and decreases 5
(B ru Up. VI, 2, 16) ? If, in accordance with these passages,
they are eaten by the gods as by tigers, &c., it is not
possible that they should enjoy the fruit of their deeds.—
To this the following Sutra replies.
7. Or (the souls’ being the food of the gods is)
metaphorical, on account of their not knowing the
Self. For thus (scripture) declares.
The word ‘ or 5 is meant to set aside the started objection.
The souls 5 being food has to be understood in a metaphorical,
not a literal, sense, as otherwise all scriptural statements of
claims (adhikara)—such as c He who is desirous of the
heavenly world is to sacrifice’—would be contradicted. If
1 -Sankara's attempts to render plausible the interpretation of
sraddha by 4 water/ and to base thereon the doctrine of the souls
when going to a new body being enveloped by a subtle involucrum
of water (and the other elements contained therein) are, of course,
altogether artificial. I do not, however, see that he can be taxed
with inconsistency (as he is by Deussen, p. 408). Sraddha is to him
in the first place the gross water which constitutes the chief material
employed in the sacrifices; in the second place the apurva which
results from the sacrifice, and which is imagined to consist of the
subtle parts of the water whose gross parts have been consumed by
the sacrificial fire. These subtle parts attach themselves to the soul,
accompany it as an involucrum when it goes to another world, and
form the base of any new body which the soul may have to assume
in accordance with its previous deeds.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 7.
I I I
the performers of sacrifices, &c., did not, in the sphere of
the moon, enjoy the fruits of their works, why should they
undertake works such as sacrifices, which are to him who
performs them the cause of great trouble ? We see, more¬
over, that the word c food/ as denoting in general whatever
is the cause of enjoyment, is metaphorically used of that
also which is not food (in the narrower sense), as, for in¬
stance, in such phrases as ‘the VaLryas are the food of
kings, the animals are the food of the Vahyas.’ Hence
what is meant there by the term ‘eating’ is the rejoicing
of the gods with the performers of sacrifices, &c., who
stand in a subordinate (instrumental) relation to that rejoic¬
ing—a rejoicing analogous to that of an ordinary man with
beloved persons such as wife, children, friends, and so on—
not actual eating like the chewing and swallowing of sweet¬
meats. For that the gods eat in the ordinary way a
scriptural passage expressly denies ( Kh . Up. Ill, 6, 1),
‘ The gods do not eat or drink; by seeing the nectar they
are satisfied.’ At the same time the performers of sacrifices,
although standing in a subordinate relation to the gods,
may themselves be in a state of enjoyment, like servants
who (although subordinate to the king) themselves live on
the king.—That the performers of sacrifices are objects of
enjoyment for the gods follows, moreover, from their quality
of not knowing the Self. For that those who do not know
the Self are objects of enjoyment for the gods the following
scriptural passage shows, ‘ Now, if a man worships another
deity, thinking the deity is one and he is another, he does
not know. He is like a beast for the Devas ’ (B ri. Up. I, 4,
10). That means: he, in this life, propitiating the gods by
means of oblations and other works, serves them like a beast,
and does so in the other world also, depending on them like
a beast and enjoying the fruits of his works as assigned by
them.—The latter part of the Sutra can be explained in
another manner also 1 . Those who do not know the Self
are those who perform works only, such as sacrifices, &c.,
1 Anatma^abdamiter mukhyarthatvanurodhena sfitramasyartham
uktva prakarawanurodhenarthantaram aha. An. Gi.
I 12
VEDANTA-sflTRAS.
and do not join knowledge to works. We then take the
expression, 4 the knowledge of the Self/ as indirectly denot¬
ing the knowledge of the five fires; an explanation which
rests on the general subject-matter. And on account of the
performers of sacrifices being destitute of the knowledge of
the five fires the circumstance of their serving as food is
brought forward as a mere guzzavada 1 for the purpose of
glorifying the knowledge of the five fires. For the latter is
what the text aims at enjoining, as we infer from the
general purport of the passage.— 4 For thus 5 another scrip¬
tural passage 4 declares/ viz. that enjoyment (on the part of
the^iva) takes place in the sphere of the moon, 4 Having
enjoyed greatness in the Soma world he returns again’ (Pr.
Up. V, 4). Another scriptural passage also declares that
the performers of sacrifices dwelling together with the gods
obtain enjoyment, 4 A hundred blessings of the fathers who
have conquered this world make one blessing of the work-
gods, who obtain their godhead by work ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3,
33).—As thus the statement about the performers of sacri¬
fices becoming food is metaphorical only, we understand
that it is their souls which go, and hence there is no longer
any objection to the doctrine that they go enveloped by
water.
8. On the passing away of the works (the soul
redescends) with a remainder, according to scripture
and Sm/Vti, as it went (i.e. passing through the same
stations) and not thus (i.e. in the inverse order).
Scripture states that the souls of those who perform
sacrifices, and the like, rise on the road leading through
smoke, and so on, to the sphere of the moon, and when
they have done with the enjoyment (of the fruits of their
works) again descend, 4 Having dwelt there, y&vatsampatam 2 ,
they return again that way as they came/ &c., up to 4 Those
whose conduct has been good obtain some good birth, the
1 See part i, p. 221.
2 About which term see further on.
Ill ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 8. I 13
birth of a Brahma;za, &c.—Those whose conduct has been
evil obtain the birth of a dog, &c.’ ( Kh . Up. V, 10, 5-7).
Here it must be considered whether the souls, after having
enjoyed the fruits of all their works, descend without a
remainder (anuraya, of their works), or with such a re¬
mainder (of unrequited works).—The purvapakshin says :
without such a remainder.—Why?—On account of the
specification £ yavat sampatam.’ The word sampata here
denotes the aggregate of works (karma^aya) 1 , which is so
called because by it the souls pass from this world to that
world for the purpose of enjoying the fruits of the works.
So that the entire clause £ Having dwelt there as far as the
aggregate of the works extends ’ indicates their works being
completely requited there. The same thing is indicated by
another scriptural passage, £ But when in their case that
(i.e. the effect of their w r orks) ceases’ (B ri. Up. VI, 2, 16).—
Well, but why should we not assume that these passages
(do not mean that all works are requited there but) only
indicate that the soul enjoys in the other world so long as
there are works to be enjoyed there ?—It is impossible to
assume this, because elsewhere a reference is made to the
totality of works. For the passage, Bn. Up. IV, 4, 6, £ Having
obtained the end of whatever deed he does here on earth,
he again returns from that world to this world to action,’
intimates, by means of the comprehensive term £ whatever,’
that all works done here are exhausted there.—Moreover,
death has the power of manifesting those works whose fruit
has not yet begun 2 ; the manifestation of those works not
being possible previously to death because then they are ob¬
structed by those works whose fruits have already begun.
Now death must manifest alike all works whose fruits had
not begun previously, because the cause being the same the
effects cannot be different. Analogously a lamp which is
placed at the same distance from a jar and a piece of cloth
1 The Comm, on Kh. Up. V, 10, 5, explains it by £ sampatanti
yeneti sampata^ karmawa^ kshaya^, yavat sampatam yavat
\axmanah kshaya^.’
2 Abhivyakth ha karmarca/fl phaladanayonmukhatvam. An. Gi.
[38] I
VEDANTA-stfTRAS.
114
illuminates the latter as well as the former.—Hence it
follows that the souls descend without a remainder of
unrequited works.
To this we reply as follows : 4 On the passing away of the
works with a remainder.’ That means : when the aggregate
of works with which the souls had risen to the moon for the
purpose of the enjoyment of their fruits is, by such enjoy¬
ment, exhausted, then the body, consisting of water, which
had originated in the moon for the purpose of such enjoy¬
ment, is dissolved by contact with the fire of the grief
springing from the observation that the enjoyment comes to
an end ; just as snow and hail are melted by contact with
the rays of the sun, or the hardness of ghee by contact with
the heat of fire. Then, at the passing away of the works,
i.e. when the works performed, such as sacrifices, &c., are,
by the enjoyment of their fruits, exhausted, the souls
descend with a remainder yet left.—But on what grounds
is that remainder assumed ?—On the ground of what is seen
(.Sruti) and Smrz'ti. For scripture declares manifestly that
the souls descend joined with such a remainder, 4 Those
whose conduct (v£ara?za) has been good will quickly attain
some good birth, the birth of a Brahmazza, or a Kshattriya,
or a Vauya. But those whose conduct has been evil will
quickly'attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a hog, or
a iTazzdala.’ That the word £arazza here means the re¬
mainder (of the works) will be shown later on. Moreover,
the different degrees of enjoyment which are implied in the
difference of birth on the part of the living beings point, as
they cannot be accidental, to the existence of such a
remainder of works. For we know from scripture that
good fortune as well as misfortune is caused by good and
evil works. Smrz’ti also teaches that the members of the
different castes and a^ramas do, in accordance with their
works, at first enjoy the fruit of their works and then enter
into new existences, in which they are distinguished from
each other by locality, caste, family, shape, length of life,
knowledge, conduct, property, pleasure, and intelligence;
which doctrine implies that they descend with a remainder
of their works.—Of what kind then is that so-called re-
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 8. 115
mainder ?—Some say that thereby we have to understand
a remainder of the works which had been performed (in the
previous existence) for the sake of the heavenly world, and
whose fruits have (for the greater part) been enjoyed.
That remainder might then be compared to the remainder
of oil which sticks to the inside of a vessel previously filled
with oil even after it has been emptied.—But you have no
right to assume a remainder in the case of works, the fruits
of which have been enjoyed already, since the adrzsh/a
(which springs from works) is opposed to the works (so as
to destroy them completely 1 ).—This objection, we reply, is
not valid, as we do not maintain that the works are com¬
pletely requited (previously to the new existence).—But the
souls do ascend to the sphere of the moon for the express
purpose of finding there a complete requital of their works !
—True ; but when only a little of the effects of their works
is left, they can no longer stay there. For as some courtier
who has joined the king’s court with all the requisites
which the king’s service demands is unable to remain at
court any longer, when in consequence of his long stay most
of his things are worn out, so that he is perhaps left with a
pair of shoes and an umbrella only; so the soul, when
possessing only a small particle of the effects of its works,
can no longer remain in the sphere of the moon.—But all
this reasoning is in fact altogether unfounded 2 . For it has
already been stated that, on account of (the adnsh/a) being
opposed to the work, the continued existence of a remainder
cannot be admitted in the case of works which had been
performed with a view to the heavenly world, and which
have been requited in the moon.—But has it not also been
said above that not all the work whose fruit the heavenly
world is meets with requital there?—Yes, but that state¬
ment is not defensible. For works which are performed for
1 Bhandanusarina/i snehasyavirodhad yukta^ j'esha^, karma tu
phalodayavirodhitvat phala/rc keg g&X&m nash/am eveti na tasya
jeshasiddhir iti .rankate nanv iti. An. Gi.
2 Ivakaro madhuroktya prayukto vastutas tv evakaro vivakshita^.
An. Gi.
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
I 16
the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world produce their
entire heavenly fruit for the soul only as long as it stays in
heaven, and if we take our stand on scripture we have no
right to assume that they produce even a particle of fruit
for the souls after those have again descended from heaven.
That some part of the oil continues to remain in the vessel
is unobjectionable because we see it, and we likewise see
that some part of the courtier’s equipment continues to
remain with him ; but that some part of those works which
led the soul to heaven continues to exist, that we neither
see nor are able to surmise, because it would contradict the
texts declaring that the heavenly world (alone) is the fruit
of the works.—That of works whose fruit is heaven, such as
sacrifices and the like, no remainder continues to exist, we
must necessarily acknowledge for the following reason also.
If some part of those good works, such as sacrifices, &c., on
account of which the agents enjoyed the heavenly world,
were surmised to continue in existence as a remainder, that
remainder would in all cases be itself a good one, would never
be of a contrary nature. But then our supposition would be
in conflict with the scriptural passage which distinguishes
remainders of a different kind, viz. 4 Those whose conduct
has been good;—those whose conduct has been evil,’ &c.
Hence after the fruits of that set of works which is requited
in the other world have been (completely) enjoyed, the
remaining other set of works whose fruits are to be enjoyed
in this world constitutes the so-called anu^aya with which
the souls re-descend.—It was said above that we must assume
the souls to descend without any such remainder, after
having reached, by the enjoyment of the fruits, the end of
all the works done here below, on account of the compre¬
hensive statement implied in the expression ‘whatever.’
But that assertion cannot be upheld as the existence of
such a remainder has been proved. Hence we have to
understand that the souls re-descend after having exhausted,
by the enjoyment of its fruits, only that entire part of the
works done here below whose fruit belongs to the other
world and is begun to be enjoyed there.—The proof given
by us of the existence of the remainder refutes at the same
Ill ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 8.
ii 7
time the other assertion made above, viz. that death mani¬
fests equally all works the enjoyment of whose fruits was
not begun here below, and that on that account we are not
entitled to draw a line between works whose fruits begin in
the other world and works whose fruits begin in this world
only (i.e. in a new existence on earth).—We, moreover, have
to ask for what reason it is maintained that death manifests
(i.e. lays open and makes ready for requital) those works
whose fruits have not begun here below. The answer will
be that in this life the operation of certain works cannot
begin because it is obstructed by other works whose fruits
already begin here below, that, however, that operation does
begin as soon as, at the moment of death, the obstruction
ceases. Well, then, if previously to death those actions
whose fruits have already begun prevent other actions from
beginning their operation, at the time of death also certain
works of less force will be obstructed in their operation by
other works of greater force, it being impossible that the
fruits of works of opposite tendency should begin at the
same time. For it is impossible to maintain that different
deeds whose fruits must be experienced in different exist¬
ences should, merely because they have this in common
that their fruits have not begun (previously to death), be¬
come manifest on the occasion of one and the same death,
and originate one new existence only; against this militates
the fact of the definite fruits (attached to each particular
work) being of contrary natures 1 . Nor, on the other hand,
can we maintain that at the time of death some works
manifest themselves while others are altogether extin¬
guished ; for that would contradict the fact that absolutely
all works have their fruits. No work in fact can be
extinguished except by means of expiatory actions, &c. 2
Smrzti also declares that works whose operation is ob-
1 On which account they cannot be experienced in one and the
same existence.
2 Works are extinguished either by expiatory ceremonies or by
the knowledge of Brahman or by the full fruition of their conse¬
quences.
118 vedanta-sCtras.
structed by other works leading to fruits of a contrary
nature last for a long time, £ Sometimes a good deed
persists immovable as it were, the doer meanwhile remain¬
ing immerged in the sa/^sara, until at last he is released
from pain/
Moreover, if all unrequited works becoming manifest on
the occasion of one and the same death were to begin one
new existence only, the consequence would be that those
who are born again in the heavenly world, or in hell, or as
animals, could, as not entitled thereto, perform no religious
works, and being thus excluded from all chance of acquiring
religious merit and demerit could not enter on any new
forms of existence, as all reason for the latter would be
absent 1 . And that would further contradict Smrzti, which
declares that some single actions, such as the murder of a
Brahma^a, are the causes of more than one new existence.
Nor can we assume, for the knowledge of the particular
results springing from religious merit and demerit, any
other cause than the sacred texts 2 . Nor, again, does death
manifest (bring about the requital of) those works whose
fruit is observed to be enjoyed already here below, as, for
instance, the kariresh/i, &c. 3 How then can we allow the
assumption that death manifests all actions ? The instance
of the lamp (made use of by the purvapakshin) is already
refuted by our having shown the relative strength of
actions 4 . Or else we may look on the matter as analogous
to the manifestation (by a lamp) of bigger and smaller
objects. For as a lamp, although equally distant from a
big and a very small thing, may manifest the former only
1 And in consequence of this they could never obtain final
release.
2 We have the sacred texts only to teach us what the effects of
particular good or evil actions may be.
3 The kariresh/i is a sacrifice offered by those who are desirous
of rain.
4 I.e. by our having shown that death does not equally manifest
all works, but that, after death has taken place, the stronger works
bring about their requital while the operation of the weaker ones is
retarded thereby.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 9.
119
and not the latter, so death provokes the operation of the
stronger works only, not of the weaker ones, although an equal
opportunity presents itself for both sets of works as hitherto
unrequited.—Hence the doctrine that all works are mani¬
fested by death cannot be maintained, as it is contradicted
by 5 ruti, Smrzti, and reason alike. That the existence
of a remainder of works should stand in the way of final
release is a misplaced fear, as we know from wSruti that all
works whatever are destroyed by perfect knowledge. It
therefore is a settled conclusion that the souls re-descend
with a remainder of works. They descend ‘ as they came ’
(mounted up); 4 not thus/ i.e. in inverted order. We con¬
clude that they descend ‘ as they came ’ from the fact of
ether and smoke, which the text includes in the road of the
fathers, being mentioned in the description of the descent
also, and from the expression 4 as they came.’ That they
follow the inverted order we conclude from night, &c., not
being mentioned, and from the cloud, &c., being added.
9. Should it be objected that on account of con¬
duct (the assumption of a remainder is not needed),
we deny this because (the scriptural expression
‘ conduct’) is meant to connote (the remainder); so
Karsh/za^ini thinks.
But—an objection may be raised—the scriptural passage,
which has been quoted for the purpose of proving that the
existence of a remainder of works (‘those whose conduct
has been good/ &c.), declares that the quality of the new
birth depends on karana, not on anuj-aya. Now karana and
anuraya are different things; for karana is the same as
£aritra, akara, .rila, all of which mean conduct 1 , while
anu^aya denotes work remaining from requited work.
Scripture also speaks of actions and conduct as different
things, ‘According as he acts and according as he conducts
himself so will he be ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 5); and ‘Whatever
1 *Sila also means here ‘conduct’ only, as we see from its being
co-ordinated with Tarawa, ^aritra, &c.; not character.
120
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
works are blameless those should be regarded, not others ;
whatever our good conduct was that should be observed by
thee’ (Taitt. Up. I, n, 2). From the passage which pro¬
claims the dependence of the quality of birth on conduct
the existence of an unrequited remainder of works cannot
therefore be proved.—This objection is without force, we
reply, because the scriptural term ‘ conduct } is meant to
connote the remainder of the works. This is the opinion of
the teacher Karsh^^ini.
10. If it be said that purposelessness (of conduct
would result therefrom), we deny this on account of
the dependence (of work) on that (conduct).
That may be ; but for what reason should we abandon
that meaning which the term ‘ karana ’ directly conveys,
viz. the meaning ‘ conduct/ and accept the merely connota-
tive meaning ‘ remainder of the works ?’ Conduct, which the
text directly mentions, may be supposed to have for its
fruit either a good or an evil birth, according as it is
enjoined or prohibited, good or evil. Some fruit will have
to be allowed to it in any case; for otherwise it would
follow that it is purposeless.—This objection is without
force ‘ on account of the dependence on it/ Such works as
sacrifices, and the like, depend on conduct in so far as
somebody whose conduct is not good is not entitled to
perform them. This we know from Smrzti-passages, such
as the following, ‘ Him who is devoid of good conduct the
Vedas do not purify/—And also if conduct is considered as
subservient to man 1 it will not be purposeless. For when
the aggregate of works such as sacrifices, &c., begins to
originate its fruit, the conduct which has reference to the
sacrifice will originate there (i. e. in the fruit) some addition.
1 I.e. as something which produces in man a sazrcskara analogous
to that produced by other preparatory or purificatory rites such as
bathing, &c.—In the preceding sentences conduct had been spoken
of not as purushartha but as karmanga. In that case it produces
no separate result; while if considered as purushartha it has a
special result of its own.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 12 .
12 I
And it is known from .Sruti as well as Smrzti that work
effects everything \ It is, therefore, the opinion of Karsh-
nagini that the remainder of works only—which is connoted
by the term 4 conduct ’—is the cause of the souls entering
on new births. For as work may be the cause of new
births, it is not proper to assume that conduct is the cause.
If a man is able to run away by means of his feet he will
surely not creep on his knees.
ii. But {katana means) nothing but good and
evil works; thus Badari opines.
The teacher Badari, however, thinks that the word
1 kaxana 3 denotes nothing else but good works and evil
works. It means the same as anush/Zzana (performance) or
karman (work). For we see that the root kax (to walk, to
conduct oneself) is used in the general sense of acting. Of
a man who performs holy works such as sacrifices, &c.,
people say in ordinary language, 4 that excellent man walks
in righteousness.’ The word akaxa also denotes only a kind
of religious duty. That works and kaxana (conduct) are
sometimes spoken of as different things is analogous to the
distinction sometimes made between Brahmazzas and Pari-
vra^akas 1 2 . We, therefore, decide that by men of good
kaxana are meant those whose works are worthy of praise,
by men of evil kaxana those whose works are worthy of
blame.
12. Of those also who do not perform sacrifices
(the ascent to the moon) is stated by scripture.
It has been said that those who perform sacrifices, &c., go
to the moon. The question now arises whether those also
who do not perform sacrifices go to the moon or not.—The
purvapakshin maintains that it cannot be asserted that
men belonging to the former class only go to the moon,
1 A clause added to guard against the assumption—which might
be based on the preceding remarks—that conduct is, after all,
the cause of the quality of the new birth.
2 Although the latter are a mere sub-class of the former.
122
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
because scripture speaks of the moon as being resorted to
by those also who have not performed sacrifices. For the
Kaushitakins make the following general statement, ‘All
who depart from this world go to the moon ’ (Kau. Up. I, 2).
Moreover, the origination of a new body in the case of those
who are born again is not possible without their having
(previously) reached the moon, on account of the precise
definition of number contained in the statement, ‘ In the
fifth oblation ’ ( Kh . Up. V, 9, i) 1 . Hence all men must be
supposed to resort to the moon. If it be objected that it
does not appear proper that those who perform sacrifices
and those who do not should go to the same place, we reply
that there is no real objection, because those who do not
perform sacrifices do not enjoy anything in the moon.
13. But of the others, after having enjoyed the
fruits of their actions in Sawyamana, ascent and
descent take place; as such a course is declared (by
scripture).
‘ But 5 discards the purvapaksha. It is not true that all men
go to the moon. For the ascent to the moon is for the purpose
of enjoyment only; it is neither without a special purpose nor
for the mere purpose of subsequent re-descent. Just as a man
climbs on a tree for the purpose of breaking fruit or
blossoms, not either without any aim or for the mere
purpose of coming down again. Now it has been admitted
already that for those who do not offer sacrifices there is
not any enjoyment in the moon; hence those only who
perform sacrifices rise to the moon, not any other persons.
The latter descend to Sa^yamana, the abode of Yama,
suffer there the torments of Yama corresponding to their
evil deeds, and then again re-ascend to this world. Such is
their ascent and descent; as we maintain on the ground of
such a course being declared by scripture. For a scriptural
passage embodying Yama’s own words declares that those
who die without having offered sacrifices fall into Yama’s
1 Which statement presupposes four other oblations, the first of
which is the one from which ‘ Soma the king rises.’
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 17.
123
power. ‘ The other world never rises before the eyes of the
careless child deluded by the delusion of wealth. This is
the world, he thinks, there is no other; thus he falls again
and again under my sway 5 (Ka. Up. I, 2, 6). Scripture con¬
tains many other passages likewise leading us to infer that
men fall into Yama’s power ; cp. e.g. ‘ Yama, the gathering-
place of men * (Ri. Sa//zh. X, 14, 1).
14. The Smrztis also declare this.
Moreover, authorities like Manu, Vyasa, &c., declare that
in the city Sa/^yamana evil works are requited under
Yama’s rule ; cp. the legend of Na&keta and others.
15. Moreover there are seven (hells).
Moreover, the pura/za-writers record that there are seven
hells, Raurava, &c., by name, which serve as abodes of
enjoyment of the fruits of evil deeds. As those who do not
sacrifice, &c. go there, how should they reach the moon ?
—But, an objection is raised, the assertion that evil doers
suffer punishments allotted by Yama is contradicted by the
circumstance that Snmti mentions different other beings,
such as iTitragupta, &c., who act as superintendents in Rau¬
rava and the other hells.—This objection the next Sutra
refutes.
16. On account of his activity there also no
contradiction exists.
There is no contradiction, as the same Yama is admitted
to act as chief ruler in those seven hells. Of iTitragupta
and others Smrzti merely speaks as superintendents em¬
ployed by Yama.
17. But on (the two roads) of knowledge and
works, those two being under discussion.
In that place of the knowledge of the five fires, where the
answer is expected to the question, ‘ Do you know why that
world never becomes full ? * the text runs as follows : ‘ On
neither of these two ways are those small creatures continu¬
ally returning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. Theirs
is a third place. Therefore that world never becomes full/
124
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
By the two ways mentioned in this passage we have to
understand knowledge and works.—Why ?—On account of
their being the subjects under discussion. That means :
knowledge and works are under discussion as the means for
entering on the road of the gods and the road of the fathers.
The clause, ‘those who know this/ proclaims knowledge to
be the means whereby to obtain the road of the gods ; the
clause, 4 sacrifices, works of public utility, and alms/proclaims
works to be that by which we obtain the road of the
fathers. Under the heading of these two paths there stands
the subsequent passage, 4 on neither of these two ways, &c/
To explain. Those who are neither entitled, through
knowledge, to follow the road of the gods, nor, by works,
to follow the road of the fathers, for those there is a third
path on which they repeatedly return to the existence of
small animals. For this reason also those who do not
perform sacrifices, &c. do not reach the moon.—But why
should they not first mount to the sphere of the moon and
thence descending enter on the existence of small animals ?
—No, that would imply entire purposelessness of their
mounting.—Moreover, if all men when dying would reach
the sphere of the moon, that world would be filled by the
departed, and from that would result an answer contrary to
the question (viz. 4 why does not that world become full ? ’).
For an answer is expected showing that that world does
not become full.—Nor can we admit the explanation that
the other world possibly does not become full because
re-descent is admitted; since this is not stated by scripture*
For it is true, indeed, that the not becoming full might be
explained from their re-descending ; but scripture actually
explains it from the existence of a third place, 4 Theirs is
a third place; therefore that world never becomes full/
Hence the fact of the other world not becoming full must
be explained from their not-ascending only. For, other¬
wise, the descent equally taking place in the case of those
who do perform sacrifices, &c., it would follow that the
statement of a third place is devoid of purpose.—The word
4 but ’ (in the Sutra) is meant to preclude the idea—arising
from the passage of another jakha (i.e. the Kaush. Up.)
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 19.
«5
—that all departed go to the moon. Under the circum¬
stances the word ‘ all ’ which occurs in that passage has
to be taken as referring only to those qualified, so that
the sense is ‘all those who depart from this world properly
qualified go to the moon/—The next Sutra is directed
against the averment that all must go to the moon for
the purpose of obtaining a new body, in accordance with
the definite statement of number (‘in the fifth oblation &c/).
18. Not in (the case of) the third place, as it is
thus perceived,
With regard to the third place, the rule of the oblations
being five in number need not be attended to for the
purpose of obtaining a new body.—Why ?—On account
of it being perceived thus. That means: because it is
seen that the third place is reached in the manner de¬
scribed without any reference to the oblations being
limited to the number five, ‘Live and die. That is the
third place/—Moreover, in the passage, ‘ In the fifth obla¬
tion water is called man/ the number of the oblations is
stated to be the cause of the water becoming the body of
a man, not of an insect or moth, &c.; the word ‘ man *
applying to the human species only.—And, further, the
text merely teaches that in the fifth oblation the waters
are called man, and does not at the same time deny that,
where there is no fifth oblation, they are not called man ;
for if it did the latter, the sentence would have the imper¬
fection of having a double sense. We therefore have to
understand that the body of those men who are capable of
ascending and descending originates in connexion with
the fifth oblation, that in the case of other men, however,
a body forms itself from water mixed with the other ele¬
ments even without a settled number of oblations.
19. It is, moreover, recorded in the (ordinary)
world.
There are, moreover, traditions, apart from the Veda,
that certain persons like Dro^a, Dhmh/adyumna, Sita,
Draupadi, &c., were not born in the ordinary way from
126
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
mothers. In the case of Dro«a and others there was
absent the oblation which is made into the woman; while
in the case of Dhrzsh/adyumna and others, even two of
the oblations, viz. the one offered into woman and the one
offered into man, were absent. Hence in other cases also
birth may be supposed to take place independently of the
number of oblations.—It is, moreover, commonly known
that the female crane conceives without a male.
20. And on account of observation.
It is, moreover, observed that out of the four classes of
organic beings—viviparous animals, oviparous animals, ani¬
mals springing from heat, and beings springing from germs
(plants)—the two latter classes are produced without sexual
intercourse, so that in their case no regard is had to the
number of oblations. The same may therefore take place
in other cases also.—But, an objection may here be raised,
scripture speaks of those beings as belonging to three
classes only, because there are three modes of origin only ;
‘ That which springs from an egg, that which springs from
a living being, that which springs from a germ* (Kh. Up.
VI, 3, i). How then can it be maintained that there
are four classes?—To this objection the next Sutra
replies.
2i. The third term comprises that which springs
from heat.
The third term in the scriptural passage quoted, i.e.
4 that which springs from a germ/ must be understood as
implying those beings also which spring from heat ; the
two classes having in common that they spring from earth
or water, i.e. from something stable. Different from their
origin is the origin of those beings which spring from moving
things (viz. animals).—In other places the beings springing
from heat and those springing from germs are spoken of as
constituting separate classes.—Hence there is no contra¬
diction.
22. (On the part of the soul’s descending from the
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2 2.
127
moon) there is entering into similarity of being (with
ether and so on); as this (only) is possible.
It has been explained that the souls of those who perform
sacrifices, &c., after having reached the moon dwell there as
long as their works last and then re-descend with a remain¬
der of their works. We now have to inquire into the mode
of that descent. On this point scripture makes the follow¬
ing statement: ‘ They return again the way they came, to
the ether, from the ether to the air. Then the sacrificer
having become air becomes smoke, having become smoke
he becomes mist, having become mist he becomes a cloud,
having become a cloud he rains down.*—Here a doubt arises
whether the descending souls pass over into a state of
identity with ether, &c., or into a state of similarity.—The
purvapakshin maintains that the state is one of identity,
because this is directly stated by the text. Otherwise there
would take place so-called indication (laksha«&). Now
whenever the doubt lies between a directly expressed and
a merely indicated meaning the former is to be preferred.
Thus the following words also, ‘ Having become air he be¬
comes smoke/ &c., are appropriate only if the soul be under¬
stood to identify itself with them.—Hence it follows that
the souls become identical with ether, &c.—To this we reply
that they only pass into a state of similarity to ether, &c.
When the body, consisting of water which the soul had
assumed in the sphere of the moon for the purpose of en¬
joyment, dissolves at the time when that enjoyment comes
to an end, then it becomes subtle like ether, passes there¬
upon into the power of the air, and then gets mixed with
smoke, &c. This is the meaning of the clauses, ‘ They return
as they came to the ether, from the ether to the air, &c.’—
How is this known to be the meaning?—Because thus only
it is possible. For it is not possible that one thing should
become another in the literal sense of the word. If, more¬
over, the souls became identified with ether they could no
longer descend through air, &c. And as connexion with
the ether is, on account of its all-pervadingness, eternal, no
other connexion (of the souls) with it can here be meant
128
vedanta-s£jtras.
but their entering into a state of similarity to it 1 . And in
cases where it is impossible to accept the literal meaning of
the text it is quite proper to assume the meaning which is
merely indicated.—For these reasons the souls’ becoming
ether, &c., has to be taken in the secondary sense of their
passing into a state of similarity to ether, and so on.
23. (The soul passes through the stages of its
descent) in a not very long time; on account of the
special statement.
A doubt arises with reference to the period beginning
with the soul’s becoming ether and extending up to its
entering into rice, &c., viz. whether the soul remains a long
time in the state of similarity to each of the stages of its
way before It enters into similarity to the next one, or only
a short time.—The purvapakshin maintains that, on ac¬
count of the absence of a definite text, no binding rule
exists.—To this we reply that the souls remain in the state
of similarity to ether, &c., for a short period only before they
fall to the earth in raindrops. We infer this from the
circumstance of the text making a special statement. For
after having said that the souls enter into rice, &c., it adds,
‘ From thence the escape is beset with more pain ; ’ a state¬
ment implying that the escape from the previous states was
comparatively easy and pleasant. Now this difference in
point of pleasantness must be based on the comparative
shortness or length of the escape ; for as, at that time, the
body is not yet formed, enjoyment (in the ordinary sense)
is not possible. Hence we conclude that, up to the
moment when the souls enter into rice, &c., their descent
is accomplished in a short time.
1 It might be said that the relation to ether, &c., into which the
souls enter, is the relation of conjunction (sazrcyoga), not the relation
of similarity. But as nothing can enter into the relation of sa/rayoga
with ether (everything being in eternal sazuyoga with it) we must
assume that 4 becoming ether 9 means ‘ becoming like ether,’ and by
parity of reasoning, that ‘ becoming air, &c.,’ means ‘ becoming like
air.
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 24.
129
24. (The descending souls enter) into (plants)
animated by other (souls), as in the previous cases,
on account of scriptural declaration.
In the description of the souls’ descent we read, after their
coming down in raindrops has been mentioned, 4 Then they
are born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and
beans.’—Here a doubt arises whether, at this stage of their
descent, the souls to which a remainder of their works con¬
tinues to cling really pass over into the different species of
those immoveable things (plants) and enjoy their pleasures
and pains, or if they enter merely into a state of conjunction
with the bodies of those plants which are animated by
different souls.—The purvapakshin maintains that they pass
over into those species and enjoy their pleasures and pains,
on account of the remainder of works still attaching to
them ; firstly, because that enables us to take the verb ‘to
be born ’ in its literal sense; secondly, because we know from
5 ruti and Smrz'ti that the condition of a plant may be a
place of enjoyment (of the fruits of actions); and thirdly,
because sacrifices and similar actions, being connected
with harm done to animals, &c., may lead to unpleasant
results. We therefore take the ‘being born as rice,’ &c.,
of those to whom a remainder of their works attaches, in its
literal sense, and consider the case to be analogous to that of
a man who is born either as a dog or a hog or a ATa^ala,
where we have to understand that the man really becomes
a dog, and so on, and experiences the pleasures and pains
connected with that condition.
To this reasoning we reply as follows:—The souls to which
a remainder attaches enter merely into conjunction with rice
plants, &c., which are already animated by other souls; and
do not enjoy their pleasures and pains ; ‘as in the previous
cases.’ As the souls’ becoming air, smoke, &c., was decided
to mean only that they become connected with them 1 , so
here too their becoming rice, &c. merely means that they
1 This does not agree well with what had been said above about
the souls becoming similar to ether, air, &c.
[38]
K
130
vedanta-sijtras.
become connected with those plants.—How is this known ?
—From the fact of the statement here also being of the
same nature.—Of what nature ?—Here, also, as in the case
of the souls becoming ether, &c., down to rain, the text does
not refer to any operation of the works; hence we conclude
that the souls do not enjoy pleasure and pain. Where, on
the other hand, the text wants to intimate that the souls
undergo pleasure and pain, there it refers to the operation
of the former works; so, e. g. in the passage which treats of
men of good or evil conduct. Moreover, if we should take
the souls’ being born as rice, &c., in its literal sense, it would
follow that when the rice plants are reaped, unhusked, split,
cooked and eaten, the souls which have descended into them
and are animating them would have to leave them ; it being
generally known that when a body is destroyed the soul
animating it abandons it. And then (if the souls left the
plants) the text could not state (as it does state, V, io, 6)
that the souls which had entered into the plants are trans¬
mitted by animal generation (on the part of those who eat
the plants). Hence it follows that the souls which have
descended are merely outwardly connected with the plants
animated by other souls. This suffices to refute the asser¬
tions that ‘ to be born ’ must be taken in its literal sense ;
and that the state of vegetable existence affords a place
for enjoyment. We do not entirely deny that vegetable
existence may afford a place for enjoyment; it may do so
in the case of other beings which, in consequence of their
unholy deeds, have become plants. We only maintain that
those souls which descend from the moon with an un¬
requited remainder of works do not experience the enjoy¬
ment connected with plant life.
25. Should it be said that (sacrificial work is)
unholy; we deny this on the ground of scripture.
We proceed to refute the remark made by the purva-
pakshin that sacrificial works are unholy because involving
harm done to animals, &c., that they may therefore lead
to unpleasant results, and that hence the statement as to
the souls being born as plants, &c., may be taken in its
Ill ADHYAYA, I PADA, 26. I3I
literal sense; in consequence of which it would be uncalled-
for to assume a derived sense.—This reasoning is not valid,
because our knowledge of what is duty and the contrary of
duty depends entirely on scripture. The knowledge of
one action being right and another wrong is based on
scripture only; for it lies out of the cognizance of the
senses, and there moreover is, in the case of right and wrong,
an entire want of binding rules as to place, time, and occa¬
sion. What in one place, at one time, on one occasion
is performed as a right action, is a wrong action in
another place, at another time, on another occasion; none
therefore can know, without scripture, what is either right
or wrong. Now from scripture we derive the certain know¬
ledge that the ^yotish/oma-sacrifice, which involves harm
done to animals (i.e. the animal sacrifice), &c., is an act of
duty; how then can it be called unholy ?—But does not
the scriptural precept, 4 Do not harm any creature/ intimate
that to do harm to any being is an act contrary to duty?—
True, but that is a general rule, while the precept, 4 Let him
offer an animal to Agnishomau/ embodies an exception ;
and general rule and exception have different spheres of
application. The work (i.e. sacrifice) enjoined by the Veda
is therefore holy, being performed by authoritative men and
considered blameless; and to be born as a plant cannot be
its fruit. Nor can to be born as rice and other plants be
considered analogous to being born as dogs, &c. For the
latter birth scripture teaches with reference to men of evil
conduct only; while no such specific qualification is stated
in the case of vegetable existence. Hence we conclude that
when scripture states that the souls descending from the
moon become plants, it only means that they become en¬
closed in plants.
26. After that (there takes place) conjunction (of
the soul) with him who performs the act of genera¬
tion.
The conclusion arrived at under the preceding Sfitra is
confirmed also by scripture stating that the souls, after
having entered into plants, 4 become 5 beings performing the
K 2
132
vedanta-sCtras.
act of generation, ‘ for whoever eats the food, whoever per¬
forms the act of generation, that again he (the soul)
becomes/ Here again the soul’s { becoming 5 he who performs
the act of generation cannot be taken in its literal sense;
for a person becomes capable of generation a long time
after his birth only, viz. when he reaches puberty. How
then should the soul contained in the food eaten enter into
that condition in its true sense ? Hence we must interpret
the passage to mean only that the soul enters into conjunc¬
tion with one who performs the act of generation ; and
from this we again infer that the soul’s becoming a plant
merely means its entering into conjunction with a plant.
27. From the yoni a (new) body (springs).
Then, subsequently to the soul having been in conjunc¬
tion with a person of generative power, generation takes
place, and a body is produced in which the soul can enjoy
the fruits of that remainder of works which still attaches to
it. This scripture declares in the passage, 6 Those whose
conduct has been good,’ &c. From this, also, it appears that
the souls to which a remainder clings, when descending and
becoming rice plants, and so on, do not enter into the state
of forming the body of those plants with its attendant
pleasure and pain, but are ‘ born as plants ’ in so far only
as they enter into conjunction with them.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2.
133
SECOND PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
1. In the intermediate place there is (a real)
creation; for (scripture) says (that).
In the preceding pada we have set forth, with reference
to the knowledge of the five fires, the various stages of
the soul’s passing through the sa;^sdra. We shall now
set forth the soul’s different states (waking, dreaming, &c.)
—Scripture says (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 9; 10), ‘ When he falls
asleep —; there are no chariots in that state, no horses, no
roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads,’
&c.—Here a doubt arises whether the creation thus taking
place in dreams is a real one (paramarthika) like the crea¬
tion seen in the waking state, or whether it consists of
illusion (maya).—The purvapakshin maintains that ‘ in the
intermediate place (or state) there is (a real) creation.’ By
intermediate place we have to understand the place of
dreams, in which latter sense the word is used in the Veda,
‘ There is a third intermediate state, the state of dreams ’
(B ri. Up. IV, 3, 9). That place is called the intermediate
place because it lies there where the two worlds, or else the
place of waking and the place of bliss (deep sleep), join.
In that intermediate place the creation must be real; be¬
cause scripture, which is authoritative, declares it to be so,
‘He creates chariots, horses, roads,’ &c. We, moreover,
infer this from the concluding clause, ‘ He indeed is the
maker’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 10).
2. And some (state the Self to be) the shaper
(creator); sons and so on (being the lovely things
which he shapes).
Moreover the members of one jakha state that the Self
is, in that intermediate state, the shaper of lovely things,
‘He, the person who is awake in us while we are asleep,
shaping one lovely thing after another ’ (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8).
*34
vedanta-sOtras.
Kama (lovely things) in this passage means sons, &c.,
that are so called because they are beloved.—But may
not the term ‘kama^’ denote desires merely?—No,we reply;
the word kama is here used with reference to sons, &c.;
for those form the general subject of discussion, as we see
from some preceding passages, ‘ Choose sons and grand¬
sons/ &c., and C I make thee the enjoyer of all kamas 1
(Ka. Up. I, i, 23 ; 24).—And that that shaper is the highest
Self (pr&£7za) we infer from the general subject-matter and
from the complementary sentence. That the highest Self
is the general subject-matter appears from II, 14, c That
which thou seest as neither this nor that/ And to that
highest Self there also refers the complementary sentence
II, 5, 8, ‘That indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that
alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained
in it, and no one goes beyond/—Now it is admitted that
the world (creation) of our waking state of which the highest
Self (pra^a) is the maker is real; hence the world of our
dreaming state must likewise be real. That the same reason¬
ing applies to the waking and the sleeping state a scriptural
passage also declares, ‘Here they say: No, this is the same
as the place of waking, for what he sees while awake the
same he sees while asleep’ (Bn. Up. IV, 3, 14).—Hence the
world of dreams is real.—To this we reply as follows.
3. But it (viz. the dream world) is mere illusion
(m&ya), on account of its nature not manifesting
itself with the totality (of the attributes of reality).
The word ‘but* discards the purvapaksha. It is not true
that the world of dreams is real; it is mere illusion and
there is not a particle of reality in it.—Why?—‘On account
of its nature not manifesting itself with the totality/ i.e.
because the nature of the dream world does not manifest
itself with the totality of the attributes of real things.—
What then do you mean by the ‘ totality * ?—The fulfilment
of the conditions of place, time, and cause, and the circum¬
stance of non-refutation. All these have their sphere in real
things, but cannot be applied to dreams. In the first place
there is, in a dream, no space for chariots and the like; for
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3.
135
those cannot possibly find room in the limited confines of
the body.—Well, but why should not the dreaming person
see the objects of his dream outside of his body ? He does
as a matter of fact perceive things as separated from him¬
self by space; and 6ruti, moreover, declares that the dream
is outside the body, 4 Away from the nest the Immortal moves;
that immortal one goes wherever he likes ’ (B ri. Up. IV,
3, 12). And this distinction of the conceptions of staying
and going would have no good sense if the being (the soul)
did not really go out.—What you maintain is inadmissible,
we reply. A sleeping being cannot possibly possess the
power to go and return in a moment the distance of a
hundred yo^anas. Sometimes, moreover, a person recounts
a dream in which he went to some place without returning
from it, 4 Lying on my bed in the land of the Kurus I was
overcome by sleep and went in my dream to the country
of the Pa^alas, and being there I awoke/ If, now, that
person had really gone out of his country, he would on
waking find himself in the country of the Pa^alas to which
he had gone in his dream ; but as a matter of fact he awakes
in the country of the Kurus.—Moreover, while a man
imagines himself in his dream going, in his body, to another
place, the bystanders see that very same body lying on the
couch. Further, a dreaming person does not see, in his
dream, other places such as they really are. But if he in
seeing them did actually go about, they would appear to
him like the things he sees in his waking state. Sruti,
moreover, declares that the dream is within the body, cp.
the passage beginning 4 But when he moves about in dream,'
and terminating 4 He moves about, according to his plea¬
sure, within his own body’ (B ru Up. II, 1, 18). Hence the
passage about the dreamer moving away from his nest
must be taken in a metaphorical sense, as otherwise we
should contradict scripture as well as reason ; he who while
remaining within his own body does not use it for any pur¬
pose may be said to be outside the body as it were. The
difference of the ideas of staying within the body and going
outside must, therefore, be viewed as a mere deception.—
In the second place we see that dreams are in conflict with
136 vedanta-s6tras.
the conditions of time. One person lying asleep at night
dreams that it is day in the Bharata Varsha ; another lives,
during a dream which lasts one muhtirta only, through many
crowds of years.—In the third place there do not exist in
the state of dreaming the requisite efficient causes for either
thought or action; for as, in sleep, the organs are drawn
inward, the dreaming person has no eyes, &c. for perceiving
chariots and other things; and whence should he, in the
space of the twinkling of an eye, have the power of—or
procure the material for—making chariots and the like ?—
In the fourth place the chariots, horses, &c., which the
dream creates, are refuted, i. e. shown not to exist by the
waking state. And apart from this, the dream itself refutes
what it creates, as its end often contradicts its beginning;
what at first was considered to be a chariot turns, in a
moment, into a man, and what was conceived to be a man
has all at once become a tree.—Scripture itself, moreover,
clearly declares the chariots, &c., of a dream to have no
real existence, ‘There are no chariots in that state, no
horses, no roads, &c.’—Hence the visions of a dream are
mere illusion.
4. (Not altogether) for it (the dream) is indicative
(of the future), according to . 5 ruti; the experts also
declare this.
Well then, as dreams are mere illusion, they do not
contain a particle of reality?—Not so, we reply; for
dreams are prophetic of future good and bad fortune. For
scripture teaches as follows, ‘ When a man engaged in
some work undertaken for a special wish sees in his dreams
a woman, he may infer success from that dream-vision.’
Other scriptural passages declare that certain dreams
indicate speedy death, so, e.g. ‘If he sees a black man
with black teeth, that man will kill him.’—Those also who
understand the science of dreams hold the opinion that to
dream of riding on an elephant and the like is lucky; while
it is unlucky to dream of riding on a donkey, &c.; and that
certain other dreams also caused by special mantras or
devatas or substances contain a particle of truth.—In all
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 4 .
137
these cases the thing indicated may be real; the indicating
dream, however, remains unreal as it is refuted by the
waking state. The doctrine that the dream itself is mere
illusion thus remains uncontradicted.—On this account the
Vedic passage to which the first Sutra of this pada refers is
to be explained metaphorically. When we say ‘ the plough
bears, i.e. supports the bullocks/ we say so because the
plough is the indirect cause of the bullocks being kept \
not because we mean that the plough directly supports
the bullocks. Analogously scripture says that the dream¬
ing person creates chariots, &c., and is their maker, not
because he creates them directly but because he is the
cause of their creation. By his being their cause we have
to understand that he is that one who performs the good
and evil deeds which are the cause of the delight and
fear produced by the apparition, in his dream, of chariots
and other things 1 2 .—Moreover, as in the waking state,
owing to the contact of the senses and their objects and
the resulting interference of the light of the sun, &c., the
self-luminousness of the Self is, for the beholder, difficult
to discriminate, scripture gives the description of the
dreaming state for the purpose of that discrimination. If
then the statements about the creation of chariots, &c.,
were taken as they stand (i.e. literally) we could not
ascertain that the Self is self-luminous 3 . Hence we have
to explain the passage relative to the creation of chariots,
&c., in a metaphorical sense, so as to make it agree with
the statement about the non-existence of chariots, &c.
This explains also the scriptural passage about the
shaping (III, 2, 2). The statement made above that in
the Ka//zaka the highest Self is spoken of as the shaper
1 Bullocks have to be kept because the fields must be tilled.
2 The dreams have the purpose of either cheering or saddening
and frightening the sleeper; so as to requite him for his good and
evil works. His adrfsh/a thus furnishes the efficient cause of the
dreams.
3 Because then there would be no difference between the dream¬
ing and the waking state.
i3§
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
of dreams is untrue; for another scriptural passage
ascribes that activity to the individual soul, ‘ He him¬
self destroying, he himself shaping dreams with his
own splendour, with his own light’ (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 9) 1 .
And in the Kanaka Upanishad itself also we infer from
the form of the sentence, ‘ That one who wakes in us
while we are asleep,’—which is an anuvada, i.e. an
additional statement about something well known—that
he who is there proclaimed as the shaper of lovely things
is nobody else than the (well-known) individual soul. The
other passage which forms the complementary continuation
of the one just quoted (‘ That indeed is the Bright, that is
Brahman ’) discards the notion of the separate existence of
the individual soul and teaches that it is nothing but Brah¬
man, analogously to the passage ‘ That art thou.’ And this
interpretation does not conflict with Brahman being the
general subject-matter.—Nor do we thereby deny altogether
that the highest (pra^a) Self is active in dreams ; for as
being the Lord of all it may be considered as the guide
and ruler of the soul in all its states. We only maintain
that the world connected with the intermediate state (i.e.
the world of dreams) is not real in the same sense as the
world consisting of ether and so on is real. On the other
hand we must remember that also the so-called real crea¬
tion with its ether, air, &c., is not absolutely real; for as
we have proved before (II, 1, 14) the entire expanse of
things is mere illusion. The world consisting of ether, &c.,
remains fixed and distinct up to the moment when the soul
cognizes that Brahman is the Self of all; the world of
dreams on the other hand is daily sublated by the waking
state. That the latter is mere illusion has, therefore, to be
understood with a distinction.
5. But by the meditation on the highest that
which is hidden (viz. the equality of the Lord and
1 Svayazrc vihatya purvadehaw nh#esh/a m kr/tva svayazrc nirma-
yapfirva/72 vasanamayaw deha m sampadya svena bhasa svakiyabu-
ddhivn'ttya svena ^yotisha svarupa/fcaitanyenety artha^. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 6.
139
the soul, becomes manifest); for from him (the
Lord) are its (the soul’s) bondage and release.
Well, but the individual soul is a part of the highest Self
as the spark is a part of the fire. And as fire and spark
have in common the powers of burning and giving light, so
the individual soul and the Lord have in common the
powers of knowledge and rulership ; hence the individual
soul may, by means of its lordship, effect in the dreaming
state a creation of chariots and the like, springing from its
wishes (sa;^kalpa).—To this we reply that although the
Lord and the individual soul stand to each other in the
relation of whole and part, yet it is manifest to perception
that the attributes of the two are of a different nature.—
Do you then mean to say that the individual soul has
no common attributes with the Lord ?—We do not maintain
that; but we say that the equality of attributes, although
existing, is hidden by the veil of Nescience. In the case
of some persons indeed who strenuously meditate on the
Lord and who, their ignorance being dispelled at last,
obtain through the favour of the Lord extraordinary
powers and insight, that hidden equality becomes mani¬
fest—just as through the action of strong medicines the
power of sight of a blind man becomes manifest; but it
does not on its own account reveal itself to all men.—Why
not?—Because ‘from him/ i.e. from the Lord there are
bondage and release of it, viz. the individual soul. That
means : bondage is due to the absence of knowledge of
the Lords true nature; release is due to the presence of
such knowledge. Thus 5 ruti declares, ‘ When that god is
known all fetters fall off; sufferings are destroyed and
birth and death cease. From meditating on him there
arises, on the dissolution of the body, a third state, that
of universal Lordship ; he who is alone is satisfied ’ (SVet.
Up. I, ji), and similar passages.
6. Or that (viz. the concealment of the soul's
powers springs) from its connexion with the body.
But if the soul is a part of the highest Self, why should
its knowledge and lordship be hidden ? We should rather
140
vedAnta-s£jtras.
expect them to be as manifest as the light and the heat of
the spark.—True, we reply ; but the state of concealment
of the soul’s knowledge and lordship is due to its being
joined to a body, i.e. to a body, sense-organs, mind,
buddhi, sense-objects, sensations, &c. And to this state
of things there applies the simile: As the heat and light of
the fire are hidden as long as the fire is still hidden in the
wood from which it will be produced by friction, or as long
as it is covered by ashes ; so, in consequence of the soul
being connected with limiting adjuncts in the form of a
body, &c., founded on name and form as presented by
Nescience, its knowledge and lordship remain hidden as
long as it is possessed by the erroneous notion of not being
distinct from those adjuncts.—The word ‘ or ’ in the Sutra
is meant to discard the suspicion that the Lord and the
soul might be separate entities.—But why should not the
soul be separate from the Lord, considering the state of
concealment of its knowledge and power? If we allow the
two to be fundamentally separate, we need not assume
that their separateness is due to the soul’s connexion with
the body.—It is impossible, we reply, to assume the soul
to be separate from the Lord. For in the scriptural pas¬
sage beginning with 4 That divinity thought’ &c. ( Kh . Up.
VI, 3, 2) we meet with the clause, ‘ It entered into those
beings with this living Self ’ (^iva atman); where the
individual soul is referred to as the Self. And then we
have the other passage, ‘It is the True; it is the Self;
that art thou, O vSvetaketu,’ which again teaches that the
Lord is the Self of the soul. Hence the soul is non-
different from the Lord, but its knowledge and power are
obscured by its connexion with the body. From this it
follows that the dreaming soul is not able to create, from
its mere wishes, chariots and other things. If the soul
possessed that power, nobody would ever have an un¬
pleasant dream; for nobody ever wishes for something
unpleasant to himself.—We finally deny that the scriptural
passage about the waking state (‘ dream is the same as the
place of waking ’ &c.) indicates the reality of dreams. The
statement made there about the equality of the two states
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7 . I 4 I
is not meant to indicate that dreams are real, for that would
conflict with the soul’s self-luminousness (referred to above),
and scripture, moreover, expressly declares that the chariots,
&c., of a dream have no real existence; it merely means
that dreams, because due to mental impressions (vasana)
received in the waking state, are equal to the latter in ap¬
pearance.—From all this it follows that dreams are mere
illusion.
7. The absence of that (i.e. of dreams, i.e. dream¬
less sleep) takes place in the na^/is and in the Self;
according to scriptural statement.
The state of dream has been discussed; we are now
going to enquire into the state of deep sleep. A number
of scriptural passages refer to that state. In one place we
read, 4 When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest
so that he sees no dream, then he has entered into those
navis’ ( Kh . Up. VIII, 6, 3). In another place it is said
with reference to the na^/is, 4 Through them he moves forth
and rests in the surrounding body’ (B ri. Up. II, 1,19). So
also in another place, 4 In these the person is when sleeping
he sees no dream. Then he becomes one with the pra^a
alone’ (Kau. Up. IV, 20). Again in another place, 4 That
ether which is within the heart in that he reposes 5 (B ri.
Up. IV, 4, 22). Again, 4 Then he becomes united with that
which is ; he is gone to his Self 5 (. Kh . Up. VI, 8, 1). And,
4 Embraced by the highest Self (pra^a) he knows nothing
that is without,nothing that is within’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 21).
Here the doubt arises whether the na^is, &c., mentioned in
the above passages are independent from each other and
constitute various places for the soul in the state of deep
sleep, or if they stand in mutual relation so as to constitute
one such place only. The purvapakshin takes the former
view on account of the various places mentioned serving one
and the same purpose. Things serving the same purpose,
as, e.g. rice and barley 1 , are never seen to be dependent
1 Either of which may be employed for making the sacrificial
cake.
142
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
on each other. That the naafis, &c., actually serve the
same purpose appears from the circumstance of their being
all of them exhibited equally in the locative case, 4 he has
entered into the na*/is/ 4 he rests in the pericardium/ &C . 1
—But in some of the passages quoted the locative case is
not employed, so, e.g. in 4 He becomes united with that
which is’ (sata, instrumental case)!—That makes no differ¬
ence, we reply, because there also the locative case is
meant. For in the complementary passage the text states
that the soul desirous of rest enters into the Self, 4 Finding
no rest elsewhere it settles down on breath ’ ( Kh . Up. VI,
8 , 2); a passage in which the word 4 breath 5 refers to that
which is (the sat). A place of rest of course implies the
idea of the locative case. The latter case is, moreover,
actually exhibited in a further complementary passage,
4 When they have become merged in that which is (sati),
they know not that they are merged in it.’—In all these
passages one and the same state is referred to, viz. the
state of deep sleep which is characterised by the suspension
of all special cognition. Hence we conclude that in the
state of deep sleep the soul optionally goes to any one of
those places, either the nadis, or that which is, <$tc.
To this we make the following reply— 4 The absence of
that/ i.e. the absence of dreams—which absence constitutes
the essence of deep sleep—takes place 4 in the nadls and in
the Self;’ i.e. in deep sleep the soul goes into both to¬
gether, not optionally into either.—How is this known?—
4 From scripture.’—Scripture says of all those things, the
nadis, &c. } that they are the place of deep sleep ; and those
statements we must combine into one, as the hypothesis of
option would involve partial refutation 2 . The assertion
1 The argument of the purvapakshin is that the different places
in which the soul is said to abide in the state of deep sleep are all
exhibited by the text in the same case and are on that account
co-ordinate. Mutual relation implying subordination would require
them to be exhibited in different cases enabling us to infer the
exact manner and degree of relation.
2 By allowing option between two Vedic statements we lessen the
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7 .
H3
made above that we are compelled to allow option because
the ncU/is, &c., serve one and the same purpose, is without
foundation; for from the mere fact of two things being
exhibited in the same case it does not follow by any means
that they serve the same purpose, and that for that reason
we have to choose between them. We on the contrary see
that one and the same case is employed even where things
serve different purposes and have to be combined; we say,
e.g. ‘ he sleeps in the palace, he sleeps on the couch 1 . 9 So
in the present case also the different statements can be
combined into one, 4 He sleeps in the nddts, in the sur¬
rounding body, in Brahman. 5 Moreover, the scriptural
passage, ‘ In these the person is when sleeping he sees no
dream; then he becomes one with the prana alone, 5 de¬
clares, by mentioning them together in one sentence, that
the n&dis and the pra^a are to be combined in the state of
deep sleep. That by pra^a Brahman is meant we have
already shown (I, 1, 28). Although in another text the
nfh/is are spoken of as an independent place of deep sleep
as it were (‘ then he has entered into those nadis 5 ), yet, in
order not to contradict other passages in which Brahman is
spoken of as the place of deep sleep, we must explain that
text to mean that the soul abides in Brahman through the
nchfts. Nor is this interpretation opposed to the employ¬
ment of the locative case (‘ into—or in—those nadis ’); for
if the soul enters into Brahman by means of the nadis it is
at the same time in the na^is; just as a man who descends
to the sea by means of the river Ganga is at the same time
on the Gangd.—Moreover that passage about the nadis,
because its purpose is to describe the road, consisting of
the rays and ndafts, to the Brahma world, mentions the
entering of the soul into the na^is in order to glorify the
latter (not in order to describe the state of deep sleep); for
the clause following upon the one which refers to the enter-
authority of the Veda; for the adoption of either alternative
sublates, for the time, the other alternative.
1 Where the two locatives are to be combined into one statement,
1 he sleeps on the couch in the palace.'
144
vedanta-s£jtras.
ing praises the nadis, ‘There no evil touches him.’ The
text, moreover, adds a reason for the absence of all evil, in
the words, 4 For then he has become united with the light.*
That means that on account of the light contained in the
naafts (which is called bile) having overpowered the organs
the person no longer sees the sense-objects. Or else Brah¬
man may be meant by the 4 light; ’ which term is applied
to Brahman in another passage also, 4 It is Brahman only,
light only 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 7). The passage would then
mean that the soul becomes, by means of the naafis, united
with Brahman, and that hence no evil touches it. That the
union with Brahman is the reason for the absence of all
contact with evil, is known from other scriptural passages,
such as, 4 All evils turn back from it ; for the world of
Brahman is free from all evil* ( Kh . Up. VIII, 4, 1). On
that account we have to combine the naafts with Brahman,
which from other passages is known to be the place of deep
sleep.—Analogously we conclude that the pericardium also,
because it is mentioned in a passage treating of Brahman,
is a place of deep sleep only in subordination to Brahman.
For the ether within the heart is at first spoken of as the
place of sleep (‘He lies in the ether which is in the heart/
B ri. Up. II, 1, 17), and with reference thereto it is said
later on, 4 He rests in the pericardium* (II, 1, 19). Peri¬
cardium (puritat) is a name of that which envelops the
heart; hence that which rests within the ether of the heart
—which is contained in the pericardium—can itself be said
to rest within the pericardium ; just as a man living in a
town surrounded by walls is said to live within the walls.
That the ether within the heart is Brahman has already
been shown (I, 3, 14).—That again the nadis and the peri¬
cardium have to be combined as places of deep sleep appears
from their being mentioned together in one sentence
( 4 Through them he moves forth and rests in the puritat).
That that which is (sat) and the intelligent Self (pra^a)
are only names of Brahman is well known; hence scripture
mentions only three places of deep sleep, viz. the nadis,
! the pericardium, and Brahman. Among these three again
I Brahman alone is the lasting place of deep sleep ; the
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, J.
145
nadfts and the pericardium are mere roads leading to it.
Moreover (to explain further the difference of the manner
in which the soul, in deep sleep, enters into the na^/is, the
pericardium and Brahman respectively), the na^is and the
pericardium are (in deep sleep) merely the abode of the
limiting adjuncts of the soul; in them the soul’s organs
abide x . For apart from its connexion with the limiting
adjuncts it is impossible for the soul in itself to abide any¬
where, because being non-different from Brahman it rests
in its own glory. And if we say that, in deep sleep, it
abides in Brahman we do not mean thereby that there is a
difference between the abode and that which abides, but
that there is absolute identity of the two. For the text
says, ‘ With that which is he becomes united, he is gone to
his Self; * which means that the sleeping person has entered
into his true nature.—It cannot, moreover, be said that the
soul is at any time not united with Brahman—for its true
nature can never pass away—; but considering that in the
state of waking and that of dreaming it passes, owing to
the contact with its limiting adjuncts, into something else,
as it were, it may be said that when those adjuncts cease
in deep sleep it passes back into its true nature. Hence it
would be entirely wrong to assume that, in deep sleep, it
sometimes becomes united with Brahman and sometimes
not 1 2 . Moreover, even if we admit that there are different
places for the soul in deep sleep, still there does not result,
from that difference of place, any difference in the quality
of deep sleep which is in all cases characterised by the ces¬
sation of special cognition ; it is, therefore, more appro¬
priate to say that the soul does (in deep sleep) not cognize
on account of its oneness, having become united with Brah¬
man ; according to the Sruti, ‘How should he know an¬
other ? ’ (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15).—If, further, the sleeping soul
did rest in the na</is and the puritat, it would be impossible
1 An. Gi. explains karawani by karmawi: na^/ishu puritati kz.
^ivasyopadhyantarbhfitani karawani karmawi tish//^antity upadhya-
dharatvam, ^ivasya tv adharo brahmaiva.
2 But with the na</is or the pericardium only.
[38] L
146
vedAnta-s£jtras.
to assign any reason for its not cognizing, because in that
case it would continue to have diversity for its object;
according to the Sruti, i When there is, as it were, duality,
then one sees the other,’ &c.—But in the case of him also
who has diversity for his object, great distance and the like
may be reasons for absence of cognition !—What you say
might indeed apply to our case if the soul were acknow¬
ledged to be limited in itself; then its case would be
analogous to that of Vish/zumitra, who, when staying in
a foreign land, cannot see his home. But, apart from its
adjuncts, the soul knows no limitation.—Well, then, great
distance, &c., residing in the adjuncts may be the reason
of non-cognition !—Yes, but that leads us to the conclu¬
sion already arrived at, viz. that the soul does not cognize
when, the limiting adjuncts having ceased, it has become
one with Brahman.
Nor do we finally maintain that the naz/is, the pericar¬
dium, and Brahman are to be added to each other as
being equally places of deep sleep. For by the knowledge
that the naz/is and the pericardium are places of sleep,
nothing is gained, as scripture teaches neither that some
special fruit is connected with that knowledge nor that it is
the subordinate member of some work, &c., connected with
certain results. We, on the other hand, do want to prove
that that Brahman is the lasting abode of the soul in the state
of deep sleep ; that is a knowledge which has its own
uses, viz. the ascertainment of Brahman being the Self of
the soul, and the ascertainment of the soul being essentially
non-connected with the worlds that appear in the waking
and in the dreaming state. Hence the Self alone is the
place of deep sleep.
8. Hence the awaking from that (viz. Brahman).
And because the Self only is the place of deep sleep, on
that account the scriptural chapters treating of sleep inva¬
riably teach that the awaking takes place from that Self.
In the B ri. Up. when the time comes for the answer to the
question, ‘Whence did he come back?’ (II, 1, 16), the text
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9 .
147
says, f As small sparks come forth from fire, thus all pranas
come forth from that Self’ (II, 1, 20). And Kh . Up. VI,
10, 2, we read: ‘ When they have come back from the True
they do not know that they have come back from the True.’
If there were optional places to which the soul might resort
in deep sleep, scripture would teach us that it awakes some¬
times from the na^/is, sometimes from the pericardium,
sometimes from the Self.—For that reason also the Self is
the place of deep sleep.
9. But the same (soul returns from Brahman); on
account of work, remembrance, text, and precept.
Here we have to enquire whether the soul when awaking
from the union with Brahman is the same which entered
into union with Brahman, or another one.—The purvapak-
shin maintains that there is no fixed rule on that point.
For just as a drop of water, when poured into a large quan¬
tity of water, becomes one with the latter, so that when we
again take out a drop it would be hard to manage that it
should be the very same drop; thus the sleeping soul, when
it has become united with Brahman, is merged in bliss and
not able again to rise from it the same. Hence what
actually awakes is either the Lord or some other soul.—To
this we reply that the same soul which in the state of sleep
entered into bliss again arises from it, not any other. We
assert this on the ground of work, remembrance, sacred
text, and precept; which four reasons we will treat sepa¬
rately. In the first place the person who wakes from sleep
must be the same, because it is seen to finish work left un¬
finished before. Men finish in the morning what they had
left incomplete on the day before. Now it is not possible
that one man should proceed to complete work half done
by another man, because this would imply too much l .
1 There would follow from it, e. g. that in the case of sacrifices
occupying more than one day, there would be several sacrificers,
and that consequently it would be doubtful to whom the fruit
of the sacrifice, as promised by the Veda, belongs. And this
would imply a stultification of the sacred text.
L 2
148
VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
Hence we conclude that it is one and the same man who
finishes on the latter day the work begun on the former.—
In the second place the person rising from sleep is the
same who went to sleep, for the reason that otherwise he
could not remember what he had seen, &c., on the day
before ; for what one man sees another cannot remember.
And if another Self rose from sleep, the consciousness of
personal identity (atmanusmara^a) expressed in the words,
4 I am the same I was before,’ would not be possible.—In
the third place we understand from Vedic texts that the
same person rises again, 4 He hastens back again as he
came, to the place from which he started, to be awake 5
(B ri. Up. IV, 3, 16); 4 All these creatures go day after day
into the Brahma-world and yet do not discover it’ (. Kh . Up.
VIII, 3, 2 ); 4 Whatever these creatures are here, whether a
lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat,
or a musquito, that they become again and again ’ (Kh.
Up. VI, 10, 2). These and similar passages met with in
the chapters treating of sleeping and waking have a proper
sense only if the same soul rises again.—In the fourth place
we arrive at the same conclusion on the ground of the in¬
junctions of works and knowledge, which, on a different
theory, would be meaningless. For if another person did
rise, it would follow that a person might obtain final
release by sleep merely, and what then, we ask, would be
the use of all those works which bear fruit at a later period,
and of knowledge ?—Moreover on the hypothesis of another
person rising from sleep, that other person would either be
a soul which had up to that time carried on its phenomenal
life in another body; in that case it would follow that the
practical existence carried on by means of that body would
be cut short. If it be said that the soul which went to
sleep may, in its turn, rise in that other body (so that B
would rise in A’s body and A in B’s body), we reply that
that would be an altogether useless hypothesis ; for what ad¬
vantage do we derive from assuming that each soul rises
from sleep not in the same body in which it had gone to
sleep, but that it goes to sleep in one body and rises in
another ?—Or else the soul rising (in A’s body) would be
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 rADA, IO. 149
one which had obtained final release, and that would imply
that final release can have an end. But it is impossible
that a soul which has once freed itself from Nescience
should again rise (enter into phenomenal life). Hereby
it is also shown that the soul which rises cannot be the
Lord, who is everlastingly free from Nescience.—Further,
on the hypothesis of another soul rising, it would be diffi¬
cult to escape the conclusion that souls reap the fruits of
deeds not their own, and, on the other hand, are not requited
for what they have done.—From all this it follows that the
person rising from sleep is the same that went to sleep.—
Nor is it difficult to refute the analogical reasoning that the
soul, if once united with Brahman, can no more emerge
from it than a drop of water can again be taken out from
the mass of water into which it had been poured. We
admit the impossibility of taking out the same drop of
water, because there is no means of distinguishing it from all
the other drops. In the case of the soul, however, there
are reasons of distinction, viz. the work and the knowledge
(of each individual soul). Hence the two cases are not
analogous.—Further, we point out that the flamingo, e. g.
is able to distinguish and separate milk and water when
mixed, things which we men are altogether incapable of
distinguishing.—Moreover, what is called individual soul is
not really different from the highest Self, so that it might
be distinguished from the latter in the same way as a drop
of water from the mass of water ; but, as we have explained
repeatedly, Brahman itself is on account of its connexion
with limiting adjuncts metaphorically called individual
soul. Hence the phenomenal existence of one soul lasts as
long as it continues to be bound by one set of adjuncts, and
the phenomenal existence of another soul again lasts as
long as it continues to be bound by another set of adjuncts.
Each set of adjuncts continues through the states of sleep
as well as of waking ; in the former it is like a seed, in the
latter like the fully developed plant. Hence the proper
inference is that the same soul awakes from sleep.
10. In him who is senseless (in a swoon, &c.)
150 vedanta-s6tras.
there is half-union ; on account of this remaining (as
the only possible hypothesis).
There now arises the question of what kind that state
is which ordinarily is called a swoon or being stunned.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that we know only of
three states of the soul as long as it abides in a body,
viz. the waking state, dreaming, and deep dreamless sleep ;
to which may be added, as a fourth state, the soul’s passing
out of the body. A fifth state is known neither from vSruti
nor Smr/ti; hence what is called fainting must be one of
the four states mentioned.—To this we make the following
reply. In the first place a man lying in a swoon cannot be
said to be awake ; for he does not perceive external objects
by means of his senses.—But, it might be objected, may
not his case be analogous to that of the arrow-maker?
Just as the man working at an arrow, although awake, is
so intent on his arrow that he sees nothing else; so the
man also who is stunned, e.g. by a blow, may be awake,
but as his mind is concentrated on the sensation of pain
caused by the blow of the club, he may not at the time
perceive anything else.—No, we reply,the case is different, on
account of the absence of consciousness. The arrow-maker
says, ‘ For such a length of time I was aware of nothing but
the arrow ; ’ the man, on the other hand, who returns to con¬
sciousness from a swoon, says, 4 For such a length of time
I was shut up in blind darkness; I was conscious of nothing.’
—A waking man, moreover, however much his mind may
be concentrated on one object, keeps his body upright ;
while the body of a swooning person falls prostrate on
the ground. Hence a man in a swoon is not awake.—Nor,
in the second place, is he dreaming; because he is alto¬
gether unconscious.—Nor, in the third place, is he dead ;
for he continues to breathe and to be warm. When a man
has become senseless and people are in doubt whether he
be alive or dead, they touch the region of his heart, in
order to ascertain whether warmth continues in his body
or not, and put their hands to his nostrils to ascertain
whether breathing goes on or not. If, then, they perceive
Ill ADHYAyA, 2 PADA, TO. I 51
neither warmth nor breath, they conclude that he is dead,
and carry off his body into the forest in order to burn it;
if, on the other hand, they do perceive warmth and breath,
they decide that he is not dead, and begin to sprinkle him
with cold water so that he may recover consciousness.—
That a man who has swooned away is not dead follows,
moreover, from the fact of his rising again (to conscious
life); for from Yama’s realm none ever return.—Let us then
say that a man who has swooned lies in deep sleep, as he
is unconscious, and, at the same time, not dead!—No, we
reply; this also is impossible, on account of the different
characteristics of the two states. A man who has become
senseless does sometimes not breathe for a long time; his
body trembles ; his face has a frightful expression; his
eyes are staring wide open. The countenance of a sleeping
person, on the other hand, is peaceful, he draws his breath
at regular intervals; his eyes are closed, his body does
not tremble. A sleeping person again may be waked by
a gentle stroking with the hand ; a person lying in a swoon
not even by a blow with a club. Moreover, senselessness
and sleep have different causes; the former is produced
by a blow on the head with a club or the like, the latter
by weariness. Nor, finally, is it the common opinion that
stunned or swooning people are asleep.—It thus remains
for us to assume that the state of senselessness (in swoon¬
ing, &c.) is a half-union (or half-coincidence) \ as it coin¬
cides in so far as it is an unconscious state and does not
coincide in so far as it has different characteristics.—But
how can absence of consciousness in a swoon, &c., be called
half-coincidence (with deep sleep)? With regard to deep
sleep scripture says, ‘ He becomes united with the True 5
( Kh . Up. VI, 8, i); ‘Then a thief is not a thief’ (Bn. Up.
IV, 3, 21 ); ‘ Day and night do not pass that bank, nor old
age, death, and grief, neither good nor evil deeds ’ (. Kh . Up.
VIII, 4, i). For the good and evil deeds reach the soul in
that way that there arise in it the ideas of being affected by
pleasure or pain. Those ideas are absent in deep sleep, but
1 Viz. with deep sleep, as will be explained below.
152
vedanta-sOtras.
they are likewise absent in the case of a person lying in a
swoon ; hence we must maintain that, on account of the
cessation of the limiting adjuncts, in the case of a senseless
person as well as of one asleep, complete union takes place,
not only half-union.—To this we make the following reply.
—We do not mean to say that in the case of a man who
lies in a swoon the soul becomes half united with Brahman ;
but rather that senselessness belongs with one half to the
side of deep sleep, with the other half to the side of the
other state (i.e. death). In how far it is equal and not
equal to sleep has already been shown. It belongs to death
in so far as it is the door of death. If there remains (un¬
requited) work of the soul, speech and mind return (to the
senseless person); if no work remains, breath and warmth
depart from him. Therefore those who know Brahman
declare a swoon and the like to be a half-union.—The ob¬
jection that no fifth state is commonly acknowledged, is
without much weight; for as that state occurs occasionally
only it may not be generally known. All the same it is
known from ordinary experience as well as from the ayur-
veda (medicine). That it is not considered a separate fifth
state is due to its being avowedly compounded of other
states.
ii. Not on account of (difference of) place also
twofold characteristics can belong to the highest;
for everywhere (scripture teaches it to be without
any difference).
We now attempt to ascertain, on the ground of 5 ruti, the
nature of that Brahman with which the individual soul
becomes united in the state of deep sleep and so on, in
consequence of the cessation of the limiting adjuncts.—The
scriptural passages which refer to Brahman are of a double
character; some indicate that Brahman is affected by dif¬
ference, so, e.g. ‘ He to whom belong all works, all desires,
all sweet odours and tastes’ {Kh. Up. Ill, 14,2); others,
that it is without difference, so, e.g. 4 It is neither coarse nor
fine, neither short nor long,’ &c. (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8). Have
we, on the ground of these passages, to assume that Brah-
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12.
153
man has a double nature, or either nature, and, if either,
that it is affected with difference, or without difference?
This is the point to be discussed.
The purvapakshin maintains that, in conformity with the
scriptural passages which indicate a double nature, a double
nature is to be ascribed to Brahman.
To this we reply as follows.—At any rate the highest
Brahman cannot, by itself, possess double characteristics;
for on account of the contradiction implied therein, it is im¬
possible to admit that one and the same thing should by
itself possess certain qualities, such as colour, &c.,and should
not possess them.—Nor is it possible that Brahman should
possess double characteristics ‘on account of place,’ i.e. on
account of its conjunction with its limiting adjuncts, such as
earth, &cc. For the connexion with limiting adjuncts is
unavailing to impart to a thing of a certain nature an alto¬
gether different nature. The crystal, e.g. which is in itself
clear, does not become dim through its conjunction with a
limiting adjunct in the form of red colour; for that it is
pervaded by the quality of dimness is an altogether erro¬
neous notion. In the case of Brahman the limiting adjuncts
are, moreover, presented by Nescience merely 1 . Hence (as
the upadhis are the product of Nescience) if we embrace
either of the two alternatives, we must decide in favour of
that according to which Brahma is absolutely devoid of all
difference, not in favour of the opposite one. For all pas¬
sages whose aim it is to represent the nature of Brahman
(such as, ‘It is without sound, without touch, without form,
without decay,’ Ka. Up. I, 3, 15) teach that it is free from
all difference.
12. If it be objected that it is not so, on account of
the difference (taught by the Veda); we reply that it
is not so on account of the declaration of (Brahman)
1 The limiting adjunct of the crystal, i.e. the red colour of a thing,
e.g. a flower with which the crystal is in contact, is as real as the
crystal itself; only the effect is an illusion.—But the limiting
adjuncts of Brahman are in themselves illusion.
154
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
being not such, with reference to each (declaration of
difference).
Let this be, but nevertheless it cannot be maintained
that Brahman is devoid of difference and attributes, and
does not possess double attributes either in itself or on
account of difference of station.—Why not?—‘ On account
of difference.’ The various vidyas teach different forms of
Brahman ; it is said to have four feet ( Kh . Up. Ill, 18, i);
to consist of sixteen parts (Pr. Up. VI, 1); to be charac¬
terised by dwarfishness (Ka. Up. V, 3); to have the three
worlds for its body (B ri. Up. I, 3, 22); to be named Vai-
jvanara ( Kh . Up. V, 11, 2), &c. Hence we must admit
that Brahman is qualified by differences also.—But above
it has been shown that Brahman cannot possess twofold
characteristics!—That also does not contradict our doctrine;
for the difference of Brahman’s forms is due to its limiting
adjuncts. Otherwise all those scriptural passages which
refer to those differences would be objectless.
All this reasoning, we say, is without force ‘on account of
the declaration of its being not such, with reference to each/
i.e. because scripture declares, with reference to all the
differences produced by the limiting adjuncts, that there is
no difference in Brahman. Cp. such passages as the follow¬
ing: ‘This bright immortal person in this earth, and that
bright immortal person incorporated in the body; he indeed
is the same as that Self’ (B ri. Up. II, 5, 1). It, therefore,
cannot be maintained that the connexion of Brahman
with various forms is taught by the Veda.
13. Some also (teach) thus.
The members of one jakha also make a statement
about the cognition of non-difference which is preceded by
a censure of the perception of difference, ‘ By the mind
alone it is to be perceived, there is in it no diversity. He
who perceives therein any diversity goes from death to
death 3 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 19). Others also (‘By knowing the
enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the ruler, everything has been de¬
clared to be threefold, and this is Brahman/ 5 Vet. Up. I, 12)
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 4 .
155
record in their text that the entire world, characterised
by enjoyers, things to be enjoyed, and a ruler, has Brahman
for its true nature.—But as among the scriptural passages
referring to Brahman, there are some which represent it as
having a form, and others teaching that it is devoid of form,
how can it be asserted that Brahman is devoid of form, and not
also the contrary?—To this question the next Sutra replies.
14. For (Brahman) is merely devoid of form, on
account of this being the main purport of scripture.
Brahman, we must definitively assert, is devoid of all form,
colour, and so on, and does not in any way possess form,
and so on.—Why ?— 4 On account of this being the main
purport (of scripture)/— 4 It is neither coarse nor fine,
neither short nor long’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8); ‘That which is
without sound, without touch, without form, without decay 1
(Ka. Up. I, 3, 15); 4 He who is called ether is the revealer
of all forms and names. That within which forms and
names are, that is Brahman’ ( Kh . Up. VIII, 14, 1); ‘That
heavenly person is without body, he is both without and
within, not produced’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2) ; 4 That Brahman
is without cause and without effect, without anything inside
or outside, this Self is Brahman, omnipresent and om¬
niscient’ (B ri. Up. II, 5, 19). These and similar passages
have for their purport the true nature of Brahman as non-
connected with any world, and have not any other purport,
as we have proved under I, 1,4. On the ground of such
passages we therefore must definitively conclude that Brah¬
man is devoid of form. Those other passages, on the
other hand, which refer to a Brahman qualified by form
do not aim at setting forth the nature of Brahman, but
rather at enjoining the worship of Brahman. As long as
those latter texts do not contradict those of the former class,
they are to be accepted as they stand; where, however,
contradictions occur, the passages whose main subject is
Brahman must be viewed as having greater force than those
of the other kind.—This is the reason for our deciding that
although there are two different classes of scriptural texts,
Brahman must be held to be altogether without form, not
vedanta-s6tras.
156
at the same time of an opposite nature.—But what then is
the position of those passages which refer to Brahman as
possessing form ?—To this question the next Sutra replies.
15. And as light (assumes forms as it were by its
contact with things possessing form, so does Brah¬
man ;) since (the texts ascribing form to Brahman)
are not devoid of meaning.
Just as the light of the sun or the moon after having
passed through space enters into contact with a finger or
some other limiting adjunct, and, according as the latter is
straight or bent, itself becomes straight or bent as it were;
so Brahman also assumes, as it were, the form of the earth
and the other limiting adjuncts with which it enters into
connexion. Hence there is no reason why certain texts
should not teach, with a view to meditative worship, that
Brahman has that and that form. We thus escape the
conclusion that those Vedic passages which ascribe form to
Brahman are devoid of sense ; a conclusion altogether un¬
acceptable since all parts of the Veda are equally authori¬
tative, and hence must all be assumed to have a meaning.
— But does this not imply a contradiction of the tenet main¬
tained above, viz. that Brahman does not possess double
characteristics although it is connected with limiting ad¬
juncts?—By no means, we reply. What is merely due to a
limiting adjunct cannot constitute an attribute of a sub¬
stance, and the limiting adjuncts are, moreover, presented
by Nescience only. That the primeval natural Nescience
leaves room for all practical life and activity—whether or¬
dinary or based on the Veda—we have explained more
than once.
16. And (scripture) declares (Brahman) to consist
of that (i.e. intelligence).
And scripture declares that Brahman consists of intelli¬
gence, is devoid of any other characteristics, and is alto¬
gether without difference; ‘As a mass of salt has neither
inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus,
indeed, has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is alto-
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 8 .
157
gether a mass of knowledge 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 5, 13). That
means: That Self has neither inside nor outside any cha¬
racteristic form but intelligence; simple non-differentiated
intelligence constitutes its nature ; just as a lump of salt
has inside as well as outside one and the same saltish taste,
not any other taste.
17. (This scripture) also shows, and it is likewise
stated in Smrzti.
That Brahman is without any difference is proved by
those scriptural passages also which expressly deny that it
possesses any other characteristics; so, e.g. ‘Next follows
the teaching by No, no’ (B ri. Up. II, 3, 6); ‘ It is different
from the known, it is also above the unknown 5 (Ke. Up. I,
4); ‘From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away
unable to reach it 9 (Taitt. Up. II, 9). Of a similar purport
is that scriptural passage which relates how Bahva, being
questioned about Brahman by Vashkalin, explained it to
him by silence, ‘He said to him, “ Learn Brahman, O friend;”
and became silent. Then, on a second and third question,
he replied, “ I am teaching you indeed, but you do not
understand. Silent is that Self.”’ The same teaching
is conveyed by those Smrzti-texts which deny of Brah¬
man all other characteristics; so, e.g. ‘I will proclaim
that which is the object of knowledge, knowing which
one reaches immortality ; the highest Brahman without
either beginning or end, which cannot be said either to
be or not to be’ (Bha. Gita XIII, 12). Of a similar pur¬
port is another Smrzti-passage, according to which the
omniform Narayazza instructed Narada, 6 The cause, O Na-
rada, of your seeing me endowed with the qualities of all
beings is the Maya emitted by me ; do not cognize me as
being such (in reality).’
18. For this very reason (there are applied to
Brahman) comparisons such as that of the images of
the sun and the like.
Because that Self is of the nature of intelligence, devoid
of all difference, transcending speech and mind, to be
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
158
described only by denying of it all other characteristics,
therefore the Moksha 5 &stras compare it to the images
of the sun reflected in the water and the like, meaning
thereby that all difference in Brahman is unreal, only due
to its limiting conditions. Compare, e.g. out of many, the
two following passages: ‘ As the one luminous sun when
entering into relation to many different waters is himself
rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts; so also the
one divine unborn Self; ’ and ‘ The one Self of all beings
separately abides in all the individual beings ; hence it
appears one and many at the same time, just as the one
moon is multiplied by its reflections in the water/
The next Sutra raises an objection.
19. But there is no parallelism (of the two things
compared), since (in the case of Brahman) there is
not apprehended (any separate substance) compar¬
able to the water.
Since no substance comparable to the water is appre¬
hended in the case of Brahman, a parallelism between Brah¬
man and the reflected images of the sun cannot be
established. In the case of the sun and other material
luminous bodies, there exists a separate material substance
occupying a different place, viz. water; hence the light of
the sun, &c., may be reflected. The Self, on the other
hand, is not a material thing, and, as it is present everywhere
and all is identical with it, there are no limiting adjuncts
different from it and occupying a different place.—There¬
fore the instances are not parallel.
The next Sfttra disposes of this objection.
20. Since (the highest Brahman) is inside (of the
limiting adjuncts), it participates in their increase
and decrease ; owing to the appropriateness (thus
resulting) of the two (things compared) it is thus
(i.e. the comparison holds good).
The parallel instance (of the sun’s reflection in the water)
is unobjectionable, since a common feature—with reference
to which alone the comparison is instituted—does exist.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21.
159
Whenever two things are compared, they are so only with
reference to some particular point they have in common.
Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated ;
indeed if it could be demonstrated there would be an end
of that particular relation which gives rise to the comparison.
Nor does the sutrakara institute the comparison objected
to on his own account; he merely sets forth the purport of
a comparison actually met with in scripture.—Now, the
special feature on which the comparison rests is ‘the par¬
ticipation in increase and decrease.’ The reflected image
of the sun dilates when the surface of the water expands ;
it contracts when the water shrinks; it trembles when the
water is agitated; it divides itself when the water is divided.
It thus participates in all the attributes and conditions of
the water; while the real sun remains all the time the same.
—Similarly Brahman, although in reality uniform and never
changing, participates as it were in the attributes and states
of the body and the other limiting adjuncts within which it
abides; it grows with them as it were, decreases with them
as it were, and so on. As thus the two things compared
possess certain common features no objection can be made
to the comparison.
21. And on account of the declaration (of
scripture).
Scripture moreover declares that the highest Brahman
enters into the body and the other limiting adjuncts, ‘He
made bodies with two feet, he made bodies with four feet.
Having first become a bird he entered the bodies as
purusha’ (B ri. Up. II, 5, 18); and ‘Having entered into
them with this living (individual) Self’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 3, 2).
—For all these reasons the comparison set forth in Sutra
18 is unobjectionable.
Some teachers assume that the preceding discussion
(beginning from Sutra 11) comprises two adhikara^as, of
which the former discusses the question whether Brahman is
an absolutely uniform being in which all the plurality of the
apparent world vanishes, or a being multiform as the
apparent world is; while the latter tries to determine
i6o
vedanta-sOtras.
whether Brahman—whose absolute uniformity was es¬
tablished in the former adhikara;za—is to be defined as
that which is (sat), or as thought (intelligence ; bodha), or as
both.—Against this we remark that in no case there is a
valid reason for beginning a second adhikara^a. For what
should be the subject of a special second adhikara^a? Sutra
15 and foil, cannot be meant to disprove that Brahman
possesses a plurality of characteristics; for that hypothesis
is already sufficiently disposed of in Sutras 11-14. Nor can
they be meant to show that Brahman is to be defined only
as ‘ that which is,’ not also as c thought; ’ for that would
imply that the scriptural passage, ‘consisting of nothing
but knowledge’ (B ri. Up. II, 4, 12), is devoid of meaning.
How moreover could Brahman, if devoid of intelligence, be
said to be the Self of the intelligent individual soul ?
Nor again can the hypothetical second adhikarawa be
assumed to prove that Brahman must be defined as
‘thought’ only, not at the same time as ‘that which is;’
for if it were so, certain scriptural passages—as e.g. Ka.
Up. II, 6, 13, ‘ He is to be conceived by the words, He is ’—
would lose their meaning. And how, moreover, could we
admit thought apart from existence?—Nor can it be said
that Brahman has both those characteristics, since that
would contradict something already admitted. For he who
would maintain that Brahman is characterised by thought
different from existence, and at the same time by existence
different from thought, would virtually maintain that there
is a plurality in Brahman, and that view has already been
disproved in the preceding adhikara^a.—But as scripture
teaches both (viz. that Brahman is one only and that it
possesses more than one characteristic) there can be no
objection to such a doctrine !—There is, we reply, for one
being cannot possibly possess more than one nature.—And
if it finally should be said that existence is thought and
thought existence and that the two do not exclude each
other; we remark that in that case there is no reason for
the doubt 1 whether Brahman is that which is, or intelligence,
] And hence no reason for a separate adhikara^a.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. l 6 l
or both.—On the other hand we have shown that the Sfttras
can be explained as constituting one adhikarazza only. More¬
over, as the scriptural texts concerning Brahman disagree in
so far as representing Brahman as qualified by form and
again as devoid of form we, when embracing the alternative
of a Brahman devoid of form, must necessarily explain the
position of the other texts, and if taken in that sense the
Sutras (15-21) acquire a more appropriate meaning. And
if it is maintained that those scriptural passages also which
speak of Brahman as qualified by form have no separate
meaning of their own, but likewise teach that Brahman is
devoid of all form, viz. by intimating that the plurality
referred to has to be annihilated; we reply that this
opinion also appears objectionable. In those cases, indeed,
where elements of plurality are referred to in chapters
treating of the highest knowledge, we may assume them
to be mentioned merely to be abstracted from; so e.g. in
the passage, B ri. Up. II, 5, 19, ‘His horses are yoked
hundreds and ten. This is the horses, this is the ten and
the thousands, many and endless/ which passage is
immediately followed by the words, * This is the Brahman
without cause and without effect, without anything inside
or outside.’ But where elements of plurality are referred
to in chapters treating of devout meditation, we have no
right to assume that they are mentioned only to be set
aside. This is the case e.g. in the passage, ‘He who con¬
sists of mind, whose body is prazza, whose form is light ’
( Kh . Up. Ill, 14, 2), which is connected with an injunction
of devout meditation contained in the preceding passage,
c Let him have this will and belief.’ In passages of the
latter kind, where the determinations attributed to Brahman
may be taken as they stand and viewed as subserving the
purposes of devout meditation, we have no right to assume
that they are mentioned with the indirect purpose of being
discarded. Moreover, if all texts concerning Brahman
equally aimed at discarding all thought of plurality, there
would be no opportunity for stating the determinative
reason (why Brahman is to be viewed as devoid of all
form) as was done in Sutra 14. And further scripture
[ 38 ] M
i62
vedAnta-s^tras.
informs us that devout meditations on Brahman as charac¬
terised by form have results of their own, viz. either the
warding off of calamities, or the gaining of power, or else
release by successive steps. All these reasons determine
us to view the passages concerning devout meditation on
the one hand and the passages concerning Brahman on the
other hand as constituting separate classes, not as forming
one whole. In what way moreover, we ask, could the two
classes of texts be looked upon as constituting one whole ?
—Our opponent will perhaps reply, ‘Because we apprehend
them to form parts of one injunction, just as we do in the
case of the dari-apur^amasa-sacrifice and the oblations
called pray&^as.’—But this reply we are unable to admit,
since the texts about Brahman, as shown at length under
I, i, 4, merely determine an existing substance (viz.
Brahman), and do not enjoin any performances. What
kind of activity, we moreover ask, are those texts, accord¬
ing to our opponent’s view, meant to enjoin ? For whenever
an injunction is laid upon a person, it has reference to
some kind of work to be undertaken by him.—Our oppo¬
nent will perhaps make the following reply. The object
of the injunction is, in the present case, the annihilation of
the appearance of duality. As long as the latter is not
destroyed, the true nature of Brahman is not known ; hence
the appearance of duality which stands in the way of true
knowledge must be dissolved. Just as the Veda prescribes
the performance of certain sacrifices to him who is desirous
of the heavenly world, so it prescribes the dissolution of
the apparent world to him who is desirous of final release.
Whoever wants to know the true nature of Brahman must
first annihilate the appearance of plurality that obstructs
true knowledge, just as a man wishing to ascertain the
true nature of some jar or similar object placed in a dark
room must at first remove the darkness. For the apparent
world has Brahman for its true nature, not vice versa ;
therefore the cognition of Brahman is effected through the
previous annihilation of the apparent world of names and
forms.
This argumentation we meet by asking our opponent
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21 .
163
of what nature that so-called annihilation of the ap¬
parent world is. Is it analogous to the annihilation of
hardness in butter which is effected by bringing it into
contact with fire ? or is the apparent world of names and
forms which is superimposed upon Brahman by Nescience
to be dissolved by knowledge, just as the phenomenon of a
double moon which is due to a disease of the eyes is
removed by the application of medicine 1 ? If the former,
the Vedic injunctions bid us to do something impossible ;
for no man can actually annihilate this whole existing
world with all its animated bodies and all its elementary
substances such as earth and so on. And if it actually
could be done, the first released person would have done it
once for all, so that at present the whole world would be
empty, earth and all other substances having been finally
annihilated.—If the latter, i.e. if our opponent maintains
that the phenomenal world is superimposed upon Brahman
by Nescience and annihilated by knowledge, we point out
that the only thing needed is that the knowledge of
Brahman should be conveyed by Vedic passages sublating
the apparent plurality superimposed upon Brahman by
Nescience, such as ‘Brahman is one, without a second; 1
‘ That is the true, it is the Self and thou art it. 5 ( Kh . Up.
VI, 2, 1; 8, 7.) As soon as Brahman is indicated in this
way, knowledge arising of itself discards Nescience, and
this whole world of names and forms, which had been
hiding Brahman from us, melts away like the imagery of a
dream. As long, on the other hand, as Brahman is not
so indicated, you may say a hundred times, ‘Cognize
Brahman 1 Dissolve this world! ’ and yet we shall be
unable to do either the one or the other.
But, our opponent may object, even after Brahman has
been indicated by means of the passages quoted, there is room
for injunctions bidding us either to cognize Brahman or to
dissolve the world.—Not so, we reply; for both these
1 1. e. does the injunction bidding us to annihilate the phenomenal
world look on it as real or as fictitious, due to Nescience only?
M 2
164
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
things are already effected by the indication of the true
nature of Brahman as devoid of all plurality; just as the
pointing out of the true nature of the rope has for its
immediate result the cognition of the true nature of the
rope, and the dissolution of the appearance of a snake or
the like. And what is done once need not be done again \
—We moreover ask the following question: Does the
individual soul on which the injunction is laid belong to
the unreal element of the phenomenal world or to the real
element, i.e. Brahman, which underlies the phenomenal
world? If the former, the soul itself is dissolved just as
earth and the other elements are, as soon as the knowledge
of Brahman’s true nature has arisen, and on whom then
should the dissolution of the world be enjoined, or who
should, by acting on that injunction, obtain release?—If
the latter, we are led to the same result. For as soon as
there arises the knowledge that Brahman, which never can
become the subject of an injunction, is the true being of the
soul while the soul as such is due to Nescience, there
remains no being on which injunctions could be laid, and
hence there is no room for injunctions at all.
What then, it may be asked, is the meaning of those
Vedic passages which speak of the highest Brahman as
something to be seen, to be heard, and so on ?—They aim,
we reply, not at enjoining the knowledge of truth, but
merely at directing our attention to it. Similarly in
ordinary life imperative phrases such as 4 Listen to this! ’
c Look at this ! ’ are frequently meant to express not that we
are immediately to cognize this or that, but only that we
are to direct our attention to it. Even when a person is
face to face with some object of knowledge, knowledge
may either arise or not; all that another person wishing
to inform him about the object can do is to point it out to
him ; knowledge will thereupon spring up in his mind of
itself, according to the object of knowledge and according
1 I. e. after the true nature of Brahman has been once known,
there is no longer room for a special injunction to annihilate this
apparent world.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21 . 1 65
to the means of knowledge employed.—Nor must it be
said that an injunction may have the purpose of modifying
the knowledge of a thing which was originally obtained by
some other means of knowledge h For the modified
knowledge due to such injunctions is not knowledge in the
true sense of the word, but merely a mental energy (i.e. the
product, not of an object of knowledge presented to us
through one of the means of true knowledge, but of an
arbitrary mental activity), and if such modification of
knowledge springs up in the mind of itself (i.e. without a
deliberate mental act) it is mere error. True knowledge
on the other hand, which is produced by the means of true
knowledge and is conformable to its object, can neither be
brought about by hundreds of injunctions nor be checked
by hundreds of prohibitions. For it does not depend on
the will of man, but merely on what really and unalterably
exists.—For this reason also injunctions of the knowledge
of Brahman cannot be admitted.
A further point has to be considered here. If we
admitted that injunctions constitute the sole end and aim
of the entire Veda, there would remain no authority for the,
after all, generally acknowledged truth that Brahman—
which is not subject to any injunction—is the Self of all.
—Nor would it be of avail to maintain that the Veda may
both proclaim the truth stated just now and enjoin on man
the cognition of that truth; for that would involve the
conclusion that the one Brahma-^astra has two—and more¬
over conflicting—meanings.—The theory combated by us
gives moreover rise to a number of other objections which
nobody can refute ; it compels us to set aside the text as it
stands and to make assumptions not guaranteed by the
text; it implies the doctrine that final release is, like the
results of sacrificial works, (not the direct result of true
knowledge but) the mediate result of the so-called unseen
1 The purvapakshin might refer e.g. to the Vedic injunction , 1 he
is to meditate upon woman as fire/ and maintain that the object of
this injunction is to modify our knowledge of woman derived from
perception &c., according to which a woman is not fire.
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
166
principle (adr/sh/a), and non-permanent &c. &c. — We
therefore again assert that the texts concerning Brahman
aim at cognition, not at injunction, and that hence the
pretended reason of ‘their being apprehended as parts of
one injunction 5 cannot induce us to look upon the entire
Veda as one whole.
And finally, even if we admitted that the texts concern¬
ing Brahman are of an injunctive character, we should be
unable to prove that the texts denying plurality, and the
texts setting forth plurality enjoin one and the same thing;
for this latter conclusion cannot be accepted in the face of
the several means of proof such as difference of terms 1 , and
so on, which intimate that there is a plurality of injunctions.
The passages respectively enjoining the danyapur;zamasa-
sacrifice and the offerings termed praya^*as may indeed be
considered to form one whole, as the qualification on the
part of the sacrificer furnishes an element common to the
two 2 . But the statements about the Brahman devoid of
qualities and those about the qualified Brahman have not
any element in common ; for qualities such as ‘having light
for one’s body’ contribute in no way towards the dissolution
of the world, nor again does the latter help in any way the
former. For the dissolution of the entire phenomenal world
on the one hand, and regard for a part of that world on
the other hand do not allow themselves to be combined
in one and the same subject.—The preferable theory, there¬
fore, is to distinguish with us two classes of texts, accord¬
ing as Brahman is represented as possessing form or as
devoid of it.
22. For (the clause ‘Not so, not so’) denies (of
Brahman) the suchness which forms the topic of
1 ‘Difference of terms’ (.rabdantaram) is according to the Purva
Mimatfzsa the first of the six means of proof showing karmabheda
or niyogabheda. Cp. £abara bhashya on II, i, i.
2 For the sacrifice as well as its subordinate part—the offering of
the praya^-as—has to be performed by a sacrificer acting for one
end, viz. the obtainment of the heavenly world.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 2 .
167
discussion; and (the text) enounces something more
than that.
We read, Bri. Up. II, 3, 4 Two forms of Brahman there
are indeed, the material and the immaterial, the mortal and
the immortal, the solid and the fluid, sat and tya/ The
text thereupon divides the five elements into two classes,
predicates of the essence of that which is immaterial—which
it calls purusha—saffron-colour, and so on, and then goes on
to say, ‘ Now then the teaching by Not so, not so! For
there is nothing else higher than this (if one says): It is
not so/ Here we have to enquire what the object of the
negative statement is. We do not observe any definite
thing indicated by words such as 4 this ’ or 4 that; ’ we
merely have the word f so ’ in 4 Not so, not so ! ’ to which
the word ‘ not * refers, and which on that account indicates
something meant to be denied. Now we know that the
word 4 so’ (iti) is used with reference to approximate things,
in the same way as the particle 4 evam ’ is used ; compare,
e.g. the sentence 4 so (iti) indeed the teacher said ’ (where the
{ so ’ refers to his immediately preceding speech). And, in
our passage, the context points out what has to be con¬
sidered as proximate, viz. the two cosmic forms of Brah¬
man, and that Brahman itself to which the two forms
belong. Hence there arises a doubt whether the phrase,
4 Not so, not so! 5 negatives both Brahman and its two
forms, or only either; and if the latter, whether it negatives
Brahman and leaves its two forms, or if it negatives the two
forms and leaves Brahman.—We suppose, the pfirvapakshin
says, that the negative statement negatives Brahman as well
as its two forms; both being suggested by the context. As
the word 4 not ’ is repeated twice, there are really two nega¬
tive statements, of which the one negatives the cosmic form
of Brahman, the other that which has form, i.e. Brahman
itself. Or else we may suppose that Brahman alone is
negatived. For as Brahman transcends all speech and
thought, its existence is doubtful, and admits of being nega¬
tived ; the plurality of cosmic forms on the other hand falls
within the sphere of perception and the other means of right
j68
vedanta-sCtras.
knowledge, and can, therefore, not be negatived.—On this
latter interpretation the repetition of ‘ not ’ must be con¬
sidered as due to emphasis only.
To this we make the following reply. It is impossible that
the phrase, ‘Not so, not so!’ should negative both, since
that would imply the doctrine of a general Void. When¬
ever we deny something unreal, we do so with reference to
something real; the unreal snake, e.g. is negatived with
reference to the real rope. But this (denial of something
unreal with reference to something real) is possible only if
some entity is left. If everything is denied, no entity is left,
and if no entity is left, the denial of some other entity which
we may wish to undertake, becomes impossible, i.e. that
latter entity becomes real and as such cannot be negatived.
—Nor, in the second place, can Brahman be denied ; for
that would contradict the introductory phrase of the chapter,
‘ Shall I tell you Brahman ? ? (B ri. Up. II, i, i); would show
disregard of the threat conveyed in Taitt. Up. II, 6, ‘He who
knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non¬
existing ; ’ would be opposed to definitive assertions such
as ‘ By the words “ He is ” is he to be apprehended ’ (Ka.
Up. II, 6, 13); and would involve a stultification of the
entire Vedanta.—The phrase that Brahman transcends all
speech and thought does certainly not mean to say that
Brahman does not exist; for after the Vedanta-part of
scripture has established at length the existence of Brahman
—in such passages as ‘ He who knows Brahman obtains the
highest‘Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman 5 —it cannot
be supposed all at once to teach its non-existence. For, as
the common saying is, ‘ Better than bathing it is not to touch
dirt at all/ The passage, ‘ from whence all speech with the
mind turns away unable to reach it ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 4), must,
therefore, rather be viewed as intimating Brahman.
The passage of the B ri. Up. under discussion has, there¬
fore, to be understood as follows. Brahman is that whose
nature is permanent purity, intelligence, and freedom ; it
transcends speech and mind, does not fall within the cate¬
gory of ‘object,’ and constitutes the inward Self of all. Of
this Brahman our text denies all plurality of forms ; but
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 2 .
169
Brahman itself it leaves untouched. This the Sutra expresses
in the words, 4 for it denies the suchness which forms the
topic of discussion/ That means : The passage ‘ Not so,’
&c., denies of Brahman the limited form, material as well
as immaterial, which in the preceding part of the chapter is
described at length with reference to the gods as well as the
body, and also the second form which is produced by the
first, is characterised by mental impressions, forms the
essence of that which is immaterial, is denoted by the term
purusha, rests on the subtle Self (lingatman) and is described
by means of comparisons with saffron-colour, &c., since the
purusha, which is the essence of what is immaterial, does
not itself possess colour perceivable by the eye. Now these
forms of Brahman are by means of the word 4 so ’ (iti), which
always refers to something approximate brought into con¬
nexion with the negative particle ‘not.’ Brahman itself, on
the other hand (apart from its forms), is, in the previous
part of the chapter, mentioned not as in itself constituting
the chief topic, but only in so far as it is qualified by its
forms ; this appears from the circumstance of Brahman
being exhibited in the genitive case only ('These are two
forms of Brahman ’). Now, after the two forms have been
set forth, there arises the desire of knowing that to which
the two forms belong, and hence the text continues, 4 Now
then the teaching by means of “Not so, not so.’” This pas¬
sage, we conclude, conveys information regarding the nature
of Brahman by denying the reality of the forms fictitiously
attributed to it; for the phrase, 4 Not so, not so 1 ’ negatives
the whole aggregate of effects superimposed on Brahman.
Effects we know to have no real existence, and they can
therefore be negatived ; not so, however, Brahman, which
constitutes the necessary basis for all fictitious superimpo¬
sition.—Nor must the question be asked here, how the
sacred text, after having itself set forth the two forms of
Brahman, can negative them in the end, contrary to the
principle that not to touch dirt is better than bathing after
having done so. For the text does not set forth the two
forms of Brahman as something the truth of which is to be
established, but merely mentions those two forms, which in
170
vedanta-s6tras.
the sphere of ordinary thought are fictitiously attributed to
Brahman, in order finally to negative them and establish
thereby the true nature of the formless Brahman.
The double repetition of the negation may either serve
the purpose of furnishing a special denial of the material as
well as the immaterial form of Brahman ; or the first 4 Not
so ’ may negative the aggregate of material elements, while
the second denies the aggregate of mental impressions. Or
else the repetition may be an emphatic one, intimating that
whatever can be thought is not Brahman. This is, perhaps,
the better explanation. For if a limited number of things
are denied each individually, there still remains the desire
to know whether something else may not be Brahman ; an
emphatic repetition of the denial on the other hand shows
that the entire aggregate of objects is denied and that
Brahman is the inward Self; whereby all further enquiry
is checked.—The final conclusion, therefore, is, that the text
negatives only the cosmic plurality fictitiously superimposed
on Brahman, but leaves Brahman itself untouched.
The Sutra gives another argument establishing the same
conclusion, ‘and the text enounces something more than
that, 5 i.e. more than the preceding negation. The words
of the text meant are 4 (not) is there anything beyond.’—
If the negation, 4 Not so, not so! ’ were meant to negative
all things whatever, and this terminated in absolute non¬
existence, the text could not even allude to ‘anything
beyond.’—The words of the text are to be connected as
follows. After the clause, 4 Not so, not so ! ’ has given infor¬
mation about Brahman, the clause next following illustrates
this teaching by saying : There is nothing beyond or sepa¬
rate from this Brahman; therefore Brahman is expressed
by 4 Not so, not so ! 5 which latter words do not mean that
Brahman itself does not exist. The implied meaning rather
is that different from everything else there exists the 4 non-
negatived 5 Brahman.—The words of the text admit, how¬
ever, of another interpretation also; for they may mean
that there is no teaching of Brahman higher than that
teaching which is implied in the negation of plurality ex¬
pressed by ‘ Not so, not so ! ’ On this latter interpretation
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 24 . I 7 1
the words of the Sutra, ‘ and the text enounces something
more than that/ must be taken to refer to the name men¬
tioned in the text, ‘ Then comes the name, the True of the
True ; the senses being the True and he the True of them/
—This again has a sense only if the previous negative
clause denies everything but Brahman, not everything but
absolute non-existence. For, if the latter were the case,
what then could be called the True of the True ?—We there¬
fore decide that the clause, £ Not so, not so ! ’ negatives not
absolutely everything, but only everything but Brahman.
23. That (Brahman) is unevolved; for (thus
scripture) says.
If that highest Brahman which is different from the world
that is negatived in the passage discussed above really
exists, why then is it not apprehended?—Because, the
Sutrakara replies, it is unevolved, not to be apprehended by
the senses ; for it is the witness of whatever is apprehended
(i.e. the subject in all apprehension). Thus vSruti says,
‘ He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by speech, nor by
the other senses, not by penance or good works’ (Mu. Up.
Ill, 1, 8); ‘That Self is to be described by No, no! He is
incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended ’ (B ri.
Up. Ill, 9, 26); ‘That which cannot be seen nor appre¬
hended’ (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6); ‘When in that which is invis¬
ible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported 5 &c. (Taitt. Up.
II, 7). Similar statements are made in Smrzti-passages;
so e. g. ‘ He is called unevolved, not to be fathomed by
thought, unchangeable.’
24. And in the state of perfect conciliation also
(the Yogins apprehend the highest Brahman),
according to Yruti and Smnti.
At the time of perfect conciliation the Yogins see the
unevolved Self free from all plurality. By ‘perfect con¬
ciliation ’ we understand the presentation before the mind
(of the highest Self), which is effected through meditation
and devotion.—This is vouched for by Sruti as well as
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
I 72
Smrzti. So, e.g. Ka. Up. IV, 1, ‘The Self-existent pierced the
openings of the senses so that they turn outward; there¬
fore man looks without, not within himself. Some wise
man, however, with his eyes closed and wishing for
immortality, saw the Self within.’ And Mu. Up. Ill, J, 8,
‘ When a man’s mind has become purified by the serene
light of knowledge then he sees him, meditating on him
as without parts.’ Smrzti-passages of the same tendency
are the following ones, ‘ He who is seen as light by the
Yogins meditating on him sleepless, with suspended breath,
with contented minds, with subdued senses; reverence be
to him 1 !’ and ‘The Yogins see him, the august, eternal one.’
But if in the state of perfect conciliation there is a being
to be conciliated and a being conciliating, does not this
involve the distinction of a higher and a lower Self?—No,
the next Sutra replies.
25. And as in the case of (physical) light and the
like, there is non-distinction (of the two Selfs), the
light (i.e. the intelligent Self) (being divided) by
its activity ; according to the repeated declarations
of scripture.
As light, ether, the sun and so on appear differentiated
as it were through their objects such as fingers, vessels,
water and so on which constitute limiting adjuncts 2 , while
in reality they preserve their essential non-differentiated-
ness; so the distinction of different Selfs is due to limiting
adjuncts only, while the unity of all Selfs is natural and
original. For on the doctrine of the non-difference of the
individual soul and the highest Self the Ved&nta-texts
insist again and again 3 .
1 Whose Self is Yoga.
2 Light is differentiated as it were by the various objects on
which it shines; the all-pervading ether is divided into parts as it
were by hollow bodies ; the sun is multiplied as it were by its
reflections in the water.
3 It certainly looks here as if the Bhashyakara did not know
what to do with the words of the Sutra. The ‘ karmarn/ which is
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA,
173
26. Hence (the soul enters into unity) with the
infinite (i.e. the highest Self); for this scripture
indicates.
Hence i. e. because the non-difference of all Selfs is
essential and their difference due to Nescience only, the
individual soul after having dispelled Nescience by true
knowledge passes over into unity with the highest Self. For
this is indicated by scripture, cp. e.g. Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9,
4 He who knows that highest Brahman becomes even
Brahman;’ B ri. Up. IV, 4, 6, ‘Being Brahman he goes to
Brahman.’
27. But on account of twofold designation, (the
relation of the highest Self to the individual soul
has to be viewed) like that of the snake to its coils.
In order to justify his own view as to the relation of the
conciliating individual soul and the conciliated highest Self,
the Sutrakara mentions a different view of the same matter.
—Some scriptural passages refer to the highest Self and
the individual soul as distinct entities, cp. e.g. Mu. Up. Ill,
1, 8, ‘ Then he sees him meditating on him as without parts,’
where the highest Self appears as the object of the soul’s
vision and meditation; Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 8, ‘ He goes to the
divine Person who is greater than the great; ’ and B ri. Up.
Ill, 7, 15, ‘ Who rules all beings within ;’ in which passages
the highest Self is represented as the object of approach
and as the ruler of the individual soul. In other places
again the two are spoken of as non-different, so e.g. Kh .
Up. VI, 8, 7, ‘Thou art that;’ B ri. Up. I, 4, 10, ‘ I am
Brahman;' B ri. Up. Ill, 4, 1, ‘This is thy Self who is
within all;’ B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 15, ‘He is thy Self, the ruler
within, the immortal.’—As thus difference and non-differ¬
ence are equally vouched for by scripture, the acceptation
of absolute non-difference would render futile all those
as good as passed over by him, is explained by Go. An. as
‘ dhyanadikarmawy upadhau.' An. Gi. says, ‘ atmaprakaja^abdi-
to^wanatatkarye karma/zy upadhau savueshas' &c.
174
VEDANTA-SflTRAS.
texts which speak of difference. We therefore look on the
relation of the highest Self and the soul as analogous to
that of the snake and its coils. Viewed as a whole the
snake is one, non-different, while an element of difference
appears if we view it with regard to its coils, hood, erect
posture and so on.
28. Or else like that of light to its substratum,
both being fire.
Or else the relation of the two may be viewed as follows.
Just as the light of the sun and its substratum, i.e. the sun
himself, are not absolutely different—for they both consist
of fire—and yet are spoken of as different, so also the soul
and the highest Self.
29. Or else (the relation of the two is to be
conceived) in the manner stated above.
Or else the relation of the two has to be conceived in
the manner suggested by Sutra 25. For if the bondage of
the soul is due to Nescience only, final release is possible.
But if the soul is really and truly bound—whether the soul
be considered as a certain condition or state of the highest
Self as suggested in Sutra 27, or as a part of the highest
Self as suggested in Sutra 28—its real bondage cannot be
done away with, and thus the scriptural doctrine of final
release becomes absurd.—Nor, finally, can it be said that
6 ruti equally teaches difference and non-difference. For
non-difference only is what it aims at establishing; while,
when engaged in setting forth something else, it merely
refers to difference as something known from other sources
of knowledge (viz. perception, &c.).—Hence the conclusion
stands that the soul is not different from the highest Self,
as explained in Sutra 25.
30. And on account of the denial.
The conclusion arrived at above is confirmed by the fact
of scripture expressly denying that there exists any intel¬
ligent being apart from the highest Self. Cp. ‘ There is no
other seer but he’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 7, 23). And the same
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3 1 . 175
conclusion follows from those passages which deny the
existence of a world apart from Brahman and thus leave
Brahman alone remaining, viz. ‘ Now then the teaching,
Not so, not so!’ (B ru Up. II, 3, 6); ‘That Brahman is
without cause and without effect, without anything inside
or outside'’ (B ri. Up. II, 5, 19).
31. Beyond (Brahman, there is something) further,
on account of the designations of bank, measure,
connexion, separation.
With reference to this Brahman which we have ascer¬
tained to be free from all plurality there now arises the
doubt—due to the conflicting nature of various scriptural
statements—whether something exists beyond it or not.
We therefore enter on the task of explaining the true
meaning of those scriptural passages which seem to indicate
that there is some entity beyond, i.e. apart from Brahman.
The purvapakshin maintains that some entity must be
admitted apart from Brahman, because Brahman is spoken
of as being a bank; as having size ; as being connected ;
as being separated.—As a bank it is spoken of in the
passage, Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 1, ‘That Self is a bank, a
boundary.’ The word ‘bank’ (setu) ordinarily denotes
a structure of earth, wood and the like, serving the purpose
of checking the flow of water. Here, being applied to the
Self, it intimates that there exists something apart from
the Self, just as there exists something different from an
ordinary bank. The same conclusion is confirmed by the
words, ‘Having passed the bank’ (VIII, 4, 2). For as in
ordinary life a man after having crossed a bank reaches
some place which is not a bank, let us say a forest; so,
we must understand, a man after having crossed, i.e. passed
beyond the Self reaches something which is not the Self.—
As having size Brahman is spoken of in the following
passages, ‘This Brahman has four feet (quarters), eight
hoofs, sixteen parts.’ Now it is well known from ordinary
experience that wherever an object, a coin, e.g. has a
definite limited size, there exists something different from
that object; we therefore must assume that there also
176
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
exists something different from Brahman.—Brahman is
declared to be connected in the following passages, ‘ Then
he is united with the True' ( Kh . Up. VI, 8 , 1), and ‘The
embodied Self is embraced by the highest Self 1 (Brz.
Up. IV, 3, 31). Now we observe that non-measured
things are connected with things measured, men, e.g.
with a town. And scripture declares that the individual
souls are, in the state of deep sleep, connected with
Brahman. Hence we conclude that beyond Brahman
there is something unmeasured.—The same conclusion
is finally confirmed by those texts which proclaim
difference, so e.g. the passage, I, 6, 6 ff. (‘Now that
golden person who is seen within the sun' &c.), which at
first refers to a Lord residing in the sun and then mentions
a Lord residing in the eye, distinct from the former (‘Now
the person who is seen within the eye ’). The text dis¬
tinctly transfers to the latter the form &c. of the former 1
(‘The form of that person is the same as the form of the
other ’ &c.), and moreover declares that the lordly power of
both is limited, ‘ He obtains through the one the worlds
beyond that and the wishes of the devas ’ &c.; which is
very much as if one should say, ‘ This is the reign of the
king of Magadha and that the reign of the king of Videha.’
From all this it follows that there exists something
different from Brahman.
32. But (Brahman is called a bank &c.) on account
of (a certain) equality.
The word ‘ but ’ is meant to set aside the previously
established conclusion.—There can exist nothing different
from Brahman, since we are unable to observe a proof for
such existence. That all existences which have a beginning
spring from, subsist through, and return into Brahman
we have already ascertained, and have shown that the
effect is non-different from the cause.—Nor can there
exist, apart from Brahman, something which has no
beginning, since scripture affirms that ‘ Being only this was
1 Which would be unnecessary if the two were not distinct.
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 33 . 177
in the beginning, one, without a second/ The promise
moreover that through the cognition of one thing every¬
thing will be known, renders it impossible that there
should exist anything different from Brahman.—But does
not the fact that the Self is called a bank, &c. indicate
that there exists something beyond the Self?—No, we
reply; the passages quoted by the pfirvapakshin have no
power to prove his conclusion. For the text only says
that the Self is a bank, not that there is something beyond
it. Nor are we entitled to assume the existence of some
such thing, merely to the end of accounting for the Self
being called a bank; for the simple assumption of some¬
thing unknown is a mere piece of arbitrariness. If, more¬
over, the mere fact of the Self being called a bank implied
the existence of something beyond it, as in the case of an
ordinary bank, we should also be compelled to conclude
that the Self is made of earth and stones; which would
run counter to the scriptural doctrine that the Self is not
something produced.—The proper explanation is that the
Self is called a bank because it resembles a bank in a
certain respect; as a bank dams back the water and
marks the boundary of contiguous fields, so the Self
supports the world and its boundaries. The Self is thus
glorified by the name of bank because it resembles one.—
In the clause quoted above, ‘having passed that bank,’
the verb ‘ to pass ’ cannot be taken in the sense of ‘ going
beyond/ but must rather mean 4 to reach fully/ In the
same way we say of a student, c he has passed the
science of grammar/ meaning thereby that he has fully
mastered it.
33. (The statement as to Brahman having size)
subserves the purpose of the mind; in the manner
of the four feet (quarters).
In reply to the purvapakshin’s contention that the state¬
ments as to Brahman’s size, prove that there exists some¬
thing different from Brahman, we remark that those state¬
ments merely serve the purposes of the mind, i.e. of devout
meditation.—But how can the cognition of something con-
[38] N
i ;8
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
sisting of four, or eight, or sixteen parts be referred to
Brahman?—Through its modifications (effects), we reply,
Brahman is assumed to be subject to measure. For as some
men are of inferior, others of middling, others again of
superior intelligence, not all are capable of fixing their mind
on the infinite Brahman, devoid of all effects. ‘ In the
manner of the four feet, 5 i.e. in the same way as ( Kh . Up.
Ill, 18), for the purpose of pious meditation, speech and
three other feet are ascribed to mind viewed as the personal
manifestation of Brahman, and fire and three other feet to
the ether viewed as the cosmic manifestation of Brahman.
—Or else the phrase, ‘ in the manner of the four quarters/
may be explained as follows. In the same way as to facili¬
tate commerce, a karshapa/za is assumed to be divided into
four parts—for there being no fixed rule as to the value of
bargains, people cannot always carry on their transactions
with whole karshapazzas only—, (so, in order to facilitate
pious meditation on the part of less intelligent people, four
feet, &c., are ascribed to Brahman).
34. (The statements concerning connexion and
difference) are due to difference of place; in the
manner of light and so on.
The present Sutra refutes the allegation that something
different from Brahman exists, firstly, because things are
said to be connected with Brahman, and secondly, because
things are said to be separate from it. The fact is, that all
those statements regarding connexion and difference are
made with a view to difference of place. When the cog¬
nition of difference which is produced by the Selfs con¬
nexion with different places, i.e. with the buddhi and the
other limiting adjuncts, ceases on account of the cessation
of those limiting adjuncts themselves, connexion with the
highest Self is metaphorically said to take place ; but that
is done with a view to the limiting adjuncts only, not with
a view to any limitation on the part of the Self.—In the
same way, all statements regarding difference have reference
to the difference of Brahman’s limiting adjuncts only, not
to any difference affecting Brahman’s own nature.—All this
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 36.
179
is analogous to the case of light and the like. For the light of
the sun or the moon also is differentiated by its connexion
with limiting adjuncts, and is, on account of these adjuncts,
spoken of as divided, and, when the adjuncts are removed, it
is said to enter into connexion (union). Other instances of
the effect of limiting adjuncts are furnished by the ether
entering into connexion with the eyes of needles and the
like.
35. And because (only such a connexion) is
possible.
Moreover, only such a connexion as described above is
possible. For scriptural passages, such as ‘ He is gone to
his Self 5 ( Kh . Up. VI, 8, 1), declare that the connexion of
the soul with the highest Self is one of essential nature.
But as the essential nature of a thing is imperishable, the
connexion cannot be analogous to that of the inhabitants
with the town, but can only be explained with reference
to an obscuration, owing to Nescience, of the soul's true
nature.—Similarly the difference spoken of by scripture
cannot be real, but only such as is due to Nescience ; for
many texts declare that there exists only one Lord. Ana¬
logously, scripture teaches that the one ether is made
manifold as it were by its connexion with different places
‘ The ether which is outside man is the ether which is
inside man, and the ether within the heart’ (Kh. Up.
Ill, 12, 7 ff.).
36. (The same thing follows) from the express
denial of other (existences).
Having thus refuted the arguments of the purvapakshin,
the Sutrakara in conclusion strengthens his view by a
further reason. A great number of Vedic passages—which,
considering the context in which they stand, cannot be
explained otherwise—distinctly deny that there exists any¬
thing apart from Brahman; ‘He indeed is below; I am
below; the Self is below 9 (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 1; 2); ‘ Who¬
soever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self was
abandoned by everything' (B ri. Up. II, 4, 6); ‘Brahman
N 2
180 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
alone is all this’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, n); ‘The Self is all this ’
(Kk. Up. VII, 25, 2); ‘In it there is no diversity’ (B ri. Up.
IV, 4, 19); ‘He to whom there is nothing superior, from
whom there is nothing different’ ( 5 vet. Up. Ill, 9); ‘This
is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without
anything inside or outside’ (B ri. Up. II, 5, 19).—And that
there is no other Self within the highest Self, follows from
that scriptural passage which teaches Brahman to be within
everything (B ri. Up. II, 5, 19).
37. Thereby the omnipresence (of Brahman is
established), in accordance with the statements about
(Brahman’s) extent.
The preceding demonstration that the texts calling
Brahman a bank, and so on, are not to be taken literally,
and that, on the other hand, the texts denying all plurality
must be accepted as they stand, moreover, serves to prove
that the Self is omnipresent. If the former texts were taken
literally, banks and the like would have to be looked upon
as belonging to the Self, and thence it would follow that the
Self is limited. And if the texts of the latter class were
not accepted as valid, there would be substances exclusive
of each other, and thus the Self would again be limited.—
That the Self is omnipresent follows from the texts pro¬
claiming its extent, &c., cp. Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 3, ‘As large
as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart; ’
‘Like the ether, he is omnipresent and eternal;’ ‘He is
greater than the sky, greater than the ether’ (.Sat. Br. X,
6, 3, 2); ‘ He is eternal, omnipresent, firm, immoveable ’
(Bha. Gita II, 24); and other similar passages from 6ruti and
Smrzti.
38. From him (i.e. the Lord, there comes) the
fruit (of works); for (that only) is possible.
We now turn to another characteristic belonging to
Brahman, in so far as it is connected with the every-day
world in which we distinguish a ruler and the objects of
his rule.—There arises the question whether the threefold
fruits of action which are enjoyed by the creatures in their
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 39.
l8l
sawsara-state—viz. pain, pleasure, and a mixture of the
two—spring from the actions themselves or come from the
Lord.—The Shtrakara embraces the latter alternative,
on the ground that it is the only possible one. The ruler
of all who by turns provides for the creation, the subsist¬
ence and the reabsorption of the world, and who knows all
the differences of place and time, he alone is capable of
effecting all those modes of requital which are in accord¬
ance with the merit of the agents; actions, on the other
hand, which pass away as soon as done, have no power of
bringing about results at some future time, since nothing
can spring from nothing. Nor can the latter difficulty be
overcome by the assumption that an action passes away
only after having produced some result according to its
nature, and that the agent will at some future time enjoy
that fruit of his action. For the fruit of an action is such
only through being enjoyed by the agent; only at the
moment when some pleasure or some pain—the result of
some deed—is enjoyed by the doer of the deed people
understand it to be a ‘ fruit/—Nor, in the second place,
have we the right to assume that the fruit will, at some
future time, spring from the so-called supersensuous
principle (apurva), which itself is supposed to be a direct
result of the deed; for that so-called supersensuous
principle is something of non-intelligent nature, compar¬
able to a piece of wood or metal, and as such cannot act
unless moved by some intelligent being. And moreover
there is no proof whatever for the existence of such an
apurva.—But is it not proved by the fact that deeds are
actually requited ?—By no means, we reply ; for the fact of
requital may be accounted for by the action of the Lord.
39. And because it is declared by scripture.
We assume the Lord to bring about the fruits of actions,
not only because no other assumption appears plausible, but
also because we have direct scriptural statement on our
side. Cp. e.g. the passage, ‘ This indeed is the great, unborn
Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth’ (B ri. Up. IV,
4,24)-
182
vedanta-s6tras.
40. Gaimini (thinks) for the same reasons that
religious merit (is what brings about the fruits of
actions).
Gaimini bases a contrary opinion on the reasons specified
in the last two Sutras. Scripture, he argues, proclaims
injunctions such as the following one, ‘ He who is desirous
of the heavenly world is to sacrifice/ Now as it is ad¬
mitted that such scriptural injunctions must have an object,
we conclude that the sacrifice itself brings about the result,
i. e. the obtainment of the heavenly world ; for if this were
not so, nobody would perform sacrifices and thereby
scriptural injunctions would be rendered purposeless.—
But has not this view of the matter already been aban¬
doned, on the ground that an action which passes away as
soon as done can have no fruit?—We must, the reply is,
follow the authority of scripture and assume such a con¬
nexion of action and fruit as agrees with scriptural state¬
ment. Now it is clear that a deed cannot effect a result
at some future time, unless, before passing away, it gives
birth to some unseen result; we therefore assume that
there exists some result which we call apurva, and which
may be viewed either as an imperceptible after-state of the
deed or as an imperceptible antecedent state of the result.
This hypothesis removes all difficulties, while on the other
hand it is impossible that the Lord should effect the results
of actions. For in the first place, one uniform cause
cannot be made to account for a great variety of effects;
in the second place, the Lord would have to be taxed with
partiality and cruelty; and in the third place, if the deed
itself did not bring about its own fruit, it would be useless
to perform it at all.—For all these reasons the result
springs from the deed only, whether meritorious or non-
meritorious.
41. Badaraya^a, however, thinks the former (i. e.
the Lord, to be the cause of the fruits of action),
since he is designated as the cause (of the actions
themselves).
Ill ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 41.
183
The teacher Badaraya^a thinks that the previously-
mentioned Lord is the cause of the fruits of action. The
word £ however 1 sets aside the view of the fruit being pro¬
duced either by the mere deed or the mere apurva.—The
final conclusion then is that the fruits come from the Lord
acting with a view to the deeds done by the souls, or, if it
be so preferred, with a view to the apurva springing from
the deeds. This view is proved by the circumstance of
scripture representing the Lord not only as the giver of
fruits but also as the causal agent with reference to all
actions whether good or evil. Compare the passage, Kau.
Up. Ill, 8, ‘ He makes him whom he wishes to lead up
from these worlds do a good deed ; and the same makes
him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a
bad deed.’ The same is said in the Bhagavadgita (VII,
21), ‘ Whichever divine form a devotee wishes to worship
with faith, to that form I render his faith steady. Holding
that faith he strives to propitiate the deity and obtains
from it the benefits he desires, as ordained by me. 5
All Vedanta-texts moreover declare that the Lord is the
only cause of all creation. And his creating all creatures
in forms and conditions corresponding to—and retributive
of—their former deeds, is just what entitles us to call the
Lord the cause of all fruits of actions. And as the Lord
has regard to the merit and demerit of the souls, the
objections raised above—as to one uniform cause being
inadequate to the production of various effects, &c.—are
without any foundation.
184
vedanta-sCtras.
THIRD PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
1. (The cognitions) intimated by all the Vedanta-
texts (are identical), on account of the non-difference
of injunction and so on.
In the preceding part of this work we have explained
the nature of the object of cognition, i. e. Brahman. We
now enter on the discussion of the question whether the
cognitions of Brahman, which form the subject of the
different Vedanta-texts, are separate cognitions or not.
But, an objection may here be raised, so far we have
determined that Brahman is free from all distinctions
whatever, one, of absolutely uniform nature like a lump of
salt; hence there appears to be no reason for even raising
the question whether the cognitions of Brahman are
separate cognitions or constitute only one cognition. For
as Brahman is one and of uniform nature, it certainly cannot
be maintained that the Vedanta-texts aim at establishing
a plurality in Brahman comparable to the plurality of
works (inculcated by the karmaka^a of the Veda). Nor
can it be said that although Brahman is uniform, yet it
may be the object of divers cognitions ; for any difference
in nature between the cognition and the object known
points to a mistake committed. If, on the other hand,
it should be assumed that the different Vedanta-texts aim
at teaching different cognitions of Brahman, it would
follow that only one cognition can be the right one while
all others are mistaken, and that would lead to a general
distrust of all Vedanta.—Hence the question whether each
individual Vedanta-text teaches a separate cognition of
Brahman or not cannot even be raised.—Nor, supposing
that question were raised after all, can the non-difference of
the cognition of Brahman be demonstrated (as the Sutra
attempts) on the ground that all Vedanta-texts are equally
injunctions, since the cognition of Brahman is not of the
nature of an injunction. For the teacher has proved at
Ill ADHYAVA, 3 PADA, I. 185
length (I, 1, 4) that the knowledge of Brahman is pro¬
duced by passages which treat of Brahman as an existing
accomplished thing and thus do not aim at enjoining any¬
thing.—Why then begin at all this discussion about the
difference or non-difference of the cognitions of Brahman ?
To all this we reply that no objection can be raised
against a discussion of that kind, since the latter has for its
object only the qualified Brahman and pra^a and the like.
For devout meditations on the qualified Brahman may, like
acts, be either identical or different. Scripture moreover
teaches that, like acts, they have various results ; some of
them have visible results, others unseen results, and others
again—as conducive to the springing up of perfect know¬
ledge—have for their result release by successive steps.
With a view to those meditations, therefore, we may raise
the question whether the individual Vedanta-texts teach
different cognitions of Brahman or not.
The arguments which may here be set forth by the
purvapakshin are as follows. In the first place it is known
that difference may be proved by names, as e. g. in the case
of the sacrificial performance called ‘ light’ (^yotis) h And
the cognitions of Brahman which are enjoined in the
different Ved£nta-texts are connected with different names
such as the Taittiriyaka, the Va^asaneyaka, the Kauthum-
aka, the Kaushitaka, the 5a/yayanaka, &c.—In the second
place the separateness of actions is proved by the difference
of form (characteristics; rupa). So e.g. with reference to
the passage, ‘ the milk is for the VLsvedevas, the water for
the va^ins 1 2 * * * * .’
1 See the saw^akrftakarmabhedadhikarawa, Pfi. Mi. Su. II, 2,
22, where the decision is that the word ^yotis (in ‘ athaisha ^yotir 7
&c.) denotes not the gyotish/oma but a separate sacrificial per¬
formance.
2 See Pu. Mi. Su. II, 2,23. The offering of water made to the
divinities called vagin is separate from the offering of milk to the
Vkvedevas; for the material offered as well as the divinity to
which the offering is -made (i.e. the two rupa of the sacrifice)
differs in the two cases.
i86
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Now similar differences of form are met with in the
Vedanta-texts; the followers of one 5 akha, e. g. mention,
in the chapter called 4 the knowledge of the five fires/ a
sixth fire, while other 6akhas mention five only; and in
the colloquy of the pranas some texts mention a lesser,
others a greater number of organs and powers of the body.
—In the third place differences in qualifying particulars
(dharma) are supposed to prove difference of acts, and such
differences also are met with in the Vedanta-texts ; only in
the Muzzz/aka-Upanishad, e. g. it is said that the science of
Brahman must be imparted to those only who have per¬
formed the rite of carrying fire on the head (Mu. Up. Ill,
2 , 10).—In the same way the other reasons which are
admitted to prove the separateness of actions, such as repe¬
tition and so on, are to be applied in a suitable manner to
the different Vedanta-texts also.—We therefore maintain
that each separate Vedanta-text teaches a different cogni¬
tion of Brahman.
To this argumentation of the purvapakshin we make the
following reply.—The cognitions enjoined by all the
Vedanta-texts are the same, owing to the non-difference
of injunction and so on. The 4 and so on * refers to the
other reasons proving non-difference of acts which are
enumerated in the Siddhanta-sutra of the adhikarazza
treating of the different Vakhas (Pu. Mi. II, 4, 9, 4 (the act) is
one on account of the non-difference of connexion of form,
of injunction, and of name ’). Thus, as the agnihotra
though described in different 5 akhas is yet one, the same
kind of human activity being enjoined in all by means of
the words, 4 He is to offer ; ’ so the injunction met with in
the text of the Va^asaneyins (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 1), 4 He who
knows the oldest and the best/ &c., is the same as that
which occurs in the text of the .Oandogas, 4 He who knows
the first and the best' (Kk. Up. V, 1, 1). The connexion
of the meditation enjoined with its aim is likewise the
same in both texts, 4 He becomes the first and best among
his people/ In both texts again the cognition enjoined
has the same form. For in both the object of knowledge
is the true nature of the prazza which is characterised by
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2.
I8 7
certain qualities such as being the first and best, and just
as the material and the divinity constitute the form of the
sacrifice, so the object known constitutes the form of the
cognition. And finally both cognitions have the same name,
viz. the knowledge of the prazza.—For these reasons we
declare that the different Vedanta-texts enjoin identical
cognitions.—A similar line of reasoning applies to other
cognitions which are met with in more than one Vedanta-
text, so e. g. to the knowledge of the five fires, the know¬
ledge of Vabvanara, the knowledge of Sandilya and so on.
—Of the apparent reasons on the ground of which the
purvapakshin above tried to show that the meditations are
not identical but separate a refutation is to be found in the
Purva Mimazzzsa-sutras II, 4, 10 ff.
The next Sfitra disposes of a doubt which may remain
even after the preceding discussion.
2. (If it be said that the vidyas are separate) on
account of the difference (of secondary matters),
we deny that, since even in one and the same vidya
(different secondary matters may find place).
In spite of the preceding argumentation we cannot admit
that the different cognitions of Brahman are equally
intimated by all Vedanta-texts, because we meet with
differences in secondary matters (guzza). Thus the Va-
^•asaneyins mention in their text of the knowledge of the
five fires a sixth fire (‘And then the fire is indeed fire,’
Bri. Up. VI, 2,14), while the A^andogas mention no sixth
fire but conclude their text of the pazz^agnividya with
the express mention of five fires (‘ But he who thus knows
the five fires,’ Kh. Up. V, 10, 10).
Now it is impossible to admit that the cognition of those
who admit that particular qualification (i.e. the sixth fire)
and of those who do not should be one and the same. Nor
may we attempt to evade the difficulty by saying that the
sixth fire may be tacitly included in the vid yk of the
A^andogas; for that would contradict the number ‘ five ’
expressly stated by them.—In the colloquy of the prazzas
vedanta-sCtras.
188
again the iV^andogas mention, in addition to the most
important pra/za, four other pranas, viz. speech, the eye, the
ear, and the mind ; while the Va^asaneyins mention a fifth
one also, ‘ Seed indeed is generation. He who knows that
becomes rich in offspring and cattle ’ (B ri. Up. VI, i, 6).—
Now a difference of procedure in the point of addition and
omission effects a difference in the object known, and the
latter again effects a difference in the vidya, just as a
difference in the point of material and divinity distinguishes
one sacrifice from another.
To this we make the following reply.—Your objection
is without force, since such differences of qualification
as are met with in the above instances are possible
even in one and the same vidya. In the ATMndogya-
text a sixth fire is indeed not included; yet, as five fires,
beginning with the heavenly world, are recognised as
the same in both texts the mentioned difference cannot
effect a split of the vidya; not any more than the
atiratra-sacrifice is differentiated by the sho^a.rin-rite
being either used or not-used. Moreover, the iT/zandogya-
text also actually mentions a sixth fire, viz. in the passage,
V, 9, 2, ‘ When he has departed, his friends carry him, as
appointed, to the fire/—The Va^asaneyins, on the other
hand, mention their sixth fire (‘ and then the fire is indeed
fire, the fuel fuel, 5 &c.) for the purpose of cutting short the
fanciful assumption regarding fuel, smoke, and so on, which
runs through the description of the five fires with which the
heavenly world and so on are imaginatively identified.
Their statement regarding the sixth fire (has therefore not
the purpose of enjoining it as an object of meditation but)
is merely a remark about something already established
(known) 1 . And even if we assume that the statement
about the sixth fire has the purpose of representing that
fire as an object of devout meditation, yet the fire may be
inserted in the vidya of the Af/£andogas without any fear of
its being in conflict with the number five mentioned there;
1 Viz. the real fire in which the dead body is burned and which
is known from perception.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 3.
189
for that number is not an essential part of the injunction 1 ,
but merely makes an additional statement regarding some¬
thing known already from the text, viz. the five fires with
which the heavenly world and so on are identified 2 . Simi¬
larly nothing stands in the way of some additional quali¬
fication being included in the vidyd concerning the colloquy
of the prazzas and so on. The addition or omission of
some particular qualification is unable to introduce differ¬
ence into the object of knowledge and thereby into the
knowledge itself; for although the objects of knowledge
may differ partly, yet their greater part and at the same
time the knowing person are understood to be the same.
Hence the vidya also remains the same.
3. (The rite of carrying fire on the head is an
attribute) of the study of the Veda (of the Athar-
va/zikas); because in the Sama^ara (it is mentioned)
as being such. (This also follows) from the general
subject-matter, and the limitation (of the rite to the
Atharva/zikas) is analogous to that of the libations.
With reference to the purvapakshin’s averment that the
rite of carrying fire on the head is connected with the vidya
of the followers of the Atharva-veda only, not with any
other vidya, and that thereby the vidya of the Atharvazzikas
is separated from all other vidyas, the following remarks
have to be made.—The rite of carrying fire on the head is
an attribute not of the vidya, but merely of the study of the
Veda on the part of the Atharvazzikas. This we infer from
the circumstance that the Atharvazzikas, in the book called
‘SamaHra’ which treats ofVedic observances, record the
above rite also as being of such a nature, i.e. as constituting
an attribute of the study of the Veda. At the close of the
Upanishad moreover we have the following sentence, ‘ A
1 I.e. the iTMndogya-text contains no injunction that five fires
only are to be meditated upon.
2 So that there stands nothing in the way of our amplifying our
meditation by the addition of a sixth fire.
190
VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
man who has not performed the rites does not read this; ’
here we conclude from the word £ this ’ which refers to the
subject previously treated, and from the fact of ‘ reading ’
being mentioned, that the rite is an attribute of the study of
the Upanishad of the Atharva?zikas (but has nothing to do
with theUpanishad itself).—But what about the immediately
preceding passage,‘ Let a man tell this science of Brahman
to those only by whom the rite of carrying fire on the head
has been performed according to rule?’ Here the rite in
question is connected with the science of Brahman, and as
all science of Brahman is one only, it follows that the rite
has to be connected with all science of Brahman !—Not so,
we reply; for in the above passage also the word ‘ this ’
refers back to what forms the subject of the antecedent part
of the Upanishad, and that subject is constituted by the
science of Brahman only in so far as depending on a par¬
ticular book (viz. the Mu^aka-Upanishad); hence the rite
also is connected with that particular book only.—The
Sutra adds another illustrative instance in the words ‘ and as
in the case of the libations there is limitation of that.’ As
the seven libations—from the saurya libation up to the
^ataudana libation—since they are not connected with the
triad of fires taught in the other Vedas, but only with the
one fire which is taught in the Atharvan, are thereby en¬
joined exclusively on the followers of the Atharvan ; so the
rite of carrying fire on the head also is limited to the study
of that particular Veda with which scriptural statements
connect it.—The doctrine of the unity of the vidyas thus
remains unshaken.
4. (Scripture) also declares this.
The Veda also declares the identity of the vidyas; for all
Vedanta-texts represent the object of knowledge as one;
cp. e.g. Ka. Up. I, 2, 15, ‘That word which all the Vedas
record Ait. Ar. Ill, 2, 3,1 2 , ‘ Him only the Bahvrz^as con¬
sider in the great hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial
fire, the iT^andogas in the Mahavrata ceremony/—To quote
some other instances proving the unity of the vidyas : Ka.
Up. I, 6 , 2, mentions as one of the Lord’s qualities that he
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 5. I9I
causes fear; now this very same quality is referred to in
the Taitt. Up. II, 7, in order to intimate disapprobation of
those who are opposed to the absolute unity of that which
is, ‘ For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it (the
Self), there is fear for him. But that fear is only for him
who knows (a difference) and does not know (the oneness)/
—Similarly the Vabvanara, who in the Va^asaneyaka is
imaginatively represented as a span long, is referred to in
the ZTMndogya as something well known, ‘ But he who
worships that VaLsvanara Self which is a span long,’ &c.
{Kk. Up. V, 18, 1).
And as, on the ground of all Vedanta-texts intimating
the same matters, hymns and the like which are enjoined in
one place are employed in other places (where they are not
expressly enjoined) for the purposes of devout meditation, it
follows that all Vedanta-texts intimate also (identical) devout
meditations.
5. In the case of (a devout meditation) common
(to several .Vakhas) (the particulars mentioned in
each .Sakha) have to be combined, since there is no
difference of essential matter; just as in the case of
what is complementary to injunctions.
[This Sutra states the practical outcome of the discussion
carried on in the first four Sutras.] It having been deter¬
mined that the cognitions of Brahman are equally intimated
by all Vedanta-texts, it follows that as long as the cognition
is one and the same its specific determinations mentioned in
one text are to be introduced into other texts also where
they are not mentioned. For if the matter of these deter¬
minations subserves some particular cognition in one place,
it subserves it in another place also, since in both places
we have to do with one and the same cognition. The
case is analogous to that of the things subordinate to
some sacrificial performance, as, e. g. the agnihotra. The
agnihotra also is one performance, and therefore its
subordinate members, although they may be mentioned in
different texts, have to be combined into one whole.—If the
192
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
cognitions were separate, the particulars mentioned in
different texts could not be combined; for they would be
confined each to its own cognition and would not stand to
each other in that relation in which the typical form of a
sacrifice stands to its modifications*. But as the cognitions
are one, things lie differently.—The above Sutra will be
explained and applied at length further on, in Sutra 10 ff.
6. If it be said that (the udgitha vidya of the Bri.
Up. and that of the AfMnd. Up.) are separate on
account (of the difference) of the texts ; we deny this
on the ground of their (essential) non-difference.
We read in the Va^asaneyaka I, 3, 1, ‘The Devas said,
well, let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means
of the Udgitha. They said to speech : Do thou sing out for
us.—Yes, said speech,’ &c. The text thereupon relates how
speech and the other pranas were pierced by the Asuras
with evil, and therefore unable to effect what was expected
from them, and how in the end recourse was had to the
chief vital air, ‘ Then they said to the breath in the mouth :
Do thou sing for us.—Yes, said the breath, and sang.’—A
similar story is met with in the K/tandogya. 1,2. There we
read at first that ‘ the devas took the udgitha, thinking they
would vanquish the Asuras with it; ’ the text then relates
how the other pra/zas were pierced with evil and thus foiled
by the Asuras, and how the Devas in the end had recourse
to the chief vital air, ‘ Then comes this chief vital air; on
that they meditated as udgitha.’—As both these passages
glorify the chief vital air, it follows that they both are in¬
junctions of a meditation on the vital air. A doubt, how¬
ever, arises whether the two vidyas are separate vidy&s or
one vidya only.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that for the reasons
specified in the first adhikarazza of the present pada the two
1 The Purva Mimaffzsa teaches that all subordinate things which
the Veda prescribes for some typical sacrifice are eo ipso prescribed
for the modified forms of the sacrifice also.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7.
193
vidy&s have to be considered as one.—But, an objection is
raised, there is a difference of procedure which contradicts
the assumption of unity. The Va£*asaneyins represent the
chief vital air as the producer of the udgitha (‘ Do thou sing
out for us’), while the Af^andogas speak of it as itself being
the udgitha (‘ on that they meditated as udgitha ’). How
can this divergence be reconciled with the assumption of the
unity of the vidy&s ?—The difference pointed out, the purva-
pakshin replies, is not important enough to bring about
a separation of the two vidyas, since we observe that
the two both agree in a plurality of points. Both texts
relate that the Devas and the Asuras were fighting ;
both at first glorify speech and the other pra/zas in their
relation to the udgitha, and thereupon, finding fault with
them, pass on to the chief vital air ; both tell how through
the strength of the latter the Asuras were scattered as
a ball of earth is scattered when hitting a solid stone.
And, moreover, the text of the Va^asaneyaka also co¬
ordinates the chief vital air and the udgitha in the clause,
‘He is udgitha’ (B ri. Up. I, 3, 23). We therefore have to
assume that in the i^andogya also the chief prazza has
secondarily to be looked upon as the producer of the udgitha.
—The two texts thus constitute one vidya only.
7. Or rather there is no (unity of the vidy&s),
owing to the difference of subject-matter.
Setting aside the view maintained by the purvapakshin,
we have rather to say that, owing to the difference of sub¬
ject-matter, the two vidycls are separate.—In the iTMndogya
the introductory sentence ( 1 ,1, 1), ‘ Let a man meditate on
the syllable Om (as) the udgitha,’ represents as the object
of meditation the syllable Om which is a part of the
udgitha; thereupon proceeds to give an account of its
qualities such as being the inmost essence of all (‘The full
account, however, of Om is this,’ &c.); and later on tells,
with reference to the same syllable Om which is a part of
the udgitha, a story about the Gods and Asuras in which
there occurs the statement, ‘ They meditated on the udgitha
[38] o
194
vedanta-sOtras.
as that breath V If now we should assume 1 2 * that the term
4 udgitha ’ denotes here the whole act of worship (not only
the syllable Om which is a part of the udgitha), and that
(in the passage, 4 they meditated on the udgitha as that
breath 5 ) the performer of that worship, i.e. the Udgatrz-
priest, is said to be meditated upon as breath ; our inter¬
pretation would be open to two objections : in the first
place it would be opposed to the introductory sentence
(which directly declares the syllable Om to be the object
of devotion); and in the second place it would oblige us
to take the word udgitha (in ‘ they meditated on the ud¬
githa ’), not in its direct sense, but as denoting by impli¬
cation the udgatrz. But the rule is that in one and the
same connected passage the interpretation of later pas¬
sages has to adapt itself to the earlier passages. We
therefore conclude the passage last quoted to teach that
the syllable Om which is a part of the udgitha is to be
meditated upon as prazza.—In the Va£*asaneyaka on the
other hand there is no reason for taking the word udgitha
to denote a part of the udgitha only, and we therefore
must interpret it to denote the whole; and in the
passage, ‘Do thou sing out for us,’ the performer of the
worship, i.e. the Udgatrz-priest, is described as prazza.
In reply to the purvapakshin’s remark that in the Va^*asa-
neyaka also the udgitha and the prazza occur in co-ordi¬
nation (in the passage, c He is udgitha 5 ), we point out that
that statement merely aims at showing that the Self of all
is that prazza which the text wishes to represent as udgatz'z.
The statement, therefore, does not imply the unity of the
two vidyas. Moreover, there also the term udgitha denotes
the whole act of worship (while in the Kkandogya it denotes
the omkara only). Nor must it be said that the pr&zza can
1 From which it appears that the iTMndogya enjoins throughout
a meditation on the syllable Om which is only a part of the
udgitha; while the object of meditation enjoined in the Br/'had-
arazzyaka is the whole udgitha.
2 Viz. for the purpose of making out that the object of medita¬
tion is the same in the ^andogya and the Brzhad-arazzyaka.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7.
X 95
impossibly be an udgatrz, and that on that account our inter¬
pretation of the Brzhad-clra;zyaka passage is erroneous ; for
with a view to pious meditation scripture may represent
the prana as udgatrz as well as udgitha. And, moreover,
the Udgcltrz* actually performs his work by the strength of
his breath; hence the pra;za may be called udgatrz. In
accordance with this the text says (I, 3, 24), 4 He sang it
indeed as speech and breath.’—And if we understand that
the text clearly intends to convey a difference of matter we
have no right to conclude from merely apparent similarities
of expression that only one matter is intended to be ex¬
pressed. To quote an analogous instance from the karma-
ka/zda: In the section relative to the unexpected rising of
the moon during the dans-a-sacrifice, as well as in the section
about the offering to be made by him who is desirous of
cattle, we meet with identical injunctions such as the follow¬
ing one, 4 He is to divide the grains into three portions,
and to make those of medium size into a cake offered on
eight potsherds to Agni the Giver,’ &c.; nevertheless it
follows from the difference of the introductory passages of
the two sections that the offerings to be made on account
of the moon’s rising are indeed not connected with the
divinities of the dan*a-sacrifice (but do not constitute a new
sacrifice separate from the darsa), while the section about
him who is desirous of cattle enjoins a separate sacrificial
performance h—Analogously a difference in the nature of
the introductory clauses effects a difference of the vidyas,
4 As in the case of that which is greater than great.’ That
means: Just as the meditation on the udgitha enjoined in
the passage, 4 Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest;
he is indeed the udgitha, greater than great, he is without
end’ (Kk. Up. 1,9,1), and the other meditation on the ud¬
githa as possessing the qualities of abiding within the eye
and the sun, &c. ( Kh . Up. I, 6), are separate meditations,
although in both the udgitha is identified with the highest
Self; so it is with vidyas in general. The special features
of different vidyas are not to be combined even when the
Cp. Taitt. Samh. II, 5, 5, 2 ; Pu. Mi. Su. VI, 5, 1.
O 2
1
196
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
vidy&s belong to one and the same >Sakha ; much less then
when they belong to different Vakhas.
8. If it be said (that the vidyas are one) on account
of (the identity of) name ; (we reply that) that is
explained (already); moreover that (identity of name)
is (found in the case of admittedly separate vidyas).
Here it might be said that after all the unity of the two
vidyas discussed must be admitted, since they are called by
one and the same name, viz. ‘ the science of the udgitha.’
—But this argument is of no avail against what has been
said under the preceding Sutra. The decision there advo¬
cated has the advantage of following the letter of the
revealed text; the name ‘ udgitha-vidya ’ on the other
hand is not a part of the revealed text, but given to the
vidyds for convenience sake by ordinary men for the reason
that the word ‘ udgitha * is met with in the text.—More¬
over, we observe that admittedly separate meditations such
as the two mentioned under the last Shtra have one and
the same name. Similarly altogether separate sacrificial
performances, such as the agnihotra, the darrapur/zamasa,
and so on, are all comprised under the one name Ka/Zzaka,
merely because they are recorded in the one book called
Ka^/zaka.—Where, on the other hand, there is no special
reason for assuming the difference of vidyas, their unity may
be declared on the ground of identity of name ; as, e.g. in
the case of the Saz/zvargavidyas.
9. And on account of the (omkara) extending over
the whole (Veda), (the view that the term udgitha
expresses a specialisation) is appropriate.
In the passage, ‘Let a man meditate on the syllable Om
(as) the udgitha,’ the two words ‘ omkara ’ and ‘ udgitha ’
are placed in co-ordination h The question then arises
1 Samanadhikarazzya, i. e. literally, ‘ the relation of abiding in a
common substratum/—The two words are shown to stand in that
relation by their being exhibited in the same case.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 9.
197
whether the relation in which the ideas conveyed by these
two words stand to each other is the relation of super¬
imposition (adhyasa) or sublation (apavada) or unity
(ekatva) or specification (vuesha;/a); for prima facie each
of these relations may present itself to the mind.—Adhyasa
takes place when the idea of one of two things not being
dismissed from the mind, the idea of the second thing is
superimposed on that of the first thing; so that together
with the superimposed idea the former idea remains
attached to the thing on which the second idea is super¬
imposed. When e.g. the idea of (the entity) Brahman
superimposes itself upon the idea of the name, the
latter idea continues in the mind and is not driven out
by the former. A similar instance is furnished by the
superimposition of the idea of the god Vish/zu on a statue
of Vishnu. So, in the case under discussion also, the idea
of the udgitha may be superimposed on the omkara or the
idea of the omkara on the udgitha.—We, in the second
place, have apavada when an idea previously attached to
some object is recognised as false and driven out by the
true idea springing up after the false one. So e.g. when
the false idea of the body, the senses, and so on being the
Self is driven out by the true idea springing up later—and
expressed by judgments such as ‘Thou art that’—that the
idea of the Self is to be attached to the Self only. Or, to
quote another example, when a previous mistaken notion
as to the direction of the points of the compass is replaced
by the true notion. So here also the idea of the udgitha
may drive out the idea of the omkara or vice versa.—The
relation would, in the third place, be that of 4 unity 5 if the
terms f omkara 5 and 4 udgitha 5 were co-extensive in mean¬
ing ; just as the terms, c the Best of the Twice-born/ ‘ the
Brahma;za,’ 4 the god among men, 5 all denote an individual
of the noblest caste.—The relation will, finally, be that of
specification if, there being a possibility of our understand¬
ing the omkara in so far as co-extensive with all the Vedas,
the term 4 udgitha’ calls up the idea of the sphere of action
of the udgatrz. The passage would then mean, 4 Let a man
meditate on that omkara which is the udgitha, 5 and would
198
vedanta-sCtras.
be analogous to an injunction such as ‘ Let him bring that
lotus-flower which is blue.’
All these alterations present themselves to the mind, and
as there is no reason for deciding in favour of any one, the
question must remain an unsettled one.
To this purvapaksha-view the Sutra replies, ‘And on
account of extending over the whole, it is appropriate/
The word ‘ and ’ stands here in place of ‘ but/ and is
meant to discard the three other alternatives. Three out
of the four alternatives are to be set aside as objectionable ;
the fourth, against which nothing can be urged, is to be
adopted.—The objections lying against the first three
alternatives are as follows. In the case of adhyasa we
should have to admit that the word which expresses the
idea superimposed is not to be taken in its direct sense,
but in an implied sense 1 ; and we should moreover have to
imagine some fruit for a meditation of that kind 2 . Nor
can it be said that we need not imagine such a fruit, as
scripture itself mentions it in the passage, ‘He becomes
indeed a fulfiller of desires ’ (I, 1, 7); for this passage
indicates the fruit, not of the ideal superimposition of the
udgitha on the omkara, but of the meditation in which the
omkara is viewed as the fulfilment of desires.—Against the
hypothesis of an apavada there likewise lies the objection
that no fruit is to be seen. The cessation of wrong know¬
ledge can certainly not be alleged as such; for we see no
reason why the cessation of the idea that the omkara
is udgitha and not omkara or vice versa should be bene¬
ficial to man. Sublation of the one idea by the other
is moreover not even possible in our case; for to the
omkara the idea of the omkara remains always attached,
and so to the udgitha the idea of the udgitha. The
passage, moreover, does not aim at teaching the true
1 I.e. in the present case we should have to assume that the word
udgitha means, by implication, the omkara.—Recourse may be had
to implied meanings only when the direct meaning is clearly
impossible.
2 For a special adhyasa-meditation must be attended with a
special result.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 9.
199
nature of something, but at enjoining a meditation of a
certain kind.—The hypothesis of unity again is precluded
by the consideration that as in that case one term would
suffice to convey the intended meaning, the employment of
two terms would be purposeless. And moreover the term
‘ udgitha 5 is never used to denote the omkara in its
connexion with the J?/g-veda and Ya^ur-veda; nor is the
word ‘omkara’ used to denote that entire second sub¬
division of a saman which is denoted by the word ‘ udgitha.*
Hence it cannot be said that we have to do with different
words only denoting one and the same thing.—There thus
remains the fourth alternative, ‘On account of its compris¬
ing all the Vedas.’ That means: In order that the omkara
may not be understood here as that one which comprises
all the Vedas, it is specified by means of the word ‘ udgitha,’
in order that that omkara which constitutes a part of the
udgitha may be apprehended.—But does not this inter¬
pretation also involve the admission of implication, as
according to it the word ‘ udgitha ’ denotes not the whole
udgitha but only a part of it, viz. the omkara ?—True, but
we have to distinguish those cases in which the implied
meaning is not far remote from the direct meaning
and those in which it is remote. If, in the present case,
we embrace the alternative of adhyasa, we have to
assume an altogether remote implication, the idea of one
matter being superimposed on the idea of an altogether
different matter. If, on the other hand, we adopt the
alternative of specification, the implication connected there¬
with is an easy one, the word which in its direct sense
denotes the whole being understood to denote the part.
And that words denoting the whole do duty for words
denoting the part is a matter of common occurrence ; the
words ‘ cloth,’ ‘ village,’ and many others are used in this
fashion 1 .—For all these reasons we declare that the appro¬
priate view of the iTMndogya-passage is to take the word
‘ udgitha’ as specialising the term ‘ omkara V
1 We say, e.g. ‘ the doth is burned/ even if only a part of the
cloth is burned.
2 We therefore, according to Sankara, have to render the passage
200
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
io. Those (qualities which are attributed to the
subject of a vidya in one 6akha only) (are to be
inserted) in other places (also), since (the vidyas) are
non-different on the whole.
In the colloquy of the pranas recorded by the Va^asane-
yins and the .Oandogas the pra^a, endowed with various
qualities such as being the best and so on, is represented as
the object of meditation, and various qualities such as being
the richest and the like are ascribed to speech and the other
organs. And these latter qualities are in the end attributed
to the pra^a also, ‘ If I am the richest thou art the richest,’
&c. Now in other Sakhas also, as e.g. that of the Kaushi-
takins, the former set of qualities such as being the best and
so on is ascribed to the pra^a (cp. Kau. Up. II, 14, ‘Now
follows the Ni/^reyasadana,’ &c.), but at the same time the
latter set of attributes, viz. being the richest and so on, is
not mentioned.—The question then is whether those quali¬
ties which are mentioned in some places only are, for the
purposes of meditation, to be inserted there also where
nothing is said about them.
They are not so to be inserted, the purvapakshin main¬
tains, on account of the employment of the word ‘ thus.’ In
the Kaushitakin-text we meet with the clause, ‘He who
knows thus, having recognised the pre-eminence in pra^a.’
Now the word ‘thus’ which here indicates the object of
knowledge always refers to something mentioned not far off,
and cannot therefore denote a set of qualities mentioned in
other .Sakhas only. We therefore maintain that each of
the colloquies of the pranas must be considered complete
with the qualities stated in itself.
To this we make the following reply. The qualities
mentioned in one text are to be inserted in the other cor¬
responding texts also, ‘ Since on the whole they are non-
different,’ i. e. because the prana-vidyas are recognised to be
the same in all essential points. And if they are the same,
under discussion as follows, ‘ Let a man meditate on the syllable
Om which is (i. e. which is a part of) the udgitha.’
Ill ADHyAyA, 3 PADA, IT.
201
why should the qualities stated in one not be inserted in the
others also?—But how about the objection founded by the
purvapakshin on the employment of the word ‘ thus ? 5 —
Although it is true, we reply, that the word ‘ thus ’ in the
Kaushitakin-brahma^a does not denote the set of qualities
mentioned in the Va^asaneyin-brahma^a, yet that set of
qualities is denoted by the ‘thus 5 met with in the Va^a-
saneyin-brahma;za, while the vidya is, as proved by us, one
and the same; hence no difference has to be made between
qualities mentioned in one’s own .Sakha and qualities men¬
tioned in another Sakha, as long as the vidya is one and the
same. Nor does this by any means imply a disregard of the
text of scripture, and the assumption of things not warranted
by the text. The qualities declared in one Sctkha are valid
for all scripture as long as the thing to which the qualities
belong is the same. Devadatta, who in his own country is
known to possess valour and certain other qualities, does
not lose those qualities by going to a foreign land, although
the inhabitants of that land may know nothing about them.
And through better acquaintance his qualities will become
manifest to the people of the foreign country also. Similarly
the qualities stated in one Sakha may, through special
application, be inserted in another Sakha.—Hence the attri¬
butes belonging to one and the same subject have to be
combined wherever that subject is referred to, although
they may be expressly stated in one place only.
ii. Bliss and other (qualities) as belonging to the
subject of the qualities (have to be attributed to
Brahman everywhere).
Those scriptural texts which aim at intimating the
characteristics of Brahman separately ascribe to it various
qualities, such as having bliss for its nature, being one mass
of knowledge, being omnipresent, being the Self of all and
so on. Now the doubt here presents itself whether in each
place where Brahman is spoken of we have to understand
only those qualities which actually are mentioned there,
or whether we have to combine all qualities of Brahman
mentioned anywhere.
202
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
The purvapakshin maintains that only the attributes
actually stated are to be understood as referred to in each
particular scriptural text.—But this view the Sutrakara dis¬
cards by declaring that delight and all the other qualities
which belong to the subject, i.e. Brahman, are all of them
to be understood in each place. The reason for this conclu¬
sion is the one given in Sutra 10. In all the passages treat¬
ing of Brahman the subject to which the qualities belong is
one, non-different; hence, as explained at length under the
preceding Sutra, the qualities attributed to Brahman in
any one place have to be combined wherever Brahman is
spoken of.
But in that case also such qualities as having joy for its
head, &c., would have to be ascribed to Brahman every¬
where ; for we read in the Taittiriyaka with reference to the
Self consisting of Bliss, ‘Joy is its head, satisfaction is its
right arm, great satisfaction its left arm, bliss is its trunk,
Brahman is its tail, its support’ (II, 5).
To this objection the next Sutra replies.
12. (Such qualities as) joy being its head and so
on have no force (for other passages); for increase
and decrease belong to plurality (only).
Attributes such as having joy for its head and so on,
which are recorded in the Taittiriyaka, are not to be viewed
as having force with regard to other passages treating of
Brahman, because the successive terms, ‘Joy,’ 4 Satisfaction,’
4 Great Satisfaction,’ 4 Bliss,’ indicate qualities possessing
lower and higher degrees with regard to each other and to
other enjoyers. Now for higher and lower degrees there is
room only where there is plurality; and Brahman is without
all plurality, as we know from many scriptural passages
(‘ One only, without a Second’).—Moreover, we have already
demonstrated under I, 1, 12, that having joy for one’s head
and so on are qualities not of Brahman, but of the so-called
involucrum of delight. And further, those qualities are
attributed to the highest Brahman merely as means of
fixing one’s mind on it, not as themselves being objects of
Ill ADHYAYA, 3
PADA, 13.
203
contemplation, and from this also it follows that they are
not valid everywhere 1 .—That the AMrya refers to them, in
the Sutra, as attributes of Brahman (while in reality they are
attributes of the anandamaya ko^a) is merely done for the
purpose of establishing a general principle to be extended
to all attributes of Brahman—also the undoubted ones—
which are stated with a view to a special form of meditation
only; such as the quality of being that towards which all
blessings go ( Kh . Up. IV, 15, 2), or he whose desires are true
( Kh . Up. VIII, 7, 1). For those passages may all indeed
have to do with the one Brahman as the object of medi¬
tation, but as owing to the different nature of the opening
sentences the meditations are different ones, the attributes
mentioned in any one are not valid for the others. The
case is analogous to that of two wives ministering to one
king, one with a fly-flap, the other with an umbrella ; there
also the object of their ministrations is one, but the acts of
ministration themselves are distinct and have each their
own particular attributes. So in the case under discussion
also. Qualities in which lower and higher degrees can be
distinguished belong to the qualified Brahman only in which
plurality is admitted, not to the highest Brahman raised
above all qualification. Such attributes therefore as having
true desires and the like which are mentioned in some
particular place only have no validity for other meditations
on Brahman.
13. But other (attributes are valid for all passages
relative to Brahman), the purport being the same.
Other attributes, however, such as bliss and so on which
scripture sets forth for the purpose of teaching the true
nature of Brahman are to be viewed as valid for all passages
referring to Brahman ; for their purport, i.e. the Brahman
1 For if they are not real attributes of Brahman there is all the
less reason to maintain them to be universally valid. The mere
means of fixing the mind, moreover, are special to each separate
upasana.
204
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
whose nature is to be taught, is one. Those attributes are
mentioned with a view to knowledge only, not to meditation.
14. (The passage, Kanaka I, 3, 10, gives informa¬
tion about the person) for the purpose of pious
meditation, as there is no use (of the knowledge of
the objects being higher than the senses and so on).
We read in the Kanaka (I, 3,10), c Higher than the senses
are the objects, higher than the objects there is the mind,
&c. &c.; higher than the person there is nothing—this is
the goal, the highest road/—Here the doubt arises whether
the purport of the passage is to intimate that each of the
things successively enumerated is higher than the preceding
one, or only that the person is higher than all of them.
The purvapakshin maintains the former alternative, for
the reason that the text expressly declares the objects to be
higher than the senses, the mind higher than the objects
and so on.
The objection that the assumption of the passage intend¬
ing to represent many things as successively superior to
their antecedents would involve a so-called split of the
sentence, he meets by the remark that the passage may be
viewed as containing a plurality of sentences. Many sen¬
tences may represent many things as superior to their
antecedents, and hence each clause of the passage must be
viewed as containing a separate statement of the superiority
of something to other things.
To this we reply as follows.
We must assume that the whole passage aims at intimat¬
ing only that the person is higher than everything. Any
information as to the relative superiority of the preceding
members of the series would be devoid of all purpose; for
of the knowledge derived from such observation a use is
neither to be seen nor declared by scripture. Of the know¬
ledge, on the other hand, of the person being higher than
the senses and everything else, raised above all evil, we do
see a purpose, viz. the accomplishment of final release. And
so scripture also says, c He who has perceived that is freed
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 6.
205
from the jaws of death’ (I, 3, 15). Moreover, the text by
declaring that nothing is higher than the person and that he
is the highest goal intimates reverence for the person, and
thereby shows that the whole series of objects is enumerated
only to the end of giving information about the person.—
‘ For the purpose of pious meditation,’ i.e. for the purpose
of perfect knowledge which has pious meditation for its
antecedent. For the passage under consideration does not
teach pious meditation by itself.
15. And on account of the word ‘ Self/
The above conclusion is confirmed by the circumstance
that the person under discussion is called the Self in I,
3, 12, 4 That Self is hidden in all beings and does not
shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their
sharp and subtle intellect.’ From this we conclude that
the text wishes to represent the other beings enumerated
as the Non-Self. The passage quoted, moreover, indicates
that the person is hard to know, and to be reached by sharp
minds only.—Again, the passage (I, 3, 13), 4 A wise man
should keep down speech and mind,’ enjoins pious medi¬
tation as a means of the knowledge of the highest person,
as we have explained under I, 4, 1.—It thus follows that
scripture indicates various excellences in the case of the
purusha only, and not in that of the other beings enu¬
merated.—The passage, moreover, 4 He reaches the end of
his journey and that is the highest place of Vishnu,’ sug¬
gests the question as to who is the end of the journey
and so on, and we therefore conclude that the enumera¬
tion of the senses, objects, &c., has merely the purpose of
teaching the highest place of Vish;zu (not of teaching any¬
thing about the relation of the senses, objects, and so on).
16. The (highest) Self has to be understood (in
Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1), as in other places; on account of
the subsequent (qualification).
We read in the Aitareyaka (II, 4, 1), 4 Verily, in the
beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing
206
vedAnta-s£tras.
else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth
worlds ? He sent forth these worlds, the (heavenly) waters,
the rays, the mortal (earth), and water.’—Here the doubt
presents itself whether the term ‘ Self’ denotes the highest
Self or some other being.
The purvapakshin maintains the latter view, which is
borne out, he says, by an examination of the connected
sense of the whole passage.—But, an objection is raised, an
examination of that kind rather leads to the conclusion that
the highest Self is meant; for the passage says that before
the creation the Self only existed and that the creation was
preceded by thought.—No such conclusion is possible, the
purvapakshin replies, since the passage relates the creation
of the worlds. If it aimed at representing the highest Self
as the creator, it would speak of the creation of the elements,
of which the worlds are only certain combinations. That
the worlds are meant by the terms c water,’ &c., appears
from the subsequent clause (4), ‘ That water is above the
heaven,’ &c.—Now Sruti and Smrzti teach that the creation
of the worlds is accomplished by some inferior Lord dif¬
ferent from—and superintended by—the highest Self; cp.
e.g. B ru Up. 1 ,4,1, ‘ In the beginning this was Self alone, in
the shape of a person,’ and the Smrzti-passage, ‘ He is the
first embodied soul, he is called the person ; he the prime
creator of the beings was in the beginning evolved from
Brahman.’ And the Aitareyins themselves record in a pre¬
vious prakara/za (II, 1, 3, 1, ‘ Next follows the origin of
seed. The seed of Pra^apati are the Devas ’) that this
manifold creation was accomplished by Pra^apati. That
to the latter being the word ‘ Self ’ is sometimes applied
appears from the passage quoted above from the B ri. Up.
And Pra^apati also may be spoken of as being before the
creation one only, if we consider that then his products did
not yet exist; and thought also may be ascribed to him as
he, of course, is of an intelligent nature. Moreover, the
passages, ‘ He led a cow towards them ; he led a horse
towards them; he led man towards them ; then they said, 5
&c. (11,4, 2), which are in agreement with what is known
about the various activities of particular qualified Selfs be-
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7.
207
longing to the apparent world, show that in the Aitareyaka
also some such qualified Self is meant.
To this we reply that the highest Self is meant in the Aita¬
reyaka ‘as in other places.’ As in other accounts of the
creation (‘ From that Self ether was produced,’ Taitt. Up. II,
1, &c.) the highest Self has to be understood, and, as in other
cases where the term ‘Self’ is applied to particular Selfs, the
‘ Self within 5 (i.e. the highest Self) has to be understood in
the first place ; so it is here also.—In those passages, on the
other hand, where the Self is qualified by some other attri¬
bute, such as ‘having the shape of a person,’ we must un¬
derstand that some particular Self is meant.—In the Aitare¬
yaka, however, we meet with a qualification, subsequent to
the first reference to the Self, which agrees only with the
highest Self; we mean the one implied in the passage, ‘He
thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these
worlds.’—Hence we maintain that the highest Self is
meant.
17. Should it be said that on account of the con¬
nected meaning (of the whole passage) (the highest
Self cannot be meant); (we reply that) it is so, on
account of the assertion.
We now have to refute the objection, made above by the
purvapakshin, that the highest Self cannot be meant ‘ on
account of the connected meaning of the passage.’—The
Sutrakara remarks, ‘ It is so, on account of the assertion.’
That means: It is appropriate to understand the passage
as referring to the highest Self, because thus the assertion
that the Self, previously to the creation, was one only, gives
a fully satisfactory sense, while on the other interpretation
it would be far from doing so. The creation of the worlds
recorded in the Aitareyaka we connect with the creation of
the elements recorded in other Vedic texts, in that way that
we understand the worlds to have been created subsequently
to the elements; just as we showed above (11,4, x ) that
the passage, ‘ It sent forth fire,’ must be understood to say
that the creation of fire followed on the creation of ether
208
vedAnta-s6tras.
and air as known from other texts. For, as proved by us
before, particulars mentioned in one scriptural text have to
be combined with particulars mentioned in other texts, if
only the chief subject of the passages is the same.—The
details about the activity of the Self referred to by the pur-
vapakshin have likewise to be understood in such a way as
to agree with the general matter about which the text de~
sires to make assertions. For we must by no means assume
that the text is interested in setting forth all the details of
the story on their own account; the knowledge of them
would be in no way beneficial to man. The only thing the
text really means to teach is the truth that Brahman is the
Self of everything. Hence it first relates how the different
worlds and the guardians of the worlds, viz. Agni and so
on, were created ; explains thereupon the origination of the
organs and the body, their abode ; and shows how the
creator having thought, c How can all this be without me?’
(II, 4, 3, 4), entered into this body, ‘ Opening the suture of
the skull he got in by that door’ (7). Then again the text
relates how the Self after having considered the activities
of all the organs (‘ if speech names/ &c.; 6) asked himself
the question, ‘What am I?’ and thereupon ‘saw this person
as the widely spread Brahman’ (10). The aim of all which
is to declare that Brahman is the universal Self. The same
truth is inculcated in a subsequent passage also, viz. II, 6,
1 , 5; 6, where the text at first enumerates the whole aggre¬
gate of individual existences together with the elements,
and then continues, ‘ All this is led by knowledge (i.e. the
highest Self); it rests on knowledge. The world is led by
knowledge, knowledge is its rest, knowledge is Brahman. 5
—For all these reasons the view that the highest Brahman
is meant in the Aitareyaka is not open to any objections.
The two preceding Sutras may also be explained with
reference to some other Vedic passages. We read in the
Va£*asaneyaka (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 7)5 ‘Who is that Self?—
He who is within the heart, surrounded by the pra/zas,
consisting of knowledge, the person of light.’ Of the Self
here first mentioned the text goes on to show that it is
free from all contact and thus proves it to have Brahman
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 7.
209
for its Self, the concluding statement being, 4 This great
unborn Self undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is
indeed Brahman’ (IV, 4, 25).—In the AVzandogya again
we have a chapter in which the introductory statement
does not use the term 4 Self y (‘ Being only this was in the
beginning, one, without a second ’), while at the conclusion
the term 'Self'’ is used in the declaration of identity (‘That
is the Self. Thou art that’).—A doubt here arises whether
these two scriptural texts treat of the same matter or not.
They do not, the purvapakshin maintains, since they are
not equal. Since the determination of the sense depends
on the letter of the text, we have no right to maintain
equality of sense where the texts differ. In the Va^asa-
neyaka the initial statement about the Self shows that the
whole passage conveys instruction about the true nature of
the Self. In the TTMndogya, on the other hand, the initial
clause is of a different kind, and we therefore must assume
that the whole passage imparts instruction differing in nature
from that of the Va^asaneyaka.—But has it not been said
that the .Oandogya-passage also teaches in the end the
doctrine of universal identity with the Self?—That has been
said indeed (but wrongly); for as the concluding passage
must be made to agree with the initial passage (which latter
does not say anything about the identity of the Self and
Brahman), we assume that the concluding passage merely
enjoins an imaginative combination (sampatti) of the Self
and Brahman.
To this we reply that also the passage, 4 Being only this
was in the beginning,’ has to be understood as referring
to the Self; ‘as other places,’ i. e. in the same way as
the passage quoted from the Va^asaneyaka. For what
reason?—‘On account of the subsequent (statement),’viz.
the statement as to identity. And if it be said that ‘ on
account of the connected meaning ’ of the initial passage
in which no mention is made of the Self, the chapter
cannot be understood to refer to the Self; we reply ‘ that
it may be so understood on account of the assertion ’ made
in the passage about that 4 by which we hear what is not
heard, perceive what is not perceived, know what is not
[38] P
210
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
known. 5 For this passage asserts that through the know¬
ledge of one thing all things become known, and to make
good this assertion the text later on declares that ‘ Being
only this was/ &c. Now this knowledge of all things
through one thing is possible only if we understand the pas¬
sage last quoted to refer to the Self; for if the principal
Self were not known, how could all things be known?
Moreover the assertion that, before creation, there existed
one thing only, and the reference to the individual soul
by means of the word c Self/ and the statement that in
deep sleep the soul becomes united with the True, and the
repeated inquiries on the part of Nvetaketu, and the
repeated assertions, ‘ Thou art that/—all this is appropriate
only if the aim of the whole section is not to enjoin an
imaginative meditation on all things as identical with the
Self, but to teach that the Self really is everything.—Nor
must it be said that, in the section under discussion, the
concluding passage must be interpreted so as to agree
with the introductory clause (and cannot on that account
teach anything about the Self ); for the introductory
passage declares neither that the Self is everything, nor
that the Non-self is everything (but merely makes a
statement regarding what is in general), and such an
altogether general statement cannot be in conflict with
any particular statement made in a supplementary passage,
but rather is in want of some such particular statement
whereby to define itself 1 .—And moreover (to view the
matter from a different point of view), the word 4 Being 5
if looked into closely can denote nothing else but the
principal Self, since we have proved, under II, i, 14, the
unreality of the whole aggregate of being different from
the Self.—Nor, finally, does a difference of expression
necessarily imply a difference of sense ; not any more than
in ordinary language the two phrases, c Bring that vessel
1 I.e. the definite statement about the Self in the concluding
passage may be used for defining the sense of the indefinite initial
statement about that which is. ‘That which is’ comprises the
Self as well as the Not-Self.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 8 .
21 I
over there,’ and, 4 That vessel over there, bring it,’ have
different meanings.—It therefore remains a settled con¬
clusion that in texts such as discussed above, the matter
of instruction is the same, however much the mode may
vary in which the instruction is conveyed.
18 . As (scripture where speaking of the rinsing of
the mouth with water) makes a reference to an act
(established by Smrzti), (that act is not enjoined by
•Sruti, but rather) the new (act of meditation on the
water viewed as the dress of pra/za).
The A 7 /andogas as well as the Va^asaneyins record, in
the colloquy of the pranas, that the food of Breath com¬
prizes everything even unto dogs and birds, and that water
is its dress. To this the A 7 zandogas add, ‘Therefore when
going to eat food they surround it before and after with
water’ ( Kh . Up. V, 2, 2). And the Va^*asaneyins add
(Bn. Up. VI, 1, 14), ‘.Srotriyas who know this rinse the
mouth with water when they are going to eat and rinse
the mouth with water after they have eaten, thinking that
thereby they make the breath dressed. Therefore a man
knowing this is to rinse the mouth with water when going
to eat and after having eaten; he thereby makes that
breath dressed.’—These texts intimate two things, rinsing
of the mouth and meditation on the breath as dressed.
The doubt then arises whether the texts enjoin both these
matters, or only the rinsing of the mouth, or only the
meditation on breath as dressed.
The purvapakshin maintains that the text enjoins both,
since the one as well as the other is intimated by the text,
and since both matters not being settled by any other
means of knowledge are worthy of being enjoined by the
Veda.—Or else, he says, the rinsing of the mouth only is
enjoined, since with reference to the latter only the text
exhibits the particular injunctive verbal form (‘he is to
rinse ’). In this latter case the mention made in the text
of the meditation on breath as dressed has merely the
purpose of glorifying the act of rinsing.
P 2
212
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
To this we make the following reply.—The rinsing of
the mouth cannot possibly be enjoined by the quoted
passages ‘ since they merely contain references to an act/
i.e. since they merely contain remarks concerning the
purificatory act of rinsing the mouth which is known from
and settled by Smrzti.—But are not the very 5 ruti-passages
under discussion to be looked upon as the fundamental texts
on which the Smrzti-injunctions regarding the rinsing of
the mouth are based ?—This is not possible, we reply, since
the vSruti and Smrzti-passages refer to different matters.
All the Smrzti-passages enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth
only in so far as it purifies man ; while the quoted vSruti
texts which occur in prazza-vidy&s, if enjoining the rinsing of
the mouth at all, enjoin it with reference to the knowledge
of pra/za. And a 6ruti-passage cannot constitute the basis
of a Smr/ti-passage referring to an altogether different
matter. Nor can it be maintained that the vSruti-passage
enjoins some altogether new rinsing of the mouth connected
with the prazza-vidya, as we recognise the rinsing mentioned
in vSruti as the ordinary rinsing performed by men for the
sake of purification.—The preceding argumentation already
precludes the alternative of two matters being enjoined,
which would moreover lead to a so-called split of the sen¬
tence.—We therefore conclude that the text—with reference
to the rinsing of the mouth before and after eating which is
enjoined by Smrzti— enjoins (by means of the passage,
‘thinking that thereby they make the breath dressed’) a
new mental resolve with regard to the water used for rinsing
purposes, viz. that that water should act as a means for
clothing the pra/za. The statement about the clothing of the
pra/za cannot (as suggested by the purvapakshin) be taken
as a glorification of the act of rinsing the mouth ; for in the
first place the act of rinsing is not enjoined in the Vedic
passage \ and in the second place we apprehend that the
passage itself conveys an injunction, viz. of the mental
1 A glorifying arthavada-passage would be in its place only if
it were preceded by some injunction; for the glorification of
certain acts is meant to induce men to comply with the injunctions
concerning those acts.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 18.
213
resolve to provide clothing for the pra;za. Nor must the
objection be raised that in that case two purposes are
admitted for the one act of rinsing the mouth, viz. the
purpose of purification and the purpose of providing the
pra/za with clothing. For we have actually to do not with
one action, but with two separate actions. For one action
is the rinsing of the mouth which serves the purpose of
purifying man, and another action is the mental resolve
that that water should serve the purpose of clothing the
pra/za. Similarly the preceding passage, ‘ Whatever there
is, even unto dogs, &c., that is thy food/ does not enjoin
the promiscuous use of food of all kinds—for that would be
contrary to scripture and impossible in itself—but merely
enjoins the meditation on all food as food of the pra/za. We
therefore conclude that also the passage, ‘ Water is thy dress/
which forms the immediate continuation of the passage last
quoted does not enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth but
merely the act of meditating on the rinsing-water as con¬
stituting the dress of the pra/za.
Moreover the mere present-form, ‘ they rinse the mouth
with water/ has no enjoining force.—But also in the passage,
‘They think that thereby they make the breath dressed/we
have a mere present-form without injunctive power (and yet
you maintain that that passage conveys an injunction)!—
True ; but as necessarily one of the two must be enjoined 1 ,
we assume, on the ground of what the text says about the
making of a dress, that what is enjoined is the meditation
on water being the dress of pra/za; for this is something
‘new/ i.e. not established by other means of knowledge 2 .
The rinsing of the mouth with water, on the other hand, is
already established by other means (i.e. Smrzti), and there¬
fore need not be enjoined again.—The argument founded
1 Because otherwise we should have only arthavadas. But
arthavadas have a meaning only in so far as connected with an
injunction.
2 The above argumentation avails itself of the Sutra, putting a
new construction on it.—Tarhi dvayor avidheyatvam ity ayankyanu-
vadamatrasya*ki#/£itkaratvad anyataravidher ava.syakatve samkalpa-
nam eva vidheyam iti vidhantare/za sutrazzz yqgayati. An. Gi.
214
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
by the purvapakshin on the circumstance that, in the B ri.
Up., the verb ‘to rinse’ is found in the injunctive form
(‘therefore a man, &c., is to rinse'’), is already refuted by
our showing that the act of rinsing the mouth is not a new
one (and therefore requires no Vedic injunction).
For the very reason that the text does not aim at enjoin¬
ing the rinsing of the mouth, the Ka^vas (in their recension
of the B ri. Up.) conclude the chapter with the clause, ‘ They
think,’ &c., and do not add the concluding clause of the
Madhyandinas, ‘Therefore a man,’ &c. From this we have
to conclude that what is enjoined in the text of the Madhy¬
andinas also is ‘ the knowledge of that,’ i. e. the knowledge
of the water being the dress of the previously mentioned
pra//a.—Nor finally can it be maintained that in one place
(i.e. the M 4 dhyandina-^akha) the rinsing of the mouth
is enjoined, and in other places the knowledge of water
as the dress of pra^a ; for the introductory passage, ‘ Water
is the dress,’ is the same everywhere.—We are therefore
entitled to conclude that what is enjoined in all 5 akhas is
the cognition of water being the dress of the pra;za.
19. In the same (.Sakha also) it is thus (i.e. there
is unity of vidya), on account of the non-difference
(of the object of meditation).
In the Agnirahasya forming part of the Va^asaneyksakha
there is a vidya called the Sa^ilya-vidya, in which we
meet with the following statement of particulars, ‘ Let him
meditate on the Self which consists of mind, which has the
pra/^a for its body and light for its form,’ &c.—In the Bri-
had-araz/yaka again, which belongs to the same Sakha, we
read (V, 10, 6), ‘ That person consisting of mind, whose being
is light, is within the heart, small like a grain of rice or
barley. He is the ruler of all, the Lord of all—he rules all
this whatsoever exists.’—A doubt here presents itself
whether these two passages are to be taken as one vidya in
which the particulars mentioned in either text are to be
combined or not.
The purvapakshin maintains that we have to do with two
separate vidyas whose particulars cannot be combined. For
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9.
215
otherwise, he argues, the text could not be cleared from the
reproach of useless repetition. As long as we have to do
with texts belonging to different Nakhas we can rebut the
charge of useless repetition by pointing to the fact that the
texts are read and known by separate classes of men; we
can then ascertain the unity of the vidyas and combine the
particulars mentioned in one text only with those mentioned
in the others ; so e.g. in the colloquy of the pra/zas. On the
other hand, texts belonging to one and the same 5akha
cannot be freed from the reproach of tautology as the same
persons study and know them, and passages occurring in
different places cannot therefore be combined into one vidya.
Nor can we make out a separate position for each of the
texts of the latter kind by saying that it is the task of one
text to enjoin the vidya and that of the other to enjoin the
particulars of the vidya. For in that case each of the
two passages would mention only such particulars as are
not mentioned in the other one; while as a matter of
fact particulars common to both as well as not common to
both are mentioned in each. Hence the particulars of the
one passage are not to be combined with those of the other.
To this we make the following reply. Just as passages
met with in different 5akhas form one vidya in which the
different particulars are to be combined, so the two passages
under discussion also, although belonging to one and the
same Nakha, constitute one vidya only, since the object of
meditation is the same in both. For as such we recognise
Brahman possessing certain qualities such as consisting of
mind and so on. Now we know that the object constitutes
the character of a meditation; as long as there is no differ¬
ence of character we cannot determine difference of vidya ;
and if there is no difference of vidya the particulars men¬
tioned in different places cannot be held apart.—But has it
not been demonstrated above that the vidyas have to be
held apart, as otherwise tautology would arise?—Tautology
does not result, we reply, because the two passages may be
understood to have each its particular meaning, one of them
enjoining the vidy£, and the other the particulars of the
vidya.—But in that case the Brzhad-arazzyaka ought to
216
vedanta-s(jtras.
mention only those points which are not mentioned in the
Agnirahasya, as e.g. c he is the Lord of all; ’ while it ought
not to mention what is already mentioned in the Agni¬
rahasya, as e.g. the Selfs consisting of mind !—Not so, we
reply. Only the repetition, in one passage, of what is
already mentioned in the other passage enables us to
recognise the vidya. The Brzhad-ara/^yaka-passage, by
mentioning some common qualities, first enables us to
recognise the vSa/^ilya-vidya, and then teaches certain
particulars with reference to the latter; how otherwise
should we know that the Brz.-passage is meant to enjoin
particulars for the Sa;^ilya-vidya ? Moreover, as in a
passage which has a purpose of its own in so far as it
teaches something not yet established, a reference to some¬
thing already established is justified on the ground of its
being a (so-called) nityanuvada, we cannot overlook the
recognition (of the identity of the passage with another one)
which is rendered possible through that anuvada. Hence,
although the two passages belong to one and the same
Sakha, they yet constitute one vidya only, and their particu¬
lars have to be combined into one whole.
20. Thus in other cases also, on account of the con¬
nexion (of particulars with one and the same vidya).
We read in the Brzhad-ara//yaka (V, 5), £ The true is
Brahman/ and, further on, ‘Now what is the true, that is the
Aditya, the person that dwells in yonder orb, and the person
in the right eye/ Having thus declared the different abodes
of that true Brahman with reference to the gods and with
reference to the body, and having, in what follows, identified
its body with the sacred syllables (bhu/*, &c.), the text
teaches its two secret names (upanishad), ‘ Its secret name
is ahar 5 with reference to the gods ; and ‘ its secret name is
aham ’ with reference to the body.—A doubt here arises
whether these two secret names are both to be applied to
the deva-abode of Brahman as well as to its bodily abode,
or only one name to each.
The above Sutra maintains the purvapaksha view. Just
as certain particulars though recorded elsewhere are yet
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PA DA, 21 .
217
to be combined with the Sandilya-vidya, so we have to
proceed in other cases also, as e. g. the one under discus¬
sion, because the particulars mentioned are all connected
with one vidya. The vidya of the True with its double
reference to the Devas and to the body is one only, as we
infer from the fact of its having one exordium only (‘ The
true is Brahman 5 ), and from the way in which the text
interconnects Aditya and the person in the eye. Why
then should an attribute belonging to one of the latter
not belong to the other also ? For, to quote an analogous
case, certain rules of life which are prescribed for a teacher
—as e. g. having a following of pupils—remain equally valid
whether the teacher be in a village or in a wood. For
these reasons both secret names equally belong to the
Aditya as well as to the person within the eye. This view
the next Sutra refutes.
21. Or this is not so, on account of the difference
(of place).
The two secret names do not apply quite equally to
the two persons mentioned, because they are connected
with different places in the vidya. For the clause, 4 Its
secret name is ahar, 5 the text exhibits in connexion with
the person in the solar orb, while the clause, ‘ Its secret
name is aham, 5 occurs in connexion with the person in the
eye. Now the pronoun ‘its 5 always refers to something
mentioned close by; we therefore conclude that the text
teaches each secret name as belonging to one special abode
of Brahman only. How then can both names be valid for
both ?—But, an objection is raised, the person within the
orb of the sun and the person within the eye are one only;
for the text teaches them both to be abodes of the one
true Brahman !—True, we reply; but as each secret name
is taught only with reference to the one Brahman as con¬
ditioned by a particular state, the name applies to Brahman
only in so far as it is in that state. We on our part also
illustrate the case by a comparison. The teacher always
remains the teacher ; yet those kinds of services which the
pupil has to do to the teacher when sitting have not to be
2 18
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
done when he stands; and vice versa.—The comparison,
on the other hand, instituted by the purvapakshin is ill
chosen, since the duties of the disciple towards his teacher
depend on the latter’s character as teacher, and that is not
changed by his being either in the village or the forest.—
Hence the two secret names have to be held apart.
22. (Scripture) also declares that.
Scripture moreover contains a distinct intimation that
the attributes under discussion are to be held apart. We
read, Kh . Up. I, 8, 5, ‘ The form of that person is the same
as the form of the other person, the joints of the one are
the joints of the other, the name of the one is the name of
the other.’—But how does this passage convey the desired
intimation?—By expressly transferring the attributes of
the person within the sun to the person within the eye;
for this express transfer shows that the text looks upon
the attributes of the two as separated by the difference
of abode and therefore not to be combined (unless specially
enjoined to be so combined).—The conclusion therefore
is that the two secret names are to be held apart.
23. And for the same reason the holding together
and the pervading the sky (attributed to Brahman
in the Ra^ayamya-khila) (are not to be inserted in
other vidyas).
In the khilas (supplementary writings) of the Ra^a-
yaniyas we meet with a passage, ‘ Held together are the
powers among which Brahman is the best; the best
Brahman in the beginning stretched out the sky V which
mentions certain energies of Brahman, such as holding
together its powers, entering into the sky, &c. And in the
1 Virya virya/zi parakramabheda^, anye hi purusha^ sahayan
apekshya vikraman bibhrati tena tatparakrama^am na ta eva niyat-
apurvatvarupakara^atvena ^yesh/M bhavanti ki m tu tatsahakarmo
*pi, brahmavirya^aw tu brahmaiva gykshth&m brahma gyesh/Mm
yesha m tani tatha brahma khalv ananyapekshaz# ^aga^anmadi
karoti. Kim Mnyeshazra parakrama^am balavadbhir madhye
bhanga^ sambhavati tena te svaviryam na bibhrati, brahmaviryam
tu brahma^a sambhrftani avighnena sambhrftany ity artha^. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 23.
219
Upanishad of the same (i. e. the Ra/zayaniyas) we meet
with vidyas of Brahman among which the wSaz/^/ilya-vidya
is the first.—The question then arises whether the energies
of Brahman just mentioned are to be inserted in those
Brahma-vidyas or not. To the purvapaksha view that
they are to be so inserted because they are connected with
Brahman, the Sutrakara replies that the holding together
and pervading the sky are not to be inserted in the
vSa/z^ilya-vidya and other vidyas, for the same reason,
i. e. on account of their being connected with different
abodes. In the vSa/z^ilya-vidya, Brahman is said to have
its abode in the heart, 4 He is the Self within the heart 5
(Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 3); the same statement is made in the
dahara-vidya, 4 There is the palace, the small lotus (of the
heart), and in it that small ether’ (VIII, 1, 1). In the
Upako^ala-vidya again, Brahman is said to reside within
the eye, 'That person that is seen in the eye’ (IV, 15, 1).
In all these vidyds Brahman is described as residing within
the body; it is therefore impossible to insert into them
the energies of Brahman which the khila of the Ra^a-
yaniyas mentions, and which are connected with the Devas
(i. e. external nature).—But the vidyas of the .Oandogya
likewise mention such powers of Brahman as are connected
with the Devas ; cp. e. g. Ill, 14, 3, 4 He is greater than the
heaven, greater than these worlds ; 5 IV, 15, 4, 4 He is also
Bhamani, for he shines in all worlds VIII, 1, 3, 4 As large
as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart.
Both heaven and earth are contained within it.’ And again
there are other vidyas of Brahman, such as the one which
represents Brahman as comprising sixteen parts, in which
not any special abode is mentioned.—True ; but there is a
special reason why the attributes stated in the Ra/zayaniya-
khila cannot be introduced into the other vidyas. Par¬
ticulars mentioned in one place can indeed be inserted in
vidyas met with in another place if the latter are suggested
to the mind by containing some reference to agreeing par¬
ticulars ; the qualities of holding together, however, on one
side and those mentioned in the vSa/z^ilya-vidya, &c., on
the other side are of such a nature as to exclude each
220
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
other, and therefore do not mutually suggest each other.
The mere circumstance of all the particulars being con¬
nected with Brahman does not suffice to suggest vidyas
occurring in other places ; for even in vidyas which are
avowedly separate, all the particulars may be connected
with Brahman. And it is an established fact that Brahman,
although one only, is, owing to the plurality of its powers,
meditated upon in more than one way, as shown under
Sutra 7 -—The conclusion therefore is that the attributes
of holding together its powers and so on are not to be
inserted in the 5 a;^ilya and similar vidyas.
24. And as the record of others (viz. the Taittiri-
yaka) is not such as in the purusha-vidya (of the
AT/zandogya), (the two purusha-vidyas are not to be
combined).
In the Rahasya-brahma/za of the Tazzafins and the
Paingins (the jOandogya) there is a vidya treating of
man, in which man is fancifully identified with the sacrifice,
the three periods of his life with the three libations, his
hunger and so on, with the diksha, &c. And other par¬
ticulars also are mentioned there, such as formulas of
prayer, use of mantras and so on.—A similar fanciful
assimilation of the sacrifice and man the Taittiriyakas
exhibit, 4 For him who knows thus the Self of the sacrifice
is the sacrificer, Faith is the wife of the sacrificer/ and so
on (Taitt. Ar. X, 64).—The doubt here arises whether the
particulars of the man-sacrifice given in the Khk ndogya
are to be inserted in the Taittiriyaka or not.
Against the view of the purvapakshin that they are so
to be inserted because in both places we have a purusha-
ya^Tza, we maintain that they are not to be inserted because
the characteristics of the purusha-ya^zza of the AVzandogas
are not recognised in the Taittiriya-text. This the Sutra-
kara expresses by saying, 4 As (the record of the followers
of some Sakhas, viz. the Tazzz/ins and Paingins, is) in the
purusha-vidya, not such is the record of others, 5 viz. the
Taittiriyakas. For the latter exhibit an identification of
man with the sacrifice, in which the wife, the sacrificer, the
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 24.
221
Veda, the vedi, the sacrificial grass, the post, the butter,
the sacrificial animal, the priest, &c., are mentioned in
succession ; none of which particulars are mentioned in the
iTMndogya. The use also to which the Taittiriyaka turns
the three libations is different from the K/tandogya. And
the few points in which the two texts agree, such as the iden¬
tification of the Avabrztha-ceremony with death, lose their
significance side by side with the greater number of dis¬
similarities, and are therefore not able to effect the recog¬
nition of the vidya.—Moreover the Taittiriyaka does not
represent man as the sacrifice (as the Khandogya does);
for the two genitives (‘ of him who thus knows 5 and ‘of
the sacrifice ’) are not co-ordinate, and the passage there¬
fore cannot be construed to mean, ‘ The knowing one who
is the sacrifice, of him the Self is/ &c. For it cannot be
said that man is the sacrifice, in the literal sense of the
word k The two genitives are rather to be taken in that
way, that one qualifies the other, ‘ The sacrifice of him
who thus knows, of that sacrifice/ &c. For the connexion
of the sacrifice with man (which is expressed by the geni¬
tive, ‘ the sacrifice of him ’) is really and literally true ;
and to take a passage in its literal meaning, if possible at
all, is always preferable to having recourse to a secondary
metaphorical meaningk Moreover the words next follow¬
ing in the Taittiriyaka-passage, ‘the Self is the sacrificer/
declare that man (man’s Self) is the sacrificer, and this
again shows that man’s relation to the sacrifice is not that
of co-ordination 1 2 3 . Moreover as the section beginning with
‘ Of him who thus knows ’ forms an anuvada of something
previously established (and as such forms one vakya to
which one sense only must be ascribed), we must not
bring about ‘ a split of the sentence 5 by interpreting it as
1 And therefore we are not warranted in taking the two genitives
as co-ordinate, as otherwise they might be taken.
2 Which latter would be the case if we should take the two
genitives as co-ordinate and therefore expressing an imaginative
identification of the man and the sacrifice.
3 If man is the sacrificer he cannot be identified with the
sacrifice; he is rather the Lord of the sacrifice.
222
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
teaching in the first place that man is the sacrifice, and
in the second place that the Self and the other beings
enumerated are the sacrificer and so on. And as we see
that the passage, ‘Of him who thus knows,’ &c., follows
upon some instruction about the knowledge of the Self
coupled with sazzznyasa, we apprehend that the Taittiri-
yaka-chapter is not an independent vidya but merely
supplementary to the instruction previously given. In
agreement with this conclusion we observe that the Tait-
tiriyaka promises only one result for both chapters, viz.
the one stated in the passage, ‘ He obtains the greatness
of Brahman.’—On the other hand the text embodying the
purusha-vidya in the jOandogya is an independent text;
for we see that an independent result is attached to it,
viz. an increase of length of life, ‘ He who knows this lives
on to a hundred and sixteen years.’—Hence the particulars
mentioned in the purusha-vidya of another vSakha, such as
formulas of prayer, mantras and so on, are not to be com¬
bined with the Taittiriya-text of the vidya.
25. Because the matter (of certain mantras) such
as piercing and so on is different (from the matter
of the approximate vidyds) (the former have not to
be combined with the latter).
At the beginning of an Upanishad of the Atharvazzikas
the following mantra is recorded, £ Pierce him (the enemy)
whole, pierce his heart: crush his veins, crush his head;
thrice crushed,’ &c. At the beginning of the Upanishad
of the Tazzz/ins we have the mantra, c O God Savitar, pro¬
duce the sacrifice.’ At the beginning of that of the 5 a/ya-
yanins, ‘ Thou hast a white horse and art green as grass/
&c.; at the beginning of that of the Ka//zas and theTaitti-
riyakas, 'May Mitra be propitious to us and Varuzza/ &c.
At the beginning of the Upanishad of the Va^asaneyins we
have a Brahma/za-passage about the pravargya-ceremony,
‘ The gods indeed sat down to a sattra; ’ and at the begin¬
ning of that of the Kaushitakins there is a Brahmazza-passage
about the agnish/oma, ‘Brahman indeed is the Agnishfoma,
Brahman is that day ; through Brahman they pass into
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 25.
223
Brahman, immortality those reach who observe that day.’—
The point to be inquired into with reference to all these
mantras and the sacrifices referred to in the Brahma/^a-pas-
sages is whether they are to be combined with the vidyas
(contained in the Upanishads) or not.
The purvapakshin maintains that they are so to be
combined, because the text exhibits them in proximity to
the Upanishad-portions of the Brahma/zas whose chief
contents are formed by the vidyas.—But we do not observe
those mantras and sacrifices to be actually enjoined as sub¬
ordinate members of the vidyas !—True, but in spite of this
we, on the ground of proximity, infer them to be connected
with the vidyas. For we have no right to set aside the
fact of proximity as irrelevant as long as an inference can
be established on it.—But we are unable to see that the
mantras have anything to do with the vidyas, and how can
it be assumed that ceremonies, such as the pravargya which
scripture enjoins with reference to other occasions, sacrifices,
and so on, stand in any relation to the vidyas !—Never mind,
the purvapakshin replies. In the case of mantras we can
always imagine some meaning which connects them with
the vidyas; the first mantra quoted, e. g. may be viewed as
glorifying the heart. For the heart and other parts of the
body are often represented, in the vidyas, as abodes of
meditation, and hence mantras glorifying the heart, &c.,
may appropriately form subordinate members of those
vidyas. Some mantras, moreover, we clearly see to be
enjoined with reference to vidyas, so, e.g. the mantra, ‘I
turn to Bhu /5 with such and such 5 (. Kh . Up. Ill, 15, 3).
Sacrificial acts again may indeed be enjoined in connexion
with other occasions; yet there is no reason why they
should not also be applied to the vidyas, just as the
offering called Brzhaspatisava is a subordinate part of the
Va^apeya-sacrifice h
To this we make the following reply. The mantras and
1 The Bnhaspatisava, although enjoined with special reference to
him who is desirous of Brahmavar^as, is yet at the same time a
subordinate part of the Va^apeya-sacrifice. Cp. Pu. Mi. Su. IV,
3 > 2 9 -
224
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
ceremonies mentioned cannot be drawn into connexion
with the vidyas, 4 because their matter, such as piercing the
heart, &c., is different (from the matter of the vidyas)/ and
therefore cannot be connected with the latter.—But has
it not been said above that the mantras may be connected
with the meditations enjoined in the vidyas, on the ground
of their coming of use in meditations on the heart, &c. ?—
The mantras, we reply, might be so employed, if their
entire contents were glorification of the heart, and the like;
but this is by no means the case. The mantra first quoted,
e. g. clearly expresses hostility to somebody, and is there¬
fore to be connected, not with the vidyas of the Upanishads,
but with some ceremony meant to hurt an enemy. The
mantra of the Ta/zafins again, ‘ O God Savitar, produce the
sacrifice, 5 indicates by its very words that it is connected
with some sacrifice; with what particular sacrifice it is
connected has to be established by other means of proof.
Similarly other mantras also—which, either by ‘ indica¬
tion 5 (linga), or ‘syntactical connexion 5 (vakya), or some
other means of proof, are shown to be subordinate to
certain sacrificial actions—cannot, because they occur in
the Upanishads also, be connected with the vidyas on the
ground of mere proximity. For that ‘ proximity/ as a
means of proof regarding the connexion of subordinate
matters with principal matters, is weaker than direct enun¬
ciation (Sruti), and so on, is demonstrated in the former
science (i.e. in the Purva Mimawsa) under III, 3, 14. Of
sacrificial works also, such as the pravargya, which are pri¬
marily enjoined with reference to other occasions, it cannot
be demonstrated that they are supplementary to vidyas
with which they have nothing in common. The case of
the Brzhaspatisava, quoted by the purvapakshin, is of an
altogether different kind, as there we have an injunction
clearly showing that that oblation is a subordinate member
of the Va^apeya, viz. c Having offered the Va£*apeya he
offers the Brzhaspatisava/ And, moreover, if the one
pravargya-ceremony has once been enjoined for a definite
purpose by a means of proof of superior strength, we must
not, on the strength of an inferior means of proof, assume
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 26.
225
it to be enjoined for some different purpose. A proceeding
of that kind would be possible only if the difference of the
means of proof were not apprehended; but in our case this
latter possibility is excluded since the relative strength
and weakness of the various means of proof is fully appre¬
hended (on the ground of the conclusions arrived at in the
Purva Mima^sa).—For these reasons the mentioned man¬
tras and acts are not, on the ground of mere textual collo¬
cation, to be viewed as supplementary to the vidyas of the
Upanishads. To account for the fact of their textual colloca¬
tion with the latter we must keep in view that the mantras, &c.
as well as the vidy&s have to be studied, &c. in the woods.
26. Where the getting rid (of good and evil) is
mentioned (the obtaining of this good and evil by
others has to be added) because the statement about
the obtaining is supplementary (to the statement
about the getting rid of), as in the case of the kui-as,
the metres, the praise and the singing. This (i.e.
the reason for this) has been stated (in the Purva
Mimawsa).
In the text of the Ta;^ins we meet with the following
passage: ‘ Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair,
and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from
the mouth of Rahu, I obtain self made and satisfied the
uncreated world of Brahman’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 13). Again,
in the text of the Atharvamkas, we read, ‘ Then knowing,
shaking off good and evil he reaches the highest oneness,
free from passion’ (Mu. Up. III. 1, 3). The Sa/yayanins
read, 4 His sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the
good, his enemies the evil he has done.’ And the
Kaushitakins, 4 He shakes off his good and his evil deeds.
His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved
relatives the evil he has done’ (Kau. Up. I, 4).—Of these
texts two state that the man who has reached true know¬
ledge rids himself of his good and evil deeds ; one, that his
friends and enemies obtain his good and evil deeds respec¬
tively; and one finally declares that both things take place.
[ 38 ] Q
226
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
This latter text calls for no remark; nor again that one which
refers only to his friends and enemies obtaining his good
and evil deeds ; for in order that they may obtain those
he must necessarily first have got rid of them, and the act
of getting rid of them has therefore to be supplied in the
text. Those passages, however, which merely mention a
man’s shaking off his deeds, give rise to a discussion
whether those deeds, when shaken off, are obtained by
his friends and enemies, or not. Here the purvapakshin
maintains that the latter circumstance is not to be supplied
in the two passages mentioned—firstly because the text
does not state it; secondly because what other 5 akhas
say about it falls within the sphere of a different vidya ;
and thirdly because the getting rid of the evil and good
deeds is something done by the man himself, while the
obtaining of them is the work of others. As thus there
is no necessary connexion between the two, we have no
right to supply the latter on the basis of the former.
To this we make the following reply. Although the
text mentions only the getting rid of the deeds, yet the
obtaining of them by others must necessarily be added,
because the statement concerning the latter is merely
supplementary to the statement about the former, as
appears from the text of the Kaushitakins.—In reply to
the arguments brought forward by the purvapakshin we
offer the following remarks.
The separation of the different passages would indeed
have to be insisted upon, if anybody intended to introduce
an injunction about something to be done, which is con¬
tained in one text only, into some other text also. But
in the passages under discussion the act of getting rid of—
and the act of obtaining—the good and evil deeds are
not mentioned as something to be performed, but merely
as implying a glorification of knowledge; the intended
sense being, c Glorious indeed is that knowledge through
whose power the good and evil deeds, the causes of the
sawsara, are shaken off by him who knows, and are trans¬
ferred to his friends and enemies.’ The passage thus
being glorificatory only, the teacher is of opinion that,
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 26. 2 2 7
to the end of strengthening the glorification, the obtaining
of the good and evil deeds by the friends and enemies—
which in some passages is represented as the consequence
of their being shaken off by the man who knows—must
be supplied in those passages also which mention only the
shaking off. That one arthavada-passage often depends
on another arthavada-passage is a well-known fact; the
following passage, e.g. 4 The twenty-first indeed from this
world is that sun,’ would be unintelligible if no regard
were paid to the other passage, ‘Twelve are the months,
five the seasons, three these worlds; that sun is the twenty-
first.’ Similarly the passage, ‘The two Trish/ubh verses
are for strengthening,’ necessarily requires to be taken in
connexion with the other passage, ‘ Strength of the senses
indeed is Trish/ubh.’ And as the statement about the
obtaining of the good and evil deeds has only the purpose
of glorifying knowledge (and is not made on its own
account), we need not insist too much on the question how
the results of actions done by one man can be obtained
by others. That the obtaining of the deeds by others is
connected with their being got rid of by the man who
knows, merely for the purpose of glorifying knowledge,
the Sutrakara moreover indicates by making use of the
expression, ‘because the statement about obtaining is
supplementary to,’ &c.; for if he wished to intimate that
the actual circumstance of other persons obtaining a man’s
good and evil deeds is to be inserted in those vidyas where
it is not mentioned he would say, ‘because the fact of
obtaining,’ &c. The Sutra therefore, availing itself of the
opportunity offered by the discussion of the combination of
particular qualities, shows how mere glorificatory passages
have to be inserted in texts where they are wanting.
The remaining part of the Sutra, ‘ Like the kujas, the
metres, the praise and the singing,’ introduces some analo¬
gous instances.—The case under discussion is analogous
to the case of the kiuas 1 . Those, a mantra of the Bhal-
1 I.e. according to the commentators, small wooden rods used
by the Udgatrzs in counting the stotras.
Q 2
228
VEDANTA-SfjTRAS.
lavins (‘You ku.yas are the children of the tree, do you
protect me! ’) represents as coming from trees in general,
without any specification. The corresponding mantra of
the vSa/yayanins on the other hand is, ‘You kuj*as are
the children of the Udumbara-tree; 5 a particularizing
statement which must be considered as valid for the koras
in general.—Another analogous case is that of the metres.
In some places no special statement is made about their
order of succession; but the text of the Paingins, ‘ The metres
of the Devas come first, 5 determines the general priority
of the metres of the Devas to those of the Asuras 1 .—
Similarly the time of the stotra accompanying the perform¬
ance of the Sho^ajin-rite which in some texts is left
undefined is settled by the text of the i?zg-vedins (ar k&h),
£ when the Sun has half risen.’—And similarly a particu¬
larizing text of the Bhallavins defines what priests have
to join in the singing; a point left unsettled in other
Srutis 2 .—As in these parallel cases, so we have to proceed
in the case under discussion also. For if we refused to
define a general text by another more particular one,
we should be driven to assume optional procedure (vikalpa),
and that the latter is if possible to be avoided is a well-
known principle. This is stated in the Purva Mima^sa-
sutras X, 8, 15.
The passages about the shaking (off) can be viewed as
giving rise to a different discussion also, and the Sutra
can accordingly be explained in a different manner. The
question can be raised whether the ‘ shaking 5 means the
getting rid of one’s good and evil deeds or something else.—
The purvapaksha will in that case have to be established
in the following manner. Shaking (dhu) here does not
mean * getting rid of,’ since the root ‘dhu 5 according to
grammar means shaking in an intransitive sense or
trembling; of flags streaming in the wind we say, for
1 Metres of less than ten syllables belong to the Asuras, those of
ten and more to the Devas.
2 The general text is, according to the commentators, ‘The
priests join in the singing;' the defining text of the Bhallavins, ‘The
adhvaryu does not join in the singing/
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 27.
229
instance, 4 the flags are shaking ’ (dodhuyante). We there¬
fore take the word in the same sense in the passages under
discussion and understand by the 4 trembling ’ of the good
and evil deeds the fact of their not meeting, for a certain
time, with their results.
To this purvapaksha we make the following reply. The
word ‘shaking 5 has to be taken in the sense of 4 getting
rid of,’ because it is supplemented by the statement of
others obtaining the good and evil deeds. For those
deeds cannot be obtained by others unless they are got
rid of by their former owner. Hence although it is not
easily imaginable that the deeds got rid of by one man
should be obtained by others, we yet, on the ground of
its being mentioned, may determine accordingly that
4 shaking 5 means 4 getting rid of. 5 And although only in
some passages the statement about the obtaining is
actually found in proximity to the statement about the
shaking, it yet has, on the ground of the latter, to be
supplied everywhere and thus becomes a general reason
of decision (viz. that ‘shaking’ means ‘getting rid of’).
Against the purvapakshin’s view we further remark that
good and evil deeds cannot be said to 4 tremble ’ in the
literal sense of the word, like flags in the wind, since
they are not of substantial nature.—(Nor must it be
said that of the horse which exemplifies the shaking^
the text only says that it shakes its hair, not that it
casts anything off, for) the horse when shaking itself
shakes off dust and also old hairs. And with that shaking
(which at the same time is a shaking off) the text expressly
compares the shaking (off) of evil.—Nor do we when
assigning different meanings to one and the same root
enter thereby into conflict with Smrzti (grammar). The
clause 4 this has been stated ’ we have already explained.
27. At the (moment of) departing (he frees him¬
self from his works), there being nothing to be
reached (by him, on the way to Brahman, through
those works); for thus others (declare, in their sacred
texts).
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
2 30
The Kaushitakins record in the paryanka-vidya how the
man (who possesses true knowledge) when approaching
Brahman seated on the couch frees himself on the way
from his good and evil deeds, ‘ He having reached the path
of the gods comes to the world of Agni,’ &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3),
and later on ( 1 ,4), ‘ He comes to the river Vi^arS, and crosses
it by the mind alone and there shakes off his good and evil
deeds.’—The question here arises whether in strict agree¬
ment with the text we have to understand that the deceased
man frees himself from his good and evil deeds on the way
to Brahman, or rather that he does so at the outset when he
departs from his body.
The letter of the text favouring the former alternative,
the Sutrakara rebuts it by declaring ‘ at the going, 5 i.e. at
the time of departing from the body the man frees himself,
through the strength of his knowledge, from his good and
evil deeds. The reason for this averment is assigned in the
words,‘On account of the absence of anything to be reached.’
For when the man possessing true knowledge has departed
from the body and is, through his knowledge, about to reach
Brahman, there exists nothing to be reached by him on the
way through his good and evil works, and we therefore
have no reason to assume the latter to remain uneffaced
during a certain number of moments. We rather have to
conclude that as the results of his good and evil works are
contrary to the result of knowledge, they are destroyed by
the power of the latter ; and that hence the moment of their
destruction is that moment in which he sets out toward the
fruit of his knowledge (i.e. the world of Brahman).—The
conclusion thus is that the deliverance of the man from his
works takes place early, and is only mentioned later on in
the text of the Kaushitakins.—Thus other Vakhas also, as
that of the Tkndms and Sa/yayanins, declare that he frees
himself from his deeds at an earlier stage ; cp. the passages,
‘ Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hair, 5 and ‘ His
sons obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies
the evil he has done. 5
28. And because (on the above interpretation)
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 29.
23I
there is no contradiction to both (i.e. man’s making
an effort to free himself from his deeds and actually
freeing himself) according to his liking.
Moreover if we assumed that the man frees himself from
his good and evil deeds on the way—after having departed
from the body and having entered on the path of the gods
—we should implicate ourselves in impossibilities ; for after
the body has been left behind, man can no longer accomplish,
according to his liking, that effort which consists in self-
restraint and pursuit of knowledge, and which is the cause
of the obliteration of all his good and evil deeds, and con¬
sequently that obliteration also cannot take place. We
therefore must assume that the requisite effort is made—
and its result takes place —at an earlier moment, viz. in the
state in which man is able to effect it, and that in conse¬
quence thereof man rids himself of his good and evil deeds.
Nothing then stands in the way of the conditioning and
the conditioned events taking place, and the assumption
moreover agrees with the statements of the Ta/z^ins and
Sa/yayanins.
29. A purpose has to be attributed to the going
(on the path of the gods) in a twofold manner;
otherwise there would be contradiction of scripture.
In some scriptural texts the (dead man’s) going on the
path of the gods is mentioned in connexion with his freeing
himself from good and evil; in other texts it is not men¬
tioned. The doubt then arises whether the two things go
together in all cases or only in certain cases.—The purva-
pabshin maintains that the two are to be connected in all
cases, just as the man’s freeing himself from his good and
evil deeds is always followed by their passing over to his
friends and enemies.
To this we make the following reply. That a man’s
going on the path of the gods has a purpose is to be
admitted in a twofold manner, i.e. with a distinction only.
His going on that path has a sense in certain cases, in
others not. For otherwise, i.e. if we admitted that men,
232
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
in all cases, proceed on that path, we should have to
assume that even the passage, Mu. Up. Ill, i, 3, ‘ Shaking
off good and evil, free from passions, he reaches the highest
unity,’ refers to actual going through which another place
is reached, and that would clearly be contrary to reason.
For a person free from all desire and therefore non-moving
does not go to another place, and the highest unity is not
to be reached by a man transporting himself to another
locality.
30. (The twofold view taken above) is justified
because we observe a purpose characterised thereby
(i.e. a purpose of the going); as in ordinary life.
Our view of the matter, viz. that a man’s proceeding on
the path of the gods has a meaning in certain cases but not
in others, is justified by the following consideration. In
meditations on the qualified Brahman such as the paryanka-
vidya we see a reason for the man’s proceeding on the path
of the gods ; for the text mentions certain results which can
be reached only by the man going to different places, such as
his mounting a couch, his holding a colloquy with Brahman
seated on the couch, his perceiving various odours and so
on. On the other hand we do not see that going on the
path of the gods has anything to do with perfect know¬
ledge. For those who have risen to the intuition of the
Selfs unity, whose every wish is fulfilled, in whom the
potentiality of all suffering is already destroyed here below,
have nothing further to look for but the dissolution of the
abode of activity and enjoyment of former deeds, i.e. the
body; in their case therefore to proceed on the road of the
gods would be purposeless.—The distinction is analogous
to what is observed in ordinary life. If we want to reach
some village we have to proceed on a path leading there;
but no moving on a path is required when we wish to attain
freedom from sickness.—The distinction made here will be
established more carefully in the fourth adhyaya.
31. There is no restriction (as to the going on the
path of the gods) for any vidya; nor any contra-
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 31.
233
diction (of the general subject-matter), according to
scripture and inference (i.e. Smrzti).
We have shown that the going on the path of the gods
is valid only for the vidyas of the qualified Brahman, not for
the knowledge of the highest Brahman which is destitute of
all qualities.—Now we observe that the going on the path
of the gods is mentioned only in some of the qualified
vidyas, such as the paryanka-vidya, the pa;X£agni-vidya, the
upakoj-ala-vidya, the dahara-vidya; while it is not men¬
tioned in others,such as the madhu-vidya,the ici/zzfilya-vidya,
the sho^ai'akala-vidya, the vauvanara-vidyct.—The doubt
then arises whether the going on the path of the gods is to
be connected with those vidyas only in which it is actually
mentioned or generally with all vidyas of that kind.
The purvapakshin maintains the former view ; for, he
says, the limitative force of the general subject-matter of
each particular section compels us to connect the going on
the path of the gods with those vidy&s only which actually
mention it If we transferred it to other vidyas also, the
authoritativeness of scripture would suffer; for then any¬
thing might be the sense of anything. Moreover, the
details about the path of the gods beginning with light and
so on are given equally in the upakoj*ala-vidya and the
pazz/fagni-vidya, which would be a useless repetition if as a
matter of course the going on the path of the gods were
connected with all vidyas.
To this we make the following reply. The going on the
path of the gods is not to be restricted but to be connected
equally with all those qualified vidyas which have exaltation
(abhyudaya) for their result. The objection above raised
by the purvapakshin that thereby we contradict the general
subject-matter, we refute by appealing to scripture and
Sm/'zti. Scripture in the first place declares that not only
those ‘who know this,’ i.e. the pazz/£agni-vidya ( Kh . Up. V,
10, 1), proceed on the path of the gods, but also those who
understand other vidyas, ‘ and also those who in the forest
follow faith and austerities.’—But how do we know that the
latter passage refers to those who are conversant with other
234
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
vidyas ? The text certainly speaks of those only who are
intent on faith and austerities !—Not by faith and austerities
alone, we reply, unaided by knowledge, can that path be
attained ; for another scriptural passage says, 4 Through
knowledge they mount to that place from which all wishes
have passed away; those who are skilled in works only do
not go there, nor penitents devoid of knowledge’ (Nat. Bra.
X,5, 4 , id). We therefore conclude that faith and austerities
denote at the same time other vidyas.—The Va^'asaneyins
again read in the Pa£/£agni-vidya, ‘ Those who thus know
this and those who in the forest worship faith and the True.’
The latter part of this passage we must explain to mean,
‘ Those who in the forest with faith worship the True, i.e.
Brahman; 5 the term ‘the True’ being often employed to
denote Brahman. And as those who know the pa?X£agni-
vidya are in the above passage referred to as ‘ those who
thus know this,’ we must understand the clause, c and those
who in the forest,’ &c., as referring to men in the possession
of other vidy&s. And, moreover, also the passage, £ Those,
however, who know neither of these two paths become
worms, birds, and creeping things ’ (VI, 2, 16), which teaches
that those who miss the two paths have to go downwards,
intimates that those who possess other vidyas have to pro¬
ceed either on the path of the gods or that of the fathers,
and as their vidyas are as such not different from the
pa/zMgni-vidya, we conclude that they proceed on the path
of the gods (not on that of the fathers) 1 .
In the second place Smrfti also confirms the same
doctrine, £ These two, the white and the black path, are
known as the eternal paths of the world ; on the one man
goes not to return, on the other he again returns ’ (Bha. Gi.
VIII, 26).
With regard, finally, to the circumstance that the details
about the path of the gods are given in the Upako^ala-
1 Ita^ k& vidjantara^ilina^ gatir iti lingadar^ana^ samu^inoti
atheti, etan iti vidyantarapara gr/hyante, tathapi katha m deva-
yanayogas tesham ity a^ankya yogyatayety aha tatrapiti. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32.
235
vidya as well as the Pa/zMgni-vidya, we remark that the
repetition is meant to assist reflection.
For all these reasons the going on the path of the gods
is not limited to those vidyas in which it is actually
mentioned.
32. Of those who have a certain office there is
subsistence (of the body) as long as the office lasts.
The question here is whether for him who has reached
true knowledge a new body originates after he has parted
with the old one or not.—But, an objection is here raised
at the outset, there is really no occasion for inquiring
whether knowledge when reaching its perfection brings
about its due effect, viz. complete isolation of the Self
from all bodies or not; not any more than there is room
for an inquiry whether there is cooked rice or not, after
the process of cooking has reached its due termination ;
or, for an inquiry whether a man is satisfied by eating or
not.—Not so, we reply. There is indeed room for the
inquiry proposed, as we know from itihasa and pura/za that
some persons although knowing Brahman yet obtained new
bodies. Tradition informs us, e. g. that Apantaratamas,
an ancient rishi and teacher of the Vedas, was, by the
order of Vishnu, born on this earth as Krishna. Dvaipayana
at the time when the Dvctparayuga was succeeded by the
Kaliyuga. Similarly Vasish/^a, the son of Brahman’s
mind, having parted from his former body in consequence
of the curse of Nimi, was, on the order of Brahman, again
procreated by Mitra and Varu//a. Smrzti further relates
that Bhrz'gu and other sons of Brahman’s mind were again
born at the sacrifice of Varwza. Sanatkumara also, who
likewise was a son of Brahman’s mind, was, in consequence
of a boon being granted to Rudra, born again as Skanda.
And there are similar tales about Daksha, Narada, and
others having, for various reasons, assumed new bodies.
Stories of the same kind are met with in the mantras and
arthavadas of Nruti. Of some of the persons mentioned
it is said that they assumed a new body after the old body
had perished; of others that they assumed, through their
236
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
supernatural powers, various new bodies, while the old
body remained intact all the while. And all of them are
known to have completely mastered the contents of the
Vedas.
On the ground of all this the purvapakshin maintains
that the knowledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either
be or not be the cause of final release.
This we deny, for the reason that the continuance of
the bodily existence of Aparantamas and others—who
are entrusted with offices conducive to the subsistence
of the worlds, such as the promulgation of the Vedas and
the like—depends on those their offices. As Savitar (the
sun), who after having for thousands of yugas performed the
office of watching over these worlds, at the end of that period
enjoys the condition of release in which he neither rises
nor sets, according to Kh . Up. Ill, 11, 1, ‘ When from
thence he has risen upwards, he neither rises nor sets. He
is alone, standing in the centre;’ and as the present knowers
of Brahman reach the state of isolation after the enjoyment
of those results of action, which have begun to operate,
has come to an end, according to Kh . Up. VI, 14, 2, ‘For
him there is only delay so long as he is not delivered from
the body;’ so Aparantamas and other Lords to whom the
highest Lord has entrusted certain offices, last—although
they possess complete knowledge, the cause of release—as
long as their office lasts, their works not yet being ex¬
hausted, and obtain release only when their office comes
to an end. For gradually exhausting the aggregate of
works the consequences of which have once begun, so as to
enable them to discharge their offices; passing according
to their free will from one body into another, as if from
one house into another, in order to accomplish the duties
of their offices ; preserving all the time the memory of their
identity ; they create for themselves through their power
over the material of the body and the sense organs new
bodies, and occupy them either all at once or in succession.
Nor can it be said that when passing into new bodies they
remember only the fact of their former existence (not their
individuality); for it is known that they preserve the sense
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32. 237
of their individuality 1 . Smrzti tells us, e.g. that Sulabha, a
woman conversant with Brahman, wishing to dispute with
Ganaka, left her own body, entered into that of Uanaka,
carried on a discussion with him, and again returned into her
own body. If in addition to the works the consequences of
which are already in operation, other works manifested them¬
selves, constituting the cause of further embodiments, the
result would be that in the same way further works also,
whose potentiality would in that case not be destroyed, would
take place, and then it might be suspected that the know¬
ledge of Brahman may, indifferently, either be or not be the
cause of final release. But such a suspicion is inadmissible
since it is known from .Sruti and Smrzti that knowledge
completely destroys the potentiality of action. For />ruti
says, ‘The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are
solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld
who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); and, £ When the
memory remains firm, then all the ties are loosened 5 ( Kh .
Up. VII, 26, 2). And Smrz'ti similarly says, 'As a fire
well kindled, O Ar^una, reduces fuel to ashes, so the fire
of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes and, 'As seeds
burned by fire do not sprout again, so the Self is not again
touched by the afflictions which knowledge has burned/
Nor is it possible that when the afflictions such as ignor¬
ance and the like are burned, the aggregate of works
which is the seed of affliction should be partly burned,
but partly keep the power of again springing up ; not any
more than the seed of the Aali, when burned, preserves
the power of sprouting again with some part. The
aggregate of works, however, whose fruits have once
begun to develop themselves comes to rest through
effecting a delay which terminates with the death of the
body, just as an arrow discharged stops in the end owing to
the gradual cessation of its impetus; this in agreement
with Kh . Up. VI, 14, 2, ‘For him there is only delay/ &c.
We have thus shown that persons to whom an office is
1 Utpadyamananam aparimushitasmaratve*pi ^atismaratvam eva
na vasish/Mdinanatvam ity cranky aha na ^eti. An. Gi.
238
VEDANTA-S$TRAS.
entrusted last as long as their office lasts, and that never¬
theless there is absolutely only one result of true know¬
ledge.—In accordance with this, scripture declares that
the result of knowledge on the part of all beings is
equally final release, cp. ‘ So whatever Deva was awakened
he indeed became that, and the same with Ri shis and
men 5 (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10). Moreover 1 it may be the case
that (some) great ri shis had attached their minds to other
cognitions whose result is lordly power and the like, and
that later on only when they became aware of the tran¬
sitory nature of those results they turned from them and
fixed their minds on the highest Self, whereby they
obtained final release. As Smrzti says, ‘When the maha-
pralaya has arrived and the highest (i. e. Hira/zyagarbha)
himself comes to an end, then they all, with well-prepared
minds, reach together with Brahman the highest place.’—
Another reason precluding the suspicion that true know¬
ledge may be destitute of its result is that that result is
the object of immediate intuition. In the case of such
results of action as the heavenly world and the like which
are not present to intuitional knowledge, there may be a
doubt; but not so in the case of the fruit of true know¬
ledge, with regard to which scripture says, ‘ The Brahman
which is present to intuition, not hidden’ (B ri. Up. Ill,
4, 1), and which in the passage, ‘ That art thou,’ is referred
to as something already accomplished. This latter passage
cannot be interpreted to mean, ‘ Thou wilt be that after
thou hast died for another Vedic passage declares that
the fruit of complete knowledge, viz. union with the
universal Self, springs up at the moment when complete
knowledge is attained, ‘The Rishi Vamadeva saw and
understood it, singing, “ I was Manu, I was the sun.” ’
For all these reasons we maintain that those who possess
true knowledge reach in all cases final release.
33. But the (denials of) conceptions concerning the
1 Api ka nadhikaravataw sarvesham nshhzam atmatativa^anaw
tenavyapako*py ayam purvapaksha ity aha^Tzanantareshu £eti. Bha.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33. 239
akshara are to be comprehended (in all meditations
on the akshara), on account of the equality and of
the object being the same, as in the case of the
upasad; this has been explained (in the Purva Mi-
ma^sa).
We read in the Va^asaneyaka, ‘O G&rgi, the Brahma//as
call this the Akshara. It is neither coarse, nor fine, nor
short, nor long/ &c. ( Bri . Up. Ill, 8, 8). Similarly the
Atharva;/a says, c The higher knowledge is that by which
the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be
seen nor seized, which has no family and no caste/ &c.
(Mu. Up. I, 1, 5 ; 6). In other places also the highest
Brahman, under the name of Akshara, is described as
that of which all qualities are to be denied. Now in some
places qualities are denied of Brahman which are not
denied in other places, and hence a doubt arises whether
the mental conception of these particular denials is to
form part of all those passages or not.
To the assertion of the purvapakshin that each denial
is valid only for that passage in which the text actually
exhibits it, we make the following reply.—The concep¬
tions of the akshara, i.e. the conceptions of the particular
denials concerning the akshara, are to be included in all
those passages, 4 on account of the equality and on account
of the same object being referred to/ The equality con¬
sists therein that all the texts alluded to convey an idea
of Brahman in the same way, viz. by denying of it all
attributes ; and we recognise in all of them the same ob¬
ject of instruction, viz. the one undivided Brahman. Why
then should the conceptions stated in one passage not be
valid for all others also ? To the present case the same
argumentation applies which had been made use of under
III, 3, 11. There positive attributes were discussed ; here
we are concerned with negative ones. The division of the
discussion into two (instead of disposing of positive and
negative attributes in one adhikara//a) is due to the wish
of explaining the differences in detail—The clause, 4 as in
the case of the upasads/ introduces a parallel case. For
240
vedanta-sCtras.
the Gamadagnya-ahina-sacrifice 1 the text enjoins that the
upasad offerings are to consist of puroa^Uas. Now although
the mantras accompanying the offering of the puro^aj-as are
originally enjoined in the Veda of the Udgatrzs (Ta;^ya
Bra. XXI, 10. n, 6 Agni, promote the hotra,’ &c.), yet they
are to be enounced by the adhvaryu ; for the offering of
the puro<fa^as is the work of the adhvaryu, and subordinate
matters (i.e. here, the mantras) are governed by the prin¬
cipal matter (i.e. the offering of the puro^cUa). Similarly,
in the case under discussion, the attributes of the akshara
have, because they are subordinate to the akshara itself,
to be connected with the latter everywhere, in whatever
places the text may originally state them.—The principle
of decision employed is explained in the Purva Mima//zsa-
sutras III, 3, 9.
34. On account of (the same) number being re¬
corded.
The Atharvamkas exhibit, with reference to the Self,
the following mantra, ‘Two birds, inseparable friends, cling
to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the
other looks on without eating’ (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1). The
same mantra is found in the text of the SVetajvataras
(IV, 6). The Ka//zas again read, c There are the two
drinking their reward in the world of their own works,
entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit.
Those who know Brahman call them shade and light, like¬
wise those householders who perform the Trb/a£iketa-sacri-
fice.’—The doubt here arises whether the two sections in¬
troduced by these mantras constitute one vidya or two
vidyas. Here the purvapakshin maintains that we have to
do with two separate vidyas, because the texts exhibit certain
differences. For the mantra of the Mu^aka and Xveta-
jvatara Upanishads represents one bird as enjoying and the
other as not enjoying ; while in the mantra of the Ka//zas
1 I.e. a sacrifice lasting four days, called Gamadagnya, because
first offered by Gamadagni. Cp. Taitt. Sa^h. VII, 1, 9.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34.
24I
both are said to enjoy.—As thus the objects of knowledge
differ in character, the vidyas themselves must be looked
upon as separate.
To this we make the following reply. The vidy& is one
only because both mantras exhibit the character of the
objects of knowledge as one and the same, viz. as defined
by the number two.—But has not the purvapakshin shown
that there exists a certain difference of character ?—By no
means, we reply. Both texts intimate one and the same
matter, viz. the Lord together with the individual soul. In
the Mu;^aka-text the clause, ‘ The other looks on without
eating, 5 intimates the highest Self which is raised above all
desire ; the same highest Self forms also the subject of the
complementary passage, 4 But when he sees the other Lord
contented. 5 And the Ka//za-text intimates the same highest
Self which is raised above all desire ; only, as it is mentioned
together with the enjoying individual soul, it is itself meta¬
phorically spoken of as enjoying; just as we speak of the
‘ men with the umbrella, 5 although only one out of several
carries an umbrella. For that in the Ka//za-text also the
highest Self forms the general subject-matter we have to
conclude from the preceding passage, ‘ That which thou
seest as neither this nor that 5 (I, 2, 14), and from the com¬
plementary passage referring to the same Self, ‘Which is
a bridge for sacrificers, which is the highest imperishable
Brahman 5 (I, 3, 2). All this has been explained at length
under I, 2, 11. As therefore there is one object of know¬
ledge only, the vidya also is one.—Moreover, if we carefully
examine the context of the three mantras quoted, we observe
that they are concerned merely with the knowledge of the
highest Self, and that they mention the individual soul not
as a new object of instruction but merely to show its identity
with the highest Self. And that, as far as the knowledge of
the highest Self is concerned, the question as to the oneness
or separateness of vidyas cannot be even raised, we have
already shown above. The present Sutra therefore merely
aims at a fuller discussion of the matter, the practical out¬
come of which is that any particulars stated in one of the
texts only have to be supplied in the others also.
[38] R
242
vedanta-s6tra s.
35. As the Self is within all, as in the case of the
aggregate of the elements, (there is oneness of
vidyd).
The Va£*asaneyins record, in the questions asked by
Ushastaandby Kahola, the same passage twice in succession,
‘Tell me the Brahman which is present to intuition, not
hidden ; the Self who is within all ’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 4,1; 5,1).
—The question here presents itself whether the two sections
introduced by the questions constitute one vidya only or
two separate vidyas.
Two separate vidyas, the purvapakshin maintains; owing
to the force of repetition. For if the second passage added
nothing to—or took nothing away from—the contents of
the first, the repetition would be altogether meaningless.
We therefore conclude that the repetition intimates the
separateness of the two vidy&s, just as in the Purva
Mima/^sa repetition shows two sacrificial actions to be
separate.
To this we make the following reply. As both texts
equally declare the Self to be within all, they must be
taken as constituting one vidya only. In both passages
question and answer equally refer to a Self which is
within everything. For in one body there cannot be
two Seifs, each of which is inside everything else. One
Self indeed may without difficulty be within everything,
but of a second one this could not be predicated, not any
more than of the aggregate of the elements; i.e. the case
of that second Self is analogous to that of the aggregate of
the five elements, i.e. the body. In the body the element
of water is indeed within the element of earth, and the
element of fire within the element of water ; but each of
these elements is ‘ within all ’ in a relative sense only, not
in the literal sense of the phrase.—Or else the ‘ like the
aggregate of the elements (or beings) 5 of the Sutra has to
be taken as pointing to another scriptural passage, viz. 5 ve.
Up.VI, 11, ‘He is the one god, hidden in all beings, all-
pervading, the Self within all beings.’ As this mantra re¬
cords that one Self lives within the aggregate of all beings,
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 36.
243
the same holds good with regard to the two Brahma;/a-
passages. And the object of knowledge being one, the
vidya also is one only.
36. If it be said that otherwise the separation (of
the statements) cannot be accounted for; we reply
that it is (here) as in the case of other instructions.
We yet have to refute the remark made by the purva-
pakshin that, unless the separateness of the two vidyas be
admitted, the separation of the two statements cannot be
accounted for. We do this by pointing to analogous cases.
In the sixth prapa/^aka of the upanishad of the Ta^ins
the instruction conveyed in the words, c That is the Self,
thou art that, O vSVetaketu/ is repeated nine times, and
yet the one vidya is not thereby split into many. Simi¬
larly in our case.—But how do you know that the vidya
remains one and the same in spite of the ninefold repeti¬
tion?—Because, we reply, the introductory and concluding
clauses show that all those passages have the same sense.
For the repeated request on the part of vSVetaketu, c Please,
Sir, inform me still more/ shows that one and the same
matter is again and again proposed for further discussion,
and further instruction regarding it is repeatedly given by
means of new doubts being removed. Similarly, in the
case under discussion, the sameness of form of the two
introductory questions and the equality of the concluding
clauses, ‘ Everything else is of evil/ show that both sections
refer to one and the same matter.—Moreover, in the second
question the text adds the word 6 just’ (eva). ‘ Tell me just
that Brahman/ &c., which shows that the second question
refers to the same matter as the first one. That the
matter of the two sections is really the same, we establish
by pointing out that the former section declares the
existence of the highest Self which is neither cause nor
effect, while the latter qualifies it as that which transcends
all the attributes of the Sa^sara state, such as hunger,
thirst, and so on.—The two sections, therefore, form one
vidya only.
I< 2
244
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
37. There is exchange (of meditation), for the
texts distinguish (two meditations); as in other
cases.
The Aitareyins declare with reference to the person in
the sun, ‘ What I am, that is he; what he is, that am 1 5
(Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6). And the G &balas say, 4 1 am thou
indeed, O reverend divinity, and thou art I indeed.’—The
doubt here arises whether the reflection founded upon this
text is to be a double one ‘ by means of exchange ’ (i. e.
whether the soul is to be meditated upon as &ditya and
ctditya as the soul), or a simple one (the soul only being
meditated upon as aditya).
The purvapakshin maintains the latter view; for, he says,
the text cannot possibly propose as matter of meditation
anything but the oneness of the individual soul with the
Lord. For if we assumed that two different forms of
meditation are intended, viz. firstly the soul’s being the
Self of the Lord, and, secondly, the Lord’s being the Self
of the soul, the soul indeed would be exalted by the former
meditation, but the Lord, at the same time, be lowered by
the latter one. We therefore conclude that the meditation
is to be of one kind only, and that the double form, in which
the text exhibits it, merely aims at confirming the oneness
of the Self.
To this we make the following reply. ‘Exchange’ is
expressly recorded in the text for the purposes of medita¬
tion, just as other qualities (of the Self), such as its being
the Self of all, &c., are recorded for the same purpose.
For both texts make the distinctive double enunciation,
‘ I am thou,’ and ‘ Thou art 1 / Now this double enunci¬
ation has a sense only if a twofold meditation is to be
based upon it; otherwise it would be devoid of meaning,
since one statement would be all that is required.—But
has not the purvapakshin urged above that this your ex¬
planation involves a lowering of the Lord, who is thereby
represented as having the transmigrating soul for his Self?
—Never mind, we reply ; even in that way only the unity
of the Self is meditated upon.—But does your explanation
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 38.
245
then not come to that of the purvapakshin, viz. that the
double statement is merely meant to confirm the oneness
of the Self?—We do not, our reply is, deny that the text
confirms the oneness of the Self; we only want to prove
that, on the ground of the text as it stands, a twofold me¬
ditation has to be admitted, not a simple one. That this
virtually confirms the unity of the Self we admit; just as
the instruction about (the Lord’s) possessing such qualities
as having only true wishes, and so on—which instruction is
given for the purpose of meditation—at the same time
proves the existence of a Lord endowed with such qualities.
—Hence the double relation enounced in the text has to be
meditated upon, and is to be transferred to other vidyas also
which treat of the same subject.
38. For the True and so on are one and the same
(vidya).
The text of the Va^asaneyaka, after having enjoined the
knowledge of the True, together with a meditation on the
syllables of its name (‘ Whosoever knows this great glorious
first-born as the true Brahman/ &c., Bri. Up. V, 4, 1), con¬
tinues, f Now what is the True, that is the Aditya, the person
that dwells in yonder orb, and the person in the right eye ’
(V, 5, 2).—The doubt here arises whether the text enjoins
two vidyas of the True or one only.
Two, the purvapakshin maintains. For the text declares
two different results, one in the earlier passage, ‘ He con¬
quers these worlds’ (V, 4, 1); the other one later on, ‘He
destroys evil and leaves it ? (V, 5, 3). And what our oppo¬
nent may call a reference to the subject-matter under dis¬
cussion 1 , is merely due to the circumstance of the object of
meditation being the same (in the two vidyas).
To this we make the following reply.—There is only
one vidya of the True, because the clause, ‘That which is
the True,’ &c., refers back to that True which is treated
1 Viz. the clause in V, 5, 2, ‘That which is the true/ which
apparently—or really—connects the vidyd of V, 5 with that of
V, 4.
246
vedanta-s(jtras.
of in V, 4.—But has not the purvapakshin shown that the
clause alluded to can be accounted for even on the sup¬
position of there being two vidyas ?—The reasoning of
the purvapakshin, we reply, would be admissible only if
the separateness of the two vidyas were established by
some other clear and undoubted reason; in our case, how¬
ever, there is a general possibility of both (viz. of the
vidyas being separate or not), and the very circumstance
that the mentioned clause contains a back reference to the
True spoken of in V, 4, determines us to conclude that
there is only one vidya of the True.—To the remark that
there must be two vidyas because the text states two
different results, we reply that the statement of a second
result merely has the purpose of glorifying the new in¬
struction given about the True, viz. that its secret names
are ahar and aham. Moreover, as in the case under dis¬
cussion, the fruit of the vidya has really to be supplied
from its arthavada part 1 , and as there is unity of vidya,
all those fruits which the text states in connexion with
the single parts of the vidya are to be combined and put
in connexion with the vidya taken as a whole.—The con¬
clusion therefore is that the text records only one vidya
of the True, distinguished by such and such details, and
that hence all the qualities mentioned, such as Truth and
so on, are to be comprehended in one act of meditation.
Some commentators are of opinion that the above Sutra
refers (not to the question whether Bn. Up. V, 4 and V, 5
constitute one vidya but) to the question whether the
Va^asaneyaka-passage about the persons in the sun and in
the eye, and the similar iTMndogya-passage (I, 6, 6,‘ Now
that golden person who is seen within the sun/ &c.) form
one vidya or not. They conclude that they do so, and
that hence truth and the other qualities mentioned in
1 For the vidya contains no explicit statement that a man
desirous of such and such a fruit is to meditate on the True in such
and such a way.—That in cases where the fruit is not stated in a
vidhi-passage it must be supplied from the arthavada-passages, is
taught in the Ph. Mi. Su. IV, 3, eighth adhikara;/a.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 39.
247
the Vd^asaneyaka are to be combined with the Kh an-
dogya-text also.—But this interpretation of the Sutra
appears objectionable. For the jOandogya-vidyd refers
to the udgitha and is thus connected with sacrificial acts,
marks of which connexion are exhibited in the beginning,
the middle, and the end of the vidya. Thus we read at
the beginning, ‘The Rik is the earth, the Saman is fire
in the middle, ‘Rik and Saman are his joints and there¬
fore he is udgitha;’ and in the end, ‘He who knowing
this sings a S&man ’ ( Kh . Up. I, 6, 1 ; 8; I, 7, 7). In the
Va^asaneyaka, on the other hand, there is nothing to
connect the vidya with sacrificial acts. As therefore the
subject-matter is different, the vidyas are separate and the
details of the two are to be held apart.
39. (Having true) wishes and other (qualities)
(have to be combined) there and here, on account of
the abode and so on.
In the chapter of the iTMndogya which begins with the
passage, ‘ There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace,
the small lotus, and in it that small ether’ (VIII, 1, 1), we
read, ‘ That is the Self free from sin, free from old age,
from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires
are true, whose imaginations are true.’ A similar passage
is found in the text of the Va^asaneyins, ‘ He is that great
unborn Self who consists of knowledge, is surrounded by
the Praz/as, the ether within the heart. In it there reposes
the ruler of all’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22).
A doubt here arises whether these two passages con¬
stitute one vidya, and whether the particulars stated in one
text are to be comprehended within the other text also.
There is oneness of vidya 1 .—Here (the Sutrakara) says,
‘ Wishes and so on,’ i. e. ‘ The quality of having true wishes
and so on’(the word kama standing for satyakama, just
1 This clause must apparently be taken as stating the siddhanta-
view, although later on it is said that the two vidyas are distinct (that,
however, in spite of their distinctness, their details have to be com¬
bined).
248
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
as people occasionally say Datta for Devadatta and Bhama
for Satyabhama). This quality and the other qualities, which
the jOandogya attributes to the ether within the heart,
have to be combined with the Va^asaneyaka-passage, and
vice versa the qualities stated in the Va^asaneyaka, such as
being the ruler of all, have also to be ascribed to the Self
free from sin, proclaimed in the AV/andogya. The reason
for this is that the two passages display a number of
common features. Common to both is the heart viewed
as abode, common again is the Lord as object of know¬
ledge, common also is the Lord being viewed as a bank
preventing these worlds from being confounded; and
several other points.—But, an objection is raised, there
are also differences. In the /TMndogya the qualities are
attributed to the ether within the heart, while in the
Va^asaneyaka they are ascribed to Brahman abiding in
that ether.—This objection, we reply, is unfounded, for we
have shown under I, 3, 14 that the term ‘ether’ in the
iL^andogya designates Brahman.
There is, however, the following difference between the
two passages. The AV/andogya-vidya has for its object
the qualified Brahman, as we see from the passage VIII, 1,
6, ‘ But those who depart from hence after having dis¬
covered the Self and those true desires,’ in which certain
desires are represented as objects of knowledge equally as
the Self. In the Va^asaneyaka, on the other hand, the
highest Brahman devoid of all qualities forms the object
of instruction, as we conclude from the consideration of the
request made by (kanaka, c Speak on for the sake of eman¬
cipation,’ and the reply given by Ya^avalkya, £ For that
person is not attached to anything’ (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14;
15). That the text ascribes to the Self such qualities as
being the Lord of all and the like is (not for the purpose
of teaching that the Self really possesses those qualities,
but is) merely meant to glorify the Self. Later on also
(IV, 5 ? i 5 ) the chapter winds up with a passage clearly
referring to the Self devoid of all qualities, 4 That Self is
to be described by No, no ! J But as the qualified Brahman
is (fundamentally) one (with the unqualified Brahman), we
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 40.
249
must conclude that the Sutra teaches the combination of
the qualities to the end of setting forth the glory of
Brahman, not for the purpose of devout meditation.
40. On account of (the passage showing) respect,
there is non-omission (of the pra/zagnihotra) (even
when the eating of food is omitted).
We read in the iTMndogya under the heading of the
Vauvanara-vidya, 4 Therefore the first food which comes is
in the place of Homa. And he who offers that first oblation
should offer it to Pra/za, saying Svclhct’ ( Kh . Up. V, 19, 1).
The text thereupon enjoins five oblations, and later on
applies to them the term 4 Agnihotra; 5 4 He who thus
knowing this offers the agnihotra,’ and ‘As hungry children
here on earth sit round their mother, so do all beings sit
round the agnihotra ’ (V, 24, 2 ; 4).
Here the doubt arises whether the agnihotra offered to
the pranas is to be omitted when the eating itself is omitted
or not.—As, according to the clause, 4 The first food which
comes,’ &c., the oblation is connected with the coming of
food, and as the coming of food subserves the eating, the
agnihotra offered to the pranas is omitted when the eating
is omitted.—Against this conclusion the Sutra (embodying
the purvapaksha) declares, 4 It is not omitted.’—Why?—
‘ On account of the respect.’ This means : In their version
of the Vauvanara-vidya the Cabalas read as follows: 4 He
(i. e. the host) is to eat before his guests ; for (if he would
make them eat first) it would be as if he without having
himself offered the agnihotra offered that of another
person.’ This passage, which objects to the priority of the
eating on the part of the guests and establishes priority
on the part of the host, thereby intimates respect for the
agnihotra offered to the pra/zas. For as it does not allow
the omission of priority it will allow all the less the
omission of that which is characterised by priority, viz.
the agnihotra offered to the pra/zas.—But (as mentioned
above) the connexion—established by the iT/zandogya-
passage—of the oblation with the coming of food—which
subserves the eating—establishes the omission of the ob-
250
VEDANTA-stiTRAS.
lation in the case of the eating being omitted !—Not so,
the purvapakshin replies. The purpose of that passage is
to enjoin some particular material (to be offered). For the
fundamental agnihotra certain materials, such as milk and
so on, are exclusively prescribed. Now, as through the
term ‘ agnihotra 5 (which the text applies to the offering
to the prazzas) all the particulars belonging to the funda¬
mental agnihotra are already established for the secondary
agnihotra also (viz. the oblation made to the prazzas), just
as in the case of the ayana of the Kuzz^apayins 1 ; the
clause, 'the first food which comes,’ &c., is meant to enjoin,
for the prazzagnihotra, some particular secondary matter,
viz. the circumstance of food constituting the material of
the oblation 2 . Hence, considering the Mimazzzsa principle
that the omission of a secondary matter does not involve
the omission of the principal matter, we conclude that even
in the case of the omission of eating, the agnihotra offered
to the prazzas has to be performed by means of water or
some other not altogether unsuitable material, according
to the Mimazzzsa principle that in the absence of the
prescribed material some other suitable material may be
substituted.
To this purvapaksha the next Sutra replies.
41. When (eating) is taking place, (the pra^agni-
hotra has to be performed) from that (i.e. the food
first eaten); on the ground of the passage declaring
this.
When eating is actually taking place,' from that/ i.e. with
that material of food which first presents itself, the agni¬
hotra offered to the prazzas is to be effected.—On what
1 For one of the great sacrifices lasting a whole year—called the
ayana of the Kuzz^/apayins—the texts enjoin the offering of the
'agnihotra’ during a full month (cp. e.g. Tazz^/ya Mahabrahmazza
XXV, 4). Now from the term ‘agnihotra’ we conclude that all the
details of the ordinary agnihotra are valid for the agnihotra of the
ayana also.
2 Whereby the materials offered in the ordinary agnihotra are
superseded.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 4 1 .
251
ground ?—‘ On the ground of the passage declaring this.’
For the clause, ‘ The first food which a man may take is in
the place of a homa,’ enjoins the circumstance of the obla¬
tions to the pranas being effected by means of a material
(primarily) subserving another purpose (viz. eating), as
appears from its referring to the presentation of food as
something accomplished (i. e. accomplished independently
of the oblations; not tending to accomplish the oblations).
How then should these oblations—which are characterised
as not having any motive power with regard to the employ¬
ment of the food—be capable of causing us to substitute, in
the absence of eating, some other material (than food) ?—
Nor is it true that there are already established, for the
prazzagnihotra, all the details belonging to the fundamental
agnihotra. In the case of the ayana of the Kuzz^apayins,
the term ‘agnihotra’ forms part of the injunctive pas¬
sage, ‘ They offer the agnihotra during a month,’ and
therefore may have the force of enjoining a general
character of the sacrifice identical with that of the funda¬
mental agnihotra ; and it is therefore appropriate to con¬
sider the details of the latter as valid for the agnihotra of
the Kuzzz/apayins also. In the case of the so-called
prazzagnihotra, on the other hand, the term ‘ agnihotra’
occurs in an arthavada-passage only, and does not therefore
possess an analogous injunctive force. If, again, we admitted
that the details of the fundamental agnihotra are valid for
the prazzagnihotra also, such details as the transference of the
fire (from the garhapatya fire to the two other fires) would be
likewise valid. But this is impossible, as the transference
of the fire is made for the purpose of establishing a fire¬
place in which the oblations are made ; in our case, on the
other hand, the oblations are not made in the fire at all—
because that would interfere with their being used as food,
and because they are connected with a material procured
for the purpose of eating,—but are made in the mouth (of
the eater). Thus the text of the Cabalas also, ‘ He is to
eat before the guests,’ shows that the accomplishment of the
oblation has the mouth for its abode. For the same reason
(i. e. because the details of the fundamental agnihotra are
252
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
not valid for the prazzagnihotra) the text declares the sub¬
ordinate members of the agnihotra to be present here (i.e.
in the prazzagnihotra) in the way of fanciful combination
only, ‘ the chest is the vedi, the hairs the sacrificial grass,
the heart the Garhapatya fire, the mind the Anvaharya-
pa^ana fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya fire.’ By the vedi
mentioned in this passage we have to understand a levelled
spot, as in the fundamental agnihotra there is no vedi, and
as the intention of the passage is to effect a fanciful combi¬
nation of the members of the fundamental agnihotra (with
members of the prazzagnihotra).—And as the prazzagnihotra
is connected with eating which has its definite times, it is
also not possible that it should be restricted to the time
enjoined for the fundamental agnihotra. In the same way
other particulars also of the fundamental agnihotra, such as
the so-called upasthana, cannot be reconciled with the re¬
quirements of the pr&zzagnihotra. From all this it follows
that the five oblations, as connected with their respective
mantras, materials, and divinities, have to be performed only
in the case of food being eaten.—With reference to the pas¬
sage showing 6 respect,’ we remark that it is meant to inti¬
mate priority (of the host), in the case of food being actually
eaten. But the passage has no power to declare that the
offering of the prazzagnihotra is of permanent obligation.—
It therefore is a settled conclusion that the prazzagnihotra
is omitted when the eating of food is omitted.
42. There is non-restriction of the assertions
concerning them (i.e. the assertions made concerning
certain sacrificial acts are not permanently connected
with those acts), because this is seen (in scripture);
for a separate fruit, viz. non-obstruction (of the
success of the sacrifice), (belongs to them).
We meet in the Vedanta-texts with certain vidyas which
are founded on matters subordinate to sacrificial acts. To
this class belongs, e. g. the first vidya of the iTMndogya
Upanishad, c Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as
udgitha.’—We now enter on an inquiry whether those
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42.
253
vidyas are permanently connected with the acts in the
same way as the circumstance of being made of par;/a-wood
is permanently connected with all sacrifices in which the
^uhu (the sacrificial ladle) is used; or if they are non¬
permanent like the vessel called godohana L The purva-
pakshin maintains that the meditations are permanently
connected with the sacrificial acts, because they also are
comprised within the scriptural enouncements concerning
performances. For they also do not stand under some
special heading 1 2 , and as they are connected with the sacrifice
through the udgitha and so on, they combine themselves,
like other subordinate members, with the scriptural state¬
ments as to the performance of the sacrifice.
If against the doctrine of the meditations forming per¬
manent parts of the sacrificial performances it should be
urged, that in the chapters containing them special results
are mentioned (which seem to constitute the meditations
into independent acts), as e.g. in the passage, ‘he indeed
becomes a fulfiller of desires’ ( Kh . Up. I, 1, 7); we reply
that those statements of results being given in the text in
the present form only (not in an injunctional form), are mere
1 The question is raised whether the meditations, enjoined in the
Upanishads, on certain parts or elements of sacrificial acts, are per¬
manently connected with the latter, i. e. are to be undertaken when¬
ever the sacrificial act is performed, or not.—In the former case
they would stand to the sacrifice in the same relation as the
par^amayitva, i.e. the quality of being made of par«a-wood, does.
Just as the latter is connected with the sacrifice by means of the
guhu —the sacrificial ladle,—so the meditation on the syllable Om,
e.g. would be connected with the sacrifice by means of that syllable.
—In the latter case, i.e. in the case of being connected with the
sacrifice on certain occasions only, the upasana is analogous to the
godohana-vessel which is used in the danrapurwamasa-sacrifice
instead of the usual ^amasa, only if the sacrificer specially wishes for
cattle.—See Pu. Mi. Sft. Ill, 6, 1 ; IV, 1, 2.
2 Like the statement about the panzamayitva of the guhiX which
the sacred text does not exhibit under some particular prakara^a,
but ex abrupto as it were; on which account it is to be connected
with the sacrifice in general.
254
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
arthavada-passages—like the statement about him whose
^uhu is made of par/za-wood hearing no evil sound—and
thus do not aim at enjoining certain results.—Hence, just
as the statement about being made of parzza-wood—which
does not occur under a definite prakara/za—connects itself,
by means of the sacrificial ladle, with the sacrifice, and thus
forms a permanent element of the latter no less than if it
were actually made under the heading of the sacrifice ; so
the meditations on the udgitha, &c., also form permanent
parts of the sacrifices.
To this we make the following reply. ‘There is non¬
restriction of the assertions concerning them.’ That means :
the assertions which the text makes concerning the nature
of certain subordinate members of sacrificial acts such as
the udgitha and so on—as e. g. that the udgitha is the best
of all essences ( Kh . Up. I, i, 3), the fulfiller of desires
(I, 1, 7), a gratifier of desires (I, 1, 8), the chief prazza
(I, 2, 7), Aditya (I, 3,1)—cannot be permanently connected
with the sacrificial acts in the same way as other permanent
members are, ‘because that is seen,’ i. e. because scripture
shows that they are not so permanently connected. For
scripture allows also such as are not acquainted with the
details mentioned above to perform the sacrificial actions
(cp. the passage I, 1, 10, ‘ Therefore both he who knows
this,and he who does not,perform the sacrifice’),and declares
that even those priests, Prastotrz and so on, who are devoid
of the knowledge of the divinities of the prastava and the
like, do perform the sacrifices c Prastotrz, if you without
knowing the deity which belongs to the prastava are going
to sing it,’ &c. (I, 10, 9 and ff.).—The sacred text moreover
declares that the vidyas founded on certain elements of
sacrificial acts have results of their own, apart from those
acts, viz. ‘ non-obstruction ’ in the accomplishment of the
fruit of the sacrifice, i. e. a certain additional success of the
sacrifice, cp. the passage I, 1, 10, ‘Therefore he who knows
this and he who does not perform the sacrifice. But
knowledge and ignorance are separate. The sacrifice which
a man performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad
is more powerful.’ The declaration made in this passage
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42 .
2 55
that the performances of him who knows and of him who
does not know are separate, and the employment of the
comparative form ( f more powerful ’) show that even the
sacrifice destitute of the vidy& is powerful. But how would
that be possible if the vidya formed a permanent necessary
part of the sacrifice ? In the latter case a sacrifice devoid
of that vidya could never be admitted to be powerful; for
it is an established principle that only those sacrifices are
effective which comprise all subordinate members. Thus
the text also teaches definite results for each meditation, in
the section treating of the meditation on the Saman as the
worlds and others : 4 The worlds in an ascending and in a
descending line belong to him/ &c. (Kh. Up. II, 2, 3).—
Nor must we understand those declarations of results to be
mere arthavadas ; for in that case they would have to be
taken as stating a secondary matter only, while if under¬
stood to teach certain results they may be taken in their
principal (i. e. direct, literal) sense 1 . The case of the results
which scripture declares to be connected with the praya^as
e. g. is of a different nature. For the praya^as are en¬
joined with reference to a sacrifice (viz. the dans*apur/zamasa)
which requires certain definite modes of procedure (such as
the offering of the praya£*as and the like), and hence sub¬
serve that sacrifice; so that the passage stating a fruit for
the praya^as has to be considered as a mere arthavada-pas-
sage 2 . In the case again of the quality of consisting of
parzza-wood—which quality is stated ex abrupto, not under
a definite heading—no special result can be assumed; for
as a quality is not an act it cannot be connected with any
result unless it be joined to something to abide in. The
use of the godohana indeed may have its own injunction of
1 The statement as to the result of an action is a ‘ statement of
a principal matter ’ if it is really meant to inform us that a certain
result will attend a certain action. It is a statement of a ‘secondary
matter’ if it is only meant to glorify the action.
2 Not as a passage enjoining a special result for the praya^as;
for the latter merely help to bring about the general result of the
danrapur/zamasa and have no special result of their own.
256
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
result, for it does possess such an abode—viz. the act of
water being carried (in it)—with reference to which it is
enjoined. So again a special fruit may be enjoined for the
case of the sacrificial post being made of bilva-wood; for
this latter quality likewise has an abode, viz. the sacrificial
post with reference to which it is enjoined. But in the case
of the quality of consisting of parzza-wood there is no such
established abode under the heading of which that quality
is enjoined ; and if we assumed that the sentence (‘ He
whose ^uhu is made of parzza-wood hears no evil sound ’)
after intimating that the quality of consisting of parzza-wood
resides in the^uhu is also meant to enjoin the fruit thereof,
we should impute to the text the imperfection called c split
of the sentence/—The meditations on the other hand are
themselves acts, and as such capable of a special injunc¬
tion ; hence there is no reason why a special result should
not be enjoined for those meditations which are based on
sacrificial acts. The conclusion therefore is that the medi¬
tations on the udgitha, &c., although based on sacrifices, are
yet not necessary members of the latter, because they have
results of their own like the use of the godohana-vessel.
For this reason the authors of the Kalpa-sutras have not
represented such meditations as belonging to the sacrificial
performances.
43. As in the case of the offerings, (Vayu and
Pra^a must be held apart). This has been ex¬
plained (in the Purva Mima^sa-sutra).
The section of the Va§*asaneyaka which begins, ‘Voice
held, I shall speak’ (B ri. Up. I, 5, 21), determines Prazza
to be the best among the organs of the body, viz. speech
and so on, and Vayu to be the best among the Devas,
viz. Agni and so on.—Similarly in the AVzandogya, Vayu is
affirmed to be the general absorber of the Devas, ‘Vayu in¬
deed is the absorber’ (IV, 3, 1), while Prazza is said to be the
general absorber of the organs of the body, ‘ Breath indeed
is the absorber’ (IV, 3, 3).—The doubt here arises whether
Vayu and Prazza are to be conceived as separate or not.
As non-separate, the purvapakshin maintains; because in
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 43.
257
their true nature they do not differ. And as their true
nature does not differ they must not be meditated upon
separately. Another scriptural passage also declares that
the organs of the body and the divinities are non-different
in their true nature, ‘ Agni having become speech entered
the mouth, 5 &c. (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4). Moreover, the passage
Bri. Up. I, 5,13, 4 These are all alike, all endless, 5 declares
that the powers of the Devas constitute the Self of the
organs of the body. And various other passages also
testify to the fundamental non-difference of the two. In
some places we have even a direct identification of the
two, ‘ What Pra/za is, that is Vayu. 5 And in the doka
concluding the Va^asaneyaka-chapter to which the passage
under discussion belongs, the text refers to prazza only (‘ He
verily rises from the breath and sets in the breath ’), and
thus shows the breath to be one with the previously men¬
tioned Vayu. This conclusion is moreover confirmed by the
fact that the observance enjoined in the end refers to prazza
only, ‘ Therefore let a man perform one observance only,
let him breathe up and let him breathe down 5 (Bri. Up. I,
5, 23). Similarly, the iTMndogya-passage, IV, 3, 6, ‘ One
god swallowed the four great ones, 5 intimates that there
is one absorber only, and does not say that one god is the
absorber of the one set of four, and another the absorber of
the other set of four.—From all this it follows that Vayu
and Prazza are to be conceived as one.
To this we make the following reply. Vayu and Prazza
are to be conceived separately, because the text teaches
them in separation. The separate instruction given by the
text with reference to the organs and the Devas for the
purposes of meditation would be meaningless if the medi¬
tations were not held apart.—But the purvapakshin main¬
tains that owing to the essential non-difference of Vayu and
Prazza the meditations are not to be separated!—Although,
we reply, there may be non-difference of true nature, yet
there may be difference of condition giving rise to dif¬
ference of instruction, and, through the latter, to difference
of meditation. And although the introduction of the con¬
cluding j-loka may be accounted for on the ground of its
[38] S
258 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
showing the fundamental non-difference of the two, it
yet has no power to sublate the previously declared dif¬
ference of the objects of meditation. Moreover, the text
institutes a comparison between Vayu and Prazza, which
again shows that the two are different, ‘And as it was with
the central breath among the breaths, so it was with Vayu,
the wind among those deities ’ (B ri. Up. I, 5, 22).—This
explains also the mention made of the observance (I, 5, 23).
The word c only 5 (in ‘ Let a man perform one observance
only ’) has the purpose of establishing the observance with
regard to Prazza, by sublating the observances with regard
to speech and so on, regarding which the text had re¬
marked previously that they were disturbed by Death
(‘ Death having become weariness took them ’), and does
not by any means aim at sublating the observance with
regard to Vayu ; for the section beginning £ Next follows
the consideration of the observances’ distinctly asserts
that the observances of Vdyu and Prazza were equally
unbroken.—Moreover, the text, after having said, ‘ Let a
man perform one observance only,’ declares in the end
that the fruit of that observance is the obtaining of (union
with) Vayu (‘ Then he obtains through it union and one¬
ness with that deity and thus shows that the observance
with regard to Vayu is not to be considered as sublated.
That by that ‘deity’ we have to understand Vayu, we
conclude from the circumstance that what the worshipper
wishes to obtain is non-limitation of his Self 1 , and that
previously the term ‘deity’ had been applied to Vayu,
‘Vayu is the deity that never sets.’—Analogously in the
AT/zandogya-passage the text represents Vayu and Pr 4 zza
as different, ‘ These are the two absorbers, Vayu among the
Devas, Prazza among the prazzas,’ and in the concluding para¬
graph also (IV, 3,8) refers to them as distinct, ‘These five and
the other five make ten, and that is the Krzta.’—For these
reasons Vayu and Prazza are to be conceived as different.
The Sutra compares the case under discussion to a
1 Agnyadin apekshyanavaM^ino devo vayus te tu tenaivava-
kkhmrA iti sazzzvargaguzzo vayur anava^inna devata. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 44.
259
parallel one from the karmaka;z^a, by means of the clause,
‘ as in the case of the offerings.’ With regard to the ish/i
comprising three sacrificial cakes, which is enjoined in the
passage, Taitt. Samh. II, 3, 6 , ‘ A puroa^a on eleven
potsherds to Indra the ruler, to Indra the over-ruler, to
Indra the self-ruler/ it might be supposed that the three
cakes are to be offered together because they are offered
to one and the same Indra, and because the concluding
sentence says, ‘ conveying to all (gods) he cuts off to pre¬
clude purposelessness.’ But as the attributes (viz. ‘ruler’
and so on) differ, and as scripture enjoins that the yagya
and anuvakyamantras are to exchange places with regard
to the different cakes 1 , the divinity is each time a different
one according to the address, and from this it follows that
the three offerings also are separate.—Thus, in the case
under discussion, Vayu and Pra^a, although fundamentally
non-different, are to be held apart as objects of meditation,
and we have therefore to do with two separate medita¬
tions.—This is explained in the Sankarsha-ka/z^a, ‘The
divinities are separate on account of their being cognized
thus.’
But while in the case of the three puro^/a^as the dif¬
ference of material and divinity involves a difference on the
part of the oblations, we have in the case under discussion
to do with one vidya only ; for that the text enjoins one
vidya only we conclude from the introductory and con¬
cluding statements. There is contained, however, in this
one vidya a double meditative activity with regard to the
bodily organs and the divinities, just as the agnihotra which
is offered in the morning as well as in the evening requires
a double activity. In this sense the Sutra says, ‘as in the
case of the offerings.’
44. On account of the majority of indicatory marks
(the fire-altars built of mind, &c. do not form
elements of any act); for this (i. e. the indicatory
1 The yagya-mantra of the first offering being used as anuvakya
in the second one and so on.
26 o
vedAnta-s^tras.
mark) is stronger (than the general subject-matter) ;
this also (has been explained in the Pu. Mi. Sutras).
In the Agnirahasya of the Va^asaneyins, in the Brahmazza
beginning ‘ for in the beginning indeed this was not exis¬
tent/ we read with reference to mind (manas), ‘ It saw thirty-
six thousand shining fire-altars, belonging to itself, made of
mind, built of mind/ And, further on, the text makes similar
statements about other fanciful fire-altars built of speech,
built of breath, built of sight, built of hearing, built of
work, built of fire.—A doubt here arises whether these
fire-altars built of mind and so on are connected with the
act (i. e. the construction of the fire-altar made of bricks),
and supplementary to it, or whether they are independent,
constituting a mere vidya.
Against the primd facie view that those agnis are con¬
nected with the sacrificial act under whose heading the
text records them, the Sutra maintains their independence,
6 on account of the majority of indicatory marks/ For we
meet in that Brahmazza with a number of indicatory marks
confirming that those agnis constitute a mere vidya ; cp.
e. g. the following passages : ‘ Whatever these beings con¬
ceive in their minds, that is a means for those fire-altars/
and ‘All beings always pile up those fire-altars for him
who thus knows, even when he sleeps,’ and so on 1 .—And
that indicatory marks (linga) are of greater force than the
leading subject-matter (prakara/za) has been explained in
the Purva Mima//zsa (III, 3,14).
45. (The agni built of mind, &c.) is a particular
form of the preceding one (i.e. the agni built of
bricks), on account of the leading subject-matter; it
is (part of) the act; as in the case of the manasa cup.
Your supposition, the purvapakshin objects, as to those
fire-altars being not supplementary to the sacrificial act,
1 For something which forms part of an act cannot be brought
about by something so indefinite as ‘ whatever these beings conceive
in their minds/ nor can it be accomplished indifferently at any
time by any beings.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 46.
26l
but altogether independent of it, is untenable. The in¬
fluence of the leading subject-matter rather compels us to
conclude that the instruction given by the text about the
agni made of mind and so on, enjoins some particular mode
of the same agni which the preceding sections describe as
the outcome of a real act 1 .—But are not indicatory marks
stronger than the leading subject-matter?—True in general;
but indicatory marks such as those contained in the pas¬
sages quoted above are by no means stronger than the
general subject-matter. For as those passages are of the
nature of glorifications of the fanciful fire-altars, the lingas
(have no proving power in themselves but) merely illustrate
some other matter (viz. the injunction to which those
passages are arthavadas); and as they are of that nature
they may, there being no other proof, be taken as mere
guzzavadas, and as such are not able to sublate the influence
of the prakara/za. On the ground of the latter, therefore,
all those fanciful agnis must be viewed as forming parts of
the sacrificial action.
The case is analogous to that of the ‘ mental ’ (cup). On
the tenth day of the Soma sacrifices occupying twelve days
—which day is termed avivakya—a soma cup is offered
mentally, the earth being viewed as the cup, the sea as the
Soma and Pra^apati as the divinity to which the offering is
made. All rites connected with that cup, viz. taking it up,
putting it down in its place, offering the liquid in it, taking
up the remaining liquid, the priests inviting one another to
drink the remainder, and the drinking, all these rites the
text declares to be mental only, i.e. to be done in thought
only 2 . Yet this mental quasi-cup, as standing under the
heading of a sacrificial act, forms part of that act.—The
same then holds good with regard to the quasi-agnis made
of mind and so on.
46. And on account of the transfer (of particulars).
That those agnis enter into the sacrificial action follows
1 I.e. of the agni made of bricks which is the outcome of the
agni/fcayana.—An. Gi. explains vikalpavkesha by prakarabheda.
2 Cp. Tazz^ya Brah. IV, 9; Taitt. Sazzzh. VII, 3, 1.
262
VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.
moreover from the fact that the text extends to them (the
injunctions given about the agni made of bricks). Com¬
pare the passage, ‘Thirty-six thousand shining Agnis; each
one of them is as large as the previously mentioned Agni.’
Such extension of injunctions is possible only where there
is general equality. The text therefore by extending the
determinations relative to the previous agni, i.e. the agni
built of bricks, which forms a constituent element of the
sacrificial action, to the fanciful agnis, intimates thereby
that they also form part of the sacrificial performance.
47. But (the agnis rather constitute) a vidya, on
account of the assertion (made by the text).
The word c but 5 sets aside the purvapaksha.—The agnis
built of mind and so on are to be viewed not as comple¬
mentary to a sacrificial action, but as independent and con¬
stituting a vidya of their own. For the text expressly
asserts that ‘ they are built of knowledge (vidya) only,’ and
that ‘ by knowledge they are built for him who thus knows.’
48. And because (indicatory marks of that) are
seen (in the text).
And that there are to be observed indicatory marks
leading to the same conclusion, has already been declared
in Siltra 44.—But, under Sutra 45, it was shown that
indicatory marks unaided by other reasons cannot be
admitted as proving anything, and it was consequently
determined that, owing to the influence of the leading
subject-matter, the Agnis form part of the sacrificial
action!—To this objection the next Sutra replies.
49. (The view that the agnis constitute an inde¬
pendent vidya) cannot be refuted, owing to the
greater force of direct enunciation and so on.
Our opponent has no right to determine, on the ground
of prakara/za, that the agnis are subordinate to the sacri¬
ficial action, and so to set aside our view according to which
they are independent. For we know from the Purva
Mimazzzsa that direct enunciation (Sruti), indicatory mark
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 49. 263
(linga), and syntactical connexion (vakya) are of greater
force than leading subject-matter (prakara^a), and all those
three means of proof are seen to confirm our view of the agnis
being independent. In the first place we have the direct
enunciation, ‘These agnis are indeed knowledge-piled only.’
In the second place we have the indicatory mark supplied
by the passage,‘All beings ever pile for him sleeping/ &c.
And in the third place we have the sentence, ‘By know¬
ledge indeed those (agnis) are piled for him who thus
knows. 5
In the first of these passages the emphatical expression,
‘built by knowledge only/ would be contradicted if we ad¬
mitted that the agnis form part of the sacrificial action.—
But may this emphatical phrase not merely have the pur¬
pose of indicating that those agnis are not to be accom¬
plished by external means ?—No, we reply, for if that were
intended, it would be sufficient to glorify the fact of know¬
ledge constituting the character of the agnis by means of
the word ‘knowledge-piled/ and the emphatical assertion
(implied in the addition of the word ‘only’) would be
useless. For it is the nature of such agnis to be accom¬
plished without any external means. But, although the
agnis are clearly to be accomplished without external
means, yet it might be supposed that, like the mental cup,
they form part of the sacrificial action, and the object of
the emphatical assertion implied in ‘ only’ is to discard
that suspicion.—So likewise (to pass over to linga) the
continuity of action implied in the passage, ‘ For him who
thus knows whether sleeping or waking all beings always
pile these agnis, ’ is possible only on the supposition of
those agnis being independent. The case is analogous to
that of the imaginary agnihotra consisting of speech and
breath, with reference to which the text says at first, ‘He
offers his breath in his speech, he offers his speech in his
breath/ and then adds, ‘ These two endless and immortal
oblations he offers always whether waking or sleeping ’
(Kau. Up. II, 6).—If, on the other hand, the imaginary
agnis were parts of the sacrificial action it would be
impossible for them to be accomplished continually, since
264
VEDANTA-s(jTRAS.
the accomplishment of the sacrificial action itself occupies
only a short time.—Nor may we suppose the passage
(which contains the linga) to be a mere arthavada-passage
(in which case, as the purvapakshin avers, the linga would
be unable to refute prakara/za). For in those cases where
we meet with an unmistakeable injunctory passage—
marked out as such by the use of the optative or imperative
form—there indeed we may assume a glorificatory passage
(met with in connexion with that injunctory passage) to
be an arthavada. In the present case, however, we observe
no clear injunctory passage, and should therefore be obliged
to construct one enjoining the knowledge of the various
fanciful agnis, merely on the basis of the arthavada-
passage. But in that case the injunction can be framed
only in accordance with the arthavada, and as the arthavada
speaks of the continual building of the agnis, the latter item
would have to appear in the injunction also. But, if so, it
follows (as shown above) that the mental construction of
those agnis constitutes an independent vidya (and does not
form part of the actual agni^ayana).—The same argument¬
ation applies to the second linga-passage quoted above,
‘Whatever those beings conceive in their minds,' &c.—And
the sentence finally shows, by means of the clause, ‘ For
him who thus knows/ that those agnis are connected with
a special class of men (viz. those who thus know), and are
therefore not to be connected with the sacrificial action.—
For all these reasons the view of those agnis constituting an
independent vidya is preferable.
50. On account of the connexion and so on (the
agnis built of mind, &c. are independent); in the
same way as other cognitions are separate. And
there is seen (another case of something having to
be withdrawn from the leading subject-matter); this
has been explained (in the Purva Mima^sa-sutras).
Independence has, against the general subject-matter, to
be assumed for the fire-altars built of mind and so on, for
that reason also that the text connects the constituent
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 50.
265
members of the sacrificial action with activities of the
mind, &c.; viz. in the passage, ‘ With mind only they
are established, with mind only they are piled, with
mind only the cups were taken, with mind the udgatrzs
praised, with mind the hotris recited ; whatever work is
done at the sacrifice, whatever sacrificial work, was done as
consisting of mind, by mind only, at those fire-altars made
of mind, piled by mind,’ &c. For that connexion has for
its result an imaginative combination (of certain mental en¬
ergies with the parts of the sacrifice), and the obtainment
of the parts of the sacrifice which are objects of actual
perception cannot be made dependent on such imaginative
combination \ Nor must it be supposed that, because here
also, as in the case of the meditation on the udgitha, the
vidya is connected with members of the sacrificial action,
it enters into that action as a constituent part; for the state¬
ments of the text differ in the two cases. For in our case
scripture does not say that we are to take some member of
a sacrificial action and then to superimpose upon it such
and such a name ; but rather takes six and thirty thousand
different energies of the mind and identifies them with the
fire-altars, the cups, and so on, just as in some other place
it teaches a meditation on man viewed as the sacrifice.
The number given by the text is originally observed as
belonging to the days of a man’s life, and is then transferred
to the mental energies connected therewith.—From the con¬
nexion (referred to in the Sutra) it therefore follows that
the agnis piled of mind, &c. are independent.—The clause
£ and so on ’ (met with in the Sutra) must be explained as
comprehending ‘transference’ and the like as far as possi¬
ble. For if the text says, ‘Each of those Agnis is as great
as that prior one,’ it transfers the glory of the fire-altar
consisting of the work (i.e. the real altar piled of bricks) to
the altars consisting of knowledge and so on, and thereby
1 Kimartham idam anubandhakarawaw tad aha, sampad iti, upa-
styartho hy anubandhas tathapi mana^idadinam akriyangatve
kim ayata/ra tad aha, na £eti, teshaw kriyangatve sakshad evadha-
nadiprasiddher anarthika sampad ity artha^. An. Gi.
266
VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.
expresses want of regard for the work. Nor can it be said
that if there is connexion (of all the agnis) with the sacri¬
ficial action, the later ones (i.e. those made of mind) may
optionally be used instead of the original agnis made of
bricks (as was asserted by the purvapakshin in Sutra 45).
For the later agnis are incapable of assisting the sacrificial
action by means of those energies with which the original
agni assists it, viz.by bearing the ahavaniya fire and so on.—
The assertion, again, made by the purvapakshin (Sutra 46)
that‘transference’strengthens his view in so far as transfer¬
ence is possible only where there is equality, is already refuted
by the remark that also on our view transference is possible,
since the fanciful fire-altars are equal to the real fire-altar in so
far as both are fire-altars.—And that direct enunciation and
so on favour our conclusion has been shown.—From con¬
nexion and so on it therefore follows that the agnis piled
of mind, &c. are independent.—‘ As in the case of the
separateness of other cognitions.’ As other cognitions, such
as e. g. the vSa^</ilya-vidya, which have each their own parti¬
cular connexion, separate themselves from works and other
cognitions and are independent ; so it is in our case also.—
Moreover ‘there is seen’ an analogous case of independence
from the leading subject-matter. The offering called avesh/i
which is mentioned in the sacred texts under the heading of
the ra^asuya-sacrifice, is to be taken out from that heading
because it is connected with the three higher castes, while the
ragasuya can be offered by a member of the warrior caste
only. This has been explained in the first section (i.e. in
the Purva MimcL^sa-sutras).
51. Not also on account of its resembling (the
manasa cup) (can the fires constitute parts of an
action); for it is observed (on the ground of » 5 ruti,
&c., that they are independent); as in the case of
death; for the world does not become (a fire)
(because it resembles a fire in some points).
Against the allegation made by the purvapakshin that
the present case is analogous to that of the manasa cup, we
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 52.
267
remark that the fire-altars made of mind and so on cannot be
assumed to supplement a sacrificial action although they
may resemble the manasa cup, since on the ground of direct
enunciation &c. they are seen to subserve the purpose of
man only (not the purpose of some sacrificial action).
Anything indeed may resemble anything in some point or
other; but in spite of that there remains the individual
dissimilarity of each thing from all other things. The case
is analogous to that of death. In the passages, ‘The man
in that orb is death indeed’ (Sat. Bra. X, 5, 2, 3),and ‘Agni
indeed is death ’ (Taitt. Samh. V, 1, io, 3), the term ‘death ’
is applied equally to Agni and the man in the sun; all the
same the two are by no means absolutely equal. And if
the text says in another place, ‘ This world is a fire indeed,
O Gotama; the sun is its fuel,’ &c. ( Kh . Up. V, 4, 1), it
does not follow from the similarity of fuel and so on that
the world really is a fire. Thus also in our case.
52. And from the subsequent (Brahma/za) it
follows that being of that kind (i. e. injunction of a
mere vidya) (is the aim) of the text. The connexion
(of the fanciful agnis with the real one) is due to the
plurality (of details of the real agni which are
imaginatively connected with the vidya).
With regard to a subsequent Brihmazza also, viz. the one
beginning, ‘ That piled agni is this world indeed,’ we appre¬
hend that what is the purpose of the text is ‘ being of that
kind,’ i.e. injunction of a mere vidya, not injunction of the
member of a mere action. For we meet there with the fol¬
lowing sloka, ‘ By knowledge they ascend there where all
wishes are attained. Those skilled in works do not go there,
nor those who destitute of knowledge do penance.’ This
verse blames mere works and praises knowledge. A former
Brahmazza also, viz. the one beginning, ‘ What that orb
leads’ (Sat. Bra. X, 5, 2, 23), concludes with a statement of
the fruit of knowledge (‘Immortal becomes he whose Self is
death ’), and thereby indicates that works are not the chief
thing.—The text connects the vidya (of the agnis built of
268
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
mind) with the real agni built of bricks, not because those
agnis are members of the act of building the real agni,
but because many of the elements of the real agni are
imaginatively combined with the vidya.
All this establishes the conclusion that the fire-altars
built of mind and so on constitute a mere vidya.
53. Some (maintain the non-existence) of a
(separate) Self, on account of the existence (of the
Self) where a body is (only).
At present we will prove the existence of a Self different
from the body in order to establish thereby the qualifica¬
tion (of the Self) for bondage and release. For if there were
no Self different from the body, there would be no room for
injunctions that have the other world for their result; nor
could it be taught of anybody that Brahman is his Self.—
But, an objection is raised, already in the first pada which
stands at the head of this Sastra (i. e. the first pada of the
Purva Mima^sa-sutras) there has been declared the exist¬
ence of a Self which is different from the body and hence
capable of enjoying the fruits taught by the Sastra.—True,
this has been declared there by the author of the bhashya,
but there is in that place no Sutra about the existence of
the Self. Here, on the other hand, the Sutrakara himself
establishes the existence of the Self after having disposed
of a preliminary objection. And from hence the teacher
vSabara Svamin has taken the matter for his discussion of
the point in the chapter treating of the means of right
knowledge. For the same reason the reverend Upavarsha
remarks in the first tantra—where an opportunity offers
itself for the discussion of the existence of the Self—‘ We
will discuss this in the Sariraka,’ and allows the matter to
rest there. Here, where we are engaged in an inquiry into
the pious meditations which are matter of injunction, a
discussion of the existence of the Self is introduced in order
to show that the whole Sastra depends thereon.
Moreover, in the preceding adhikara/za we have shown
that passages may be exempted from the influence of the
leading subject-matter, and that for that reason the fire-
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 54.
269
altars built of mind and so on subserve the purpose of man
(not of the sacrifice). In consequence thereof there naturally
arises the question who that man is whose purposes the
different fire-altars subserve, and in reply to it the existence
of a Self which is separate from the body is affirmed.—The
first Sutra embodies an objection against that doctrine;
according to the principle that a final refutation of objec¬
tions stated in the beginning effects a stronger conviction
of the truth of the doctrine whose establishment is aimed at.
Here now some materialists (lokayatika), who see the
Self in the body only, are of opinion that a Self separate
from the body does not exist; assume that consciousness
(^aitanya), although not observed in earth and the other
external elements—either single or combined—may yet
appear in them when transformed into the shape of a
body, so that consciousness springs from them ; and thus
maintain that knowledge is analogous to intoxicating
quality (which arises when certain materials are mixed in
certain proportions), and that man is only a body qualified
by consciousness. There is thus, according to them, no
Self separate from the body and capable of going to the
heavenly world or obtaining release, through which con¬
sciousness is in the body ; but the body alone is what is
conscious, is the Self. For this assertion they allege the
reason stated in the Sutra, ‘ On account of its existence
where a body is/ For wherever something exists if some
other thing exists, and does not exist if that other thing
does not exist, we determine the former thing to be a mere
quality of the latter ; light and heat, e. g. we determine to
be qualities of fire. And as life, movement, consciousness,
remembrance and so on—which by the upholders of an
independent Self are considered qualities of that Self—are
observed only within bodies and not outside bodies, and as
an abode of those qualities, different from the body, cannot
be proved, it follows that they must be qualities of the body
only. The Self therefore is not different from the body.—
To this conclusion the next Sutra replies.
54. There is separation (of the Self from the
270
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
body) because its existence does not depend on the
existence of that (viz. the body), but there is not
(non-separation); as in the case of perceptive con¬
sciousness.
The assertion that the Self is not separate from the body
cannot be maintained. The Self rather must be something
separate from the body, ‘ because the existence (of the Self)
does not depend on the existence of that (i. e. the body)/
For if from the circumstance that they are where the body
is you conclude that the qualities of the Self are qualities
of the body, you also must conclude from the fact that
they are not where the body is that they are not qualities
of the body, because thereby they show themselves to be
different in character from the qualities of the body. Now
the (real) qualities of the body, such as form and so on, may
be viewed as existing as long as the body exists ; life,
movement, &c., on the other hand, do not exist even when
the body exists, viz. in the state of death. The qualities of
the body, again, such as form and so on, are perceived by
others; not so the qualities of the Self, such as conscious¬
ness, remembrance, and so on. Moreover, we can indeed
ascertain the presence of those latter qualities as long as
the body exists in the state of life, but we cannot ascertain
their non-existence when the body does not exist; for it is
possible that even after this body has died the qualities of
the Self should continue to exist by passing over into
another body. The opposite opinion is thus precluded
also for the reason of its being a mere hypothesis.—We
further must question our opponent as to the nature of
that consciousness which he assumes to spring from the
elements ; for the materialists do not admit the existence
of anything but the four elements. Should he say that
consciousness is the perception of the elements and what
springs from the elements, we remark that in that case the
elements and their products are objects of consciousness
and that hence the latter cannot be a quality of them, as it
is contradictory that anything should act on itself. Fire
is hot indeed but does not burn itself, and the acrobat, well
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 54.
271
trained as he may be, cannot mount on his own shoulders.
As little could consciousness, if it were a mere quality of
the elements and their products, render them objects of
itself. For form and other (undoubted) qualities do not
make their own colour or the colour of something else their
objects; the elements and their products, on the other
hand, whether external or belonging to the Self (the
organism) are rendered objects by consciousness. Hence
in the same way as we admit the existence of that per¬
ceptive consciousness which has the material elements and
their products for its objects, we also must admit the
separateness of that consciousness from the elements. And
as consciousness constitutes the character of our Self, the
Self must be distinct from the body. That consciousness
is permanent, follows from the uniformity of its character
(and we therefore may conclude that the conscious Self is
permanent also ; as also follows) from the fact that the
Self, although connected with a different state, recognises
itself as the conscious agent—a recognition expressed in
judgments such as ‘ I saw this/—and from the fact of
remembrance and so on being possible *.
The argumentation that consciousness is an attribute of
the body because it is where a body is, is already refuted
by the reasons stated above. Moreover, perceptive con¬
sciousness takes place where there are certain auxiliaries
such as lamps and the like, and does not take place where
those are absent, without its following therefrom that per¬
ception is an attribute of the lamp or the like. Analogously
1 The ‘nityatva/zz kaJ of the text might perhaps be connected
directly with ‘ atmano/ Ananda Giri on the entire passage:
Bhavatu tarhi bhutebhyo * tirikta svatantryopalabdhis tathapi katham
atmasiddhis tatraha upalabdhiti, ksha/zikatvat tasya nityatmarft-
patvam ayuktam ity a^ankyag-anatas tadbhedabhavad vishayoparagat
tadbhanad asav eva nityopalabdhir ity aha nityatvaw £eti, Ywi ka.
sthuladehabhimanahmasya svapne pratyabhi^/zanad atiriktatma-
siddhir ity aha aham iti, svapne sthuladehantarasyaivopalabdhrz-
tvam ity a^ankyaha smrztyaditi, upalabdhr/smartror bhede saty
anyopalabdhe^nyasya smntir i^adaya^ ka. neti na tayor anyatety
artha^.
272
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
the fact that perception takes place where there is a body,
and does not take place where there is none, does not imply
that it is an attribute of the body ; for like lamps and so
on the body may be used (by the Self) as a mere auxiliary.
Nor is it even true that the body is absolutely required as
an auxiliary of perception ; for in the state of dream we
have manifold perceptions while the body lies motionless.—
The view of the Self being something separate from the
body is therefore free from all objections.
55. But the (meditations) connected with members
(of sacrificial acts are) not (restricted) to (particular)
■Sakhas, according to the Veda (to which they
belong).
The above occasional discussion being terminated, we
return to the discussion of the matter in hand.—We meet
in the different Sakhas of each Veda with injunctions of
vidyas connected with certain members of sacrificial acts,
such as the udgitha and the like. Cp. e.g. ‘Let a man
meditate on the syllable Om (as) the udgitha ’ (Kk. Up. I,
1, 1) ; ‘Let a man meditate on the fivefold Saman as the
five worlds' (Kk. Up. II, 2, 1); ‘People say: “Hymns,
hymns! ” the hymn is truly this earth ’ (Ait. Ar. II, 1,2, 1);
‘ The piled up fire-altar truly is this world ’ (Sat. Bra. X, 5,
4. 1). A doubt here arises whether the vidyas are enjoined
with reference to the udgitha and so on as belonging to a
certain Sakha only or as belonging to all Sakhas. The
doubt is raised on the supposition that the udgitha and so
on differ in the different Sakhas because the accents, &c.
differ.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the vidyas are
enjoined only with reference to the udgitha and so on which
belong to the particular Sctkha (to which the vidyd belongs).
—Why?—On account of proximity. For as such general
injunctions as ‘ Let a man meditate on the udgitha’ are in
need of a specification, and as this need is satisfied by the
specifications given in the same Sakha which stand in
immediate proximity, there is no reason for passing over
that Sakha and having recourse to specifications enjoined
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 56.
273
in other Sakhas. Hence the vidyas are to be held apart,
according to the Sakhas to which they belong.
To this the Sutra replies ‘but those connected with
members/ &c.—The word ‘ but 5 discards the prima facie
view. The meditations are not restricted to their own
Sakhas according to the Veda to which they belong, but
are valid for all Sakhas.—Why?—Because the direct state¬
ments of the texts about the udgitha and so on enounce
no specification. For to such general injunctions as £ Let a
man meditate on the udgitha’—which say nothing about
specifications—violence would be done, if on the ground of
proximity we restricted them to something special belong¬
ing to its own Sakha, and that would be objectionable
because direct statement has greater weight than proximity.
There is, on the other hand, no reason why the vidya
should not be of general reference. We therefore conclude
that, although the Vakhas differ as to accents and the like,
the vidyas mentioned refer to the udgitha and so on belong¬
ing to all 6akhas, because the text speaks only of the
udgitha and so on in general.
56. Or else there is no contradiction (implied in
our opinion); as in the case of mantras and the like.
Or else we may put the matter as follows. There is no
reason whatever to suspect a contradiction if we declare
certain vidyas enjoined in one Sakh& to be valid for the
udgitha and so on belonging to other Sakhas also ; for
there is no more room for contradiction than in the case of
mantras. We observe that mantras, acts, and qualities of
acts which are enjoined in one Sakha are taken over by
other Sakhas also. So e. g. the members of certain Ya^ur-
veda Sakhas do not exhibit in their text the mantra, £ Thou
art the ku/aru V which accompanies the taking of the stone
(with which the rice-grains are ground); all the same we
meet in their text with the following injunction of applica¬
tion, £ Thou art the cock, with this mantra he takes the
stone ; or else with the mantra, Thou art the ku/aru. 5
1 Maitrayamya Sawhita I, 1, 6.
T
[ 38 ]
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
2 74
Again, the text of some 5 akha does not contain a direct
injunction of the five offerings called pray&£*as which are
made to the fuel and so on, but it contains the injunction
of secondary matters connected with the pray^as, viz. in
the passage, 4 the seasons indeed are the praya^*as; they
are to be offered in one and the same spot V—Again, the
text of some vSakha does not contain an injunction as to
the species of the animal to be sacrificed to Agnishomau—
such as would be 4 a he-goat is sacrificed to Agnishomau 1 2 3
—but in the same vSakha we meet with a mantra which
contains the required specification, 4 Hot ri, recite the
anuvakya, for the fat of the omentum of the he-goat V
Similarly mantras enjoined in one Veda only, such as
4 O Agni, promote the hautra, promote the sacrifice/ are
seen to be taken over into other Vedas also. Another
example (of the transference of mantras) is supplied by the
hymn, 4 He who as soon as born showed himself intelligent/
&c. (Rik. Sa/^h. II, 12), which although read in the text of
the Bahvr/^as is employed in the Taittiriya Veda also,
according to Taitt. Sa^h. VII, 5, 5, 2, 4 The Sa£*aniya hymn
is to be recited.’—Just as, therefore, the members of sacri¬
ficial actions on which certain vidyas rest are valid every¬
where, so the vidyas themselves also which rest on those
members are valid for all 5 akhas and Vedas.
57. There is pre-eminence of the (meditation on)
plenitude (i.e. Agni Vairvanara in his aggregate
form), as in the case of sacrifices; for thus scripture
shows.
In the legend beginning 4 Pra^inaj-ala Aupamanyava/
the text speaks of meditations on VaLrvanara in his dis-
1 As this passage states the number of the prayag-as (viz. five,
which is the number of the seasons) and other secondary points, we
conclude that the injunction of the offering of the praya^as, which is
given in other Aakhas, is valid also for the -Sakha referred to in the
text (the Maitrayamyas, according to the commentators).
2 But only says ‘they offer an animal to Agnishomau/
3 Wherefrom we infer that not any animal may be offered to
Agnishomau, but only a he-goat.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 57.
275
tributed as well as his aggregate condition. References
to him in his distributed state are made in the passage,
‘ Aupamanyava, whom do you meditate on as the Self?
He replied : Heaven only, venerable king. He said : The
Self which you meditate on is the VaLsvanara Self called
Sute^as; 5 and in the following passages (. Kh . Up. V,
12-17). A meditation on him in his aggregate state, on
the other hand, is referred to in the passage (V, 18), ‘Of
that Vauvanara Self the head is Sute^as, the eye Visv a-
rupa, the breath Przthagvartman, the trunk Bahula, the
bladder Rayi, the feet the earth/ &c.—A doubt here arises
whether the text intimates a meditation on VaLrvanara in
both his forms or only in his aggregate form.
The purvapakshin maintains that we have to do with
meditations on Vauyvanara in his distributed form, firstly
because the text exhibits a special verb, viz. ‘ you meditate
on,’ with reference to each of the limbs, Sute^as and so on;
and secondly because the text states special fruits (con¬
nected with each special meditation) in the passage,
‘Therefore every kind of Soma libation is seen in your
house,’ and the later similar passages.
To this we make the following reply. We must sup¬
pose that the entire section aims at intimating ‘ the pre¬
eminence,’ i. e. at intimating as its pre-eminent subject, a
meditation on ‘plenitude,’ i. e. on Vauvanara in his aggre¬
gate state, who comprises within himself a plurality of
things ; not a number of special meditations on the limbs
of VaLsvanara. ‘ As in the case of sacrifices.’ In the same
way as the Vedic texts referring to sacrifices such as the
danrapun/amasa aim at enjoining the performance of the
entire sacrifice only, i. e. of the chief sacrificial action to¬
gether with its members—and not in addition the perform¬
ance of single subordinate members such as the praya^as,
nor again the performance of the chief action together with
some of its subordinate members; so it is here also.—
But whence do you know that c plenitude ’ is the pre¬
eminent topic of the passage?—It is shown by scripture,
we reply, since we apprehend that the entire section forms
a connected whole. For on examining the connexion of
T 2
276
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
the parts we find that the entire section has for its subject
the knowledge of VaLfvanara. The text at first informs
us that six Rzshis —Pr^inaj'ala, &c., up to Uddalaka—
being unable to reach a firm foundation in the knowledge
of VaLswanara, went to the king Awapati Kaikeya; goes
on to mention the object of each Ri shi’s meditation, viz.
the sky and so on; determines that the sky and so on are
only the head and so on of VaLs , v 4 nara—in the passage
4 he said : that is but the head of the Self/ and the later
similar passages ;—and thereupon rejects all meditations
on Vahvctnara in his distributed form, in the passage, 4 Your
head would have fallen if you had not come to me/ and
so on. Finally having discarded all distributed meditation
it turns to the meditation on the aggregate Vauvanara and
declares that all results rest on him only, 4 he eats food in
all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs/—That the text
mentions special fruits for the special meditations on
Sute^as and so on we have, in accordance with our view,
to explain as meaning that the results of the subordinate
meditations are to be connected in their aggregate with
the principal meditation. And that the text exhibits a
special verb— 4 you do meditate ’—in connexion with each
member is not meant to enjoin special meditations on those
members, but merely to make additional remarks about
something which has another purpose (i. e. about the medi¬
tation on the aggregate Vai^vanara).—For all these reasons
the view according to which the text enjoins a meditation
on the aggregate VaLrvanara only is preferable.
Some commentators here establish the conclusion that
the meditation on the aggregate VaLsvanara is the prefer¬
able alternative, but assume, on the ground of the Sutra
employing the term 4 pre-eminence 5 only, that the Sutra-
kara allows also the alternative of distributed meditation.
But this is inadmissible, since it is improper to assume
a ‘split of the sentence' (i.e. to ascribe to a passage a
double meaning), as long as the passage may be under¬
stood as having one meaning only. Their interpretation,
moreover, contradicts those passages which expressly blame
distributed meditations; such as 4 Thy head would have
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 58.
277
fallen.' And as the conclusion of the section clearly in¬
timates a meditation on the aggregate VaLvanara, the
negation of such meditation could not be maintained as
purvapaksha 1 . The term ‘ pre-eminence ’ which the Sutra
employs may moreover be explained as meaning (not mere
preferability, but exclusive) authoritativeness.
58. (The vidyds are) separate, on account of the
difference of words and the like.
In the preceding adhikarazza we have arrived at the con¬
clusion that a meditation on Vahvanara as a whole is the
pre-eminent meaning of the text, although special results
are stated for meditations on Sute^as and so on. On the
ground of this it may be presumed that other medita¬
tions also which are enjoined by separate scriptural
texts have to be combined into more general medita¬
tions. Moreover, we cannot acknowledge a separation of
vidyas (acts of cognition ; meditations) as long as the
object of cognition is the same; for the object constitutes
the character of a cognition in the same way as the
material offered and the divinity to which the offering is
made constitute the character of a sacrifice. Now we
understand that the Lord forms the only object of cog¬
nition in a number of scriptural passages, although the
latter are separate in enunciation; cp. e. g. ‘ He con¬
sisting of mind, whose body is pra/za 5 ( Kh . Up. Ill, 14, 2);
‘Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha * ( Kh . Up. IV, 10, 5);
‘ He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true' {Kh.
Up. VIII, 7, 3). Analogously one and the same Pra/za is
referred to in different texts; cp. ‘ Prazza indeed is the
end of all ’ ( Kh . Up. IV, 3, 3); ‘ Prazza indeed is the oldest
and the best’ {Kh. Up. V, 1, 1); ‘ Prazza is father, Prazza is
mother' {Kh. Up. VII, 15, 1). And from the unity of the
object of cognition there follows unity of cognition. Nor
1 Yadobhayatropastisiddhantas tada vyastopastir evatra sama-
stopastir eva va purvapaksha^ syan nadya ity aha, spash/e £eti,
dvittya^ to tatrayukto vakyopakramasthavyastopastidhivirodhat.
An. Gi.
278
vedanta-sIjtras.
can it be said that, on this view, the separateness of the
different scriptural statements would be purposeless, since
each text serves to set forth other qualities (of the one
pradh&na which is their common subject). Hence the
different qualities which are enjoined in one’s own and in
other .Sakhas, and which all belong to one object of know¬
ledge, must be combined so that a totality of cognition
may be effected.
To this conclusion we reply, ‘ Separate/ &c. Although
the object of cognition is one, such cognitions must be
considered as separate ‘ on account of the difference of
words and the like. 5 —For the text exhibits a difference of
words such as ‘he knows,’ ‘let him meditate,’ ‘let him
form the idea’ (cp. Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). And difference of
terms is acknowledged as a reason of difference of acts,
according to Purva Mima^sa-sutras II, 2, 1.—The clause
‘and the like’ in the Sutra intimates that also qualities
and so on may be employed, according to circumstances,
as reasons for the separateness of acts.—But, an objection
is raised, from passages such as ‘ he knows ’ and so on we
indeed apprehend a difference of words, but not a difference
of sense such as we apprehend when meeting with such
clauses as ‘ he sacrifices ’ and the like (ya^ate, £*uhoti,
dadati). For all these words (viz. veda, upasita, &c.)
denote one thing only, viz. a certain activity of the mind,
and another meaning is not possible in their case 1 , How
then does difference of vidya follow from difference of
words?—This objection is without force, we reply; for
although all those words equally denote a certain activity
of the mind only, yet a difference of vidya may result from
a difference of connexion. The Lord indeed is the only
object of meditation in the passages quoted, but according
to its general purport each passage teaches different
qualities of the Lord ; and similarly, although one and the
same Pra^a is the object of meditation in the other series
1 Vedopasitetyadkabdanaw kvakig gna.na.rn kva^id dhyanam ity
arthabhedam a^ankya ^anasyavidheyatvad vidhiyamanam upasa-
nam evety aha arthantareti. An. Gi.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 58.
279
of passages, yet one of his qualities has to be meditated
upon in one place and another in another place. From
difference of connexion there thus follows difference of
injunction, and from the latter we apprehend the separate¬
ness of the vidyas. Nor can it be maintained (as the purva-
pakshin did) that one of those injunctions is the injunction
of the vidya itself, while the others enjoin mere qualities;
for there is no determining reason (as to which is the vidya -
vidhi and which the gu//avidhis), and as in each passage
more than one quality are mentioned it is impossible that
those passages should enjoin qualities with reference to a
vidya established elsewhere 1 . Nor should, in the case of
the purvapakshin’s view being the true one, the qualities
which are common to several passages, such as ‘having
true wishes,’ be repeated more than once. Nor can the
different sections be combined into one syntactical whole,
because in each one a certain kind of meditation is en¬
joined on those who have a certain wish, whence we
understand that the passage is complete in itself 2 . Nor
is there in the present case an additional injunction of a
meditation on something whole—such as there is in the
case of the cognition of the VaLrvanara—owing to the
force of which the meditations on the single parts which
are contained in each section would combine themselves
into a whole. And if on the ground of the object of cog¬
nition being one we should admit unity of vidya without
any restriction, we should thereby admit an altogether im¬
possible combination of all qualities (mentioned anywhere
in the Upanishads). The Sutra therefore rightly declares
the separateness of the vidyas.—The present adhikara^a
being thus settled, the first Sutra of the pada has now to
be considered 3 .
1 For to enjoin in one passage several qualities—none of which is
established already—would involve an objectionable vakyabheda.
2 A sentence is to be combined with another one into a larger
whole only if the sentences are not complete in themselves but
evince an akanksha, a desire of complementation.
3 I.e. the present adhikarawa ought in reality to head the entire
pada.
28 o
vedanta-sCtras.
59. There is (restriction to) option (between the
vidyas), on account of their having non-differing
results.
The difference of the vidyas having been determined, we
now enter on an inquiry whether, according to one’s liking,
there should be cumulation of the different vidyas or option
between them; or else restriction to an optional proceed¬
ing (to the exclusion of cumulation). For restriction to
cumulation (which might be mentioned as a third alterna¬
tive) there is no reason, because the separation of the
vidyas has been established.—But we observe that in the
case of the sacrifices, agnihotra, darcapur/zamasa and so on,
there is restriction to cumulation (i. e. that those sacrifices
have all of them to be performed, not optionally one or the
other) although they are different from each other.—True ;
but the reason for the obligatory cumulation of those
sacrifices lies therein that scripture teaches them to be of
absolute obligation. No scriptural passage, on the other
hand, teaches the absolute obligatoriness of the vidyas, and
it cannot therefore be a rule that they must be cumulated.
—Nor can it be a rule that there must be option between
them, because a person entitled to one vidya cannot be
excluded from another vidya. It therefore only remains to
conclude that one may proceed as one likes.—But—an
objection is raised—we must rather conclude that option
between them is the rule, because their fruits are non-
different. For vidyas such as ‘ He who consists of mind,
whose body is prd^a ;’ ‘ Brahman is Ka, Brahman is Kha
‘ He whose wishes are true, whose purposes are true,’ have
all of them equally the obtaining of the Lord for their fruit.
—This does not affect our conclusion ; for we see that it is
allowed to proceed as one likes also with regard to certain
sacrificial acts which are the means of obtaining the
heavenly world, and thus have all of them the same result.
It therefore remains a settled conclusion that in the case of
vidyas one may proceed as one likes.
To this we reply as follows. There must be option
between the vidyas, not cumulation, because they have the
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 6 1 .
28l
same fruit. For the fruit of all of them is the intuition of
the object meditated upon, and when this object, e. g. the
Lord, has once been intuited through one meditation a
second meditation would be purposeless. It would, more¬
over, be impossible even to effect an intuition through the
cumulation of several meditations, since that would cause
distraction of attention. And that the fruit of a vidya is
to be effected through intuition various scriptural passages
declare; cp. Kh . Up. Ill, 14, 4, 4 He who has this faith
and no doubt; ’ Bri. Up. IV, 1,3,* Having become a god
he goes to the gods/ and others. Also Smrzti-passages
such as Bha. Gita VIII, 6, and others.—One therefore has to
select one of those vidyas the fruit of which is the same,
and to remain intent on it until, through the intuition of
the object to be meditated upon, the fruit of the vidya is
obtained.
60. But (vidyas) connected with wishes may,
according to one’s liking, be cumulated or not; on
account of the absence of the former reason.
The above Sutra supplies a counter-instance to the
preceding Sutra.—We have, on the other hand, vidyas
connected with definite wishes ; as e. g. Kh . Up. Ill, 15, 2,
4 He who knows that the wind is the child of the regions
never weeps for his sons;’ Kh . Up. VII, 1, 5, 4 He who
meditates on name as Brahman, walks at will as far as
name reaches.’ In these vidyas which, like actions, effect
their own special results by means of their 4 unseen ’ Self,
there is no reference to any intuition, and one therefore
may, according to one’s liking, either cumulate them or
not cumulate them ; 4 on account of the absence of the
former reason,’ i. e. because there is not the reason for
option which was stated in the preceding Sutra.
61. With the (meditations on) members (of sacri¬
ficial acts) it is as with their abodes.
Are those meditations—enjoined in the three Vedas—
which rest on members of sacrificial actions such as the
282
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
udgitha to be superadded to each other, or may we proceed
with regard to them as we like?—To this doubt the Sutra
replies, ‘ it is according to the abodes/ As the abiding-
places of those meditations, viz. the Stotra and so on, are
combined (for the performance of the sacrifice), so those
meditations also. For a meditation is subject to what it
rests on.
62. And on account of the teaching.
As the Stotra and the other members of the sacrifice on
which the meditations under discussion rest are taught in
the three Vedas, so also the meditations resting on them.
The meaning of this remark is that also as far as the mode
of information is concerned there is no difference between
the members of a sacrificial act and the meditations refer¬
ring to them.
63. On account of the rectification.
The passage, ‘From the seat of the Hot ri he sets right
any mistake committed in the udgitha' ( Kh . Up. I, 5 > 5 )>
declares that, owing to the might of the meditation on the
unity of pra;zava and udgitha, the Hot ri sets right any
mistake he may commit in his work, by means of the work
of the Hot ri.
Now, as a meditation mentioned in one Veda is con¬
nected (with what is mentioned in another Veda) in the
same way as a thing mentioned in another Veda, the
above passage suggests the conclusion that all meditations
on members of sacrificial acts—in whatever Veda they may
be mentioned—have to be combined 1 .
64. And because the text states a quality (of the
vidya) to be common (to the three Vedas).
The text states that the syllable Om which is a quality,
1 A ‘ thing’ belonging to the AVg-veda, viz. the pra^ava, is, accord¬
ing to the ATMndogya-passage, connected with the Sama-veda
meditation on the udgitha. Hence meditations also which belong
to different Vedas may be combined; for there is no difference
between them and things as far as connexion is concerned.
Ill ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 65.
283
i.e. the abode of a meditation, is common to the three
Vedas, ‘ By that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds.
With Om the Adhvaryu gives orders, with Om the Hot ri
recites, with Om the Udgatrz sings.’ This suggests that,
as the abode of the vidya (viz. the O/^kara) is common,
the vidyas which abide in it are common also.—Or else
the Sutra may be explained as follows. If the udgitha
and so on, which are matters qualifying the sacrificial
action, were not all of them common to all sacrificial
performances, the vidyas resting on them would not go
together. But the scriptural passages which teach the
sacrificial performances and extend over all subordinate
matters, state that the udgitha and so on are common to
all performances. As thus the abodes of the vidyas go
together, the vidyas abiding in them go together likewise.
65. (The meditations on members of sacrificial
actions are) rather not (to be combined), as the text
does not state their going together.
The words 1 rather not’ discard the purvapaksha. The
meditations resting on members of actions are not to be
treated like what they rest on, because scripture does not
state their going together. Scripture actually states the
going together of the Stotras and other subordinate
members of sacrificial action which are enjoined in the
three Vedas; cp. passages such as ‘After the taking of
the graha or the raising of the ^amasa he performs the
Stotra ; ’ 6 After the Stotra he recites ; ’ £ Prastotrz sing the
Saman;’ £ Hot ri recite the Yd^ya for this;’ and so on.
But, on the other hand, there are no analogous texts
expressly teaching the going together of the meditations.—
But the going together of the meditations is established
by those texts which intimate the successive performance
of the different constituent members of a sacrifice!—By
no means, we reply. The meditations subserve the end
of man, while the texts referred to by you establish only
the going together of the udgitha and the like which
subserve the purpose of the sacrifice. That the medita¬
tions on the udgitha and so on—although resting on
284
VEDANTA-sftTRAS.
members of sacrificial acts—yet subserve the end of man
only in the same way as the godohana vessel does, we
have already explained under III, 3, 42.—And this very
difference between members of sacrificial action and the
meditations resting on them, viz. that the former subserve
the purpose of the sacrifice while the latter subserve the
end of man, is founded on the express teaching of
scripture 1 .—And the further two indicatory marks (pointed
out by the purvapakshin in Sutras 63 and 64) supply no
reason for the going together of the meditations, because
no direct scriptural statement may be constructed from
them. Nor 2 does the fact that in each sacrificial perform¬
ance all foundations of meditations are comprised, enable
us to conclude that the meditations founded on them are
to be combined also ; for the meditations are not caused
by what they rest on. The meditations, as resting on
their foundations, would, it may be admitted, not exist
if those foundations did not exist. But therefrom it does
not follow that the going together of the foundations
implies a necessary going together of the meditations ; for
as to this we have no direct scriptural statement.—From
all this it results that the meditations may be performed
according to one’s liking.
66 . And because (scripture) shows it.
Scripture moreover shows that the meditations do not
go together, viz. in the following passage, ‘A Brahman
priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer,
and all the priests’ ( Kh . Up. IV, 17, 10). For if all
meditations were to be combined, all priests would know
them all, and the text could not specially announce that
the Brahman priest possessing a certain knowledge
thereby saves the others.—The meditations may there¬
fore, according to one’s liking, be either combined or
optionally employed.
1 A remark refuting the averment made in Sfitra 62.
2 And this is meant to refute the second interpretation given of
Sutra 64.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 2 .
2 85
FOURTH pADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
1. The purpose of man (is effected) thence (i. e.
through the mere knowledge of Brahman), thus
B&daraya na. opines.
The Sutrakara at present enters on an inquiry whether
the knowledge of the Self which is derived from the
Upanishads, is connected with works through him who is
entitled to perform the works 1 , or is an independent means
to accomplish the purpose of man. He begins by stating
the final view in the above Sutra, ‘Thence’ &c. The
teacher Badaraya//a is of opinion that thence, i. e. through
the independent knowledge of Brahman enjoined in the
Vedanta-texts, the purpose of man is effected.—Whence
is this known?—‘From scripture/ which exhibits passages
such as the following : ‘He who knows the Self overcomes
grief’ ( Kh . Up. Ill, 4, 1) ; ‘ He who knows that highest
Brahman becomes even Brahman ’ (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9);
‘ He who knows Brahman attains the Highest’ (Taitt. Up.
II, 1); ‘ For him who has a teacher there is delay only so
long as he is not delivered ; then he will be perfect ’ ( Kh .
Up. VI, 14, 2); ‘ He who has searched out and under¬
stands the Self which is free from sin, &c. &c., obtains
all worlds and all desires’ (Kh. Up. VIII, J, 1); ‘The Self
is to be seen ’ &c. up to ‘ Thus far goes immortality ’ (B ri.
Up. IV, 5, 6-15). These and similar texts declare that
mere knowledge effects the purpose of man.—Against this
the opponent raises his voice as follows.
2. On account of (the Self) standing in a supple¬
mentary relation (to action), (the statements as to
1 The purvapakshin (see next Sutra) maintains that the know¬
ledge of the Self is subordinate to (sacrificial) action through the
mediation of the agent, i. e. in so far as it imparts to the agent a
certain qualification.
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
286
the fruits of the knowledge of the Self) are artha¬
vadas, as in other cases, thus Gaimini opines.
As the Self, in consequence of its being the agent, stands
in a supplementary relation to action, the knowledge of the
Self also is connected with action through the mediation of
its object, analogously to the case of the sprinkling of the
rice-grains with water; hence as the purpose of the know¬
ledge of the Self is understood thereby, the statements of
the text about the fruits of that knowledge are mere artha¬
vadas. Such is the opinion of the teacher Gaimini 1 . The
case is analogous to that of other textual statements as to
the fruits of certain materials, sa^skaras and works; which
statements have likewise to be understood as arthavadas.
Cp. the passage, ‘ He whose sacrificial ladle is made of
par;za-wood hears no evil sound ; 5 c By anointing his eye
he wards off the eye of the enemy; ’ ‘ By making the
praya^a and anuya^a-oblations he makes an armour for
the sacrifice, an armour for the sacrificer so that he over¬
comes his enemies 2 /—But how can it be supposed that
1 The contention of the purvapakshin—Gaimini—is that the
knowledge of the Self has no independent fruit of its own, because
it stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial action. This rela¬
tion is mediated by the Self-—the object of knowledge—which is
the agent in all action, and therefore itself stands in a subordinate
relation to action. By learning that his Self will outlive the body
the agent becomes qualified for actions, the fruit of which will
only appear after death. The qualification the Self thus acquires
is analogous to that which the rice-grains acquire by being sprinkled
with water; for only through this latter act of ceremonial modifica¬
tion (or purification, sawskara) they become fit to be used in the
sacrifice.—As the knowledge of the Self thus has no independent
position, it cannot have an independent fruit of its own, and con¬
sequently the passages which state such fruits cannot be taken as
‘injunctions of fruits/ but merely as arthavadas, making some
additional statement about the fruit of the sacrificial actions to
which the knowledge of the Self is auxiliary.
2 The material, i. e. the ladle made of par^a-wood, is auxiliary
to the sacrifice, and the fruit which the text ascribes to it (viz.
hearing no evil sound) therefore has to be viewed as a fruit of
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 .
287
the knowledge of the Self which the text does not exhibit
under any special heading can enter into sacrificial action
as a subordinate member, without the presence of any of
the means of proof—general subject-matter and so on—
which determine such subordinate relation ?—The purva-
pakshin may reply that the knowledge of the Self enters
into sacrificial action through the mediation of the agent,
on the ground of the means of proof called vakya
(sentence ; syntactical unity ) 1 . But this we deny because
in the present case ‘ sentence ’ has no force to teach the
application (of the knowledge of the Self to the sacri¬
fices, as a subordinate member of the latter). Things
which the text states under no particular heading may
indeed be connected with the sacrifice on the ground of
‘sentence,’ through some intermediate link which is not
of too wide an application 2 ; but the agent is an inter¬
mediate link of too wide an application, since it is common
to all action whether worldly or based on the Veda. The
agent cannot therefore be used as a mediating link to
establish the connexion of the knowledge of the Self with
the sacrifice.—Your objection is not valid, the purva-
pakshin replies, since the knowledge of a Self different
from the body is of no use anywhere but in works based
on the Veda. For such knowledge is of no use in worldly
works, in all of which the activity may be shown to be
guided by visible purposes; with reference to Vedic works,
on the other hand, whose fruits manifest themselves only
after the death of this body no activity would be possible
the entire sacrifice. Analogously in the case of the sazwskara—
the anointing—which fits the sacrificer for performing the sacrifice,
and in the case of the praya^as and anuya^as which are merely
subordinate members of the danrapur/zamasa.
1 The entire Veda constituting an extended syntactical whole,
in which the agent is the same.
2 Thus the quality of being made of parzza-wood is connected
with the sacrifices on the ground of the vakya implied in ‘ yasya
par/zamayi guhur bhavati,’ because here we have as an intermediate
link the guhu, i. e. a special implement which is used at sacrifices
only, and therefore is not of too wide an application.
288
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
were it not for the knowledge of a Self separate from the
body, and such knowledge therefore has its uses there.—
But, another objection is raised, from attributes given to
the Self, such as £ free from sin/ and the like, it appears
that the doctrine of the Upanishads refers to that Self
which stands outside the sa^sara and cannot therefore
be subordinate to activity.—This objection too is without
force ; for what the Upanishads teach as the object of
cognition is just the transmigrating Self, which is clearly
referred to in such terms as ‘dear’ (B ri. Up. II, 4, 5).
Attributes such as being free from sin, on the other hand,
may be viewed as aiming merely at the glorification of
that Self.—But in more than one place Brahman, the
cause of the world, which is additional to the trans¬
migrating Self and itself not subject to transmigration
has been established, and the Upanishads teach that this
very Brahman constitutes the real nature of the trans¬
migrating Self!—True, that has been established; but
in order to confirm that doctrine, objections and their
refutation are again set forth with reference to the question
as to the fruit (of the knowledge of the Self).
3. On account of scripture showing (certain lines
of) conduct.
c Uanaka the king of the Videhas sacrificed with a sacri¬
fice at which many presents were given to the priests’ (B ri.
Up. Ill, 1, 1); ‘Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice’
(Kh. Up. V, 11, 5)5 these and similar passages—which
occur in sections that have another purport—show that
those who know Brahman are connected with sacrificial
action also. And similarly we apprehend from the fact
that according to scripture Uddalaka and others taught
their sons and so on, that they were connected with the
condition of life of householders. If mere knowledge could
effect the purpose of man, why should the persons men¬
tioned have performed works troublesome in many respects?
‘ If a man would find honey in the Arka tree why should
he go to the forest ? ’
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 7.
289
4. Because scripture directly states that.
‘ What a man does with knowledge, faith and the
Upanishad is more powerful’ ( Kh . Up. I, 1, 10); this
passage directly states that knowledge is subordinate to
work 1 , and from this it follows that mere knowledge
cannot effect the purpose of man.
5. On account of the taking hold together.
‘Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of
him 5 ( Bri . Up. IV, 4, 2); as this passage shows that
knowledge and work begin together to manifest their
fruits, it follows that knowledge is not independent.
6. And because scripture enjoins (works) for such
(only as understand the purport of the Veda).
‘ He who has learnt (lit. “ read ”) the Veda from a family
of teachers, according to the sacred injunction, in the
leisure time left from the duties to be performed for the
Guru ; who after having received his discharge has settled
in his own house, studying his sacred texts in some sacred
spot 5 ( Kh . Up. VIII, 15); such passages also show that
those who know the purport of the whole Veda are qualified
for sacrificial action, and that hence knowledge does not
independently bring about a result—But the expression
‘ who has read 5 directly states only that the Veda is read,
not that its purport is understood !—Not so, we reply. The
reading of the Veda extends up to the comprehension of
its purport, as thus the reading has a visible purpose 2 * * .
7. And on account of definite rules.
* Performing works here (i. e. in this life) let a man wish
to live a hundred years ; thus work will not cling to thee,
man ; there is no other way than that’ (tra. Up. 2); ‘ The
1 For the instrumental case ‘ vidyaya 5 directly represents know¬
ledge as a means of work.
2 According to the Mima^sa principle that, wherever possible,
actions enjoined must be understood to have a visible purpose
(a supersensuous result being admitted only where no visible result
can be made out).
[38] U
290
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Agnihotra is a sattra lasting up to old age and death ; for
through old age one is freed from it or through death ’
(6at. Bra. XII, 4, 1, 1); from such definite rules also it
follows that knowledge is merely supplementary to works.
Against all these objections the Sfitrakara upholds his
view in the following Sutra.
8 . But on account of (scripture teaching) the
additional one (i.e. the Lord), (the view) of Badara-
ya/za (is valid) ; as that is seen thus (in scriptural
passages).
The word £ but ’ discards the purvapaksha.—The assertion
made in Sfitra 2 cannot be maintained ‘ on account of the
text teaching the additional one.’ If the Vedanta-texts
taught that the transmigrating embodied Self which is an
agent and enjoyer is something different from the mere
body, the statements as to the fruit of the knowledge of
the Self would, for the reasons indicated above, be mere
arthavadas. But what the Vedanta-texts really teach as
the object of knowledge is something different from the
embodied Self, viz. the non-transmigrating Lord who is
free from all attributes of transmigratory existence such as
agency and the like and distinguished by freedom from sin
and so on, the highest Self. And the knowledge of that Self
does not only not promote action but rather cuts all action
short, as will be declared in Sutra 16. Hence the view
of the reverend Badarayazza which was stated in Sutra 1
remains valid and cannot be shaken by fallacious reasoning
about the subordination of knowledge to action and the
like. That the Lord who is superior to the embodied
Self is the Self many scriptural texts declare ; compare
£ He who perceives all and knows all* (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) ;
4 From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun
rises’ (Taitt. Up. II, 8); ‘ It is a great terror, a raised
thunderbolt’ (Ka. Up. II, 6, 2); ‘By the command of that
imperishable one, O Gargi’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 9); £ It
thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth
fire ’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 2 , 3). There are indeed passages in
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 9.
29I
which the transmigrating Self—hinted at by such terms as
‘dear*—is referred to as the object of knowledge, such as
8 But for the love of the Self everything is dear. Verily
the Self is to be seen’ (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 8 He who
breathes in the up-breathing he is thy Self and within all’
(B ri. Up. Ill, 4, 1); ‘The person that is seen in the eye
that is thy Self/ up to 8 But I shall explain him further to
you’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 7 ff.). But as there are at the same
time complementary passages connected with the passages
quoted above—viz. ‘There has been breathed forth from
this great Being the Rig-ve da, Ya^ur-veda,’ &c. (B ri. Up.
II, 4, 10); 8 He who overcomes hunger and thirst, sorrow,
passion, old age and death ’ (Bri. Up. Ill, 5, 1); 8 Having
approached the highest light he appears in his own form.
That is the highest person’ (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3)—which
aim at giving instruction about the superior Self; it follows
that the two sets of passages do not mean to teach an
absolute difference of the two Selfs and that thus con¬
tradiction is avoided. For the Self of the highest Lord is
the real nature of the embodied Self, while the state of
being embodied is due to the limiting adjuncts, as appears
from scriptural passages such as 8 Thou art that; ’ 8 There
is no other seer but he.’ All which has been demonstrated
by us at length in the earlier parts of this commentary in
more than one place.
9. But the declarations (of scripture) are equal
(on the other side).
In reply to the averment made in Sutra 3, we point out
that there are declarations of scripture, of equal weight,
in favour of the view that knowledge is not complementary
to action. For there are scriptural passages such as,
8 Knowing this the rishis descended from Kavasha said :
For what purpose should we study the Veda? for what
purpose should we sacrifice? Knowing this indeed the
Ancient ones did not offer the Agnihotra; ’ and 8 When
Brahma^as know that Self and have risen above the desire
for sons, wealth, and worlds, they wander about as men¬
dicants’ (Bri. Up. Ill, 5). Scripture moreover shows that
U 2
292 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Ya^avalkya and others who knew Brahman did not take
their stand on works. ‘Thus far goes immortality. Having
said so Ya^Tzavalkya went away into the forest’ (B ri. Up.
IV, 5, 15). With reference to the indicatory sign (as to
the dependence of knowledge to work) which is implied
in the passage, ‘ Sirs, I am going to perform a sacrifice/ we
remark that it belongs to a section which treats of Vabva-
nara. Now, the text may declare that a vidya of Brahman
as limited by adjuncts is accompanied by works; but all
the same the vidya does not stand in a subordinate relation
to works since ‘leading subject-matter’ and the other
means of proof are absent.
We now reply to the averment made in Sutra 4.
10. (The direct statement is) non-comprehensive.
The direct scriptural statement implied in ‘ What a man
does with knowledge’ &c. does not refer to all knowledge,
as it is connected with the knowledge forming the subject-
matter of the section. And the latter is the knowledge of
the udgitha only, ‘ Let a man meditate on the syllable Om
(as) the udgitha.’
11. There is distribution (of the work and know¬
ledge) as in the case of the hundred.
In reply to the averment (Sutra 5) that the passage,
‘ Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of him,’
indicates the non-independence of knowledge, we point out
that the passage must be understood in a distributed sense,
knowledge taking hold of one man and work of another.
The case is analogous to that of the ‘ hundred.’ When it
is said, ‘ Let a hundred be given to these two men,’ the
hundred are divided in that way that fifty are given to one
man and fifty to the other.—Moreover what the text says
about the laying hold does not refer to him who is about
to obtain final release; for the concluding passage, ‘ So
much for the man who desires,’ indicates that the whole
section refers to the soul implicated in the sa^sara, and
a new beginning is made for him who is about to be
released, in the clause, ‘ But as to the man who does not
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 3.
293
desire. 5 The clause about the laying hold thus comprises
all knowledge which falls within the sphere of the trans¬
migrating soul whether it be enjoined or prohibited 1 , since
there is no reason for distinction, and to all action whether
enjoined or prohibited, the clause embodying a reference
to knowledge and work as established elsewhere. And on
this interpretation there is room for the clause even without
our having recourse to the distribution of knowledge and
work.
The next Sutra replies to the averment made in Sutra 6.
12. Of him who has merely read the Veda (there
is qualification for works).
As the clause, ‘ Having learnt (read) the Veda from
a family of teachers, 5 speaks only of the reading, we de¬
termine that acts are there enjoined for him who has
only read the Veda.—But from this it would follow that
on account of being destitute of knowledge such a person
would not be qualified for works!—Never mind; we do
not mean to deny that the understanding of sacrificial acts
which springs from the reading of the texts is the cause
of qualification for their performance; we only wish to
establish that the knowledge of the Self derived from the
Upanishads is seen to have an independent purpose of its
own and therefore does not supply a reason of qualification
for acts. Analogously a person who is qualified for one
act does not require the knowledge of another act.
Against the reasoning of Sutra 7 we make the following
remark.
13. There being no specification (the rule does)
not (specially apply to him who knows).
In passages such as ‘ Performing works here let a man
live 5 &c., which state definite rules, there is no specification
1 Pratishiddha £a nagnastridanranadirupa. An. Gi. — Pratishid¬
dha £a yathasa^Mstradhigamanalakshawa (not ‘ yatha sa^Mastra 5
as in the Biblioth. Indica edition). Bhamati.
294
VEDANTA-stlTRAS.
of him who knows, since the definite rule is enjoined with¬
out any such specification.
14. Or else the permission (of works) is for the
glorification (of knowledge).
The passage 6 Performing works here’ may be treated
in another way also. Even if, owing to the influence of
the general subject-matter, only he who knows is to be
viewed as he who performs works, yet the permission to
perform works must be viewed as aiming at the glorifica¬
tion of knowledge ; as appears from the subsequent clause,
4 no work clings to the man/ The meaning of the entire
passage thus is: To a man who knows no work will cling,
should he perform works during his whole life even, owing
to the power of knowledge. And this clearly glorifies
knowledge.
15. Some also by proceeding according to their
liking (evince their disregard of anything but know¬
ledge).
Moreover some who know, having obtained the intuition
of the fruit of knowledge, express, in reliance thereon, the
purposelessness of the means of all other results, viz. by
proceeding according to their liking (and abandoning those
means). A scriptural text of the Va^asaneyins runs as
follows : ‘ Knowing this the people of old did not wish for
offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said, we
who have this Self and this world’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22).
And that the fruit of knowledge, being present to intuition,
does not manifest itself at a later time only as the fruits
of actions do, we have explained more than once. From
this also it follows that knowledge is not subordinate to
action, and that the scriptural statements as to the fruit of
knowledge cannot be taken in any but their true sense.
16. And (scripture teaches) the destruction (of
the qualification for works, by knowledge).
Moreover scripture teaches that this whole apparent
world-—which springs from Nescience, is characterised by
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 8.
295
actions, agents and results of actions and is the cause of
all qualification for works—is essentially destroyed by the
power of knowledge. Compare such passages as 4 But
when all has become the Self of him, wherewith should
he see another, wherewith should he smell another?’ (B ri.
Up. IV, 5, 15). For him now who should teach that the
qualification for works has for its necessary antecedent the
knowledge of the Self which the Ved&nta-texts teach, it
would follow that the qualification for works is cut short
altogether. From this also it follows that knowledge is
independent.
17. And (knowledge belongs) to those who are
bound to chastity; for in scripture (that condition of
life is mentioned).
Scripture shows that knowledge is valid also for those
stages of life for which chastity is prescribed. Now in
their case knowledge cannot be subordinate to work
because work is absent; for the works prescribed by the
Veda such as the Agnihotra are no longer performed by
men who have reached those stages.—But, an objection is
raised, those stages of life are not even mentioned in the
Veda!—This is not so, we reply. Certain Vedic passages
clearly intimate them ; so e. g. ‘ There are three branches
of the law’ ( Kh . Up. II, 23, 1); ‘Those who in the forest
practise faith and austerity’ {Kh. Up. V, 10, 1); ‘Those
who practise penance and faith in the forest ’ (Mu. Up. I,
10, 11); ‘Wishing for that world only mendicants wander
forth ’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22); ‘Let him wander forth at once
from the state of studentship.’—That the stages requiring
chastity are open to men whether they have reached house-
holdership or not, and whether they have paid the debts (of
procreating a son, &c.) or not, is known from scripture
and Smrzti. Herefrom also follows the independence of
knowledge.
18. (Taimini (considers that scriptural passages
mentioning those stages of life in which chastity is
obligatory, contain) a reference (only to those stages);
296
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
they are not injunctions; for (other scriptural pas¬
sages) forbid (those stages).
The Vedic texts which have been quoted to the end of
showing the existence of the stages of life on which chastity
is binding—such as c There are three branches of the law 5
and so on—have no power to establish those stages. For
the teacher Gaimini is of opinion that those passages
contain only a reference to the other stages of life, not an
injunction (of them).—Why?—Because they contain no
words expressive of injunction such as imperative verbal
forms, and because each of them is seen to have some
other purport. In the passage, ‘There are three’ &c., the
text at first refers to three stages of life (‘ Sacrifice, study,
and charity are the first ’ &c. &c.), thereupon declares them
not to have unbounded results ( c All these obtain the world
of the blessed ’), and finally glorifies ‘ the state of being
grounded on Brahman ’ as having unbounded results
(‘the Brahmasa#zstha obtains immortality’).—But is not
a mere reference even sufficient to intimate the existence
of those stages of life?—True; but they are established
(enjoined) not by direct scriptural statements, but only by
Smrzti and custom, and therefore when contradicted by
direct scriptural statement 1 are either to be disregarded or
else to be viewed as concerning those who (for some reason
or other) are disqualified (for active worship, sacrifices and
the like).—But together with the stages demanding chastity
the text refers to the condition of the householder also 2 .
(‘Sacrifice,study, and charity are the first.’)—True; but the
existence of the state of the householder is established (not
by that passage but) by other scriptural passages, viz. those
which enjoin on the householder certain works such as the
Agnihotra. Hence the reference in the passage under
discussion aims at glorification only, not at injunction.
1 Such as that concerning the permanent obligation of the Agni¬
hotra and so on.
2 And we therefore may conclude that those stages are as valid
as the—notoriously valid—state of householdership.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 9.
297
Moreover, direct scriptural enunciations forbid other stages
of life ; cp. 4 A murderer of the gods is he who removes
the fire ; 5 c After having brought to thy teacher his proper
reward do not cut off the line of children 5 (Taitt. Up. I,
11, 1); 4 To him who is without a son the world does not
belong; all beasts even know that/—Similarly the passages,
4 Those who in the forest practise faith and austerity 5
(Kh . Up. V, 10, 1), and the analogous passage (from the
Mim^aka), contain instruction not about the other stages
of life but about the going on the path of the gods. And
of clauses such as 4 austerity is the second 9 it is doubtful
whether they speak of a stage of life at all. And a
passage like 4 Wishing for that world only mendicants
wander forth/ does not enjoin the wandering forth but
merely glorifies that world.—But there is at any rate one
scriptural text which directly and unambiguously enjoins
the condition of life of the wandering mendicant, viz. the
one of the Cab&las, 4 Let him wander forth at once from
the state of studentship/—True, but our discussion is
carried on without reference to that passage.
19. (The other stage of life) is to be accom¬
plished, (according to) Badaraya^a; on account of
the scriptural statement of equality.
The teacher Badaraya^a is of opinion that that other
stage of life is something to be accomplished. The view
that there is a contradiction because the other stage of
life is stated in the Veda and, on the other hand, works
such as the Agnihotra must necessarily be performed, and
that, in order to remove this contradiction, that other
stage of life must be entered upon by those only who are
not qualified for active worship, he rejects; being of opinion
that that other stage is to be entered upon, in the same
way as the state of the householder, even by him who
does not wish to do so.—On what ground ?— 4 On account
of the scriptural statement of equality/ For we have
a passage (viz. ‘There are three branches of the law/ &c.)
which refers equally to that other stage as to the state
of the householder. As the state of the householder which
298
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
is enjoined in other passages only is here referred to, so
also that other stage of life. The case is analogous to
the reference made to the wearing of the sacrificial thread
round the neck or on the right shoulder—which two modes
are established in other scriptural passages—in a passage
the purpose of which it is to enjoin the wearing of the thread
on the left shoulder. The other stage must therefore be
entered upon in the same way as the state of the house¬
holder.—Analogously in the passage, £ Wishing for that
world only mendicants leave their homes,’ the last stage
of life is mentioned together with the study of the Veda,
sacrifice and so on, and in the passage, £ Those who in the
forest,’ &c., with the knowledge of the five fires.—The
remark, made above by the purvapakshin, that in such
passages as £ austerity is the second ’ there is unambiguous
reference to a further stage of life, is without force, since
there is a reason enabling us to determine what is meant.
The text proclaims in the beginning that there are three
subdivisions ( £ There are three branches of the law’). Now
the sacrifice and the other duties (which the text enumerates
subsequently to the introductory clause) can, because they
are more than three, and rest on separate originative
injunctions, be comprised within the three branches only
if they are connected with one of the stages of life. Now
the terms £ sacrifice ’ and so on indicate that the stage
of householdership constitutes one branch of the law, and
the term £ Brahma/£arin ’ clearly denotes another stage ;
what then remains but to assume that the term £ austerity ’
also denotes a stage of life, viz. the one in which austerity
is the chief thing? Analogously the reference to the
forest—in the passage, £ Those who in the forest/—indicates
that by the austerity and faith mentioned there we have to
understand that stage of life in which austerity and faith
are the chief thing.—From all this it follows that the
further stage of life has to be gone through, even if the
passage under discussion should do nothing but refer to it.
20. Or (the passage rather is) an injunction, as in
the case of the carrying (of the firewood).
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20 .
299
Or the passage is rather to be understood as containing
an injunction, not a mere reference.—But, an objection is
raised, if we assume it to be an injunction we thereby
oppose the conception of the entire passage as a coherent
whole, while yet the passage has clearly to be conceived
as constituting such a whole, viz. as meaning that while
the three branches of the law have for their result the
world of the blessed, the condition of being grounded in
Brahman has immortality for its result.—True, but all the
same we must set aside the conception of the passage as
a whole—well founded as it is—and assume it to be an
injunction. For it is a new injunction because no other
injunction is observed, and as the conception of the other
stage of life clearly arises from the passage it is impossible
to interpret it as a coherent whole by means of the
assumption that it is a mere gu?zavada \
The case is analogous to that of the c carrying.’ There
is a scriptural text (relating to the Agnihotra which forms
part of the mahapitrzya^a), c Let him approach carrying
the firewood below (the ladle holding the offering); for
above he carries it for the gods.’ Now this passage may
be conceived as an unbroken whole if we view it as
referring to the carrying below only; nevertheless we
determine that it enjoins the carrying above because that
1 In the clause ‘ vidhyantaradanranat ’ I can see nothing more
than an explanation of—or reason for—the < apurvatvat/ If we
viewed the passage as glorifying the brahmasazzzsthata compared to
the three branches of the law through the statement of its super-
sensuous results (so that it would constitute an arthavada of the
kind called guzzavada), we should indeed preserve the unity of the
passage—which is destroyed if we view it as enjoining the different
stages of life. But all the same the latter explanation is the true
one; for a glorificatory passage presupposes an injunctive one, and
as no such injunctive passage is met with elsewhere, it is simpler
to assume that the present passage is itself injunctive than to con¬
strue (on the basis of it if viewed as a guzzavada) another injunctive
passage. (In Ananda Giri’s gloss on this passage—Biblioth. Indica
edition—read ‘vihitatvopagamaprasaktya’ and ‘stutilakshazzayaika 0 .’)
300
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
is not enjoined anywhere else 1 . This is explained in the
chapter treating of ‘ complement,’ in the Sutra, ‘But it is
an injunction/ &c. (Pu. Mim. Su.). In the same way we
assume that our passage referring to the different a^ramas
is an injunctory passage only.
Even if (to state an alternative conclusion) the passage
contains references only to the other a^ramas, it must be
viewed as enjoining at any rate the condition of being
grounded in Brahman, owing to the glorification of that
condition. The question here arises whether that state
belongs to any one comprised within the four a^ramas,
or only to the wandering mendicant. If now a reference
to the mendicant also is contained within the references
to the a^ramas up to the Brahma^arin (i. e. the three
dramas the text refers to before the passage about the
brahmasa^stha); then, as all four a^ramas are referred
to equally and as somebody not belonging to any airama
could not possibly be called brahmasaz^stha, it follows that
the term ‘ brahmasazzzstha ’ denotes any one standing
within one of the four a^ramas. If, on the other hand,
the mendicant is not comprised within the references to
the three asramas, he alone remains, and this establishes
the conclusion that the brahmasaz/zstha is the mendicant
only. (We therefore have to inquire which of the two
alternatives stated has to be adopted.)—Here some
maintain that the term ‘ austerity 5 which denotes the
hermit in the woods implies a reference to the mendi¬
cant also. But this is wrong. For as long as any other
explanation is possible, we must not assume that a term
which expresses a distinctive attribute of the hermits
living in the forest comprises the wandering mendicants
also. Both the Brahma/£arin and the householder are
1 The ekavakyata is preserved if we take the clause from ‘ above’
as an arthavada meant to give the reason why in sacrifices offered
to the Fathers the firewood has to be carried below. Nevertheless
the clause must be taken as a vidhi enjoining the carrying above in
all sacrifices offered to the gods, because this particular is not
enjoined elsewhere.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20 .
301
referred to by distinctive terms applying to them only,
and we therefore expect that the mendicant and the
hermit also should be referred to by analogous terms.
Now ‘austerity* is a distinctive attribute of the hermits
living in the woods ; for the principal conventional
meaning of the word 4 austerity * is mortification of the
body. The distinctive attribute of the mendicant, on the
other hand, viz. restraint of the senses and so on, cannot
be denoted by the term ‘austerity.* Moreover it would
be an illegitimate assumption that the dramas which are
known to be four should here be referred to as three.
And further the text notifies a distinction, viz. by saying
that those three reach the world of the blessed, while one
enjoys immortality. Now there is room for such a distinc¬
tion if the hermits and the mendicants are separate; for
we do not say ‘ Devadatta and Ya^adatta are stupid, but
one of them is clever,* but we say ‘Devadatta and Ya^a-
datta are stupid, but Vishmimitra is clever.’ The passage
therefore has to be understood in that sense, that those
belonging to the three former dramas obtain the world
of the blessed, while the remaining one, i. e. the wandering
mendicant, enjoys immortality.—But how can the term
‘ brahmasa^stha,* which according to its etymological
meaning may be applied to members of all a^ramas, be
restricted to the mendicant? and, if we agree to take it
in its conventional meaning, it follows that immortality
may be reached by merely belonging to an a^rama, and
hence that knowledge is useless !—To these objections we
make the following reply. The term ‘ brahmasa^stha *
denotes fulfilment in Brahman, a state of being grounded
in Brahman to the exclusion of all other activity. Now
such a state is impossible for persons belonging to the
three former dramas, as scripture declares that they suffer
loss through the non-performance of the works enjoined
on their ajrama. The mendicant, on the other hand, who
has discarded all works can suffer no loss owing to non¬
performance. Such duties as are incumbent on him, viz.
restraint of the senses and the like, are not opposed to
the state of being grounded in Brahman, but rather helpful
302
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
to it. For the only work enjoined on him by his Israma
is the state of being firmly grounded in Brahman, wherein
he is strengthened by restraint of the senses and so on—
just as sacrifices and the like are prescribed for the other
dramas—and loss he incurs only by neglecting that work.
In agreement herewith texts from scripture and Smrzti
declare that for him who is grounded in Brahman there
are no works. Compare ‘ Renunciation is Brahman; for
Brahman is the highest; for the highest is Brahman ;
above those lower penances, indeed, there rises renuncia¬
tion ; * ‘ Those anchorites who have well ascertained the
object of the knowledge of the Vedanta and have purified
their nature by the Yoga of renunciation ’ (Mu. Up. Ill,
2, 6); and similar scriptural passages. And Smrzti-texts
to the same effect, such as ‘ They whose minds are fixed
on him, who have their Self in him, their stand on him,
their end in him’ (Bha. Gita V, 17). All these passages
teach that for him who is founded on Brahman there are
no works. From this there also follows the non-validity of
the second objection raised above, viz. that the mendicant’s
reaching immortality through the mere stage of life in
which he stands would imply the uselessness of knowledge.
—In this way we understand that, although there is a
reference to the other stages of life, that which is indicated
by the quality of being grounded in Brahman is the state
of the wandering mendicant.
This whole discussion has been carried on by the teacher
without taking into account the text of the Uabalas, which
enjoins the other stage of life. But there exists that text
which directly enjoins the other stage, ‘ Having completed
his studentship he is to become a householder; having
been a householder he is to become a dweller in the forest;
having been a dweller in the forest he is to wander forth;
or else he may wander forth from the student’s state;
or from the house; or from the forest.’ Nor can this
text be interpreted as referring to those who are not
qualified for works; for it states no difference, and there
is a separate injunction (of the parivra^ya-state) for those
who are not qualified, viz. in the passage, £ May he have
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 1 . 303
taken vows upon himself or not, may he be a snataka or
not, may he be one whose fire has gone out or one who
has no fire/ &c. That the text does not refer to such
only as are not qualified for works, further follows from
the fact that the state of the mendicant is meant to
subserve the development of the knowledge of Brahman 1 ,
as scripture declares, ‘The wandering mendicant, with
colourless dress, shaven, wifeless, pure, guileless, living on
alms, qualifies himself for the intuition of Brahman.’—From
all this it follows that the stages of life for which chastity
is obligatory are established by scripture, and that know¬
ledge—because enjoined on persons who have entered on
those stages—is independent of works.
21. If it be said that (texts such as the one about
the udgitha are) mere glorification, on account of
their reference (to parts of sacrifices); we deny that,
on account of the newness (of what they teach, if
viewed as injunctions).
‘That udgitha is the best of all essences, the highest,
holding the highest place, the eighth’ (Kk. Up. I, 1, 3);
‘This earth is the Rik, the fire is Saman’ (Kk. Up. I,
6, 1); ‘This world in truth is that piled-up fire-altar’
(.Sat. Bra. X, 1, 2, 2); ‘That hymn is truly that earth’
(Ait. Ar. II, 1, 2, 1); with reference to these and other
similar passages a doubt arises whether they are meant
to glorify the udgitha and so on, or to enjoin devout
meditations.
The purvapakshin maintains that their aim is glorifica¬
tion, because the text exhibits them with reference to
subordinate members of sacrificial actions, such as the
udgitha and so on. They are, he says, analogous to
passages such as ‘ This earth is the ladle; ’ ‘ the sun is the
tortoise; ’ ‘ the heavenly world is the Ahavaniya,’ whose
1 Which has to be acquired in the regular prescribed way of
Brahmanical studentship.
304
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
aim it is to glorify the ladle and so on. To this the Sutra-
kara replies as follows. We have no right to consider the
purpose of those passages to be mere glorification, on
account of the newness. If they aim at injunction, a new
matter is enjoined by them ; if, on the other hand, they
aimed at glorification they would be devoid of meaning.
For, as explained in the Pu. Mim. Sfi., glorificatory
passages are of use in so far as entering into a comple¬
mentary relation to injunctive passages; but the passages
under discussion are incapable of entering into such a
relation to the udgitha and so on which are enjoined in
altogether different places of the Veda, and would there¬
fore be purposeless as far as glorification is concerned.
Passages such as ‘ This earth is the ladle ’ are not
analogous because they stand in proximity to injunctive
passages.—Therefore texts such as those under discussion
have an injunctive purpose.
22. And on account of the words expressive of
becoming.
Moreover the text exhibits words of clearly injunctive
meaning, in connexion with the passages quoted above,
viz. ‘Let him meditate on the udgitha’ ( Kh . Up. I,
1, i); ‘Let him meditate on the S&man 9 (Kh. Up. II,
2 , i); ‘Let him think: I am the hymn’ (Ait. Ar. II,
i, 6). Now these injunctive forms would be rendered
futile by the assumption of the texts under discussion
aiming at glorification only. Compare the following
saying of those who know Ny&ya, ‘ Let him do, let it be
done, it is to be done, let it become, let it be; these forms
are in all Vedas the settled signs of injunction/ What
they mean thereby is that injunction is the sense of all
potential, imperative, &c., verbal forms.—Moreover in each
of the sections to which the passages under discussion
belong the text states special fruits, ‘He becomes indeed
a fulfiller of desires’ ( Kh . Up. I, i, 7); ‘He is able to
obtain wishes through his song’ [Kh. Up. I, 7, 9); ‘The
worlds in an ascending and a descending line belong to
him* [Kh. Up. II, 2, 3). For this reason also the texts
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 24.
305
about the udgitha and so on are meant to enjoin devout
meditations.
23. (The stories told in the Upanishads) are for
the purpose of the pariplava; we deny this on
account of (certain stories only) being specified.
‘ Ya^vzavalkya had two wives, Maitreyi and Katyayani’
(B ri. Up. IV, 5, 1); ‘ Pratardana, forsooth, the son of
Divodasa came to the beloved abode of Indra 5 (Kau. Up.
Ill, 1); ‘There lived once upon a time Ganairuti Pautra-
ya^a, who was a pious giver, giving much and keeping
open house’ ( Kh . Up. IV, 1,1); with regard to these and
similar stories met with in the Vedanta portions of
scripture there arises a doubt whether they are meant to
subserve the performance of the pariplava 1 , or to introduce
the vidyas standing in proximity to them.
The purvapakshin maintains that those scriptural stories
subserve the pariplava because they are stories like others,
and because the telling of stories is enjoined for the pari¬
plava. And from this it follows that the Vedanta-texts
do not chiefly aim at knowledge, because like mantras
they stand in a complementary relation to sacrificial per¬
formances.
This conclusion we deny ‘ on account of the specifica¬
tion.’ Under the heading ‘he is to recite the pariplava, 5
scripture specifies certain definite stories such as that of
‘Manu Vivasvat’s son the king.’ If, now, for the reason
that all tales as such are alike, all tales were admitted for
the pariplava, the mentioned specification would be devoid
of meaning. We therefore conclude that those scriptural
stories are not meant to be told at the pariplava.
24. This follows also from the connexion (of the
stories with the vidyas) in one coherent whole.
And as thus the stories do not subserve the pariplava it
1 I.e. have to be recited at stated intervals during the year
occupied by the ajvamedha sacrifice.
[ 38 ] X
3°6
vedanta-sOtras.
is appropriate to assume that they are meant to bring
nearer to our understanding the approximate vidyas with
which they are seen to form connected wholes; for they
serve to render the latter more acceptable and facilitate
their comprehension.
In the Maitreyi-brahmazza we see that the story forms
a whole with the vidya beginning, ‘ The Self indeed is to
be seen,’ &c.; in the account of Pratardana with the vidya,
T am prazza, the conscious Self;' in the legend of Cana^ruti
with the vidya, ‘Air indeed is the end of all.’ The case
of all these stories is analogous to that of stories met with
in scriptural texts referring to works, whose purpose is the
glorification of injunctions standing in proximity; as e.g.
‘ He cut out his own omentum.’—The stories under discus¬
sion therefore do not subserve the pariplava.
25. For this very reason there is no need of the
lighting of the fire and so on.
The expression ‘ For this very same reason ’ must be
viewed as taking up Sutra III, 4, 1, because thus a satis¬
factory sense is established. For this very same reason,
i.e. because knowledge subserves the purpose of man, the
lighting of the sacrificial fire and similar works which are
enjoined on the different asramas are not to be observed,
since man’s purpose is effected through knowledge.
The Sutrakara thus sums up the result of the first
adhikarazza, intending to make some further remarks.
26. And there is need of all (works), on account
of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like ;
as in the case of the horse.
We now consider whether knowledge has absolutely no
need of the works enjoined on the different asramas, or
whether it has some need of them. Under the preceding
Sutra we have arrived at the conclusion that as knowledge
effects its own end the works enjoined on the asramas
are absolutely not required. With reference to this point
the present Sutra now remarks that knowledge has regard
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 27.
307
for all works enjoined on the a^ramas, and that there is
not absolute non-regard.—But do not the two Sutras thus
contradict each other?—By no means, we reply. Know¬
ledge having once sprung up requires no help towards the
accomplishment of its fruit, but it does stand in need of
something else with a view to its own origination.—Why
so?—On account of the scriptural statements of sacrifices
and so on. For the passage, ‘ Him Brahma^as seek to
know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by
penance, by fasting' (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22), declares that
sacrifices and so on are means of knowledge, and as the
text connects them with the ‘seeking to know, 5 we conclude
that they are, more especially, means of the origination of
knowledge. Similarly the passage, ‘What people call
sacrifice that is really brahma^arya’ ( Kh . Up. VIII, 5, 1),
by connecting sacrifices and so on with brahma^arya
which is a means of knowledge, intimates that sacrifices
&c. also are means of knowledge. Again the passage,
‘That word which all the Vedas record, which all penances
proclaim, desiring which men live as religious students,
that word I tell thee briefly, it is Om 5 (Ka. Up. I, 2, 15),
likewise intimates that the works enjoined on the a^ramas
are means of knowledge. Similarly Smriti says, ‘ Works
are the washing away of uncleanliness, but knowledge is
the highest way. When the impurity has been removed,
then knowledge begins to act.’
The phrase, ‘as in the case of the horse, 5 supplies an
illustration on the ground of suitability. As the horse,
owing to its specific suitability, is not employed for
dragging ploughs but is harnessed to chariots; so the
works enjoined on the a^ramas are not required by know¬
ledge for bringing about its results, but with a view to its
own origination.
27. But all the same he (who is desirous of know¬
ledge) must be possessed of calmness, subjection of
the senses, &c., since those (states) are enjoined as
auxiliaries to that (viz. knowledge), and must (on
that account) necessarily be accomplished.
x 2
3°8
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
Perhaps somebody might think that we have no right
to look upon sacrifices and the like as means of knowledge
because there is no injunction to that effect. For a passage
like ‘ By sacrifice they seek to know ’ is of the nature of an
anuvada, and therefore does not aim at enjoining sacrifices
but rather at glorifying knowledge, ‘ so glorious is know¬
ledge that they seek to obtain it through sacrifices and the
like/
But even should this be so the seeker for knowledge
must possess calmness of mind, must subdue his senses
and so on ; for all this is enjoined as a means of knowledge
in the following scriptural passage, ‘Therefore he who knows
this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and
collected, sees self in Self 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 23). And what
is enjoined must necessarily be carried out.—But in the
above passage also we observe only a statement as to
something actually going on—‘ Having become calm, &c.,
he sees/ not an injunction!—Not so, we reply. The
introductory word ‘ therefore 5 which expresses praise of
the subject under discussion makes us understand that the
passage has an injunctive character 1 .
Moreover the text of the Madhyandinas directly reads
‘let him see 5 (not ‘he sees’). Hence calmness of mind
and so on are required even if sacrifices, &c., should not
be required.—Sacrifices and so on, however, are required
likewise, because (as said in Sutra 26) scripture teaches
them.—But it has been said that in the passage, ‘ Him they
seek to know by sacrifices/ no injunction is observed!—
True ; but nevertheless we must assume the passage to
be an injunction, because the connexion of the search for
knowledge with sacrifices and so on is something new;
i.e. is not established by another text, and therefore the
1 For if there were no injunction, the praise would be without
meaning. The ‘ therefore 5 connects the passage with the pre¬
ceding clause, ‘ he is not sullied by any evil deed . 5 The sense
then is, ‘ Because he who knows the Self as described before is
not sullied by any evil deed, therefore let him, after having become
calm, &c., see the Self, and so on/
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 28.
309
passage under discussion cannot be an anuvada referring
to it. The case is analogous to that of passages such as
‘ therefore Pushan 1 receives a well-crushed share of food,
for he is toothless.’ There also no injunction is directly-
stated ; but as the matter of the passage is new we assume
an injunction and understand that the grains for Pushan
are to be crushed at all vikrztis of the danrapur/zamasa ; as
was explained in the Purva Mimciz^sa.
An analogous conclusion was arrived at under Sutra
20.—Smrztis also such as the Bhagavadgita explain that
sacrifices and the like if undertaken without a view to their
special results become for him who is desirous of final
release a means of knowledge. Hence sacrifices and the
like, on the one hand, and calmness of mind and so on, on
the other hand, according to the airamas, i.e. all works
enjoined on the a^ramas must be had regard to with a
view to the springing up of knowledge. Calmness of mind,
&c., are, on account of the expression ‘ he who knows this ’
connecting them with knowledge, to be viewed as approxi¬
mate—direct—means of knowledge, while sacrifices and so
on which scripture connects with the search of knowledge
are to be looked upon as remote—indirect—means.
28. And there is permission of all food, (only) in
the case of danger of life; on account of this being
shown (by scripture).
In the colloquy of the pranas the AVzandogas record, 4 To
him who knows this there is nothing which is not food’
(Kh . Up. V, 1, 2); and the Va^asaneyins,‘ By him nothing is
eaten that is not food, nothing is received that is not food *
(B ri. Up. VI, 1, 14). The sense of the two passages is
that anything may be eaten by him.—A doubt here arises
whether the texts enjoin the permission of eating anything
1 The passage quoted occurs in the Veda under the heading of
the danrapfirzzamasa. But as Pushan has no share in the funda¬
mental form of that sacrifice, we conclude that the injunction
implied in the passage is valid for those vikntis of the dam-
purzzamasa in which offerings are made to Pfishan.
3 i°
vedanta-s£jtras.
as an auxiliary to knowledge—as calmness of mind, &c.,
are—or mention them for the purpose of glorification.—
The purvapakshin maintains that the passages are injunc¬
tions because thus we gain an instruction which causes
a special kind of activity. What, therefore, the text teaches
is the non-operation of a definite rule, in so far as auxiliary
to the knowledge of the prazzas in proximity to which it is
taught.—But this interpretation implies the sublation of the
scriptural rules as to the distinction of lawful and unlawful
food !—Such sublation, we reply, is possible, because the
present case is one of general rule and special exception.
The prohibition of doing harm to any living creature is
sublated by the injunction of the killing of the sacrificial
animal; the general rule which distinguishes between such
women as may be approached and such as may not, is
sublated by the text prescribing, with reference to the
knowledge of the Vamadevya, that no woman is to be
avoided (‘ Let him avoid no woman, that is the vow,’ Kh .
Up. II, 13, 2 ); analogously the passage which enjoins, with
reference to the knowledge of the prazzas, the eating of all
food may sublate the general rule as to the distinction of
lawful and unlawful food.
To this we reply as follows. The permission to eat any
food whatever is not enjoined, since the passages do not
contain any word of injunctive power; for the clause, ‘To
him who knows this there is nothing,’ &c., expresses only
something actually going on. And where the conception
of an injunction does not naturally arise we may not
assume one from the mere wish of something causing
a special line of activity. Moreover the text says that
‘ for him who knows this there is nothing that is not food,’
only after having said that everything even unto dogs and
the like is food for the Prazza. Now food such as dogs
and the like cannot be enjoyed by the human body; but
all this can be thought of as food of the Prazza. From
this it follows that the passage is an arthavada meant to
glorify the knowledge of the food of the Prazza, not an
injunction of the permission of all food.—This the Sutra
indicates in the words, ‘ and there is permission of all food
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 30. 31 I
in danger of life.’ That means : Only in danger of life, in
cases of highest need, food of any kind is permitted to
be eaten. 4 On account of scripture showing this.’ For
scripture shows that the rishi iTakraya^a when in evil
plight proceeded to eat unlawful food. In the brahma^a
beginning, 4 when the Kurus had been destroyed by hail¬
stones/ it is told how the rishi iTakraya^a having fallen
into great wretchedness ate the beans half eaten by a chief,
but refused to drink what had been offered on the ground
of its being a mere leaving; and explained his proceeding
as follows: 4 I should not have lived if I had not eaten
them ; but water I can drink wherever I like.’ And again
on the following day he ate the stale beans left by himself
and another person. Scripture, in thus showing how the
stale leaving of a leaving was eaten, intimates as its
principle that in order to preserve one’s life when in
danger one may eat even unlawful food. That, on the
other hand, in normal circumstances not even a man
possessing knowledge must do this, appears from K& kra-
ya^a’s refusing to drink.—From this it follows that the
passage, 4 For to him who knows this/ &c., is an arthavada.
29. And on account of the non-sublation.
And thus those scriptural passages which distinguish
lawful and unlawful food,—such as Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2,
4 When the food is pure the whole nature becomes pure/—
are non-sublated.
30. And this is said in Smrz’ti also.
That in cases of need both he who knows and he who
does not know may eat any food Smrzti also states;
compare e.g. 4 He who being in danger of his life eats
food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the
lotus leaf by water.’—On the other hand, many passages
teach that unlawful food is to be avoided. 4 Intoxicating
liquor the Brahma^a must permanently forego; 5 4 Let
them pour boiling spirits down the throat of the Brahma^a
who drinks spirits; ’ 4 Spirit-drinking worms grow in the
312
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
mouth of the spirit-drinking man, because he enjoys what
is unlawful. 5
31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to
non-proceeding according to liking.
There is also a scriptural passage prohibiting unlawful
food, the purpose of which it is to stop procedure therein
according to one’s liking, viz. in the Sa^hita of the Ka/Zzas,
‘ Therefore a Brahma;za is not to drink spirits. 5 This text
also is more appropriate if we take the passage, ‘To him
who knows this,’ as an arthavada.—Hence passages of that
kind are arthavadas, not injunctions.
32. The works of the airamas (are incumbent on
him) also (who does not desire release); because
they are enjoined.
Under Sutra 26 it has been proved that the works
enjoined on the a^ramas are means of knowledge. Now
we will consider whether those works have to be performed
also by him who does not desire final release and therefore
takes his stand on his ajrama merely without wishing for
knowledge.—Here the purvapakshin maintains that as the
works incumbent on the a^ramas are enjoined as means of
knowledge by the passage, ‘ Him the Br&hma/zas seek to
know by the study of the Veda’ &c., the works of per¬
manent obligation are not to be performed by him who,
not desirous of knowledge, wishes for some other fruit.
Or else they are to be performed by him also; but then
they cannot be means of knowledge, since it would be
contradictory to attribute to them a permanent and a non¬
permanent connexion k
Against this conclusion the Sutrakara remarks that the
works of permanent obligation are to be performed by
1 I. e. we must not think that because they enjoin the ‘ nityata ’
of certain works, other passages may not enjoin the same works
as mere means of knowledge.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 33.
3 T 3
him only who, not desirous of release, takes his stand on
the ajramas merely, because they are enjoined by texts
such ‘ as long as his life lasts he is to offer the agnihotra.’
For to such texts no excessive weight must be ascribed.—
The next Sutra replies to the objection raised above in the
words, ‘ but then they cannot be means of knowledge. 5
33. And through the co-operativeness (of the
works towards the origination of knowledge).
Those works are also co-operative with knowledge just
because they are enjoined as such, viz. in passages such as
4 Him the Brahma/zas seek to know by the study of the
Veda, 5 &c. This has been explained under Sutra 26. Nor
must you think that the texts stating the co-operation of
the works of the a^ramas towards knowledge refer to the
fruit of knowledge, as e. g. the offerings called praya^as
co-operate towards the fruit of the danrapurzzamasa of which
they are auxiliary members; for knowledge is not charac¬
terised by injunction, and the fruit of knowledge is not
to be effected by means. Means characterised by injunctions
such as the danrapur/zamasa-sacrifice which aim at bringing
about certain fruits such as the heavenly world require
other (subordinate) means co-operating towards the fruit
(such as the praya^as). But not so knowledge. Compare
on this point Sutra 25. Therefore texts stating the co¬
operation of works (with knowledge) have to be interpreted
as stating that works are means for the origination of
knowledge.—Nor need we fear that thus there arises a
contradiction of permanent and non-permanent connexion.
For there may be difference of connexion even where there
is no difference of work. One connexion is permanent,
resting on the texts about the life-long performance of the
agnihotra and so on ; of this knowledge is not the result.
The other connexion is non-permanent, resting on texts
such as f Him the Brahmazzas seek to know, 5 &c.; of this
knowledge is the result. The case is analogous to that
of the one khadira, which through a permanent connexion
serves the purpose of the sacrifice, and through a non¬
permanent connexion the purpose of man.
3 H
vedanta-s6tras.
34. In any case the same (duties have to be per¬
formed) on account of the twofold indicatory marks.
In any case, i. e. whether viewed as duties incumbent
on the a^ramas or as co-operating with knowledge, the very
same agnihotra and other duties have to be performed.—
What, it may be asked, does the teacher wish to preclude
by the emphatic expression ‘the very same?’—The sus¬
picion, we reply, that those works might be separate
works 1 . In the ayana of the Ku^apayins indeed the
injunctive statement, ‘ They offer the agnihotra for a month 2 /
enjoins a sacrifice different from the permanent (ordinary)
agnihotra ; but in our present case there is no analogous
separation of works.—Why?—On account of the twofold
indicatory mark ; i. e. on account of both scripture and
Smrzti supplying indicatory marks. In the first place, the
scriptural passage, c Him the Brahma^as seek to know
through the study of the Veda,' &c., directs that sacrifices
and the like—as things already established and the form of
which is already in existence (viz. through previous in¬
junctions)—are to be employed as means in the search for
knowledge; and does not originate a new form of those
works, while the passage quoted above, ‘ They offer the
agnihotra for a month/ does originate a new separate
sacrifice.—In the second place the Smrzti-passage, ‘ He
who performs the work to be done without aiming at the
fruit of the work/ shows that the very same work which is
already known as something to be performed subserves the
origination of knowledge. Moreover the Smrzti-passage,
‘ He who is qualified by those forty-eight purifications/ &c.,
refers to the purifications required for Vedic works, with
a view to the origination of knowledge in him who has
undergone those purifications.—The Sutrak&ra therefore
rightly emphasizes the non-difference of the works.
1 That the works referred to in the Upanishads as means of
knowledge, might be works altogether different from those enjoined
in the karmaka^a as means of bringing about certain special
results such as the heavenly world.
2 See above, p. 250.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 37.
315
35. And scripture also declares that (those per¬
forming works) are not overpowered (by passion
and the like).
This Sutra points out a further indicatory mark fortifying
the conclusion that works co-operate towards knowledge.
Scripture also shows that he who is furnished with such
means as Brahma^arya, &c., is not overpowered by such
afflictions as passion and the like. Compare the passage,
£ That Self does not perish which they find out by Brahma-
£arya ’ (Kk. Up. VIII, 5, 3).—It is thus a settled conclusion
that sacrifices and so on are works incumbent on the
asramas as well as co-operative towards knowledge.
36. But also (persons standing) between (are
qualified for knowledge); for that is seen (in scrip¬
ture).
A doubt arises whether persons in want who do not
possess means, &c., and therefore are not able to enter
one or the other of the ajramas, standing between as it
were, are qualified for knowledge or not.—They are not
qualified, the purvapakshin maintains. For we have ascer¬
tained that the works incumbent on the asramas are the
cause of knowledge, and those persons have no opportunity
to perform those works.—To this the Sutrakara replies,
4 But also between/ Even a person who because he does
not belong to an asrama stands between, as it were, is
qualified for knowledge. ‘ For that is seen.’ For we meet
with scriptural passages declaring that persons of that
class—such as Raikva and the daughter of Va^aknu—
possessed the knowledge of Brahman (Kh. Up. IV, 1 ;
Bri. Up. Ill, 6, 8).
37. This is stated in Smnti also.
It is recorded in itihasas also how Sa?/zvarta and others
who paid no regard to the duties incumbent on the
asramas, in going naked and so on, became great Yogins
all the same.—But the instances quoted from scripture
and Smrz’ti furnish merely indicatory marks ; what then is
3*6
vedanta-s£jtras.
the final conclusion ?—That conclusion is stated in the next
Sutra.
38. And the promotion (of knowledge is bestowed
on them) through special acts.
Also for widowers, &c., the favour of knowledge is
possible through special acts of duty, such as praying,
fasting, propitiation of divinities, &c., which are not opposed
to their ajrama-less condition and may be performed by
any man as such. Thus Smrzti says, ‘ By mere prayer no
doubt the Brahmam perfects himself. May he perform
other works or not, the kindhearted one is called Brah-
mae’ (Manu Sa;/zh. II, 87), which passage shows that
where the works of the airamas are not possible prayer
qualifies for knowledge. Moreover knowledge may be
promoted by Israma works performed in previous births.
Thus Smrz’ti also declares, c Perfected by many births he
finally goes the highest way’ (Bha. Gita VI, 45); which
passage shows that the aggregate of the different purifi¬
catory ceremonies performed in former births promotes
knowledge. — Moreover knowledge—as having a seen
result (viz. the removal of ignorance)—qualifies any one
who is desirous of it for learning and so on, through the
mere absence of obstacles *. Hence there is no contra¬
diction in admitting qualification for knowledge on the
part of widowers and the like.
39. Better than this is the other (state of be¬
longing to an airama), on account of the indicatory
marks.
‘Than this/ i. e. ‘than standing between/ a better means
of knowledge it is to stand within one of the a^ramas,
since this is confirmed by Nruti and Smrz'ti. For scripture
supplies an indicatory mark in the passage, c On that path
goes whoever knows Brahman and who has done holy
1 I.e. any one who wishes to learn may do so, if only there
is no obstacle in the way. No special injunction is wanted.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 40. 3 I 7
works (as prescribed for the asramas) and obtained splen¬
dour’ (B ru Up. IV, 4, 9) ; and Smrzti in the passage, ‘Let
a Brahma^a stay not one day even outside the cLsrama;
having stayed outside for a year he goes to utter ruin. 5
40. But of him who has become that (i.e. entered
on a higher asrama) there is no becoming not that
(i.e. descending to a lower one), according to (Tai-
mini also, on account of restrictive rule, absence of
such like (i.e. statements of descent), and non¬
existence (of good custom).
It has been established that there are stages of life
for which chastity is obligatory. A doubt here arises
whether one who has entered them may for some reason
or other fall from them or not.—The purvapakshin main¬
tains that as there is no difference a person may descend
to a lower stage, either from the wish of well performing
the duties of that stage, or influenced by passion and the
like.—To this we reply as follows, ‘ Of him who has
become that,’ i. e. of him who has reached the stages for
which chastity is obligatory, there is no ‘becoming not
that,’ i.e. descending thence.—Why?—‘ On account of
restrictive rule, absence of such like, and non-existence.’
That means : there are, in the first place, restrictive rules
declaring that a descent may not take place. Compare
‘ for life mortifying the body in the house of a tutor 5
(Kk. Up. II, 23, 2); ‘ He is to go into the forest, that is
he is not to return thence, that is the Upanishad ; ’ ‘ Having
been dismissed by the teacher he is to follow one of the
four asramas, according to rule, up to release from the
body.’—In the second place there are texts teaching the
ascent to higher arramas ( 4 Having completed the Brahma-
£arya state he is to become a householder; he may wander
forth from the Brahma^arya state ’); but there are none
teaching the descent to lower asramas.—And in the third
place there exists no good custom of that kind.—The
descent to a lower asrama can in no way be based on the
wish of well performing the duties of that cLsrama; for
VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.
318
Snmti says,‘One’s own duty, however badly performed, is
better than another duty well carried out ’ (Bha. Gita III, 35).
And the principle is that whatever is enjoined on a certain
person constitutes his duty, not what a person is able to
perform well; for all duty is characterised by injunction.
Nor is a descent allowed owing to the influence of passion,
&c.; for restrictive rules are weightier than passion.—By
the word ‘ also ’ the Sutrakara indicates the consensus of
Gaimini and Badarayazza on this point, in order to confirm
thereby the view adopted.
41. And not also (can the expiation take place)
prescribed in the chapter treating of qualification,
because on account of the inference of his lapse
from Smrfti he (the Naish^ika) is not capable
of it.
If a Brahma&mn for life breaks from inattention the
vow of chastity, is he to perform the expiatory sacrifice
enjoined by the text, ‘ A student who has broken the vow
of chastity shall sacrifice an ass to Nhrzti 1 ’ or not?—He
is not, the purvapakshin says. For although in the chapter
which treats of qualification (Pu. Mim. Su. VI, 8, 22) that
expiatory ceremony has been settled (for Brahma^arins in
general), it does not yet hold good for the professed
Brahma/£arin. For Smrzti declares that such sins can¬
not be expiated by him any more than a head once
cut off can again be healed on to the body, 4 He who
having once entered on the duties of a Naish/^ika again
lapses from them, for him—a slayer of the Self—I see
no expiation which might make him clean again.’ The
Upakurvazza (i. e. he who is a BrahmaMrin for a certain
time only, not for life) on the other hand, about whose sin
Smrzti makes no similar declaration, may purify himself
by the ceremony mentioned.
42. But some (consider the sin) a minor one, (and
1 Cp. e. g. Apastamba Dharma-sutra I, 9, 26, 8. The passage
quoted in the text is, however, a scriptural one.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 42. 319
hence claim) the existence (of expiation for the
Naish/^ika also); as in the case of the eating (of
unlawful food). This has been explained (in the
Pfirva Mima;^sa).
Some teachers, however, are of opinion that the trans¬
gression of the vow of chastity, even on the part of
a professed Brahma^arin, is a minor sin, not a mortal one,
excepting cases where the wife of the teacher and so on are
concerned. For they plead that that sin is not anywhere
enumerated among the deadly ones such as violating
a teacher’s bed and so on. Accordingly they claim the
expiatory ceremony to be valid for the Naish/Zzika as well
as the Upakurva/za ; both being alike Brahma^arins and
having committed the same offence. The case is analogous
to that of eating. Just as BrahmaHrins (in general) who
have broken their vow by eating honey, flesh, and the like
may again purify themselves by a ceremony, so here also.—
The reason for this decision is that for those who assume
the absence of all expiation on the part of the Naish/^ikas
no scriptural passage supporting their view is met with;
while those who admit expiation can base their view on
the passage quoted above (‘ A student who has broken the
vow’ &c.), which makes no distinction between Upakur-
va^as and Naish^ikas. It therefore is more appropriate
to assume the validity of the ceremony for Naish/Zdkas
also. The principle guiding the decision has been explained
in the chapter treating of the means of right knowledge
(Pu. Mi. Su. I, 3, 8).—On this view the Smrzti-passage
which declares that there is no expiation for the Naish/^ika
must be explained as aiming at the origination of weighty
effort on the Naish/^ika’s part.—Similarly in the case of
the mendicant and the hermit. The hermit, when he has
broken his vows, undergoes the Krikk/ira. penance for twelve
nights and then cultivates a place rich in plants. The
mendicant proceeds like the hermit, with the exception of
cultivating the Soma-plant, and undergoes the purifications
prescribed for his state. The rules given by Smrzti for
those cases have to be followed.
VEDANTA-SfjTRAS.
3 20
43. But (they are to be kept outside) in either
case, on account of Smrzti and custom.
But whether lapses from the duties of one’s order, com¬
mitted by those who are bound to chastity, be mortal sins
or minor sins, in either case such persons are to be excluded
by honourable men frish/as). For Smrzti refers to them
in terms of the highest reproach ; cp. passages such as the
one quoted under Sutra 41; and the following one, 4 He who
touches a Brahmazza that has broken his vow and fallen
from his order, or a hanged man or one gnawed by worms
must undergo the iTandraya/za penance. 5 And good custom
also condemns them; for good men do not sacrifice, study,
or attend weddings with such persons.
44. To the lord (of the sacrifice) only (the agent-
ship in meditations belongs), because scripture de¬
clares a fruit; this is the view of Atreya.
With regard to meditations on subordinate members of
sacrificial actions there arises a doubt whether they are to
be carried out by the sacrificer (i.e. him for whom the sacri¬
fice is performed) or by the officiating priests.—By the
sacrificer, the purvapakshin maintains, because scripture
declares fruits. For a fruit is declared in such texts as the
following one, ‘ There is rain for him, and he brings rain
for others who thus knowing meditates on the fivefold
Saman as rain’ ( Kh . Up. II, 3, 2); and we must conclude
that that fruit goes to the Lord of the sacrifice, because it
is he who is entitled to the sacrificial performance together
with its subordinate members, and because such meditations
fall within the sphere of that to which he is entitled. And
that the fruit belongs to him who carries out the medita¬
tions scripture states when saying, ‘ There is rain for him
who meditates. 5 —But scripture declares a fruit for the
priest also, viz. in the passage, c Whatever desire he may
desire either for himself or for the sacrificer he obtains by
his singing.’—That passage, we reply, is of no force because
it expressly declares the fruit (as belonging to the priest in
a special case only). Hence the lord of the sacrifice only
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 46.
321
is the agent in those meditations which have a fruit; this
is the opinion of the teacher Atreya.
45. (They are) the work of the priest, this is the
view of Aru/ulomi; since for that (i.e. the entire
sacrificial work) he is feed.
The assertion that the meditations on subordinate
members of the sacrifice are the work of the sacrificer is
unfounded. They rather are the work of the priest, as the
teacher Au<Ailomi thinks. For the priest is rewarded for
the work together with its subordinate members; and the
meditations on the udgitha and so on fall within the per¬
formance of the work since they belong to the sphere of
that to which the person entitled (viz. the lord of the
sacrifice) is entitled. Hence they are to be carried out by
the priests only, the case being analogous to that of the
restrictive rule as to the work to be performed by means
of the godohana vessel. In agreement herewith scripture
declares the udgatrz to be the agent in knowledge, in
the following passage, ‘Him Vaka Dalbhya knew. He
was the udgatrz of the Naimishiya-sacrificers * (Kh. Up. I,
2, 13). With reference to the circumstance noted by the
purvapakshin that scripture states the fruit to belong to
the agent, we remark that this makes no difference; for
with the exception of cases expressly stated the priest can¬
not be connected with the sacrifice since he subserves the
purposes (acts for) another (viz. the lord of the sacrifice).
46. And on account of scriptural statement.
‘ Whatever blessing the priests pray for at the sacrifice,
they pray for the good of the sacrificer; thus he said ’
(Sat. Bra. I, 3, 1, 26); ‘Therefore an udgatrz who knows
this may say: what wish shall I obtain for you by my
singing? 5 (Kh. Up. I, 7, 8). These scriptural passages
also declare that the fruit of meditations in which the priest
is the agent goes to the sacrificer.—All this establishes the
conclusion that the meditations on subordinate parts of
the sacrifice are the work of the priest.
[38] Y
32 2 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
47. There is the injunction of something else co¬
operating (towards knowledge) (which is) a third
thing (with regard to balya and pa^itya), (which
injunction is given) for the case (of perfect know¬
ledge not yet having arisen) to him who is such
(i. e. the Sazzznyasin possessing knowledge); as in
the case of injunctions and the like.
c Therefore let a Brahmazza after he has done with learning
wish to stand by a childlike state; and after he has done
with the childlike state and learning (he is, or, may be)
a Muni ; and after he has done with what constitutes Muni-
ship and non-Muniship (he is, or, may be) a Brahmazza ’
(Brz. Up. Ill, 5). With reference to this passage a doubt
arises whether it enjoins the state of a Muni or not.—The
purvapakshin maintains that it does not enjoin it, since the
injunction is completed with the clause, ' Let him wish to
stand by a childlike state.’ The following clause £ then
a Muni’ contains no verbal form of injunctive force and there¬
fore must be viewed as a mere anuvada (making a remark
concerning the state of a Muni which is already established).
Should it be asked how this conclusion is reached, we reply
that Muniship is established by the clause 'having done with
learning’ (which forms part of the injunctive portion of the
passage), as ' Muni ’ and * learned man ’ both denote know¬
ledge b It is, moreover, clear also that the last clause, fi and
after he has done with what constitutes Muniship and non-
Muniship (he is) a Brahmazza,’ does not enjoin the condition
of a Brahmazza, as that state is previously established
(independently of that clause); but the words 'then a
Brahmazza’ are a mere glorificatory anuvada. Now as
the words 'then a Muni’ show an analogous form of
enunciation (to the clause ' then a Brahmazza ’), they also
can embody a glorificatory anuvada only.
1 The state of a Muni is already enjoined by the clause ‘ pazzafi-
tyazzz nirvidya;’ the clause ‘atha muni/b’ therefore, may be viewed
as an anuvada (as which it could not be viewed, if there were no
previous injunction of mauna).
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 47.
323
To all this we reply as follows. ‘ There is an injunction
of something else which co-operates. 5 The passage must
be understood as enjoining the state of a Muni—which
co-operates towards knowledge—in the same way as it
enjoins learning and a childlike state, because that state is
something new (not enjoined before).—But it has been said
above that the word ‘learning 5 already intimates Muni-
ship !—This, we reply, does not invalidate our case since
the word ‘ muni 5 denotes (not only knowledge as the term
‘ learned man 5 does, but) pre-eminence of knowledge, on
the ground as well of its etymology from ‘ manana, 5 i.e.
thinking, as of common use, shown in such phrases as ‘ I
am the Vyasa of Munis also. 5 —But the term ‘ Muni 5 is also
seen to denote the last order of life; cp. passages such
as ‘ Householdership, studentship, the order of Munis, the
order of hermits in the woods. 5 —Yes, but it has not that
meaning exclusively, as we see that it does not apply to
phrases such as ‘ Valmiki is the foremost among Munis. 5
In the passage quoted (about the four orders) the last order
is referred to, by the term ‘ Muni, 5 because there it stands
in proximity to the other orders of life, and, as the state of
the Ascetic is the only one which remains (after we have
assigned the three other terms to the stages of life clearly
denoted by them), the last order may be denoted 4 mauna 5
because knowledge is its principal requirement.—We there¬
fore conclude that in the passage under discussion the state
of the Muni—whose characteristic mark is pre-eminence of
knowledge—is enjoined as something third—with regard
to the childlike state and learning.—Against the objection
that the injunction terminates with the childlike state, we
remark that all the same we must view the Muniship also
as something enjoined, as it is something new, so that we
have to supplement the clause as follows : ‘ then he is to be
a Muni. 5 That the state of a Muni is something to be
enjoined, in the same way as the childlike state and learning,
also follows from its being referred to as something to
be done with (like balya and paWitya). It is enjoined
‘ on him who is such, 5 i. e. on the Sawnyasin possessing
knowledge.—How do we know this latter point ?—Because
Y 2
324
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
the Sawnyasin who possesses knowledge forms the topic,
as we see from the preceding passage, ‘ Having cognized
the Self and risen above the desire for sons, &c., they
wander about as mendicants.’—But if the Sawnyasin
possesses knowledge, pre-eminence of knowledge is already
established thereby; what then is the use of the injunction
of Muniship?—To this the Sutra replies ‘in the case of.’
That means: in the case of pre-eminence of knowledge
not being established owing to the prevailing force of the
(erroneous) idea of multiplicity; for that case the injunction
(of Muniship, i.e. of pre-eminence of knowledge) is given.
‘As in the case of injunctions and the like.’ With reference
to sacrifices such as are enjoined in the passage, ‘ He who
is desirous of the heavenly world is to offer the daryapur/za-
masa-sacrifice,’ the aggregate of subordinate members,
such as the establishment of the sacred fires, is enjoined as
something helpful; similarly in this text whose topic is
knowledge and which therefore does not chiefly aim at
injunction, Muniship is enjoined as something helpful to
knowledge.
As thus the order of the ascetic, as distinguished by
a childlike state and so on, is actually established by
scripture, for what reason does the iT^andogya Upanishad
wind up with the householder, viz. in the passage, c After
having received his discharge from his teacher he settles
in his own house,’ &c. ? For by concluding with the
householder, scripture manifests special regard for him.—
To this doubt the next Sutra replies.
48. On account of his being all, however, there
is winding up with the householder.
The word ‘however’ is meant to lay stress on the house¬
holder’s being everything. For the performance of many
works belonging to his own a^rama, such as sacrifices and the
like, which involve not a little trouble, is enjoined on him
by scripture; and at the same time the duties of the other
ajramas—such as tenderness for all living creatures, restraint
of the senses and so on—are incumbent on him also as far
as circumstances allow. There is therefore nothing con-
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 50.
325
tradictory in the jOandogya winding up with the house¬
holder.
49. On account of there being injunction of the
others also, in the same way as of the state of a
Muni.
As the state of the Muni (Sa^nyasin) and the state of the
householder are enjoined in scripture, so also the two other
orders, viz. that of the hermit and that of the student. For
we have already pointed above to passages such as
‘ Austerity is the second, and to dwell as a student in the
house of a teacher is the third.’ As thus the four a^ramas
are equally taught by scripture, they are to be gone through
equally, either in the way of option (between them) or in
the way of comprehension (of all of them).—That the
Sutra uses a plural form (of ‘ the others ’) when speaking
of two orders only, is due to its having regard either to
the different sub-classes of those two, or to their different
duties.
50. (The passage enjoining balya means that the
ascetic is to live) not manifesting himself; on
account of the connexion (thus gained for the
passage).
The passage, ‘ Therefore let a Brahmazza after he has
done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state,’
speaks of the childlike state as something to be under¬
taken. Now by the ‘ childlike state ’ we have to understand
either the nature or the actions of a child. Childhood in
so far as it means a period of life cannot be brought about
at will, and we therefore must take the 6 childlike state ’ to
mean either the behaviour of a child—such as attending
to the calls of nature without any respect of place, &c.—
or inward purity, i. e. absence of cunning, arrogance, force
of the sensual passions, and so on\—With regard to the
1 I am doubtful as to the true reading in this place. The ‘ va ’
of the Calcutta edition (p. 1039, last line) has certainly to be struck
326
vedanta-s'Otras.
doubt thus arising the purvapakshin maintains that by
‘childlike being’ people more commonly understand be¬
having, talking, and eating according to one’s liking, freely
attending to the calls of nature and so on, and that there¬
fore the word is to be understood here also in that sense.—
But such free conduct is improper, because sinfulness and
so on would follow from it!—Not so, the purvapakshin
replies ; for the Sa//myasin possessing knowledge is, through
express scriptural statements, free from all sinfulness thus
incurred; just as the sacrificer is declared to be free from
the sin he might incur in slaying the sacrificial animal.
To this we reply that it is not so because the statement
of the text may be understood in a different sense. For as
long as another rational interpretation of the word ‘ balya ’
is possible we have no right to adopt an interpretation
which involves the assumption of another injunction being
rendered futile. Moreover subordinate matters are enjoined
with a view to the furtherance of the principal matter, and
what here is the principal matter is the endeavour after
knowledge which ascetics have to take upon themselves.
Now if we accepted the entire conduct of a child as what
is enjoined here we could in no way show that the en¬
deavour of knowledge is furthered thereby. We therefore
understand by ‘ balya ’ the special inward state of a child,
i. e. absence of strong sensual passions and the like. This
the Sutra expresses by saying ‘ Not manifesting.’ The
meaning of the clause under discussion thus is : Let him
be free from guile, pride, and so on, not manifesting himself
by a display of knowledge, learning, and virtuousness, just
as a child whose sensual powers have not yet developed
themselves does not strive to make a display of himself
before others. For thus the passage gains a connexion
with the entire chapter on the ground of co-operating
towards the principal matter. In agreement herewith
Smrzti-writers have said, ‘ He whom nobody knows either
out. Some good MSS. read:—bala^aritam antargata bhavavhud-
dhir aprarutf^endriyatvaffz dambhadirahitatvaw va.—The ‘ antar¬
gata ’ seems to mean the same as the ‘antara h,’ p. 1041, 11. 1-2.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 5 1 .
327
as noble or ignoble, as ignorant or learned, as well-
conducted or ill-conducted, he is a Brahma^a. Quietly
devoted to his duty, let the wise man pass through life
unknown; let him step on this earth as if he were blind,
unconscious, deaf/ Another similar passage is, ‘ With
hidden nature, hidden conduct/ and so on.
51. In this life also (the origination of know¬
ledge takes place) if there is no obstruction of what
is ready at hand; on account of this being seen (in
scripture).
Beginning from Sutra 26 of the present pada we have
discussed the various means of knowledge. We are now
to consider whether knowledge—the fruit of those means—
when accomplishing itself accomplishes itself only here in
this life, or sometimes in the next life only.—The purva-
pakshin maintains that it accomplishes itself here in this
life only. For, he argues, knowledge has for its antecedent
the learning of scripture and so on, and nobody applies
himself to learning, &c., with the intention that knowledge
should result therefrom in the next life only; we rather
observe that men begin to learn with a view to knowledge
already springing up in this life. And also sacrifices and
the like produce knowledge only mediately through
learning and so on; for knowledge can be produced
(directly) through the means of right knowledge only 1 .
Hence the origination of knowledge takes place in this
life only.—To this we reply, ‘The origination of knowledge
takes place in this life if there is no obstruction of that
which is ready at hand/ That means: When the means
of knowledge which is operative is not obstructed by some
other work the results of which are just then reaching
maturity, knowledge already reaches maturity in this life.
1 Of which study is one.—Sacrifices indeed may bear their
special fruits in the next life only; but in so far as they co-operate
towards knowledge they are effective in this life. For their only
action in that line is to purify the mind and thus to render it fitter
to receive knowledge.
328
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
But when such an obstruction takes place, then in the next
life. And a work’s reaching maturity depends on place, time,
and operative cause presenting themselves. Nor is there
any binding rule according to which the same time, place,
and operative cause which ripen one work should ripen
another work also; for there are works the fruits of which
are opposed to each other. And scripture also goes only
so far as to teach what the fruit of each work is, without
teaching the special conditions of place, time, and operative
cause. And owing to the specific strength of the means
employed the supersensuous power of one work manifests
itself (i. e. the fruit of that work realizes itself), while that
of another is obstructed thereby and comes to a standstill.
Nor is there any reason why a man should not form,
with regard to knowledge, an unspecified intention 1 ; for
we may freely form the intention that knowledge should
spring up from us either in this life or in some subsequent
life. And knowledge although springing up through the
mediation of learning and so on, springs up only in so far
as learning destroys the obstacles in the way of knowledge.
Thus scripture also declares the difficulty of knowing the
Self, c He of whom many are not even able to hear, whom
many even when they hear of him do not comprehend ;
wonderful is a man when found who is able to teach him ;
wonderful is he who comprehends him when taught by an
able teacher’ (Ka. Up. I, 2, 7).—Moreover scripture relates
that Vamadeva already became Brahman in his mother’s
womb, and thus shows that knowledge may spring up in
a later form of existence through means procured in
a former one; for a child in the womb cannot possibly
procure such means in its present state.
The same is shown by Smr/ti. Vasudeva being asked
by Ar^una, c What will be the fate of him, O Krzshzza, who
has not reached perfection?’ replies, ‘ None who performs
good works undergoes an evil fate ; ’ declares thereupon
1 I.e. there is no reason for the assertion made by the purva-
pakshin that men form a specified intention only, viz. that know¬
ledge should spring up in this life only.
Ill ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 52.
329
that such a man reaches the world of the blessed and is,
later on, born again in a good family; and finally states
just what we at present maintain in the passage beginning,
'There he obtains that knowledge which corresponds to
his former bodily existence,’ and closing, 4 Perfected by
many states of existence he then goes the highest way.’—
It therefore is an established conclusion that knowledge
originates, either in the present or in a future life, in
dependence on the evanescence of obstacles.
52. No such definite rule (exists) as to the fruit
which is release, on account of the assertions as to
that condition, on account of the assertions as to
that condition.
We have seen that in the case of persons desirous of
release who rely upon the means of knowledge there exists
a definite difference of result, in so far as the knowledge
resulting springs up either in this life or a future life
according to the degree of strength of the means employed.
It might now be supposed that there exists a similar
definite difference with regard to the fruit characterised as
final release, owing to the superior or inferior qualification
of the persons knowing.
With reference to this possible doubt the Sutra now
says, 'No such definite rule as to that fruit which is release.’
That means: We must not suppose that in the case of that
fruit which is release there exists an analogous definite rule
of difference.—Why ?—' On account of the assertions (by
scripture) about that condition.’ For all Vedanta-texts
assert the state of final release to be of one kind only.
The state of final release is nothing but Brahman, and
Brahman cannot be connected with different forms since
many scriptural passages assert it to have one nature only.
Compare e.g. ' It is neither coarse nor fine’ (B ri, Up. Ill,
8 , 8); 'That Self is to be described by No, no’ (B ri, Up.
Ill, 9, 26); 'Where one sees nothing else’ ( Kh . Up. VII,
24, 1); 'That immortal Brahman is before’ (Mu. Up. II,
2, 11); 'This everything is that Self’ (B ri, Up. II, 4, 6 );
330
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
‘This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal,
fearless, is indeed Brahman 5 (B ru Up. IV, 4, 25); ‘When
the Self only is all this how should he see another?’ (B ri.
Up. IV, 5, 15).—Moreover the means of knowledge might
perhaps, according to their individual strength, impart
a higher (or lower) degree to their result, viz. knowledge,
but not to the result of knowledge, viz. release; for, as we
have explained more than once, release is not something
which is to be brought about, but something whose nature
is permanently established, and is reached through know¬
ledge. Nor does, in reality, knowledge admit of lower or
higher degree; for it is, in its own nature, high only, and
would not be knowledge at all if it were low. Although
therefore knowledge may differ in so far as it originates
after a long or short time, it is impossible that release
should be distinguished by a higher or lower degree. And
from the absence of difference of knowledge also there
follows absence of definite distinction on the part of the
result of knowledge (viz. release). The whole case is
analogous to that of the results of works. In that know¬
ledge which is the means of release there is no difference
as there is between works. In those cognitions, on the
other hand, which have the qualified Brahman for its
object—such as ‘he who consists of mind, whose body is
prazza 5 —a difference is possible according to the addition
or omission of qualities, and hence there may be a definite
distinction of results, just as there is between the results
of actions. This is also indicated by the passage,
‘according as they meditate on him they become.’ But
in meditations on Brahman devoid of qualities it is other¬
wise. Thus Smrzti also says, ‘No higher road is possible
for any one ; for they speak of inequality only where there
are qualities.’—The repetition of the clause ‘ on account of
the assertions as to that condition ’ indicates the termina¬
tion of the adhyaya.
FOURTH ADHYAYA.
FIRST PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
i. Repetition (of the mental functions of know¬
ing, meditating, &c., is required) on account of the
text giving instruction more than once.
The third adhyaya was taken up chiefly with a discussion
of the means of knowledge as related to the higher and
lower vidyas. In the fourth adhyaya we shall now discuss
the fruits of knowledge, and as occasion suggests some
other topics also.—In the beginning, however, we shall
carry on, in a few adhikara/;as, a special discussion connected
with the means of knowledge. ‘Verily the Self is to be
seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected on ’ (B ru
Up. II, 4, 5); ‘ Let a wise Brahma^a after he has discovered
him practise wisdom’ (B ru Up. IV, 4, 21); ‘That it is
which we must search out, that it is which we must try to
understand 5 (Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1).
Concerning these and similar passages a doubt arises
whether the mental action referred to in them is to be
performed once only or repeatedly.—Once only, the pur-
vapakshin says ; as in the case of the praya^a-offerings
and the like. For thereby the purpose of scripture is
accomplished ; while to practise repetitions not demanded
by scripture would be to accomplish what is not the pur¬
pose of scripture.—But passages have been quoted which
teach repetition ‘it is to be heard, to be thought, to be
reflected on,’ &c.!—Let us then repeat exactly as scripture
says, i. e. let us hear the Self once, let us think it once, let
us reflect on it once, and nothing more. But where
scripture teaches something once only—viz. in such
passages as ‘ He knows,’ ‘ Let him meditate,’ &c.—no
repetition has to be practised.—To this we reply as
332
vedanta-sOtras.
follows. Repetition is to be performed because scripture
gives repeated instruction. For the repeated instruction
contained in passages such as ‘He is to be heard, to be
thought, to be reflected on 5 intimates the repetition of the
required mental acts. — But the purvapakshin has said
above that the repetition is to extend exactly to what
scripture says and not to go further!—This is wrong, we
reply, because all those mental activities have for their end
intuition. For hearing and so on when repeated terminate
in intuition, and thus subserve a seen purpose, just as the
action of beating, &c., terminates in freeing the rice grains
from their husks. Moreover also such terms as ‘ medi¬
tating,’ ‘ being devoted to,’ and 4 reflecting ’ denote actions
in which repetition is implied as a quality. Thus we say
in ordinary life that a person 4 is devoted ’ to a teacher or
a king if he follows him with a mind steadily set on him ;
and of a wife whose husband has gone on a journey we say
that she thinks of him, only if she steadily remembers him
with longing. And (that also ‘ knowing ’ implies repetition,
follows from the fact that) in the Vedanta-texts the terms
‘knowing’ and ‘meditating 5 are seen to be used one in
the place of the other. In some passages the term ‘ know¬
ing ’ is used in the beginning and the term ‘ meditating 5 in
the end; thus e. g. ‘He who knows what he knows is thus
spoken of by me,’ and : Teach me, sir, the deity which you
meditate on’ (.Kh . Up. IV, i, 4 ; 2, 2). In other places
the text at first speaks of 4 meditating ’ and later on of
‘knowing;’ thus e.g. ‘Let a man meditate on mind as
Brahman,’ and 4 He who knows this shines and warms
through his celebrity, fame, and glory of countenance ’ [Kh.
Up. Ill, 18, 1; 6). —From this it follows that repetition
has to be practised there also, where the text gives in¬
struction once only. Where, again, the text gives repeated
instruction, repeated performance of the mental acts is
directly intimated.
2. And on account of an indicatory mark.
An indicatory mark also gives to understand that repe¬
tition is required. For, in the section treating of meditation
IV ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 2 .
333
on the udgitha, the text rejects the meditation on the
udgitha viewed as the sun, because its result is one sun only,
and (in the clause ‘ Do thou resolve his rays/ &c.) enjoins
a meditation on his manifold rays as leading to the pos¬
session of many suns (Kh. Up. I, 5, 1 ; 2) ; which shows that
the repetition of meditations is something well known.
Now as other meditations are meditations no less than the
one referred to, it follows that repetition holds good for all
of them.
Here the following objection may be raised. With
regard to those meditations whose fruit is something to
be effected repetition may hold good, because thereby
superior strength may be imparted to them. But of what
use can repetition be with regard to the meditations having
for their object the highest Brahman, which present to us
Brahman as the universal Self characterised by eternal
purity, thought, and freedom? Should it be said that
repetition has to be allowed because the knowledge of
Brahman being the Self cannot spring up on hearing
a text once only, we reply that in that case it will not
spring up even when it is heard repeatedly. For if a text
such as ‘ Thou art that’ does not originate the true notion
of Brahman if heard once, what hope is there that the
desired effect should be produced by its repetition ?—
Perhaps it will be said that a sentence alone is not able
to lead to the intuition of a thing; but that a sentence
assisted by reasoning may enable us to intuite Brahman
as the universal Self. But even in that case repetition
would be useless; for the reasoning will lead to the desired
intuition even if gone through once only.—Again it will
perhaps be said that the sentence and reasoning together
effect only a cognition of the generic nature of the object
known, not of its specific individual character. When, to
exemplify this, a man says that he feels a pain in his heart
another person can infer from this statement—and certain
accompanying symptoms such as trembling of the limbs—
only that there exists a pain in general but is unable to
intuite its specific character; all he knows is c This man
suffers a pain/ But what removes ignorance is (not
334
vedanta-sOtras.
a general knowledge but) the intuitive knowledge of the
specific character of something. And repetition serves to
produce such knowledge.—This also is not so. For if so
much only is done repeatedly even, no specific knowledge
can spring up. When a specific character is not cognized
through scripture and reasoning being applied once, it will
not be cognized through them if applied a hundred times
even. Hence whether scripture and reasoning produce
specific knowledge or general knowledge, in either case
they will do so even if acting once only; and repetition
therefore is of no use. Nor can it be laid down as a bind¬
ing rule that scripture and reasoning, applied once, in no
case produce intuitive knowledge; for their effect will after
all depend on the various degrees of intelligence of those
who wish to learn. Moreover a certain use of repetition
may be admitted in the case of worldly things which
consist of several parts and possess generic character as well
as individual difference; for there the student may grasp
by one act of attention one part of the object, and by
another act another part; so e. g. in the case of long
chapters to be studied. But in order to reach a true
knowledge of Brahman whose Self is mere intelligence and
which therefore is destitute of generic character as well as
specific difference there clearly is no need of repetition.
To this we make the following reply. Repetition would
indeed be useless for him who is able to cognize the true
nature of Brahman even if enounced once only in the
sentence 4 Thou art that.' But he who is not able to do
that, for him repetition is of use. For this reason the
teacher in the .Oandogya, having given instruction in the
sentence c Thou art that, O Svetaketu,’ and being again and
again asked by his pupil— 4 Please, sir, inform me still
more ’—removes his pupil’s reasons for doubt, and again
and again repeats the instruction 4 Thou art that.’ We
have already given an analogous explanation of the passage
4 The Self is to be heard, to be thought, to be reflected
upon.’—But has not the purvapakshin declared that if the
first enunciation of the sentence 4 Thou art that ’ is not
able to effect an intuition of its sense, repetition will like-
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 2 .
335
wise fail of the desired effect ?—This objection, we reply, is
without force, because the alleged impossibility is not con¬
firmed by observation. For we observe that men by again
and again repeating a sentence which they, on the first
hearing, had understood imperfectly only, gradually rid
themselves of all misconceptions and arrive at a full under¬
standing of the true sense.—Moreover the sentence 4 Thou
art that 5 teaches that what is denoted by the term 4 thou 5
is identical with what is denoted by 4 that/ Now the latter
term denotes the subject of the entire section, viz. the think¬
ing Brahman which is the cause of the origin and so on of
the world ; which is known from other passages such as
4 Brahman which is true knowledge, infinite 5 (Taitt. Up. II, i);
4 Brahman that is knowledge and bliss 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 28) ;
4 That Brahman is unseen, but seeing ; unknown, but know¬
ing 5 (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 11); 4 not produced 5 (Mu. Up. II,
1,2); 4 not subject to old age, not subject to death 9 (B ri.
Up. IV, 4, 25) ; 4 not coarse, not fine ; not short, not long 5
(Bn. Up. Ill, 8, 8). In these passages terms such as 4 not
produced 5 deny the different phases of existence such as
origination ; such terms as 4 not coarse 5 deny of it the
qualities of substances such as coarseness; and such terms
as 4 knowledge 5 declare that the luminousness of intelligence
constitutes its nature. The entity thus described—which is
free from all the qualities of transmigratory existence, has
consciousness for its Self and is called Brahman—is known,
by all students of the Vedanta, as what is denoted by the
term 4 that. 5 They likewise know that what is denoted by
the term 4 thou 5 is the inward Self (pratyagatman); which
is the agent in seeing and hearing, is (successively) appre¬
hended as the inward Self of all the outward involucra
beginning with the gross body (cp. Taitt. Up.), and finally
ascertained as of the nature of intelligence. Now in the
case of those persons for whom the meaning of these two
terms is obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception,
the sentence 4 Thou art that 5 cannot produce a right know¬
ledge of its sense, since the knowledge of the sense of
a sentence presupposes the knowledge of the sense of the
words ; for them therefore the repetition of the scriptural
336
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
text and of reasoning must be assumed to have a purpose,
viz. the discernment of the true sense of the words.—And
although the object to be known, viz. the Self, does not
consist of parts, yet men wrongly superimpose upon it the
attribute of being made up of many parts, such as the body,
the senses, the manas, the buddhi, the objects of the senses,
the sensations, and so on. Now by one act of attention we
may discard one of these parts, and by another act of
attention another part; so that a successively progressing
cognition may very well take place. This however is
merely an antecedent of the (true) knowledge of the Self
(in which there can be no successive stages).
Those quick-witted persons, on the other hand, in whose
mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance,
doubt, and misconception, are able to intuite the sense of
the sentence ‘ Thou art that ’ on its first enunciation even,
and for them therefore repetition is not required. For the
knowledge of the Self having once sprung up discards all
ignorance ; so that in this case no progressive process of
cognition can be acknowledged.—All this might be so—an
objection is raised—if cognition did spring up in any mind
in the way described. (But this is not the case) ; for the
cognition of the Self being subject to pain and so on has
such strength that nobody ever reaches the cognition of all
absence of pain and so on.—This objection, we reply, is
without force ; for it can be shown that the conceit of the
Self being subject to pain, &c., is a wrong conceit, no less
than the conceit of the body being the Self. For we clearly
observe that when the body is cut or burned a wrong
notion springs up, ‘ I am being cut,’ ‘ I am being burned
and similarly we observe that when sons, friends, &c.—who
are even more external to the Self than one’s own body—
suffer affliction, that affliction is wrongly attributed to the
Self. Analogous to these cases is the conceit of the Self
being subject to pain, &c.; for like the body and so on, the
condition of being subject to pain is observed as something
external to intelligence. This moreover follows from its
not being continued in such states as dreamless sleep and
the like ; while scripture expressly declares that in deep
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3 .
337
sleep intelligence suffers no interruption, c And when there
he does not see, yet he is seeing,’ &c. (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 22).
Hence the intuition of the Self consists in the knowledge,
‘ My Self is pure intelligence free from all pain.’ For him
who possesses that knowledge there remains no other work.
Thus scripture says, 4 What shall we do with offspring, we
who have this Self and this world ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22).
And Smrzti also says, 4 But that man who loves the Self, is
satisfied by the Self and has all his longings stilled by the
Self only, for him there is no further work' (Bha. Gita III,
12 ).—For him, on the other hand, who does not reach
that intuition all at once, we admit repetition, in order
that the desired intuition may be brought about. He
also, however, must not be moved towards repetition in
such a way as to make him lose the true sense of the
teaching, 4 Thou art that.’ In the mind of one on whom
repetition is enjoined as a duty, there arise infallibly notions
opposed to the true notion of Brahman, such as 4 1 have
a claim on this (knowledge of the Self) as an agent; this is
to be done by me 1 .’ But if a learner, naturally slow-
minded, is about altogether to dismiss from his mind
the purport of the sentence, because it does not reveal
itself to him, it is permissible to fortify him in the under¬
standing of that sense by means of reasoning on the texts
relative to repetition and so on.—All this establishes the
conclusion that, also in the case of cognitions of the
highest Brahman, the instruction leading to such cognition
may be repeated.
3. But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge
and make us comprehend (the Lord).
The Sutrak&ra now considers the question whether the
highest Self whose characteristics scripture declares is
1 Care must be taken not to engender in the mind of such a
learner the notion that the repeated acts of reflection are incumbent
on him as a duty; for such notions would only obstruct the end
aimed at, i. e. the intuition that the Self of the meditating man is
identical with Brahman s Self, to which no notions of duty or action
apply.
[38] Z
338
vedanta-sOtras.
to be understood as the 4 1 5 or as different from me.—But
how can a doubt arise, considering that scripture exhibits
the term £ Self’ whose sphere is the inward Self?—This
term ‘Self’—a reply maybe given—maybe taken in its
primary sense, provided it be possible to view the individual
soul and the Lord as non-different; but in the other case
the term has to be taken in a secondary (metaphorical)
sense only 1 .
The purvapakshin maintains that the term ‘Self’ is not
to be taken as meaning the 4 1 .’ For that which possesses
the qualities of being free from all evil, &c., cannot be under¬
stood as possessing qualities of a contrary nature, nor can
that which possesses those contrary qualities be understood
as being free from all evil and so on. But the highest
Lord possesses the qualities of being free from all evil, &c.,
and the embodied Self is characterised by qualities of
a contrary nature.—Moreover, if the transmigrating soul
constituted the Self of the Lord, it would follow that he
is no Lord, and thus scripture would lose its meaning ;
while, if the Lord constituted the Self of the individual
soul, the latter would not be entitled (to works and know¬
ledge), and scripture would thus also lose its meaning.
The latter assumption would moreover run counter to
perception and the other means of proof.—Should it
be said that, although the Lord and the soul are different,
they yet must be contemplated as identical, on the basis
of scripture, just as Vishnu and other divinities are con¬
templated in images and so on; the answer is that this
contemplation may take place, but that therefrom we must
not conclude that the Lord is the real Self of the trans¬
migrating soul.
To all this we make the following reply. The highest
Lord must be understood as the Self. For in a chapter
treating of the highest Lord the Cabalas acknowledge
him to be the Self, 4 Thou indeed I am, O holy divinity ;
I indeed thou art, O divinity! ’—In the same light other
1 And in that case the identity of the highest Self and the 4 1 *
would not follow from the term 4 Self/
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3 .
339
texts have to be viewed, which also acknowledge the Lord
as the Self, such as ‘I am Brahman’ (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10).
Moreover certain Vedanta-texts make us comprehend the
Lord as the Self, 4 Thy Self is this which is within all’
(B ri. Up. Ill, 4, 1); ‘He is thy Self, the ruler within, the
immortal’ (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 3); ‘That is the True, that is
the Self, thou art that’ ( Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7).—Nor can we
admit the truth of the assertion, made by the purvapakshin,
that all these passages teach merely a contemplation (of
the Lord) in certain symbols, analogous to the contem¬
plation of Vish/zu in an image. For that would firstly
involve that the texts have not to be understood in their
primary sense 1 ; and in the second place there is a difference
of syntactical form. For where scripture intends the con¬
templation of something in a symbol, it conveys its meaning
through a single enunciation such as ‘ Brahman is Mind ’
(. Kh . Up. Ill, 18, 1), or ‘ Brahman is Aditya’ (Kh. Up. Ill,
19, 1). But in the passage quoted above, scripture says,
f I am Thou and thou art 1 / As here the form of ex¬
pression differs from that of texts teaching the contem¬
plation of symbols, the passage must be understood as
teaching non-difference. This moreover follows from the
express prohibition of the view of difference which a
number of scriptural texts convey. Compare e. g. ‘Now
if a man worships another deity, thinking the deity is one
and he another, he does not know’ (B ri. Up. I, 4, 10);
‘ From death to death goes he who here perceives any
diversity’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 19); ‘Whosoever looks for any¬
thing elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything ’
(B ri. Up. II, 4, 6).—Nor is there any force in the objection
that things with contrary qualities cannot be identical; for
this opposition of qualities can be shown to be false.—Nor
is it true that from our doctrine it would follow that the
Lord is not a Lord. For in these matters scripture alone
is authoritative, and we, moreover, do not at all admit that
scripture teaches the Lord to be the Self of the transmi-
1 And this is objectionable as long as it has not been demon¬
strated that the primary meaning is altogether inadmissible.
340
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
grating soul, but maintain that by denying the transmi¬
grating character of the soul it aims at teaching that the
soul is the Self of the Lord. From this it follows that the
non-dual Lord is free from all evil qualities, and that to
ascribe to him contrary qualities is an error.—Nor is it
true that the doctrine of identity would imply that nobody
is entitled to works, &c., and is contrary to perception and
so on. For we admit that before true knowledge springs
up, the soul is implicated in the transmigratory state, and
that this state constitutes the sphere of the operation of
perception and so on. On the other hand texts such as 4 But
when the Self only has become all this, how should he see
another? ’ &c., teach that as soon as true knowledge springs
up, perception, &c., are no longer valid.—Nor do we mind
your objecting that if perception, &c., cease to be valid, scrip¬
ture itself ceases to be so ; for this conclusion is just what we
assume. For on the ground of the text, 4 Then a father is
not a father’ up to ‘Then the Vedas are not Vedas’ (Bri.
Up. IV, 3, 22 ), we ourselves assume that when knowledge
springs up scripture ceases to be valid.—And should you
ask who then is characterised by the absence of true know¬
ledge, we reply: You yourself who ask this question!—
And if you retort, 4 But I am the Lord as declared by
scripture,’ we reply, £ Very well, if you have arrived at that
knowledge, then there is nobody who does not possess
such knowledge.’—This also disposes of the objection, urged
by some, that a system of non-duality cannot be established
because the Self is affected with duality by Nescience.
Hence we must fix our minds on the Lord as being the
Self.
4. Not in the symbol (is the Self to be contem¬
plated) ; for he (the meditating person) (may) not
(view symbols as being the Self).
4 Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman; this is said
with reference to the body. Let a man meditate on ether
as Brahman; this is said with reference to the Devas ’ (Kh.
Up. Ill, 18, 1); ‘Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine’
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4 .
341
(Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1); 4 He who meditates on name as
Brahman' (Kk. Up. VII, t, 5). With regard to these and
similar meditations on symbols a doubt arises whether the
Self is to be apprehended in them also, or not.
The purvapakshin maintains that it is right to apprehend
the Self in them also because Brahman is known from
scriptural passages as the (universal) Self. For those symbols
also are of the nature of Brahman in so far as they are effects
of it, and therefore are of the nature of the Self as well.
We must not, our reply runs, attach to symbols the idea
of Brahman. For he, i.e. the meditating person, cannot
comprehend the heterogeneous symbols as being of the
nature of the Self.—Nor is it true that the symbols are
of the nature of the Self, because as being effects of Brahman
they are of the nature of Brahman ; for (from their being of
the nature of Brahman) there results the non-existence of
(them as) symbols. For the aggregate of names and so on
can be viewed as of the nature of Brahman only in so far
as the individual character of those effects of Brahman
is sublated ; and when that character is sublated how then
can they be viewed as symbols, and how can the Self be
apprehended in them? Nor does it follow from the fact of
Brahman being the Self that a contemplation of the Self
can be established on the ground of texts teaching a con¬
templation on Brahman (in certain symbols), since a
contemplation of the latter kind does not do away with
agentship and the like. For the instruction that Brahman
is the Self depends on the doing away with agentship and
all other characteristics of transmigratory existence; the
injunction of meditations, on the other hand, depends on the
non-removal of those characteristics. Hence we cannot
establish the apprehension of the Self (in the symbols) on
the ground of the meditating person being the same as the
symbols. For golden ornaments and figures made of gold
are not identical with each other, but only in so far as gold
constitutes the Self of both. And that from that oneness
(of symbol and meditating person) which depends on
Brahman being the Self of all there results non-existence
of the symbols (and hence impossibility of the meditations
342 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
enjoined), we have explained above.—For these reasons the
Self is not contemplated in symbols.
5. A contemplation of Brahman (is to be super¬
induced on symbols of Brahman), on account of the
exaltation (thereby bestowed on the symbols).
With regard to the texts quoted above there arises
another doubt, viz. whether the contemplation of Aditya
and so on is to be superimposed on Brahman, or the
contemplation of Brahman on Aditya and so on A—But
whence does this doubt arise?—From the absence of
a decisive reason, owing to the grammatical co-ordination.
For we observe in the sentences quoted a co-ordination of
the term ‘ Brahman 3 with the terms ‘Aditya,’ &c. ‘Aditya
is Brahman,’ ‘Prcb/ais Brahman,’ ‘ Lightning is Brahman;’
the text exhibiting the two members of each clause in the
same case. And here there is no obvious occasion for
co-ordination because the words ‘ Brahman ’ on the one
hand, and ‘Aditya’ and so on on the other hand, denote
different things ; not any more than there exists a relation
of co-ordination which could be expressed by the sentence
‘ The ox is a horse/—But cannot Brahman and Aditya
and so on be viewed as co-ordinated on the basis of the
relation connecting a causal substance and its effects,
analogously to the case of clay and earthen vessels ?—By
no means, we reply. For in that case dissolution of the
effect would result from its co-ordination with the causal
substance, and that—as we have already explained—would
imply non-existence of the symbol. Moreover, the scrip¬
tural passages would then be statements about the highest
Self, and thereby the qualification for meditations would
be sublated 1 2 ; and further the mention of a limited effect
would be purposeless 3 . It follows herefrom that we have
1 I. e. whether Brahman is to be meditated upon as Aditya, or
Aditya as Brahman.
2 While, as a matter of fact, scripture enjoins the meditations.
3 It would serve no purpose to refer to limited things, such as
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5 .
343
to do here with the superimposition of the contemplation
of one thing on another thing—just as in the case of the
text, ‘ The Brahma/za is Agni Vauvanara,’—and the doubt
therefore arises the contemplation of which of the two
things is to be superimposed on the other.
The purvapakshin maintains that there exists no fixed
rule for this case, because we have no scriptural text
establishing such a rule.—Or else, he says, contemplations
on Aditya and so on are exclusively to be superimposed
on Brahman. For in this way Brahman is meditated upon
by means of contemplations on Aditya, and scripture
decides that meditations on Brahman are what is pro¬
ductive of fruits. Hence contemplations on Brahman are
not to be superimposed on Aditya and so on.
To this we make the following reply. The contemplation
on Brahman is exclusively to be superimposed on Aditya
and so on.—Why ?—‘ On account of exaltation/ For thus
Aditya and so on are viewed in an exalted way, the con¬
templation of something higher than they being super¬
imposed on them. Thereby we also comply with a secular
rule, viz. the one enjoining that the idea of something
higher is to be superimposed upon something lower, as
when we view—and speak of—the king’s charioteer as
a king. This rule must be observed in worldly matters,
because to act contrary to it would be disadvantageous ;
for should we view a king as a charioteer, we should thereby
lower him, and that would be no ways beneficial.—But, an
objection is raised, as the whole matter rests on scriptural
authority, the suspicion of any disadvantage cannot arise;
and it is, further, not appropriate to define contemplations
based on scripture by secular rules !—That might be so, we
reply, if the sense of scripture were fully ascertained ; but
as it is liable to doubt, there is no objection to our having
recourse to a secular rule whereby to ascertain it. And as
by means of that rule we decide that what scripture means
the sun and so on, as being resolved into their causal substance,
i. e. Brahman. True knowledge is concerned only with the
resolution of the entire world of effects into Brahman.
344
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
is the superimposition of a higher contemplation on some¬
thing lower, we should incur loss by superimposing a lower
contemplation upon something higher.—As moreover in
the passages under discussion the words ‘Aditya’ and so on
stand first, they must, this being not contradictory, be
taken in their primary sense. But, as our thought is thus
defined by these words taken in their true literal sense, the
word c Brahman,’ which supervenes later on, cannot be
co-ordinated with them if it also be taken in its true literal
sense, and from this it follows that the purport of the
passages can only be to enjoin contemplations on Brahman
(superinduced on Aditya and so on).—The same sense
follows from the circumstance that the word c Brahman ’ is,
in all the passages under discussion, followed by the word
‘iti,’ ‘thus 1 .’ ‘He is to meditate (on Aditya, &c.) as
Brahman.’ The words ‘Aditya’ and so on, on the other
hand, the text exhibits without any such addition. The
passages therefore are clearly analogous to such sentences
as ‘He views the mother o’ pearl as silver,’ in which the
word c mother o’ pearl 5 denotes mother o’ pearl pure and
simple, while the word ‘ silver 5 denotes, by implication, the
idea of silver ; for the person in question merely thinks
c this is silver ’ while there is no real silver. Thus our
passages also mean, ‘ He is to view Aditya and so on as
Brahman.’—The complementary clauses, moreover, which
belong to the passages under discussion (‘He who knowing
this meditates (upon) Aditya as Brahman ‘ Who meditates
(on) speech as Brahman ; ’ ‘ Who meditates (on) will as
Brahman’), exhibit the words ‘ Aditya’ and so on in the
accusative case, and thereby show them to be the direct
objects of the action of meditation 2 * .—Against the remark
that in all the mentioned cases Brahman only has to be
meditated upon in order that a fruit may result from the
meditation, we point out that from the mode of proof used
1 Which in the translations given above of the texts under dis¬
cussion is mostly rendered by ‘as’ before the words concerned.
2 While the word ‘ Brahman ’ does not stand in the accusative
case.
IV ADIIYAYA, I PADA, 6.
345
above we infer that (not Brahman but) only Aditya and so
on have to be meditated upon. But as in the case of
hospitality shown to guests, Brahman, that is the supreme
ruler of all, will give the fruit of meditations on Aditya and
so on as well. This we have already shown under III, 2,28.
And, after all, Brahman also is meditated upon (in the cases
under discussion) in so far as a contemplation on Brahman
is superinduced on its symbols, analogously as a contem¬
plation on Vishnu is superinduced on his images.
6. And the ideas of Aditya and so on (are to be
superimposed) on the members (of the sacrificial
action); owing to the effectuation (of the result of
the sacrifice).
‘ He who burns up these, let a man meditate upon him as
udgitha 5 ( Kh . Up. I, 3, 1); ‘Let a man meditate on the
fivefold Saman in the worlds’ {Kh. Up. II, 2, 1) ; ‘Let
a man meditate on the sevenfold Saman in speech 5 {Kh. Up.
II, 8, 1); ‘This earth is the Rik, fire is Saman’ {Kh. Up.
I, 6, 1).—With regard to these and similar meditations
limited to members of sacrificial action, there arises a doubt
whether the text enjoins contemplations on the udgitha and
so on superinduced on Aditya and so on, or else contem¬
plations on Aditya, &c., superinduced on the udgitha and
so on.
No definite rule can here be established, the purvapakshin
maintains, since there is no basis for such a rule. For in
the present case we are unable to ascertain any special
pre-eminence, while we were able to do so in the case of
Brahman. Of Brahman, which is the cause of the whole
world and free from all evil and so on, we can assert
definitively that it is superior to Aditya and so on ; the
udgitha and so on, on the other hand, are equally mere
effects, and we cannot therefore with certainty ascribe to
any of them any pre-eminence.—Or else we may decide
that the ideas of the udgitha and so on are to be superin¬
duced exclusively on Aditya and so on. For the udgitha
and so on are of the nature of sacrificial work, and as it is
known that the fruit is attained through the work, Aditya
346
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
and so on if meditated upon as udgitha and so on will
themselves become of the nature of work and thereby be
causes of fruit.—Moreover, the text,‘ This earth is the Rik,
the fire is the Saman,’ is followed by the complementary
passage, ‘ this Saman is placed upon this Rik , 9 where the
word ‘Rik 9 denotes the earth and the word c Saman’ the
fire. Now this (viz. this calling the earth ‘Rik 9 and calling
the fire ‘ Saman’) is possible only if the meaning of the
passage is that the earth and the fire have to be viewed as
Rik and Saman ; not if the Rik and the Saman were to be
contemplated as earth and fire. For the term ‘king’ is
metaphorically applied to the charioteer—and not the term
‘ charioteer’ to the king—the reason being that the charioteer
may be viewed as a king.—Again in the text, £ Let a man
meditate upon the fivefold Saman in the worlds,’ the use of
the locative case ‘ in the worlds ’ intimates that the medi¬
tation on the Saman is to be superimposed on the worlds as
its locus. This is also proved by the analogous passage,
c This Gayatra Saman is woven on the vital airs’ ( Kh . Up.
II, ii, 1).—Moreover (as proved before), in passages such
as ‘ Aditya is Brahman, this is the instruction,’ Brahman,
which is mentioned last, is superimposed on Aditya, which
is mentioned first. In the same way the earth, 5 cc., are
mentioned first, and the hink&ra, &c., mentioned last in
passages such as ‘The earth is the hinkara’ ( Kh . Up. II, 2, i).
—For all these reasons the idea of members of sacrificial
action has to be transferred to Aditya and so on, which are
not such members.
To this we make the following reply. The ideas of
Aditya and so on are exclusively to be transferred to mem¬
bers of sacrificial action, such as the udgitha and so on.
For what reason ?—‘ On account of effectuation ’—that
means : Because thus, through their connexion with the
supersensuous result (of the sacrificial work under dis¬
cussion), when the udgitha and so on are ceremonially
qualified by being viewed as Aditya and so on, the sacri¬
ficial work is successful 1 . A scriptural passage—viz. Kh .
Certain constituent members of the sacrificial action—such as
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 6.
347
Up. I, i, io, ‘ Whatever one performs with knowledge, faith,
and the Upanishad is more powerful’—moreover expressly
declares that knowledge causes the success of sacrificial
work.—Well then, an objection is raised, let this be admitted
with regard to those meditations which have for their result
the success of certain works ; but how is it with meditations
that have independent fruits of their own? Of this latter
nature is e.g. the meditation referred to in KJi . Up. II, a, 3,
£ He who knowing this meditates on the fivefold Saman in
the worlds (to him belong the worlds in an ascending and
a descending scale).’—In those cases also, we reply, the
meditation falls within the sphere of a person entitled to
the performance of a certain work, and therefore it is proper
to assume that it has a fruit only through its connexion
with the supersensuous result of the work under the heading
of which it is mentioned ; the case being analogous to that
of the godohana-vessel 1 .—And as Aditya and so on are of
the nature of fruits of action, they may be viewed as superior
to the udgitha and so on which are of the nature of action
only. Scriptural texts expressly teach that the reaching of
Aditya (the sun) and so on constitutes the fruit of certain
works.—Moreover the initial passages, ‘ Let a man meditate
on the syllable Om as the udgitha/ and ‘ Of this syllable the
full account is this’ ( Kh . Up. I, 1, 1), represent the udgitha
only as the object of meditation, and only after that the
the udgitha—undergo a certain ceremonial purification (sa m-
skara) by being meditated upon as Aditya and so on. The
meditations therefore contribute, through the mediation of the
constituent members, towards the apurva, the supersensuous result
of the entire sacrifice.
1 The sacred text promises a special fruit for the employment
of the milking-pail (instead of the ordinary ^amasa), viz. the
obtainment of cattle; nevertheless that fruit is obtained only
in so far as the godohana subserves the accomplishment of the
apfirva of the sacrifice. Analogously those meditations on mem¬
bers of sacrificial works for which the text promises a separate
fruit obtain that fruit only in so far as they effect a mysterious
sawskara in those members, and thereby subserve the apurva of
the sacrifice.
348
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
text enjoins the contemplations on Aditya and so on.—Nor
can we accept the remark that Aditya and so on being
meditated upon as udgitha, &c., assume thereby the nature
of work and thus will be productive of fruit. For pious
meditation is in itself of the nature of work, and thus capable
of producing a result. And if the udgitha and so on are
meditated upon as Aditya, &c., they do not therefore cease
to be of the nature of work.—In the passage, ‘ This Saman
is placed upon this Rik] the words £ Rik' and ‘Saman’ are
employed to denote the earth and Agni by means of impli¬
cation (laksha/za), and implication may be based, according
to opportunity, either on a less or more remote connexion
of sense. Although, therefore, the intention of the passage
is to enjoin the contemplation of the Rik and the Saman as
earth and Agni, yet—as the Rik and the Saman are
mentioned separately and as the earth and Agni are men¬
tioned close by—we decide that, on the ground of their
connexion with the Rik and Saman, the words ‘ Rik 5 and
‘ S&man 5 are employed to denote them (i. e. earth and
Agni) only. For we also cannot altogether deny that the
word ‘charioteer’ may, for some reason or other, meta¬
phorically denote a king.—Moreover the position of the
words in the clause, ‘ Just this (earth) is Rik, declares that
the Rik is of the nature of earth ; while if the text wanted
to declare that the earth is of the nature of Rik , the words
would be arranged as follows, ‘this earth is just Riki —
Moreover the concluding clause, ( He who knowing this
sings the Saman, 5 refers only to a cognition based on
a subordinate member (of sacrificial action), not to one
based on the earth and so on.—Analogously in the passage,
‘ Let a man meditate (on) the fivefold Saman in the worlds, 5
the worlds—although enounced in the locative case—have
to be superimposed on the Saman, as the circumstance of
the ‘ Saman 5 being exhibited in the objective case indicates
it to be the object of meditation. For if the worlds are
superimposed on the Saman, the Sctman is meditated upon
as the Self of the worlds; while in the opposite case the
worlds would be meditated upon as the Self of the Saman.
—The same remark applies to the passage, ‘ This Gayatra
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 7 .
349
Sclman is woven on the pranas’ ( Kh . Up. II, 11, 1).—
Where again both members of the sentence are equally
exhibited in the objective case, viz. in the passage, ‘ Let a man
meditate on the sevenfold Saman (as) the sun’ ( Kh . Up. II,
9, 1), we observe that the introductory passages — viz.
‘ Meditation on the whole Saman is good ; ’ 4 Thus for the
fivefold Saman ‘Next for the sevenfold Saman’ (. Kh . Up.
II, 1, 1 ; 7, 2; 8, 1) —represent the Saman only as the
object of meditation, and therefrom conclude that Aditya
has to be superinduced on it, and not the reverse.—From
this very circumstance of the Saman being the object of
meditation, it follows that even in cases where the two
members of the sentence have a reverse position—such as
c The earth (is) the hinkara,’ &c.—the hinkara, &c., have to
be viewed as earth and so on ; and not the reverse.—From
all this it follows that reflections based on things not
forming constituent members of the sacrifice, such as Aditya
and so on, are to be superimposed on the udgitha and the
like which are such constituent members.
7. Sitting (a man is to meditate), on account of
the possibility.
As meditations connected with members of sacrificial
action depend on action, we need not raise the question
whether they are to be carried on in a sitting, or any other
posture. The same holds good in the case of perfect
intuition, since knowledge depends on its object only.
With regard to all other meditations, on the other hand,
the author of the Sutras raises the question whether they
may be undertaken indifferently by a person standing,
sitting, or lying down; or only by a person sitting.
The purvapakshin here maintains that as meditation is
something mental there can be no restriction as to the
attitude of the body.—No, the author of the Sutras rejoins;
‘Sitting’ only a man is to meditate.—Why?—‘On account
of the possibility.’ By meditation we understand the length¬
ened carrying on of an identical train of thought; and of
this a man is capable neither when going nor when running,
since the act of going and so on tends to distract the mind.
35°
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
The mind of a standing man, again, is directed on main¬
taining the body in an erect position, and therefore incapable
of reflection on any subtle matter. A man lying down,
finally, is unawares overcome by slumber. A sitting person,
on the other hand, may easily avoid these several untoward
occurrences, and is therefore in a position to carry on
meditations.
8. And on account of thoughtfulness.
Moreover also the word ‘thoughtfulness’ denotes a
lengthened carrying on of the same train of ideas. Now
* thoughtfulness ’ we ascribe to those whose mind is concen¬
trated on one and the same object, while their look is fixed
and their limbs move only very slightly. We say e.g. that
the crane is thoughtful, or that a wife whose husband has
gone on a journey is thoughtful. Now such thoughtfulness
is easy for those who sit; and we therefore conclude here¬
from also that meditation is the occupation of a sitting
person.
9. And with reference to immobility (scripture
ascribes thought to the earth, &c.).
Moreover, in the passage ‘ The earth thinks as it were ’
scripture ascribes thought to the earth, with regard to its
immobility. This also helps us to infer that meditation is
the occupation of one who is sitting.
10. And Smrzti-passages say the same.
Authoritative authors also teach in their Smrztis that
a sitting posture subserves the act of meditation: cp. e.g.
Bha. Gitci VI, 11, 6 Having made a firm seat for one’s self
on a pure spot.’ For the same reason the Yoga.rastra
teaches different sitting postures, viz. the so-called lotus
position and so on.
11. Where concentration of mind (is possible),
there (meditation may be carried on), on account of
there being no difference.
A doubt here arises with regard to direction, place, and
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12. 351
time, viz. whether any restrictive rules exist or not.—Against
the view of those who maintain that such rules exist because
we have analogous rules concerning the locality, &c., of
Vedic works, the Sutrakara remarks that all rules concerning
direction, place, and time depend on the aim merely; that
is to say: Let a man meditate at whatever time, in whatever
place and facing whatever region, he may with ease manage
to concentrate his mind. For while scripture prescribes an
easterly direction, the time of forenoon, and a spot sloping
towards the east for certain sacrifices, no such specific rules
are recorded for meditation, since the requisite concentra¬
tion may be managed indifferently anywhere.—But, an
objection is raised, some passages record such specific rules,
as e. g. the following one, ‘ Let a man apply himself (to
meditation) in a level and clean place, free from pebbles,
fire and dust, noises, standing water, and the like, favourable
to the mind, not infested by what hurts the eyes, full of
caves and shelters’ (Sve t. Up. II, io).—Such particular
rules are met with indeed ; but the teacher being friendly-
minded says that there is no binding rule as to the particulars
mentioned therein. The clause ‘favourable to the mind’
moreover shows that meditation may be carried on wherever
concentration of the mind may be attained.
12. Up to death (meditations have to be repeated);
for then also it is thus seen in scripture.
The first adhikara^a (of the present adhyaya) has estab¬
lished that repetition is to be observed with regard to all
meditations. But now a distinction is made. Those
meditations which aim at complete knowledge, terminate—
in the same way as the beating of the rice grains is
terminated by the husks becoming detached from the
grains—with their effect being accomplished; for as soon
as the effect, i. e. perfect knowledge, has been obtained, no
further effort can be commanded, since scriptural instruction
does not apply to him who knows that Brahman—which
is not the object of injunction—constitutes his Self. On
the other hand a doubt arises whether the devotee is to
repeat those meditations which aim at certain forms of
35 2
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
exaltation for a certain time only and then may stop; or
whether he is to repeat them again and again as long as
he lives.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that such meditations
are to be carried on for some time only and then to be
given up, since this satisfies the demands of those scriptural
passages which teach meditations distinguished by repetition.
To this we make the following reply. The devotee is
to reiterate those meditations up to his death, since the
supersensuous result (of such meditations) is reached
by means of the extreme meditation. For such works
also as originate a fruit to be enjoyed in a future state
of existence presuppose, at the time of death, a creative
cognition analogous to the fruit to be produced ; as appears
from such passages as, ‘Endowed with knowledge (i.e. the
conception of the fruit to be obtained) he (i.e. the individual
soul) goes after that (viz. the fruit) which is connected with
that knowledge’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 2); £ Whatever his thought
(at the time of death), with that he goes into Prazza, and
the Pra/za united with light, together with the individual
Self, leads on to the world as conceived (at the moment of
death)’ (Pr. Up. IV, 2, 10). This also follows from the
comparison to the caterpillar (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 3). But the
meditations under discussion do not, at the time of death,
require any other creative cognition but a repetition of
themselves. Such meditations therefore as consist in the
creative conception of a fruit to be obtained must be
repeated up to the moment of death. Analogously the
scriptural text, 5 at. Bra. X, 6, 3,1—‘With whatever thought
he passes away from this world ’—declares that the medita¬
tion extends up to the time of death. Similarly Smrz*ti
says, ‘ Remembering whatever form of being he in the end
leaves this body, into that same form he ever passes,
assimilated to its being’ (Bha. Gita VIII, 6); and ‘At the
time of death with unmoved mind’ (Bha. Gita VIII, 10).
And that at the moment of death also there remains some¬
thing to be done, the scriptural passage ( Kh . Up. Ill, 17, 6)
also proves, ‘ Let a man, at the time of death, take refuge
with this triad.’
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 3 .
353
13. On the attainment of this (viz. Brahman) (there
take place) the non-clinging and the destruction of
later and earliersins; this being declared (by scripture).
The supplement to the third adhyaya is finished here¬
with. and an inquiry now begins concerning the fruit of
the knowledge of Brahman.—The doubt here presents
itself whether, on the attainment of Brahman, sins the
results of which are opposed in nature to such attainment
are extinguished or not. They cannot possibly be extin¬
guished, the purvapakshin maintains, before they have
given their results, because the purpose of all works is their
result. For we understand from scripture that work
possesses the power of producing results ; if, therefore,
the work would perish without the enjoyment of its result,
scripture would thereby be rendered nugatory. Smrzti
also declares that ‘works do not perish. , —But from this
it would follow that all scriptural instruction regarding
expiatory ceremonies is meaningless!—This objection is
without force, we reply, because expiatory ceremonies may
be viewed as merely due to certain special occurrences ;
as is the case with the offering enjoined on the occasion
of the house (of one who has established the sacred fire-
place)being burned 1 .—Let us moreover admit that expiatory
ceremonies, because enjoined on account of a person being
afflicted by some mischief, may be meant to extinguish
that mischief. But there is no analogous injunction of the
knowledge of Brahman.—But if we do not admit that the
works of him who knows Brahman are extinguished, it
follows that he must necessarily enjoy the fruits of his
works and thus cannot obtain release!—This follows by no
means ; but in the same way as the results of works, release
will take place in due dependence on place, time, and special
causes.—For these reasons the obtainment of Brahman
does not imply the cessation of (the consequences of) mis¬
deeds.
1 Scripture enjoins the ish/i in question merely on the occasion
of the house being burned, not as annulling the mischief done.
[38] a a
354
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
To this we make the following reply. On the obtain-
ment of Brahman there take place the non-clinging (to the
agent) of the posterior sins and the annihilation of anterior
ones.—‘ On account of this being declared/ For in
a chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman scrip¬
ture expressly declares that future sins which might be
presumed to cling to the agent do not cling to him
who knows: ‘ As water does not cling to a lotus-leaf,
so no evil deed clings to him who knows this’ (. Kh . Up.
IV, 14, 3). Similarly scripture declares the destruction
of previously accumulated evil deeds: ‘ As the fibres of
the Ishika reed when thrown into the fire are burned,
thus all his sins are burned ’ ( Kh . Up. V, 24, 3). The
extinction of works the following passage also declares,
‘The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved,
extinguished are all his works when He has been beheld
who is high and low 5 (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).—Nor is there
any force in the averment that the assumption of works
being extinguished without their fruits having been enjoyed
would render scripture futile. For we by no means deny
the fruit-producing power of works ; this power actually
exists; but we maintain that it is counteracted by other
causes such as knowledge. Scripture is concerned only
with the existence of this power in general, not with its
obstruction and non-obstruction. Thus also the Smrzti
passage, ‘ For work is not extinguished/ expresses the
general rule ; for as fruition of the result is the purpose of
work, work is not extinguished without such fruition. But
it is assumed that evil deeds are extinguished through
expiatory ceremonies and the like, on account of scriptural
and Smrzti passages such as ‘All sins transcends he, the
murder of a Brahma^a transcends he who offers the
aivamedha-sacrifice and who knows it thus’ (Tai. Sawh.
V, 3, 12, 1).—Nor is there any truth in the assertion that
expiatory ceremonies are due to certain special occurrences
(without possessing the power of extinguishing the evil
inherent in such occurrences). For as these expiatory acts
are enjoined in connexion with evil events, we may assume
that they have for their fruit the destruction of such evil,
IV ADHYAYA, I PA DA, 1 3 .
355
and are therefore not entitled to assume any other fruit.
—Against the objection that knowledge is not actually
enjoined with reference to the destruction of evil while
expiatory acts are so enjoined, we make the following
remark. In the case of the meditations on the qualified
Brahman there exists such injunction, and the corresponding
complementary passages declare that he who possesses such
knowledge obtains lordly power and cessation of all sin.
Now there is no reason why the passages should not
expressly aim at declaring these two things 1 , and we
therefore conclude that the fruit of those vidyas is the
acquisition of lordly power, preceded by the annulment
of all sin. In the case of vidyas referring to Brahman
devoid of qualities we indeed have no corresponding in¬
junction ; nevertheless the destruction of all works follows
from the cognition that our true Self is not an agent.
(With relation to these vidyds about Brahman as devoid
of qualities) the term ‘ non-clinging' shows that, as far as
future works are concerned, he who knows Brahman does
not enter at all into the state of agency. And as to works
past, although he has entered as it were into that state
owing to wrong knowledge, yet those works also are
dissolved when, through the power of knowledge, wrong
cognition comes to an end; this is conveyed by the term
‘ destruction.’ ‘ That Brahman whose nature it is to be
at all times neither agent nor enjoyer, and which is thus
opposed in being to the (soul’s) previously established state
of agency and enjoyment, that Brahman am I; hence
I neither was an agent nor an enjoyer at any previous time,
nor am I such at the present time, nor shall I be such
at any future time ; ’ this is the cognition of the man who
knows Brahman. And in this way only final release is
possible; for otherwise, i.e. if the chain of works which have
been running on from eternity could not be cut short, release
1 I. e. there is no reason to assume that those passages mention
the acquisition of lordly power and the cessation of sin merely for
the purpose of glorifying the injunction, and not for the purpose of
stating the result of our compliance with the injunction.
a a 2
356
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
could never take place.—Nor can final release be dependent
on locality, time, and special causes, as the fruit of works is;
for therefrom it would follow that the fruit of knowledge is
non-permanent and cannot be.
It therefore is an established conclusion that on attaining
Brahman there results the extinction of all sin.
14. Of the other (i. e. good works) also there is,
in the same way, non-clinging; but at death.
In the preceding adhikara/za it has been shown that,
according to scriptural statements, all natural sin—which
is the cause of the soul’s bondage—does, owing to the
power of knowledge, either not cling to the soul or undergo
destruction. One might now think that works of religious
duty which are enjoined by scripture are not opposed to
knowledge also founded on scripture. In order to dispel
this notion the reasoning of the last adhikarazza is formally
extended to the case under discussion. For him who
knows there is ‘ in the same way,’ i.e. as in the case of
sin, ‘non-clinging’ and destruction ‘of the other also,’ i.e. of
good works also ; because such works also, as productive
of their own results, would be apt to obstruct thereby the
result of knowledge. Scripture also—in passages such as
‘He overcomes both’ (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22)—declares that
good works are extinguished no less than evil ones, and
the extinction of works which depends on the cognition
of the Self not being an agent is the same in the case
of good and of evil works, and moreover there is a passage
making a general statement without any distinction, viz.
‘And his works are extinguished’ (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).
And even there where the text mentions evil works only,
we must consider good works also to be implied therein,
because the results of the latter also are inferior to the
result of knowledge. Moreover scripture directly applies the
term ‘ evil works ’ to good works also, viz. in the passage,
Kh . Up. VIII, 4, 1, ‘ Day and night do not pass that bank,’
where good works are mentioned together with evil works,
and finally the term ‘ evil ’ is without any distinction
applied to all things mentioned before, ‘All evil things
IV ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 1 5 .
357
turn back from it.’—‘ But at death.’ The word ‘ but 9 is
meant for emphatical assertion. As it is established that
good as well as evil works—which are both causes of
bondage—do, owing to the strength of knowledge, on the
one hand not cling and on the other hand undergo de¬
struction, there necessarily results final release of him who
knows as soon as death takes place.
15. But only those former (works) whose effects
have not yet begun (are destroyed by knowledge);
because (scripture states) that (i. e. the death of the
body) to be the term.
In the two preceding adhikara/zas it has been proved
that good as well as evil works are annihilated through
knowledge. We now have to consider the question whether
this annihilation extends, without distinction, to those
works whose effects have already begun to operate as well
as to those whose effects have not yet begun; or only
to works of the latter kind.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that on the ground of
scriptural passages such as £ He thereby overcomes both,’
which refer to all works without any distinction, all works
whatever must be considered to undergo destruction.
To this we reply, ‘ But only those whose effects have
not begun.’ Former works, i. e. works, whether good or
evil, which have been accumulated in previous forms of
existence as well as in the current form of existence before
the origination of knowledge, are destroyed by the attain¬
ment of knowledge only if their fruit has not yet begun
to operate. Those works, on the other hand, whose effects
have begun and whose results have been half enjoyed—
i.e. those very works to which there is due the present state
of existence in which the knowledge of Brahman arises—
are not destroyed by that knowledge. This opinion is
founded on the scriptural passage, ‘ For him there is delay
only as long as he is not delivered (from the body) ’ ( Kh .
Up. VI, 14, 2), which fixes the death of the body as the
term of the attainment of final release. Were it otherwise,
.>58
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
i.e. were all works whatever extinguished by knowledge,
there would be no reason for the continuance of the current
form of existence, and the rise of knowledge would there¬
fore be immediately followed by the state of final release ;
in which case scripture would not teach that one has to
wait for the death of the body.—But, an objection is raised,
the knowledge of the Self being essentially non-active
does by its intrinsic power destroy (all) works; how then
should it destroy some only and leave others unaffected ?
We certainly have no right to assume that when fire and
seeds come into contact the germinative power of some
seeds only is destroyed while that of others remains un¬
impaired !—The origination of knowledge, we reply, can¬
not take place without dependence on an aggregate of
works whose effects have already begun to operate, and
when this dependence has once been entered into, we must
—as in the case of the potter’s wheel—wait until the
motion of that which once has begun to move comes to
an end, there being nothing to obstruct it in the interim.
The knowledge of our Self being essentially non-active
destroys all works by means of refuting wrong knowledge;
but wrong knowledge—comparable to the appearance of
a double moon—lasts for some time even after it has been
refuted, owing to the impression it has made.—Moreover
it is not a matter for dispute at all whether the body of
him who knows Brahman continues to exist for some time
or not. For how can one man contest the fact of another
possessing the knowledge of Brahman—vouched for by his
heart’s conviction—and at the same time continuing to
enjoy bodily existence ? This same point is explained in
scripture and Smrz’ti, where they describe him who stands
firm in the highest knowledge.—The final decision therefore
is that knowledge effects the destruction of those works
only—whether good or evil—whose effects have not yet
begun to operate.
16. But the Agnihotra and the like (tend) towards
the same effect; scripture showing this.
The reasoning as to evil deeds has been extended to the
IV ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 6 .
359
non-clinging and destruction of good deeds also. Against
a notion which now might present itself, viz. that this
extension comprehends all good works alike ; the Sutrakara
remarks, ‘ But the Agnihotra and so on. 5 —The word ‘but 5
is meant to set that notion aside. Works of permanent
obligation enjoined by the Veda, such as the Agnihotra,
tend ‘towards the same effect, 5 i. e. have the same effect as
knowledge. For this is declared by texts such as the
following one, ‘ Brahma;zas seek to know him by the study
of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22).—
But, an objection is raised, as knowledge and works have
different effects, it is impossible that they should have one
and the same effect!—It is observed, we reply, that sour
milk and poison whose ordinary effects are fever and death
have for their effects satisfaction and a flourishing state of
the body, if the sour milk is mixed with sugar and the
poison taken while certain mantras are recited ; in the
same way works if joined with knowledge may effect final
release.—But final release is something not to be effected
at all; how then can you declare it to be the effect of
works?—Works, we reply, may subserve final release
mediately. For in so far as furthering knowledge, work
may be spoken of as an indirect cause of final release.
For the same reason the equality of effect spoken of above
extends only to works past (at the time when knowledge
springs up). Because for him who knows Brahman no future
Agnihotras and the like are possible, since the attainment
of the Self of Brahman—which Brahman is not subject to
injunction—lies outside the sphere of sacred precept. In
those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to
the qualified Brahman, the Self does not cease to be an
agent, and consequently future Agnihotras and the like are
not excluded. Such works also—because they have no
other effect if undertaken without a view to reward—may
be brought into connexion with knowledge.
To what works then, it may be asked, does the statement
refer made above about the non-clinging and the destruction,
and to what works the following statement made in some
.S&kha about the application of works, 4 His sons enter upon
360
vedanta-sOtras.
his inheritance, his friends on his good works, his enemies
upon his evil works?’—To this question the next Sutra
replies.
17. For (there is) also (a class of good works)
other than this, according to some. (There is agree¬
ment) of both (teachers) (as to the fate of those
works.)
‘ For also one other than this,’ i. e. there is also a class of
good works different from works of permanent obligation,
viz. those good works which are performed with a view to
a fruit. Of those latter works the passage quoted above
from some .Sakha (‘ His friends enter on his good works’)
teaches the application. And first of those works Sutra 14
teaches that, in the same way as evil deeds, they do not
cling to the doer or else are destroyed. Both teachers,
Gaimini as well as Badaraya;?a, are agreed that such works,
undertaken for the fulfilment of some special wish, do not
contribute towards the origination of true knowledge.
18. For (the text) ‘ whatever he does with know¬
ledge ’ (intimates that).
In the preceding adhikara^a the following conclusion
has been established :—Works of permanent obligation
such as the Agnihotra, if performed by a person desirous
of release with a view to release, lead to the extinction of
evil deeds committed, thus become a means of the purifi¬
cation of the mind, and thereby cause the attainment of
Brahman, which leads to final release; they therefore
operate towards the same effect as the knowledge of
Brahman. Now the Agnihotra and similar works are
either connected with a special knowledge based on the
constituent members of the sacrificial work, or absolute
(non-connected with such knowledge). This appears from
scriptural texts such as £ He who knowing this sacrifices;
he who knowing this makes an offering; he who knowing
this recites; he who knowing this sings; therefore let
a man make him who knows this his Brahman-priest
IV ADHYAyA, I PADA, 1 8 .
361
(Kh . Up. IV, 17, 1); therefore both perform the work, he
who knows this and he who does not know it * ( Kh . Up. I,
1, 10).—We have now to consider the question whether
only such Agnihotras and so on as are connected with
knowledge cause knowledge on the part of him who desires
release and thus operate towards the same effect as
knowledge; or whether both kinds of works—those con¬
nected with knowledge and those not so connected—equally
act in that way. The doubt concerning this point arises on
the one hand from scriptural passages such as 4 That Self
they seek to know by sacrifice 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 22), which
represent sacrifices and the like, without difference, as
auxiliary to the knowledge of the Self; and on the other
hand from our observing that a superiority is conceded to
Agnihotras, &c., if connected with knowledge.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that only such sacri¬
ficial works as are connected with knowledge are helpful
towards the cognition of the Self, since we understand from
various scriptural and Smrzti passages that works connected
with knowledge are superior to those destitute of know¬
ledge ; cp. e. g. 4 On the very day on which he sacrifices on
that day he overcomes death again, he who knows this 5
(B ri. Up. I, 5, 2); and 4 Possesser of this knowledge thou
wilt cast off the bonds of action; 5 4 Action is far inferior
to concentration of mind 5 (Bha. Gita II, 39 ; 49).
To this the Sutrak&ra replies, 4 For what with knowledge
only.’ It is true that works such as the Agnihotra if joined
with knowledge are superior to works destitute of knowledge,
in the same way as a Brahma/za possessed of knowledge is
superior to one devoid of knowledge. Nevertheless works
such as the Agnihotra even if not connected with know¬
ledge are not altogether ineffective; for certain scriptural
texts declare that such works are, all of them without any
difference, causes of knowledge ; so e. g. the passage, 4 That
Self they seek to know through sacrifices. 5 —But, as we
understand from scripture that works connected with
knowledge are superior to those destitute of knowledge,
we must suppose that the Agnihotra and the like if un¬
accompanied by knowledge are inoperative towards the
362
vedanta-sCtras.
cognition of the Self!—By no means, we reply. The
proper assumption is that the Agnihotra and so on, if
accompanied by knowledge, possess a greater capability of
originating knowledge and therefore are of superior causal
efficiency with regard to the cognition of the Self; while
the same works if devoid of knowledge possess no such
superiority. We cannot, however, admit that the Agni¬
hotra and similar works which scripture, without making
any distinction, declares to subserve knowledge (cp. ‘ they
seek to know through sacrifices’) should not subserve it.
With this our conclusion agrees the scriptural text, ‘What¬
ever he performs with knowledge, faith, and the Upanishad
that is more powerful’ (Kk. Up. I, i, to); for this text—
in speaking of the greater power of work joined with
knowledge and thus proclaiming the superiority of such
work with regard to its effect—intimates thereby that
work destitute of knowledge possesses some power towards
the same effect. By the ‘power’ of work we understand
its capacity of effecting its purpose. We therefore accept
as settled the following conclusion : All works of perma¬
nent obligation, such as the Agnihotra—whether joined
with or devoid of knowledge—which have been performed
before the rise of true knowledge, either in the present
state of existence or a former one, by a person desirous
of release with a view to release; all such works act,
according to their several capacities, as means of the
extinction of evil desert which obstructs the attainment of
Brahman, and thus become causes of such attainment,
subserving the more immediate causes such as the hearing
of and reflecting on the sacred texts, faith, meditation, devo¬
tion, &c. They therefore operate towards the same effect
as the knowledge of Brahman.
19. But having destroyed by fruition the two
other (sets of work) he becomes one with Brahman.
It has been shown that all good and evil deeds whose
effects have not yet begun are extinguished by the power
of knowledge. ‘ The two others,’ on the other hand, i. e.
those good and evil works whose effects have begun, a man
IV ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 19.
363
has at first to exhaust by the fruition of their consequences,
and then he becomes one with Brahman. This appears
from scriptural passages such as f For him there is delay so
long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will
become one with Brahman’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 14, 2); and
c Being Brahman he goes to Brahman 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 6).
—But, an objection is raised, even when perfect intuition
has risen the practical intuition of multiplicity may continue
after the death of the body, just as it continued before
death ; analogously to the visual appearance of a double
moon (which may continue even after it has been cognized
as false).—Not so, we reply. After the death of the body
there no longer exists any cause for such continuance;
while up to death there is such a cause, viz. the extinction
of the remainder of works to be enjoyed.—But a new
aggregate of works will originate a new fruition !—Not so,
we reply; since the seed of all such fruition is destroyed.
What, on the death of the body, could originate a new
period of fruition, is only a new set of works, and works
depend on false knowledge ; but such false knowledge is
completely destroyed by perfect intuition. When therefore
the works whose effects have begun are destroyed, the
man who knows necessarily enters into the state of perfect
isolation.
364
vedanta-sOtras.
SECOND PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self!
1. Speech (is merged) in mind, on account of this
being seen, and of the scriptural statement.
Being about to describe the path of the gods which leads
those who possess the lower kind of knowledge towards
the attainment of their reward, the Sutrakara begins by
explaining, on the basis of scriptural statements, the
successive steps by which the soul passes out of the body;
for, as will be stated later on, the departure of the soul
is the same in the case of him who possesses the (lower)
knowledge and of him who is devoid of all knowledge.
About the process of dying we have the following passage,
4 When a man departs from hence his speech merges in his
mind, his mind in his breath, his breath in fire, fire in the
highest deity’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 6, 1). A doubt here arises
whether the passage means to say that speech itself, together
with its function, is merged in the mind, or only the
function of speech.
The purvapakshin maintains that speech itself is merged
in the mind. For this explanation only is in agreement
with the direct statement of the sacred text, while the other
alternative compels us to have recourse to an implied
meaning; now wherever direct enunciation and implied
meaning are in conflict the preference has to be given to
the former, and we therefore maintain that speech itself is
merged in the mind.
To this we reply that only the function of speech is
merged in the mind.—But how can this interpretation be
maintained, considering that the teacher (in the Sutra)
expressly says ‘Speech in the mind?’—True, we reply;
but later on he says ‘ There is non-division, according to
scriptural statement’ (Sutra 16), and we therefrom conclude
that what is meant in the present Sutra is merely cessation
of the function of speech. For if the intention were to
IV ADHVAYA, 2 PADA, 2 . 365
express absorption of the thing (i.e. the organ of speech)
itself, there would be ‘non-division’ in all cases, and for
what reason then should ‘ non-division ’ be specially stated
in another case (i.e. in the case of which Sutra 16 treats)?
The meaning therefore is that the different functions are
retracted, and that while the function of the mind continues
to go on the function of speech is retracted first.—Why
so ?—‘ Because this is seen.’ It is a matter of observation
that while the mind continues to act the function of speech
comes to an end; nobody, on the other hand, is able to
see that the organ of speech itself, together with its function,
is merged in the mind.— But are we not justified in assuming
such a merging of speech in the mind, on the ground of
scriptural statement?—This is impossible, we reply, since
mind is not the causal substance of speech. We are entitled
to assume only that a thing is merged in what is its causal
substance; a pot e. g. (when destroyed) is merged in clay.
But there is no proof whatever for speech originating from
mind. On the other hand we observe that functions originate
and are retracted even where they do not inhere in causal
substances. The function of fire, e.g. which is of the nature
of heat, springs from fuel which is of the nature of earth,
and it is extinguished in water.—But how do you, on this
interpretation, account for the scriptural statement that
‘ speech is merged in the mind ? 5 —‘ And on account of the
scriptural statement,’ the Sutrakara replies. The scriptural
statement also may be reconciled with our interpretation,
in so far as the function and the thing to which the function
belongs are viewed as non-different.
2. And for the same reason all (sense-organs)
(follow) after (mind).
‘ Therefore he whose light has gone out comes to a new
birth with his senses merged in the mind ’ (Pr. Up. Ill, 9);
this passage states that all senses without difference are
merged in the mind. ‘For the same reason,’ i.e. because
there also as in the case of speech, it is observed that the
eye and so on discontinue their functions, while the mind
together with its functions persists, and because the organs
366
vedanta-s£jtras.
themselves cannot be absorbed, and because the text
admits of that interpretation ; we conclude that the different
organs follow after, i.e. are merged in, the mind only as far
as their functions are concerned.—As all organs 1 without
difference are merged in the mind, the special mention
made of speech (in Sutra i) must be viewed as made in
agreement with the special example referred to by scripture,
‘ Speech is merged in mind.’
3. That mind (is merged) in breath, owing to the
subsequent clause.
It has been shown that the passage, £ Speech is merged
in mind,’ means a merging of the function only.—A doubt
here arises whether the subsequent clause, c mind in breath,’
also means to intimate a merging of the function only or
of that to which the function belongs.—The purvapakshin
maintains the latter alternative. For that, he says, agrees
with scripture, and moreover breath may be viewed as the
causal substance of mind. For scripture—‘ Mind is made
of earth, breath of water’ ( Kh . Up. VI, 6, 5)—states that
mind comes from earth and breath from water, and scripture
further states that ‘Water sent forth earth’ [Kh. Up. VI,
2, 4). When mind therefore is merged in breath, it is the
same as earth being merged in water; for mind is earth
and breath is water, causal substance and effect being non-
different.
To this we reply as follows. c The subsequent clause ’
intimates that the mind, after having absorbed within itself
the functions of the outer senses, is merged in breath only
in the way of its function being so merged. For we
observe in the case of persons lying in deep sleep or about to
die that, while the function of breath persists, the functions
of the mind are stopped. Nor is the mind capable of being
itself merged in breath, since breath does not constitute
its causal substance.—But it has been shown above that
breath is the causal substance of mind!—This is not valid,
I. e. the functions of all organs.
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 4.
367
we reply. For the relation of causality, made out in such
an indirect way, does not suffice to show that mind is really
merged in breath. Were it so, then mind would also be
merged in earth, earth in water, breath in water. Nor
is there, on the alternative contemplated, any proof of mind
having originated from that water which had passed over
into breath.—Mind cannot therefore, in itself, be merged
in breath. And that the scriptural statement is satisfied
by a mere merging of the function—the function and that
to which the function belongs being viewed as identical—
has been shown already under the preceding Sutra.
4. That (viz. breath) (is merged) in the ruler
(i. e. the individual soul), on account of the (state¬
ments as to the pranas) coming to it and so on.
We have ascertained that a thing which has not originated
from another is not itself merged in the latter, but only
through its functions. A doubt now arises whether, accord¬
ing to the word of scripture, the function of breath is merged
in heat, or in the individual soul which is the ruler of the
body and senses.—According to the purvapakshin we must
conclude that the breath is merged in heat only, since the
scriptural statement allows no room for doubt and we are
not entitled to assume something not declared by scripture.
The breath under discussion persists 4 in the ruler/ i.e.
the intelligent Self (the individual soul) which possesses
nescience, work, and former knowledge as limiting adjuncts;
i.e. the function of breath has that soul for its substratum.
—Why so?—‘On account of (the pra/zas) going towards
him/ &c.—Another scriptural passage declares that all
pra/zas without any difference go to the soul, ‘ All the pra/zas
go to the Self at the time of death when a man is thus
going to expire 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 38). Another passage
again specially declares that the pra/?a with its five functions
follows the individual soul, ‘After him thus departing the
pra/za departs/ and that the other pra/zas follow that pra/za,
‘ And after the pra/za thus departing all the other pra/zas
depart 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2). And the text, ‘ He is furnished
with intelligence 5 (ibid.), by declaring the individual soul to
368
VEDANTA-StJTRAS.
be of intimately intelligent nature, suggests that in it, viz.
the soul, the pra/za—into which the different organs of
knowledge have been merged—has taken its abode.—But
scripture also says, ‘ The pra/za (is merged) in heat; ’ why
then make the addition implied in the doctrine—that breath
is merged in the individual soul?—We must make that
addition, we reply, because in the process of departure &c.
the soul is the chief agent, and because we must pay regard
to specifications contained in other scriptural passages
also.—How then do you explain the statement, ‘ Breath is
merged in heat?’—To this question the next Sfttra replies.
5. To the elements (the soul, with pra^a, goes),
on account of the subsequent scriptural clause.
The soul joined by the pra^a takes up its abode within
the subtle elements which accompany heat and form the
seed of the (gross) body. This we conclude from the clause,
‘Breath in heat. 5 —But this passage declares, not that the
soul together with the pra;/a takes up its abode in heat,
but only that the pra^a takes up its abode!—No matter,
we reply; since the preceding Sutra intercalates the soul
in the interval (between pra^a and te^as). Of a man who
first travels from Srughna to Mathura and then from
Mathura to Pa^aliputra, we may say shortly that he travels
| from Srughna to Pafeliputra. The passage under discussion
I therefore means that the soul together with the pra^a
abides in the elements associated with heat.—But how are
you entitled to draw in the other elements also, while the
text only speaks of heat?—To this question the next Sutra
replies.
6. Not to one (element) (the soul goes); for both
(i. e. scripture and Smmi) declare this.
At the time of passing over into another body the
individual soul does not abide in the one element of heat
only; for we see that the new body consists of various
elements. This matter is declared in the question and
answer about the waters called man (Kh. Up. V, 3, 3);
as explained by us in III, i, 2. —Scripture and Smrzti alike
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 7.
369
teach this doctrine; compare e. g. 4 Consisting of earth,
water, wind, ether, heat’ (B ri, Up. IV, 4, 5); and ‘ The
subtle perishable parts of the five (elements) from them all
this is produced in due succession’ (Manu I, 27).—But is
there not another scriptural text—beginning ‘ Where then
is that person? 5 —which teaches that at the time of the
soul attaining a new body, after speech and the other
organs have been withdrawn within the soul, work
constitutes the soul’s abode, ‘ What those two said, as work
they said it; what they praised, as work they praised it ’
(B ri. Up. Ill, 2, 13)?—That passage, we reply, describes
the operation of bondage consisting of the senses and their
objects—there called grahas and atigrahas—and therefore
work is spoken of as the abode ; here on the other hand
the elements are said to be the abode because we have
to do with the origination of a new body out of the matter
of the elements. The expression ‘ they prayed 5 moreover
intimates only that work occupies the chief place in the
process, and does not exclude another abode. The two
passages therefore do not contradict each other.
7. And common (to him who knows and him who
does not know) (is the departure) up to the beginning
of the way ; and the immortality (of him who knows)
(is relative only) without having burned (nescience
and so on).
The question here arises whether the departure of the
soul, as described hitherto, is the same in the case of him
who knows and him who is destitute of knowledge; or
whether there is any difference.—There is a difference, the
purvapakshin maintains. For the departure as described
has for its abode the elements, and this abiding in the
elements is for the purpose of a new birth. But he who
possesses true knowledge cannot be born again, since
scripture declares that ‘He who knows reaches immor¬
tality. 5 Hence only he who is devoid of knowledge departs
in the way described.—But as that departure is described
in chapters treating of knowledge it can belong only to him
[38] b b
37°
vedanta-s6tras.
who knows!—Not so, the purvapakshin replies. In the
same way as sleep and the like, the departure of the soul
is only referred to in the texts as something established
elsewhere (not as something to be taught as part of true
knowledge). Passages such as 4 When a man sleeps,—is
hungry,—is thirsty 5 ( Kh . Up. VI, 8), although forming
part of chapters concerned with true knowledge, mention
sleep and so on which are common to all living beings,
because they assist the comprehension of the matter to be
taught, but do not aim at enjoining them specially for those
who know. Analogously the texts about the soul’s
departure refer to that departure only in order to teach
that 4 that highest deity in which the heat of the dying
man is merged, that is the Self, that art thou.’ Now that
departure is (in other scriptural passages) specially denied
of him who knows ; it therefore belongs to him only who
does not know.
To this we make the following reply. That departure
which is described in the passage, 4 speech is merged in
mind,’ &c., must be 4 common ’ to him who knows and him
who does not know 4 up to the beginning of the way ; ’
because scripture records no distinction. The soul des¬
titute of true knowledge having taken its abode in the
subtle elements which constitute the seed of the body and
being impelled by its works, migrates into a new body ;
while the soul of him who knows passes into the vein,
revealed by true knowledge, which is the door of release.
In this sense the Sutra says 4 up to the beginning of the
way.’—But he who knows reaches immortality, and im¬
mortality does not depend on a change of place ; why then
should the soul take its abode in the elements or set out
on a journey ?—That immortality, we reply, is 4 without
having burned,’ i. e. for him who, without having altogether
burned nescience and the other afflictions, is about to
obtain, through the power of the lower knowledge, a relative
immortality only, there take place the entering on the
way and the abiding in the elements. For without a sub¬
stratum the pranas could not move. There is thus no
difficulty.
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 9.
371
8. This (aggregate of the elements) (continues to
exist) up to the (final absolute) union (with Brah¬
man) ; on account of the declarations of the sa;^sara
state (made by scripture).
With regard to the final clause, * Heat in the highest
deity, 5 the force of its connexion with what precedes shows
that the meaning is ‘the heat of the dying man is—together
with the individual soul, the pra/za, the aggregate of the
organs and the other elements—merged in Brahman.’—We
now have to consider of what kind that merging is.—The
purvapakshin maintains that it is an absolute absorption
of the things merged, since it is proved that those things
have the highest deity for their causal matter. For it has
been established that the deity is the causal substance of
all things that have an origin. Hence that passing into
the state of non-separation is an absolute one.
To this we reply as follows. Those subtle elements—
heat and so on—which constitute the abode of hearing and
the other organs persist up to the ‘ union, 5 i. e. up to final
release from the saws&ra, which is caused by perfect
knowledge. ‘On account of the declarations of the sawsara
state ’ made in passages such as ‘ Some enter the womb,
for embodied existence as organic beings ; others go into
inorganic matter, according to their work and according to
their knowledge 3 (Ka. Up. II, 5, 7). Otherwise the limiting
adjuncts of every soul would, at the time of death, be
absorbed and the soul would enter into absolute union
with Brahman; which would render all scriptural injunction
and scriptural doctrine equally purportless. Moreover
bondage, which is due to wrong knowledge, cannot be
dissolved but through perfect knowledge. Hence, although
Brahman is the causal substance of those elements, they
are at the time of death—as in the case of deep sleep and
a pralaya of the world—merged in it only in such a way
as to continue to exist in a seminal condition.
9. And (heat is) subtle in measure ; as this is thus
observed.
The elementary matter of heat and the other elements
B b 2
372
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
which form the substratum for the soul when passing out
of this body, must be subtle in its nature and extent. This
follows from the scriptural passages, which declare that it
passes out by the veins and so on. Their thinness renders
them capable of passing out, and their transparency (per¬
meability) is the cause of their not being stopped by any
gross substance. For these reasons they, when passing out
of the body, are not perceived by bystanders.
10. For this reason (it is) not (destroyed) by the
destruction (of the gross body).
On account of this very subtlety the subtle body is not
destroyed by what destroys the gross body, viz. burning
and the like.
11. And to that same (subtle body) that warmth
(belongs), on account of the proof (which observation
furnishes).
To that same subtle body belongs the warmth which we
perceive in the living body by means of touch. That
warmth is not felt in the body after death, while such
qualities as form, colour and so on continue to be perceived;
it is. on the other hand, observed as long as there is life.
From this it follows that the warmth resides in something
different from the body as ordinarily known. Scripture
also says, ‘ He is warm if going to live, cold if going
to die.’
12. Should you say that on account of the denial
(made by scripture) (the soul of him who knows
Brahman does not depart); we deny this, (because
scripture means to say that the pra/zas do not
depart) from the embodied soul.
From the distinction conveyed by the clause, ‘ and
(relative) immortality without having burned ’ (Sutra 7), it
follows that in the case of absolute immortality being
reached there is no going and no departure of the soul
from the body.—The idea that for some reason or other
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 3.
373
a departure of the soul might take place in this latter case
also, is precluded by the following scriptural passage, c But
as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed
from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self
only, of him the vital spirits do not depart,—being Brahman,
he goes to Brahman ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 6). From this
express denial—forming part of the higher knowledge—it
follows that the pranas do not pass out of the body of him
who knows Brahman.
This conclusion the purvapakshin denies. For, he says,
the passage quoted does not deny the departure of the
pranas from the body, but from the embodied (individual)
soul.—How is this known?—From the fact that in another
Sakha we have (not the sixth, genitive, case ‘ of him/ but)
the fifth, ablative, case ‘ from him 5 —‘From him the vital
spirits do not depart ’ (Madhyandina Sakha). For the
sixth case which expresses only relation in general is
determined towards some special relation by the fifth case
met with in another Sakha. And as the embodied soul
which has a claim on exaltation and bliss is the chief topic
of the chapter, we construe the words ‘ from him ’ to mean
not the body but the embodied soul. The sense therefore
is ‘ from that soul when about to depart the pranas do not
depart, but remain with it.’ The soul of him who dies
therefore passes out of the body, together with the pranas.
This view the next Sutra refutes.
13. For (in the text) of some (the denial of the
soul’s departure) is clear.
The assertion that also the soul of him who knows
Brahman departs from the body, because the denial states
the soul (not the body) to be the point of departure, cannot
be upheld. For we observe that in the sacred text of some
there is a clear denial of a departure, the starting-point of
which is the body.—The text meant at first records the
question asked by Artabhaga, £ When this man dies, do
the vital spirits depart from him or not ? ’ then embraces
the alternative of non-departure, in the words, No, replied
Ya^avalkya ; thereupon—anticipating the objection that
374
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
a man cannot be dead as long as his vital spirits have not
departed—teaches the resolution of the pranas in the body
£ in that very same place they are merged ; 5 and finally, in
confirmation thereof, remarks, ‘ he swells, he is inflated,
inflated the dead man lies/ This last clause states that
swelling, &c., affect the subject under discussion, viz. that
from which the departure takes place (the £ tasm&t 5 of the
former clause), which subject is, in this last clause, referred
to by means of the word ‘ He/ Now swelling and so on
can belong to the body only, not to the embodied soul.
And owing to its equality thereto 1 also the passages, c from
him the vital spirits do not depart; 5 ‘in that very same
place they are resolved, 5 have to be taken as denying
a departure starting from the body, although the chief
subject of the passage is the embodied soul. This may be
done by the embodied soul and the body being viewed as
non-dififerent 2 . In this way we have to explain the passage
if read with the fifth case.—If again the passage is read
with the sixth case (‘of him the vital spirits do not depart 5 ),
it must be understood as denying the departure of him who
knows, as its purport manifestly is to deny a departure
established elsewhere. But what it denies can only be
a departure from the body ; for what is established (viz.
for ordinary men not possessing the highest knowledge) is
only the departure (of the soul, &c.) from the body, not the
departure (of the pranas, &c.) from the embodied soul.—
Moreover, after the passage, ‘ Either through the eye or
through the skull or through other places of the body, him
thus departing the pr&;za departs after, and after the de¬
parting pra^a all pranas depart, 5 &c., has at length described
the departure and transmigration of the soul as belonging
to him who does not know, and after the account of him
1 I. e. its belonging to the same chapter and treating of the same
subject.
2 The two being viewed as non-different, the pronoun (tasmat),
which properly denotes the soul, the person, may be used to denote
the body.—AbhedopaMre/za dehadehinor dehiparamarfina sarva-
namna deha eva paramrzsh/a iti. Bha.
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 14.
375
who does not know has been concluded with the words,
‘ So much for the man who has desires, 5 the text designates
him who knows as £ he who has no desires ;’ a designation
which would be altogether inappropriate if the text wanted
to establish departure, &c., for that person also. The
passage therefore has to be explained as denying of him
who knows the going and departing which are established
for him who does not know. For thus only the designation
employed by the text has a sense.—And for him who
knowing Brahman has become the Self of that omnipresent
Brahman, and in whom all desires and works have become
extinct, departing and going are not even possible, as
there is not any occasion for them. And such texts as
‘there he reaches Brahman 5 (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 7) indicate the
absence of all going and departing.
14. And Smnti also says that.
In the Mah&bharata also it is said that those who know
do not go or depart, ‘ He who has become the Self of all
beings and has a complete intuition of all, at his way the
gods themselves are perplexed, seeking for the path of him
who has no path.’—But, an objection is raised, other
passages speak of men knowing Brahman as going, so e.g.
‘ Suka the son of Vyasa being desirous of release travelled
to the sphere of the sun ; being called by his father who
had followed him, he gave an answering shout.’—That
passage, we reply, describes (not the effects of the highest
knowledge but only) how an embodied person, through the
power of Yoga (which is of the nature of the lower know¬
ledge), reached some special place and freed himself from the
body. This appears from it being mentioned that he was
seen by all beings ; for the beings could not see a person
moving without a body. The conclusion of the story
makes all this clear, ‘ .Suka having moved through the
air more rapidly than wind, and having shown his power,
was known by all beings.’—It thus follows that he who
knows Brahman neither moves nor departs. To what
sphere the scriptural texts about going and so on refer we
shall explain later on.
376
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
15. Those (elements, &c.) (are merged) in the
highest Brahman; for thus (scripture) says.
Those, i. e. the sense organs—denoted by the term ‘ prazza 5
—and the elements of him who knows the highest Brahman,
are merged in that same highest Brahman.—Why ?—
Because scripture declares that ‘ Thus these sixteen parts
of the spectator that go towards the person, when they
have reached the person, sink into him 5 (Pr. Up. VI, 5).—
But another text which refers to him who knows teaches
that the parts also are merged in something different from
the highest Self, ‘ The fifteen parts enter into their elements ’
(Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 7).—No, we reply. This latter passage is
concerned with the ordinary view of the matter, according
to which the parts of the body which consist of earth and
so on are merged in their causal substances, earth and so
on. The former passage, on the other hand, expresses the
view of him who knows ; according to which the whole
aggregate of the parts of him who knows the highest
Brahman is merged in Brahman only.—There is thus no
contradiction.
16. (There is absolute) non-division (from Brah¬
man, of the parts merged in it); according to
scriptural declaration.
When the parts of him who knows are merged in
Brahman, is there a remainder (which is not so merged),
as in the case of other men ; or is there no such remainder?
As the merging of him also who knows falls under the
general heading of merging, it might be assumed that of
him also there remains a potential body, and the Sutra-
kara therefore teaches expressly that the elements, &c., of
him who knows enter into the relation of (absolute) non¬
division from Brahman.—On what ground ?—Because
scripture declares this. For after having taught the
dissolution of the parts, the text continues, 4 Their name
and form are broken, and people speak of the person only;
and he becomes without parts and immortal 5 (Pr. Up. VI,
5). And when parts that are due to nescience are dissolved
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 7 . 377
through knowledge it is not possible that a remainder
should be left. The parts therefore enter into absolute
non-division from Brahman.
17. (There takes place) a lighting up of the point
of its (the soul’s) abode (viz. the heart) ; the door
(of its egress) being illuminated thereby; owing to
the power of knowledge and the application of
meditation to the way which is part of that (know¬
ledge) ; (the soul) favoured by him in the heart
(viz. Brahman) (passes upwards) by the one that
exceeds a hundred (i. e. by the hundred and first
vein).
Having absolved the inquiry into a point of the higher
knowledge into which we were led by a special occasion,
we now continue the discussion connected with the lower
knowledge.— It has been stated that up to the beginning
of the way the departure of him who knows and him who
does not know is the same. The present Sutra now
describes the soul’s entering on the way. The abode of
the soul, when—having taken within itself speech and the
other powers—it is about to depart, is the heart, according
to the text, ‘ He taking with him those elements of light
descends into the heart’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 1). Of the heart
the point becomes lighted up, and subsequent to that is
the departure of the soul, starting from the eye or some
other place, according to the passage, ‘ The point of his
heart becomes lighted up, and by that light the Self
departs, either through the eye or through the skull or
through other places of the body’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 2).
The question here arises whether that departure is the
same for him who knows and him who does not know, or
if there is a special limitation in the case of the former;
and the prima facie view might be upheld that there is
no such limitation since scripture records no difference.
Against this the teacher states that although, equally for
him who does know and him who does not know, the point
of the heart becomes shining and the door of egress thereby
37§
vedanta-sOtras.
is lighted up, yet he who knows departs through the skull
only, while the others depart from other places.—Why so ?
-— 4 On account of the power of knowledge.’ If also he who
knows departed, like all others, from any place of the body,
he would be unable to reach an exalted sphere ; and then
all knowledge would be purportless. 4 And on account of
the application of meditation on the way forming a part of
that.’ That means : in different vidyas there is enjoined
meditation on the soul’s travelling on the way connected
with the vein that passes through the skull ;—which way
forms a part of those vidyas. Now it is proper to conclude
that he who meditates on that way should after death
proceed on it 1 . Hence he who knows, being favoured by
Brahman abiding in the heart on which he had meditated,
and thus becoming like it in nature departs by the vein
which passes through the skull and 4 exceeds the hundred,’
i. e. is the hundred and first. The souls of other men pass
out by other veins. For thus scripture says, in a chapter
treating of the knowledge of Brahman dwelling in the
heart, 4 There are a hundred and one veins of the heart;
one of them penetrates the crown of the head ; by that
moving upwards a man reaches immortality ; the others
serve for departing in different directions ’ (Kh. Up. VIII,
6 , 5 )-
18. (The soul after having passed forth from the
body) follows the rays.
There is the vidya of him within the heart, which begins,
4 There is this city of Brahman and in it the palace, the
small lotus, and in it that small ether 9 ( Kh . Up. VIII, i, i).
A subsequent section of that chapter—beginning with the
words, 4 Now these veins of the heart ’—describes at length
the connexion of the veins and the rays, and the text then
continues, 4 When he departs from this body, he departs
upwards by those very rays,’ and further on, 4 By that
1 For otherwise the meditation enjoined would be 4 adrfsh/artha ’
only; an alternative not to be admitted anywhere as long as a
4 seen 7 purpose can be demonstrated.
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 19.
379
moving upwards he reaches immortality. 5 From this we
understand that the soul passing out by the hundred and
first vein follows the rays.—A doubt here arises as to
whether the soul of him who dies by night as well as of
him who dies by day follows the rays, or the soul of the
latter only/—Since scripture mentions no difference, the
Sutra teaches that the souls follow the rays in both cases.
19. (Should it be said that the soul does) not
(follow the rays) by night; (we reply) not so,
because the connexion (of veins and rays) exists
as long as the body; and (scripture) also declares
this.
It might perhaps be said that the veins and rays are
connected during the day, so that the soul of a person who
dies during the day may follow those rays ; but not the soul
of one who dies by night when the connexion of the veins
and rays is broken.—But this is a mistaken assumption,
because the connexion of rays and veins lasts as long as
the body exists. This scripture also declares, ‘ They (the
rays) stretch out from yonder sun and slip into these veins;
they stretch from these veins and slip into yonder sun ’
(Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 2). We moreover observe that the rays
of the sun continue to exist in the nights of the summer
season ; for we feel their warmth and other effects. During
the nights of the other seasons they are difficult to perceive
because then few only continue to exist; just as during
the cloudy days of the cold season.—This the following
scriptural passage also shows, 4 Day he makes in the night/
—If, moreover, he who dies at night mounted upwards
without following the rays, the following of the rays would
be generally meaningless. For the text gives no special
direction to the effect that he who dies by day mounts
upwards by means of the rays, while he who dies by night
mounts without them.—Should, on the other hand, even
he who knows be prevented from mounting upwards, by
the mere mischance of dying by night, knowledge would
in that case produce its fruit eventually only, and the
consequence would be that—as the time of death is not
380
VEDANTA-S<JTRAS.
fixed—nobody would apply himself to knowledge.—If,
again, a man dying at night should wait for the dawn (to
mount upwards), it might happen that, owing to the action
of the funeral fire, &c., his body would, at the time of
daybreak, not be capable of entering into connexion with
the rays. Scripture moreover expressly says that he does
not wait, ‘ As quickly as he sends off the mind he goes to
the sun ’ ( Kh . Up. VIII, 6, 5).—For all these reasons the
soul follows the rays by night as well as by day.
20. And for the same reason (the departed soul
follows the rays) also during the southern progress
of the sun.
For the same reason, viz. because waiting is impossible,
and because the fruit of knowledge is not a merely eventual
one, and because the time of death is not fixed, also that
possessor of true knowledge who dies during the southern
progress of the sun obtains the fruit of his knowledge.
Because dying during the northern progress of the sun is
more excellent, and because Bhishma is known to have
waited for that period, and because scripture says, ‘ From
the light half of the month (they go) to the six months
when the sun goes to the north,’ it might be thought that
the northern progress of the sun is needful for dying.
This notion the Sutra refutes. The greater excellence of
the sun’s northern progress applies to those only who do
not possess the highest knowledge.—Bhishma’s waiting for
the sun’s northern progress was due to his wish of upholding
good customs and of showing that by the favour of his
father he could choose the time of his death.—And the
sense of the scriptural passage quoted will be explained
under IV, 3, 4.—But we have the following Smrzti-text,
‘At what times the Yogins depart either not to return or
to return, those times I will declare to thee’ (Bha. Gita VIII,
23), which determines specially that to die by day and so
on causes the soul not to return. How then can he who
dies by night or during the sun’s southern progress depart
not to return ? Concerning this point the next Sutra
remarks :
IV ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2 1. 38 1
21. (These details) are recorded by Smrzti with
reference to the Yogins; and both (Sankhya and
Yoga) are Smnti (only).
The rules as to dying by day and so on in order not to
return are given by Smrzti for the Yogins only. And
those two, viz. Yoga and Sankhya are mere Smrzti, not of
scriptural character. As thus it has a different sphere of
application and is based on a special kind of authority, the
Smr/ti rule as to the time of dying has no influence on
knowledge based on scripture.—But, an objection is raised,
we have such passages as the following one, ‘ Fire,
light, the day, the light half of the month, the six months
of the northern progress; smoke, night, the dark half of
the month, the six months of the southern progress ’ (Bha.
Gita VIII, 24; 25); in which though belonging to Smrzti
we recognise the path of the gods and the path of the
fathers just as determined by scripture!—Our refutation,
we reply, of the claims of Smrzti applies only to the
contradiction which may arise from the teaching of Smrzti
regarding the legitimate time of dying. ‘ I will tell you the
time,’ &c. In so far as Smrz'ti also mentions Agni and the
other divinities which lead on the departed soul, there is no
contradiction whatever.
382
VEDANTA-sflTRAS.
THIRD PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
1. On the road beginning with light (the departed
soul proceeds), on account of that being widely
known.
It has been explained that up to the beginning of the
way, the departure is the same. About the way itself,
however, different texts make different declarations. One
passage describes it as constituted by the junction of the
veins and rays, ‘Then he mounts upwards by just those rays’
( Kh . Up. VIII, 6, 5). Another passage describes it as
beginning with light, ‘ They go to the light, from light to
day 5 ( Kh . Up. V, 10, 1). Another way is described, Kau.
Up. I, 3, ‘Having reached the path of the gods, he comes to
the world of Agni.’ Another, Bri. Up. V, 10, 1, 4 When
the person goes away from this world, he comes to the
wind.’ Another again, Mu. Up. I, 2, 11, ‘Free from passions
they depart through the gate of the sun.’ A doubt here
arises whether these ways are different from each other,
or whether there is only one road of which the different
texts mention different particulars.—The purvapakshin
embraces the former alternative, for the reason that those
roads are referred to in different chapters and form parts
of different meditations. If, moreover, we regarded the
statements about light and so on, the emphatical assertion 1
made in the first of the passages quoted above would be
contradicted ; and the statement about the quickness of
mounting, ‘ As quickly as he sends off the mind he goes
to the sun,’ would also be interfered with. We therefore
conclude that the roads described are different roads.
To this we reply, ‘On the road beginning with light;’
1 The emphasis lies in the word 4 eva,’ i.e. ‘ just 5 or ‘ only/
which seems to exclude any stages of the way but those rays.
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, I.
383
i.e. we maintain that every one who desires to reach
Brahman moves on the road beginning with light.—Why
so?— c On account of its being widely known.’ That road
is known to all who possess knowledge. Thus the chapter
of the vidya of the five fires (‘ And those also who in the
forest meditate on the True as faith/ &c., Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15)
expressly states that the road beginning with the light
belongs to those also who practise other meditations.—
That road, an objection is raised, may present itself to the
mind in the case of those meditations which do not mention
any road of their own; but why should it be accepted for
such meditations as mention different roads of their own ?
—This objection would be valid, we reply, if the various
roads mentioned were entirely different; but as a matter
of fact there is only one road leading to the world of
Brahman and possessing different attributes ; and this road
is designated in one place by one attribute and in another
place by another attribute. For this relation of attributes
and what possesses attributes is established by the circum¬
stance that we recognise, in all the passages quoted, some
part of the road 1 . And if the chapters which mention the
roads are different, we, as long as the meditation is one,
have to combine the different attributes of the road (men¬
tioned separately in the different chapters), in the same way
as (in general) the different particulars of one meditation
(which are stated in different chapters) have to be combined.
And even if the meditations (in which the particulars of the
road are mentioned) are different, the road must be viewed
as one and the same, because we recognise everywhere
some part of the road and because the goal is everywhere
the same. For all the following passages declare one and
the same result, viz. the obtainment of the world of Brahman:
‘ In these worlds of Brahman they dwell for ever and ever ’
(Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15); ‘There he dwells eternal years’ (Bri.
1 Each passage mentions at least one of the stages of the road
leading to the world of Brahman, and we thus conclude that the
same road—of which the stations are the attributes—is meant
everywhere.
384
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
Up. V, 10, 1); ‘Whatever victory, whatever greatness
belongs to Brahman, that victory he gives, that greatness
he reaches ’ (Kail. Up. I, 2); ‘ Those who find the world of
Brahman by Brahma^arya’ ( Kh . Up. VIII, 4, 3).—To the
remark that the emphatical assertion (made in the passage,
‘Just by those rays,’ &c.) would be contradicted by our
admitting light and so on as stages of the road, we reply
that no such difficulty exists, because that passage aims
only at establishing the rays (as part of the road). For the
one word ‘just’ cannot at the same time establish the rays
and discard light and so on. The passage therefore must
be understood as only emphasising the connexion with the
rays.—Nor does the regard paid by us to the statements
about light and so on being stages of the way contradict
what one passage says about speed ; for that passage means
to say that one goes (to the world of Brahman) more
quickly than anywhere else, so that its sense is, ‘ In the
twinkling of an eye one goes there 1 .’—Moreover the passage,
‘On neither of these two ways’ ( Kh . Up. V, 10, 8)—in
teaching that there is a third inferior road for those who have
missed the other two roads—shows that besides the road of
the fathers there is only one further road, viz. the road of the
gods, of which light and so on are stages. The text about
light and so on mentioning a greater number of stages
while other texts mention a smaller number, it stands to
reason that the less numerous should be explained in
conformity with the more numerous. For this reason also
the Sutra says, ‘ On the road beginning with light, on account
of its being widely known.’
2. From the year to Vayu; on account of the
absence and presence of specification.
But by what special combination can we establish between
1 Read in the text—tvarava^anaw tv ar&radyapekshayam api
gantavyantarapekshaya kshaipryartha 0 .—Anandagiri comments —
tvareti, ar/dradimargasyaikye^pi kuta^id anyato gantavyad aneno-
payena satyalokazrc g&t iti ga^Mantiti gantavyabhedapekshaya
va^ana m yuktam ity artha^.
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 2.
385
the different attributes of the road the relation of what is
determined by attributes and of determining attributes ? The
teacher out of kindness to us connects them as follows.—
The Kaushitakins describe the road of the gods as follows,
£ Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the
world of Agni, to the world of Vayu, to the world of
Varu/za, to the world of Indra, to the world of Pra^cLpati,
to the world of Brahman’ (Kau. Up. I, 3). Now the world
of Agni means the same as light, since both terms denote
burning, and we therefore need not, with regard to them,
search for the order in which they are to be combined.
Vayu, on the other hand, is not mentioned in the road
beginning with light; in what place then is he to be
inserted?—We read, Kh . Up. V, 10, 1, 4 They go to the
light, from light to day, from day to the waxing half of
the moon, from the waxing half of the moon to the six
months when the sun goes to the north, from those months
to the year, from the year to Aditya.’ Here they reach
Vayu after the year and before Aditya.—Why so ?— 4 On
account of the absence and presence of specification.’ About
Vayu—concerning whom the passage, 4 He goes to the
world of Vayu,’ contains no specification—another passage
does state such a specification, viz. B ri. Up. V, 10, 1, 4 When
the person goes away from this world he comes to Vayu.
Then Vayu makes room for him like the hole of a wheel,
and through it he mounts higher, he comes to Aditya.’
On account of this specification which shows Vayu to come
before Aditya, Vayu must be inserted between the year
and Aditya.—But as there is a specification showing that
Vayu comes after Agni, why is he not inserted after the
light?—There is no such specification, we reply.—But
a scriptural passage has been quoted which runs as follows,
4 Having reached the path of the gods he comes to the
world of Agni, to the world of Vayu.’—In that passage,
we reply, we have only two clauses, of which the text
exhibits one before the other, but there is no word express¬
ing order of succession. We have there only a simple
statement of facts, 4 He goes to this and to that.’ But in
the other text we perceive a regular order of succession;
[38] c c
386
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
for it intimates that after having mounted on high through
an opening as large as the wheel of a chariot, granted by
Vayu, he approaches the sun. The Sutra therefore rightly
says, ‘ On account of the absence and presence of specifica¬
tion.’—The Vd^asaneyins in their text record that he
proceeds 4 from the months to the world of the gods, from
the world of the gods to the sun’ (B ri. Up. VI, 2, 15).
Here, in order to maintain the immediate succession of
Vayu and Aditya, we must suppose the souls to go from
the world of the gods to Vayu. What the Sutra says
about the soul going to Vayu from the year has reference
to the text of the ATMndogya. As between the Va^asane-
yaka and the Khk ndogya, the world of the gods is absent
from one, the year from the other. As both texts are
authoritative, both stages have to be inserted in each, and
the distinction has to be made that, owing to its connexion
with the months, the year has the first place (i.e. after the
months and before the world of the gods), and the world of
the gods the second place.
3. Beyond lightning (there is) Varima, on account
of the connexion (of the two).
The jVMndogya continues, 4 From Aditya to the moon,
from the moon to lightning.’ Here Varu/^a (mentioned in
the Kaushitaki-upan.) has to be brought in so that above
that lightning he goes to the world of Varu7/a. For there
is a connexion between lightning and Varu;/a; the broad
lightnings dance forth from the womb of the clouds with the
sound of deep thunder, and then water falls down. And
a Brahma^a also says, 4 It lightens, it thunders, it will rain’
( Kh . Up. VII, 11, 1). But the lord of all water is Vanma,
as known from vSruti and Smr/ti.—And above Varu/za
there come Indra and Pra^apati, as there is no other place
for them, and according to the force of the text, as it stands.
Varu^a and so on should be inserted at the end, for that
reason also that they are merely additional, no particular
place being assigned to them. And lightning is the end of
the road beginning with light h
So that Varu/za and so on are to be placed after lightning.
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 4.
387
4. (They are) conductors, this being indicated.
With regard to those beginning with light a doubt arises
whether they are marks of the road, or places of enjoyment,
or leaders of the travelling souls.—The first possible view
of the question is that light and so on are marks of the
road, because the instruction has that character. For as in
ordinary life a man wishing to go to a village or a town is
told, ‘ Go from here to that hill, from there to a fig-tree,
from that to a river, from that to a village ; after that you
will reach the town;’ so here the text also says, ‘from light
to day, from day to the waxing half of the month/ &c.—
Or else light and so on may be viewed as places of enjoy¬
ment. For the text connects Agni and so on with the
word ‘world’; ‘ He comes to the world of Agni/ &c. Now
the term ‘world ’ is used to denote places of enjoyment of
living beings, as when we say, ‘ The world of men ; the
world of the Fathers ; the world of the gods.’ A Brahma/za
passage also says, ‘ They remain attached to the worlds
which consist of day and night 5 (Nat. Bra. X, 2, 6, 8).
Therefore light and the rest are not conductors. Moreover,
they cannot be conductors because they are without intelli¬
gence. For in ordinary life intelligent men only are
appointed by the king to conduct travellers over difficult
roads.
To all this we reply as follows. They must be con¬
ductors, because the text indicates this. For we read,
‘ From the moon to the lightning ; there a person that is
not a man leads them to Brahman ; ’ which shows their
conductorship to be something settled. Should it be
objected that this last sentence exhausts itself in conveying
its own purport 1 ; we say No ; for the attribute (‘that is
not a man ’) has only the meaning of excluding his
previously established humanity. Only if in the case of
the light and the rest personal conductors are settled, and
those of human nature, it is appropriate to use the attribute
1 And has not the additional power of indicating, i. e. enabling
us to infer that also the beings previously mentioned are ‘ leaders ’
of the soul.
C C 2
3 88
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
‘ amanava/ to the end of excluding this (previously estab¬
lished) humanity 1 .
But mere indication has no force, as there is nothing
to prove (that there must be such personal conductors).—
To this objection the next Sutra replies.
5. (There are personal conductors) because that
is established on the ground of both (i. e. road and
travellers) being bewildered (i. e. unconscious).
As, owing to their separation from a body, the organs of
those who go on the road beginning with light are wrapped
up, they are incapable of ruling themselves ; and the light
&c., as they are without intelligence, are equally incapable.
Hence it follows that the particular intelligent deities who
represent light and the rest are appointed to the conductor-
ship. For in ordinary life also drunken or senseless people
whose sense-organs are wrapped up follow a road as com¬
manded by others.—Again light and the rest cannot be
taken for marks of the road because they are not always
present. A man who dies in the night cannot come to day
in its true (physical) nature ; and he cannot wait (for the
break of day), as we have already explained above (IV, 2,
19). But this objection does not apply to gods who are
permanent. And gods may be called light and so on,
because they represent light and so on. Nor is the ex¬
pression, ‘ From light to day/ &c. objectionable, even if we
adopt the sense of conductorship ; for it means, through
the light as cause they come to the day ; through the day
as cause, to the waxing half of the moon. And such
instruction is seen also in the case of conductors known in
ordinary life, for they say, Go hence to Balavarman, thence
(i. e. Balavarman conducting you) to Cayasiraha, thence to
1 Why should it be specially stated that this last ‘ conducting
person ’ is amanava ? Only, because it is a settled matter that the
previously mentioned beings are also ‘ conducting persons,’ and at
the same time ‘manava/ The last clause therefore does not only
directly teach that a person conducts the souls to Brahman, but at
the same time ‘ indicates ’ that the beings mentioned before in
connexion with the road are also ‘ personal conductors/
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7.
389
Krzsh;/agupta. Moreover, in the beginning where the text
says that they go to the light, a relation in general only
is expressed, not a special relation ; at the end, however,
where it is said he leads them to Brahman, a special
relation is expressed, viz. that between conducted and
conductor. Therefore this is accepted for the beginning
also.—And as the organs of the wandering souls are wrapped
up together there is no possibility of their enjoying any¬
thing. Although, however, the wanderers do not enjoy
anything, the word ‘world’ may be explained on the
ground that those worlds are places of enjoyment for other
beings dwelling there.—The conclusion therefore is that
he who has reached the world of Agni is led on by Agni.
and he who has reached the world ruled by Vayu, by Vayu.
But how, if we adopt the view of conductorship, can this
apply to Varu/za and the rest? Varu/za and the rest were
inserted above the lightning; but scripture states that
after the lightning until Brahman is reached a person leads
who is not a man.—To this doubt the next Sutra replies.
6. From thence (the souls are led) by him only
who belongs to the lightning ; the sacred text
stating that.
From thence, i. e. after they have come to the lightning
they go to the world of Brahman, being led through the
worlds of Varu//a and the rest by the person, not a man,
who follows immediately after the lightning. For that
that person leads them is stated in the following passage,
4 When they have reached the place of lightning a person,
not a man, leads them to the world of Brahman’ (B ri.
Up. VI, 2, 15). Varu;za and the rest, we must understand,
favour them either by not hindering or somehow assisting
them.—Therefore it is well said that light and so on are
the gods who act as conductors.
7. To the effected (Brahman) (the souls are led) ;
(thus opines) Badari ; because going to him is
possible.
With regard to the passage, ‘He leads them to Brahman,’
390
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
the doubt arises whether that person leads the souls to the
effected, lower, Brahman, or to the highest, non-modified,
chief Brahman.—Whence the doubt ?—Because the (am¬
biguous) word Brahman is used, and because scripture
speaks of going.—The opinion of the teacher Badari is that
the person, who is not a man, leads them to the lower,
qualified, effected Brahman ; because it is possible to go to
that. For the effected Brahman which occupies a definite
place can be the goal of a journey. With the highest
Brahman, on the other hand, we cannot connect the ideas
of one who goes, or object of going, or act of going ; for
that Brahman is present everywhere and is the inner Self
of all.
8. And on account of (the Brahman to which the
souls are led) being qualified (in another passage).
That the soul’s going has for its object the effected
Brahman, we conclude from another scriptural passage
also which qualifies Brahman in a certain way, 4 He leads
them to the worlds of Brahman; in these worlds of Brahman
they live for ever and ever’ (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15). For it
would be impossible to qualify the highest Brahman by
means of the plural number ( 4 worlds ’); while the plural
number may be applied to the lower Brahman which may
abide in different conditions.—The term 4 world ’ also can
directly denote only some place of enjoyment falling
within the sphere of effects and possessing the quality of
being entered into, while it must be understood in a meta¬
phorical sense in passages 1 such as 4 Brahman is that
world 5 (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23).—And also what the text
says concerning an abode and some one abiding within
it (‘in these worlds of Brahman,’ &c.), cannot be directly
understood of the highest Brahman.—For all these reasons
the leading of the souls has the lower Brahman for
its goal.
But even on this interpretation the word 4 Brahman 5 is
inappropriate, as it has been proved that Brahman is the
Where the term 4 world ’ is applied to the highest Brahman.
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, IO.
391
cause of the origination and so on of the entire world.—
To this objection the next Sutra replies.
9. But on account of its proximity (to the higher
Brahman) there is designation (of the lower Brahman)
as that.
The word ‘but 5 indicates the setting aside of the doubt.—
As the lower Brahman is in proximity to the higher one,
there is nothing unreasonable in the word ‘ Brahman 5 being
applied to the former also. For when the higher Brahman
is. for the purposes of pious meditation, described as
possessing certain effected qualities—such as consisting of
mind and the rest—which qualities depend on its connexion
with certain pure limiting adjuncts ; then it is what we call
the lower Brahman.—But with the assumption of the lower
Brahman there does not agree what scripture says about
the souls not returning ; for there is no permanence any¬
where apart from the highest Brahman. And scripture
declares that those who have set out on the road of the
gods do not return, ‘ They who proceed on that path do not
return to the life of man 5 (Kh . Up. IV, 15, 6 ); c For them
there is no return here 5 (B ru Up. VI, 2, 15) ; ‘ Moving
upwards by that a man reaches immortality 5 (. Kh . Up.
VIII, 6, 5).
To this objection we make the following reply.
10. On the passing away of the effected (world of
Brahman) (the souls go) together with the ruler of
that (world) to what is higher than that; on account
of scriptural declaration.
When the reabsorption of the effected Brahman world
draws near, the souls in which meanwhile perfect knowledge
has sprung up proceed, together with Hira^yagarbha the
ruler of that world, to 4 what is higher than that/ i.e. to the
pure highest place of Vishnu. This is the release by
successive steps which we have to accept on the basis of
the scriptural declarations about the non-return of the
souls. For we have shown that the Highest cannot be
directly reached by the act of going.
39 2
vedanta-sOtras.
i i. And on account of Smrzti.
Smrzti also agrees with this view; cp. the following
passage, 4 When the pralaya has come and the end of the
highest (i. e. Hira/zyagarbha), then they all, together with
Brahman, with purified minds enter the highest place.’—
The final conclusion (siddhanta) therefore is that the going
of the souls, of which scripture speaks, has for its goal the
effected Brahman.—But what is the prima facie view, with
regard to which this final conclusion has been established
in Sutras 7-11 ?— This required prima facie view is now set
forth in the following Sutras.
12. To the highest (Brahman) (the souls are led) ;
(Taimini (opines); owing to this being the principal
sense (of the word ‘ Brahman ’).
The teacher Uaimini is of opinion that the passage,
4 He leads them to Brahman/ refers to the highest
Brahman. For the highest Brahman constitutes the prin¬
cipal, primary sense, of the word 4 Brahman/ which denotes
the lower Brahman only in a secondary, metaphorical way.
And where both senses are possible, the primary sense has
to be preferred.
13. And because scripture declares that.
The text, 4 Going upwards by that he reaches immortality/
declares that immortality is reached by going. But im¬
mortality is possible only in the highest Brahman, not in
the effected one, because the latter is transitory. So
scripture says, 4 Where one sees something else, that is
little, that is mortal’ ( Kh . Up. VII, 24, 1). According to
the text of the Ka/^a-upanishad also the going of the soul
is towards the highest Brahman ; for after the highest
Brahman has been introduced there as general subject-
matter—in the passage, 4 That which thou seest/ &c., I, 2,
14, no other kind of knowledge is taken up later on.
14. And the intention of entering (can) not (be
referred) to the effected (Brahman).
Moreover the intention of entering into which is expressed
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4.
393
in the passage, 4 I enter the hall of Pra^apati, the house 5
(Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1), cannot have the lower Brahman for
its object. For the immediately preceding passage, 4 That
within which these forms and names are contained is the
Brahman, 5 shows that the highest Brahman, different in
nature from the effected one, is the general subject-matter;
and the subsequent passage, T am the glory of the
Brahmans, 5 represents the soul as the Self of all; it being
known from another scriptural passage that 4 Glory 5 is
a name of the highest Brahman, 4 There is no likeness of
him whose name is great glory 5 (Va^*. Sa;/di. XXXII, 3).
And in the vidya of Brahman within the heart it is said of
this same entering the house that it is preceded by going 1 ,
4 There is the city of Brahman Apara^ita, and the golden
hall built by Prabhu 5 {Kk. Up. VIII, 5, 3). And that
the performing of a journey is intended follows also from
the use of the verb 4 pad, 5 which denotes going (prapadye,
I enter).—The other (prima facie) view therefore is that all
the passages about the soul’s going refer to the highest
Brahman.
These two views have been embodied by the teacher in
the Sutras ; one in the Sutras 7-11, the other in the Sutras
12-14. Now the arguments contained in the former set
are capable of proving the fallaciousness of the arguments
in the latter set, but not vice versa; from which it follows
that the former set states the final view and the latter
set the prima facie view only.—For nobody can compel
us to accept the primary sense of a word (such as Brahman)
even where it is impossible to do so.—And although met
with in a chapter that treats of the highest knowledge, the
reference to the going to Brahman—which belongs to
another kind of knowledge—may be explained as aiming
merely at the glorification of the highest knowledge (not at
teaching that the going to Brahman is the result of higher
1 I am not quite sure which passage in the daharavidyd is
supposed to prove that the entering of Brahman’s house is preceded
by going. Probably VIII, 6, 5, ‘He departs upwards ; he is going
to the sun.’
394
VEDANTA-S^TRAS.
knowledge).—And with reference to the passage, ‘ I enter
the hall of Pra^apati, the house,’ there is no reason why we
should not separate that passage from what precedes and
refer the intention of entering to the effected Brahman.
And the qualified Brahman also may be spoken of as being
the Self of all, as shown by other passages such as ' He
to whom all works, all desires belong,’ &c. ( Kh . Up. Ill,
14, 2). The texts about the going therefore all belong to
the lower knowledge.—Others again, in accordance with
the general principle that the earlier Sutras set forth the
prima facie view, while the later ones contain the siddhanta
view, maintain that the passages about the soul’s going fall
within the sphere of the higher knowledge. But this is
impossible, because nothing may go to the highest Brahman.
* Omnipresent and eternal like the ether; ’ ‘ The Brahman
which is visible, not invisible, the Self that is within all ’
(B ru Up. Ill, 4, 1); ‘Self only is all this’ (Kh. Up. VII,
25, 2) ; 'Brahman only is all this, it is the best’ (Mu. Up.
II, 2, 11): from all these passages we ascertain that the
highest Brahman is present everywhere, within everything,
the Self of everything, and of such a Brahman it is altogether
impossible that it ever should be the goal of going. For
we do not go to what is already reached ; ordinary ex¬
perience rather tells us that a person goes to something
different from him.— But we observe in ordinary experience
also that something already reached may become an object
of going, in so far as qualified by a different place ; a man
living on the earth, e. g. goes to the earth, in so far as he
goes to another place on the earth. In the same way we
see that a child reaches the adult state which in reality
belongs to the child’s identical Self, but is qualified by
a difference of time. Analogously Brahman also may be
an object of going in so far as it is possessed of all kinds
of powers.—This may not be, we reply, because scripture
expressly negatives Brahman’s possessing any distinctive
qualities.—' Without parts, without actions, tranquil, without
fault, without taint* ( 5 vet. Up. VI, 19); 'Neither coarse
nor fine, neither short nor long’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 8, 8); ‘ He
who is without and within, unproduced ’ (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2);
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4 .
395
4 This great, unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal,
fearless, is indeed Brahman’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 25); ‘He is to
be described by No, no!’ (B ri. Up. Ill, 9, 26); from all
these scriptural texts, as well as from Smrz’ti and reasoning,
it follows that the highest Self cannot be assumed to possess
any differences depending on time or space or anything
else, and cannot therefore become the object of going.
The cases of places on the earth and of the different ages
of man are by no means analogous ; for they are affected
by differences of locality and so on, and therefore can be
gone to or reached.—Nor will it avail our opponent to say
that Brahman possesses manifold powers, because scripture
declares it to be the cause of the world’s origination,
sustentation, and final retractation ; for those passages
which deny difference have no other sense (but just the
absolute denial of all difference).—But in the same way
also those passages which state the origination and so on
of the world have no other sense! (i.e. cannot be under¬
stood to teach anything but just the origination and so on
of the world).—This is not so, we reply; for what they
aim at teaching is the absolute oneness of Brahman. For
texts which by means of the simile of the lump of clay,
&c., teach that only that which is, viz. Brahman, is true,
while everything effected is untrue, cannot aim at teaching
the origination, &c. of the world.—But why should the
passages about the origination, &c. of the world be sub¬
ordinate to those which deny all difference, and not vice
versa?—Because, we reply, the texts which negative all
difference effect the cessation of all desire. For when the
absolute oneness, permanence, and purity of the Self have
once been apprehended, we cognize that the highest aim
of man has been attained, and therefore conceive no further
desires. Compare the following texts : ‘ What trouble, what
sorrow can there be to him who beholds that unity ?’ (lya-up.
7); c Thou hast reached fearlessness, O Uanaka ’ (Brz.Up.IV,
2,4); ‘ He who knows does not fear anything; he does not
distress himself with the thought, Why did I not do what is
good ? Why did I do what is bad ? ’ (Taitt. Up. II, 9.) This
also follows from our observing that those who know realise
396
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
contentment of mind; and from the fact that scripture
blames the false notion of (the reality of) effects, ‘From
death to death goes he who sees here any difference ’
(Ka. Up. II, 4, io). The texts negativing all difference
cannot therefore be understood as subordinate to other
texts. Those texts, on the other hand, which speak of the
origination of the world and so on have no similar power
of conveying a sense which effects cessation of all desire.
At the same time it is manifest that they have another
(than their literal) meaning. For the text, after having
said at first, ‘ Of this shoot sprung up know that it cannot
be without a root’ (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 3), declares in the end
that Being which is the root of the world is the only
object of cognition. Similarly Taitt. Up. Ill, 1, ‘ That from
which these beings are born, that by which when born they
live, that into which they enter at their death, seek to know
that; that is Brahman.’ As thus the passages about
origination and so on aim at teaching the unity of the Self,
Brahman cannot be viewed as possessing manifold powers,
and cannot therefore be the object of the action of going.—
And, as already explained under IV, 2, 13, also the text
Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6 (‘ Of him the pranas do not depart ; being
Brahman he goes to Brahman ’), denies any going to the
highest Brahman.
Moreover, on the hypothesis of going, that which goes,
i.e. the individual soul, must be either a part of Brahman to
which it goes, or an effect of Brahman, or different from
Brahman ; for if the two were absolutely identical no going
could take place.—Well, what then?—We reply as follows.
If, in the first place, the soul is a part of Brahman, it cannot
go to it, since the whole is permanently reached by the
part. Besides, the hypothesis of whole and parts cannot
be applied to Brahman, which is acknowledged to be
without parts.—The same objection lies against the hypo¬
thesis of the soul being an effect of Brahman ; for also that
which passes over into an effect is permanently reached by
the effect. A jar made of clay does not exist apart from
the clay which constitutes its Self; were it so apart it
would cease to be. And on both hypotheses, as that to
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4 .
397
which the parts or the effects would belong, i. e. Brahman
is altogether unchanging, its entering into the Sawsara
state could not be accounted for.—Let then, in the third
place, the soul be different from Brahman. In that case
it must be either of atomic size, or infinite, or of some
intervening extent. If it is omnipresent, it cannot go
anywhere. If it is of some middling extent, it cannot be
permanent. If it is of atomic size, the fact of sensation
extending over the whole body cannot be accounted for.
The two hypotheses of atomic and middling extent have
moreover been refuted at length in a former part of this
work (II, 3, 19 ffi). And from the soul’s being different
from the highest Brahman it also would follow that such
texts as ‘ Thou art that’ are futile. This latter objection
also lies against the theories of the soul being a part or an
effect of Brahman. Nor can the difficulty be got over by it
being pleaded that a part and an effect are not different
from the whole and the causal substance; for that kind
of oneness is not oneness in the true literal sense.—From
all those three theories it moreover equally follows that the
soul cannot obtain final release, because its Saws&ra con¬
dition could never come to an end. Or else, if that
condition should come to an end, it would follow that the
very essence of the soul perishes ; for those theories do not
admit that the (imperishable) Brahman constitutes the Self
of the soul.
Here now some come forward with the following con¬
tention. Works of permanent obligation and works to be
performed on special occasions are undertaken to the end
that harm may not spring up ; such works as are due to
special desires, and such as are forbidden, are eschewed, in
order that neither the heavenly world nor hell may be
obtained, and those works whose fruits are to be enjoyed
in the current bodily existence are exhausted by just that
fruition. Hence, as after the death of the present body,
there is no cause for the origination of a new body, that
blessed isolation which consists in the soul’s abiding within
its own nature will accomplish itself for a man acting in
the way described above, even without the cognition of his
398
VEDANTA-StjTRAS.
Self being identical with Brahman’s Self.—All this is
inadmissible, we reply, because there is no proof of it.
For scripture nowhere teaches that he who desires release
should conduct himself in the way described. To say that
because the Sa^sara state depends on works, it will cease
when works are absent, is an altogether arbitrary style of
reasoning. And (whether arbitrary or not) this reasoning
falls to the ground, because the absence of the cause is
something that cannot be ascertained. It may be supposed
that each living being has, in its former states of existence,
accumulated many works which have part of them pleasant,
part of them unpleasant results. As these works are such
as to lead to contrary results, which cannot be enjoyed all
of them at the same time, some works whose opportunity
has come, build up the present state of existence; others
sit inactive waiting for a place, a time, and operative causes
(favourable to them). As these latter works cannot thus
be exhausted in the present state of existence, we cannot
definitely assert, even in the case of a man who conducts
himself as described above, that at the end of his present
bodily existence all cause for a new bodily existence will
be absent. The existence of a remainder of works is,
moreover, established by scriptural and Smrz’ti passages,
such as, ‘Those whose conduct has been good’ ( Kh . Up.
V, io, 7); ‘Then with the remainder.’—But may not,
an objection is raised, those remaining works be wiped
out (even in the present existence) by the performance of
works of permanent obligation and such works as are due
to special occasions?—This may not be, we reply, because
the two sets of works are not of contrary nature. Where
there is contrariety of nature, one thing may be wiped out
by another; but good deeds performed in previous states
of existence, and works of permanent obligation and so on
(performed in the present life), are both of them equally
pure and therefore not of opposite nature. Bad works
indeed, as being of impure nature, are opposed to works
of permanent obligation, &c., and therefore may be extin¬
guished by the latter. But even from this admission it
does not follow that the causes for a new embodied existence
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 4 .
399
are altogether absent; for those causes may be supplied by
good deeds, and we do not know that the evil works have
been extinguished without a remainder. Nor is there
anything to prove that the performance of works of per¬
manent obligation, &c., leads only to the non-origination of
harm, and not at the same time to the origination of new
results (to be extinguished in future states of existence);
for it may happen that such new results spring up collater¬
ally. Thus Apastamba says, c When a mango tree is planted
for the sake of its fruits, it in addition gives shade and
fragrance; thus additional advantages spring from the
performance of religious duty.’—Nor can anybody who has
not reached perfect knowledge promise to refrain altogether,
from birth to death, from all actions either forbidden or
aiming at the fulfilment of special wishes; for we observe
that even the most perfect men commit faults, however
minute. This may be a matter of doubt; all the same it
remains true that the absence of causes for a new existence
cannot be known with certainty.—If, further, the soul’s
unity with Brahman’s Self—which is to be realised through
knowledge—is not acknowledged, the soul whose essential
nature it is to be an agent and enjoyer cannot even desire
the state of blissful isolation ; for a being cannot divorce
itself from its true essence, not any more than fire can cease
to be hot.—But, an objection is raised, what is of disad¬
vantage to the soul is the state of agentship and fruition in
so far as actually produced, not its mere potentiality.
Release of the soul may, therefore, take place if only that
actual condition is avoided while its potentiality remains.
—This also, we reply, is not true; for as long as the
potentiality exists it will inevitably produce the actuality.
—But, our opponent resumes, potentiality alone, without
other co-operative causes, does not produce its effect; as
long therefore as it is alone it cannot, though continuing
to exist, do any harm!—This also, we reply, is not valid ;
for the co-operative causes also are, potentially, permanently
connected (with the acting and enjoying soul). If, therefore,
the soul whose essence is acting and enjoying is not
considered to possess fundamental identity with Brahman
400
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
—an identity to be realised by knowledge—there is not
any chance of its obtaining final release. Scripture, more¬
over (in the passage, 4 There is no other way to go/ SVet. Up.
III, 8), denies that there is any other way to release but
knowledge.—But if the soul is non-different from the highest
Brahman, all practical existence comes to an end, because
then perception and the other means of right knowledge
no longer act!—Not so, we reply. Practical life will hold
its place even then, just as dreamlife holds its place up to
the moment of waking. Scripture, after having said that
perception and the rest are operative in the sphere of those
who have not reached true knowledge (‘ For where there is
duality, as it were, there one sees the other/ &c.; B ri. Up.
IV, 5, 15), goes on to show that those means of knowledge
do not exist for those who possess that knowledge (‘ But
when the whole of him has become the Self, whereby
should he see another/ &c.). As thus for him who knows
the highest Brahman all cognition of something to be gone
to, &c. is sublated, his going cannot in any way be shown to
be possible.
To what sphere then belong the scriptural texts about
the soul’s going?—To the sphere of qualified knowledge,
we reply. Accordingly the soul’s going is mentioned in
the chapter treating of the knowledge of the five fires,
in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Brahman’s
couch, in the chapter treating of the knowledge of Agni
VaLsvanara (Kh. Up. V, 3-10; Kau. Up. I; Kh. Up. V,
11-24). And where the soul’s going is spoken of in
a chapter treating of Brahman—(as e.g. in the passages,
‘He leads them to Brahman/ &c., Kh. Up. IV, 15, 6, in
a chapter treating of Brahman, as shown by ‘ Breath is
Brahman/ &c., IV, 10, 5; and ‘ He departs upward/ &c.,
Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5, in the chapter beginning ‘There is this
city of Brahman/ VIII, 1, 1)—such attributes as ‘vamani/
i.e. Leader of blessings (Kh. Up. IV, 15, 3), and ‘satyakama/
i. e. having true wishes, show that there the qualified Brahman
has to be meditated upon, and to that Brahman the soul
can go. No passage, on the other hand, speaks of the soul’s
going to the highest Brahman; while such going is specially
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 1 4 .
401
denied in the passage, ‘ Of him the pra//as do not depart.’
In passages, again, such as 4 He who knows Brahman obtains
the Highest’ (Taitt. Up. II, 1), we indeed meet with the verb
‘to reach,’ which has the sense of going; but because, as
explained before, the reaching of another place is out of
question, ‘reaching’ there denotes only the obtainment
(realisation) of one’s own nature, in so far as (through true
knowledge) the expanse of names and forms which Nescience
superimposes (on Brahman) is dissolved. Such passages
are to be understood analogously to the text, * Being
Brahman he enters into Brahman’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 6).—
Besides, if the going were understood as connected with
the highest Brahman, it could only subserve the purpose
either of satisfying (the mind of him who knows) or of
reflection. Now, a statement of the soul’s going cannot
produce any satisfaction in him who knows Brahman, since
satisfaction is already fully accomplished through his perfect
condition, bestowed on him by knowledge, of which he is
immediately conscious. Nor, on the other hand, can it be
shown that reflection on the soul’s going in any way
subserves knowledge, which is conscious of eternally perfect
blessedness, and has not for its fruit something to be
accomplished.—For all these reasons the soul’s going falls
within the sphere of the lower knowledge. And only in
consequence of the distinction of the higher and lower
Brahman not being ascertained, statements about the soul’s
going which apply to the lower Brahman are wrongly put
in connexion with the higher Brahman.
But are there really two Brahmans, a higher one and a lower
one?—Certainly there are two! For scripture declares this,
as e.g. in the passage, c O Satyakama, the syllable Om is the
higher and also the lower Brahman ’ (Pr. Up. V, 2).—What
then is the higher Brahman, and what the lower ?—Listen !
Where the texts, negativing all distinctions founded on name,
form, and the like, designate Brahman by such terms as that
which is not coarse and so on, the higher Brahman is spoken
of. Where, again, for the purpose of pious meditation, the
texts teach Brahman as qualified by some distinction
depending on name, form, and so on, using terms such as
[38] D d
402
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
4 He who consists of mind, whose body is pra/za, whose
shape is light’ ( Kh . Up. III. 14, 2), that is the lower Brah¬
man.—But is there not room here for the objection that
this distinction of a higher and a lower Brahman stultifies
the scriptural texts asserting aduality?—Not so, we reply.
That objection is removed by the consideration that name
and form, the adjuncts (of the one real Brahman), are due to
Nescience. Passages such as ‘If he desires the world of
the fathers ’ ( Kh . Up. VIII, 2, 1), which the text exhibits in
proximity to a meditation on the lower Brahman, show that
the fruit of such meditation is lordship over the worlds;
a fruit falling within the sphere of the Sa/z/sara, Nescience
having not as yet been discarded. And as that fruit is
bound to a special locality, there is nothing contradictory
in the soul’s going there in order to reach it. That the soul,
although all-pervading, is viewed as going because it enters
into connexion with the buddhi and the rest of its adjuncts,
just as general space enters into connexion with jars and
the like, we have explained under II, 3, 29.
For all these reasons the view of Badari as set forth in
Sutra 7 is the final one; while Sutra 12, which states
Uaimini’s opinion, merely sets forth another view, to the
end of the illumination of the learner’s understanding. j
15. Those who do not take their stand on symbols
he leads, thus Badaraya^a (opines); there being no
fault in the twofold relation (resulting from this
opinion); and the meditation on that (i. e. Brahman)
(is the reason of this twofold relation).
It is a settled conclusion that all going has reference
to the effected Brahman, not to the highest Brahman.
Another doubt now arises here. Does that person who is
not a man lead to the world of Brahman all those who take
their stand on the effected Brahman, without any difference ;
or only some of them ?
The purvapakshin maintains that all those who possess
knowledge—provided that knowledge be not of the highest
Brahman—go to the world of Brahman. For in Sutra III,
IV ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 6 .
403
3, 31 that going was put in connexion with all the dif¬
ferent vidyas (of the qualified Brahmans), without any
distinction.
To this the Sutrakara replies, ‘Those who do not take
their stand on symbols.’ That means: Excepting those
who take their stand on symbols (i. e. who meditate on
certain things as symbolically representing Brahman), that
person who is not a man leads all others who take their
stand (i. e. who meditate) on the effected Brahman, to the
world of Brahman; this is the opinion of the teacher
Badaraya/za. For in acknowledging in this way a twofold
relation there is no fault; since the argumentation as to
the non-restriction of going (Sutra III, 3, 31) may be under¬
stood as referring to all meditations with the exception of
those on symbols. The words, ‘and the meditation on
that, 5 state the reason for this twofold relation. For he
whose meditation is fixed on Brahman reaches lordship
like that of Brahman, according to the scriptural relation,
* In whatever form they meditate on him, that they
become themselves.’ In the case of symbols, on the
other hand, the meditation is not fixed on Brahman, the
symbol being the chief element in the meditation.—But
scripture says also that persons whose mind is not fixed
on Brahman go to it; so in the knowledge of the five fires,
‘He leads them to Brahman 5 ( Kh . Up. V, 10, 2).—This
may be so where we observe a direct scriptural declaration.
We only mean to say that where there is no such declar¬
ation the general rule is that those only whose purpose is
Brahman go to it, not any others.
16. And scripture declares a difference (in the
case of meditations on symbols).
With reference to the meditations on symbols, such as
name and so on, scripture declares that each following
meditation has a different result from the preceding one,
‘ As far as name reaches he is lord and master ;—speech is
greater than name ;—as far as speech reaches he is lord and
master;—mind is greater than speech ’ (Kh. Up. VII, 1, ff.).
D d 2
404
VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.
Now this distinction of rewards is possible because the
meditations depend on symbols, while there could be no
such distinction if they depended on the one non-dififerent
Brahman.—Hence those who take their stand on symbols
cannot have the same reward as others.
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I. 405
FOURTH PADA.
Reverence to the highest Self !
1. (On the souls) having entered (into die highest
light), there is manifestation (of its own nature); (as
we infer) from the word ‘ own/
‘ Thus does that serene being, having risen out of this
body and entered into the highest light, manifest itself by
its own nature 5 (Kh. Up. VII, 12, 3). Regarding this text
a doubt arises whether the Self 1 manifests itself through
some adventitious distinction—as the Self (of him who
possesses the lower knowledge only) does in the world of
the gods and other abodes of enjoyment—or only through
its own Self.—The purvapakshin maintains that, as in
other places, here also the manifestation takes place
through some adventitious characteristic ; because release
also is a fruit (like other fruits, e. g. svarga), and because
•manifestation’ means as much as origination. If the
manifestation took place only through the Self’s own
nature, it would already appear in the Self’s former states;
for a thing’s own nature is never absent from it. The Self
therefore manifests itself by means of some adventitious
distinction.
To this we make the following reply. It manifests itself
through its Self only, not through any other attribute.—
Why so ?—On account of the word ‘ own ’ in the clause
‘ by its own nature/ For on the other view the qualification
conveyed by ‘ own ’ would be unmeaning.—But may not
the term ‘own’ merely indicate that that form belongs to
that which manifests itself?—Not so, we reply. This is
a point which would not require to be stated. For as in
1 Sazzzprati /£aturthe pade paravidyaphalaikade^o brahmabhava-
virbhava^, saguzzavidyaphalazzz >£a sarvesvaratulyabhogatvam ava-
dharayishyate, tatraparavidyaprapyam uktva paravidyaprapyam aha
sa/zzpadyeti. An. Gi.
406
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
whatever form a thing manifests itself that form necessarily
belongs to it, the qualification ‘ own 5 would be devoid of
purport. It has a meaning, on the other hand, if it denotes
the Self, the sense conveyed then being that the manifesta¬
tion takes place only through the nature of the Self, not
through any other, adventitious, nature.—But, as a thing
cannot be without its own nature, what difference is there
between the Selfs former states and its present state (after
the manifestation)?—To this question the next Sutra
replies.
2. (The Self whose true nature has manifested
itself is) released ; according to the promise (made
by scripture).
That soul, of which the text says that it manifests itself,
is released from its former bondage and abides in its own
pure Self; while previously its Self was stained by the
three states (i. e the state of waking, dreaming, and dream¬
less sleep), according to Kh. Up. VIII, 9-11, ‘ It is blind
—‘it weeps as it were; 5 —‘it goes to utter annihilation. 5
This is the difference.—But how is it known that in its
present condition the soul is released?—‘On account of the
promise, 5 the Sutra says. For after the teacher has
promised to give further instruction about the Self as free
from the imperfections of the three states (‘ I shall explain
him further to you’ Kh. Up. VIII, 11, 3), he introduces
the topic (of the released Self) in the words, ‘ Him being
free from the body neither pleasure nor pain touches, 5 and
concludes, ‘ By his own nature he manifests himself; that
is the highest Person. 5 The words at the beginning of the
tale also, ‘The Self which is free from sin 5 (VIII, 7, 1),
make a promise regarding the released Self. And release
is a fruit in so far only as it is a cessation of all bondage,
not as implying the accession of something new. And with
reference to the assertion that manifestation is the origi¬
nation of something new we remark that it is so only with
regard to a former condition (which ceases to be), as when
we say of a convalescent person that he now manifests
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 4 . 407
himself free from sickness. Hence there is no room for
objections.
3. (The light into which the soul enters is) the
Self; owing to the subject-matter of the chapter.
But how can the soul be called ‘released/ considering
that the clause 4 having entered into the highest light ’
speaks of it as within the sphere of what is a mere effect ?
For the word 4 light/ according to general usage, denotes
physical light. And none who has not passed beyond the
sphere of what is effected can be released, it being known
that whatever is an effect is tainted with evil.—This objection
is without force, we reply ; because in the passage referred
to the word ‘light’ denotes the Self, in accordance with the
subject-matter of the chapter. For as such the highest
Self is introduced in the words, ‘The Self which is free from
sin, old age, death/ &c., and we therefore may not all at
once pass over to physical light; incurring thereby the fault
of abandoning the topic under discussion and introducing
a new one. Besides, the word 4 light ’ sometimes denotes
the Self, as e. g. in the passage, 4 That the gods meditate
on as the light of lights' (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 16). We have
discussed this at length under I, 3, 40.
4. (The released soul abides) in non-division
(from the highest Self); because that is seen from
scripture.
A doubt here arises whether that soul of which the text
says, 4 Having entered the highest light it manifests itself by
its true nature/ remains separate from the highest Self, or
abides in the state of non-division from it.—Somebody
might be inclined to think that—because in the passage, 4 He
moves about there,’ a distinction is made between the abode
and him who abides; and because the clause, 4 Having entered
the highest light/ mentions an agent and an object (of the
agent's activity)—the soul remains distinct from the highest
Self.—This view the Sutra sets aside. The released soul is
non-separate from the highest Self.—Why so?—Because
408
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
that is seen from scripture. For passages such as ‘ Thou
art that 5 (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7); ‘I am Brahman’ (B ri. Up. I,
4, 10); ‘Where he sees nothing else’ ( Kh . Up. VII, 24, 1);
‘ But there is then nothing second, nothing else different
that he could see ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 3, 23), show that the highest
Self abides in the state of non-division. And the fruit
must be assumed to correspond to the cognition, according
to what was explained under IV, 3, 15. And also such
passages as ‘Just as pure water poured into pure water
remains the same, thus, O Gautama, is the Self of a thinker
who knows ’ (Ka. Up. II, 4,15), whose object it is to describe
the nature of the released soul, declare that there is non¬
separation only. The same follows from the comparisons
(of the soul entering Brahman) to rivers falling into the
sea. Passages where separation (of abode and abiding
thing, &c.) is expressed, may be explained as, in a secondary
sense, expressing non-separation; so e. g. Kh. Up. VII.
24, 1, ‘ In what does the Infinite rest?—In its own great¬
ness;’ and Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2, ‘Loving the Self, playing
with the Self.’
5. By (a nature) like that of Brahman (the soul
manifests itself); (thus) Craimini (opines); on account
of reference and the rest.
It has been concluded that the clause, ‘ by its own nature,’
means that the soul manifests itself by its own Self only,
not by some other adventitious character. What has now
to be inquired into is the specific qualities of that nature.
Here the Sutra at first states the opinion of the teacher
Uaimini. According to him the soul’s own nature is ‘ like
that of Brahman,’ i.e. it comprises all the qualities beginning
with freeness from sin and concluding with truthfulness of
conception (i.e. the qualities enumerated in Kh. Up. VIII,
7, 1), and also omniscience and omnipotence; and in this
nature the soul manifests itself.—Why so ?—Because this is
known from reference 1 and the rest. For the reference
1 The commentators say that the ‘and the rest’ of the Sutra
comprises vidhi and vyapade^a, and give the following definitions.
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6.
409
to certain qualities made in VIII, 7, i, teaches that the
Selfhood of the Self is such (i.e. such as made up of those
qualities).—Again, the passage, £ He there moves about
eating, playing, rejoicing, 5 shows that the Self possesses
lordly power; so also the passage, £ For him there is free
movement in all worlds 5 ( Kh . Up. VIII, 1, 6).—And thus
also there is justification for such designations as ‘All¬
knowing ; all-powerful.’
6. By the sole nature of intelligence (the soul
manifests itself), as that is its Self; thus Au^ulomi
(opines).
Although the text enumerates different qualities, such as
freeness from sin, &c., these qualities rest only on fanciful
conceptions due to difference of words; for what the text
intimates is only absence in general of all qualities such as
sin and the rest. Intelligence alone constitutes the nature
of the Self, and hence it is proper to conclude that it mani¬
fests itself in a nature consisting of that only. This con¬
clusion will also agree with other scriptural texts, such as
B ri. Up. IV, 5, 13, ‘Thus this Self has neither inside nor
outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge.’—Qualities,
on the other hand, such as having true wishes, are indeed
mentioned by the text as real (positive) attributes, the
meaning being that his wishes are true, i.e. truly existent;
but all the same they, as depending on the connexion with
limiting adjuncts, cannot constitute the true nature of the
Upanyasa is the reference to something known (established else¬
where), which reference is made with a view to a vidhi, i. e. the
establishing of something not yet known (upanyaso namodde^a^ sa
X’a^nyatra ^atasya^nyavidhanayanuvada^). Thus here the qualities
—freeness from sin—are referred to as known, for the purpose of
establishing the vidhi, ‘ That it is which we must search out.’—The
passage, ‘ He there wanders about,’ &c., is a vidhi; for it teaches
what is not already known from elsewhere.—The mentioning of
such qualities as omniscience and omnipotence is vyapade^a, i.e.
simple expression of something known without reference to a
vidhi.
4io
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Self, as intelligence does. For all manifoldness of character
has to be denied of Brahman, as we have shown under
III, 2, ii. For the same reason the mention made of
eating and so on, means only the absence of all pain in
general, and aims at glorification, just as the passage about
‘loving the Self’ ( Kh . Up. VII, 25, 2). For love, play, and
the like cannot in their literal sense be ascribed to the action
of the Self, because they presuppose something second
(beyond the Self). Hence the soul manifests itself in the
nature of pure intelligence, free from all manifoldness, calm,
not capable of being expressed by any terms. This is the
view of the teacher Au^ulomi.
7. Thus also, on account of the existence of the
former (qualities), (admitted) owing to reference and
so on, there is absence of contradiction, (as) Badara-
yazza (thinks).
Thus also, i. e. although it be admitted that intelligence
only constitutes the true nature of the Self, also the former
nature, i.e. lordly power like that of Brahman, which is
intimated by reference and the rest, is—with a view to the
world of appearances—not rejected; and hence there is no
contradiction. This is the opinion of the teacher Badar&-
ya/za.
8. But by mere will (the released effect their
purposes) ; because scripture states that.
In the meditation on Brahman within the heart we read
as follows : ‘ If he desires the world of the fathers, by his
mere will the fathers rise,’ &c. (Kk. Up. VIII, 2,1).—A doubt
here presents itself whether the will alone is the cause of the
rising of the fathers, or the will joined with some other
operative cause.—The purvapakshin maintains that although
scripture says ‘ by his mere will,’ some other cause must be
supposed to co-operate, as in ordinary life. For as in our
ordinary experience the meeting with one’s father is caused
by one’s will, and, in addition, by the act of going and so
on, so it will be in the case of the released soul also; and
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, IO. 4 1 I
thus we do not assume something contrary to observation.
When the text says ‘ by his mere will, 5 it implies, as in the
case of a king, the whole apparatus of other easily pro¬
curable instrumental causes by which the desired object is
obtained. Besides, if the fathers and so on rose owing to
a mere wish, they would be of unstable nature, like the
imaginary representation of some desired object, and thus
not be able to procure any solid enjoyment.—To this we
reply that the rising of the fathers and so on is due to the
will only.—Why so ?—Because scripture declares this. If
any other cause were required, the direct scriptural state¬
ment c by his will only’ would thereby be contradicted.
And even if we admit some other cause accompanying the
act of will, it cannot be a cause to be realised by an effort;
for therefrom it would follow that before the realisation of
that cause the will would be barren. Nor can the analogies
of ordinary experience be applied to something to be learned
from scripture. For as the will of the released differs in
nature from the will of ordinary men, it may have the
power of effecting something that possesses as much
stability as the special purpose requires.
9. And for this very same reason (the released
soul is) without another lord.
For this very same reason, i. e. owing to the fact of the will
of the released person not being barren, he who knows has
no other lord over himself. For not even an ordinary person
when forming wishes will, if he can help it, wish himself to
be subject to another master. And scripture also declares
this when saying, ‘Those who depart from hence, after
having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them
there is freedom in all worlds ’ (. Kh . Up. VIII, 1 , 6).
10. The absence (of a body and sense-organs, on
the part of the released) Badari (asserts); for thus
scripture says.
The passage, ‘ By his mere wish the fathers rise, 5 shows
that the released possesses a mind (internal organ, manas)
whereby he wills. A question however arises whether he
412
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
who knows, after having reached lordly power, possesses
a body and senses, or not. Here the teacher Badari is of
opinion that the glorified possessor of knowledge is without
body and sense-organs.—Why so ?—Because scripture de¬
clares this, ‘ With the mind seeing those wishes he rejoices ’
(Kk. Up. VIII, 12, 5). If he rejoiced with the mind, the
body, and the senses, scripture would not specially say
4 with the mind.’ Hence there are neither body nor sense-
organs in the state of release.
11. The presence (of a body and senses) (Taimini
(asserts); because the text records option (of the
released person multiplying himself).
The teacher Uaimini is of opinion that the released
person possesses a body and sense-organs as well as a mind.
For passages like '* He is onefold, he is threefold 5 ( Kh . Up.
VII, 26, 2) declare that the Self has the option of manifold
existence which cannot be brought about without manifold¬
ness of body.—The capability of optionally multiplying one’s
self is, indeed, mentioned in the knowledge of plenitude
(bhuman) which refers to Brahman as devoid of qualities,
but this lordly power which is valid only for the qualified
state is there mentioned only in order to glorify the know¬
ledge of the (unqualified) plenitude; and it therefore presents
itself as constituting the fruit of qualified knowledge 1 .
12. For this reason Badaraya;/a (opines that the
released person is) of both kinds; as in the case of
the twelve days’ sacrifice.
The teacher Badaraya;^a, again, thinks that for this reason,
i.e. because scripture contains indications of both kinds, the
proper conclusion is that the released person exists in both
1 Manifoldness of the Self is mentioned in a vidya referring to
the highest Brahman; but its introduction there is not due to the
wish of teaching something about that state, but merely of, rhe¬
torically, glorifying it. We, therefore, are entitled to view that
passage as teaching something about him who possesses the lower
knowledge.
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 5.
413
conditions. When he wishes to have a body, he appears
with one ; when he wishes to be disembodied, he is without
one. For he has various wishes, and all his wishes are
realised.—‘As in the case of the twelve days 5 sacrifice. 5
As the soma sacrifice extending over twelve days may be
viewed either as a sattra or as an ahina sacrifice, because
both alternatives are indicated by scriptural passages 1 ; so
it is here also.
13. When there is no body, (the process) may
take place as in the dreaming state.
When there is no body and no sense-organs, the process
in the state of release may be viewed as analogous to that
in the state of dream, when objects wished, such as a father
and so on, have a perceptional existence only while body,
senses, and objects do not really exist.
14. When there is (a body), (it may be) as in the
waking state.
When, on the other hand, the released person has a body,
then the objects of his wishes—fathers and so on—may have
real existence, as in the waking state.
15. The entering (of one soul into several bodies)
is like (the multiplication of) the flame of a lamp;
for thus scripture declares.
Under Sutra 11 it has been shown that the released person
is embodied. The question now arises whether the bodies
which the released create for themselves when rendering
themselves threefold and so on are soulless like wooden
figures, or animated by souls like the bodies of us men.—
The purvapakshin maintains that as neither the soul nor
the manas can be divided they are joined with one body
only, while the other bodies are soulless.—To this the
Sutrakara replies,‘Like the flame of a lamp is their entering, 5
i. e. just as the one flame of a lamp can pass over into several
flames (lighted at the original flame), because it possesses
See Purva Mima^sa-suiras II, 3, 5th adhikarawa.
414
vedanta-sOtras.
the power of modifying itself, thus the soul of him who
know T s, although one only, multiplying itself through its
lordly power, enters into all those bodies. For scripture
declares that in this way one may become many, 4 He is
onefold, he is threefold, fivefold, sevenfold’ (Kh. Up. VII,
26, 2). And this is not possible, if we should accept the
simile of the wooden puppets, or the entering of other
souls into those additional bodies 1 . Nor again can there
be any motion on the part of bodies destitute of souls.—
Nor is there any force in the objection that, because the
Self and the Manas cannot be divided, they cannot be in
connexion with more than one body. For the Self, because
possessing the quality of having true wishes (i. e. wishes
which become real), may be supposed to create other bodies
with internal organs, conformable to the original one organ ;
and, the Self dividing itself through the division of its
limiting adjuncts, it may be possible to give a soul to each
created body. This is the topic which the books on Yoga
treat, in the chapters explaining the connexion of one soul
with several bodies.—But how can lordly power, enabling
the released soul to enter into several bodies, be admitted,
if we consider that different scriptural texts declare that
the soul in that state has not any specific cognition? so e.g.
4 Whereby should he know another? 5 4 For there is then
no second, nothing else different from him that he could
know; 5 4 An ocean is that one seer, without any duality ’
(B ri. Up. II, 4, 14; IV, 3, 30 ; 32).
To this objection the next Sutra replies.
16. (What scripture says about absence of all
specific cognition) refers either to deep sleep or
union (release); for this is manifested (by the texts).
By 4 entering into one’s own Self’ is meant dreamless
1 I. e. the scriptural statement about one Self rendering itself
manifold can neither be reconciled with the hypothesis of the other
bodies being moved by the one soul as puppets are moved by one
person through strings, nor with the hypothesis of a new separate
soul entering each new body.
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I 7.
415
sleep ; according to the text, c He is gone to his own Self,
he sleeps they say’ (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1). 'Union 5 means
blissful isolation (final release), according to the text, 'Being
Brahman he goes to Brahman ’ (B ri. Up. IV, 4, 6). What
the texts say about absence of specific cognition is said
with reference to either of those two states, dreamless sleep
or final release.—How do we know this?—Because this is
4 manifest/ owing to the fact that those two states form the
topic there (where absence of all cognition is mentioned).
Compare the passages/Having risen from out of these ele¬
ments it perishes again after them. Having departed there
is no more knowledge / ‘ But where the Self only is all this; ’
4 Where when asleep he desires no more desires, and dreams
no more dreams’ (B ri. Up. II, 4, 12 ; IV, 5, 15 ; IV, 3, 19).
—Those passages, on the other hand, which describe lordly
power refer to an altogether different condition, which—
like the heavenly world and so on—is an abode where
qualified knowledge produces its results.—Thus there is no
contradiction.
17. With the exception of world-business (the
released possess all lordly power), (the Lord) being
the topic (where world-business is referred to), and
(the souls) not being near (to such business).
The following doubt here presents itself. Do those who
through meditations on the qualified Brahman enter,
together with their manas, into a condition of equality with
the Lord, possess unlimited lordly power, or power limited
to some extent ?—The purvapakshin maintains that their
power must be unlimited, because we meet with texts such
as 'He obtains Self-lordship’ (Taitt. Sa/;zh. I, 6, 2); ‘All
the gods bring an offering for him ’ (Taitt. Sa^h. I, 5, 3) ;
4 For them there is freedom in all worlds ’ ( Kh . Up. VIII,
1, 6).—To this the Sutra replies, 'Excepting the world-
business.’ With the exception of the origination and so on
of the world all other lordly powers, as e. g. rendering one’s
self of atomic size, must belong to the released. The world-
business, on the other hand, can belong to the everlastingly
416
VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.
perfect Lord only. —Why so?—Because there (where the
origination and so on of the world are referred to) the
Lord forms the general topic, and because the other (souls)
do not stand near (to the world-business). The highest
Lord only is appointed to do all work referring to the
entire world ; for the world’s origination and so on are
taught only where he constitutes the general subject-matter,
and moreover he (only) is eternal; and described in scripture
(as the creator; &c. of the world) 1 . The lordly power of
the other souls, on the contrary, scripture shows to have
a beginning, because it depends on their searching for and
striving to know the Lord. They are therefore remote
from all world-business. And just because they have
minds, they might be of different minds, and one might
have the intention of preserving the world while another
might wish to destroy it. Such conflicts can only be
avoided by assuming that the wishes of one should conform
to those of another, and from this it follows that all other
souls (but the Lord) depend on the highest Lord.
18. (Should it be said that the souls must possess
unlimited power) on account of manifest teaching ;
we reply No, because scripture states him who,
entrusted with office, abides in the spheres (of the
sun and so on), (to be that one on whom the soul’s
obtaining lordly power depends).
It remains to refute the remark, made by the purvapa-
kshin, that absolute power on the part of those who know
must be inferred from texts directly asserting such power,
as e. g. ‘ He obtains self-lordship.’ — This refutation the
above Sutra undertakes. Scripture declares that the ob-
tainment of rulership on the soul’s part, depends on the
1 Ki/ft ka paraisyaiva nityatvena svahetvanapeksha/zasya k/zpta-
jaktitva^agatsar^anaflz prati kalpyasamarthyai ka. vidusham Lvara-
vishayaiva ^agatsnsh/ir esh/avya, ki m ka paurvaparyalo/£anayam
uvarasyaiva ^agatsarga^ sabdad gamyate ^anm&disutram arabhya
£aitad upapaditam. An. Gi.
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 20 .
417
highest Lord who, as entrusted with definite offices, abides
in certain definite abodes, such as the sphere of the sun, &c.
This is shown by the text going on to say (after the clause
quoted above), 4 He obtains the lord of Mind/ For that
means that he obtains the lord known to be the lord of all
minds. In accordance herewith the text later on says that
he becomes lord of speech, lord of the eye, lord of the ear,
lord of understanding.—Similarly in other passages also the
lordly power of the other souls has to be viewed, according
to circumstances, as depending on the eternally perfect
Lord.
19. And (there is also a form of the highest Lord)
not abiding in effected things ; for thus scripture
declares his abiding.
Moreover, according to scripture, there is also an eternal
form of the highest Lord which does not abide in effects ;
he is not only the ruling soul of the spheres of the sun and
so on which lie within the sphere of what is effected. For
the text declares his abiding in a twofold form, as follows:
‘ Such is the greatness of it ; greater than it is the Person.
One foot of him are all beings ; three feet of him is what is
immortal in heaven 5 ( Kh . Up. Ill, 12, 6 ). And it cannot
be maintained that that form of him which is divorced from
all effects is reached by those who put their trust on his
other form ; for their minds are not set on the former.
Hence as he who does not reach that form of the double-
natured highest Lord which is divorced from all qualities
stops at that form which is distinguished by qualities, so
also, unable to reach unlimited power within the latter
form, he stops at limited lordly power.
20. And thus perception and inference show.
Scripture and Smrz’ti both declare that the highest light
does not abide within effected things, 4 The sun does not
shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings,
and much less this fire 5 (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10). 4 The sun
does not illume it, nor the moon, nor fire 5 (Bha. Gita XV, 6).
—The Sutra is meant to show that the non-abiding of the
[38] e e
4 i8
VEDANTA-stjTRAS.
highest light within effected things is a well-known cir¬
cumstance.
21. And on account of the indications of equality
of enjoyment only.
The lordly power of those who take their stand on the
effected Brahman is not absolute, for that reason also that
scripture teaches that their enjoyment only is equal to that
of the eternally perfect Lord. For scripture contains state¬
ments and indications of the difference (of the Lord and the
released soul); compare ‘To him he says, Water indeed is
enjoyed 1 (by me); that world (is to be enjoyed by thee
also)’ (Kau. Up. I, 7); 4 As all beings honour that deity, so
do all beings honour him who knows that ’ (B ri. Up. I,
5, 20) ; £ He obtains through it equality (in body) and
sameness of abode with that deity’ (B ri. Up. I, 5, 23). But
from the circumstance of the lordly power of the released
souls not being absolute it follows that it comes to an end,
and then they will have to return from the world of
Brahman !—To this objection the reverend Badaraya;/a
replies in the following Sutra.
22. (Of them) there is non-return, according to
scripture ; non-return, according to scripture.
Those who, in following the road of the gods, to which
the vein and the ray are leading, and on which light is the
first stage, reach the world of Brahman as described by
scripture—where ‘ there are the two lakes Ara and Aya in
the world of Brahman, in the third heaven from hence,’ and
where ‘ there is the lake Airammadiya and the Aivattha
tree showering down Soma, and the city of Brahman
Apara^ita and the golden hall built by Prabhu ’ ( Kh .
Up. VIII, 5, 3) — and set forth at length in mantras,
1 All the commentators explain the reading ‘ nnyante/—An. Gi.
says—ta m brahmalokagatam upasaka^z hirawyagarbha^ svasamipam
upagatazra sanunayam aha maya khalv apa evamrftamayyo miyante
dmyante bhugyante tavapy asav amrftarupodakalaksha/zo loko
bhogyo yathasukhaw bhu^yatam.
IV ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2.
419
arthavadas, and so on; those, we say, who reach that world
do not return from there after having finished the enjoyment
of their deeds ; as those do who have gone to the world of
the moon and other places.—Why so ?—Because scriptural
passages teach that they do not so return. Compare
c Moving upwards by it he reaches the immortal ’ ( Kh .
Up. VIII, 6, 6); 4 For them there is no return’ (Bn.
Up. VI, 2, 15); 4 Those who proceed on that path do not
return to the life of man’ (.Kh . Up. IV, 15, 6); ‘He
reaches the world of Brahman and does not return ’
( Kh . Up. VIII, 15, 1). That the finality of their lordly
power does not imply their return to the life of man, we
have shown under IV, 3, 10. It is a settled matter that
those who through perfect knowledge have dispelled all
mental darkness and are devoted to the eternally perfect
Nirvana do not return. And as those also who rely on the
knowledge of the qualified Brahman in the end have
recourse to that (Nirvana), it follows that they also do not
return.—The repetition of the words, ‘Non-return, accord¬
ing to scripture,’ indicates the conclusion of this body of
doctrine.
e e 2
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